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THE ADMINISTRATION OF NPIC IN WAR TIME

1. This information is based on some materials that Mr. Knoche made available to me before he left NPIC, on 31 October 1969.

2. On the 2 October 1963, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatric wrote a letter to the DCI, John A. McCone. The subject of this letter was; The War Time Role of NPIC and Problem of a Smooth Transfer of Administrative Control over NPIC to the Department of Defense in Case of War. This letter is identified by the Top Secret Control Number 188384. In this memo, in which Gilpatric addresses McCone as "Dear John", he reminds McCone that the three military detachments at NPIC have been consolidated and that certain military personnel have been assigned to key positions as agreed by McCone and the director, DIA. Gilpatric points out that these actions have given the director, NPIC, assets and authority commensurate<sup>nsurate</sup> with the mission assigned him under NSCID No. 8, and hence have enhanced the capability of NPIC to respond to peace time requirements. Gilpatric stresses the important role NPIC would play in case of war and suggests that plans should be made to transfer the administration of NPIC to the Department of Defense, as provided in NSCID 8, not later than a national declaration of defense condition No. 2. Gilpatric further states that until such an agreement is reached, optimum military planning in this respect cannot be accomplished. He suggests that the DIA representative whom he designates as the Director/DIA should convene at an early date

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to develop a plan for transfer of authority.

3. On 25 October 1963, the DCI responded to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in a Dear "Ros" letter identified as TS188384-A. In his letter McCone says that he is currently engaged in a comprehensive review of emergency and war plans as they apply to the intelligence community, ~~And~~, more specifically, to CIA. He says that this study should be completed by the end of the year. McCone reminds Gilpatric that agreements exist with the Joint Chiefs of Staff for phasing certain CIA overseas assets in the military upon the commencement of hostilities in command areas. He says that in the broader field of collection analysis and production of finished intelligence for policy makers, particularly at the Washington level, his views may be influenced by the study that is underway. McCone adds that he will be in touch with Gilpatric at a later date when "I have determined to my own satisfaction just what the arrangements should be for the intelligence community at the national level." It seems from the tenor of McCone's response that he is firmly asserting his responsibilities as the DCI.

4. Nearly two years later, on 13 July 1965, the DDCI, Mr. Helms, in a memo for the Deputy to the DCI for national intelligence programs evaluation, picks this point up. He was reminded by the IG's 1965 report on the survey of NPIC that the question raised by Gilpatric in his October 1963 letter to McCone was never really answered. The DDCI points out

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that although the issue has been dormant, it is unlikely that it has been forgotten by the DOD. I find no further reference to this matter in any of the documents available to me as of this date, so I am uncertain as to what, if any, official action has been taken with respect to this matter since that time.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ WORKING PAPERCHARTER FOR NPIC TO DO IMAGERY INTEPRETATION

1. In the same 13 July 1965 memo which the DDCI, Mr. Helms, wrote to the Deputy to the DCI for national intelligence programs evaluation, Mr. Helms points out that NSCID 8 may not be an adequate charter for the DCI's exercise for responsibility to provide a National Imagery Interpretation Center as opposed to a National Photographic Interpretation Center. Helms points out that NPIC is now receiving  radar imagery. He seeks advise and recommendations from the Director NIT<sup>P</sup>E concerning what if any changes should be recommended in NSCID 8 to provide for across the board imagery interpretation at NPIC. This is the first and last document that I have come across relating to this subject. The subject, incidentally, was raised in the IG's 1965 report on NPIC. I am not aware whether or not there has been any further discussion on this matter.

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THE NPIC PROBLEM

1. The first document that I have which refers officially to the so called NPIC problem is dated 2 July 1965. It consists of the results of a study of <sup>the</sup> an IG report on NPIC and the DDI <sup>(NPIC)</sup> White Paper by Hank Knoche as requested by the Deputy DCI, Mr. Helms. This is an extremely significant and revealing document in that the analysis of the problem and the recommendations for its solution already at this early date portend the Agency's position with respect to these matters and to the ~~Janied~~ <sup>JIRG</sup> report more than a year later.

2. In the covering memo Hank Knoche lauds the IG report and urges that Mr. Helms read it in its entirety. He does not believe that the DDI White Paper is worth spending much time with, though he points out that the DDI memo accompanying the White Paper is largely a confession of an inability to suggest ways of solving the problem at NPIC other than to honor demands.

3. With respect to the NPIC problem Knoche says there are four primary aspects:

- a. That the NPIC product is crucial, and that it provides the only hard information on the nature and dimensions of the Soviet strategic threat.

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- b. That the volume of materials collected has been on the rise, and that in the next few years the quantity and quality of these materials will increase substantially.
- c. That compared with the expense of collecting the information, the number of dollars devoted to its exploitation are very, very small.

After having seemed to take a position rather sympathetic to the NPIC problem, Knoche's final point is one very critical of the Center. He says that read in its entirety, the IG report to him constitutes a strong inditement of NPIC management, and in turn the management responsibility of the DDI. He says there is need for change, one might presume, close to the top in NPIC, but he hastens to add that Art Lundahl must remain at the helm of NPIC.

4. Knoche continues by summing up the projected increases in inputs and the cooresponding projected needs for personnel and funds to run NPIC during the next five years. He adds that the IG report points out that these projections may well be conservative. Knoche questions this. He believes that the NPIC projections can be cut back substantially. First of all, he says that much greater selectivity can be exercised in accepting requirements at NPIC. He agrees with the IG that NPIC has, to some degree, been the victim of its own "can do" philosophy. Knoche also refers to the

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discussion in the IG report about the need for more attention to the problems of photographic exploitation. Knoche personally challenges the proposal to establish a committee on exploitation. He doubts the wisdom of setting up a second committee which might only feud with COMOR, thus presenting the USIB with a series of Hobson's choices. Knoche states his personal preference for adding to the tasks of COMOR another dimension, namely, responsibility for making recommendations on the exploitation program. It is, thus, interesting to note that as early as July 1965, proposal to create what later became COMERIX was advanced by Mr. Knoche.

5. At this early date, it is also interesting to note that Knoche is challenging the excessive number of support personnel in the Center. He feels that if NPIC processes can be streamlined, then it follows that the ratio of support personnel can be cut significantly. One way of doing this he suggests is to legitimize satellite activities. This is not the first time that such a course of action has been proposed, the former DDI, Robert Amory, Jr. proposed this as early as 1960. Knoche does point out, however, that were satellite collection to be legitimized, that many support personnel could be saved not only in the control of the materials but also in the special processing facilities needed to publish the results of exploitation.

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6. It is also interesting to note, that in July 1965, Knoche is suggesting the possibility of tasking PI units in the community other than in NPIC to do some of the photographic interpretation. He also mentions that [ ] would be ready and willing to undertake exploi- 50X1 tation assignments.

7. In coming up with some proposal as to where the additional people to man NPIC might come from, Knoche proposes that the vast majority of them come from within the DDI. He thus envisions cross training with some of the analysts so that they might become competent PIs. Knoche points out that one of Art Lundahl's prime contributions to the procedures for photographic interpretation, has been the provision of quantities of collateral for the photointerpreters. He points out that this has resulted in <sup>providing a</sup> ~~provisional~~ wealth of all sorts of information for NPIC PIs. This, says Knoche, has clearly led to a duplication of much material assembled and used elsewhere in the Agency. Why not, says Knoche, move many of the analysts to NPIC and let them work there where the photography is and where there are adequate amounts of collateral? More over, these same analysts are the ones who are <sup>4/6</sup> ~~leveling~~ many of the requirements on NPIC and contributing to the increased work load. If they were moved to NPIC, Knoche believes this would not only provide for more economical procedures in exploitation, but it also might eliminate some unnecessary requirments.

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8. Knoche points out that there are a number of conditions which make it difficult to project figures for manning NPIC in the next several years. He points out, for example, that there are still no firm decisions about projected intelligence requirements in the state of the satellite art. A number of new systems as well as improvements to old collection systems are under consideration but no firm decisions have been made. Until more precise answers are available, however, Knoche admits that it is only wise to figure on greater volume, and the consequent need to increase at least in some measure NPIC personnel and costs. Another <sup>imponderable</sup> ~~improbable~~ that he mentions is R&D, he says that he believes NPIC R&D estimates should be regarded as exaggerated. He says the NPIC projection lacks precision and rational. He adds, however, that breakthroughs in the R&D field should result in both reduced future spendings for R&D and <sup>improved</sup> ~~improved~~ processing of information with the resulting decrease in work load.

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9. After gazing at his crystal ball, Knoche comes up with projected figures for NPIC for 1970 for personnel and dollars that are about midway between the then current figures and the NPIC 1970 projection. In a private conversation with Hank, he admitted that these figures were pretty much pulled out of thin air.

10. Knoche concludes his study with a serious of recommendations as follows: (a) that the deputy DCI insist on early actions in response to the recommendations made by the IG in his report of the survey of NPIC. (b) that the executive director, DDI, and the Director, NPIC, be charged with proposing bold and imaginative programs to meet the recommendations of the IG. (c) that the executive director, be asked to expedite a look at the question of legitimizing satellite reconnaissance and the handling of satellite products. (d) that the deputy, DCI, direct that early action be taken to fill the 100 authorized, but unfilled slots currently available to NPIC, and that he further authorize a buildup to a figure of 1200 capacity of the current space in Building 213. He stresses however, that a proposal acceptable to the DCI should be presented to him in justification for proceeding with this buildup. (e) that the Deputy, DCI direct the executive director to begin to work with the DDI and the director, NPIC to make more specific proposals for funding and manning NPIC. (f) that the deputy, DCI direct that action be taken to further plans for future space reconnaissance collections systems and that steps be taken to ensure the closest possible <sup>rapport</sup> ~~repair~~ between NPIC and the collectives. <sup>ars</sup> (g) that the deputy DCI

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arrange with the DCI and USIB to revise the charter for COMOR so that it includes responsibility for assessing the impact for collection on <sup>the</sup> exploitation process at NPIC. (h) that the Executive Director, the DDI, and the Director, NPIC, be required to take early action to bring overtime at NPIC under better control. It is interesting to note that Knoche comments that just because a new package of materials has been received, there is no need to begin immediate around-the-clock exploitation. Knoche adds that DOD is a principle consumer of this immediate readout and may not be content with delaying it unless told by the very top that there is need for the institution of <sup>orderliness.</sup> "Adolescent" (?) (i) that the deputy DCI direct that the NPIC problem and its implications become a prime factor in the development of Agency long-range plans now underway.

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MORE ON THE NPIC PROBLEM

1. In a memorandum dated 13 July 1965, and signed by Richard Helms, the Deputy Director, he addresses the Executive Director, pointing out that the purpose of his memorandum is to generate new approaches to dealing with the NPIC work load. He stresses that the Agency is in no position to request relief from the Bureau of the Budget or the White House until these new approaches to the NPIC problem have been explored thoroughly and future plans have been made and fully justified.

2. The memo touches on the following points, all of which were mentioned in Hank Knoche's analysis of the NPIC problem: (a) He asks the Executive Director to arrange for close and frequent contacts between the IG, the DDI, and the Director, NPIC to ensure early response to the IG's report. (b) He calls for imaginative and bold proposals to solve the problem of the growing work load at NPIC. Among other things he cites the need for looking into the assigning of analysts from elsewhere in the DDI to work at NPIC, and to seek to decentralize some of the photographic interpretation to other elements in the intelligence community. (c) He brings up the question of the <sup>need for a special compartment in the</sup> ~~compartment~~ of security system and asks the Executive Director to look into the question of revising it. (d) He calls for ways and means to reduce the support personnel and the overhead at NPIC. (e) He calls for the enlargement of <sup>the charter of</sup> COMOR and the addition of responsibilities in the exploitation field. (f) He speaks of the need to improve liaison between NPIC and the planners of overhead reconnaissance systems. (g) He speaks for the need to have detailed justification and explanation of NPIC's R&D plans. (h) He suggests the possibility of redoubling efforts to fill

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the vacant positions at NPIC, but cautions that first he would like to know what the possibilities are for filling most of those positions from within the Agency.

3. If this memo is reminiscent of Hank Knoche's assessment of the NPIC problem, it is no chance occurrence. Hank Knoche told me in a private conversation that he had drafted this memo for the Deputy DCI to send to the Executive Director. It seems to me exceedingly significant that at this early date, long before the JIIRG study was completed, Knoche had been given the responsibility for staffing out the proposals for the solution of the NPIC problem, and that many of the recommendations that he made were ultimately adopted.

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## Space Requirements of NPIC

In the fall of 1965 NPIC forwarded to the DDS a staff study on space requirements. Although I do not yet have a copy of this staff study, it is apparent from the context of comments in other memos that NPIC was pointing out to the DDS that recent approval had been given for an increase in personnel strength at NPIC [redacted] by June 1967. NPIC apparently pointed out that Building 213 could accommodate [redacted], and, therefore, space would be lacking to accommodate 325 of the additional personnel. The NPIC staff study also apparently pointed out the need for collocating any new facility with the existing NPIC facility in Building 213.

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In a memo dated 1 December 1965 for the DDS from the Director of Logistics, George Meloon, Meloon says that he concurred in the NPIC staff study and the selection of [redacted] because of its proximity to Building 213A; the latter building, Meloon points out, could, with modifications, serve the new building as well as Building 213. What Meloon proposes in his memo is the construction of a one-story building having 65,000 sq. ft. of space and located on the site of [redacted] at that time, a Navy garage. The estimated cost of this construction, including the relocation of activities presently in [redacted], is [redacted]. Meloon estimates that the relocation of Building 213, the demolition of the present structure and the construction of the NPIC addition could all be accomplished in 24 months.

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On 29 November 1965 a draft memorandum was prepared from the DDS for the DCI. The subject was "Additional Space for NPIC" and the request for approval of construction. This memorandum summed up the major points in the NPIC staff study pointing out NPIC needs and the proposal for satisfying them. The memo

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further pointed out that the necessary funds were not included in current budgets and it requested the DCI to approve this construction project in the amount specified. In this draft memorandum for the DCI it said that there were attached copies of the NPIC staff study and a memo from the Director of Logistics on the logistical implications of the proposed new building. It would seem to me that the memo from the Director of Logistics is the one dated 1 December 1965 and mentioned in the previous paragraph. There is as yet no indication that this memorandum for the DCI was ever finalized and forwarded by .

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On 16 December 1965 the Director of Planning, Programming and Budgeting sent a memorandum to the DDS. The subject of this memorandum was "Construction of Additional NPIC Space." It referenced the memo for the DDS from the Director of Logistics dated 1 December 1965, same subject. This would seem to indicate that upon receipt of the memo from the Director of Logistics, the DDS sought the advice and opinion of John Clarke. In his memo of 16 December for the DDS Clarke mentions the fact that undoubtedly the PI program will grow in the future. He points out that it is the subject of budget negotiations in CIA and the entire community. In this connection he speaks of the JIIRG study then underway. He admits that Agency figures seem to support the position that the activity at NPIC will grow substantially in the next five years. He says, however, that until the manpower ceiling figures can be set there is little hope of getting funds for construction. He closes with the admission that a serious problem could develop in the meantime and that dual shifts might be the only solution. From this memo it is apparent that the subject of additional space for NPIC is already being questioned in higher echelons within the Agency. It is further

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evident that at least at this time the Agency was reluctant to undertake the difficulty of justifying any proposal for increased space for NPIC without a careful study of the manpower ceiling.

On 21 December 1965 the DDS wrote a memorandum for the D/DCI/NIPE. The subject was "Construction of Additional NPIC Space" and attached were two memos. One was the 16 December 1965 memo for the DDS from the Director of Planning, Programming and Budgeting. The other was the 1 December 1965 memo for the DDS from the Director of Logistics. In his memorandum of

21 December [ ] summed up the situation pointing out that the anticipated growth of NPIC could be accommodated only by new construction, that some internal adjustments such as dual shifts could be made, and that the construction under consideration would require a minimum of two years.

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[ ] points out the fact that the JIIRG study then underway would have a bearing on the decision. He requests the Director of NIPE to review the attached memoranda in the context of the JIIRG study to determine whether or not it would be possible to make some interim decisions concerning the proposed NPIC construction. Before completion of the JIIRG study he asks for any guidance that the Director, NIPE, can give him. There is no record in the materials that I have on hand that the DDS ever received a response from the Director, NIPE.

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On 2 February 1966 the DDS wrote a memorandum for the record on the subject of NPIC space problems. He points out that this is a record of a meeting on 26 January 1966 with the Executive Director - Comptroller concerning the NPIC space problem. According to the DDS it was agreed not to wait until the projected completion of the JIIRG report in June because to do so would lose six months lead time. It was agreed to project an NPIC population of 2900 and base a construction program on it. It was agreed



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that the new space must be colocated with NPIC and that relocating of NPIC at Headquarters was not feasible. It was agreed that the Office of Logistics should immediately initiate informal discussions with the Public Building Service, GSA, and the Department of Navy to take over [ ] and have 50X1 it relocated. It was agreed that informal negotiations should be entered by the Public Building Service with the Geological Survey in an attempt to determine their plans for moving from Building 213. It was agreed that the Office of Logistics should work with [ ] of NPIC in planning for 50X1 occupancy of the new building. It was agreed to project a full scale building rather than a one-story structure with a view to putting other Agency tenants in the same building. It was finally agreed that no formal <sup>+</sup>AE contracts would be undertaken at this time but that after plans were made and the Navy reaction was determined that approval of the Bureau of the Budget and congressional committees would be sought. From the contents of this memorandum it is apparent that the Executive Director was prompted for some reason not entirely clear to proceed immediately at least with serious plans for some rather large-scale construction. It is all the more puzzling when one recalls serious doubts <sup>cast</sup>passed upon the initial proposal for the construction of a one-story building by John Clarke more than a month previously. On the 9th of March the Director of Logistics wrote a memorandum for the Acting Deputy Director of Support proposing an additional building for NPIC. In this memo he purports to be responding to "your request" for tentative information for planning so as to arrive at an estimate of the size, and the cost, and the time to complete another building for NPIC. As far as size is concerned, he is proposing a building of 450,000 sq. ft. to be constructed at a cost of \$25.8 million dollars with the complete planning, relocation and construction effort to take 46 months, and with the new building to be located

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on the site of  Here then, presumably in response to the agreement reached between the DDS and the Executive Director - Comptroller on 26 January, is a proposal for a new full-scale building for NPIC, large enough to accommodate a projected NPIC population of  persons and at a cost approximately ten times the proposal of only three months earlier. It is further interesting to note that this much larger and more urgent project was projected in spite of the comments by the Director, Planning, Programming and Budgeting to the effect that the Agency would be unable to justify any such construction until the JIIRG report was finished and a firm figure set on the personnel ceilings for NPIC. In a private conversation with Hank Knoche on 31 October 1969, Hank pointed out to me that this expensive and grandiose scheme terminated all plans for further construction for NPIC.

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The next time construction for NPIC is mentioned is in a memo for the record dated 8 July 1966 and signed by John M. Clarke, Director of Planning Programming and Budgeting. The subject was the "Bureau of the Budget Review of the Fiscal 1968 Program Issues." Present at this meeting were a number of Bureau of the Budget staff members, including Charles L. Schultze, Director. Agency representatives included Richard Helms, Col. White, John Bross and John Clarke. In this meeting Schultze requested among other things that proposals on new building for NPIC be separated from consideration of other budget items. Schultze further reminded Helms of a disagreement the previous year over the validity of factors supporting the build-up in NPIC and remarked that Helms should study the factors supporting any proposed build-up at NPIC in terms of the following alternatives: (a) a sharper priority on PI requirements and (b) a consideration of the amount of photography collected. He pointed out that the JIIRG report promised to be constructive. Helms

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agreed to this review and expressed his own concern of the growth of NPIC. He promised the manpower figures would be further considered with relation to practical considerations of recruitment and training. Schultze stated that there would be no new construction for NPIC, that economic pressures had to take precedence even over the legitimate need for an NPIC building. He asked Helms to consider alternatives such as double-shifting.

Although I do not have a copy of the memo, it is apparent that the Executive Director - Comptroller wrote a memo to the DDI on 24 July 1966 requesting a report on a study of alternatives to constructing a new building for NPIC. This memo was said to have an attachment . I do have a paper labelled attachment. It is entitled: "Alternatives to the Construction of a New NPIC Building." It appears to be the attachment to the Executive Director's memo to the DDI on 24 July. This attachment states the problem, namely, that the Director, Bureau of the Budget, has requested the DCI to consider alternatives other than the construction of a second building to satisfy NPIC needs. He asked the DDI to base his analysis on more than one assumption concerning NPIC manpower over the next five years, i.e., 1968 to 1973. He says the assumption should be clearly stated and show both CIA and non-CIA personnel. He asks that the study be carried out under the general direction of the DDI with support and assistance from the DDS and with further guidance from the Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting. He <sup>sets</sup> ~~says~~ the report deadline of 20 September 1966. He says the study should include analysis of the following alternatives: (a) intensified use of the present space including possible double shifts, (b) the possibility of expanding NPIC operations into other leased or government-owned buildings such as attaining more space <sup>from</sup> the Geological Survey or the use of space in  50X1

This memo and attachment clearly follow from the 8 July 1966 meeting of

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Bureau of the Budget representatives with the DCI and his representatives.

The final memorandum dealing with the subject of NPIC space is dated 16 September 1966 and it was prepared by Hank Knoche for the Executive Director - Comptroller. The subject has now become "Alternatives to Construction of a New NPIC Building." In this memo Mr. Knoche points out the DDI asked him, Knoche, to take action to meet the requests by the Executive Director - Comptroller to submit by 20 September 1966 a study of alternatives to constructing a new building for NPIC. Knoche says that since "it has already been decided not to seek construction funds in FY 1968 and because space for NPIC is a problem directly related to questions under study by JIIRG a study of alternatives as requested would best be deferred until after completion and approval of the JIIRG report and a determination of its effect on future needs for NPIC space." Knoche speaks of the intention to form a small Agency task group following approval and implementation of JIIRG to make the fullest possible study of space needs for imagery exploitation under Agency direction.

*Though this is the last memo I have dealing with proposed NPIC construction, it is not the last word. In his 4 Nov 66 memorandum for the Executive Director - Comptroller, Knoche advises against budgeting funds for acquisition of the 6th floor Geodetic [sic] space in Bldg. 213. He says the space isn't worth the estimated expense, and, anyway, it may not be needed.*

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## More on the NPIC Problem

On 10 January 1966 the Executive Director - Comptroller sent a memorandum to the DDI. The subject was "NPIC." In this memo, of which I do not have a copy, the Executive Director - Comptroller gives a list of points and problems on which he wants the DDI's views. He says he desires a meeting in the next few days. It should be noted that this must be the meeting that was held on 14 January.

On 17 January 1966 Hank Knoche wrote a memo for the record. The subject of this memo was "Status of Actions Concerning NPIC." This memorandum records the results of a meeting held on 14 January and <sup>chaired</sup> shared by Col. White. The subject of the meeting was "The Current Status and Outlook of Various Actions Intended to Alleviate Workload & Management Problems at NPIC." It is interesting to note that among those present were Cline, who was then the DDI, R. J. Smith, who was to become the DDI three days later, Art Lundahl,  50X1  and General Reynolds. 50X1

At this meeting Col. White invited Cline to comment on the status of actions on the June 1965 IG Report on NPIC. The DDI mentions a memo he sent to the DCI on 24 August 1965 indicating various actions that he intended to take and that the DCI had approved his memo in principle. Cline claimed that since that time two issues had developed to stall the accomplishment of his intended action. One was the question of budget and manpower for NPIC. The other was the JIIRG study which was then underway and scheduled for completion on the 31st of May 1966. Lundahl made comments on several points raised in the IG Report and of actions that had been taken or were about to be taken. Like Mr. Cline, Lundahl also pointed out that some of these actions were being deferred pending completion of the JIIRG study. By this time Colonel White

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was apparently becoming very testy about the manner in which everything seemed to be in a state of abeyance pending completion of the JIIRG study and he spoke up to say that the survey's findings were not likely to eliminate the NPIC problems. He asked Smith, who was to take over on 17 January as the DDI, to make a concerted effort to classify the issues and potential actions. He said there should be one list of actions which could be taken which are not dependent on the JIIRG study. There should be a second list of those which must await the JIIRG study <sup>but on</sup> before which some planning and suggested actions could be undertaken on the basis of assumption as to what the survey's findings are likely to be and then there should be a third list of those actions which cannot possibly be taken until the survey is completed.

On 31 January 1966 the new DDI, R. J. Smith, sent a memorandum to the Executive Director - Comptroller. The subject was: "Status of Actions - NPIC." As the Executive Director - Comptroller had requested on the 14th of January, Smith categorized<sup>2</sup> these actions in three groups. In the first list, which consisted of actions which had been or can be undertaken without reference to JIIRG, were the following: (a) Review the effects of NPIC R&D and automation, current and projected. (b) Investigate the possibilities for realignment of analytic forces within the Agency to augment NPIC's capabilities. (c) Assess the outlook for reducing the support and overhead in NPIC, including the prospect for less overtime work by NPIC personnel. (d) Make arrangements to improve liaison and rapport between NPIC and the planners of overhead reconnaissance collection systems at NRO, CIA, and USAF. His second list of actions were those on which some work can be accomplished pending the outcome of JIIRG deliberations. These actions included the following: (a) consider the need for a USIB committee to deal with imagery exploitation as well as requirements, (b) formalization and maintenance

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in strength of a CIA detachment at NPIC with a separate Table of Organization, (c) take steps to insure authoritative screening and validation of requirements levied against NPIC. His third list consisted of only one action which he felt must await final decisions of the JIIRG. This was to develop plans for the delegation of photo interpretation work to American military components, [redacted] From this memo it appears that the actions which the DDCI and the Executive Director had attempted to get underway the previous July following Hank Knoche's analysis and recommendations relative to the NPIC problem, were at last underway.

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## Agency Reaction to the JIIRG Report

On 19 August Hank Knoche wrote a memorandum for the record concerning a meeting that he had with the DCI and the Executive Director that morning to brief them on the JIIRG findings and recommendations. This led to a discussion of the Agency's comments which it was proposed that the Executive Director would send to General Reynolds. It was pointed out by Knoche that in the final analysis the Agency would sooner or later have to abide by something like the tasking plan proposed by JIIRG. There is no indication in this memo of any objection to this point of view, and it is to be assumed that this meant that the DCI approved. On the other hand, the DCI concurred "with emphasis" on Knoche's view that the COMEX proposal was unacceptable to the Agency because it invested the committee with executive authority which would conflict the DCI and the Director of NPIC in the management of NPIC affairs. At this point it is interesting to note that the DCI observed that it was his responsibility to see to it that a tasking plan is made good and that all the participants perform. To accomplish this he thought that some kind of special assistant would have to be designated who would be responsive to the DCI and to USIB and he suggested that such a mission might be assigned to the Director of NPIC. At this point a brief discussion ensued in which the point was made that the Director, NPIC, would not logically appear to be the one charged with responsibility for establishing the priority of intelligence exploitation requirements, but rather that the Director of NPIC would be charged with responsibility to insure the technical competence and performance of various PI agencies. According to Knoche's memo, it is not clear whether it was he or the Executive Director - Comptroller or both who threw cold water on the idea of assigning this honcho responsibility to the Director, NPIC.

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Knoche continues that no conclusion was reached but it was agreed that the paper should go forward from the Executive Director to General Reynolds with the addition of a statement emphasizing that a committee should not be invested with the proposed executive authority.

On 23 August 1966 Hank Knoche met with General Reynolds to discuss the Agency's views and comments on the JIIRG report. General Reynolds told Knoche that JIIRG was perfectly aware that not all the things that were recommended could be accomplished at once or even in a short period of time. Next, they discussed COMEX. Knoche told Reynolds that there was no sentiment anywhere in the Agency to provide a committee solution to a management problem and the Agency could not concur with the sweeping authorities assigned to COMEX by the proposed CDCID. Reynolds responded that he was inclined to recommend to the DCI that he either approve the COMEX proposal made by JIIRG or toss the whole JIIRG report out. Knoche replied that he felt there was too much that was good in JIIRG to have it ~~fall~~ <sup>fall</sup> over this one issue. Reynolds asked for Knoche's views on the nature of possible options and Knoche advanced his proposal that one reconnaissance committee with a COMOR and COMEX Working Group under a single authority could deal with the requirements phases of exploitation as well as the collection, and that in other areas/deal with the tasking plan, particularly the more technical fields, the Director of NPIC could be assigned increased responsibilities to insure performance. With regard to the JIIRG recommendation that construction of a new NPIC building be revalidated, Reynolds said that the intent of JIIRG was that this question should be restudied, or reassessed and that the word revalidated was a poor choice.

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Reactions to JIIRG

The following was taken from hand-written notes made by Hank Knoche after he had interviewed the several components and persons indicated.

NNPIC

- 1. Items not costed.
- 2. Political warning: downgrading of DCI and CIA.
- 3. COMEX improve on management.
- 4. See R&D growing; no shared funding arrangement.
- 5. Support load under Option 2 might not permit timely production.
- 6. Target methodology untested.
- 7. Plots to AMS, but NPIC will have to do other plots for first-phase exploitation.

- 8. Recommendations by NPIC.
  - a. Staff out options I, II, and III.
  - b. Study and recommend more equitable allocations for NPIC and get Bureau of Budget advise.
  - c. Clarify assignment of first and second-phase reporting.

[Redacted]

50X1

- 1. Use OPIC's only when authorized by USIB.
- 2. Keep OPIC's as standbys.
- 3. Concern over COMEX -- intrudes on COMOR.

[Redacted]

50X1

- 1. COMEX intrudes on standing substantive committees as well as on COMOR and NPIC.
- 2. Must insure validity and realism of requirements.
- 3. Let committees handle requirements.

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IG

1. Conclusions ok; recommendations not.
2. COMEX ok. Have COMEX develop tasks. Get control of the three variables.
3. No U.S. facility can take on more load; merely shift NPIC load to offices that can handle.
4. Increased target base will cause growth rather than reductions.
5. Flies in the face of experience against breakdown of functions for responsibilities. Giving a department a national responsibility gets bias into national reporting.
6. Means national vs departmental competition for resources.
7. Second phase will build data base in time otherwise there is duplication.
8. NPIC's support at mercy of DOD.
9. ADP not available in 66-71 time frame.

PPB

1. Enhance D/NPIC as national manager.
2. Accept JIIRG figures, but for different reasons. No new building now.
3. Don't commit to a figure beyond 68.
4. Restudy COMEX.
5. Cost of <sup>task</sup> ~~past~~ two is unknown. Comment: Does he mean Option II rather than task 2.

ORR

1. Too many on COMEX.
2. DIA and CIA should be the cogs. Services should be advisory.
3. Decries NPIC inability to do direct support.

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4. Why is DOD to be made responsible for second- as well as first-phase readout over Vietnam? Second-phase readout is of national interest. Will be much duplication. Example: Aircraft plants.

DDI

1. Leans to PI systems; not to needs of intelligence officers and producers. Let them be represented on whatever committee is established.

2. Committee in long run won't do. Need a non-substantive authority to make decisions in area of targeting and exploitation. Responsible to DCI and reporting to USIB.

3. Cost options 1 and 2. Must go number 1 sooner or later.

4. Thirty percent of DIA budget goes to mapping, charting, and area intelligence. Why no mention of these in tasking?

5. Security drives up costs.

6. The following comments are attributed to John Hicks.

a. Link COMOR and COMEX. Get ANRO and NPIC representatives, but have them under one permanent manager and staff. No committee.

b. Two staffs -- targeting and exploitation, with representatives from all USIB agencies.

c. CIA could assign representatives from producing offices.

d. Give OPIC's to NPIC.

e. Intelligence problems decreasing. This and better resolution will bring reduction of resource forecasts.

DDS&T

1. JIIRG unacceptable. Erodes DCI and CIA authorities. COMEX not justified; nor is existing mechanisms. Duplication not proved.

2. Remand in order to cost the duplication. Take note of existing committees. And take note of NPIC responsibility under NSCID #8.

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3. Have USIB committees and NPIC take steps to reduce duplication.
  4. Not necessary to form USIB committee on R&D. COPE and ISCIG provide adequate coordination.
  5. NPIC R&D ok. Extension of R&D as common concern is ill-defined.
  6. Tasking plan unclear and not costed. Might fragment well-regarded PI efforts.
  7. Gives responsibility to offices lacking expertise, equipment, etc.
  8. Committee cannot override Agency lines of command.
  9. Will not cure but will foster duplication.
  10. What about uncategorized targets.
  11. OSI Annex: Affects CIA ability to do its work.
  12. FMSAC: Elevates DIA; wrecks CIA. Bring IAD to Headquarters.
- Go for Option I. "Political dynamite."
13. OLDHAM: Alternative not costed. Add COMEX to COMOR.
  14. CROWLEY: "Deceptive."

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## NPIC and the JIIRG Recommendations

On 15 September 1966 E. H. Knoche wrote a memorandum for Mr. [ ] 50X1  
 [ ] and commenced it with the salutation: [ ]. In this memorandum 50X1  
 Knoche speaks of "our discussion yesterday" and a chat that Knoche had  
 with [ ] "yesterday afternoon." Knoche says that 50X1  
 he made the point with Hal and John that it was important to discuss some  
 aspects of the JIIRG Report that seem uncertain or trouble to people at NPIC.  
 He requests that [ ] prepare a list of such questions and arrange to meet 50X1  
 with him and Hal and John on Monday. Knoche then says he wishes to re-  
 iterate some of the advantages of the JIIRG proposals as he had presented  
 them to [ ] on the previous day: (1) According to the JIIRG proposal all 50X1  
 aspects come within USIB cognizance, thus enhancing the DCI's ability to  
 deal with the entire PI problem in the intelligence community. Knoche adds  
 parenthetically that this is a point that caused great difficulties for  
 General Carroll within DOD, that Carroll insisted on including this provision  
 in the face of opposition and that Knoche feels he is worthy of DCI's support  
 in this regard. (2) It provides clear authority for NPIC to do third-phase  
 reporting, and that in the area of greatest significance -- the strategic  
 threat. (3) It recognizes CIA's right to do departmental PI exploitation  
 across the board. (4) It provides savings, primarily by using NPIC support  
 facilities in the preparation of all national basic reporting. (5) If the  
 JIIRG recommendations are adopted, money and manpower needed to do the job  
 will be approved by the Agency and Bureau of the Budget, if the funds and  
 manpower requested are consistent with JIIRG findings and principles. Knoche  
 then digresses to point out that these advantages which he has enumerated  
 are of particular importance to the top leadership in the Agency, and he  
 urges [ ] and all other NPIC officials to adopt a positive and constructive 50X1

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attitude toward JIIRG findings and recommendations. He cautions against giving any appearance of being a "dog in the manager." He reminds [ ] that his and Art Lundahl's leadership over the years has been too brilliant to risk the possibility of tarnishing their reputations now. Knoche then returns to his consideration of the JIIRG recommendations to point out that he realizes there are a number of points that require clarification and revision. He says that in his judgment the proposal for COMEX constitutes an intrusion by a committee into the field of management. He adds, however, that some alternative is necessary in order to provide a champion for the cause of exploitation. Knoche points out that he is aware that [ ] and his colleagues are troubled with points other than the one just mentioned. He says he is glad that [ ] raised these points in his discussion of the previous days and it is that in order to deal with them that he proposes the meeting on Monday. He points out, however, that he does not believe that these questions invalidate the good points of JIIRG or the advantages that he has enumerated. He says that [ ] must realize that it is in his own interest in most of these cases that provisions in the JIIRG report should be kept general and flexible so that NPIC can develop its own ways of meeting the general principles and objectives. He says that with this approach NPIC can find itself with broader powers, with the possibility of making wider contributions, and receiving wider recognition by pressing ahead in developing new solutions and new procedures. He closes with the remark that change is inevitable and says that it's [ ] and Art's job to be the masters of the changes.

On 30 September 1966 [ ] wrote a memo addressed to "Mr. Henry Knoche." The subject of this memo was "Work Force Needed at NPIC and RAD to Meet Current Requirements." The contents of this memo, according to Steele, were derived mainly from the August NPIC Workload figures. [ ]

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concludes that it would take about 80 PI man-months per month to do third-phase requirements under JIIRG Option II, and that it would take about another 80 PI man-hours for mission exploitation. [ ] thus, comes up with the figure of about 160 PI's for PAG. There is a marginal note at this point made by Knoche, "SEA Double Checking Field Readout plus extensive third-phase work on logistics per DIA request." [ ] says that it would be foolish for him to estimate the numbers of support people needed at NPIC to handle the Option II workload, but points out that ratios have been worked out for the number of support people needed to service a given number of PI's. [ ] comments also on the IAD workload under JIIRG Option II. He comes up with a figure of about 100 PI's. He says he sees no evidence of increased requirements on IAD from increases in volume for resolution of film.

On 31 October 1966 [ ] wrote a memorandum for the Assistant to the Director, Mr. Knoche. The subject of this memo was "Estimated Personnel Costs for Option II of JIIRG." In his memo [ ] stresses that this is a rapid assessment, made under a 48-hour deadline. He also points out the assumptions under which the estimates were made. The results call for 1,690 employees in NPIC and IAD by the end of Fiscal 1968. [ ] says CIA would provide 1,568 of these. [ ] stresses that no comparison is possible between these figures and previous projections made by NPIC for a five year period because of the differing concepts and assumptions. [ ] speaks of the reservations and apprehensions in NPIC concerning the operational concepts of the JIIRG study and says that these have made quantification difficult. He adds, however, that he believes that the results are accurate and objective. [ ] uses the IAD projection as a basis for making comments about the strong reservations that CIA employees, presumably in IAD, have that their previous fine record of performance will be impossible under the JIIRG proposal, and that their past support of the Agency analytical effort

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may be expected to diminish by 50 percent. In closing [ ] refers to a memo 50X1  
by Mr. Lundahl dated 14 October 1966 and sent to the DDI. [ ] adds that 50X1  
"it is clear that a strong show of constructive concern and interest in the  
future of photo interpretation under CIA auspices is necessary."

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## The Lundahl Memo of 14 October 1966

On the above date Art Lundahl wrote a memo for the DDI on the subject of the effect of proposed FY 67 personnel ceiling cuts on NPIC.

Lundahl says that he has studied the three alternative cuts and finds they will have a serious effect in meeting current commitments and even more serious effect in meeting commitments three or four years in the future. He reminds the DDI that the JIIRG report, which has not yet been approved, recommends additional NPIC personnel through 1970. Lundahl lays it on the line when he says that repeated cuts below levels needed for present and projected JIIRG workloads "seriously challenge the intent of CIA to support a National Photographic Exploitation Program and particularly the National Photographic Interpretation Center."

Lundahl recounts the history over the past six months during which the Center has been requested to renew the implications of successively lower ceilings below this  CIA employees requested for Fiscal 67. He points out that whereas CIA is experiencing budgetary constrictions in providing resources for exploitation that NRO and DOD are funding the development of new and revised collection systems. He points out that unless the Agency is willing to make plans and provide funds for the exploitation of the inputs from these systems, NPIC may be counted out of the exploitation/take from these systems. He recommends that if the Center is not given funds to provide for the exploitation of such materials that the collection authorities should be so advised.

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Lundahl says that the DCI "must seriously examine the extent to which CIA can support a bonafide national exploitation center." He recommends that

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whatever JIIRG option the DCI chooses, the Department of Defense should be advised of the limitations of NPIC to provide technical assistance and exploitation resources needed to exploit the material so that DOD can budget and plan for the technical assistance and the exploitation currently assigned to NPIC.

Lundahl concludes with the statement that if CIA is to support a national center, no reduction in the planned resources for NPIC is feasible.

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## Agency Plans for the Management of NPIC Under JIIRG

On 31 October 1966 the DDI wrote a memo to the Executive Director - Comptroller on the subject of management and supervision of NPIC. The most important point in this memorandum was a proposal for the establishment of a Board of Directors to provide policy guidance to the managers of NPIC and to provide for a greater sharing of responsibilities and costs by the Department of Defense. He proposes that this Board of Directors consist of the Director, DIA, or his designee, the D/DCI/NIPE and the DDI. He claims that the proposed Board of Directors would have the following advantages. DIA would be impressed with the cost implications of requirements, thereby leading to better cooperation, <sup>in controlling them.</sup> (b) Increased DOD participation would provide relief in meeting funding and personnel needs for NPIC. (c) NPIC would get agreed-upon guidance from its two owners, DOD and CIA. (d) The three inter-related levels of controls would provide less costly and more efficient operation of NPIC. With respect to this latter point, the DDI points out that presumably the instrumentality would have a CIA Chairman, that in any case it would be responsive to the USIB and its chairman, that the DCI would have two representatives on the Board of Directors, and that the DDI would be the DCI's agent for the supervision and management of NPIC. The DDI pointed out that in speaking of NPIC he was considering PAG and all the support elements. He added that IAD would be resubordinated directly to the DDI and would be authorized to do departmental imagery interpretation. He added that this capacity should be carefully nurtured, and that IAD should be responsive to all appropriate and validated Agency requirements.

On 4 November 1966 E. H. Knoche wrote a memorandum for the Executive Director - Comptroller on the subject of some affects of the JIIRG report on NPIC. Basically,

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this memorandum answered two questions. First, can NPIC do the ADP job by JIIRG? The answer is yes, but not in the 18 months suggested by JIIRG. Three years is more like it. Knoche adds that success can be assured only if NPIC ceases to insist on a totally separate automation effort. He says that liaison with and assistance from Agency and DOD automation offices is needed. He adds that outside expertise, such as the United Aircraft study will also be needed. The second question was how much will JIIRG proposals add to NPIC costs? The answer is that current authorizations are generally sufficient to handle NPIC tasks assigned under JIIRG. Knoche adds that some increases may be needed, but that it would be best to wait until experience in working under JIIRG demonstrates what the needs are. He also advises against budgeting any funds for the acquisition of the sixth floor Geological Survey space in Building 213. He says the space is not worth the estimated expense and may not really be required. He points out that if this judgment should prove to be wrong, shift work is available, if needed. Knoche speaks of the NPIC costing that was done on JIIRG Option II on what he calls short notice. This obviously is in reference to the 31 October 1966 memo to him from  Knoche points out that this estimate includes 500 positions over current authorizations and 334 positions over the Fiscal 68 budget request for NPIC, and he states that he believes these estimates did not take into consideration provision of requirements control which will be provided by the instrumentality, plans to reduce cost publication, and advances in R&D and automation. My comment at this point is that note the introduction here for the first time of the suggestion that costs of publication should be reduced.

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On 7 November 1966 E. H. Knoche wrote a memorandum for the Deputy Director for Intelligence on the subject of the USIB instrumentality vs DNPIC. In this

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memorandum Knoche speaks of the DDI's having asked about the extent to which the USIB instrumentality as proposed by JIIRG would encroach on the managerial rights and responsibilities of the Director, NPIC. Knoche refers to the 13 functions that are proposed in the JIIRG report for the COMEX. He says that 12 of these 13 need doing. He recommends that number 6 be eliminated from COMEX responsibilities. This is the one that calls for a periodic survey of resources to insure their adequacy to meet national needs. He points out that this would intrude on managerial responsibilities within both CIA and DIA as well as the services. He also adds that this would conflict with the responsibilities for the proposed CIA-DIA Board of Directors. In two other case he suggests slight rewording. In the case of function 1 in which it was proposed that the instrumentality be responsible for formulating policies on the conduct of imagery exploitation activities, Knoche proposes that this be changed to formulate policies as guidelines for imagery exploitation activities. Knoche adds that this change would be in keeping with the author's intent anyway. In the case of function 5 he suggests a similar change. In number 5 the instrumentality was to be given the responsibility to do an annual five year program for planning. Knoche feels the program for planning conjures up too many management prerogatives to make this acceptable. He suggests that it should be changed to guidance and that it further should be made clear that the guidance is to be translated by the participating agencies not by the instrumentality.

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BOARD OF DIRECTORS

*(Re: Implementation of JIIRG)*

1. In a memorandum for the record by Hank Knoche dated 30 January 1967, he recalls the results of a meeting that included John Bross, R. J. Smith, and Hank Knoch at CIA initiative with General Joseph Carroll, and [redacted] 50X1 in Gen. Carroll's office. Presumably, this meeting took place on the same day as the date of the memo for the record. The announced purpose of this meeting was to discuss Agency thinking and planning regarding imagery interpretation in the wake of the approval of the JIIRG report.

2. Smith told Carroll of the resubordination of IAD and the appointment of [redacted] as the Chief, IAD. Smith then introduced the concept of a Board of Directors. According to Knoche's memo, Carroll seemed very uncertain about the distinction between the proposed Board of Directors and the USIB instrumentality. Parenthetically Knoche notes that no mention was made at this time of Agency desires of funding and management assistance from DOD as per Knoche's justification for the Board of Directors concept in his briefing of the DCI. Carroll said that he had no quarrel with the Board of Directors concept or the plan to use it for providing guidance for manageable decisions on a joint basis with DIA, but he wanted to see the terms of reference for the proposed Board of Directors before committing himself. It was agreed that the terms of reference would have to be compatible with responsibilities assigned to USIB instrumentality. At this point, Bross advanced the idea of one USIB committee rather than two as proposed in JIIRG. Carroll said that he had considered such an alternative, but rejected it in favor of a new group to handle exploitation problems. He said, however, that he was basically neutral, and that he expected in the long run there would be but one committee. It was agreed that [redacted] and Knoche would meet and prepare proposed terms of reference for the Board of Directors. 50X1

3. On or about 8 March 1967, John Clarke passed to Hank Knoche, a draft of the terms of reference for the Board of Directors of NPIC. <sup>in</sup> a note on his buck slip, John Clarke advised that this is "a clean draft incorporating the changes I talked about with you." This draft included a statement of the authority for the proposed Board of Directors, the purpose, its composition, the scope of its responsibilities, the scheduling of its meetings, and provisions for periodically reporting. I am not including any of these details in this recording because Hank Knoche indicated in his interview of 30 October 1969, that the Board of Directors proposal was not adopted by the DCI. At that time, Knoche pointed out, that <sup>the Executive Director</sup> ~~both~~ <sup>Comptroller in particular</sup> ~~the DCI and the DDI~~ felt that it would open the door to intrusions by DIA in the management of NPIC.

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AGENCY APPROVAL OF JIIRG FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The following comments are based on some notes by E. H. Knoche to use in briefing the Deputy DCI and the DCI on recommendations for Agency approval of the JIIRG report. According to these notes, the chief results and actions from CIA should be as follows: (a) The DCI to approve JIIRG recommendations and sign a letter to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. (b) ~~to~~ DCI to direct the D/DCI/NIPE to prepare a plan for USIB approval covering the missions and functions of the proposed USIB "instrumentality" for dealing with imagery matters (note that he does not say for dealing with imagery exploitation matters.) (c) The DDI, the D/DCI/NIPE, and the Director, DIA, arranged for themselves to act as a board of directors to provide policy guidance for the management of NPIC. According to Knoche's notes the objective of this is to increase the role of the DOD/DIA in sharing funding, staffing, and management responsibilities at NPIC. (d) CIA/IAD should be detached from NPIC and established as a departmental <sup>entity</sup> ~~intidy~~ under the DDI. The DDI, in <sup>consultation</sup> ~~consotiation~~ with other Agency <sup>components</sup> ~~components~~ should establish a mechanism for screening Agency requirements levied on IAD. (e) The DDI should take the lead in developing less costly procedures for producing imagery intelligence in NPIC and IAD.

2. On his working sheets, Knoche notes that there must be belt tightening in the analyst's procedures to match efforts to control requirements. These measures apply to (a) floss and gloss, (b) elevation of production controls, (c) adjustment of working procedures to no new space.

3. In a personal conversation with E.H. Knoche on 30 October 1969, Knoche stated that when the briefing of the DCI was completed on 12 January 1967, he signed the JIIRG report.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ WORKING PAPERSUBORDINATION AND SUPERVISION OF CIA/IAD

1. On 7 November 1966, Hank Knoche wrote a memorandum for the Deputy Director of Intelligence on the subject, "Subordination and Supervision of CIA/IAD."

2. In this memo, Knoche points out that IAD is authorized under JIIRG TO do departmental photointerpretation. Knoch adds that the DDI, working with the DDP and DDS&T, should develop a mechanism for screening requirements levied on IAD. Knoche points out that NPIC should not be doing this work as it had been in the recent past and that supervision of IAD should be removed from the hands of the Director, NPIC. Knoche points out that under the DDI, IAD could be developed into a model PI shop, one to be emulated by NPIC and others. Knoche further states that IAD could quietly be used to serve as sort of a watchdog over the military units which have recently been given national responsibilities under JIIRG. Knoche says the DIA would heartily approve such a shift in management.

3. Adapting the recommended change, however, would create certain problems. Among them Knoche lists the following: (a) The DDI must regulate and prioritize Agency wide requirements levied on IAD. IAD must not be permitted to do this alone as it had in the recent past. (b) Rotation of PIs should be stopped. DIA objects to the then current practice. (c) IAD should remain in Building 213 so as to utilize NPIC support. Knoche reminds the DDI, however, that providing support for IAD may lead to a request for similar support in departmental production by DIA ELEMENTS in Building 213. (d) Knoche suggests that IAD might be subordinated into the office of Central Reference which has experience in matters of common concern and which has a Deputy Chief who is familiar with imagery interpretation, as well as IAD itself. A marginal

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comment by Ed Proctor, the Deputy DDI, says "No!!".

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DRAFT

3 November 1969

[redacted]

COMMENTS ON SOME DETAILS OF THE EARLY HISTORY

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On today 29 October 1969, [redacted] came up to discuss several matters of mutual <sup>interest.</sup> ~~matters.~~ While he was here, I took the opportunity to question him on several points relating to the years prior to the establishment of the PI component in the Agency. Jim had been in the Agency for some time before the PI unit was established and was familiar with some of the people and some of the things that antedated the establishment of the PI component. I asked him about <sup>Lyman</sup> ~~Lyman~~ Kirkpatrick, whose name appeared on a 3 x 5 piece of notepaper attached to one of the early pieces of correspondence sent to [redacted]

50X1

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who later became the PI consultant. [redacted] had sent an unclassified personal letter to [redacted] under the date of 7 August 1950, in

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which he explained that he had personally drafted on eight sheets of Esquire onion skin, his proposal for a high-level PI component in the CIA. [redacted] said that this proposal was being transmitted to [redacted] in

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a double-envelope package through the courtesy of some Agency person in New York City. The 3 x 5 paper to which I refer, had Kirkpatrick's name on it and said, "Envelope marked to Kirkpatrick for [redacted]" This envelope

50X1

presumably was turned over in New York City to an Agency employee by the name of [redacted]

50X1

[redacted] observes that according to his recollection, Kirkpatrick was then deputy to the DDP, and that in all probability, the man in New York City to whom [redacted] papers were turned over was a DDP type, who

50X1

50X1

(cont.)

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GROUP 1  
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downgrading and  
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(Page Two)

delivered them to Kirkpatrick for transmittal to [ ] 50X1

Attached to the [ ] proposal, typed on the eight pages of 50X1  
 Esquire onion skin, is an official routing slip with the name [ ] 50X1  
 on it, / And with the remarks from [ ] as follows: "AD-RR asked 50X1  
 me to give this to you for safe keeping. I suggest that you hold it for  
 him on an 'Eyes Only' basis." Signed, [ ] According to [ ], at 50X1  
 this time the date on the buck slip is 12 July 1951. [ ] was 50X1  
 Chief of the General Division of ORR. [ ] was deputy chief of 50X1  
 the special center (~~Comment~~<sup>COMINT</sup> Center) / ORR.

In a memo written by Robert Amory Jr. on the 19 of March 1952, at  
 which time Amory was the Assistant Director, Research & Reports, he  
 requested approval by the Director of Central Intelligence for the appoint-  
 ment of [ ] as PI consultant. In the memo, among other things, 50X1  
 Amory pointed out that the position of Brown would be substantially the same  
 as that held by Mr. [ ] with respect to the latter's field. 50X1  
 According to [ ] was a consultant or contract employee 50X1  
 engaged by ORR to work on maritime activities. As Jim recalls it, [ ] 50X1  
 was doing a study on the success of ~~Comment~~<sup>COMINT</sup> as it related to all maritime  
 activities. Jim further has the recollection that [ ] was working 50X1  
 with this group, but on another subject. Alice of course, later became a  
 full time staff employee, and soon after the establishment of the PI element,  
 joined it as a PI.

One final note from [ ], was the observation that Robert Amory Jr. 50X1  
 replaced ~~Maksymiec~~<sup>Max Millikan</sup> as the Assistant Director, Research & Reports.

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