

One of the greatest factors in the strengthening of our national security has been the enormous growth of appreciation of intelligence over the past decade. This increased appreciation is due in part to a full realization of our pre-war failures in the field of intelligence. In Washington, it is heightened by the reduction of our armed forces as they approach their peace-time complement. It is axiomatic that the more the actual combat forces are reduced, the greater is the role that must be played by intelligence.

Commanders in all grades have expressed a high regard for operational intelligence. General Omar Bradley, the Chief of Staff of the Army, stated in a speech last January that:

" . . . we are heavily dependent on the performance of the Central Intelligence Agency to keep us adequately informed of progress elsewhere. We are clearly aware that it is only by training competent men in a lifetime career of intelligence service that the United States can hope to draw on the experience, wisdom, and the human resources necessary to keep us securely informed. We know it is this factual information that can make the difference between good judgment and bad judgment, between safety and danger."

As General Spaatz, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, stated recently in testifying before the President's Air Policy Commission:

"I think Intelligence must be exploited to the maximum. We must spend all that is necessary to get the best Intelligence."

From the experiences of the past decade, an appreciation of intelligence has spread through the highest ranks and agencies of our Government.

Public awareness of the role played by intelligence was heightened immeasurably by the work of the Joint Congressional Committee (1946) which investigated the attack on Pearl Harbor. One should point out the validity of many of the findings and conclusions of that Committee concerning some failures which went to the very foundation of our intelligence structure; namely, the failure to exploit obvious sources, the failure to coordinate the collection and dissemination of intelligence, and the failure to centralize intelligence. One point which the Committee made deserves particular underlining. That is the statement that "efficient intelligence services are just as essential in time of peace as in war."

Our war experience in the intelligence field, the conclusions of the Joint Congressional Committee which investigated the Pearl Harbor attack, and the studies of many other groups and committees, focused attention on the need for a centralized intelligence system.

As a result, a National Intelligence Authority was established by President Truman on 22 January 1946, by Executive Directive. The Central Intelligence Group was designated as the operating agency of the National Intelligence Authority. With the passage of the National Security

Act of 1947, the Central Intelligence Group was renamed the Central Intelligence Agency, with its previous functions transferred by law to the new Agency.

The National Security Act of 1947 established -- for the first time in our history -- a National Security Council, the function of which is to advise the President on the integration of foreign, domestic and military policies relating to the national security. The Council is to be presided over by the President himself, or by any member he may designate. Its membership is composed of the President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, together with certain others who may be appointed at the option of the President.

The Central Intelligence Agency is established under this Council, which directs the planning, development and coordination of all Federal foreign intelligence activities.

There is one more point which should be made concerning Central Intelligence. During the period in which it operated under Executive Order, and in the debates, both in the press and in the Congress, which preceded its establishment under the National Security Act of 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency was the object of some unthinking attacks. Nothing could be more unfair to the Agency or do more to muddy the public reaction as to its real duties than the attempts which

were made by some to label it as an incipient Gestapo. Therefore, let us lay this ghost once and for all by pointing out that the law specifically provides that the Central Intelligence Agency "shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions." Internal security is the function of the FBI. The functions of the Central Intelligence Agency are the foreign intelligence activities of the United States. Central Intelligence does not have, and does not want any internal domestic functions, and under the law it cannot assert them. The history of Ogpus, or NKVDs and of Gestapos will show that they can arise only when the intelligence functions and the police powers are blended together in one organization. That cannot happen and will not happen here.

The Central Intelligence Agency is charged by law with performing, for the benefit of departmental intelligence agencies, additional functions of common concern which can be more efficiently performed centrally. One example is the continued exploitation of foreign documents captured during the war in all theaters. As this exploitation nears completion, the Agency will continue to translate and exploit current magazines, technical works, and so forth, from all foreign countries.

Another example is the monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts of news and propaganda and public statements of

leading figures abroad. This is an increasingly important source of information. As the Japanese found before Pearl Harbor, a continual study of a country's broadcasts over a period of time brings such intelligence which can be secured by no other means.

The Agency is also charged with making recommendations to the Security Council for the coordination of intelligence activities of the Government relating to the national security. This coordination is particularly important in determining primary fields of intelligence responsibilities of the various departments and agencies. The Agency is working to prevent overlapping functions in the fields of collection and dissemination; to eliminate duplicate roles and missions, and to eliminate duplicate services in carrying out these functions.

Another CIA function is the correlation and evaluation within the Government of intelligence relating to the national security. This involves the systematic and critical examination of intelligence information; the synthesis of that intelligence information with all available related material; and the determination of the probable significance of evaluated intelligence.

There is nothing mysterious, no great mumbo-jumbo about intelligence. Today those engaged in intelligence have

learned that it isn't Mata Hari and the man with the false whiskers who produce the results. Instead, the results come from hard, painstaking work, pouring over newspapers and magazines which come from abroad, reference works and similar material, and endlessly putting together fact upon fact, until the whole outline appears and the details begin to fill in.

Thus, all intelligence is not sinister, nor is it an invidious type of work. Before the Second World War, our intelligence services had left largely untapped the great open sources of information upon which roughly 80 per cent of intelligence should normally be based. These sources include such things as books, magazines, technical and scientific surveys, photographs, commercial analyses, newspapers and radio broadcasts, and general information from people with a knowledge of affairs abroad. Into the United States there is funnelled so vast an amount of readily available information from so many varied sources that it is virtually staggering. It encompasses every field of endeavor -- military, political, economic, commercial, financial, agricultural, mineral, labor, scientific, technical -- an endless and inexhaustible supply.

The importance of research to CIA becomes clear when one starts to deal with intelligence on a national as distinguished from a departmental level. National intelligence

as such goes beyond the interests of any one department. It includes political, military and economic information on all countries and areas abroad.

One of the greatest contributions which a Central Intelligence Agency makes is in the preparation of national intelligence estimates which will not be slanted in the interest of any one department. It falls to us to present this over-all picture in a balanced, national intelligence estimate, including all pertinent data. From this the President and appropriate officials can draw a well-rounded picture on which to base their policies. It must be remembered that Central Intelligence does not make policy.

It might be well to think of our Agency as a battery of searchlights peering out to sea -- trying to pierce the fog which surrounds the other countries and areas of the world. The product which we produce should be considered as a giant jig-saw puzzle, into which we are continually trying to fit the pieces.

There exists a misconception in the minds of some people regarding the task intelligence is to perform in time of peace, as contrasted with its task in time of war. This misconception is that in wartime intelligence is more important and more difficult than in time of peace. That is a fallacy. In the midst of a war, our armed forces, with their intelligence services, gather vast amounts of strategic

and tactical information. But these sources are drastically reduced as our forces return home. Such information, which can be collected during actual combat, is largely denied us in peace-time. In times of peace, we must rely on the painstaking study of available material. If we fail to take advantage of these vast masses of material, we are deliberately exposing the American people to the consequences of a policy dictated by a lack of information. We must realize that we are competing with other nations who have been building up their intelligence systems for centuries to keep their leaders informed of international intentions -- to inform them long before intentions have materialized into action.

In the world today, America's leaders must be the best informed on the face of the earth. To make them so is the role of intelligence. That is the goal which the Central Intelligence Agency has set for itself.

ILLEGIB

