

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] WHO ACCOMPANIED [REDACTED] TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

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This is a statement relating to incidents happening to me on or about October 1962 concerning the Cuban crisis. It happened in the morning, I'm not sure of the date, but I was called up early in the morning to the Director's office on 10 minutes' notice and was given \$50 for expenses and told to escort [REDACTED] to New York. I then went into the office of the Director, Mr. Lundahl, who had some (briefing) boards in a briefcase; [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] told him he wanted some boards to go to New York, and Mr. Lundahl explained that we were raping him taking his boards away from him because he had been giving quite a few briefings on these boards. So we left the Steuart Building and immediately went to National Airport where we were met by Mr. Ray Cline; [REDACTED]

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and soon took off. As soon as the plane became airborne Mr. Cline stated that he would like to look the boards over while we were in flight. So I opened up the case, and we carefully spread the boards along the aisle while he and [REDACTED] went over them. These were all boards made up on the different sites that had been picked up in Cuba. On arriving in New York we were met by two gentlemen whose names I can't recall, and we were placed in automobiles and soon arrived at the office of Adlai Stevenson. On arriving at the office we were called into the inner office and met by two gentlemen who evidently were on his staff. Their first reaction was that they hoped that we were in a position to prove or had positive proof of these sites in Cuba. They seemed to be quite upset over the situation.

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They said that all the ambassadors were upstairs waiting for these boards, and they would like to look at them. [REDACTED] then told me that we'd have to remove the codewords on the bottom and top of the boards; we only had about 10 minutes to do this and it was a very rush operation. So the

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codewords were covered by masking tape so that the words would not show through. As I completed each one, they were taken upstairs and placed on tables - several tables in fact - and strewed all over the area so that the ambassadors from Latin American countries could have a good view of them. When I finished covering up the codewords I went upstairs, and I noticed that Roger Hillsman was up there briefing the various ambassadors; they all seemed to have quite a few questions. They seemed very impressed with what they saw on the boards. [redacted] and Mr. Cline were there also. The boards were arranged in such a position so they could see how the buildup of the sites was being accomplished. Because they were so clear no one needed to be a PI to understand the situation. Mr. Hillsman briefed them in turn, answered all the various questions, and seemed to be doing a very good job. It impressed them very much. After the boards had been reviewed by all concerned I gathered them up and took them back to Mr. Stevenson's office. About that time we were very hungry, and [redacted] pulled out a diapidated ham sandwich and began eating it there on the couch which seemed quite humorous to me. Of course, I was without a sandwich at the time, but nobody seemed to care about us as far as eating was concerned. Mr. Cline then called [redacted] into the office, and I accompanied him in with some boards. [redacted] Mr. Cline, and two or three men of Mr. Stevenson's staff sat around the table and began to go over his speech. Mr. Cline had several papers there that he was going over, and they were making various corrections and also referring to the boards. At that time I was instructed to remove some arrows from one of the boards that seemed to be indicating some site they were not sure of, and Mr. Cline then informed them he would get some low-level photography of these sites. He then called

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Washington and talked to the Director. At that time it was about 7:00 p.m., and I was told to return with the boards; they kept a few out in New York, and I returned to Washington arriving around 11:00 at night.

STATEMENT BY [REDACTED] REGARDING HIS EXPERIENCES IN NEW YORK

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I'll start this discussion, to the best of my memory, about one day that I went to New York to assist [REDACTED] during the Cuban Missile Crisis. [REDACTED] (speaking) I forget just which day it was, although

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[REDACTED] had gone up to the UN the day before, or possibly two days before, to take some boards and brief Adlai Stevenson and the rest of the staff up there. He had expected to go for only one day when he initially went, but he ended up going for actually a number of days. He called down the morning that I went up. There were more boards to be taken up to show him, and he also needed a couple of clean shirts and some underwear. As I said, when he first went, he hadn't expected to stay overnight. In the

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middle of the morning, while I was working the day shift, [REDACTED] came and told me, "... go get on a shuttle; you're going up with [REDACTED] (one of the couriers)..." to take the shuttle up to New York to deliver some

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material and stand by while [REDACTED] gives a briefing and to update [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] on what had been found during the previous 24 hours or so. Well, I don't recall just how many boards there were in that package; there were a good number of them. As I remember, there were a number of these boards that showed the negation coverage and first observed coverage of the SS-4 and SS-5 sites. It was quite a large, a pretty good bundle as I recall, fairly heavy - one of the big black briefcases. We went up there, took a cab to the American Legation across the street from the UN, and went to one of the upper floors to brief some of the staff. I met [REDACTED] there. He was speaking to some of the staff, and Mr. McCloy was there. He had just been returned from Europe or some place I believe, I'm not sure on that part, but

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we were briefing him; he was being brought in as a special advisor for President Kennedy to handle some of the discussions between the Russians and ourselves, I believe. We briefed him for a while, and then they set up a special briefing that we were there for with the non-aligned nations, the legations and the staffs of the non-aligned nations. This was given on the top floor, in a large auditorium of the American offices across the street from the UN, and it was given on the afternoon that I went up there; it would have been approximately a few hours before [redacted] assisted Adlai

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Stevenson in his presentation at the full UN. I don't know if it was a full UN or the Security Council. Actually, I guess it was the Security Council that they were presenting this for. We had all these boards that were presented in this large room. It would be my guess that there were 60 or 70 people that we were briefing, most of them Asiatics and Negroes from non-aligned nations in Africa and in Southeast Asia; there must have been a couple from down there. It was interesting that each time [redacted]

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gave a part of the briefing in English, he had the boards there, phrases would have to be translated into French as some of the people did not speak English. There was quite a bit of interest on the part of these people, although as I recall from the questions, they were very non-committal; they were looking at the pictures afterwards - we had them all laid out on tables and answered questions specifically as to what was there and what wasn't there, clarifying things - but none of them really at this point had anything at all to say indicating whether they believed or disbelieved or if they had any opinions at all. The boards were left up there at that time with [redacted]

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[redacted] and he stayed on for another couple of days; as I said before, later that evening he assisted Adlai Stevenson in his presentation, and this is the

one at which he was photographed. I believe it was in the New York Times. There seemed to be quite a bit of interest. Security was somewhat involved at this time. I was very specifically told to stay away from the UN building, not to be seen across the street; I could not possibly attend the sessions over there as I was an overt Agency employee, and they didn't want to have this connected at all. [] it seems was in a different category, being DIA and military he was just presented as a Pentagon representative rather than having anything at all to do with the Agency or NPIC as such. So [] and I took the plane back later that night. There was also discussion going on at this time about getting materials together, and what materials would be needed, for an Indian military officer - I remember a colonel or someone like that - who was going to be head of an inspection team that was going down to Cuba to inspect the sites; this was in the initial stages of the planning but never came to pass, although there were a number of books put together - black books so to speak - of the area of the sites complete with maps, locations of equipment, missiles, and completed buildings. Now this, as I recall it, was going on before the fact of the actual Soviet dismantling. This was within a couple of days, or very close to it, after President Kennedy made the public statements and set up the blockade. In fact it was probably, I'm a little hazy here, a bit before the first intercept of the ship. As I recall, the construction continued for a number of days after Kennedy's speech, and it wasn't until toward the end of the week that they actually saw any signs of stopping construction. That's just about it, what I can recall about that day; you can get the actual date from newspapers. I don't recall whether it was a Tuesday or Wednesday; it was in the middle of the week sometime. I came to work but certainly wasn't ready to go to New

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York, neither dressed nor prepared, knew nothing about it, but that's the way things were going at that time. Everybody was playing everything by ear.

Printed Sources

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DINAR CHESS RUFF

[redacted] Summary of NPIC's Role in Cuban Crisis. Draft. 30 August 1966. TOP SECRET

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McNamara, Robert S. Department of Defense Special Cuba Briefing. February 6, 1963, U.S. Department of State Auditorium.

1. Details on October 15: This was day when U-2 film of San Cristobal inspected and offensive missile sites found. What does U-2 film look like?

The high-altitude film, of course, was specially designed for the U-2 camera.

"The camera is loaded with two films, each of which was 24 cm. wide and about 2,000 m. long. The films were placed parallel to the focal plane of the camera so that during each action of the shutter two films were exposed with the total size of 45 x 45 cm. The supply of film in the camera made it possible to receive about 4,000 paired aerial pictures, i.e., to photograph in the course of the flight of May 1, 1960, a route of about 3,500 km."

"The film which was on the Lockheed U-2 aircraft possessed high sensitivity and could ensure aerial photography throughout the day. It was of a special grade designed for aerial surveys from high altitude. Compared with the film used in American spy balloons of the 1956 model, the given grade has been improved for a number of specifications essential for high altitude aerial photographic reconnaissance of military, industrial and topographic objects."

(Powers, 1960, p. 85-86)

"The photographs come in 4,000 paired frames, each slightly overlapping the other to produce a stereoscopic effect. The definition is remarkable. Photo interpreters studying the developed and greatly enlarged pictures can without much difficulty make out a newspaper headline eight or ten miles below."

(Abel, 1966, p. 21-22)

TYPE 3401
(June, 1966)

KODAK PLUS-X

Aerial Film, Type 3401 (ESTAR Thin Base)

(Formerly Type SO-102)

Medium-speed, thin-base, high-altitude reconnaissance film

BASE: 2.5-mil ESTAR polyester with dyed gel backing

SENSITIVITY: Panchromatic, with extended red sensitivity

RMS GRANULARITY VALUE: 35 (Developed in KODAK Developer D-19 for 8 minutes at 68 F and read at a net density of 1.0)

RESOLVING POWER: 105 lines/mm at T.O.C. 1000:1 (D-19)
40 lines/mm at T.O.C. 1.6:1 (D-19)


SAFELIGHT: *Total darkness required.* A KODAK Safelight Filter, WRATTEN Series 3 (dark green), in a suitable safelight lamp with a 15-watt bulb can be used at not less than 4 feet for *only* a few seconds after development is half completed.

AERIAL EXPOSURE INDEX: Daylight—64
(Based on normal development of 8 minutes at 68 F in D-19)


FILTER FACTORS:

WRATTEN Filter	No. 12	No. 25
Factor	2.0	4.0


SPECTRAL SENSITIVITY
D-19
D = 1.0 above gross fog





MODULATION TRANSFER CURVE



RECIPROCITY CHARACTERISTICS
D-19
D = 1.0 above gross fog




SENSITOMETRIC CURVES



TIME-GAMMA CURVES

Illuminant: Daylight



EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY • ROCHESTER, N. Y. 14650

Department GS

Section 19 — Data Sheets

6-66 Minor Revision

L-IPS-Bd

KODAK Publication No. M-118-B

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1a. How is it processed and analysed?

As soon as these missions returned to the U.S., the film was removed from the U-2 and rushed by waiting aircraft to the processing site. Here the film was developed under the most rigid quality and security controls around the clock by personnel of the highest caliber. The film was edited by NPIC personnel and then titled according to set procedures. Duplicate positives were produced for immediate shipment to NPIC where the film was exploited as soon as received. Constant liaison was required by the NPIC Operations Officer with the collector and the processing site in order that scheduling information was constantly available to Center components so that exploitation teams could be formed to produce the Immediate Photo Interpretation Report or IPIR. They consisted of PIs, collateral support specialists, editors, and graphics personnel. PI teams consisting of Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA PIs were organized. A coordinator for each mission was designated who was responsible for the actual IPIR production. Since the PI readouts were recorded on IBM cards it was possible, by means of the IBM EAM equipment, to produce "Target Briefs," which chronologically recorded the information from all previous coverage for use by the PIs. Target packets were prepared, which contained the target briefs, maps, and selected intelligence from other sources. The flight track was plotted on maps, and a preliminary list of targets possibly covered was prepared. COMOR targets were exploited first, but then all of the film was scanned in detail for any indication of offensive weapons. The PI's analysis was recorded on target work sheets which were preprinted with the COMOR target number, target location, name, and coordinates. After editing, the sheets were turned over to the coordinator for approval. After this, they were passed on to the key

punch operators who prepared IEM cards and verified them. The IEM cards were then sorted in a predetermined arrangement by subject categories such as missiles, airfields, naval activity, etc. After all work sheets were completed a proof run was produced which was checked by the coordinator, editor, and Operations Officer. After final approval, corrections were made as required on the applicable IEM cards, and the final version of the IPIR was run on the IEM tabulator or multilith mats. These were printed, assembled, and bound for dissemination early the next morning. The IEM cards were then processed through a card-to-tape converter, and a 5-channel teletype tape was produced which could be run directly on the communications equipment without retyping. (This avoided time-consuming punching of tape, proofing, and errors.)


1966. p. 1-3)

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lb. What kind of magnifying and stereoscopic equipment is used?


The types of photographic viewing equipment used during the crisis period consisted of: various hand-held tube magnifiers ranging in magnification from 7 to 30 power; fixed stereoscopes with magnification of 2.4 or 7 power; zoom stereo microscopes with magnification range of from 10 to 60 power; and roll film viewing tables with built-in light source. (Photos attached)

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
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


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lc. How many photo interpreters were employed on this day and subsequently? (I understand PIs were brought in for this task; if so, how many and from where?)

Six PIs, three teams of two each, worked on the initial mission readout; additional teams of specialists consisting of four PIs representing CIA, Army, Navy, and Air Force were used to support the initial readout. Approximately 60 PIs were brought into the effort two days after the initial identification.

No other PIs were brought into the building. Most, but not all, available NPIC PIs were used during the crisis. (CSD personal experience)

ld. Did work go on all Monday night?

Yes. It was necessary to work throughout the night on scanning, analysis, and report preparation so that senior Government officials could have as many pertinent intelligence facts as could be gleaned from available photography.

(CSD personal experience)

le. Was this a 24 hour operation throughout?

Essentially yes. There was a three-day period of normal work days (8 hours) for decision making between the initial identification and the receipt of additional film for exploitation.

(CSD personal experience)

lf. Where and when did anyone sleep?

Folding cots, bed gear, etc., were procured from the Agency's depot and placed throughout the Center. These were used by personnel who worked late in the evening. It soon became apparent, however, that shift scheduling was necessary, and two overlapping 12-hour shifts were required. (CSD personal experience)

lg. How did you eat?

There was no restaurant or cafeteria in the building where the analysis was being performed, and getting food represented a particular problem during the wee hours of the night. When possible some analysts got sandwiches and coffee at a nearby all-night diner. This was supplemented by an occasional hot pizza obtained from a closeby Italian restaurant. Many men, however, brought their dinners from home, while others shared sandwiches made from groceries purchased locally. (CSD personal experience)

lh. What kinds of explanations were necessary for families?

Since most of the PIs and other specialists had long been in the intelligence game, their families were thoroughly used to the long and odd hours involved, hence no explanations were necessary. The families, however, certainly knew that their fathers were involved in the intelligence crisis at hand. (CSD personal experience)

- li. One report says a PI was looking at film when he said, "Hey, look at this," and pointed out four MRBM launchers. Then the three other sites were found. Is this true? Can you reconstruct the moments when the sites were detected; what was said, reactions, etc.?

False, as indicated before, the photo interpreters were well acquainted with SA-2 equipment and, of course, this included the SA-2 transporters. When the photo interpreters first observed the transporters parked along a line of trees they knew they were not of the SA-2 variety. After performing crude mensuration, precise mensuration was called for. The transporters were covered with canvas and precise identification of the missile system was difficult. The two prime candidates considered were the SA-3 (Shyster) and the SS-4 (Sandal). The SS-3 with warhead is 67 feet long. The SS-4 without the warhead is approximately 67 feet. After precise mensuration, enlarged photo prints, and collateral including photos from the Moscow Military Parades were provided, the photo interpreters identified the missiles as being the SS-4's.

Once positive identification was made on the missile system then the PI efforts concentrated on the identification of the possible launch sites. These sites were identified later in the evening. Identification of the MRBM launch sites was made on finding four launchers/erectors.

(CSD personal experience)

October 15, 1962. Readout of [redacted]
Flown [redacted]

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On the morning of October 15, 1962, as established by NPIC procedures, a group of analysts consisting of six photo interpreters (three teams of two photo interpreters) and one collateral support analyst began the photo readout (immediate PI report-IPIR) of [redacted] which was flown over the Island of Cuba on [redacted]

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It was the responsibility of this group to report all known priority targets including anything new or unusual. The teams of PIs, each having much experience in the PI techniques as well as knowledge of functional (hardware) and geographic aspects of Cuba proceeded rapidly through the Mission. The targets that could be written directly were completed by the PIs working on the IPIR teams. So as not to delay the normal readout procedures, any target that required considerable analysis, such as unusual or unidentified targets, were normally tagged by appropriate category and relayed to back-up teams so that detail analysis could be performed. These back-up teams consisted of PIs having functional specialties such as missile, atomic energy, industries, etc. The Missile Back-up team consisted of a Joint Team of analysts; these were:

[redacted]

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Because of this mechanism, when the MRBM equipment was initially located and positive identification was not possible, it was relayed to the missile back-up team as "unidentified equipment-possibly missile related". From all outward appearances it was considered as probably SAM (surface-to-air) equipment.

Shortly after noon on the 15th the missile back-up team was given three items to check for missile connotations. One was confirmation of a new SAM site under construction; the second was an assortment of equipment and material that was identified as a field-deployed SAM support facility located at Pinar Del Rio; the third was another assortment of equipment located in the San Antonio de los Banos which later turned out to be San Cristobal MRBM activity. All three assignments were being worked on concurrently by the back-up team. Before the end of the normal work day tentative identification was completed.

As it turned out, the MRBM identification was based on quick photo measurements and was later confirmed without a doubt by experienced photogramatrists who worked diligently on high-precision measuring equipment and photo data. The results corroborated without a doubt the findings of the PI team. The PI process involved viewing duplicate positive film on light tables with the use of various pieces of optical equipment and then comparing these findings with known parameters of Soviet Medium and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile systems (MRBM and IRBM). The final determination and agreement on the findings was quite significant to the PI team, since there were no previous indications of shipment and deployment to Cuba, and all known Soviet MR and IRBM systems at that time were deployed only in the USSR.

The final identification by the team was reviewed with the Mission coordinator, who was and it was determined that the close coordi-
nation must be maintained; only the immediate Chiefs of Joint organizations participating were notified of the findings. Later that evening at 1900, when the completed measurements were available, the Director of NPIC was alerted and immediately met with the back-up team.

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Mr. Lundahl was given a complete briefing in the working area. He was shown stereograms and other photography. Knowing the importance of the identification together with the impact it would have on the upper echelons of the Government, Mr. Lundahl paced the floor and explained the importance of the find and why it was so extremely important that the information not be revealed to others. With this in mind he remarked, "Men, if I've ever wanted to be right in my life, now is when I want to be the rightest." He proceeded to review personally all available material. After gathering as much information and material as he could possibly get and considering all implications concerning the significance of the find, Mr. Lundahl made several calls to officials in DIA and CIA. At approximately 2100 representatives of DIA and CIA

[redacted] - DIA, and [redacted] - CIA) met

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with Mr. Lundahl and the PI team. These people received similar briefings. Each prepared notes and later met with or informed their respective Chiefs.

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Mr. Lundahl returned to his office to await the completion of the cable write-up, and the CIA and DIA representatives returned to their respective offices to inform their superiors. At this time, it was about 2230, the team found the only opportunity to get some food. The belated dinner was obtained at a local restaurant. As it turned out, the late dinner break was well placed because it gave the team members an opportunity to collect their thoughts and give the photo lab personnel needed time to prepare photographic enlargements and film duplicate positives for further study.

After returning from dinner and while waiting for the enlargements to arrive, the team started to scan the rolls of photography. They did not have prints nor sufficient material at that time--it was all being prepared in the lab. The team continued with their analysis. They drew up the cable and at that time were still not aware of the fact that they had a launch site. Somewhere

about 0100 or 0200 on the 16th, the enlargements arrived, and at the same time additional duplicate positive film and paper print enlargements were received. After new stereograms were made, the launch site identification began to unfold.

[redacted] commented that he had an unusual object that resembled an inverted STAT bathtub or whaleboat in appearance. The description seemed to create a humorous note to all. Several comments were passed on concerning allusions, etc., such as -- "don't tell me you have whaleboats in the middle of the island." A few minutes later another PI discovered a similar feature; then two more were discovered. It was further noted that each of them had a cable connecting it to other equipment. Having the pattern established, the team soon exclaimed almost simultaneously (and in unison) that they had an MRBM Launch Site with four probable erector/launchers. The site was arbitrarily named site Los Palacios after the nearest town. It was subsequently renamed as San Cristobal MRBM Site No. 1. Further search revealed another site.

In the process of preparing an alert cable, during a double-check on the location of the site, it was determined that the coordinates were in error. While the photography was being correlated with the maps, more equipment was located and, similarly, these turned out to be more launch sites.

Having completely scanned the photography in the San Cristobal area and since it was almost 0500, the team determined to stop the scan, consolidate all of the information, and prepare a cable for dissemination. This information was turned over to the Deputy Director (then [redacted]) STAT

By 0730 the team reported to their respective organizations and prepared to retire to their homes. Three analysts did leave the building, and [redacted] STAT

[redacted] was requested to brief Gen. Wheeler. The other analysts were called STAT

at their homes later in the day, but only one could be located, [redacted] STAT

[redacted] who was instructed to accompany other briefers in briefing some of the USIB committees. STAT

In recalling the whole story, the identification developed from a normal procedure of locating equipment and making the final determination as to proper missile system; then the systematic analytical cycle of deployment emerged from the middle of what appeared to be an indiscriminate dispersal of equipment.

This mission was of significance in many respects: one, it revealed without doubt the Soviet intentions in the establishment of offensive missile systems in close proximity to the US; two, it revealed the presence of SAM sites, soon to become operational, following the U-2 shoot down in China STAT
This was to be the last overland flight; follow-on missions were planned to be 35-50 nautical miles off shore. Had this been accomplished or if the sites were cloud covered this could have been a complete achievement of the Soviet master plan to force the US into major political concessions.

2. How were the various officials, Gen. Carroll, Gilpatric, Bundy, McNamara, etc., notified, and what was their reaction?

"The DDI was advised of the MRBM site at San Cristobal on the evening of 15 October 1962. A restricted dissemination memorandum was prepared for the DCI and DIA." [redacted] 1966, p.5)

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"...General Carter was the first to receive word of the San Cristobal discovery from the photo analysts of the National Photographic Interpretation Center. ...it was Carter who alerted General Carroll." (Abel, 1966, p. 80)

"...the hot-line telephone from the Pentagon rang: the time, a few minutes after seven o'clock... General Carroll...wanted Gilpatric to know that he had just seen something disturbing in the latest U-2 photographs from Cuba. ...two photo analysts walked into the bedroom...to show him photographs of a field, enclosed by woods near San Cristobal. Gilpatric's first reaction was that the United States and the Soviet Union stood at the beginning of a decisive confrontation. His second, that the President could not be expected to tolerate a Soviet missile base in Cuba." (Abel, 1966, p. 28-29)

"He (McGeorge Bundy) got the news at 8:30 p.m., also by telephone, from another CIA man, Deputy Director Ray Cline." (Abel, 1966, p. 30)

"'It was clear to me that we were in a major crisis,' Bundy recalls." (Abel, 1966, p. 31)

"The Director, NPIC, briefed senior CIA officials at 0730 on 16 Oct. 1962, and immediately thereafter accompanied the DDI to the White House where Mr. McGeorge Bundy and selected top officials were briefed." [redacted] 1966, p. 5-6)

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2a. It is said that CIA notified Bundy in "security parlance." What does this mean; can you give an example?

"He (McGeorge Bundy) got the news at 8:30 p.m., also by telephone, from another CIA man, Deputy Director Ray Cline." (Abel, 1966, p. 30)

"At eight o'clock, in his little basement office at the White House, Bundy met with an intelligence officer and two photo analysts. He studied the photographs and the accompanying intelligence report, then took the elevator to the Kennedy living quarters." (Abel, 1966, p. 43)

"Bundy allowed himself to interrupt. 'Mr. President,' he said, 'there is now hard photographic evidence, which you will see a little later, that the Russians have offensive missiles in Cuba.' There is no record of President Kennedy's immediate response. ...he (Kennedy) then directed Bundy to call an extraordinary meeting, in strictest secrecy, for 11:45 that morning." (Abel, 1966, p. 44)

"Later the DDCI and the Director, NPIC, briefed the President and the Excom ..." 1966, p. 6)

STAT

3. President Kennedy notified the morning of Oct. 16 in White House. Details of that meeting; were pictures shown and if not, why not; when did JFK first see the photos; what was his reaction?

"Bundy allowed himself to interrupt. 'Mr. President,' he said, 'there is now hard photographic evidence, which you will see a little later, that the Russians have offensive missiles in Cuba.' ...he (Kennedy) then directed Bundy to call an extraordinary meeting, in strictest secrecy, for 11:45 that morning." (Abel, 1966, p. 44)

"Later the DDCI and the Director, NPIC, briefed the President and the Excom..." 1966, p. 6)

STAT

3a. Bundy insisted on notifying the President that morning. What was his reaction when he saw the photographs?

"The President was having breakfast ... at 8:45 on Tuesday morning when Bundy brought the news. Kennedy asked at once about the nature of the evidence. As soon as he was convinced that it was conclusive, he said that the United States must bring the threat to an end: one way or another the missiles would have to be removed. He then directed Bundy to institute low-level photographic flights and to set up a meeting of top officials. Privately, he was furious: if Khrushchev could pull this after all his protestations and denials, how could he ever be trusted on anything"? (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 801-802)

3b. Who explained them to him and the President?

"At eight o'clock, in his little basement office at the White House, Bundy met with an intelligence officer and two photo-analysts." (Abel, 1966, p. 43)

"The Director, NPIC, briefed senior CIA officials at 0730 on 16 October 1962 and immediately thereafter accompanied the DDI to the White House where Mr. McGeorge Bundy and selected top officials were briefed. Later the DDCI and the Director, NPIC, briefed the President and the EXCOM (selected cabinet members and others)." 1966, p. 6)

STAT

3c. Kennedy ordered increase in U-2 overflights that morning. Details on these flights: how many, what duration, course, altitude, shooting color or black and white?

"As a result of the identifications made in the San Cristobal area, the President --- directed that high altitude aircraft survey the island completely..."

(ACDA study, 1963, p. 3)

"Thereafter, the number of missions increased dramatically ... all parts were covered ..." [redacted] 1966, p. 6)

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~~Color photography began with the institution of low level photography,~~

[redacted] (CSD comments)

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[redacted] Need information on course, altitude, duration.)

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- 3d. Was camouflage detection a problem at any time during this period; and if so, how was the problem surmounted.

Initially, the Soviets made some use of natural cover. Once the equipment was identified and located and low-level flights commenced, the Soviets employed rudimentary field camouflage and concealment practices. Tarpaulins and sheets of plastic camouflage materials were placed over key equipment components. Camouflage netting and cut vegetation were often used in an attempt to conceal vehicles and equipment. In several instances mud or paint was smeared across the canvas in order to break up the natural outline of cylindrically shaped missiles. The measures were employed in a "field expedient" basis and were not very effective. Repetitive photo coverage negated nearly all of this effort.
(CSD personal experience)

3e. Were we prepared for camouflage detection and if so, how?

Most of the personnel employed at the Center at this time had served in World War II and/or the Korean War and were familiar with the techniques employed by the Japanese, Koreans, Germans, and Chinese. Some of the individuals had participated in past war surveys, and others had prepared PI keys. The younger PIs had attended military photo interpretation schools where detection of camouflage and concealment was part of their training. (CSD personal experience)

3f. Were side-ranging or oblique photo missions flown as well as over-flights? If so, when and why?

For

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4. The U.S. Intelligence Board met from October 16 on to examine latest U-2 photos. Details on these meetings: who was PI expert, how did he conduct the sessions, were there questions, etc.?

"Beginning Tuesday afternoon and thereafter each morning at 8:30, the United States Intelligence Board met to examine the accumulation of U-2 photographs and to estimate the degree of danger. Inevitably a code name had to be invented. This time there were two: [] for the intelligence channel, [] for the policy channel. The Intelligence Board brought together around one table representatives of the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the State Department, and intelligence officers of the individual armed services. For the duration of the missiles crisis they met not in Langley, Virginia, at the CIA's enormous headquarters overlooking the George Washington Memorial Highway, but in one of the old red-brick buildings in Foggy Bottom which had been used during the war by the Office of Strategic Services and in its early years by the CIA itself. This put the [] within easy reach of the [] meeting at the State Department or in the White House.

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"That morning, the Intelligence Board produced its first estimate based on the intensified U-2 overflight discoveries." (Abel, 1966, p. 58-59)

Mr. Lundahl:

4a. How many sets of these Top Secret photographs were made?

As significant information was uncovered, graphics personnel would prepare detailed work orders which were sent to the Photo Lab where enlargements were produced to be used in the production of briefing boards as directed by the coordinator. In addition to these, many prints were made for use by the PIs for study and establishment of chronological evidence files. After the briefing boards were prepared they were photographed and enlarged for simultaneous dissemination to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA. Later, when DIA came into being, two original copies of all briefing boards were prepared and one was disseminated to the Director, DIA, at the same time that one was being taken to CIA Headquarters to brief the DCI. Photo copies were also provided the Military Services but priority was given to the two originals. Vugraphs were also made of these briefing boards, and about fifteen (15) copies were disseminated. All materials (IPIRs, briefing boards, vugraphs, etc.) had to be disseminated by about 0730 the morning after the film was received by NPIC. 1966, p. 3-4)

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4b. How were they kept track of?

They were controlled under a special control system named [redacted] (CSD personal experience)

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"Inevitably a code name had to be invented. This time there were two:

[redacted] for the intelligence channel, [redacted] for the policy channel." (Abel, 1966, p. 58)

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4c. Where were they kept when not being used?

In specially controlled repositories. (CSD personal experience)

4d. From October 14-22, McNamara told press that PI results were coming in almost hourly. Was PI work continuing around clock?

Yes

1966, p.6)

STAT

4e. Is such film inspected by more than one PI team?

Yes (CSD personal experience)

(See also question 1c)

4f. What constitutes a PI team?

Normally there were 3 two-man teams per mission. Support was provided as required by equipment specialists. One collateral support specialist was assigned to each team. (CSD personal experience)

4h. How were these results delivered to proper officials?

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An immediate report or IPIR was generated and relayed electronically.

In addition, graphic materials were made and presented. 1966, p.2-4)

An evaluated multisource report was also prepared. (CSD)

4i. Did President Kennedy get continuous briefings on new pictures?

Each meeting opened with McCone's intelligence briefing. (Abel, 1966, p.70)

4j. If so, where, by whom, and what was his reaction?

For ACL

5. The so-called photography gap. After SAM's found [redacted] some overflights flown, [redacted] What was photographed on those flights and where were they flown?

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"They had overflown Cuba on [redacted] without discovering anything beyond SAM sites, MIG fighter planes on various Cuban airfields, and Komar torpedo boats armed with short-range rockets. All but the [redacted] flight, however, had limited their photographic sweeps to that portion of Cuba lying east of Havana." (Abel, 1966, p. 25)

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"Specifically, the photography of [redacted] the last previous thorough coverage, shows no military activity at all on the sites at Guanajay, San Cristobal, Sagua la Grande, and Remedios.....

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"Flights were made on [redacted] [redacted] but with one exception these did not cover the areas where offensive missile sites were later found. The suspected cruise missile site at Banes, which was one target, was obscured by clouds on the [redacted] flight..... The [redacted] flight covered Sagua la Grande but found no evidence.....

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"The flight approved for [redacted] was canceled because of weather. It was flown on [redacted] but provided no results because of weather..... The [redacted] mission was targeted to look for SAM sites on the Isle of Pines and Bay of Pigs." (ACDA Study, The 1962 Soviet Arms Build-up in Cuba, p. 28-29)

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5a. A U-2 was shot down over China Sept. 9, and U-2s said to have been grounded until Sept. 15. True?

A Chinese Nationalist U-2 was shot down over China on 9 September.

(N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1962)

"There was at this point a brief stand-down because of the loss of a

[redacted]

The flight approved for

STAT

[redacted]

was cancelled because of weather. It was flown

[redacted]

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but proved no results because of weather, and had to be rescheduled."

(ACDA Study, 1963, p. 28-29)

"They had overflowed Cuba on

[redacted]

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without discovering anything beyond SAM sites, MIG fighter planes on various Cuban airfields, and Komar torpedo boats armed with short-range rockets. All

but the [redacted] flight, however, had limited their photographic sweeps to

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that portion of Cuba lying east of Havana. This was the result of a policy decision by the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) meeting in McGeorge Bundy's office at the White House on September 10. Although the committee's very existence was a closely guarded secret, the reason it met that Monday in September was splashed all over the front pages of the newspapers.

For the first time since Francis Gary Powers had been shot down over Russia on May 1, 1960, presumably the victim of a SAM such as the ones now being installed in western Cuba, another U-2, belonging to the Chinese Nationalists, had been destroyed in the air over the Chinese mainland on September 9. The astonishing speed of the SAM deployment west of Havana dictated a degree of caution. No man round the table in Bundy's office wanted to see another pilot lost or a fresh outcry raised round the world that might force the abandonment

of future U-2 flights, thus denying to the United States its most reliable source of information. COMOR quickly agreed that the U-2 flights must continue, but decided to alter the flight pattern. Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, suggested that instead of covering the whole island in a single flight (up one side of a line through the middle of the island, then back down the other), the flights should be shorter and more frequent, "dipping into" Cuban air space. By way of confusing the Cubans, Rusk also proposed a larger number of so-called peripheral flights that would peer into Cuba from beyond the three-mile limit.

"McCone returned from his wedding trip to discover that western Cuba had not been overflown for a month. He promptly suggested, at a special conference on October 4, that the whole island be photographed at once with special attention to its western end. McCone recalls that several days were lost while various, less risky, alternatives were examined--among them the possibility of sending remote-controlled drone planes or balloons over the areas where SAM's were most likely to be in or near operational condition. The administration's caution gave way when it became apparent that there was no ready substitute for the U-2. COMOR finally approved a flight plan on October 9, taking in an area of western Cuba beyond the range of the peripheral flights which had not been inspected from the air since September 5." (Abel, 1966, p. 25-26)

5b. Then there was the problem of cloud cover. On [redacted] decision was made to photograph San Cristobal, true?

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"This [redacted] flight, authorized by the President on the 9th of October, but delayed by bad weather, flew over the western end of the island in the Pinar Del Rio Province. When the photographic materials were returned to Washington for processing and analysis by photo interpreters, the beginning of a Soviet medium-range missile base was spotted in the San Cristobal area."

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[redacted] 1966, p. 5)

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"A memorandum of 3 October and a USIB recommendation dated 5 October requested priority coverage of suspected surface-to-surface (MRBM) areas in Cuba. The planes stood down [redacted] because authorization for October flights had not yet been granted, and on [redacted] because of weather. Transfer of responsibility for the flights precluded a mission

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on [redacted] (ACDA Study, 1963, p. 29)

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5c. But the flight did not occur until [redacted] why?

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"The planes stood down on [redacted] because authorization for October flights had not yet been granted, and on [redacted] because of weather. Transfer of responsibility for the flights precluded a mission on [redacted] (ACDA Study, 1963, p. 29)

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5d. Is weather a particular problem for high altitude photographic flights in tropical areas and if so, why?

Weather, of course, is always a critical factor in planning photo reconnaissance missions. This is why only tentative dates and hours for photographic missions can be scheduled. Heavy cloud formations between the taking aircraft and the ground, of course, negates the purpose of the mission.

"Despite the fact that there are local variations in climate due to location, altitude, and exposure, the climate of Cuba is generally tropical throughout. The persistent trade winds are the dominant weather factor, while tropical storms and hurricanes generally account for most of the weather extremes." (NIS 78, 1959, p. 23-1)

Cuba's weather can be categorized into a wet and dry season. The wet season extends from May through October. "The precipitation regime in this season has a very distinct pattern, with rainfall peaks at the beginning and end of the season at almost every station and only moderate amounts in midseason. The rainfall peaks fall most frequently in May or June and in September or October, although along the northern coast at the eastern end of the island the heaviest rainfall occurs in November. Average rainfall in the peak months is mostly 4 to 10 inches, although some localities have as much as 15 inches. Rainfall varies greatly from year to year and from place to place in Cuba. Heaviest amounts are usually recorded in western Cuba, on the Isle of Pines, and on the windward slopes of the eastern tip of Cuba. Tropical storm and hurricane activity reaches a maximum during this season, with more than one-half of all storms occurring during September and October.

The western part of the island in particular is frequently affected by the strong winds and torrential rainfall of these storms. Thunderstorm activity is also at a maximum in this season, although frequencies vary from place to place. Mean maximum temperatures are generally in the 80's or low 90's, with mean minimums mostly in the 60's or low 70's. There is little day-to-day variation. Relative humidity is high everywhere in the early morning, dropping to 50% to 70% in early afternoon; the variation from month to month and place to place is very small. Cloudiness is relatively uniform throughout the area, averaging generally from 3-tenths to 6-tenths, with largest amounts in the afternoons as the cumulus clouds build up."

(NIS 78, 1959, p. 23-7 - 23-8)

6. Some miscellaneous questions. What was the role of U-2 pictures in planning for air strikes against missile sites, if Russia refused to remove them?

The role of U-2 pictures in planning for any air strikes that might ensue was, of course, up to the military. They received copies of the films and of all briefing boards, and the U-2 photos played a major part in formulating detailed contingency plans. Their use would, of course, be twofold: 1) strategic - to determine overall intentions, strengths, and strategy; and 2) tactical - for up-to-minute information on troop movement, deployment, degree of activity, etc. Target materials had been prepared on the sites from U-2 photography. (CSD Comments)

6a. Is there any truth to story that SAM's were first discovered when a PI saw what looked like a moving shadow and found that it was a revolving radar antenna? Details?

False. The photo interpreters were knowledgeable of Soviet practices in setting up SAM sites. The Cuban sites had the conventional six launch positions encircling a central guidance area and were in most part of the "Star of David" pattern. Personnel tents and missile support equipment were situated nearby. (CSD Comments) (See Briefing Vugraph #63)

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6b. What was the reaction of the ExComm when first shown U-2 photos?

"That first Tuesday session was dominated by somber reflections concerning the nature of the challenge from Moscow. Everyone round the table understood that a precipitate response might aggravate the situation, perhaps irreparably, but that to do nothing about the missiles in Cuba could be more dangerous still.

"The first reading was that Khrushchev, after fifteen months of talk about forcing a Berlin settlement on his own terms, was about to act. As soon as the American elections were past, he would probably go to the United Nations General Assembly, unveil his rocket batteries in Cuba and put his proposition: let the Western powers get out of Berlin in exchange for the removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba. An alternative theory, rejecting the analogy between Cuba and Berlin, was that Khrushchev might be preparing to trade off the Cuban missiles for the American Jupiters based in Turkey and Italy. Llewellyn Thompson's immediate reaction, like Bohlen's, was to blame himself for having misread the portents. "I just didn't believe the Russians would do it," he recalls. "They had never trusted their own satellites with missiles. Though once the missiles were there my immediate reaction was to relate it to Khrushchev's repeated assurances that he would do nothing about Berlin until after our election. I figured he was planning to come to the U.N. with those blue chips in his pocket.

"Either way, whether the Russian goal was to incorporate Berlin into East Germany or to force the Jupiter bases out of Europe, the alternatives for the United States were ugly. If the President did nothing, the Soviets

would certainly succeed in exposing the hollowness of the Monroe Doctrine and the Rio Treaty, indeed of all United States treaty commitments to use its great power in defense of smaller nations anywhere. "To the Latins, Khrushchev would have looked like a winner," one State Department official said. Douglas Dillon recalls: "The first reaction of the President and the others, in full agreement, was that we simply could not accept the fact of Soviet missiles in Cuba trained on the United States. Everyone round the table recognized that we were in a major crisis. We didn't know, that day, if the country would come through it with Washington intact."

(Abel, 1966, p. 47-48)

6c. Were they shown subsequent photos throughout the week?

Yes. (CSD)

6e. Did U-2 flights continue after Oct. 24 when low level recon flights began?

Yes. Low-level flights began on (CSD)

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"The restrictions on low altitude reconnaissance were removed following the President's speech on 22 October, and intensive coverage of the missile sites and other installations was begun, using reconnaissance versions of the Navy F8-6 and the Air Force RF-101. (ACDA Study, 1963. p. 35)

6f. A total of about 2,000 photo missions is given for that period. Right?

"During the period [redacted] 73 high-altitude
missions were flown and 152 low-level missions." [redacted] 1966, p. 7)

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6g. If so, how many of those were U-2s, how many low level?

"... [redacted] high-altitude missions were flown and [redacted] low-level...."

STAT

[redacted] 1966. p.7)

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6h. Did a PI expert go to the United Nations to explain the photos to U Thant and/or the other ambassadors?

See Statements of [redacted]

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Yes, [redacted] was chosen to assist Adlai Stevenson in briefing the U.N. Security Council. [redacted] was presented by Mr. Stevenson as his military assistant. Photography was displayed in the American Legation and [redacted] described the details in the photography to ambassadors and military aides at the U.N. (CSD and [redacted] who accompanied [redacted] (Time Magazine, 2 Nov. 1962).

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We do not know if U Thant was briefed by [redacted] but we remember making a photo handbook that was seen by Indian Brigadier General Indar Jit Rikhye who was U Thant's military aide. (CSD)

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"Mr. Thant will take with him a party of about 30 headed by Brig. Indar Jit Rikhye of the Indian Army, his military adviser; Omar Loutfi of the United Arab Republic, Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs, and Dr. Hernane Tavares de Sa of Brazil, Under Secretary for Public Information.

"Others will include the Acting Secretary General's military aide, Major Yilma Alemi of Ethiopia, and Lieut. Col. Dag Stiernspetz of Sweden, the principal military adviser to the Swedish delegation to the United Nations, and a number of secretaries and translators.

"Ramses Nassif of the United Nations Department of Public Information also will be in the party.

"A United Nations spokesman said that Mr. Thant was going as a guest of the Cuban Government and that he had no authority to invite correspondents at the United Nations to accompany him.

"Mr. Thant and Brigadier Rikhye have discussed the composition of the observer group with Mr. Stevenson and other United States officials. But they have reserved final decisions on most countries, pending detailed discussions with Soviet and Cuban representatives." (New York Times, October 30, 1962).

6i. Is the story true that U Thant was skeptical until shown a closeup of a Soviet rocket outfit insignia in flowers or painted rocks at one of the sites? Details?

False. There were no insignas displayed at the missile sites. They were, however, military insignas displayed at the military camps.

"In addition to the deployment of the modern weapons in Cuba, the Soviet Garrison Commanders, like any good garrison commander, had, in flagstone and flowers, inplanted in front of their garrison areas, and these are recently completed barracks buildings, the insigna or symbol of the Soviet Units. Here is the symbol of the Armored Forces, the symbol of the Infantry Forces, the Infantry leaf and the particular unit has been awarded the equivalent of The Presidential Citation, the Elite Guards Badge."

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6j. How much film was the Photo Center coping with every day from U-2s and low level flights?

No information

STAT

6k. Details on photo reconnaissance missions of the dismantling and re-turning home of missiles: what kind of planes used, how many flights, and misadventures, what was reaction of Russian ship crews, were photos made at sea, at the sites, at docks or all of these?

During the dismantlement and withdrawal phase of the crisis, the types of aircraft used were as follows: U-2 and low-altitude photo planes, land-based Navy patrol planes, and ship-borne helicopters. The number of commands involved precludes an exact count of the number of sorties.

On November 1, it was apparent that the Soviets were dismantling the sites, and equipment began moving to a number of ports. These ports were

kept under close surveillance. Totals were maintained of equipment as it arrived at the ports and as it was loaded. As the ships departed Cuba, photography was accomplished by reconnaissance aircraft, helicopters, and from U.S. Naval units. The ships crews were generally nonplussed, although one ship's crew removed the tarpaulins so that the missiles could be seen. (CSD)

61. What was significance of shooting down of Major Anderson: that SAMs were indeed operational?

"Moscow Radio was still broadcasting Khrushchev's bombshell when a second one landed. About 10:15 that morning, Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr., one of the two U.S. Air Force pilots who had captured on film the first hard proof of the Soviet missile build-up, was brought down over Cuba in his U-2 plane. It was clear that he had been shot out of the sky by Soviet missilemen and, as Khrushchev had just finished telling the President, it was no accident. A dangerous new element had been added to the equation: the surface-to-air missiles installed by the Russians were now operational."

(Abel, 1966, p.187)

6m. What was his altitude?

" Q. At what altitude were you supposed to fly? A. At the maximum altitude. Altitude varies with fuel load. As the fuel burns out the plane climbs higher. Q. To what altitude? A. The maximum altitude is 68,000 feet". (Powers, 1960, p.37)

"14 miles" (Abel, 1966, p.113)

"13 miles" (Abel, 1966, p.59)

6n. Was he alone at the time?

"At 3:35 p.m. the Defense Department belatedly announced that a reconnaissance plane (Major Anderson's U-2) was missing over Cuba, its pilot presumed lost." (Abel, 1966, p. 196)

60. Did U-2s always operate in pairs?

(No specific information)

"By October 14, the skies over Cuba had cleared, the CIA had choked down its bitter pill and two Air Force pilots, thoroughly familiar by now with the CIA version of the U-2, had climbed into their borrowed flying machines. Both were Air Force majors -- Rudolf Anderson, Jr., of Spartanburg, South Carolina, and Richard S. Heyser of Battle Creek, Michigan. Both had been born in 1927. Both had joined the Air Force in 1951. Both had served in the Far East -- Anderson in Korea with the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron; Heyser in Japan." (Abel, 1966, p.27)

6p Who was responsible for their assignments?

Up until about 14 October 1962, all U-2 flights had been flown clandestinely...
On 14 October 1962, SAC started to fly the U-2 missions..." [redacted] 1966, STAT
p.5)

"McNamara had suggested the shift to McCone in view of the greatly accelerated flight schedule. There was for the first time real danger of losing planes as well as pilots. In that situation, McNamara urged, Air Force regulars ought to take over. Some CIA people took this hard. General Carter, in McCone's month-long absence, had appealed to the White House, arguing that intelligence was properly the CIA's business and that it had its own control center to go with the planes, the trained pilots, and the experience. McGeorge Bundy dismissed the appeal." (Abel, 1966, p.27)

6q. The photos taken overseas to be shown to friendly governments: how specifically were they carried by U.S. representatives, how protected, and how kept track of?

"While Washington slept, Ambassador David Bruce in London went to Admiralty House with the photographs Dean Acheson had confided to his care at Greenham Common. Prime Minister Macmillan had known of the crisis since Friday. He was seeing for the first time that Monday morning the evidence that had prompted the President's action... He examined the photographs soberly as Bruce's photo interpreter pointed out the missiles, the launch-erectors, and the fuel trucks scattered over the Cuban landscape...

"In Paris that morning, Acheson briefed the American mission to NATO. Then at five o'clock (it was 11 a.m., in Washington), he slipped through a side entrance into the Elysee Palace. The interview with de Gaulle was graced by a regal courtesy on both sides. "Your President does me great honor," de Gaulle said, "to send me so distinguished an emissary. I assume the occasion to be of appropriate importance."

"When Acheson completed his summary, de Gaulle lost no time groping for the right words. "It is exactly what I would have done," he said. Then Acheson offered to show the photographs. De Gaulle swept them aside. "A great government such as yours does not act without evidence," he said.....

"Only then did de Gaulle ask to see the photographs. The old soldier slumbering beneath the dark, double-breasted suit of the President of the Republic wakened to this new marvel of military intelligence. He inquired from what altitude the pictures had been taken. Acheson told him 14 miles. "C'est formidable," de Gaulle exclaimed. "C'est formidable." In the sheaf of photographs was one showing a concentration of MIG fighter planes parked on

a Cuban airfield. Four models were visible--the MIG 15, MIG 17, MIG 19, and the latest MIG 21. Acheson's companion, Sherman Kent of the CIA, invited de Gaulle to identify them. Delighted, the old general put a magnifying glass to the photograph.

"Adenauer was informed the same day by Ambassador Dowling. In Ottawa, Livingston Merchant briefed the Canadian Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker."

(Abel, 1966 p. 111-113)