

FACTS ON FILE

WORLD NEWS DIGEST WITH INDEX

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Reg. U. S. Pat. Off.

WORLD AFFAIRS**Cuban Missile Crisis**

Soviet Retreat Eases Tension. The war threat arising from the USSR's construction of missile bases in Cuba was lessened Oct. 28 when Soviet Premier Khrushchev agreed to dismantling of the bases and withdrawal of the missiles under UN supervision.

Khrushchev's action amounted to virtually complete acceptance of the demands made by Pres. Kennedy in his Oct. 22 address announcing the discovery of the bases and the U.S.' intention to blockade Cuba until the bases were removed.

Khrushchev's retreat came amidst the following developments:

■ A direct U.S.-Soviet naval confrontation was averted when nearly all Soviet-bloc vessels en route to Cuba were diverted to avoid the blockade.

■ The U.S. warned it would take further action against Cuba unless work on bases was halted; air surveillance later confirmed such a halt.

■ Actg. UN Secy. Gen. U Thant's intervention in the crisis led to direct U.S.-Soviet exchanges in which Khrushchev and Mr. Kennedy communicated terms for the settlement.

■ The U.S. temporarily suspended its blockade while Thant went to Cuba but failed to persuade Premier Castro to accept UN inspection of the dismantling.

The Soviet retreat was viewed widely as a victory for Pres. Kennedy's decision to risk an armed clash by blockading Cuba and presenting Khrushchev with a clear military challenge to the "extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles in an area known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States." [See pp. 361B1-365D2]

Caribbean Clash Averted. No direct confrontation of U.S. and Soviet naval power took place off Cuba despite the U.S.' military blockade of the island starting Oct. 24.

Defense Secy. Robert S. McNamara had reported Oct. 23 that as many as 25 Russian and Soviet-bloc vessels were en route to Cuba and would be subject to halt and search by the U.S.' naval blockade. Pentagon spokesmen reported Oct. 24, a few hours after the blockade took effect, that 12 of the Soviet ships had changed course to avoid contact with the blockade but that the others still were steaming toward Cuba. The Pentagon officials expressed the view that the diverted vessels presumably had been carrying weapons or military supplies banned by the U.S.' blockade proclamation.

The first contact between a Soviet vessel and the U.S. blockaders took place off Cuba early Oct. 25. It was announced officially by the Defense De-

*Mr. Kennedy's Oct. 22 speech on the crisis.

partment only after Rep. James E. Van Zandt (R., Pa.) had reported the contact to newsmen after attending a State Department briefing in New York on the Cuban situation. The Defense Department reported that U.S. naval units had halted the Soviet tanker *Bucharest* but had permitted it to continue toward Havana without search after "the Navy satisfied itself that no prohibited material was aboard this particular ship."†

The 2d contact of the blockade was made Oct. 26 when U.S. vessels, among them the destroyer *Joseph F. Kennedy*, named after the President's late brother, intercepted and boarded the Lebanese-registered freighter *Marucla*, bound from Riga, USSR to Havana under Soviet charter. The U.S. boarding party was given the cooperation of the *Marucla's* officers, and the vessel was permitted to continue to Havana after its cargo was checked for banned weapons. The *Marucla*, according to later reports, was a U.S.-built World War II Liberty ship owned by Greek shipping interests through a Panamanian company.

Stevenson-Zorin Exchange. U.S. Amb.-to-UN Adlai E. Stevenson Oct. 25 displayed to the UN Security Council aerial photographs purporting to show offensive missile bases in Cuba. Stevenson produced the pictures after Soviet Deputy Foreign Min. Valerian A. Zorin had refused a direct reply to Stevenson's question: "Do you . . . deny that the USSR has placed and is placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba. Yes or no—don't wait for the translation—yes or no?"

Zorin, chairman of the Council for its 3d session on the Cuban crisis, replied: "I am not in an American courtroom, . . . and therefore I do not wish to answer a question which is put to me in the fashion in which a prosecutor puts questions. In due course, sir, you will have your reply."

Stevenson asserted that he was "prepared to wait for my answer until Hell freezes over, if that is your decision. I am also prepared to present evidence in this room." He thereupon had the photographs brought into the Council chamber and displayed.

Zorin called the photographs "forged" and refused to look at them. He reminded the Council that Stevenson had shown photographs dealing with the abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba and that

†The Defense Department said it was obvious that the *Bucharest* was carrying petroleum, which was not a "prohibited material" under Pres. Kennedy's blockade order. A Soviet tanker arrived in Havana Oct. 26 and was welcomed by a dockside rally honoring its crew for "running" the blockade. There was some confusion over the fact that Cuban spokesmen referred to the tanker as the *Vinnitsa* and photographs of the vessel showed this name on its side in Cyrillic letters.

Week in Headlines

Cuban crisis eased as Khrushchev agreed to dismantle and remove Soviet missile bases in Cuba; Khrushchev, Pres. Kennedy agreed to avoid naval confrontation on blockade line. U.S. suspended blockade. U Thant conferred with Castro, failed to get agreement on UN supervision of missile removal.

U.S., Britain sent arms to India to aid it in Communist Chinese border war; Menon dismissed as defense minister.

French voters approved de Gaulle's plebiscite plan.



these later had been branded as false by the U.S. press.

Stevenson, upholding the authenticity of the photographs, challenged Zorin to ask Cuba to permit UN observers to inspect the missiles shown in the pictures. Prior to his exchange with Zorin, Stevenson had declared that the U.S. had been forced to take "prompt action" against Cuba to counteract the "speed" and "stealth" with which the Soviet Union had constructed missile sites in Cuba. Stevenson ridiculed the USSR's argument that "it was not the Soviet Union which created the threat to peace by secretly installing these weapons in Cuba, but . . . the United States . . . by discovering and reporting these installations."

Zorin challenged the U.S.' claim of proof that the USSR had built missile bases in Cuba. The U.S. had "no such facts in its hands except this falsified information" in the CIA photographs "which are being displayed for review in halls and which are sent to the press," Zorin declared.

The Council meeting was adjourned without setting a new date, presumably to permit U Thant to continue his diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis.

U.S. Warns Bases Speeded. White House spokesmen warned Oct. 25 that the U.S. could not relax its blockade or surveillance of Cuba as long as reports showed, as they had, that "work is continuing on these [missile] bases."

The White House officials, who refused to be identified, drew attention to a paragraph in Pres. Kennedy's Oct. 22 speech that said that "further action will be justified" if work on the bases was not halted. They added: "It is self-evident that the quarantine [blockade] will continue. There are still Soviet ships headed toward Cuba, and the only way this government can get precise information on some of those ships or the cargo they are carrying is through the quarantine. . . ."

A White House statement Oct. 26 declared: "The development of ballistic missile sites in Cuba continues at a rapid pace. . . . The activity at these sites apparently is directed at achieving a full operational capability as soon as possible." It charged that "there is evidence that as of yesterday, Oct. 25, considerable construction activity was being en-


Vol. LXXX No. 18

TIME

THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE

November 2, 1962

THE NATION



SHIPS OF U.S. TASK FORCE 136 ON CUBA BLOCKADE LINE

"You could feel the lifting of a great national frustration. Suddenly you could hold your head up."

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Backdown

There was danger in standing still or moving forward. I thought it was the wisest policy to risk that which was incident to the latter course.

—James Monroe

to Thomas Jefferson (1822)

Last week that perilous choice confronted another, younger President of the U.S. Generations to come may well count John Kennedy's resolve as one of the decisive moments of the 20th century. For Kennedy determined to move forward at whatever risk. And when faced by that determination, the bellicose Premier of the Soviet Union first wavered, then weaseled and finally backed down.

Staggering Proof. To Kennedy, the time of truth arrived when he received sheaves of photographs taken during the preceding few days by U.S. reconnaissance planes over Cuba. They furnished stag-

gering proof of a massive, breakneck buildup of Soviet missile power on Castro's island. Already poised were missiles capable of hurling a megaton each—or roughly 50 times the destructive power of the Hiroshima atomic bomb—at the U.S. Under construction were sites for launching five-megaton missiles.

Into early October, the Soviets proceeded covertly, masking their operations with lies and claims that they were sending only "defensive" weapons to Cuba. Then they threw off stealth, lunging ahead in a frantic, scarcely concealed push to get offensive missiles up and ready to fire. Their aim was devastatingly obvious: they meant to present the U.S. with the accomplished fact of a deadly missile arsenal on Cuba.

If the plan had worked—and it came fearfully close—Nikita Khrushchev would in one mighty stroke have changed the power balance of the cold war. Once again a foreign dictator had seemingly misread the character of the U.S. and of a U.S. President. At Vienna and later, Khrushchev had sized up Kennedy as a weakling, given to strong talk and timorous action. The U.S. itself, he told Poet Robert Frost, was "too liberal to fight." Now, in the Caribbean, he intended to prove his point. And Berlin would surely come next.

The Decisions. Kennedy shattered those illusions. He did it with a series of dramatic decisions that swiftly brought the U.S. to a showdown not with Fidel Castro but with Khrushchev's own Soviet Union. Basic to those decisions were two propositions:

► It would not be enough for the Russians to halt missile shipments to Cuba. Instead, all missiles in Cuba must be dismantled and removed. If necessary, the U.S. would remove them by invasion.
► Any aggressive act from Cuba would be treated by the U.S. as an attack by the Soviet Union itself. And the U.S. would


retaliate against Russia with the sudden and full force of its thermonuclear might.

As a first step, and only as a first step, President Kennedy decided to impose a partial blockade, or quarantine, on Cuba, stopping all shipments of offensive weapons—ground-to-ground and air-to-ground missiles, warheads, missile launching equipment, bombers and bombs. When Kennedy first made known this plan, there were some complaints that it was not enough. But Kennedy meant it only to give Khrushchev an opportunity to think things over; more precipitant action by the U.S., Kennedy felt, might cause Khrushchev to lurch wildly into nuclear war. The decision to start with the quarantine also gave the U.S. time to rally support in Latin America and forestall criticism that Europeans might have directed at an immediate invasion.

The Only Course. President Kennedy announced his decisions on television to a somber nation and found that nation



SIGNING BLOCKADE PROCLAMATION
To the principle of moving forward . . .



PRESIDENT MONROE
. . . a momentous meaning.

overwhelmingly behind him. Perhaps David Heffernan, a Chicago school official who listened to the speech in a crowded hotel lobby, best expressed the American mood: "When it was over, you could feel the lifting of a great national frustration. Suddenly you could hold your head up." Political leaders of both parties swung swiftly behind Kennedy's Cuba policy. G.O.P. congressional leaders issued a joint statement saying: "Americans will support the President on the decision or decisions he makes for the security of our country." New York's Republican Senator Kenneth Keating, who had repeatedly criticized Kennedy for moving too slowly against Cuba, now said that the President's stand "will have the 100% backing of every American regardless of party." Declared ex-President Herbert Hoover: "There is only one course for the American people in this crisis of Communist aggression—to stand by the President."

From the governments of the U.S.'s allies in NATO and SEATO too came

strong, heartening assurances of support. Even more remarkable was the unanimity of the Latin American republics in endorsing the U.S. stand: at a Washington meeting of the Organization of American States, the delegates by a vote of 20 to 0 adopted a resolution calling for the "immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles."

Against this surge of feeling, Khrushchev reacted hesitantly. Twelve hours after Kennedy's speech, the Kremlin issued a cautiously worded statement. Then Khrushchev sent a peace-rattling message to British Pacifist Bertrand Russell. Next, Khrushchev grasped eagerly at a suggestion by U Thant, Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, for a two or three weeks "suspension," with Russia halting missile shipments to Cuba and Kennedy lifting the blockade. Kennedy politely declined, writing U Thant: "The existing threat was created by the secret introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, and the answer

lies in the removal of such weapons."

But Khrushchev had one more trick up his sleeve. He offered to take his missile bases out of Cuba if the U.S. would dismantle its missile bases in Turkey. With a speed that must have bewildered Khrushchev, the President refused.

That did it. Early Sunday morning came the word from Moscow Radio that Khrushchev had sent a new message to Kennedy. In it, Khrushchev complained about a U-2 flight over Russia on Oct. 28, groused about the continuing "violations" of Cuban airspace. But, he said, he had noted Kennedy's assurances that no invasion of Cuba would take place if all offensive weapons were removed. Hence, wrote Khrushchev, the Soviet Government had "issued a new order for the dismantling of the weapons, which you describe as offensive, their crating and returning to the Soviet Union." Finally, he offered to let United Nations representatives verify the removal of the missiles.

If carried out, it was capitulation. Kennedy said he welcomed Khrushchev's decision. In his stand against Khrushchev, the President had not once missed sight of the central point: that the Soviet missile capability in Cuba was a threat to U.S. survival. By directly challenging Soviet aggression in the hemisphere, Kennedy was acting on the fundamental principle of the Monroe Doctrine. And he had given momentous meaning to the principle of moving forward.

The Showdown

(See Cover)

For days and weeks, refugees and intelligence sources within Cuba had insisted that the Soviet Union was equipping its Caribbean satellite with missiles, manned by Russians, that could carry nuclear destruction to the U.S. But the reports were fragmentary and sometimes contradictory. And U.S. reconnaissance planes, photographing Cuba from the Yucatan Channel to the Windward Passage, could detect no such buildup. President Kennedy was not yet persuaded to take decisive action.

On Oct. 10 came aerial films with truly worrisome signs. They showed roads being slashed through tall timber. Russian-made tents mushrooming in remote places. The order went out to photograph Cuba mountain by mountain, field by field and, if possible, yard by yard.

Magic Pictures. For four long days, Hurricane Ella kept the planes on the ground. Finally, on Sunday, Oct. 14, Navy fighter pilots collected the clinching evidence. Flying as low as 200 ft., they made a series of passes over Cuba with their cameras whirring furiously. They returned with thousands of pictures—and the photographs showed that Cuba, almost overnight, had been transformed into a bristling missile base.

As if by magic, thick woods had been torn down, empty fields were clustered with concrete mixing plants, fuel tanks and mess halls. Chillingly clear to the expert eye were some 40 slim, 52-ft., medium-range missiles, many of them

THEIR BASES & OURS

KHRUSHCHEV's offer to remove his missile bases from Cuba if the U.S. would dismantle its missiles in Turkey was a cynical piece of statesmanship. It took shrewd advantage of the frets and feelings expressed by many peace-loving, non-Communist handwringers in the U.S. and other countries. In Philadelphia, for example, Norman Thomas, sometime Socialist Party candidate for President last week paraded outside city hall with a placard proclaiming: NO SOVIET BASE IN CUBA—NO U.S. BASE IN TURKEY.

Superficially plausible slogans equating Soviet missile bases in Cuba and U.S. bases overseas recurred in attacks on the U.S. action—whether the attackers were Russian Communists, African nationalists, Latin American Castroites or U.S. pacifists. On the part of the Communists, this equating had obvious tactical motives. On the part of neutralists and pacifists, it betrayed intellectual and moral confusion.

Unequal Equation. The U.S.'s Jupiter IRBM bases in Turkey were constructed in 1960-61, not clandestinely but only after a publicly announced agreement between the U.S. and Turkey. The purpose of the U.S. bases was not to blackmail Russia but to strengthen the defense system of NATO, which had been created as a safeguard against Russian aggression. As a member of NATO, Turkey welcomed the bases as a contribution to her own defense.

Beyond these differences between the two cases, there is an enormous moral difference between U.S. and Russian objectives. Overseas military bases, like bayonets or bombs, are neither good nor evil in themselves. What may be good or evil are the


purposes behind them, the uses to which they are put. To equate U.S. and Russian bases is in effect to equate U.S. and Russian purposes.

The point was eloquently voiced in the United Nations by Nationalist China's Representative Liu Chieh, in a retort to Soviet Delegate Valerian Zorin. "Weapons," said Liu, "cannot be intrinsically differentiated into good ones and bad ones, but the man who carries the weapons can be easily differentiated. A revolver in the hands of a gangster is not the same thing as a revolver in the top drawer of a peaceful citizen. Whether a person is a gangster or a peaceful citizen depends on his record. And what a criminal record international Communism has written for itself in recent years!"

The Vast Difference. The contrast between the Communist record and the U.S. record since 1945 is vivid enough for all to see who are willing to see it. The U.S., as President Kennedy said in his speech announcing the blockade, has demonstrated that it has "no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation." In contrast, Russia has established puppet regimes by force of arms in Eastern Europe; its attempts to conquer and dominate in Greece, Turkey, Southeast Asia and elsewhere have been thwarted only because U.S. military power, including U.S. bases overseas, has stood in the way. The U.S. bases, such as those in Turkey, have helped keep the peace since World War II, while the Russian bases in Cuba threatened to upset the peace. The Russian bases were intended to further conquest and domination, while U.S. bases were erected to preserve freedom. The difference should have been obvious to all.

U. S.

BLOCKADE



already angled up on their mobile launchers and pointed at the U.S. mainland. With an estimated range of 1,200 miles, these missiles, armed with one-megaton warheads, could reach Houston, St. Louis—or Washington. The bases were located at about ten spots, including Sagua la Grande and Remedios on the northern coast, and San Cristóbal and Guanajay on the western end of the island (see map above, and pictures on following eight pages). Under construction were a half-dozen bases for 2,500-mile missiles, which could smash U.S. cities from coast to coast. In addition, the films showed that the Russians had moved in at least 25 twin-jet Ilyushin-28 bombers that could carry nuclear bombs.

At Once. Throughout Monday, Oct. 15, the experts pored over the pictures. There could be no doubt. Early on Oct. 16 a telephone call went to CIA Director John McCone, who was in Seattle mourning the death there of his stepson. It was 4 a.m. on the Coast, but McCone came awake in shocked realization of the grave impact of the news. When he had heard the last detail, he ordered the pictures taken to the President at once.

While the pictures were being prepared for the President, CIA officials outlined the information by phone to McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's adviser on national security. Bundy hurried out of his office in the west wing of the White House, rode

the tiny elevator up to the President's living quarters on the second floor, and walked into Kennedy's bedroom. The President, who was dressed and had just finished breakfast, put down the morning papers and listened. His expression did not change as Bundy spun out the startling story.

At 10:30 a.m., Kennedy first saw the pictures of the missiles. At 11:45 he sat down in his rocking chair for a conference with the top members of his Administration that began the most crucial week of his term in office. It was a week of intensive analysis and planning, a week of round-robin meetings at State and the Pentagon—and above all, a week of decisions of surpassing importance to the U.S. and the world today.

Why? Throughout that week, U.S. planes kept Cuba under their photographic magnifying glass. Air Force RB-47s and U-2s prowled high over the island. Navy jets swooped low along the coastlines. With the passing of each day, each hour, the missile buildup burgeoned. In speed and scope it went far beyond anything the U.S. had believed possible. By conservative estimate, the Soviet Union must have been planning it in detail for at least a year, poured at least \$1 billion into its determined effort.

But why? That was the question that kept pounding at President Kennedy. He knew all too well that the Soviet Union


had long had the U.S. under the Damoclean sword of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the Russian homeland. There thus seemed little real need for such a massive effort in Cuba. Yet, as Kennedy pondered and as he talked long and earnestly with his top Kremlinologists—among them former U.S. Ambassadors to Moscow Llewellyn Thompson and Charles Bohlen—some of the answers began to emerge. More and more in Kennedy's mind, the Cuban crisis became linked with impending crisis in Berlin—and with an all-out Khrushchev effort to upset the entire power balance of the cold war.

"Chip" Bohlen, about to leave for Paris as U.S. ambassador there, supplied a significant clue. Talking to Kennedy, he recalled a Lenin adage that Khrushchev is fond of quoting: If a man sticks out a bayonet and strikes mush, he keeps on pushing. But when he hits cold steel, he pulls back.

The Theory. Khrushchev's Cuban adventure seemed just such a probe. He hoped to present the U.S. with a *fait accompli*, carried out while the U.S. was totally preoccupied—or so, at least, Khrushchev supposed—with its upcoming elections. If he got away with it, he could presume that the Kennedy Administration was so weak and fearful that he could take over Berlin with impunity.

The theory gained credence when, on the very day that Kennedy learned about

THE RECONNAISSANCE PHOTOS





REMEDIOS, SEPT. 5—U.S. Government aerial photo taken two months ago shows undeveloped wooded area (outlined) in north-central Cuba completely devoid of any evidence of

military preparations. Within six weeks the same site was undergoing rapid development as a fixed launching area, to be used for intermediate range (2,500 mi.) ballistic missiles.

↑ **OCT. 17**—Four fixed IRBM launch sites under construction form rectangle at center of picture, with two control bunker sites also visible. One bunker site is scraped area between and just to the right of the two right-hand launch sites. Other bunker site can barely be seen as clearing to right of and between the left-hand pair of launch pads.


↓ **OCT. 19**—Two days later, improved network of roads is clearly visible in area of control bunkers and launch pads under construction (U/C). Left bunker site, faintly showing two days before, is scraped clean. "Batch plant" at right is mixing facility for concrete to be used in hardening launch pads. Construction below and across road from lower left launch pad is probably for warhead storage.





SAGUA LA GRANDE, SEPT. 5—Northwest of Remedio is another pastoral patch of Cuban countryside that was innocent of military trappings two months ago. Within weeks, it was

an operational missile base capable of launching portable medium range (up to 1,200 mi.) ballistic missiles that could reach dozens of key U.S. targets—including Washington.



OCT. 17—Sagua la Grande now has an almost operational base, with four launch pads (extreme left and right)—two of which are already equipped with the erector equipment necessary to raise missiles into firing position. Near the two launch pad areas at left are three buildings used to prepare missiles for firing,

and a 63-ft. container that might hold an MRBM. Visible are tents housing workers on the site, a full network of service roads, two motor-pool areas serving as depots for vehicles bringing equipment to the area, and two additional erectors being prepared for installation at the two launch pads at right in photograph.



LAUNCH PAD WITH ERECTOR

LAUNCH PAD WITH ERECTOR

MISSILE-READY BLDGS



CABLING

FUELING VEHICLES

OXIDIZER VEHICLES

↑ **OCT. 23**—Two pads are already in business. The two erectors, ready for installation in the previous photo, are now seen in place on the pads at right in the Oct. 17 picture. Since then, more equipment has been installed. Insets at upper right above and at top left in photo below are portions of locator maps added to show position of site in Cuba.

↓ **OCT. 23**—This shot, taken the same day as the photo above, is a low-level vertical view of the launch pad at left in the photo above. Since the photo opposite was taken a week before, the site has become fully operational. All supporting equipment is in place, as labels show. Truck tracks to lower of two tents at top indicate a missile is inside.



MISSILE SHELTER TENTS

LAUNCH CONTROL

PROB THEODOLITE STATION

CABLING

2 VANS UNDER NETTING

MISSILE STAND & FLAME DEFLECTOR



MISSILE ERECTOR

CAMOUFLAGE NETTING



CHERRY PICKER

GUANAJAY, AUG. 29—One more site that was clear of military activity two months ago, this one is near the northern coast of Cuba some 30 miles southwest of Havana.

Again, within weeks construction of a missile site would be well under way. Like the base at Remedios, this was to be for firing the intermediate-range missiles.




OCT. 15—Four IRBM launch pads under construction stand out clearly in this photo, taken six weeks after the one at



left. Control bunker sites are shown under construction between and to right of each of the two pairs of launch pads.


OCT. 17—Construction continues at four launch pads shown in center photo. In this photo, both control bunkers stand


out still more clearly than they did two days earlier, showing that substantial progress was made over very short time.



SAN CRISTOBAL, AUG. 29—This site at the edge of a densely wooded area in western Cuba appeared thoroughly unmilitary under cover of scattered clouds during a reconnaissance two

months ago. Now, as later photos below and at right show clearly, it has undergone rapid development as a launch site for Soviet-supplied Cuban medium-range ballistic missiles.





← OCT. 14—This closer view of the area outlined in the earlier photo shows an MRBM site in the process of installation. A tent area for the accommodation of workers and "technicians" has been set up at upper left. A group of unidentified vehicles appears at center, while seven missile-carrying trailers are seen at upper right. Government reconnaissance experts picked out four missile erectors, plus an eighth missile trailer indicated at the lower end of the site as it appears in this vertical photo.

OCT. 23—A low-level angle shot, the most dramatic of those released, shows preparations for an MRBM base at full tilt nine days later. The picture covers a portion of the area in top half of the photo at lower left. A missile shelter tent has been erected, while readiness has been increased by addition of large numbers of fuel-tank trailers, oxidizer tank trailers and other equipment. Tracks of heavy vehicles, including the movers shown at center, indicate intense activity on the missile site.

the missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev did his best to cover up the operation by assuring U.S. Ambassador Foy D. Kohler during a relaxed, three-hour talk that the arms going to Cuba were purely defensive. Two days later, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko showed up in the White House with the same soothing message. But all was not bland during Gromyko's 2½-hour visit. Noting that he knew Kennedy appreciated frank talk, Gromyko declared that U.S. stubbornness had "compelled" Russia to plan to settle the Berlin crisis unilaterally after the Nov. 6 elections.

Khrushchev already had requested a November meeting with Kennedy. As Kennedy came to see it, Khrushchev planned to say something like this: We are going to go right ahead and take Berlin, and just in case you are rash enough to resist, I can now inform you that we have several scores of megatons zeroed in on you from Cuba.

If such a scene would hardly be dared by novelists, it was well within Khrushchev's flair for macabre melodrama. In this baleful light, it became completely clear to Kennedy that the U.S. had no course but to squash the Soviet missile buildup. But how? In his long, soul-trying talks with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, State Secretary Dean Rusk, the CIA's McCone and other top civilian and military officials, the plan was arduously worked out. Direct invasion of Cuba was discarded—for the time being. So was a surprise bombing attack on the missile sites. Both methods might cause Khrushchev to strike back instinctively and plunge the world into thermonuclear war. More than anything else, Kennedy wanted to give Khrushchev time to understand that he was at last being faced up to—and time to think about it.

The Answer. The best answer seemed to be "quarantine"—a Navy blockade against ships carrying offensive weapons to Cuba. That would give the Premier time and food for thought. It would

offer the U.S. flexibility for future, harsher action. It seemed the solution most likely to win support from the U.S.'s NATO allies and the Organization of American States. And it confronted the Soviet Union with a showdown where it is weakest and the U.S. is mighty: on the high seas. For the U.S. Navy, under Chief of Naval Operations George Anderson, 55, has no rival.

To Anderson went the job of setting up the blockade with ships and planes and making it work. While the Bay of Pigs fiasco had involved helter-skelter White House amateurs, now the pros were taking over. Anderson worked closely with Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Maxwell Taylor and with McNamara, who had been eating and sleeping in the Pentagon.

Speed was vital. Already plowing through the Atlantic were at least 25 Soviet or satellite cargo ships, many of them bringing more missiles and bombers for Cuba. They were shadowed by Navy planes from bases along the East Coast.

Whip Thomas Kuchel from a handshaking visit to a San Diego factory.

House Democratic Whip Hale Boggs was fishing in the Gulf of Mexico when an Air Force plane flew over his boat and dropped into the water a plastic bottle attached to a red flag. The message in the bottle told Boggs to phone the White House. His boat pulled over to a nearby offshore oil rig. The Congressman donned a life jacket, swung by rope to a spindly ladder, and climbed 150 feet to the rig's platform, where a helicopter was awaiting him. At an airbase on the mainland, they crammed Boggs into a flight suit, strapped him into a two-seat jet trainer, clapped an oxygen mask on his face, took away the sandwich he had been clutching, and rocketed him back to Washington.

Dissent. While the Senators and Congressmen were converging on Washington, Kennedy called in his Cabinet members. Some of the members still did not know what was going on. Silently they filed in. Silently they listened to the briefing, and silently they departed. Next came the congressional leaders. They studied the enlargements of the missile pictures and, in the words of one, their blood ran cold. The President then said simply: "We have decided to take action."

When he was done outlining the quarantine plan, Kennedy asked for comments—and found himself opposed by two of his fellow Democrats. Sitting directly across from the President, Georgia's Richard Russell, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told the President that blockade was not enough and came too late. Russell was for immediate invasion. He argued that the U.S. was still paying for the Bay of Pigs debacle, so why fiddle around any longer? Russell was supported, surprisingly, by Arkansas' William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, who had led the fight in April 1961 against the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Kennedy turned away the criticism without anger, stuck by his decisions, and even managed to send the legislators away laughing. Said the President to Minnesota's Hubert Humphrey as the meeting broke up: "If I'd known the job was this tough, I wouldn't have trounced you in West Virginia." Said the Senator to the President: "If I hadn't known it was this tough, I never would have let you beat me."

"Judge for Yourself." Throughout that afternoon, Cadillacs swept through the magnificent October sunshine bearing foreign diplomats on urgent summons to the State Department. Russia's Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin smiled affably at newsmen as he strolled into the building. After the usual pleasantries, Rusk handed Dobrynin a copy of Kennedy's speech and a letter to Khrushchev. Dobrynin emerged 25 minutes later, his shoulders sagging and his face the color of fresh putty. When reporters asked him what had happened, he snapped: "You can judge for yourself soon enough."

The afternoon papers had carried the



MEETING WITH GROMYKO (CENTER: LLEWELLYN THOMPSON)
The bayonet struck steel.

Now, under Anderson's direction, U.S. warships prepared to intercept them.

All this took place in an eerie atmosphere of total secrecy in a notably voluble Administration. As part of the security cover, Kennedy took off on a scheduled campaign tour. But by Saturday, Oct. 20, he knew he could stay away from Washington no longer. Press Secretary Pierre Salinger announced that the President had a cold. Kennedy, a dutiful deceiver muffled in hat and coat, climbed aboard his jet and sped back to Washington.

Roundup. On the morning of Monday, Oct. 22, Kennedy worked over the TV speech that would break the news to the nation that night. The order went out to round up congressional leaders—wherever they were—and fly them back to Washington. The Air Force brought House Speaker John McCormack from his home in Boston. House Republican Leader Charles Halleck from a pheasant-hunting trip in South Dakota, Senate Minority

announ Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP78B05167A001900110012-0 address the nation that night on a matter of the "highest national urgency"—and all America seemed to be watching as Kennedy went on television. It was a grim speech, delivered by a grim President. The U.S., he said, had two goals: "To prevent the use of these missiles against this or any other country, and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere."

Kennedy explained that the quarantine would cut off offensive weapons from Cuba without stopping "the necessities of life." He warned that "any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere" would be regarded by the U.S. as an attack by the Soviet Union and would bring full-scale nuclear reprisal against Russia.

Shotguns & Beans. There were some Nervous Nelly reactions in the U.S. The stock market, hardly a symbol of U.S. backbone, dropped sharply next day. In Tampa, sporting-goods stores reported a run on shotguns and rifles. In Dallas, a store reported brisk sales of an emergency ration pack of biscuits, malted-milk tablets, chocolate, pemmican and canned water. In Los Angeles, a Civil Defense warning that retail stores would be closed for five days in the event of war or a national emergency sent housewives stampeding into the supermarkets. In one, hand-to-hand combat broke out over the last can of pork and beans. Said North Hollywood Grocer Sam Goldstad: "They're nuts. One lady's working four shopping carts at once. Another lady bought twelve packages of detergents. What's she going to do, wash up after the bomb?" Yet for all such transient evidences of panic, the U.S. was solidly behind Kennedy. As he himself had discovered on his election-year forays around the nation, it was the overriding wish of almost all Americans to "do something" about Cuba.

Around the world, U.S. forces braced for combat. Under Admiral Anderson's orders, the Navy's Polaris submarines prowled the seas on courses known only to a handful of ranking officials. The Air Force went on a full-scale alert, put a fleet of B-52 bombers into the air, dispersed hundreds of B-47 bombers from their normal bases to dozens of scattered airfields. In West Berlin, the Army's contingent of 5,000 went on maneuvers.

Salty Pride. As for the blockade itself, it was precisely directed by Anderson, working in his blue-carpeted Pentagon office bedecked with pictures of historic Navy battles. Several times a day he briefed McNamara, red-eyed from lack of sleep, in front of huge wall maps. He signed countless cables—pink paper for secret, green for top secret.

As a professional—and articulate—Navyman, Anderson took particular pride in the fact that the confrontation with Russia was taking place on salt water. Said he: "The sea still does provide a measure of space, if two thermonuclear powers would stand off against each other. In general, we're seeing the great importance of sea power." Another way of putting it



DICK MOONEY—TAMPA TIMES

BUILDUP AT FLORIDA'S MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE
The pros took over.

was that the Navy's show provided a maximum amount of power with a minimum amount of friction. At all times, Anderson delegated heavy responsibility to his subordinates—most of all to an old friend he called Denny. This was Admiral Robert Lee Dennison, 61, who is both Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

Ships, Planes & Subs. As the Russian ships headed toward Cuba on their collision course with the blockading force, Dennison walked to a wall map in his Norfolk headquarters and outlined the Navy's problem. "The approaches to Cuba are pretty well funneled down. Most ships headed for Cuba come out of the North Atlantic and have to come through the Bahamas or the Lesser Antilles, and both the Bahamas and the Lesser Antilles have relatively few channels. We don't really have any headaches. We have plenty of force. There are a lot of ships out there."

So there were. They belonged to Task Force 136, commanded by Vice Admiral Alfred G. Ward, 53, a gunnery specialist who has developed into one of the Navy's most respected strategists. Under Ward were approximately 80 ships. In reserve was the nuclear-powered carrier *Enterprise*, Navy P₂V, P₃M and P₃V patrol planes, flying out of bases all along the East Coast and Florida, and from carriers encircling Cuba (*see map*), put the Soviet ships under constant surveillance within 800 miles of Cuba.

Anderson's orders were clear. All Cuba-bound ships entering the blockade area would be commanded to heave to. If one failed to halt, a shot would be fired across its bow. If it kept on, the Navy would shoot to sink. If it stopped, a boarding party would search it for offensive war materials. If it had none, it would be allowed to go on to Cuba. But if it carried proscribed cargo, the ship would be required to turn away to a non-Cuban

port of its captain's own choosing. Similarly, Cuba-bound cargo aircraft would be intercepted and forced to land at a U.S. airport for inspection, or be shot down. As for Soviet submarines, they would be sought out by radar and sonar. U.S. forces would signal an unidentified sub by dropping some "harmless" depth charges while radioing the code letters IDKCA, the international signal meaning "rise to the surface." Any submarine that ignored the order would be depth-charged for keeps.

Although there was a strong national sense of relief when Kennedy finally announced that he was "doing something" about Cuba, tension mounted almost unbearably in the hours that followed. What would happen? Would Khrushchev press the thermonuclear button? On Tuesday night, Kennedy signed a proclamation outlining the quarantine. The first indication of Russia's reaction came when a few Soviet freighters changed course away from Cuba. But others steamed on, and the moment of showdown came closer.

A day and a half after proclamation of the blockade, the Navy intercepted the Soviet tanker *Bucharest*. Oil had been left off the proscribed list because the Administration did not want to draw the line on an item that might be a necessity of life for Cuba. The tanker was allowed to pass without inspection.

"No Incidents." Sixteen hours later, about 180 miles northeast of the Bahamas, the destroyers *John R. Pierce* and *Joseph P. Kennedy Jr.** took up stations

* Asked how the destroyer named for the President's older brother, who was killed in World War II, happened to be at the right place at the right time, a Defense official said: "Pure coincidence." The *Pierce* is named for a lieutenant commander who won the Navy Cross and lost his life in 1944 while commanding the U.S.S. *Argonaut* against the Japanese. In the battle, the *Argonaut* went down with all guns firing.

behind a Russian-chartered Lebanese freighter named the *Marucla* (built in Baltimore during World War II). At day-break on Friday, in a scene reminiscent of the 19th century, the *Kennedy* lowered away its whaleboat and sent a boarding party aboard the *Marucla*, which cooperatively provided a ladder. Wearing dress whites, Lieut. Commander Dwight G. Osborne, executive officer of the *Pierce*, and Lieut. Commander Kenneth C. Reynolds, the exec of the *Kennedy*, led the party aboard the ship. After politely serving his visitors coffee, the Greek captain allowed them the run of his ship. The cargo turned out to be sulphur, paper rolls, twelve trucks, and truck parts.

"No incidents," radioed the boarding party. "No prohibited material in evidence. All papers in order. *Marucla* cleared to proceed course 260, speed 9 knots to Havana via Providence Channel. Maintaining surveillance."

While the *Marucla* was being searched, a far more important event of the blockade was happening elsewhere in the Atlantic. After days of steaming toward Cuba and closer and closer to the Navy's line of ships, the remaining Soviet arms-carrying merchantmen were heading for home. Khrushchev had decided not to collide with the U.S. Navy on the high seas. The blockade was a success.

Still, there could be no sense of relaxa-

tion. A way had to be found to get those already installed missiles out of Cuba. The U.S. effort was two-pronged: one was diplomatic, the other military.

Talk. On the diplomatic front, Adlai Stevenson urged Acting U.N. Secretary-General U Thant to impress upon the Russians the fact that the missiles must go. Making prompt action even more necessary was the fact that the Navy's twice-daily, low-level reconnaissance flights showed that the Russians were speeding up the erection of missile sites.

While the talks with U Thant were going on, Khrushchev suddenly proposed his cynical swap: he would pull his missiles out of Cuba if Kennedy pulled his

THE CNO: Unflinching Competence & an Uncommon Flair

THE plaque on his desk in the Pentagon's E-Ring reads **FAST CHARGER**. This was the radio call of Admiral George W. Anderson Jr. when he was commander of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. It is also appropriate to the man who, as Chief of Naval Operations, holds responsibility for forging and operating the Cuba blockade. For he is an aggressive blue-water sailor of unflinching competence and uncommon flair.

He was destined for the Navy. Son of a Brooklyn real estate man, Anderson developed a childhood love of the sea while running an outboard motorboat in the waters off Long Island's South Shore. A bright kid, he zipped through a Jesuit high in fast time, graduated at 16. When he heard that Manhattan Congressman Ogden Mills had a couple of Naval Academy billets at his disposal, Anderson wrote a persuasive letter requesting an appointment. Mills, who did not represent Anderson's district, wired back: Establish residence in Manhattan and the appointment is yours. Anderson did so, entered the Annapolis class of 1927 and was graduated 27th.

Now Anderson longed for wings. Annapolis had given him a short course in aviation, and in 1930, following a brief stint on a cruiser in the Pacific, he shipped to Pensacola for full flight training. After that, he flew catapult-launched seaplanes from the decks of cruisers in the Atlantic Fleet, suffered his first "and only significant" crash: during aerial gunnery practice one day, a tow target got wrapped around Anderson's propeller; the plane came down flat on its back onto a Virginia beach. Anderson crawled out uninjured.

It was long obvious that the big (6 ft. 2 in., 180 lbs.), handsome naval officer—among other things, he is called "Gorgeous George"—was headed for big things.* He flew Grumman fighters from the carrier *Lexington*, was a landing signal

* Said *TIME* in July 1951: "Captain George Anderson . . . is, according to Pentagon scuttlebutt, 'sure to be made CNO some day.'"



ADMIRAL ANDERSON

officer on the carrier *Yorktown*, executive officer of a squadron of PBY patrol planes.

In 1943, he saw action in the Pacific as navigator and tactical officer aboard the newly commissioned *Yorktown* (the first carrier *Yorktown* went down in June 1942). He then held down an assortment of desk jobs in postwar Washington, and in 1950 was named operations officer of the Sixth Fleet. That same year, General Eisenhower, who was setting up his SHAPE headquarters in Paris, wired CNO Forrest Sherman: SEND ME THE SMARTEST NAVAL AVIATOR YOU'VE GOT. Ike got Anderson, made him senior U.S. officer for plans and operations.

As a three-star admiral in 1957, Anderson was named chief of staff to Pacific Fleet Commander Felix Stump. But in order to fulfill the old Navy tradition that an admiral's flag is never really earned until it has been flown at sea, Anderson asked for and got a reduction to two-star rank so that he could command a carrier division. He got the star back in 1959 when he took over command of the Sixth Fleet.

Those who served with him in the Mediterranean—from the swabbies on up—testify to the excellence of his service with the Sixth Fleet. With 60 ships, 200 planes and 30,000 men, Anderson spider-webbed the Mediterranean, keeping watch on trouble spots and dogging Soviet "trawlers." He also worked as a diplomat, became friendly with European leaders who came to regard him as a representative of U.S. policy in the region.

His own men never saw such a stickler for propriety, protocol and taut-ship policy. He was forever turning up on board destroyers, submarines and carriers when least expected. He praised smart crews generously, but the sloppy ones got caustic criticism. To one skipper who executed an awkward maneuver, Anderson signaled: I AM NOT IMPRESSED. A devout Roman Catholic, he sermonized his men with endless broadcasts on clean living ("The Sea Scout Hour," one irreverent sailor called them). He sent medics out to feed penicillin pills to prostitutes at ports of call (and thereby cut his sailors' venereal disease rate by half), peppered the fleet with pious maxims. His most famous bulletin to all hands was titled: # % & ? * ! † . "Foul language," it began, "is not the sign of a man!" It went on to spell out "The Code of the Uncouth" under the head WHY I USE OBSCENE LANGUAGE. Sample sarcasms: "IT PLEASES my mother so much. It is a fine mark of MANLINESS."

At the same time, Anderson exhibited a human touch. If he heard that a man's wife was ailing, he sent her flowers. When an officer's wife was sent to the hospital, Anderson temporarily transferred the husband to shore duty near by. One speech showed the breadth of his concern for his men: "A ship deployed for eight months means America's great power is being projected overseas, but it also means loneliness for wives and families, babies born while father is in Antarctica, on Polaris patrol, or steaming in the Formosa Strait; many small things—the uncut lawn—the leaky faucet—the unfixed bike . . ."

With retirement of CNO Arleigh Burke last year, Washington buzz-buzz naturally

out of Turkey. His long, rambling memorandum was remarkable for its wheedling tone—that of a cornered bully. Wrote Khrushchev: "The development of culture, art and the raising of living standards, this is the most noble and necessary field of competition . . . Our aim was and is to help Cuba, and nobody can argue about the humanity of our impulse."

Force. Kennedy bluntly rejected the missile swap and increased the speed of the U.S. military buildup. The President considered choking Cuba's economy with a complete blockade. To knock the missiles out in a hurry, the White House discussed sabotage, commando raids, naval bombardment or a pinpoint bombing at-

tack. And there was the strong possibility that invasion might finally be required.

Squadrons of supersonic F-100s and F-106s zoomed into Florida's Patrick and MacDill Air Force Bases. In the Caribbean were 10,000 Marines who had been about to go on maneuvers. McNamara ordered to active duty 24 troop carrier squadrons of the Air Force Reserve—more than 14,000 men.

Demand. Kennedy's course carried with it the obvious risk of casualties and finally, after a week of talk and maneuver, an Air Force reconnaissance plane was lost. But the flights went on as the U.S. prepared to move against Cuba if Khrushchev did not destroy his missiles.

To underline the need for urgent action, Kennedy sent Khrushchev a letter at week's end stating that no settlement could be reached on Cuba until the missiles came down under U.N. supervision.

Surrender. Next day—just two weeks after the clinching recon photos were taken—Khrushchev said he was giving in. In his message, Khrushchev mildly told Kennedy: "I express my satisfaction and gratitude for the sense of proportion and understanding of the responsibility borne by you for the preservation of peace throughout the world, which you have shown. I understand very well your anxiety and the anxiety of the people of the U.S. in connection with the fact that the weapons which you describe as offensive are in fact grim weapons. Both you and I understand what kind of weapons they are."

To try to save some face, Khrushchev took full credit for preserving the peace of the world by dismantling the missiles. He also asked for a continued "exchange of opinions on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons and on general disarmament and other questions connected with the lessening of international tension." And he said that Russia would continue to give aid to Cuba, which might mean that he had a lingering hope of still using the island as a base for Communist penetration of Latin America.

Within three hours, President Kennedy made his reply: "I welcome Chairman Khrushchev's statesmanlike decision to stop building bases in Cuba, dismantling offensive weapons and returning them to the Soviet Union under United Nations verification. This is an important and constructive contribution to peace . . . It is my earnest hope that the governments of the world can, with a solution to the Cuban crisis, turn their earnest attention to the compelling necessities for ending the arms race and reducing world tensions."

Thus, President John Kennedy appeared to have won in his courageous confrontation with Soviet Russia. There would, of course, be other crises to come. Looking ahead, Kennedy said several times last week: "I am sure we face even bigger, more difficult decisions." Such decisions—if met as boldly and carried out as shrewdly as those so far—present him with an opportunity for a major breakthrough in the cold war.

put George Anderson in line for the job, Kennedy's first Navy Secretary, John B. Connally, had Anderson on his list—along with 108 other senior officers. For weeks Connally stuffed a notebook with biographies and records of all the candidates, finally narrowed them down to a dozen. By this time he had an idea of the sort of man he—and the President—wanted: a strong leader, one with extensive fleet experience, one who had dealt with Army and Air Force leaders along with statesmen and military chiefs. That turned out to be a personal portrait of Admiral George Anderson.

In his brief time as CNO Anderson has made his philosophy of command a day-to-day reality. As he explains it: "One, get a good chief of staff. Two, keep a firm grasp of fundamentals. Three, leave details to the staff. Four, go for morale, which is of almost transcending importance. And next, don't bellyache and don't worry. Show confidence, because if you don't have confidence, certainly your subordinates won't."

Last week his aides got a chance to see that philosophy in action. The big, white-painted office in the E-Ring was almost serene as the CNO read dispatches, scribbled notes and comments with a red pencil (no other Navyman in the Pentagon uses red, thus his communications get instant attention) and fielded hot telephone calls. He has had little time at his big, 14-room home with his wife* since the Cuban crisis broke; his days have been stretched from the routine twelve-hour watch to 18, but he can still laugh when the pressure is on. The other day he found an envelope on his desk, addressed in red: URGENT—TO THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS—PRIVATE. Anderson instantly opened it, to find a greeting card that only a Navy man could cherish. IN THESE TIMES OF STRESS, it read, KEEP A COOL HEAD. Inside the card was a drawing of a Navy "head"—a toilet—on which rested a big block of ice. It was signed, "Your sometime wife."

* Anderson's first wife died of cancer in 1947. His second, Mary Lee Lamar Sample Anderson, was the widow of a Navy flyer who was killed in a crash in Japan.



DAVID GAHR

HILL & WILKINS

"Old phony tokenism just doesn't work."

LABOR

End of the Affair?

The A.F.L.-C.I.O. and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People have long held hands in an uneasy romance. But though they have many overlapping interests, some of their aims are different. And now their affair looks as though it might go piffit.

The man threatening to bust up the alliance is Herbert Hill, 37, the N.A.A.C.P.'s labor secretary since 1951. Hill has taken to tangling with such labor leaders as A.F.L.-C.I.O. President George Meany, United Auto Workers Chief Walter Reuther and the Garment Workers' David Dubinsky. He charges that A.F.L.-C.I.O. unions practice open segregation in some cases, token integration in some others. Cries Hill: "We are going into federal court to develop a whole new body of labor laws in behalf of the Negro. The opposition of Meany, Reuther and Dubinsky to this new effort will not deter us in the slightest. From now on, they will have to answer for their discriminatory practices in the federal courtrooms of America. We have altered the terms of the argument. The old phony tokenism just doesn't work any more."

At Hill's urging, the N.A.A.C.P. has: ▶ Filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board that the West Coast affiliate of the Seafarers' International Union ships "lily-white crews and is reluctant to assign Negroes jobs above steward level."

▶ Charged before the NLRB that an Atlanta local of the United Steelworkers of America negotiated a contract with Atlantic Steel providing less pay for Negroes than for whites doing the same job.

▶ Filed a federal suit, charging that the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway conspired to assign Negro "train porters" to

the same work done by white "brakemen" at higher pay—at the same time denying them union membership.

► Joined in an action before the NLRB against a segregated local of the Independent Metal Workers Union in Houston.

Such actions were hardly calculated to endear Hill to the labor leaders. Dubinsky attacked Hill's virulence, attributing it, oddly, to the fact that Hill is a white man: "Maybe because he is non-Negro, he's got to convince them that he's more Negro than the Negroes." Snapped Reuther: "Certain N.A.A.C.P. staff people have seriously weakened the work of the N.A.A.C.P., and retarded progress because of indiscriminate and inaccurate charges which make large headlines but get little results." Indeed, only N.A.A.C.P. Executive Secretary Roy Wilkins seemed to be trying to smooth things over. "We are confident," said Wilkins, "that regardless of minor irritations, we will continue to have the sincere cooperation on basic issues of dedicated labor leaders like Walter Reuther." But despite Wilkins' words, the hostility between the A.F.L.-C.I.O. and the N.A.A.C.P. is likely to deepen, especially after the elections are out of the way.

POLITICS

One Election Won

What would be the impact of the Cuban crisis on the 1962 elections?

Analysts were forced to apply standard political maxims to a situation in which precedents may not apply. All that was certain was that a powerful new factor, unsettling and emotional, would affect the U.S. voter—in ways that even he may not comprehend until he enters the voting booth on Nov. 6.

President Kennedy announced that he and Vice President Lyndon Johnson had canceled their remaining campaign trips, later ordered his entire Cabinet to do the same. The immediate assumption was that this would hurt the Democrats for whom they had planned to stump. Yet there was a supposition that the nation would want to unite behind its President—and perhaps behind his party as well. Again, went the figuring, the crisis seemed likely to strengthen incumbents of both parties in cases where their opponents have never been tested in high public office.

Those Republicans who had long been demanding tougher action on Cuba and who made it an important theme of their campaign, seemed likely to gain. Prominent among these were Indiana's Senator Homer Capehart and Pennsylvania's Senatorial Candidate James Van Zandt. Such experienced world affairs hands as California's Gubernatorial Candidate Richard Nixon also would benefit.

Despite the overall aura of a rally-round-the-flag spirit, there remained some nagging doubts about the timing of the blockade decision, coming as it did just two weeks before the elections. The Republican Congressional Campaign Committee angrily charged that the timing was political and aimed at preventing a Democratic debacle.

Yet in a strong sense, one election had already been held—and the people had won. For Kennedy had gone out among the people and found that they were deeply concerned about Cuba and were ready to stand behind him if he took decisive action. That knowledge could only have helped him reach his decision.

Making It Harder

After ten terms in the House, Minnesota's Republican Representative Walter Judd was determined to retire. He was unhappy because the state legislature had tacked some heavily Democratic Minneapolis wards onto his previously safe Fifth District. He was even unhappier with the hundreds of constituent-pleasing chores that consume the time of a Congressman, and he wanted to devote full time to talking to youth groups around the U.S. But after he announced last April that he was quitting, Judd got more than 5,000 letters



MINNESOTA'S JUDD
It is better to seek than to take.

—many from outside his district—urging him to stay on. He changed his mind, and last week the old campaigner was running harder than ever before.

Conservative v. Liberal. Judd, 64, is one of the Republican Party's most respected House voices on foreign affairs. An M.D. who spent ten years in China as a medical missionary, he is a fervent anti-Communist and an enthusiastic internationalist. Says Judd of his views on domestic issues: "I'm a conservative. I go to the Federal Government last, not first, unless there's no other way to get the job done. I am afraid of concentration of power in Washington or anywhere else, because this is the way people lose their freedom." He adds: "The Bible says, 'Seek, and ye shall find.' The New Frontier says, 'Sit down, and we'll give it to you.'"

Judd's opponent is Minneapolis' Donald

Fraser, 38, a personable lawyer who has served two terms as a state senator. A Navy veteran, Fraser goes right down the line with President Kennedy and the New Frontier. "The principal issue in this campaign is what kind of Congress do American voters want in Washington. Do they want to continue the power of the obstructionist coalition of Dixiecrats and Republicans who oppose important social programs? Or do they want to elect a liberal Democratic majority responsive to the needs of our decade?"

The Other Issue. Throughout his campaign, Judd has talked constantly of Cuba, denouncing the President bitterly as "a weaker person than we realized." Fraser replied in a fashion he must now regret, attacking Judd's discussion of Cuba as "a calculated and cynical effort to divert attention from the domestic issue of this campaign."

Last week's events caused both candidates to backtrack. Though Judd hinted that President Kennedy's blockade timing may have been political, he greeted the decision with relief. "At long last the U.S. is going to stop retreating," he declared. "The situation is not worse than it has been. In fact, if anything it is less dangerous. As in the past, firmness and strength in support of our principle, our commitments and our security offer the best, perhaps the only hope of peace and freedom in the world."

Though Fraser got some indignant mileage out of Judd's suggestion that Kennedy acted partly for political reasons, there seemed little doubt that he had been hurt. An aide said that the President's action "at least eliminates the weakness and indecisiveness issue." But, he admitted ruefully, it did "make things much harder."

Polls

► Pollster Sam Lubell took a quick reading immediately after President Kennedy's television speech on Cuba last week, concluded that the crisis atmosphere might help the Democrats in this year's elections—but not very much. Chief impact, said Lubell, would be on congressional contests, which are more closely tied to voter feeling about national issues than the races for Governor.

► The Gallup poll's "semifinal" check of congressional preferences across the U.S. found 56% of those "most likely" to vote backing Democratic House candidates, 44% supporting Republicans. In the off-year election of 1958, Democrats got 56.5% of the vote, elected 283 of the 435 House members.

► In California, the Mervin Field poll put Republican Senator Thomas Kuchel well ahead of Democrat Richard Richards, 45% to 38%, among those most likely to vote. Among all those polled, Kuchel led by a smaller margin—44% to 39%, with 17% still undecided.

► The Minneapolis Tribune gave Republican Governor Elmer Andersen a 51% to 46% lead over Democratic Lieutenant Governor Karl Rolvaag, counting "likely" voters only. Among all eligible voters, it was Andersen 48%, Rolvaag 47%.