SECRET   50X1

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Have started
briefings of Bruce
today 7/20.

TO   : Mr. Lundahl, NPIC   DATE: 19 July 1966

Mem to follow.

FROM   : Bruce C. Clarke Jr.

SUBJECT: London Conference on Intelligence Methods   50X1

   1. The attachment is a kind of outline or checklist for the prepara-
tion of a presentation on "The Role of Intelligence in the Cuban Missile
Crisis" at London on 19 September. As I see it, the focus of the
presentation will be primarily on how intelligence went about serving
the decision maker during the crisis period, and not on the substantive
issues expected as they serve to illustrate the actions taken by the
intelligence community. For this reason it appears to me that there
is not a great deal of relevant written material and that it will be
necessary to gather the information needed by talking with yourself
and others in your office who had a part in the events.

   2. I would appreciate the opportunity to discuss this further
with you when you have the time.

Attachment

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memo sent.

                                                                          50X1

D R A F T   15 July 1966

Role of Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis

I. Brief Recap of History of Crisis

    A. Prelude

    B. Discovery

    C. Eyeball to eyeball

    D. Khrushchev's blink

    E. Denouement

II. Role of Intelligence in Pre-Crisis Period

    A. Sources

        1) Recce

        2) Clandestine reporting

        3) Comint

        4) ?

    B. Analysis and Reporting

        1) Community response to reporting at this stage

        2) Briefings - to whom? by whom? feedback?

        3) Publications - SNIE, CIB, ???

III. Role of Intelligence at Height of Crisis

    A. Community adjustments to crisis needs -- the producers

        1) Watch Committee

        2) GMAIC

3) DDI - OCI/ORR/OSI

    a) Cuban Daily Summary

    b) President's Checklist

    c) CIB

    d) ?

4) NPIC

5) COMOR

6) ?

7) ?

B. The Users

    1) President

    2) Executive Committee

    3) Special Group

    4) DCI - USIB

    5) Congress

    6) ?

    7) ?

IV. Aftermath

Machinery to monitor and report on Soviet fulfillment of agreement, to report on developments in Cuba, and to prevent repetition of Soviet venture:

    COMOR - Recce, NPIC

    NSA

    Clandestine reporting

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V. Intelligence Techniques Important to Community Response
   to Crisis

   A. Crate-ology

   B. Photo interpretation

   C. Highly current assessment by interagency committees

   D. Refugee and exile interrogation

   E. Daily reporting and briefing

   F. Other ?

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