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IRB

Deputy Director of Security (PS)

21 February 1966

Chief, Interrogation Research Division

Repolygraph Program

*file*

1. In his memorandum of 9 February 1966, the Deputy Director of Security requested a paper regarding the use of the polygraph examination process in the Routine Reinvestigation Program of the Office.

2. The conducting of R.R.I.P. polygraph examinations in our opinion cannot be separated from the balance of the repolygraph program. Although we are not handling any cases routinely under these programs the policy is:

- a. to conduct polygraph examinations on overseas returnees if more than five years has elapsed since the last polygraph;
- b. to conduct polygraph examinations on overseas returnees of the Office of Communications regardless of the number of years since the last polygraph; and
- c. to conduct polygraph examinations as part of the Routine Reinvestigation Program if more than five years have elapsed since the last polygraph.

3. For several months now, however, we have not scheduled such cases, except by specific decision of you or the Director or Deputy Director of Security.

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4. The returnee polygraph programs were not equitably administered. Senior grade personnel frequently had their repolygraph waived. Selecting Communications people over all others for more frequent polygraphing was manifestly unfair. The R.R.I.P. repolygraph came closest to being applied to all levels in substantially the same manner.

5. We believe it would be a mistake to let it become known that Security has discontinued repolygraphing except where there are specific questions to be asked unless we are also prepared to announce that there is no such thing as a routine repolygraph. Each person scheduled to receive such a polygraph interview would have to be told by the person making the decision or someone acting for him, "I want you to go down to take a polygraph examination on these points. It is not voluntary, you have to go."

6. The thought that there should be a reason to repolygraph someone is a good thought. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] This thought should be extended beyond the R.R.I.P. cases, however, to the returnee cases. The fact that a man has been overseas does not mean he could be any greater a security risk than a man who has never been overseas. He may have been more exposed to hostile forces; this, however, is speculation. It has not been established. Actually, the reverse might be true. The overt person in Washington may have been studied much more closely than the semi-covert or covert person overseas. The overt person in Headquarters usually has much more access to a greater breadth and depth of information than the semi-covert or covert person overseas.

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25X1A6a 7. At the present time there appears to be little likelihood of a break in the case load which would permit the resumption of any of the three repolygraph programs. We can expect, for some time, increasing demands on Headquarters, particularly with a slot cut in [REDACTED]. If time should become available there are several areas where I feel we need to apply more emphasis. These include the following, in the indicated approximate order of priority:

- a. Spanish and [REDACTED] language training; 25X1A6a
- b. in-house research work, particularly on validity and reliability;

25X1X4 [REDACTED]

- d. Security training; and
- e. other language training.

8. At the present time we are not conducting routine repolygraph cases. We could (and should) continue this without deciding anything more than not to do these cases now. This is different from arriving at a policy not to do them at all. I recommend that we avoid making any additional decisions now.

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