

*Matl for OTR History*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM  
1951 - 1963

"I am trying to build up a corps of well qualified men here who are interested in making a career with the Central Intelligence Agency. To effect this, I recently established a training section which functions - as much as I dislike the term - as a sort of career management office." Thus wrote Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, then Director of Central Intelligence to Hon. John McCloy on 17 March 1951.

Back up a bit more. When Col. Matthew Baird, USAF, left his interview with Gen. Smith in November 1950, it was understood that on assignment to the Agency, his responsibilities would be (1) to create the framework for and help to administer a Career Corps and (2) to establish a program for the recruitment and training of junior officers who at the time were referred to as Professional Trainees.

On reporting for duty in January 1951, he found, with some surprise, that he had been made Director of Training with many responsibilities in addition to those discussed in November. This turned out to be an exceedingly fortunate decision for the Agency and, later, a happy one for me personally. For Col. Baird, I suspect, it was something else. He was cheated of some of the fun I had by being given a job which was a greater test of his abilities and purposefulness.

In any event, he was saddled with all kinds of training problems in addition to those he had agreed to tackle.

ORIGINATOR OF BA

THE PROPOSAL

"A PROGRAM FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CAREER CORPS IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY" was submitted to General Smith, DCI, by Col. Baird, DTR, on 3 July 1951.

It was first reviewed by [redacted] Assistant Director (Personnel),

who recommended that General Smith approve the plan in principle.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"1st Endorsement - To General Davison - 1. I do so approve. - /s/ W.B.S."

It is important to point out that the Career Corps and the Professional Trainee Corps were planned as interacting or complementary components. The primary objective was to make the best possible use of all members of the Agency through effective management, appropriate training, and accurate assessment of their qualifications and performances as individuals. If with good personnel management employees did not show promise in work situations, they would not be selected for the Career Corps. The Professional Trainees were to be only one source of highly qualified personnel. Eligibility for selection for the Career Corps was to come after two years of service.

Col. Baird recommended "that the Career Corps Program be administered by a Career Development Staff, and that a man, experienced in this field, be brought in and supported by an adequate staff."

He then defined the problems as,

"A. To devise a plan to select, recruit, and train young men and women of great promise, and to place them in the Agency where they will be of the greatest use," but he adds that "the Agency will continue to employ specialists who may be selected as careerists on the basis of their performance."

"B. To devise a method of identifying those employees of the Agency who have the highest potential for further development; to train and rotate them within and outside the Agency in such a way that they will develop the greatest usefulness to the Agency; and to place them in the most important positions. ---"

The Proposal of the Career Corps for which young recruits were to be prepared is important because it set up the fundamental purposes, ideals, and methods which eventually helped to make the JOT Program successful. Unlike the JOT Program, however, no one officer was appointed, as recommended to guide its development through the network of varying Agency functions, activities, and subjectiveApperevtsRwRele the 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP78-06365A000200070001-3 established.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

General Davison soon moved out of his post to be followed by five other incumbents, none of whom remained in the job long enough to put his imprint firmly on the policies of the Office of Personnel. Then the appointment of Mr. Emmet D. Echols, too late, gave some continuity to the direction of the Agency's personnel practices.

Without some aggressive and continuous leadership convinced of the need for a viable, uniform Career Corps, all attempts to develop one were casual and ineffective. Meanwhile, most of the substantive offices and staffs were acquiring qualities which were, for better or for worse, characteristic of their leaders. Among other things, they developed their own career services and policies relating thereto. Many of the suggestions in the Proposal for a Career Corps were neglected. The disparities in personnel policies in various components reminds one of Stephen Leacock's general who mounted "his horse and rode off in all directions".

#### THE PLAN

So much for the Career Corps. At first, its companion in the Proposal, the Professional Trainee Program, was all but ignored by the bureaucrats. Later on, as the Junior Officer Training (JOT) Program (its new name) gained recognition, they moved in with a vengeance, nibbled away at some of the principles and procedures which made it effective, complicated its administration, forced participation in its operation, and attempted to make it "all things to all people" which, in my view, cut down its efficiency.

During its evolution, the Program remained flexible in its procedures. It profited from its own experiences and the improved opportunities offered by the expanding Office of Training as well as the increased cooperation of the substantive offices it served. It is interesting to note that the principles of its structure as originally stated by Col. Baird remained in fact. There was, indeed, no need to change!

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Look at these headings in the Proposal -

- "I Criteria for Selection of Professional Trainees". This stresses "very high (academic) standing, language skill or learning facility, leadership and breadth, good personality, sound health and morals; previous military service or willingness to enter a service, motivation for government service, willingness to accept anonymity. (Also, there are notes on "Negative Criteria".)
- "II Recruitment of Professional Trainees". This includes the use of up to 50 University Consultants who "must be men of the highest quality" since they will be nominating students of the highest quality. Other sources are suggested such as separation centers of Armed Forces and CIA Personnel Procurement. Selection of applicants would be made "by DTR after consultation with the D/Pers."
- "III Basic Training "to provide - - the necessary skills and knowledge -- to make the most of on-the-job training". This included a 12-week course in the fundamentals of intelligence and of Russian, and improvement of reading and writing skills. Continuous evaluation - up or out - unsatisfactory trainees will be dismissed if a suitable low-grade job cannot be found for them.
- "IV Initial Placement (after basic training). "Place trainee in the most suitable position available" - study his various qualifications, personality, aptitudes and interests, and performance in basic training. After 4-6 months evaluate his performance in and suitability for that work. (It was also suggested that a number of slots for training overseas be set up for PT's.)

Here are additional quotes which served as the guidelines for its operation as the Office of Training itself developed. Parenthetically, let me emphasize that they were approved for Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP78-06365A000200070001-3

CONFIDENTIAL

question, "how, under ideal conditions, would you satisfy some of the particular and peculiar requirements for first rate professionals in our business?" These refinements were, indeed, the guts of the plan. They, more than anything else, stimulated enthusiasm for the Program of administrators, instructors, supervisors, and the JOT's themselves. Not so with the bureaucrats who were offended by the discriminations implicit in the selection and training of high potential employees. Such a system created second class citizens and, with it, antagonisms toward the Program:

- (a) "A professional trainee is a young man or woman who appears to have great ability and promise, wishes to make a career in CIA and is receiving basic training."
- (b) "The chief problem is to choose from among the many applicants who will meet the selection criteria those whose less tangible qualities justify high expectations of success in the Agency". (This, incidentally, was a prominent source of difficulty in interpreting our actions to recruiters.)
- (c) "A first-rate man must not be excluded because his category is full nor may a second-rater be brought in merely to fill a slot."
- (d) Students in college or graduate school who will later apply for CIA "should not be subsidized by us since anyone who is good enough for this program will have no difficulty in obtaining a fellowship or assistantship."
- (e) "At no time will the contact give the applicant the impression that he is being selected as a member of an elite corps., but rather that he will be given an opportunity to prove by his own performance that he is entitled to training and opportunity for advancement. (The underlining is Col. Baird's)
- (f) "The (Consultant) contact will recommend a few of the best students as professional trainees, and the remainder for other more specific employment in the Agency. Applicants with operational potential may be turned over

immediately to the covert offices, so as not to compromise their cover. To give the program high prestige and wide range, every effort will be made to recruit trainees from many colleges and universities.

(g) "The trainee's initial (on-the-job) assignment is of great importance, not only in terms of his own development, but of the efficiency of the offices and the agency as a whole."

(h) "This program is built around two theses (a) that the price of admission into the Career Development Program should be on-the-job survival ability, and (b) that the program is directed toward the really able."

(The first promotion should come in 6 to 8 months and the second in from 12 to 18 months after the first.)

(i) "The Professional Trainee Program is, in effect, a high-level-potential recruitment program, coupled with a basic educational or training effort to ground the individual in intelligence and area. It is proposed that at the end of an initial course, the participant be assigned to one of the offices."

Under the contemplated plan, trainees would be required to demonstrate a survival value and an ability to rise in order to be picked up at GS-09 level in the proposed Career Development Program. This would appear to meet effectively

any criticism of "favoritism" in the Professional Trainee Program. In this framework, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] undertook his work as first chief of the Professional Trainee Program in a small office in North Building.

In the course of the next ten years, the Program evolved, perhaps slowly, but with little if any deviation from the original projected methods of operation to the point where in 1961, its objectives were outlined in the following recapitulation given to all successful candidates. In so doing, we hoped to provide them with a clear understanding of what we expected to accomplish and

how we went about it. Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP78-06365A000200070001-3 had the

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1A

25X1A9a

25X1A

basis for developing mutual understanding and cooperation.

RECAPITULATION

1. You enter the Central Intelligence Agency to serve your country, not for self aggrandizement, public recognition, or an exciting life in exotic parts of the world. Ours is difficult work, requiring a keen mind, selfless effort, personal sacrifice, and the utmost dedication. You should not enter it unless you expect to work harder and under more difficult conditions than most of your friends, whatever their occupation. You should not enter it from a profit motive, because you cannot expect to accumulate wealth. At the outset we do not expect you to be highly motivated for a service about which you know so little, but we do expect you to be the kind of person who has the capacity for developing that motivation. It is our responsibility to train you for those activities which constitute dedicated service in CIA.

2. During the two years of your JOT status you will be under the direct supervision of one of the training officers of the Program. He is responsible to Chief of the Program and to the DTR for your training and development as an intelligence officer. It is his interest to provide you with the best opportunity and to use your talents consistent always with the needs of the Agency to progress in this profession. Your formal training will consist first of general orientation to the Agency, during which evaluations of your capacities are made. You will then be given intensive training in a functional area where you will learn the requisite skills. Then you will be assigned to a desk for a period of about a year to apply your skills and demonstrate your worth. The determination of these assignments is first and above all based on the needs of the Agency; second, the opinion of the JOT Program of where you can most appropriately apply your talents based on the principle of effective use of manpower; and third, your own interests and desires. It is during the on-the-job phase of your training that we hope you

will become motivated for service in CIA. Much of this incentive will be derived from the example set by your immediate supervisor. Accordingly, it is of great importance that your on-the-desk training program be well considered and well administered. Your training officer and your component supervisor is responsible for this, as well as other elements of your development.

3. There will probably be several members of your class who hold higher grades than those normally assigned. These people will fall into two categories:

a. Employees of the Agency who have been accepted for the JOT Program at the grades which they currently hold. They are called "internal" trainees.

b. Specially qualified individuals who have been recruited and hired for a special task and are on "directed assignment". They have had prior experience or possess skills in areas for which there is specific demand.

"Directed assignment" trainees enter training with the approval of the component to which they will be assigned. They will be transferred to that component as soon as their formal training is completed, and become subject to its promotion policies.

4. It is normal and proper for a young man contemplating a career to think about advancement and personal responsibilities. The Office of Training has established the policy of hiring and promoting junior officer trainees. The following relates to present conditions which are subject to change. Most JOT's are hired at GS-7. A few of the more mature candidates are hired at GS-8.

Irrespective of the date on which you enter on duty, you will become eligible for a one-grade promotion at the conclusion of the formal training period, some 32 to 34 weeks after the class begins. This is not automatic, but is based on your performance and attitude. Having been trained for a certain type of work, you will then apply this training to a specific job, normally for about a year. During this period, you are on trial with the supervisor to whom you have been assigned. You will have opportunities



- a. to prove your value to the Agency in a work situation,
- b. to convince your supervisor that you are a desirable addition to his component as a permanent employee,
- c. To evaluate your own fitness for this particular kind of service.

During this on-the-desk training period you remain a JOT. At its conclusion you will become eligible for your next promotion. Again, this is not automatic but based on the quality of your performance and your attitude. It must be recommended by your on-the-job supervisor. You will then be transferred to the task for which you have been trained and become the responsibility of that component. You will be in competition with your peers for whatever recognition you will later receive. The Office of Training no longer has any control over your promotions and you become subject to the policies of the part of the organization to which you have been reassigned. As in the Office of Training, the higher the grade, the longer you will wait for advancement. Outstanding performance is recognized by accelerated promotion.

5. It is a fundamental principle of the JOT Program that the trainees produce the highest quality performance of which they are capable, whatever the task assigned. All JOT's, except those on "directed assignment", must be ready and willing to accept any assignment. Due regard is given to family considerations and personal circumstances.

6. Security is the cornerstone of this business. Discretion in discussing any subject anywhere is mandatory. At all times you must be on guard to protect yourself from breaking security restrictions, particularly when you are in the company of outsiders. You must conduct your life in such a way that you are not subject to public censure or private blackmail.

7. Your initial experience will largely determine the value and importance to you of a career in intelligence. Your reward for entering this service will be in the satisfaction you get from having done your part of the job well. We

need the most able people we can get. Those who are selected should possess a deep desire to serve their country knowing that rewards can only be in the intangible area of personal satisfactions.

8. There is a difference between training and education. Assumably members of the Program are fairly well educated when they enter it. This education will, of course, continue as they mature. The purpose of the training is to provide tools whereby their education and mental acuity can be put to work in this business. The skills you will gain, added to your knowledge and intellectual ability, will with experience give you the equipment to become an effective intelligence officer. Your job will be to become as expert as possible in each area of training and experience you undergo. The cumulative total of these bits of expertise will produce a first-rate officer. You cannot know in advance when you will be called upon to use any part of your professional equipment whatever it may be. Your principal objective is to become truly professional at the earliest possible moment.

The validity of Col. Baird's carefully considered and highly detailed plans had been demonstrated.

#### FORMAL TRAINING

The evolution of the Program had followed the outline and philosophy stated in the original Proposal. The formal training paralleled the evolution of the Office of Training itself. From the outset, the training comprised two elements, (1) formal classwork or instruction and (2) actual on-the-job supervised experience. In each of these the individual was to show his ability and aptitude for some phase of intelligence work by his performance in it. As far as the Office of Training was concerned, if he failed in either he did not deserve membership in the Program or the Career Corps.

It is important to recognize that the Office of Training was working to fulfill the needs of a very rapidly growing organization. These were to equip its personnel, many of whom were untutored in intelligence matters, to compete with the products of the well-established and sophisticated espionage and analytical agencies of Communist and other unfriendly countries. In 1951 and 1952, the courses offered by OTR were few and necessarily aimed at satisfying immediate Agency needs. Many supervisors at all levels did not "believe in" the usefulness of formal training to the individual or to their component. Furthermore, each component was trying to prove its usefulness which meant that the sooner people were put to work on some project, the better the chance of gaining recognition; hence no time for training.

Originally, the formal training of the PT's was a "play-it-by-ear" affair. They were brought on board at their convenience, given "make work" or routine jobs to occupy their time until an appropriate course opened. In it they worked or studied with a conglomerate group of students from many parts of the Agency, ranging from secretarial levels to GS-13 or 14. Almost invariably the PT's, fresh from top notch scholarly work, completed the course in a cluster at the top of the class.

The first "class" of Professional Trainees reported in July 1951 and numbered 17. They attended a course in intelligence techniques for half of each day and spent the other half studying Russian at Georgetown University. After fourteen weeks the trainees were assigned to some division for a 60 - 90 day trial period. At the end of the trial, they were reassigned as permanent transfers if found qualified. The fact that many trainees either would never use Russian or needed to be trained in some other language eventually led to rescinding the requirement that all Professional Trainees study Russian.

Those were the days of "Training-General" (overt) and "Training-Special" (covert). Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP78-06365A000200070001-3

the formal training program for several years. Gradually, the PT's were admitted to courses given by "Training-Special" and officers of the Program were allowed in buildings reserved for them and later to go to [REDACTED] on business.

25X1A6a

The on-the-job trial period was also a haphazard affair. The attitudes of supervisors toward the arrangement varied even more than when the Program became established. Few were willing to think of it as a training procedure. Most looked on it as an easy way to pick up a cleared "body", ready to go to work. And the sooner he could be transferred from the OTR T/O the better. On several occasions, transfers were put through without our knowledge or approval. On the other hand, some JOT's having heard from the grapevine about opportunities that seemed appealing would "shop" themselves, interview supervisors (instead of being interviewed) and make arrangements of their own, all of which tended to give the Program a bad name.

As T/O's became restricted the fact that the JOT remained on the roster of OTR while working for some office during the trial period helped to popularize the Program. Supervisors saw a chance to get additional jobs done by "training" the JOT. Some tried to take advantage of the JOT to knock down back logs of routine work. This was not training. One of the duties of our Training Officers was to insist on his having a real training experience.

In retrospect, the Program at first was an unorganized and hit-or-miss jumble whose only redeeming features were Col. Baird's eagle-eyed supervision, his insistence on making it successful, and the high quality of the PT's themselves. But the very rapid expansion in numbers in the Agency, the empire building that absorbed the attention of so many supervisors, and the need for ever more personnel gave us a chance to get our bearings. As the Office of Training grew, more and better courses were developed. Gradually we acquired the means whereby the stated objectives of the Program could be put into effect.

The first significant step was the establishment of a course in Intelligence Techniques for JOT's only and pitched at a higher level more commensurate with their ability. It was an immediate success. The JOT's (the name had been changed by now) responded favorably to the increased maturity and intensified pace. (No repetition of materials, much more required reading, advanced vocabulary, far greater coverage, in a word more nearly a graduate school level approach.)

The improvement in standards in OTR courses spread from school to school. I think the presence of JOT's in many of the courses was helpful but more important was the assignment of increasingly better Agency personnel to tours in OTR as instructors.

The next important event was the development of the first detailed on-the-job training program late in 1952. This outlined the objectives to be attained and how they would be accomplished, specified readings and office tasks to be handled, and the estimated approximate time which would be required to master each technique. Provision was made (a) to alter the Program with approval of C/JOTP as conditions, developments, and needs of the Agency dictated and (b) to provide C/JOTP with periodic reports of the JOT's progress. Such an arrangement for on-the-job training gained almost immediate acceptance.

Soon the JOT training followed a coherent meaningful pattern viz: courses in orientation to the Agency, Intelligence Techniques, International Communism, and the six weeks basic operations course called Phase II (later Operations Familiarization), all in a given sequence and beginning at specific times. These were followed by the spelled-out on-the-job training experience after which those in the DDP who had been successful during the trial period were given the full operations course. Note that up to this point, JOT's entered courses open to all qualified members of the Agency except that in Intelligence Techniques.

As the Program prospered, Mr. Baird continued to press for the best training in basic techniques, methods, and tradecraft it was possible to produce. His efforts culminated in the development of the First Integrated Program which started in September 1958 and which is a unique chapter in the history of the Office of Training. All of the resources of the office were focused on this effort to provide the very best training to produce effective intelligence officers, each with proper preparation in an area where he could excel.

The class was divided into small groups to each of which was assigned a senior and experienced member of OTR as an adviser, consultant, and observer. At the end of the headquarters phase individual interviews in depth were held by picked officers of the Operations School to determine which JOT's had the qualities and interest which qualified them to be trained in depth for the DDP and which for the DDI or DDS. On completion of the specialized training, on-the job trials were arranged as usual.

The most important element in the plan was that the entire Integrated Program was devised for JOT's exclusively and presented at the highest level that could be devised. And it worked! When instructors could keep these exceptional people working hard, paying attention to lectures, participating actively in field problems, and competing vigorously, sometimes heatedly among themselves AS THEY DID, they produced very high quality results. It should be noted that the JOTP staff did not participate in the planning of the courses; such matters were the province of the experts in each subject.

#### ON-THE-JOB TRAINING

From the beginning of the Program the importance of the on-the-job training was obvious. In spite of our own inexperience in intelligence matters, it became clear early in the Program that "some jobs in the Agency are most interesting and

challenging, but a very large part of our work is deadly monotonous, drudging routine". (IG's Survey of the CIA Career Service 30 January 1960.)

In planning the on-the-job training, all agreed that a certain amount of routine gave basic understanding of the job and tested the staying qualities of the individual, a very important characteristic of the effective officer. But to assign a highly capable young person for a protracted period to a job that could be done by a good high school graduate defeated the purposes of the Program as defined by Gen. Smith. Furthermore, it served to quench the enthusiasm of the new officer at the time when the question of his true interest in our business was being determined and should be stimulated. For these reasons, the type of on-the-job training program that was proposed for him and the attitude of the office supervisor were of vital importance to the success of our effort.

On the other hand, we faced the dangers inherent in giving the JOT his own way and spoiling him for the disciplined work he would eventually do. And as was not infrequently the case, some supervisors resented our efforts to have some stimulating work included in the training assignment.

We faced a continuing need to adjust the relatively delicate balance between these two attitudes. There were frequent contacts by the training officers with supervisors as well as with the JOT's themselves. Our purposes had to be explained ; we had to find good positions for our people, and we had to serve the divisions as well as possible. To keep a reasonably coherent approach by all training offices we held short staff meetings at the beginning of each day when we discussed reactions, opportunities, criticisms, new ideas, etc.

Negotiating for on-the-job training was an individual matter. By the time this phase of the Program was reached the training officer had gotten to know a good deal about the JOT. If the supervisor had had experience with us and was sympathetic the task was simple. In general, we approached him with the following concepts

Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP78-06365A000200070001-3

The JOT who is attached for on-the-job training knows that he must prove his worth and demonstrate his fitness for employment. At the same time, the supervisor has the opportunity to evaluate him in the actual work of the desk without being committed to accept him at the end of the training period.

Inasmuch as during this training the JOT is the responsibility of the Office of Training, we request from the supervisor a formal statement of the objectives of the on-the-job training and the type of assignment which he may expect. This will allow us to monitor his progress and provide for effective personnel management of the JOT.

In this cooperative effort we ask that should the JOT show inadequacies or deficiencies which mean that he will not be acceptable for permanent employment, the supervisor report the fact to us promptly. We do this in the hope that a re-assignment can be effected which would be more appropriate to the interests of the Agency and the individual.

The Office of Training looks upon the supervisor during the on-the-job training as an integral and very important participant in the JOT Program. As an expert in his field, it is through his influence that the JOT will, we hope, become enthused to continue and develop a career in CIA.

We recognize that these young people are in the process of testing not only their abilities to cope with the unusual needs of the Agency but also their fitness for a career with us. They are perforce examining the rewards and satisfactions of this service in terms of their own life objectives. Their decisions about continuing in the Agency are often made during this period.

Experience has shown that JOT's who have begun their careers under supervisors who have taken interest in their development, who have provided them with opportunities for growth commensurate with their ability, and who in the Clandestine Services have planned overseas experience as soon as possible after



adequate training --- such JOT's have for the most part continued in the Agency. Those, however, who for one reason or another have not been handled as individuals who are expected to make discriminating decisions have resigned.

Nothing in this should be interpreted as a plea for special treatment, coddling, softness, or favoritism in dealing with the individual. Rather we are attempting to say that the JOT respects the supervisor who makes stringent requirements of him, sets high standards for the performance expected of him, requires hard work, and demands his best effort. We believe job satisfaction will result from such treatment and have told the candidate at the time of his recruitment that this was one of our principles.

It was important for the training officer always to maintain control over the JOT. In a situation characterized by close contact and the effort to provide him with an interesting and rewarding experience, it was easy for the JOT to try to "use" the TO to gain his own ends. From the outset, steady insistence that the needs of the Agency took precedence over all considerations helped mightily in keeping the balance between service and selfish interests.

As long as there were appreciably fewer JOT's than openings for them it was relatively easy to find an appropriate assignment from among the opportunities available. Being in a favorable bargaining position we could carry out our non-bureaucratic objectives and, at the same time, serve the Agency well. But, years later, after the Program had been radically expanded and the idea or principle had been established that all intelligence officers should have JOTP training if possible, the problem of devising and supervising effective on-the-job training programs became much more difficult. And the efficiency of the Training Officers was being eroded.

#### EXPANSION

The Program began as a pilot operation. Because of the "Korean Incident"

Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP78-06365A000200070001-3  
a large number of slots, never fully used, were set aside for the several military

programs. For many years the full quota of civilian slots was not filled. With the success of the First Integrated Program, the validity of the original Proposal was established. Soon two large classes a year were inaugurated. This required doubling the number of slots for the Program with further increases contemplated and later authorized. As the military programs began to phase out, it developed that the use of the Program for employees already on board "internals" increased markedly. Eventually the various directorates stipulated the number of JOTs that were to be recruited and trained specifically for their components --- a far cry from the earlier techniques of placement after the individual's characteristics had been determined and direct contact between the Training Officer and on-the-desk supervisor was the rule. Other changes were taking place. By 20 June 1963, the new problems that the Program was about to face were summarized in the following memo for the record.

"The strength of the Program has evolved from the careful interpretation of its purposes and objectives to on-the-job supervisors. These are the parties responsible for creating an experience which motivates the JOT for long service in the Agency. Giving him formal training to do the job does not and cannot give him a real appreciation of its being worthwhile. Simply to train him only to have him leave the Agency is a waste of all the money, time, energy, and effort that goes into the selection, processing, and training of the JOT.

"During the years when we were able to pay better attention to on-the-job training we had our greatest success in this regard. More recently with the expansion of the Program and a minimum increase in the number of training officers, the attention of the latter has been absorbed by recruiting and selection processes rather than the more important function of creating a constructive attitude on the part of supervisors toward the on-the-job training. Since moving to the new building we have been in closer touch with the supervisors and feel that we have had a rewarding experience. At the same time, however, we

have been deluged with applications and interviews of applicants. Toward the end of the current fiscal year we have been short-handed and over loaded. As a result we are now lagging in our attention to the JOT's who are on board and whose careers are being shaped. Too much is being taken for granted by the supervisors not only in the BDP, but in the DDI also. There are some indications that our control is being usurped.

"With the move to the Broyhill Building our contact with JOT's during training and on-the-job training and contact with the supervisors will be most difficult to maintain. The trip from the Broyhill Building to Headquarters and return cannot itself be completed in much less than one hour's time. This will be unproductive time, unless ways and means are provided whereby we can compensate for this loss of time which, I might add, must be taken during working hours when others are available; it will become physically impossible for the training officer to perform the functions which have characterized the Program and which have made it what it is today."

In the course of the last two or three years, the Agency had altered the demands it was making of the Program. The move to the Broyhill Building now necessitated extensive changes in its methods of operation and, perhaps, its philosophy. In any event it could be said to symbolize the end of an era.

#### HIMSELF

In his book "The Real CIA", Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. speaks of the "Agency junior officer training program that was ultimately to become one of the finest in the government". The Program's success was the direct result of Matthew Baird's drive to make it just that.

Over a twelve-year period, there were very few fundamental differences between the Program as originally planned and its composition in 1963. This was not for lack of experimentation or of suggestions from many quarters. There had

been three Directors of Central Intelligence, four Deputy Directors, seven Directors of Personnel, numerous reorganizations, many changes in the Assistant Directors and Office Heads nearly all of whom had interests in the evolution of the Program. Not infrequently innovations were urged and were tried out. But in the final analysis, the care, thoroughness, practicality, and imagination of his original plan were validated by over a decade of exacting trial. This is a fair index of the ability of the man. One wonders what might have developed if his ideas about a Career Corps had been implemented.

For a number of years, he reported directly to the DCI. This allowed him to implement his non-bureaucratic proposals more effectively than otherwise would have been the case. But even so a strange paradox existed: - more than any head of a training or educational facility I know of, he had to work persistently to "sell" his product to the very people who would profit from it most!

He insisted that the Office of Training was meant to serve the other elements of the Agency. This was the basic orientation of every component of OTR, including JOTP.

One of his frustrations was the difficulty he experienced in his attempts to anticipate Agency needs such as developing a capability in difficult and/or unusual languages, e.g. Swahili. Since there were no current demands, funds and slots were denied him. He liked to think he was dealing with "men of good will" to use his own phrase. Nothing irritated him as much as when "operators" tried to take advantage of his cooperative attitude as, for example, when they tried to persuade him to accept the assignment of an inferior person as a training officer.

He insisted on seeing every new employee of OTR at EOD including each JOT. Furthermore, he interviewed many JOT's when they left the Program in order to get their views on their experiences in it. No one in the Office of Training worked

as hard as he or gave of himself more freely. He set the example. People of all levels had easy access to him. High standards of qualification and performance, particularly for the JOT's and the Program were axiomatic in his thinking.

He urged the recruitment of negroes for the Program long before General Cabell directed that at least three be brought on board in each class.

He tried to be fair and to cooperate. On occasion when OPERS would try to gain control of the JOTP he would say in effect "when you can show me that you can run the Program as well as OTR can, I shall let you have it".

Among many of his subordinates, he generated a high sense of loyalty. These comments which were sent me by one who knew him well for many years illustrate this point. "Baird led by example. He bent over backward to understand colleagues of negative attitude and often bent his own position to accommodate theirs - - - up to the point where bedrock principle became involved. There he was adamant.

"For he was a man of principle and probity. Nothing of hypocrisy was permitted to touch his character. He shunned personal publicity but showered recognition upon others. When Baird gave his word, it was his Bond.

"Employees dependent upon his decisions concerning their futures knew that Baird kept his promises. That trait gave his subordinates a firmer grip on reality and helped them to have surer understanding within their families.

"Further, Baird fought for what was right for the individual, the Agency, and his Country. He was untiring in his search for quality in human beings. When he found it, he pushed forward the person who possessed it. By his unselfishness, he served his purposes beyond the achievements open to narrow self interest."

AND OTHERS

Was assignment to the JOTP as a training officer the kiss of death to the further development of an intelligence officer's career? As I saw it, the experience gained in working with JOT's would not enhance a man's qualifications for a technically professional job. The JOTP could be, so to speak, a tangent of no return. I always suggested this possibility when interviewing men for the job. And yet, first-rate men, experienced in some phase of Agency work accepted appointment and made telling contributions to the Program.

That the training officers had had different types of professional experience gave breadth to the thinking and direction of the Program in general and, because of our daily interchange of ideas, helped in the appropriate treatment of the individual JOT's by the several men.

One other thing. The JOT's were bright, capable, already successful in the many and varied specialties they had thus far undertaken and, therefore, were confident about their abilities to succeed. Furthermore, these young men and women were experts in the art and science of learning. With them there was no need to use "pre-view, view, review" techniques; they got it the first time! They could be "difficult". To be effective in directing their training and in dealing with them personally, the training officers had to earn their individual respect and confidence personally and professionally. And they did!

These men and also the representatives of the Office of Personnel early developed strong approval of the Program. As their support grew, so also did their enthusiasm with the net result of continued progress. It was they, who in their dedicated and enthusiastic attack on doing the job for each of their own trainees, combined their talents to make the Program a success. The Training Officers were the active heart of the Program, and a big heart it was.

And last but not least, the JOT's themselves. There was no prototype. They came from all walks of life, all parts of the country, all types of educational institutions (granting at least a valid bachelor's degree), all social levels. Each had fundamental qualities of good brains, sound health, psychological and psychiatric stability, a record of fine performance in some field, an honorable record as a U. S. citizen, some well-defined area of interest, a strong sense of responsibility, and willingness to serve his country, if need be in any part of the world. Furthermore, we actively wanted him in the Program for some reason or other.

There is nothing so outstanding about anyone having some of these characteristics, but when concentrated in one person, they constitute the base of a very fine and desirable individual. On top of these, practically every JOT was exceptional in some area of his or her make-up or experience.

The proof of the pudding was in the eating. Many of those who have made their careers with the Agency have been highly successful, achieved distinction, positions of influence, and outstanding awards. Those who have transferred to other elements of the Government have performed equally well. And many who returned to civilian life have proven by their successes that they could have attained prominence with us.

My great regret has been that because of my completely overt status, I could not keep in touch with many of these friends for fear of "blowing" their cover.

#### IN RETROSPECT

In retrospect, the conditions under which the Program "grew up" were just about perfect for the evolution of a non-bureaucratic concept in a bureaucracy. Everyone was building his own empire. Few substantive division and branch chiefs were interested in any form of training other than that directly related to their

own work. Each wanted to get his mission, whatever it was, started "soonest". As a pilot program, no one paid much attention to us.

This, too, was the period of most rapid expansion. Korea was on us. People experienced in the business were relatively rare. While the numbers in the Agency were increasing rapidly, its overall professional competence in intelligence matters seemed to remain about static for some time. This gave us a chance to learn our end of the business even as our consumers were learning theirs.

No one could predict what the needs of the Agency would be for any given time. Thus, the JOT Program could not make firm plans to recruit and train anyone for a given position and have him accepted for it. Accordingly, the Program was literally forced into the procedures and standards as originally planned.

In effect, we were almost driven into one of the strongest aspects of the Program which was also a striking selling point, viz; we did not pretend to predict what the individual's job would be before we had gotten to know him. We made no promises about job assignments except that we would work diligently to effect eventual appropriate placement and job satisfaction.

#### THE MILITARY PROGRAMS

The Military Programs were worked out by General W. B. Smith, DCI and General George C. Marshall, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. At first, the U.S. being at "war", a large number of slots were assigned to the programs. As we found we could not fill them with bona fide career-intentioned men, the number was greatly reduced.

Although the programs varied in detail, they were fundamentally alike. Candidates had to be employees of the Agency, fully cleared and on duty. Then came voluntary enlistment with leave of absence from the Agency, assignment to the next Officer Candidate School, and after commissioning about one year of active duty service. After this, they were assigned to CIA as part of the Agency's military component for the remainder of their tour of duty. During this last period, they

CONFIDENTIAL



would resume their formal training where it left off when they enlisted. In the first year or so, some men were returned to the Agency as soon as they were commissioned while others spent the entire tour on active duty. (This was early regularized as above.)

With the Korean war going on the OCS Programs were very easy to recruit for. We were swamped with files of applicants whose real motivations for continued service in CIA were difficult to discover.

Only about half of the men in these programs converted to civilian employment at the end of their military tours. Attrition was highest of any group, but consider that -

1. Without this program, we would never have seen ANY of these people.
2. Those who entered civilian employment with us have made unusually strong contributions, and to this degree validated the program.
3. Their military salaries (which we reimbursed) were much less than what we paid other just-as-able trainees during the exploratory-training period.

For a relatively short period, we processed, on request, some qualified "draft bait" from other components with the written understanding that they would be returned to the original office on reassignment to the Agency.

The Navy program was discontinued first because the Navy insisted that we reimburse the pay of JOT's while they were on duty with the fleet (before coming to us).

The Army program was abandoned when the Army changed its method of evaluating candidates. Until then, we used it in preference to the others because many JOT's elected jump and ranger training after OCS. During the five years we were in it, two JOT's won the Patterson Award for the best OCS performance of the year.

The Air Force program was weakest: it was relatively soft. When AF changed from OCS to OTS, it became even weaker. One JOT won the top OCS award in competition with Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP78-06365A000200070001-3 discontinued it on my recommendation.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Marine Corps program was tops. USMC cooperated well and held JOT's to very high standards.

I am not sure about this, but out of a great many who went through the OCS schools, I can remember only three who failed to earn commissions. Several others did not get commissions because of duty-incurred physical disabilities.

THE INTERNAL PROGRAM

The Internal Phase of the JOT Program originally was the Junior Personnel Career Development Program. This matter was the subject of long discussions by the CIA Career Service Board in 1953 and early 1954. Then a task force was established consisting of seven senior officers with secretarial help to study the problem in the best bureaucratic tradition.

Their report fills six pages plus a covering letter and a plan outline of four pages. There is a "Memorandum of Understanding of Additional Policies and Procedures for Administering the Program for Career Development of Junior Personnel" of more than three pages of single spaced material duly signed by AD Pers and DTR. Then came organization and implementation meetings of AD Pers and DTR each with assistants who wrote up memos of understanding and memos for the record. The first consists of notes of agreement on 17 separate items. There follows an outline of items involved in processing candidates - 28 of them amplified by explanatory notes "a" through "n". It even suggested that any member of the Agency who was good enough to be considered for this training should also qualify for placement on the "Junior Executive Inventory" which as far as I know died quietly years ago.

And this was just the beginning of the papers dated from 2 April 1954 through 29 July 1954. These were augmented by an Agency notice of four pages (distribution AB including overseas personnel) and changes in the Regulations. Application forms had to be devised and approved and A&E testing mechanisms devised and approved by both offices. Everything, but everything, had to be spelled out

in writing. Hence, cumbersome procedures, elaborated beyond reason, and unnecessary if people had trusted each other and worked together.

In implementing the Program, we went through the prescribed and complicated bureaucratic acrobatics at a great rate -- for awhile. The predicted rush of candidates did not materialize. A and E's preparations to test 500 people were wasted. The elaborately planned meetings of the joint selection committee took place with increasing infrequency. Reasons: good candidates were discouraged by supervisors (even AD's and Division Chiefs) who didn't wish to lose their able and productive youngsters. For the most part, those who were encouraged or allowed to apply were ordinary types who couldn't qualify. But a few good ones did come along. *to here*

The first JCD's were trained and placed in 1955. Sometime before the summer of 1958, the program with slots was transferred to the TO/JOTP. One of the JOTP Training Officers was put in charge of the group along with his other duties which were reduced.

Then, several things that gave point to the value of training for a CIA career seemed to happen at about the same time. The JOT Program's authorized T/O was doubled more or less on the theory that we should or could be all things to all young professionals (to which I took strong exception). Kennedy economies called for reductions in force. There was the infamous 701 Program. C/RID/DDP began nominating some of his better people for the Program. Also, more and more the DDP looked toward us as an escape valve for their personnel troubles. The numbers of "internals" nominated by the DDP increased rapidly and the training officer became occupied with them full-time. As quotas were established for the numbers of JOT's to be assigned to various components a greater proportion of vacancies was filled by internals. This in turn reduced the amount of new blood brought in through the Program externally.

UNIVERSITY CONSULTANTS

Theoretically, the University Consultant (later University Associates) Program for the recruitment of professional trainees made sense. In actual practice, it produced relatively few men or women who became career employees.

Yearly briefings of the consultants at Headquarters were given by top level officials and were well done. The DCI met with them for perhaps an hour. The "show" at [REDACTED] was always very well received. To give them an idea of the standards of the Program, groups of 4 or 5 met for round table discussions with some 6 or 8 JOT's on board, with no questions barred and no Program officers present. A very effective technique, far better than any statement of requirements and left the consultants enthused and impressed. 25X1A6a

The consultants were very fine, cultivated people; but it was difficult to keep up their enthusiasm. There was no satisfactory way of informing them of the progress of their cases. Their contacts with the Agency were infrequent. Recruiters tried to see them, but sometimes this was difficult.

THE WIVES PROGRAMS

Early in the Program, we found that a sizeable proportion of JOT wives were apprehensive about having their husbands in CIA. Some were misinformed about the Agency; others were just plain scared about their physical safety. Being in Washington, it was not surprising that they heard all kinds of disturbing rumors. Examples: (1) children of Agency employees might be kidnaped by Communist agents, and (2) one of the requirements of the operations course was to seduce a woman in the neighborhood. Secrecy, cover problems and lack of experience in handling them, and being strangers in the community made life uncomfortable for them. Many felt that as the wives of able men, other opportunities were more attractive. What to do to make the wife less uneasy, more interested, and within the limits of security more knowledgeable and understanding of her husband's duties? We worked on the

assumption that the better she understood the basic nature of his work, its importance, the need for security, and the function of the Agency, the better she could support him and the happier all would be.

Gradually, a series of activities were developed for the wives aimed at making them feel more a part of the family -

(a) At EOD, the wife was invited to the JOTP office to meet her husband's Training Officer and the Chief JOTP and to get to know the girls in the office with whom she might talk by telephone.

(b) At the start of each formal training program, all wives were invited to a briefing on CIA, the JOTP, security, and the cover aspects of the job. The Director of Training addressed them on the importance of their husbands work and later met each of them. Questions were answered. [REDACTED] was hostess. Coffee was served by JOTP staff girls at the break. The wives got to know each other. Some husbands joined them; some did not. A feeling of mutual confidence and understanding was generated.

25X1A9a

(d) Cocktail parties restricted to CIA employees at the home of C/JOTP or some Training Officers.

(d) A "no-host" picnic for the class, their families or dates and run by members of the class.

(e) Briefings and directions in case of emergency at the time their husbands went out of town for training.

25X1A

25X1A6a

5X1A6a

5X1A6a

We also found that once overseas, some wives were very helpful to their husbands. It seemed reasonable that the better a wife understood the Agency, the more helpful she could be. If she had worked for the Agency, so much the better. So, we hired some wives whose husbands had been assigned to DDP for on-the-job training, gave them basic courses, assigned them to some other desk (to avoid competition) until the husband went overseas. It was agreed that the wife would resign when he was transferred and that there was no assurance that she would be employed when she was overseas. The husband was the focal point of our interest.

I felt this was a valuable program. The TO/DDP worked to have it eliminated and succeeded on the ground that we should not spend the money or use the space in our classes for these ladies.

Note: The logical extension of these successful efforts was the inclusion of the wives of candidates at recruiting interviews [REDACTED]

25X1A

[REDACTED] It proved to be a particularly effective recruiting technique. Wives were offered the opportunity to participate in interviews, but, at the same time, it was emphasized that this was not a requirement. In the course of eight months, I saw 43 wives. Many could not come to the meeting because they could not get away from work, or leave the children, or could not afford to join the husband on invitee travel for which I could not reimburse them.

One of the most significant aspects of this procedure was the added confidence with which both husband and wife faced the uncertainties of CIA employment. The wife did not have to depend on the husband for second hand answers to her questions. There was opportunity for me to "sell" the wife which, if accomplished, made his decision easier and firmer. And seeing the husband and wife together gave a better basis for making a decision about him.

SELECTION

In selecting candidates we had our standards, but they were not well-defined because such things just can't be. Where statistical measurements are involved, you can always set cut-off points, but eventually a subjective judgment has to be made. We were pretty confident that those whom we did select could do well somewhere in the Agency. We wondered, however, about some whom we did not select, but had no opportunity to study the question. Some "rejects" did very well in other work.

When we were young and small and highly personal we were trying to prove our point, trying to survive. This meant be as sure as possible that these JOT's would make good somewhere. We didn't gamble; "when in doubt, reject". By the time we completed our selection procedures, we had much data about the JOT, but we had no crystal ball to determine his potential for long term service.

We must remember that young people are exploring. For the able young man or woman, CIA can't compete financially with business or industry. Soon after EOD, they learn that much of the work they will do with us will not add to their competence for civilian jobs; or put it another way, five to ten years hence their opportunity to shift jobs to their advantage will be more limited than if they had remained in civilian life. The better the candidate, the harder the look he will take.

There are a great many young Americans who do not want to "sell soap" or having done it, wish to get out of that racket. Job satisfaction becomes their goal. Such people come to CIA very hopefully. We know that if they are capable enough for the JOT Program, they are able to make a good living elsewhere. The differential in salary is tolerated but not enjoyed and in a way, it sharpens the individual's evaluation of his experience. Thus, if job satisfaction is not forthcoming, he will return to the business world. We learned early that

*Confidential*

appropriate placement includes placing the able young officer under a supervisor who understands these things.

The significance of this concept is suggested by the following paragraphs taken from one of the critiques of the First Integrated Program (provided anonymously by members of the class at the request of C/JOTP).

"When I accepted a job with the agency I did not know what to expect. Eight months later I'm still pretty much in the dark. With this inherent uncertainty go certain questions which I imagine will be with me for a long time:

"How strong is my dedication to work? Will I in ten years be able to look back and feel I've done the right thing not just for myself but for my wife and children as well?

"If I am forced after several years of work to find another field, what am I qualified to do?

"What is my SNAFU tolerance?

"I could go on listing questions which come down ultimately to the problem not so much of whether this is what I want, but of how much I want it, and of what I am willing to go through to do it." As a matter of interest, he concludes his memo by saying,

"I am convinced that this is one of if not the best Government Training Programs in effect today. I am deeply proud of being able to take part in it, and it is my sincere hope that it will continue to improve as it must to remain at the top."

#### TESTS

From the earliest days of the Program, the psychologists on the Assessment and Evaluation Staff worked on the development of intelligence and diagnostic tests. Their quality and usefulness in the selection process depended on which



sub-tests were used, who interpreted them, and the form in which the results were reported. For years, (during the series of experiments in testing the tests) all scores were reported to JOTP, often with penetrating and rather specific observations. Later on, less revealing data were reported in more guarded terms and the evaluations were much shorter. Eventually, a standard, rather short format was developed. As new Training Officers came on board the test results were used more as absolute determinations of suitability than as generalizations or estimates designed to contribute to the over-all evaluations of individual candidates.

During the experimental period it was interesting to compare the differences in the reports on a given individual. I remember one very unusual case in which a man (Phi Beta Kappa) was tested once. The data were interpreted for us three different times, - when he was a candidate, when he left for Officer Candidate School, and when he returned from his military tour. Each analysis was based on the statistical figures and sub-tests then in use. These successively classed him intellectually as near the top, near the bottom, and in the middle of JOT's on board. Same guy, different interpretations of one battery of tests! The tests would not have been any good had this not been the case; but which series to use? That was the question.

When the Medical Staff began using psychiatric examinations to decide on the acceptability of JOT candidates, a new dimension was added to the selection process. Delays in processing resulted because every case had to be written up in detail and passed on by Chief/MS, and then written approval given before JOTP could take further action. This was bad enough; but when the psychiatrists began selecting rather than simply qualifying or disqualifying, we were in trouble.

The test results were certainly useful instruments. In the hands of certain diagnosticians, they were extremely accurate and revealing. A candidate who was rated high usually turned out to be first rate; but I learned that some who were rated low ~~(Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP78-06365A000200070001-3)~~ they eventually

undertook. The assessments which were made after EOD were of most value in determining suitability for permanent assignment.

### PROCESSING

For years we were encouraged at the highest levels not to lower our selection standards. Numbers were not particularly important until after 1959. Quality was what counted! Our slogan: "Don't take him unless you want him." The big problem about selecting a JOTP class was that we could never know who of those approved would EOD.

Originally, the cumbersome and time-consuming methods of processing papers and the requirement to check them in and out of each office (sometimes each desk in an office) caused delays and mistakes. Later, a personnel officer was placed in the office of the JOTP and he organized processing in such a way that files remained there most of the time.

The most significant improvement in processing candidates came when JOT's were placed in the same "hard-to-get" category as economists and scientists. This allowed us to bring a candidate to Headquarters for JOTP interviews and medical and security examinations at government expense.

When the candidate came to the JOTP office, he was first interviewed by the Personnel Officer (representing the Director of Personnel) who also told him about procedures, applicable regulations, benefits of employment, and so on. He then was interviewed by one of the training officers who decided if he was to be rejected (checked this with the Personnel Officer) or approved, subject, of course, to confirmation by the Medical and Security Offices. Generally speaking, if the Personnel Officer and Training Officer agreed on rejecting him, I did not see the candidate. If they were in doubt, I made the final decision. I interviewed every approved candidate because (a) I was the responsible officer (b) I wanted to identify immediately with those who would join the Program (c) I acted as a sort

of balance wheel on the standards for the Program as they were interpreted by the various Training Officers (d) I wished to be sure all questions in the mind of the candidate were cleared up, thus avoiding misunderstandings.

For a time, we had an agreement with the Security Office that normal cases would be completed in about 60 days. But this was discontinued in 1961 and was never resumed. We also had agreements with the Security and Medical Staffs that a few appointment slots would be kept available for us so that when a candidate was fully cleared in the field, he could be brought promptly to Headquarters for final examinations rather than make him wait his turn which sometimes delayed his case as much as an additional six weeks! They too, were given up.

About the first of April each year, I would begin to estimate the size of the July class. This guess was based on the stage of processing each candidate had completed. We got to be pretty good at it and usually came within about 5 percent of the actual count. (But not with the July class of 1961! Cuba!)

The number of "declines" and "postpones" would increase in May and shoot up in June; (over 80 one year -- many more than the number who EOD'ed). The waste in processing candidates to the point where they could EOD only to have them decline has been enormous. Much could be done to simplify the procedures as well as to place increasing emphasis on those cases which, as they develop, show more and more likelihood of affirmative action both by the Agency and the candidate. For example: once JOYP "confirmed" its action on a candidate, he should be placed in a special processing category actively supervised by an officer who would be given authority to insist on prompt handling. From then on every reasonable effort should be made to complete processing as soon as possible.

The Peace Corps lost nothing by telegraphing a successful candidate: - "Congratulations! You have been selected for the Peace Corps." Such a device would be impossible for us; but to give our successful candidates priority in

handling and let them know they had a "friend at court" would encourage them when they need it most. There is no law against being highly professional.

#### PROVISIONAL EOD

Assignment to Unclassified Training Group "A" (UTGA) was the holding mechanism in 1952 for those who had been employed provisionally subject to full medical and security clearances. I entered on duty in this category.

We met in Wing A, second floor, of Alcott Hall. The Intelligence School/OTR was quartered behind locked doors in Wing B. Their instructors would speak to us on international affairs or reminisce about their experiences overseas.

25X1A9a [REDACTED] OTR Briefing Officer, sometimes called "the Irish Thrush", and a master of the mixed metaphor harangued us occasionally "--and these, ladies and gentlemen, are the rewards of fishing in the fields of Central Intelligence".

While we were waiting for clearance, many things seemed fittingly mysterious. There were exaggerated rumors about "Building 13". After a visit there, most people returned to UTGA for only a day or two; others just disappeared. Among the latter was said to be one JOTP candidate who had been exposed as an attempted communist penetration of the Agency.

Provisional EOD served a useful purpose but when clearances were denied it became embarrassing. After several married men who had left good jobs and moved to D.C. had been disqualified, DTR discontinued using the procedure.

#### PAY SCALE AND PROMOTIONS

In 1952, EOD rates for JOT's generally were fixed at GS-05 for AB, GS-07 for MA, and GS-09 for PhD irrespective of the major subject. Also, at this time, some JOT's on board were promoted three months after EOD whereas others were ignored for over a year. After the drive to become "more competitive" with industry had begun, the JOTP adopted a GS-07-08-09-10 system and also became more orderly about

promotions while in the Program.

But after a JOT was transferred to a substantive division, there was no established basis for his promotion as proposed in the 1951 plan. This became a sensitive problem in our effort to support our graduates in the DDP where each division was accustomed to handle its own cases.

In 1959 or 1960, the Clandestine Services established a central panel to evaluate all nominations for promotion. The DDP would authorize a given number to be promoted and the panel would dole them out. This method worked against the progress of DDP/JOT's in their first tour of professional duty and discouraged a number of them.

Now, for some time, we had been asking for a stable promotion program for all junior professionals to no avail. In what might be called an act of desperation, we suggested a plan for a time table and a system of semi-automatic promotions from GS-07 through GS-11. This was proposed solely as something to shoot at. It was rejected as unworkable, but - - -

25X9

Meanwhile, a difficult situation had developed for the [redacted] JOT's required each year. There were in the DDP some [redacted] GS-09's of all types. Division chiefs would nominate perhaps 85 for promotion at each semi-annual meeting. About 15 would be approved, or a total of 30 per year. This then boiled down to the amazing condition that even if everyone who was promoted to GS-10 were a JOT there would still be [redacted] of our graduates who would NEVER be promoted: neither would any other GS-09! A paper exposing this situation was bootlegged "upstairs". Eventually, General Cabell directed that the Career Council solve this problem.

25X9

25X9

Believe it or not, the Council adopted the very proposal which we had suggested as a sample of what might be done except that it omitted the semi-automatic "up or out" provision (also in the 1951 plan) which put teeth into the system! It worked well with strong cooperation from the DDP for several years, but gradually...

NEGROES

Col. Baird insisted on the recruitment of negroes years before Gen. Cabell decreed that we EOD a minimum of three a year.

Recruitment was difficult because in general (a) relatively few negroes were interested in foreign affairs or had high quality academic records in subjects useful to us, (b) the recruiters themselves were rather apathetic about attempting to interview them because of the low yield per unit of effort, (c) the Security Office applied the same criteria established for other JOTs thus causing a good many technical disqualifications of otherwise acceptable candidates, and (d) Northern negroes did not wish to live in a southern community such as Washington.

At the initial interview, I explained that unquestionably there had been prejudice toward Negroes in the Agency which we were overcoming to some extent; that there were very few Negro officers in the Agency; that DTR and the JOTP would support them 100%; that they were, in effect, ambassadors of their race to CIA.

Even under the best of circumstances we had problems of placement. Some operators preferred not to send negroes to Africa because they said (a) they were not well received by the host country, (b) negroes would object to the living conditions sometimes necessary to maintain cover, and (c) good cover was difficult to arrange for negroes.

So General Cabell's orders were difficult to carry out. We kept careful records of the disposition of each applicant and reported regularly on them.

There were several (6-8) top-flight negro JOT's who did first rate jobs. They were respected by their classmates and were on good terms with them. One was covertly recruited, trained, and put in place overseas by the Program. Only once was I aware of demonstrated prejudice against a negro while he was in the Program. We never were able to enroll a negro girl.

25X1A9a

██████████ and I entertained them and their wives at our home with other JOT's. They approved for release 2001/08/31 CIA-RDP78-06365A000200070001-3  
sent "my love to your wife".

CONFIDENTIAL

WHY THE DDP?

In the days when the demand for JOT's was greater than the supply, we were criticized by some (including high level DDI and DDA officers) because most of our placements were in the DDP. But it was a simple fact of life that the less active components just did not appeal to the energetic, leadership-type, or adventuresome young men and women whom we had recruited and who also were interested in foreign affairs.

Such people usually have a great drive to see the countries of their interest and to get to know conditions at first hand. Indeed, one reason for their joining CIA was to get overseas; and as soon as possible at that. Those who had been overseas, such as Fulbright scholars, wished to return.

When JOT's came on board, they found very quickly that the easiest way to get overseas was to enter the DDP. Furthermore, OTR courses given by DDP personnel were often more stimulating than those offered by DDS and DDI representatives. Then, too, the DDP cooperated in developing more interesting and effective on-the-job trial training programs than the others. In addition, they had more vacancies open to junior officers. For many, service in the DDP was the normal fulfillment of their decision to join CIA.

Something that bothered Administration Officers was the fact that most of the JOT's who had had business training rejected that area of employment. I believe still that able graduates in Business Administration who want that kind of experience will NOT go near government. They can make more money, have a more stable life, and get better and more practical experience in industry. In any event, our JOT's, having been exposed to business training, had decided they wanted anything EXCEPT administration. Furthermore, many of the basic jobs in the DDS and also the DDI were so routine that our highly trained and gifted people had to be shifted out of them else they would have resigned. There was one period when

25X1A9a

the [REDACTED] Plan" to get DDS youngsters overseas went fairly well, but it involved very few JOT's and was short-lived.

#### QUARTERS

For the first eleven years, we "lived" in shabby quarters in various temporary buildings near the Reflecting Pool. Leaky roofs and windows, drafty, rats inside and out, bare board floors, poor parking, and scattered buildings. It is impossible to know how many candidates rejected appointment on seeing these conditions, but the interesting fact is that during these years, we recruited many top-notch JOT's. We had a first rate program and we believed in it. We tried to tell the truth about it and our sincerity in this belief was obvious. Once we got face to face with a good candidate, we made a good impression.

While quartered in the old World War II buildings, our training officers could, with moderate ease, maintain head-to-head contact with supervisors and with JOT's during the on-the-desk training. It was something of a "track meet" at times, but the distances were not so great that inter-office visits were difficult. These meetings reinforced our policy of knowing the JOT's personally and keeping directly informed on their progress. During the transition period of the moves of various components to Langley, we could not continue these procedures, but they were resumed when we, in turn, moved to the new building. The "permanent" divorce took place, unhappily, when OTR was moved to the Broyhill Building, far distant from the focus of the Program's interest.

#### CONCENTRATION ON THE EAST

We were accused of favoring candidates from the East and, particularly, the Ivy League colleges. Our distribution was uneven in the early days not because of prejudice, but the conditions dictated it. After all: -

(1) there was a much greater concentration of recruiters in the East than in




- (2) a goodly number of westerners came east for college or for graduate school;
- (3) many living west of the Mississippi couldn't or wouldn't invest the money in a new job requiring them to move east (later we paid their moving expenses);
- (4) except for a few places on the west coast, student interest in foreign affairs diminished in general with the distance west and south of Washington, D.C.;
- (5) the private colleges and universities of the east could and did fight McCarthyism more successfully than the public institutions of other sections;
- (6) Washington was easy and cheap to reach from many eastern cities for preliminary interviews not so with those from the South and West;
- (7) family traditions for dealing with foreigners, particularly Europeans were greater in the east than elsewhere.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

In the course of these years, we became involved in many kinds of activities, learned many things that were not general knowledge to Agency personnel, were able to give some JOT's unusual experiences.

25X1X4



It is not surprising that we tried out ideas with varying degrees of success, that our experiences touched on many aspects of this very complex business and generated many thoughts about it. The following notes give some indication of

the ramifications of the Program.

1. The DTR had hoped to set up an extended program for the very best JOT's which would give them breadth of experience, intensive training including language in considerable depth, and a tour overseas, for as much as five years under JOTP control. This would have involved rotation among directorates. In another scheme, he suggested that to give people on board the training they needed, we replace them with JOT's for the period of that training. This would help the division with some manpower, give the individual the training he deserved, and provide the JOT with some practical experience. Neither idea came to anything. Without someone at the executive level to direct and coordinate such long range programs among divisions, these plans could not work, -- too many vested interests. The Career Corps would have been the vehicle for these sorts of things.

2. Rotation of the trainee from office to office (as recommended in 1951) was impractical because supervisors were reluctant to cooperate, the Clandestine Services were unwilling to give experience to someone destined for another career service, and the manpower shortage meant that there just was not time for this "luxury".

3. Basic Russian for every Professional Trainee was given up as the Language and Area programs developed, as Agency competence in Russian increased, and as need for other languages developed.

4. Intensive Language and Area study paid for by the Agency at universities (stateside and overseas) specializing in some country proved to be not good for untried JOT's who were too likely to resign after fulfilling the requirement that they put in time-repayment.

5. The First Integrated Program (October 1958 - July 1959) was made up of the following courses: - Intelligence Orientation (1 week), International Communism (4 weeks), American Heritage\* (2 weeks), Intelligence Techniques (5 weeks), Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP78-06365A000200070001-3 (6 months)

or intensive preparations for DDI work. Note that women always took the Operations Familiarization Course even when headed for the DDP.


\*One idea, eventually turned down by the DCI, was to have the class addressed by a number of distinguished citizens of various political and philosophical persuasions as part of the section on the American Heritage. (Something of the same sort was later incorporated in the Mid Career Course.) Substituted for this were briefings by senior representatives of various agencies of the Government, not always effective.

6. After the expansion had been authorized, the extended courses of the Integrated Program were given twice a year, thus complicating the administration of the JOTP and also increasing the problems of coordinating the courses and other training problems. A "coordinator" for the Program was appointed (a man of great experience in operations as well as in education) who made a very significant contribution. He left for important duty in the Pentagon and was not replaced.

7. When Mr. Dulles authorized doubling the size of the Program, I made note in my weekly report that perhaps this "prosperity" might lead to adversity. I felt it was a big mistake to expect the Program "to be all things to all people". It would be an unkind twist of fate if through the increase in numbers we were to be forced to abandon the very qualities of the Program which had made it successful and desirable.

8. The difficulty in establishing the composition of an incoming group (hence recruiting and training against predicted requirements) is shown by this typical example. Among those whom we approved for the class of 1959, subject to completion of clearances, there were 61 who entered on duty, 51 who declined appointment for their own reasons, and an appreciable number of others who were disqualified by the Security or Medical Offices or the Panel.

9. Pressure from Agency officials to admit special cases to the Program diminished in inverse proportion to their rank. Mr. Dulles and General Cabell always took the trouble to indicate their desire for objective handling of the case. But, if and when a person was rejected, it was wise to have sound reasons for so doing.



11. Of the JOTP classes, usually between five and ten percent were women. In order to get a certain degree of maturity among them, we required either a Masters degree or at least one year of significant work experience after the Bachelor's degree. Many had fine competence in a language. In a few cases, they did outstanding work overseas and many did very well in the DDI. But many married and left while others became dissatisfied because they were not promoted as rapidly as the men in equivalent jobs. Others left because they could not get overseas. It was not always easy to arrange satisfactory placements for them.

12. Attrition of JOT's for all reasons while in the Program (up to two years) was less than 2%. This does not include those in the military programs who did not accept employment as civilians at the end of their tours of active duty.

13. If a person were good enough to be recruited for the Program, he was also bright enough and active enough to react very strongly against any misrepresentation in the recruitment pitch. This points up the need for all concerned in the processes of recruitment to be scrupulously honest about everything they say and do in this connection and also the need at Headquarters for business-like action, prompt and direct treatment once action is initiated.

14. It was easier for recruitment to sell a candidate to almost any substantive division than to JOTP. Files of economists were sent directly to ORR, scientists to OSI, business admins to Log and so on. As a result, the number of well-qualified specialists nominated for JOTP was small.

15. As candidates, Mormon missionaries had valuable built-in assets such as: ability to get along well with natives of a foreign country and sound knowledge of its spoken language; comprehensive knowledge of that country; proven capacity to adjust to difficult conditions; and conscientiousness and loyalty.

16. The better the JOT (intellect, ambition, academic background, interest in performance, accomplishment to date, and general promise), the more difficult it was to give him job satisfaction, hence to stimulate his interest and, in the long run to retain his services in CIA.

17. Problems of our serving the DDP and at the same time maintaining the principles of the Program grew out of the frequent rotation of those who supervised the on-the-desk training. We would reach mutual understanding of its purposes with a desk chief only to have him transferred to an overseas post! Then we would have to start all over again to cultivate his replacement who, unhappily, usually knew little about the Program.


18. Pre-employment polygraph and medical examination were combined with the Headquarters interview of candidates thus saving travel expenses for later interviews and giving candidate provisional decision pending final clearance. For a time, we had an arrangement whereby we were notified by telephone soon after the candidate had completed his examination if his approval was clearly not in question. This allowed many candidates to consolidate their plans early, hence accelerated EODs.

19. Not infrequently we learned from able, relatively new employees that they had not been told of the JOT Program during recruitment. After EOD and upon learning of the Program, they often sought transfer. This was one reason for establishing the Internal Program.

20. Recruitment for the class of July 1961 was disappointing after we had expected a full quota. It was not until after the Bay of Pigs that we learned that processing of our candidates had been greatly delayed because the Security Office assigned priorities to that operation.

21. In the early days, the Chief of Recruitment arranged trips to Europe (complete with miniature tape recorder) to interview possible candidates who were overseas ~~Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP78-06365A000200070001-3~~ for JOTF purposes.

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

23. Recruiting those nominees for Rhodes Scholarships who did not receive awards was attempted. They were first-rate prospects but by previous agreement we couldn't approach them before the selections were made and by that time it was too late.

24. The Medical Office proposed psychiatric examinations for wives before husbands EODed. I opposed it as impractical, expensive, and would hinder recruitment in several respects.

25. At one point when the Assessment and Evaluation Staff was a part of the Office of Training, a pretentious effort was made to establish a nation-wide testing program in collaboration with another agency. For many reasons, it was an impractical and unproductive venture and the elaborate joint project was abandoned after two recruiting seasons.

26. It was suggested that graduates of the military academies who were not commissioned be recruited for JOTP in spite of the fact that the reasons for withholding their commissions, usually medical, were also disqualifications for the Program. Eventually two graduates of Annapolis came on board. Because of their medical histories they were given restricted duties. They soon saw that their chances of competing with JOT's for good jobs were low and they resigned. Also, one young man was brought East from the Air Force Academy and given the red carpet treatment to no avail. This experiment was a failure.

27. The idea that the JOT's should not be counted on the operating T/O of the Agency was not accepted. I argued that they were hired to be trained and until they were trained they should not be counted as effectives. Like the cadets and midshipmen at West Point and Annapolis, their duties were to learn and to prepare themselves.

Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP78-06365A0002000700013

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

outside the Agency operating T/O reduced our opportunity to be more useful. We could not plan to set up competencies in anticipation of needs.

28. Some recruiters claimed that the term "Junior" in the name of the Program made it difficult to recruit mature people as we requested. I claimed that as far as being professionals in intelligence was concerned they were and would be junior officers for some time. The original proposal stated that "GS-09 embraces Journeyman Intelligence Officers". Eventually, the name was changed to the Career Training Program and JOT's became Career Trainees.

29. There were occasions when a substantive division which had spotted a candidate would ask us to train him for them on "Directed Assignment". He would come into the Program with the explicit understanding that on completion of his training, he would be reassigned to that division. Sometimes as the individual learned more about other opportunities in the Agency, he would ask to be relieved of his agreement. This then became a matter of negotiation between the sponsoring division and him. We kept out of it.

30. Occasionally, Career Agent status was urged on trainees by some DDP divisions which were having "numbers problems". I advised against this course: there were too many chances that someone at Headquarters would take advantage of a JOT while he was overseas.

31. A Summer Intern Program for graduate students was impractical at the time because: costly to clear, difficult to find interesting short term assignment for a complete neophyte, unwillingness of DDP to have him around and of DDI to grant SI clearance. The only time we tried it, it backfired in several ways.

32. A SPAT Program (Special Assignment Trainee) was a proposal which amounted to modification of basic JOTP requirements in order to employ unusually qualified specialists who might not be physically fit for FD/G. It never got off the ground. Some opposed it on basis that these people might be considered "second class citizens".

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

33. If there is one thing a bureaucrat dislikes it is the concept of a second class citizen. Furthermore, it is almost impossible to make him understand that in any group half of its members are below average. By the same token, he resents the idea of special treatment for a chosen few. In the early days, when the JOT's were referred to as members of an "Elite Corps", there was trouble. We did our best to play down this reputation, but prejudice toward our kind of "discrimination" continued for years, happily in decreasing amounts. We had to live with it; that was what the Program was all about.

34. I call attention to what I suppose can be described as the resiliency of the recruiters. Their problems were far more complex than those of the ordinary man in their profession and the rewards fewer. In selling Agency employment they were hampered by secrecy requirements, non-competitive salary scales in many types of work, uncertain promotion predictions, the long clearance waits, the indignities of the polygraph and psychiatric examinations, and security restrictions in general. They suffered many frustrations, too. They were the only easy contact with the Agency a candidate had for a number of months, and frequently had to apologize or make excuses for inadequacies of the organization they had been building up. This was embarrassing at best and it happened frequently. Yet somehow they stuck to their jobs, showed enthusiasm, and worked hard.

35. Mr. Dulles wrote that " ---the ability to judge people is one of the prime qualities of an intelligence officer". Our problem was to obtain for the JOTP staff training officers who could judge people who in turn could judge people.

36. As a matter of interest, a copy of the graphic outline of the original Proposal of 1951 is attached.

37. In 1961, one supporter wrote: "The JOT is essentially one type of animal whose breed must remain relatively pure lest he become a mongrel".

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~