

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

WASHINGTON. D. C.

20 March 1952



lecture

DEFENSE OBJECTIVES

by

Mr. Allen W. Dulles

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

1
D 8 8
C 1 1 1 1 1

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

by

Mr. Allen W. Dulles

Presented at
The National War College
Washington 25, D. C.
20 March 1952

59354

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

(20 March 1952)

by

Mr. Allen W. Dulles

MR. PAGE: I think, gentlemen, that continuing our studies with joint war planning, it is most timely to have an expert come here and talk to us on Soviet short and long-term objectives, and to give us an estimate of Soviet capabilities in attaining these objectives. All of you who have been engaged in the studies know how difficult it is to gauge Soviet intentions and capabilities, and in doing so, how necessary it is to take into careful consideration Soviet ideology and the characteristics of the Russian people. Today Mr. Dulles of C.I.A. has come here and is undertaking to assist us in our studies with this problem.

As you have read from his biography, Mr. Dulles has had a long and distinguished career in the State Department, the Council on Foreign Relations, in U.S.S. during the war, and now with the C.I.A.

Mr. Dulles, it is a great pleasure to welcome you here today.

MR. DULLES: General Bull, Mr. Page, members of the National War College: It is a great pleasure to be here today. I have often looked forward to the time when I would have an opportunity to address this august and learned body, but I didn't know that I would have a subject such as has been given to me today. When it was first suggested to me, I indicated to Colonel Lowen that I was quite incompetent to handle the subject, and I have slowly pared it down, bit by bit, cutting

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A000600180012-5
off certain of its military angles on which I did not feel compe-

tent to speak; still I have left myself quite a bit to cover in three-quarters of an hour.

Because of the scope of the subject, I have put down a few notes that I shall follow more or less in order to keep on the track and try to bring us to some conclusions. May I say before I start that I am speaking here as an individual rather than trying to give the party line of C.I.A. or intelligence in general. I will admit to having read, before I came here, the national estimates that cover the particular range of the subject I am to handle, and I am in accord with those estimates; but what I say may go somewhat beyond them.

Soviet objectives and their view of the means for achieving them can be stated briefly. They are: the extension of the Soviet Communist system throughout the world, by the revolutionary process, ending with what the Soviet leaders describe as World Revolution.

Soviet theory does not admit of the possibility of a permanent stopping place short of this objective. There are, of course, stages. There is no intermediate basis of final compromise. Their short term objectives, involving the piecemeal weakening and dividing of the opposition, merge into their ultimate aims. No step is taken if it would endanger the homeland base of the Soviet revolution and its control of the revolutionary movement.

In my opinion, the Soviet time scale is indeterminate. The goal does not have to be reached within any particular period of years. What they look to is progress. If they have to temporize or even

- 2 -

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A000600180012-5

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A000600180012-5

retreat, they then seek a basis for future progress.

In this respect the Soviet program differs vitally from that of the Nazis. Hitler, you remember, was in a tremendous hurry. He had to achieve all of his ambitions within a very limited period, and then of course he felt his Thousand Year Reich would be solidly anchored. You may recall the ranting speech he made to his generals just before the attack on Poland, when he pointed out that he had to move, he couldn't wait -- he had to achieve the objectives during his prime of life.

What might happen if the Soviet felt themselves definitely thwarted in carrying forward with their chosen revolutionary tactics is a question one ought to consider, but I don't think it needs make us pause at this point. Today we are not faced with that state of facts. Soviet techniques are working in a way which must satisfy even the men in the Kremlin. Unfortunately, I see no early likelihood of a drastic change in this situation.

I was asked to comment on the comparison between Soviet policies and Tsarist imperialism. I find them of quite a different character. Tsarist aims, though ambitious, were limited and largely pragmatic. They had practical ambitions to reach the warm seas, the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and in the last, the Yellow Sea. They had no global strategy and no philosophy of world wide application. In certain respects the Soviet forward march follows many of the lines of Tsarist imperialism, but I think this is a coincidence of geography rather than of ideology.

For our propaganda purposes, it may be useful to talk of

- 3 -

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A000600180012-5

Soviet imperialism and compare Stalin to Ivan the Terrible or Catherine the Great, but basically I find little similarity between the two. As I have suggested above, it is quite unreal to attribute territorial or time limitations to the program of Communism as the Soviet view it. It is just as unreal to do this as it is to suggest that there are limitations on the spread of the Christian faith, or for that matter, of any other great religious or philosophical concepts. They just haven't geographical limitation. The Soviet preaches the inevitability of world revolution. By its very definition, there is no territorial limitation.

As Stalin sets forth so clearly in the "Problems of Leninism," it is important to distinguish clearly between tactics and over-all strategy. Any sort of tactical move may be justified but there is to be no change in the strategic goal.

I had occasion the other night, in thinking over this lecture, to pick up again Stalin's "Problems of Leninism." I assume most of you have read it; if you haven't, you ought to read it. It is just as important, I believe, today as it would have been important for us if we had taken the pains to read "Mein Kampf" in the '30s. In connection with the Kremlin's recent note touching on German elections etc. I happened to run across a passage in the "Problems of Leninism" that was particularly interesting. Stalin in one of his speeches to the plenum of the Communist Party in 1939 was discussing elections, and he said:

"In 1937 Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Ustarevich and other friends were sentenced to be shot. After that, the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U. S. S. R. were

held. In these elections, 98.6 percent of the total vote was cast for the Soviet power. At the beginning of 1938 Fosenkolts, Rykov, Bukharin and other fiends were sentenced to be shot. After that, the elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics were held. In these elections 99.4 percent of the total vote was cast for the Soviet power. Where are the symptoms of 'demoralisation,' we would like to know, and why was this 'demoralisation' not reflected in the results of the elections?"

That is really the way to run a campaign.

The idea of a bona fide long-term agreement for co-existence with those who preach world revolution is nonsense. It seems useful to the Soviet leaders to export this idea from time to time to calm us down and, after all, they too recognise and preach the need to compromise on co-existence, for a time. But to their minds there is an inevitability in the downfall of the Capitalist system which makes the concept of co-existence entirely superfluous. This downfall they believe can be brought about by internal rotteness and decay and the resultant revolt of the proletariat. Hot war is one instrument, but not the chosen instrument of the Soviet. In their writings the Communists use the word "revolution," rarely the word "conquest." They don't want to risk destroying their own inheritance or weakening it as the central direction point of the world revolution. War, they fear, would do that.

I have suggested that the chosen instrument of Soviet policy is the fomenting and conduct of revolution by all subversive means rather than hot war involving the Soviet itself i.e., overt action by the Soviet to carry on war other than through satellites. I think it is fairly incumbent on anyone who presents such a thesis to state the

Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A000600180012-5
 reaching for it, and I propose to give you four or five reasons.

First, what is the historical precedent? In the 35 years since the Communist revolution in Russia, the Soviet only once has taken the initiative in involving its own armed forces in a hot war, if we exclude the Soviet-Polish skirmish of 1920 and the march into Poland in 1940, neither of which involved any appreciable hot war. The one instance, of course, is the Soviet-Finnish war in 1939-40. I exclude, of course, Soviet wars by proxy and through satellites, as illustrated by the wars in North Korea and Indo-China. War by proxy is a favorite Soviet technique to help along world revolution while keeping the "home base" secure -- barring accidents.

The war against Finland, I think, requires some analysis. I remember very well an off-the-record discussion with Litvinoff some time early in 1942, after a dinner at which he had discoursed on the pacific intentions of the Soviet. He called for questions and one bold man -- there were only a few of us there -- got up and said, "How do you reconcile all of these beautiful principles you have been talking about with your brutal attack on Finland?" Litvinoff had a ready answer. I gather he was prepared for the question, although it wasn't a planted one.

He said that at the time of the attack on Finland, the Soviets were apprehensive about what Hitler would do, and that if Leningrad and the approaches to Murmansk and Archangel were not protected, in the event of a war the Soviet would be in an impossible situation -- it would be cut off entirely from the north. Therefore, he said, it was absolutely necessary for them at that time to secure the approaches

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A000600180012-5
to Leningrad, and that could only be done by war against Finland.

This and this alone, he said, was the purpose of the Finnish war.

He might have said this was also one of the main purposes of the absorption of the Baltic states.

In the State Department booklet on pre-war Nazi-Soviet documents, I was interested to find an instruction that the German Foreign Office sent out to its diplomatic representatives, making an embarrassed explanation of why the Germans were supporting the Soviet in their attack on Finland. The German Foreign Minister said their diplomats should explain it was essential for the Soviet to protect the approaches to Leningrad. If Ribbentrop had looked ahead a few years -- in fact, only a year -- he would probably have been rather disappointed that he had justified a tactical move of the Soviet which was one of the reasons for the German defeat in Russia.

Whether or not we accept this as the correct analysis of Soviet motivation as far as the Finnish war is concerned, it is nevertheless a fact that this is the one case during those 35 years of the world's most troublous times, where the Soviet has openly and offensively sent its own forces into hot war. Of course during its early days, one could explain the cautious attitude of the Soviet by their military and economic weakness. They just couldn't do it. However, the point of Soviet historical precedent has to be in mind some weight if we are careful to keep in mind that this is the usual Soviet tactic, not what they are certain to do. Obviously they care little about historical precedent as such, they do not exclude war as one means of attaining their objective, and they cannot control what may happen by accident

in an overcharged world atmosphere. After all, open aggression is becoming a bit outmoded anyway.

My second point in support of the thesis that cold war rather than hot war is the immediate Soviet tactic rests on Soviet declarations. "Peace" is stressed in the statements of Soviet leaders as their objective. Insofar as these statements are addressed to the outside world, they can be discounted one hundred percent. But there is such a thing as being caught up by your own propaganda. By this time the Soviet peoples have probably become fairly well persuaded that the policy of their leaders is a defensive one and directed solely to meeting the well advertised, so-called encirclement and aggression of the capitalist world. At least the Soviet have talked themselves into a position where to initiate war they would have to invent a case of "defense against aggression" somewhat more plausible than Hitler's disguised Poles of September 1939.

I grant it is very difficult to appraise what weight is to be given to public opinion in the Soviet. It is probably a factor the Politburo would have to consider in connection with any plans to start a war. Today, with the inflated boundaries of Soviet control, any such war would start in the West many hundred, and in the East many thousand, miles distant from any frontiers of the homeland base. It is harder to make this look like defense against aggression to the Soviet citizen.

The statements Soviet spokesmen have made privately, not for public or propaganda purposes, have also stressed the viewpoint that hot war is not their chosen instrument. Take, for example, the historic

~~SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION~~

Berlin conference between Hitler and Molotov in November 1940. We have those secret documents. In the course of a discussion of war as a means of achieving national objectives, Molotov remarked "that it was vastly more expensive to attain a goal by military measures than by peaceful means."

In Soviet writings there is repeated stress upon the fact that war rarely achieves the objectives sought and scorn is shown for the suicidal policy of the capitalistic powers in tearing each other to pieces in fratricidal conflict. The Soviet never objects to seeing others fight, and that applies to allies and to their satellites.

My third point on this general topic is the Soviet fear of losing political control of their own military. The men in the Kremlin are apprehensive at the power which a successful military commander in the field might achieve. They also worry over the problem of keeping political control of great armies, particularly if those armies are engaged on foreign soil. It is one thing, in their point of view, to fight on your own soil where close political control can be maintained; it is quite another thing to have armies far afield. Stalin made himself Marshal and became the supreme military authority in his own country in part to draw away attention from the Soviet military heroes of World War II. At least that is my opinion. Most of the military heroes were scrapped after the war or brought into the political hierarchy.

I think that very innocently we had a part in helping to scrap one of these men. I happened to be in Berlin in the fall of 1945 when you may recall we extended a cordial invitation to Marshal

~~SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION~~

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A000600180012-5
Zukov, the hero of the capture of Berlin, to visit the United States.

Great preparations had been made to receive him with all the ticker tape available in New York, etc. I was skeptical and I bet a small sum that Zukov would never go. It looked as though I was going to lose my bet. Every plan was made. The plane was on the airfield at Tempelhof, practically with its motors revved up. Zukov made very careful precautions to make sure the plane would not be dunked in the sea -- he had arranged that General Lucius Clay and Eisenhower's son accompany him. But the day before the plane was to take off, Zukov became ill diplomatically, and shortly thereafter disappeared from his command in Berlin. Since then it has been one of the interesting targets of intelligence to know what he may be doing. That was a typical reaction. The men in the Kremlin were just not going to have Zukov built up any further. He was already built up to a dangerous point and there wasn't going to be any further building as far as they were concerned.

The problem of administering occupied countries presents vast difficulties and grave dangers for a system like the Soviet. They do not have the manpower to provide administrators; they do not trust their soldiers after long sojourns in foreign countries and are forced to resort to rapid rotation; furthermore, they do not trust the local population of occupied countries to provide administrators until after a long period of indoctrination and weeding out. And that weeding out is still going on in Czechoslovakia, as you see. This is difficult to accomplish incident to military invasion. The Czechoslovak pattern is for the Soviet the ideal one. Here a whole country came under its

Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A000600180012-5
domination without a shot being fired and with its industrial machine intact. They prefer to inherit an undestroyed world.

Soviet caution is my fourth point in support of the thesis that hot war is not their chosen instrument. In the aggressive actions engineered by the Soviet since 1945, they have taken the greatest precautions -- particularly recently since our armament has grown -- to avoid incidents involving Soviet personnel, and they do not clearly show their hand other than through the sending of military equipment. It is significant that in the wars in Korea and Indo-China, both of which are master-minded by the Kremlin with Soviet technicians and advisers and airmen covertly aiding, so far as I know, at least in Korea, not a single identifiable Soviet body, dead or alive, has been turned up. I don't know exactly how you would identify a person from Inner or Outer Mongolia as a Soviet or a Chinese, but anyway, so far as I know, we haven't any Soviet evidence of that nature.

Let me add one other point here that I am not sure about but which seems to me to have some weight. In certain fields -- in aircraft possibly -- it would seem that Soviet emphasis on interceptor fighters indicates an emphasis on a type of weapon which might be considered primarily defensive. In the late '20s and early '30s I attended five or six disarmament conferences, and I was head of the commission which was supposed to draw up a list of offensive and defensive military weapons. After five years I came out of it thinking the distinction was complete bunk. The weapons that any particular country had were defensive weapons in their eyes but the weapons that any other country had were offensive. But it may be -- and I throw this

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

out for your consideration -- that there is a type of short-range interceptor that may have more defensive than offensive uses. If it is, as it seems to be, a fact, that the Soviet has recently been concentrating on that type of aircraft, this is another possible argument as to their intentions to initiate global war.

Finally, my last point on this particular subject, namely the great successes of the Soviet in the use of subversive techniques, reinforces the other factors in tipping the scale in favor of subversion as the chosen instrument of the Soviet rather than hot war.

Now I want to make it very clear I am not here considering what Soviet policy might be if military action on their part was a mere parade with no military resistance and no likelihood of counter action. That is not the state of facts today.. Obviously the growing defensive strength of the United States and of the free world, plus our atomic superiority and ability to deliver a devastating counter-attack, are vital considerations in turning Soviet policy into channels which they hope will obviate this type of danger. Since our armament speed-up, I venture to say the evidence shows that Soviet caution has been greatly increased. They don't want another miscalculated accident like Korea at this time.

Now I turn to an estimate of Soviet capabilities towards obtaining their objectives. If you accept the assumptions that I have given, that the chosen Soviet technique of the moment for obtaining their objectives is the use of the various weapons of the cold war, any estimate of Soviet capabilities requires primarily an analysis of their assets and liabilities in the field of political and subversive

action, rather than an analysis of the relative military strength of the Soviet and the non-Soviet world. I personally felt quite incapable of giving the latter, and that has possibly influenced me somewhat in choosing this form of approach to the subject.

The Soviet weapons in this cold war field include the use of diplomacy, the United Nations, propaganda and economic pressures, the Cominform and Communist controlled parties outside the Iron Curtain, sabotage, the use of indigenous forces of revolution everywhere, including satellites and stooges. For want of a better term, I shall refer to these weapons collectively as subversive weapons.

Schooled as they are in the techniques of revolution, they certainly have capabilities in this field of subversion that surpass those of their potential antagonists, particularly ourselves. We have just not prepared ourselves to use, or effectively to counter, these weapons. It goes against our grain and our temperament, but we shall have to begin to do it.

In Czechoslovakia, in China, in Indo-China and elsewhere they have already shown outstanding skill in preparing the ground for revolution and in fomenting the weaknesses of the non-Communist world. Their propaganda is highly effective for their purposes, based solely on impact with total disregard for fact. And they are ingenious. Remember the potato bug business of six or eight months ago when we were supposed to be deluging Eastern Europe with potato bugs. Now they have come up with bacteriological warfare. They always get the jump. Truth has no influence whatever -- merely what will have some impact. While we have been asleep they have stolen and turned against

Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A000600180012-5
us such slogans as "peace," "democracy" and "nationalism." And they have made the United Nations a high sounding board for their propaganda.

In Western Europe they have their hard cores in the Communist parties and the Communist dominated trade unions, particularly in France and Italy. Even today, after all past experiences, there are many people in France and Italy who have no comprehension whatever of the danger of having these Communist parties representing 25 to 35 percent of the voting population (the lower figure France and the higher Italy) with comparable representation in their legislative bodies, all directed and trained by Communist leaders financed from Moscow. These organizations are tolerated and even receive types of subsidies from the non-Communist governments in France and Italy.

In my opinion, this is a situation which cannot safely be allowed to continue, and I do not feel that adequate steps have been taken by the governments of France and Italy to deal with it. In both countries you meet the argument -- and there seems to be some truth in it -- that the bulk of these French and Italian Communist voters are really good Frenchmen and good Italians, misled, but not a national threat. But this fact overlooks their leadership and financing and the ultimate purpose to which they might be driven.

In my opinion, our position in Western Europe will not be secure from the danger of subversive attack until the power of these Communist parties is eradicated. Once that is accomplished, the possibility of the Soviet obtaining their own objectives in Western Europe by subversion will be minimized, if not entirely eliminated.

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A000600180012-5

I happen to feel pretty strongly on this point. I think here is a line of action that can be taken, should be taken, and that we should get about it. Obviously we can't do it ourselves. We have to bring influence to bear on those respective governments. Something is being done; more should be done.

In the Middle East the situation is even more acute. There, relatively small Communist elements link up with the extreme nationalist groups to accomplish the initial Soviet objective of eliminating Western influence. Dangerous progress has been made in Iran and Egypt and in parts of North Africa.

Southeast Asia presents a somewhat similar picture. There is a power vacuum in Burma and hot war in Vietnam where the issue of the control of Indo-China, Burma and Thailand may well be decided in the Tonkin Basin. If lost, this may leave the next line of defense at the Kra Isthmus.

Here in the Middle East and Southeast Asia is today a fertile field for the use of the chosen instrument of Soviet subversion.

Of course, it is easy to draw a very black picture and to forget that the Soviet have very distinct limitations even in the field of subversion. They do not have any inexhaustible reserve of clever, trained subversive agents or of the other instruments of subversive warfare. Hence they cannot bring their power to bear, even in this field, simultaneously in all parts of the world from the straits of Gibraltar through Africa to the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Presumably while stirring up what ferment they can, they will choose to concentrate on certain key areas; possibly Indo-China and Iran which

Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A000600180012-5

at the moment present the greatest geographical advantages for their type of operations, since each have long frontiers either with the Soviet Union or with Communist dominated China. But even in Iran and Indo-China, the Soviet exercise great deliberation in their actions. They prefer to build slowly and firmly in order to keep control of the revolutionary movements in Moscow.

Here I am making a guess, but I would venture to say, without having very much proof, that over the past three years Chinese Communist successes moved even more rapidly than Moscow desired. In some way it got out of Moscow's hands. The Kremlin does not like the idea to get around that a Communist revolution can be accomplished without their control and guidance and decisive support. The belief, strong in the minds of the Yugoslavs, that they made their own revolution was one of the basic reasons for the independent attitude which Tito was finally able to take toward Moscow, with popular support. If China could eventually be induced to follow the Tito pattern, their pride in their own revolution might be an important factor. When Moscow supported the Chinese in their intervention in North Korea, I venture to suggest that the Soviet probably had in mind that it was high time the Chinese should learn then and there the lesson of their dependence on the Soviet in any adventure involving conflict with the west.

To summarize the Soviet capabilities in the field of subversion -- they have very definite limitations in Western Europe. Here, short of an economic depression, it should be possible to take effective counteraction. They have great potentialities in the Middle

East and elsewhere in Asia. In Latin America there is disturbing information of increased Communist activity, linked to Peronist anti-American agitation. Their capabilities seem to be slightly on the wane in Europe, but not in these other areas.

In this connection, it is interesting to speculate on the real intent of the recent Soviet note with regard to Germany. It seems to be the general assumption that it was sent largely for its propaganda effect in trying to delay German rearmament and the bringing of Western Germany into the Western European alliance. But even if it could be taken at half of its face value, it would indicate a Soviet willingness to exchange their present foothold in Eastern Germany for the gamble of dealing with a non-Communist, semirearmed Germany, detached from NATO, hoping over the long run to draw such a Germany into the Soviet orbit through the lure of trade and also the bribe of eventual territorial expansion at the expense of Poland. I don't know whether the note has any such meaning, but if it does, it would indicate that the Soviet themselves now recognize a definite limitation on their subversive capabilities as far as Germany is concerned.

Another point mentioned in the task assigned me, relates to the influence of Communist ideology and Russian national characteristics on the formulation of Soviet objectives. This is really a subject in itself, and I will touch on it only briefly because to do justice to it would take a whole lecture. Communist ideology dominates the formulation of Soviet objectives and it is Communist belief in the ultimate triumph of their world revolutionary program which guides

their policy decisions.

How large a part Russian characteristics play is a more complex problem, I think. I should say that Marx probably would be surprised if he were around today to find that Russia proved to be the first home for the development of his theory. Of course, in his day the Tsarist dictatorship seemed to be more firmly anchored than the somewhat weaker types of governments of Western Europe with which he was then familiar. But after all, Russian temperament with its long record of fatalistic acceptance of a totalitarian form of government may have contributed toward making Russia a better guinea pig for the Communist experiment than Marx could have imagined.

I have been asked also to comment on the effect of changes in top leadership on Soviet plans and programs. Many experts believe that Stalin's survival, assuming he keeps effective control of the Politburo, is a reasonable assurance that the Soviet will not knowingly and deliberately provoke a world war. I am not an expert but I agree with this. Human factors, after all, play a major role in history. Will Stalin desire to risk, in the mad gamble of war, his assured place in history as the greatest Russian? In particular, will he risk all this on a war that he might not outlive, with the probability that even if the war were successful, some younger leader might garner the glory of what he, Stalin, had accomplished? All these are certainly unlikely hypotheses.

I have heard on good authority that Tito has frequently remarked to confidants that he considered Stalin's survival the best guarantee he knew against the risks of a world war.

Probably it is useless to speculate further on this. However, if there should be a change in the top leadership in the Kremlin, if Stalin should lose his grip, if there should be a bitter contest over the succession, then very definite danger signals should go up, and our present appraisals of Soviet intentions and likely action should, in my opinion, be subject to thorough review. The Soviet has the infinite capability of quick changes of tactics and possesses the governmental machinery that permits secret changes of policy almost overnight. There never was a more thorough turnabout than the Ribbentrop-Stalin agreement of 1939.

There are certain other factors affecting Soviet policy not mentioned in the outline submitted to me, which I wish to touch on. They are factors which might bring about a change in policy and lead Soviet to choose the course of hot war.

First, if they felt definitely blocked in their use of subversive and revolutionary tactics, that is, if they felt they couldn't go any further with the type of measures they were employing at the time and they saw no future to it.

Second, if they viewed the early and effective rearmament of Germany as a certainty -- Japanese rearmament would also have its effect on Soviet planning.

It is well to remember that Russia narrowly escaped complete destruction at the hands of Germany at a time when Germany had one hand tied behind its back with other enemies, and also suffered defeat once at the hands of Japan. The Soviet will not forget either.

In this connection, let us not forget in our calculations that

the Soviet are inclined to look upon us as a rather trigger happy people and to view themselves as the victim of encirclement as we weld the Atlantic Alliance and build up our strategic air bases. There is a lot of propaganda in what they say but there is something that is not propaganda in their cold appraisal of our striking power.

Now you have suggested one other topic that also would take a whole lecture and I will have to pass over it and leave it for some other speaker; namely, United States aims, methods and programs to counter the attainment of Soviet objective. I will give you four points for someone else to fill in:

One, our program must be dynamic, not static.

Two, our policies must not be solely policies of defense and containment. They must give us the ability to act where the enemy is weakest, not where he chooses to attack.

Three, they must not be purely military. We must counter in the cold war with the weapons of the cold war.

Four, we must exploit the weakness of a totalitarian system.

During the war I was in Switzerland and had an inside view of what was going on in Germany. I think most of the American people and the people of the Western world were utterly flabbergasted when the facade was taken off the Nazi system and we saw what was behind it and its weaknesses. I cannot predict it is as bad in the Soviet, but it is not nearly as good as we think it is.

Finally, I wish to conclude with a word of caution, as an intelligence officer:

The logic of past performance and the interpretation of

~~SECRET~~ SECURITY INFORMATION

current intelligence may point to the probability that the Soviet will not take an early initiative in attacking the West by overt military means. Nothing, however, would be more fatal for the intelligence officer or the planner than to discount any possibilities where the Soviet is concerned, or to fail to keep an open mind to any new intelligence which might point to a change in this analysis. Excluding the last minute magic messages, there was little intelligence in December 1939 to point to a Pearl Harbor, but that is what we got.

We live in a world where accidents and surprises are the rule. We face an antagonist capable of quick and secret decision and rapid action.

~~SECRET~~ SECURITY INFORMATION

NWC-52

copy 3

59354

L Dulles

D88 Soviet objectives.

Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A000600180012-5

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A000600180012-5