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CSD/NPIC-54-63  
18 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, NPIC

SUBJECT : CSD's Six Problems

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1. Forwarded herewith are CSD's six candidates for discussion at the proposed [ ] Seminar. In priority order they are:

- (1) Photo Intelligence Data Base
- (2) NPIC Reference Services
- (3) Representation on Operations Board
- (4) Future Growth of NPIC
- (5) Area Specialists
- (6) NPIC Photo Interpretation Reports

2. The above priority listing is in order of direct concern to CSD. From an overall NPIC point of view, however, I suspect Item 6 and Item 5 take precedence over the other four.

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
[ ]  
Chief, Collateral Support Division,  
NPIC

Attachments: (6)

NPIC/CSD: [ ] (8 Mar 63)

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Attachment 1 to  
CSD/NPIC-54-63  
8 March 1963

Photo Intelligence Data Base

Problem:

To insure the continued creation of an up-to-date machine language data base for machine storage and retrieval in response to future requirements for photo intelligence information and for identification of pertinent photographic coverage.

Assumption:

It is desirable to maintain as comprehensive a machine controlled data base as is possible without significantly interrupting the production of substantive intelligence.

Facts:

1. To date, the MCI (and to a lesser extent the OAKs, IPIRs, SITSUMs and detailed reports) has provided a detailed machine language index to the information derived from selected photography and to the film containing this information.
2. NPIC production of MCI's is lagging seriously. Whenever backlogs exist, there is considerable pressure to inactivate and delete targets in the Target Brief file.
3. Other photo interpretation groups, such as SAC, (which has completed MCI's on all but two missions) [redacted] are preparing immediate type reports from material not fully exploited by NPIC.


Discussion:

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A. Inclusion of Non-NPIC Produced Intelligence in the Data Base

1. Most photo interpretation reports are reviewed, summarized and cited in the Target Briefs if they add substantively to the Brief and are consistent with previously available information.
2. SAC [redacted] MCI's are not now included in the Target Briefs. They are sometimes referred to by NPIC photo interpreters preparing reports but, because they are not cited in the Briefs, they are often overlooked. As a result, NPIC has reported out some installations as new or newly identified when in fact they have been reported out by other agencies.

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3. Conversely, the non-NPIC immediate reports have carried some information which has not been accepted or verified by NPIC. CSD reviews these reports for new or significant information on missiles, atomic energy, BW-CW, and long-range bomber bases. The new information is called to the attention of the Assistant for Operations and/or the substantive photo-interpreters either verbally or by memorandum.

4. There exists no mechanism at the present time for validating this new information which we feel should be disseminated to the intelligence community and included in the Target Briefs. Analysts in CIA, DIA and the Services rely on NPIC for official missile site counts. In the past, over 20 percent of the missile sites reported by others have been rejected by NPIC. We feel such important information should not be inserted into the data base without verification.

Recommendations:

1. Where conflicts in interpretation and/or new information are contained in non-NPIC reports, NPIC should review the film and validate the information.
2. All validated information and any other information from non-NPIC photo interpretation sources which appears consistent with previously reported NPIC information should be inserted in the data base.
3. CSD should explore with SAC and others the possibility of exchanging MCI's in machine language form.

B. Film References on Inactive Targets

1. Targets are deleted from the Target Brief file because:
  - a) They cannot be identified, i.e., do not exist.
  - b) Photography indicates that the target is insignificant.
2. Targets are inactivated because:
  - a) They are not of sufficient importance (in the joint view of the MCI coordinator, CSD and the Assistant for Operations) to warrant inclusion in the MCI report; but
  - b) they are of sufficient size and complexity that the photo interpreter, in scanning the film, will identify, locate and readout the target, perhaps as a newly identified installation, unless he is told by the target briefs that it is known but of no current intelligence interest (e.g., abandoned or inactive airfields).

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3. The probability that targets which are deleted will become important for intelligence is remote; the probability that targets which have been inactivated will become important in the future is much greater.

4. We have two methods of identifying film pertinent to a given installation:

a) Via plots. A cumbersome time-consuming operation that leads a researcher to the approximate frames of photography concerned. There are only broad indications of cloud coverage, no indications of photographic quality, nor assurance that the template representation is accurate.

b) Via target briefs. The target briefs cite the exact frame and coordinates of photography covered and its interpretability. These references are machine retrievable.

5. In reviewing film foran MCI, the photo interpreter peruses the inactive targets. With a minimum of additional time, the pass and frame reference could be recorded for inclusion in the target brief but not the MCI. This would insure machine identification of photography pertinent to the target.

Recommendations:

Pass and frame references of inactive targets be recorded for inclusion in the data base.

**SECRET**Attachment 2 to  
CSD/NPIC-54-63  
8 March 1963NPIC Reference ServicesProblem:


To what extent will NPIC provide photographic intelligence reference service to other photo interpretation shops outside NPIC and intelligence production agencies.

Facts:

1. The primary function of CSD is to provide collateral support to NPIC photo interpretation activities and, to the extent feasible, to the departmental activities within NPIC.
2. NSCID 8 para 2f states, "The NPIC shall maintain on a selective basis a consolidated central file of photographic data as a service of common concern. It shall make arrangements for the exchange of photographs and photographic data with other photographic collections in the Intelligence community, and shall make appropriate recommendation to facilitate the coordinated development of compatible codes, indexes, and mechanized systems for the efficient recovery, selection and collation of available photographic data."
3. NPIC/CSD has developed a large file of Target Briefs which intelligence agencies and the DOD Departments and Commands have requested.
4. NPIC/CSD provides an automated photo/intelligence report storage and retrieval service.

Discussion:

1. The CIA "All-Source Center", the DIA Production Center, and other DOD photo interpretation shops have a need for and are establishing services similar to those being provided by CSD.
2. CSD has established a data base to service internal requirements which could satisfy many external requests for published P.I. information. On an ad hoc basis we already use the data base to satisfy DIA and CIA requests.
3. To accept and attempt to satisfy all external requirements will require an expansion of CSD personnel and equipment. The increments needed, however, would be far smaller than the ones which would be required by CIA and DIA to establish and maintain their own data bases.
4. We believe that NSCID 8 authorizes NPIC to provide the needed services to the intelligence community and that a centralized service would be more economical--government wide--than separate services.

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5. The extent to which NPIC is willing to supply Minicard copies of published reports, magnetic tapes of immediate readouts and target briefs, hard copy target briefs, and answers to search requests must soon be resolved.

Recommendations:

1. NPIC provide photographic intelligence reference services to other USIB members as a service of common concern.
2. That NPIC prepare a statement of the services to be offered and obtain the concurrence of OCR as executive agent for the CIA "All-Source Center" and of DIA.
3. Having obtained these concurrences, NPIC/CSD then expand its staff and machine capabilities as necessary to meet external demands for these services.

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Attachment 3 to  
CSD/NPIC-54-63  
8 March 1963

Representation on Operations Board

Problem:

To provide closer coordination, cooperation, and integration of effort between the support divisions within NPIC and the national photo interpretation effort.

Facts:

1. The Operations Board is charged with the approval and scheduling of national photo interpretation projects.
2. The members of this Board are the Assistant for Operations, the SIO's of the PI detachments.

Discussion:


1. The Operations Officer keeps the support divisions (CSD, PSD, PD, and TID) informed of the deliberations of the Operations Board. The Board's deliberations, however, commit the support divisions to certain deadlines without consideration of their internal scheduling and work loads. Conversely, photo interpretation projects scheduled by the Operations Board frequently cannot be accomplished until certain preliminary steps have been completed by the supporting divisions.

3. Because of the close interrelationships, it is believed there would be considerable advantage to having supporting divisions represented directly on the Operations Board.

Recommendation:

That the membership of the Operations Board be expanded to include representatives of supporting divisions within NPIC.

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Attachment 4 to  
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Future Growth of NPIC


Problem:

To estimate the level and nature of NPIC activity one, two and five years hence to provide a basis for the logical organization, staffing, training and equipping of the Collateral Support Division.

Discussion:

1. We have only the vaguest concept of the growth pattern anticipated for NPIC during the next few years. Only last week, quite by happenstance, I learned that proposed payloads this summer would include twice and possibly four times the amount of film previously carried. Yet extensive R&D efforts have been underway for some time and considerable long-range planning has been done.
2. We have been given a vague estimate of the T/O increase we may expect in FY-64. Presumably this estimate is based on the anticipated increase in PI strength which in turn must have some relationship to anticipated receipts of film. We have no projections beyond FY-64 and no projections of the balance between immediate and detailed reporting.
3. The necessity for close coordination of future plans for growth and development of assigned responsibilities between NPIC Divisions and Staffs is greater than ever before.
4. Some more definite guidelines extending over the next five years would provide a better criteria for planning the development of the Division, the formulation of data management system, and the installation of equipment.

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Attachment 5 to  
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Area Specialists

Problem:

Should NPIC develop collateral support and photo interpretation area specialists.

Facts:

1. NPIC (using the term broadly encompassing all personnel who work at NPIC) has experts on Soviet guided missiles, atomic energy, BW/CW, electronics, airfields, military installations, etc., and can provide these analysts on a moment's notice.
2. NPIC cannot boast of having a single analyst who may be considered an expert (one with up-to-the minute information) on the trouble spots of the world (e.g., Middle East, Indonesia, Tibet, China, North Korea, Laos and North Vietnam).
3. Foreign Governments in periods of crisis have requested and received U.S. Forces, e.g., Lebanon. NPIC on such occasions usually is called upon to do special studies for field commanders.
4. U.S. forces are near "points of contacts" with aggressor forces in several areas of the world.
5. "Brush wars" and revolutions have broken out in areas of the world that we've known little about, e.g., Indonesia, Tibet.
6.  military field commands welcome NPIC support and briefings.
7. With the exception of work done by the U.S. Army, little has been done in preparing photographic studies of regions or countries.
8. NPIC is frequently called upon to brief chiefs of states.
9. Crisis arise rapidly allowing little or no time for training of area specialists.
10. NPIC has sent some men to the field for immediate reporting that were poorly equipped with area knowledge.
11. The administration, the Director, CIA and Director, DIA have placed great reliance on the accuracy of immediate reporting.
12. NPIC SITSUMs, IPIRs and MCI's could be improved.

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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1. It is assumed that photography will continue to be used to determine indications of hostilities, confirm order of battle, verify intelligence reports, confirm indications of bloc penetration, watch for the introduction of missiles or nuclear weapons into a heretofore non-missile or non-nuclear areas, etc. It is also assumed that with the lessons learned from the Cuban crisis, greater reliance will be placed on photography to determine the above discussed items in other areas of the world.

2. The exploitation of "tactical" photography within the Center leaves much to be desired. "Exploitation" usually means the production of the IPIR, the MCI and a few random reports. For example, the total output from 29 missions on Indonesia was 16 field reports, 10 MCI's and 3 detailed and 3 informal reports. The intelligence community is considering flying some of these potential trouble spots again and is approaching the problem as though no photography existed.

3. The problem of area specialists was recognized by this Division several years ago and the creation of the Non-Soviet Section of the Research Branch was the result. There has been some area specialization by analysts in Geo-Military Branch of PID and editors have been employed in a regional or area basis.

4. Although it might be argued that we had no need for area specialists in the past, that a shortage of personnel existed, etc., future needs point to the existence of knowledgeable area collateral specialists and photo interpreters. This combination will lead to better immediate reporting and better overall knowledge of the trouble spots of the world.

Recommendations:

1. That the problem be recognized and that a selected cadre be trained.
2. That specialists be trained for China, S.E. Asia, India-Tibet, Latin America, and North Korea.
3. That these specialists be assigned the responsibilities for the immediate readout of photography in their respective areas.
4. That when these analysts are not engaged in immediate readouts or answering requirements they prepare area or country photographic surveys.

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Attachment 6 to  
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NPIC Photo Interpretation Reports

Problem:

To improve the effectiveness and timeliness of NPIC reporting of the results of photographic interpretation.

A. First and Second Phase Reports

Discussion:

1. The OAKs, IPIRs, SITSUMs, and MCI's have become sterile, stereotyped publications that make deadly dull reading. They need more sex appeal, both in content and presentation.
2. The reports state when there is no change from previous photo interpretation. When there is a change, however, the reports do not identify the change. The only way a reader knows what is new or what is changed is to compare the new readout with previous reports, item by item.

Recommendations:


1. Change the criteria for reporting readouts to require identification of changes from previously known photographic information.
2. Include a brief summary of the significant findings and highlights at the beginning of IPIRs, SITSUMs and MCI's similar to that now included in the OAK.
3. Include annotated photography of significant developments.

B. Detailed Reports

Discussion:

1. Detailed reports have a tendency to become bogged down due to the pressure of current reporting requirements and frequently do not meet publication deadlines. Consequently, we have been forced to rely upon "pre-releases," with the result that when detailed reports are finally published, more often than not they are history.
2. Many reports are issued as cables and memoranda which never come out as an official publication. Unless they are published, it is very difficult to insure the wide dissemination deserved, and valuable information is denied major segments of the intelligence community. Furthermore, the information contained in cables and memoranda rarely gets into storage and retrieval systems; consequently, it is lost to all but the immediate recipient.

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3. In an effort to put out cables in hard copy form, we have recently published some one-paragraph 5-10 line reports which have been the object of ridicule. These reports leave many questions unanswered and force interested users to refer to the photography or possibly submit a detailed photo interpretation requirement.

Recommendations:

1. Every effort should be made to streamline the production of detailed interpretation reports so that they may be published within deadlines.

2. We should reinstitute the PI Brief or Alert publication which would be used for quick answers, and to confirm cables, but which would include suitable annotated photography or graphics.

C. "PI Notes"

Discussion:

1. There is a definite need for an informal publication which would provide the PI analysts within NPIC with a simple means of publishing the many new bits and pieces of intelligence uncovered as a by-product of their daily work. Several other DD/I offices have such semi-official publications which permit publication of individual analysts' by-product findings and hypotheses. These publications carry a suitable caveat and are issued with a minimum of substantive and editorial review. They include graphics.

Recommendation:

Within NPIC, "PI Notes" prepared voluntarily by individual analysts could be submitted weekly to a Review Board. The Board would approve those items which are of intelligence value and appear substantively sound. Approved items would be published with a minimum of further processing.

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