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23 November 1955

*Extract memo  
filed in AOTS*

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Deputy Director (Support) Committee  
on Manpower

SUBJECT: Agency Manpower Study

1. A survey of the Office of Security has been made pursuant to the instructions contained in the memorandum, same subject, dated 17 November. Information responsive to the four questions propounded in the memorandum follows each question repeated hereunder.

QUESTION: "a. If the Director is required to effect a ten percent reduction in current Agency manpower, what specific action would the three Deputy Directors take to effect this reduction in their areas?"

2. The undersigned cannot in good faith recommend action for the elimination of any of the essential functions of the Office of Security listed hereunder, which would inevitably result in a weakening of the security of the Agency. This is particularly true when it is pointed out that even at this time, all of the required functions (such as re-investigations referred to below) are not being currently performed. The reasons for this position are given below in detail.

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staff membership of the Agency will have the effect of increasing the work load per man, without reducing the origin of the work load.

4. The memorandum of 17 November associates the indicated 10% reduction in manpower to the order of importance of the functions performed. In this connection, consideration should be given to the reasons for the performance of the functions. The Office of Security functions are based on requirements or authorizations of Acts of Congress, Executive Orders of the President, National Security Council Intelligence Directives, or Presidential Directives, some of which are listed below:

Public Law 253 (80th Congress) - places responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods;

Public Law 110 (81st Congress) - places responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods; provides for entry of 100 aliens for intelligence purposes without regard to immigration laws;

Executive Order 10450 - places responsibility for establishing and maintaining effective programs to insure the employment and retention of persons consistent with the interests of national security;

Executive Order 10501 - places responsibility for enforcing standards and procedures for the classification and protection of sensitive material;

Presidential Memorandum dated 13 March 1948 - places responsibility for the control and protection of personnel security files;

Presidential Memorandum dated 11 October 1954 - directs the institution of safety programs;

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KSCID #12 - places responsibility to prevent unauthorized disclosure of written or oral information concerning intelligence.

5. The question of what functions are of lesser importance than others in the Office of Security is one difficult if not almost impossible to determine. The functions listed below in answer to Question "a" in the above referenced memorandum of 17 November are presented in numerical order, but cannot be considered strictly as a listing of their relative order of priority or importance. For example, no distinction can be made between the relative importance of the first six or eight functions, all of which

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
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are vital, nor between the next six or seven, all of which are necessary to provide an effective security program. Similarly, it cannot be said that the last several listed items are of greater or less importance among themselves. As a matter of fact, the last listed function is performed pursuant to Presidential Directive dated 11 October 1954. The omission of any one of the functions listed below is equivalent to omitting a link in the chain of security.

6. Another point to be considered before reviewing the functions listed below is that many of them are inter-related, yet are performed by different personnel, and one function without the other would be valueless. For example, a personnel investigation without an appraisal serves no purpose; likewise, an appraisal is not possible without an investigation. On the other hand, some of the functions listed below in non-contiguous order are performed by the same employees, and thus, the elimination of one such function would not eliminate the personnel performing it if the other function is to be retained. For example, the next to the last listed function is performed by personnel who also are responsible for item (14). Similarly, item (16) is performed by personnel who also perform item (10).

7. Following is a consolidated listing of the functions of the Office of Security, stated in broad categories.

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
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QUESTION: "b. Are any organizational units now performing in whole or in part any function or activity which is being performed by another component of this Agency or by another Government agency? If so, could the function, or portions thereof, be performed entirely by the other component or other Government agency?"

8. The answer to this question must be given categorically in the negative.

QUESTION: "c. Do any organizational units now have work requirements beyond present manpower capability? If so, what additional manpower is required?"

9. Yes, the Office of Security has requirements beyond the capabilities of the imposed personnel ceiling of 31 July 1955. As a matter of fact, the continuing work load has permitted us to reduce only to  in our efforts to comply with the imposed ceiling of  25X9A2  
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10. The investigative and support case records of this Office for Fiscal Year 1955 reflect a substantial increase in requests for clearances during Fiscal Year 1955 over the preceding fiscal year as follows:

Clearance requests - 17.5% increase  
Support and Special Inquiry requests - 45.6% increase

11. The increased case load is clearly reflected by a comparison of cases received during two, twelve month periods:

<u>Cases Received</u>	<u>Year Ending</u> <u>30 September 1954</u>	<u>Year Ending</u> <u>30 September 1955</u>
Cont.	10,635	11,925

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
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13. This increased work load has overtaxed the capabilities of our clerical staff to the point where it is unable to process clearance requests on a current basis. On 10 November, there was a backlog of over 1,000 pending cases, compared to the ordinary backlog of one to two hundred cases.



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15. Looking at the physical security side of the picture also reveals a continually increasing work load. Within the past year, we have acquired space in four additional buildings, 25X1A6a  
 Building. Two floors of the new Katonah Building are being acquired and it is understood that consideration is being given the acquisition of four 25X1A6a  
 floors in the  Building. Any increase in building space, particularly in separated units, causes a direct increase in the demand for physical security services and a corresponding increased responsibility in physical security matters, such as security surveys, violation investigations, safety controls, guards, receptionists, safe maintenance, classified waste collection, disposal and issuance and control of building badges. Another increasing

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work load which is not readily reflected in statistics is being imposed on the technical security function, due both to an increasing number of buildings and an increasing awareness within the Agency of the possibilities of technical penetration. The technical security function has increased about 35% in the past year. The number of special investigations on cases such as lost documents, thefts, possible compromises, improper transmissions, etc., have increased by 85 cases over the past year.

QUESTION: d. "Assuming that present manpower allocations permit the accomplishment of essential tasks, what desirable tasks have been deferred or eliminated from present progress due to current ceilings?"

16. With the facts in mind of increased backlogs presented in response to question "c" as a qualification to the assumption that present allocations permit the accomplishment of essential tasks, it must be said that in addition to the inability of keeping security investigations on a relatively current basis, there are other desirable tasks which we have been unable to undertake because of insufficient manpower. Principal among these is the periodic re-investigation of personnel. Even though this function is a vital facet in the program of insuring that the retention in employment of personnel is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, and as such is an implied requirement of Executive Order 10450 and will be a requirement of USCIB regulations, a program of routine periodic investigations of all personnel has never been within the capabilities of this Office because of manpower limitations. It should also be noted in this connection that the Doolittle and Clark committees both made firm recommendations that periodic re-investigation of personnel should be instituted.

17. On the physical security side, we have been unable, due to lack of personnel, to maintain as much liaison as would be desirable with other agencies in the matter of current developments in technical security equipment and techniques. We have not been able to make physical security surveys of all domestic facilities of the Agency on a periodic basis. As a matter of fact, there are some facilities [redacted] which we have not as yet been able to survey. It is extremely desirable that such surveys be made on a yearly basis. Another desirable task which we have been unable to accomplish is the establishment of IB records of all safe combinations and other pertinent information concerning safes.

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Sheffield Edwards  
Director of Security

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