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STUDIES in INTELLIGENCE

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VOL. 3 NO. 4

FALL 1959

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CONTENTS

CLASSIFIED ARTICLES

	Page
Colonel Abel's Assistant W. W. Rocafort <i>Story of a Soviet deep-cover operation.</i> SECRET	1
Experience with Types of Agent Motivation Paul Tollius <i>Saint and sinner in the nether world.</i> SECRET	31
The Calculation of Soviet Helicopter Performance Theodore A. George <i>Mathematical processing of data from photographs.</i> CONFIDENTIAL	43
Graphological Assessment in Action James Van Stappen <i>A technical service available to intelligence operations.</i> SECRET	49

SECRET [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1

SECRET

25X1

UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES

	Page
Intelligence as Foundation for Policy . . . Robert Cutler <i>Authoritative appraisal of the community's role in national security.</i>	59
The Lost Keys to El Alamein Wilhelm F. Flicke <i>Secret of Rommel's second sight.</i>	73
Terrain Intelligence for the Pentomic Army Clifton A. Blackburn, Jr. <i>Lay of the land in the space age.</i>	81
The Alamo Scouts Eustace E. Nabbie <i>Special military intelligence in New Guinea and the Philippines.</i>	87
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature	
<i>Military intelligence in World War II</i>	93
<i>Espionage and paramilitary operations</i>	99
<i>In the American Civil War</i>	105
<i>Evasions and escapes</i>	111
<i>Miscellany</i>	113

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25X1

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*The reconstructed history of a
Soviet deep-cover intelligence
operation against the United
States.*

COLONEL ABEL'S ASSISTANT

W. W. Rocafort

This history ends in Paris, in the spring, two years ago. On Monday the sixth of May, 1957, the American Embassy received an incoherent, urgent telephone call; someone had information of importance to U.S. security. Late in the afternoon the caller came in—a burly man wearing a blue-and-red-striped tie, fortyish, unmistakably alcoholic but showing under his uncertain equilibrium the remnants of a once sure military bearing. He claimed to be a Soviet intelligence officer on his way back from the United States to Moscow.

An American intelligence representative was called, and questioned him for hours. The man had all the qualifications of a crackpot, but his story, if disjointed, was circumstantial, and he offered some concrete evidence of his profession. He was kept in contact until his data could be checked. In return for purported information about the KGB, it developed, he wanted to be taken back to New York, to his wife, and hurriedly. He couldn't wait, began communicating with her by tapping messages on his chest, his other arm held up as an antenna. Word came, none too soon, that his facts checked out. He was got onto a plane on May 9. In the ensuing weeks, sustained by quantities of brandy and plied with questions in his more lucid intervals, he furnished the essential fragments of the dismal tale that follows.*

State of Soviet State Security, 1948

Colonel Aleksandr Mikhailovich Korotkov was exasperated. It wasn't the endless reorganizing of the intelligence and se-

* The presentation of this case as a chronological narrative has been accomplished by filling gaps with hypothetical material, cutting Gordian knots of conflicting probabilities, and manipulating the arrangement of some facts. The circumstances of these semi-fictional reconstructions are discussed in the numbered notes assembled at the end of the narrative.

curity agencies at the top; that scarcely affected him. As head of security's deep-cover foreign intelligence operations, he had the same job to do whether it was under the NKVD, the NKGB, the MGB, or, as for the past year, the KI. About the only innovation under the KI had been the effort, now aborted, to amalgamate the deep-cover activities of military intelligence with his own; and the military people had shown the same stuffy aloofness in his own shop that characterized them before and after in the GRU. Now that that was over, it seemed certain the KI would eventually be dissolved, and Korotkov had already begun to think of his outfit as back with the MGB.¹

The source of Colonel Korotkov's present exasperation was a different policy matter, one that affected operations—the unrealistic impatience of the Big Brass, all the way up to Stalin. He himself had been telling them for years that it was going to be necessary to concentrate intelligence resources on deep cover to avoid being limited more and more to purely overt information on the West. Especially in America, just at the time when the initials *U.S.* began to dominate all the Top Priority Intelligence Objectives, the Gouzenko blow-up—those military people, again!—had put an end to the lush years when you could go anywhere and do anything under paper-thin official cover. You simply couldn't run an effective agent net while under the kind of surveillance Soviet officials were getting in America nowadays.

But now that the Brass had finally been convinced that things had changed since the war years, they expected you to triple your deep-cover operations overnight. He and Shiryayev, who was in charge of his American section, were doing what they could, but it takes time. Shiryayev had remarked the other day that Comrade Beria and the men around him must be too busy with matters of state policy—meaning in-fighting and intrigues—to be concerned with the problem of lead time in getting officers out under deep cover. They couldn't understand why it should take years, even if you had a man already trained, to establish and document a legend to serve as a water-tight biography of his cover identity. They had even wanted to send one of their darlings—"Big Shot," Shiryayev called him—right off under a cheesecloth

and patchwork legend to take charge of deep-cover operations in New York.

Korotkov had got that one sidetracked, anyway. In a few months one of his veterans, Rudolph Ivanovich Abel, would arrive in New York to handle things for a while. Colonel Abel was not the ideal man; he was too straightforward and inflexible—that's what had caused his trouble with the Party a decade ago and permanently retarded his career—and now he was getting on in years. But if he lacked pliability and youthful zest he was as sound and solid as an old oak; he would do a good routine job with irreproachable security, and if worst came to worst you could depend on him. Meantime Big Shot could be building up the documentation for a decent legend for himself, if he still wanted to take over when Abel retired.

You couldn't put all your powder behind one shot, though, especially not a Big Shot who liked to cut a swathe rocking around in fast cars.² Someone in reserve should be readied during the next three or four years, preferably a young officer with initiative, intelligence, sound character, and practical training. Korotkov studied through the personnel papers General Baryshnikov³ had sent him to look over; Vladimir Yakovlevich, Deputy for Personnel in the MGB Foreign Intelligence Directorate—or was he still in KI? No matter—was a friend of his and especially looked out for his needs. This batch of potential recruits was a good one. Most of them had domestic security experience, providing an indication of their reliability and obviating some of the need for training, and a few were bilingual in Russian and some language which would lend itself to the establishment of a biographical legend outside the USSR.

One of these still unwitting candidates seemed outstanding. He was a Party member of five years' standing, a senior operative at one of State Security's posts in the Karelo-Finnish SSR, and only 28 years old. He came of good peasant stock from the Leningrad area, where a lot of Finnish was spoken; his elementary and secondary schooling, in fact, had been in Finnish, and he had learned some German too. He had been graduated with honors from the secondary school and accepted at a teachers' college without entrance examination. After graduation from college he had taught physics and mathe-

matics in his old secondary school and at the same time a class in a nearby primary school. Called up in the regular draft, he had been grabbed eagerly by the security service, then under the NKVD, at the age of 19, just before the Finnish war broke out. During that and the Great Fatherland War he had served continuously in counterintelligence and security duties in the north and had become expert in many operational skills, notably in the recruitment and training of agents. He had nine years of efficiency ratings characterizing him as intelligent, energetic, resourceful, and dedicated.

The one blemish on this man's record, from Korotkov's point of view, was his apparent devotion to the girl, Aleksandra Ivanovna Moiseyeva, whom he had married six years ago and to their adopted son. Well, he could learn to live without them; others had. Korotkov consulted Shirayev and then asked Baryshnikov to recruit Lieutenant Reino Andrey Hayhanen, among others, for foreign intelligence operations under deep cover.

Basic Training in Estonia

Family Hayhanen, riding south and west through the lake country, in its summer greenery, to Tallin, were excited and happy. They had done a lot of traveling during the war, mostly in the KFSSR, but they had been stuck in Padany for two years now, and they had never been to Estonia. Aleksa imagined it might be less raw and wild than the northland, more like her own quiet countryside southeast of Moscow. Tallin, they said, was a city of about the same size as Tambov. The boy was forever making stupendous discoveries from the train window or getting into other people's things. Reino thought about his three days in Moscow.

He seemed to have made a tremendous impression on them there at No. 2 Dzerzhinskiy Square. Very important people—Baryshnikov, Korotkov, Shirayev and his deputy Akhmedov, not to mention the Major Abramov who squired him about—seemed to consider his accomplishments remarkable and to be terribly pleased that he knew Finnish and Russian equally well. He had enjoyed his wartime work in Finland, the land of his father's folks, and now looked forward to a new and more important kind of activity there. Presumably it *would*

be Finland, although they double-talked it—"the country of your future assignment."

The caginess and mystery both titillated and disturbed him. Only one man in the MBG office at Tallin, Colonel Pavel Panteleymonovich Pastelnyak, would know that he was training with Korotkov's outfit. Foreign intelligence was fine, a higher-grade profession than being a glorified policeman, but he wished it could be under official cover. The role of a clandestine foreign agent was bound to be an inconspicuous one, and the compartmentation might hurt his career as a Soviet officer. Yet General Baryshnikov had assured him that he would advance much faster this way—captain after a year, major in two or three more, etc. And if they were going to put all foreign intelligence under deep cover that helped take the curse off it. At least he had their promise that Aleksa and the boy could accompany him. Otherwise it would be no go. She was so dependent on him. . . .

In Tallin Hayhanen found himself spending half his time on cover duties for the local MGB—familiar work, spotting and evaluating agents for activity in Finland, Sweden, and maybe other countries. The rest of the time, when he was supposed to be on "personal assignment" to Colonel Pastelnyak, he was learning both the chauffeur-mechanic and the photographer jobs, as tradecraft skills and as alternative future cover occupations. Before long Pastelnyak told him to start learning English: apparently he was not going to operate in Finland, but in Britain, in America—where Pastelnyak himself had served—or somewhere in the Far East. He arranged private lessons for himself and a reluctant Aleksa; she was no linguist and was beginning to be apprehensive about shipping off to some strange country far from home.

Meanwhile he had a chance to compare notes with a couple of other Korotkov men in Tallin, and they ridiculed the notion that a deep-cover operator could take his family along with him. This worried him; but he was reassured within the month when Abramov, the junior officer of those who had interviewed him in Moscow, came to Tallin for a few days. Abramov told him he would be going to the United States with his wife and son, that he should read books about America, and that after the turn of the year he would report for a couple of weeks to Moscow to firm up the legend for his

cover identity, to check on his progress in English, and to get additional briefing.

Eugene Maki Gets a Double

In Moscow, early in 1949, he found that Korotkov had two possible cover identities ready for him. One was represented by an American passport showing a boy of about 12 who had arrived in Russia with his parents in 1925. But this boy would now be some seven years older than Hayhanen, and besides he had relatives in the United States that might prove embarrassing. The other was better: one Eugene Maki, born in Idaho the year before Hayhanen, had come with his family to Estonia in 1927 and now worked in the KFSSR as a chauffeur-mechanic. An MGB officer who had seen Maki thought that Hayhanen had a sufficient likeness to him. He could assume this American identity in Estonia, if at a sufficient distance from Tallin where he was already known. They would get him a mechanic's job in the government garage in Valga, down on the Latvian border. The apparently confiscated Maki birth certificate which Korotkov gave him could be used after a while to apply to some U.S. consulate for a passport. His English, as good as could be expected after half a year, he should in the meantime improve by himself without a teacher.

There was no specific provision in the Maki legend for a family, and when Hayhanen asked about it Korotkov was evasive: he should leave his wife and son in Tallin when he went to Valga as Maki, at any rate; he could go up to see them weekends. It seemed pretty clear that his superiors were maneuvering to back out on their promise, now he was in so deep that his whole career was involved in these plans. He did not tell Aleksa this, but she knew it intuitively. She stopped her English lessons, saying that she did not want to go on with them alone. She sat tight, dreading even the partial separation at opposite ends of Estonia, hoping that something would happen.

As the late winter and spring were frittered away in unstimulating garage work and strained weekend commuting, the new Eugene Maki grew impatient to get on with his assignment. He got the promised captaincy in May; perhaps that meant he would be moving soon. In a month or so Abramov

showed up in Valga; they had reviewed the Maki legend, he said, and decided that in its present form it was clearly unsatisfactory. It called for him to go to America after recent residence in the USSR, thus inviting the attention of the U.S. authorities; it required fluency in Estonian; it did not take advantage of Hayhanen's knowledge of Finnish. Hayhanen wondered whether these obvious considerations had really just occurred to them.

Now in 1943, Abramov went on, when the Soviet armies were liberating Estonia from the Germans, there had been a considerable exodus of Estonians to Finland; what more logical than that Eugene Maki had joined this migration and been in Finland ever since? He was therefore to quit his garage job and come to Moscow to make new plans. He would have to spend some time in Finland to back up this amendment to his legend. His wife and son had better stay in Tallin: they had only a smattering of Finnish, would complicate the legend, and would seriously inhibit his mobility. He could get back to see them occasionally.

This was too much for Aleksa. She couldn't bear the thought of more months alone in a strange city, without friends, living only for an occasional weekend. She would go back to her own country, stay with her own people, and wait for him as so many soldiers' wives had done during the war years, half of them in vain. Hayhanen took her to Tambov, said goodbye with tenderness but with some sense of relief from the strain of conflicting demands on him, and went to Moscow for another round of conferences with Korotkov and the staff of the American section.

The Fledgling in Finland

He was told that the several months in Finland needed to backstop his legend would be useful experience in living his cover in a foreign country, making contacts with a superior under official cover and with local agents, and using drops and communications channels. He could resume his English lessons, too. He could even be of some operational use if he took advantage of the opportunity to find out more about the details of Finnish documentation. For his own documentation in Finland, aside from the Maki birth certificate and a picture of Maki's father, he was given a KFSSR chauffeur-

mechanic's work certificate—this insurance against the possibility that the Finns had some record of the real Maki would also help to explain the false Maki's deficiency in Estonian—and on his way through Tallin he was to pick up from Pastel-ynek a card showing that as far as the MVD was concerned Maki had no citizenship.

This documentation was not for the purpose of getting into Finland—he was supposed to have gone in in 1943—but only for attesting his identity while there. His entry now was effected in simple if undignified secrecy, in the trunk of a car belonging to the Soviet embassy in Helsinki, driven across the border from the Soviet base at Porkkala. The visible passengers were an embassy official and Ivan Mikhailovich Vorobyev, chief correspondent in Finland for the paper *Trud* and Maki's channel back to Moscow. Vorobyev was also to help him back up the legend of his residence in Finland for the past six years, since 1943.

In September, on Vorobyev's orders, a Finnish agent took Maki on a "hunting" trip above the Arctic circle, in the agent's native Lapland. He told his Lapp friends that Maki was a deserter from the Finnish Army who needed help, and he paid two of them to certify that Maki had lived with them successively from 1943 to 1949. The past thus sketched, he filled in the present by getting Maki a job as blacksmith's helper. Working among the Lapps in this capacity into the dayless winter, Maki was not unhappy when Vorobyev suggested that he move closer to Helsinki where they could meet more often. In January he got a helper's job in a steel fabricating plant in industrial Tampere.

As 1950 dragged on, not idly but insignificantly—work at the plant, monthly meetings with Vorobyev, reports on living conditions in Finland, on attitudes of the population, and on the industries around Tampere; made-work, thought Maki—it began to seem high time that these "several months" in Finland should be up. One late summer evening he was going over his legend, reexamining it for flaws, trying to anticipate Moscow's discovery of other considerations that might delay his departure for America. He picked up the Maki birth certificate, and his eye fell on the routine Warning, "This certification is not valid if it has been altered in any way what-

soever. . . ." He held it up against the light. It was only too apparent: in Moscow they had tried to erase a stamp which recorded the real Maki's application for a Russian passport, and had done a poor job of it.⁴ This might easily do more damage than merely delay him. The certificate itself was perfectly all right, if he could get a copy of the original before it had been stamped. Why not? He sat down and wrote a letter to the Department of Health, Enaville, Shoshone County, Idaho: "Dear sirs, I lost my birth certificate. . . ."

He didn't tell Moscow about this right away: they would probably tear their hair over anything so naive. They had still said nothing about applying for a passport, and by the time they did he'd have the new certificate. His eagerness to be off, thus dampened for a while, was soon to be thoroughly quenched.

Eugene Maki Takes a Wife

The quencher was Hanna Kurikka, young, blonde, and graceful, crowned Queen of the Fete in a recent beauty contest. Maki was bewitched; this girl's gay and open spontaneity was so different from the almost anguished affection of Aleksa, so different from anything he had known in his life, something from another world. He was not bothered by her lowly social status or by the rumors about means she had used to supplement her wages as a housemaid. These things only brought her quintessence of vitality within his reach and comprehension. Hanna, for her part, was overwhelmed. She had never aspired to the affections of such an upstanding man, so well educated, so generous and kind. There was a mysterious *savoir faire* about him which must reflect his origins in America. She loved him for himself, but she thrilled with half-conscious expectations at his hints that he might some day go back to visit his native land.

They met in September. By November they were inseparable, floating through a dream-world, intoxicated. Maki stopped going to work at the plant; it seemed a stupid waste of time. In January the new photostated birth certificate came. He showed it to Hanna. She kissed it. In March they moved to Turku in order to be by the sea. Hanna began to mention marriage wistfully once in a while. Maki was em-

barrassed, and felt vaguely guilty about Aleksa waiting there in Tambov.

Maki now worked off and on for some plumbing contractors, and found odds and ends of information to report to Moscow through Vorobyev. Of course they knew nothing about Hanna. He had better tell them about the birth certificate, though; he didn't much care if they did think him half-baked now. But Moscow was pleased, seeing in his initiative a confirmation of their estimate of his resourcefulness, and this maybe triggered their decision that it was time for him to apply for his U.S. passport. He stalled a while, but filed the application in July 1951. Fortunately there were complications—he had to show proof that he had not served in the Finnish armed forces or registered to vote—which would serve to delay action for some time.

Hanna was now more outspoken about her wish to get married. She was right, of course, from her viewpoint: a woman doesn't feel secure without that legal tie. And it really shouldn't matter to him, he told himself; after all, he was not Reino Hayhanen, with a wife in Tambov, but Eugene Maki, who could marry when he chose. Some day this wild, delicious dream would be over and he would be Reino Hayhanen again, back in the work-a-day world. As for Moscow, they hadn't played it very square with him; they needn't know. The Makis moved to nearby Tammisto and were married in November.

Hayhanen Readied for the Plunge

So passed another winter, and the spring and early summer. Late in July of 1952 came the inexorable passport, and swift on its heels the order to report to Moscow for three weeks' training and final briefing. Hayhanen's grayed enthusiasm began to glow again. A business trip to France and Italy, he told Hanna; he'd be back. He crossed to Porkkala in the same car-trunk that had brought him in three long years ago. He visited his mother in the KFSSR, and sent word to Aleksa to meet him with their son in Moscow. He was back to reality, the same vigorous career-and-family man he had been before these ties were dissolved in Maki's dream. He threw himself into his final intensive Moscow training.

His headquarters had moved to the KI building on the outskirts, although the KI itself was now defunct. Colonel Ko-

rotkov was not in evidence. Neither was Abramov. Colonel Vitali Gregoryevich Pavlov, who had interviewed him before as a member of the American section staff, was now its Deputy. But it was mostly the Training Officer, Captain Aleksey Kropotkin, that took charge of his TDY. The training was conducted from a safe-house, with two shifts of instructors. He learned how to use ciphers, and was issued a cipher of his own which he was never to reveal to anyone. When in New York he'd get one-time pads, they told him. He had a refresher in taking photographs of documents and learned to dissolve their hard backing, leaving only the emulsion as "soft film." He was taught how to make and hide microdots, and how to signal their location separately. He practiced tailing and evasion on the Moscow streets.

He was given a full set of instructions for his American operations, which he memorized in part and in part noted down. He was introduced to the official who would be his contact and communications channel, Mikhail Nikolayevich Svirin, about to leave for New York as First Secretary to the Soviet UN delegation. But the effort to minimize the use of official cover was still on, and later, when he had built up his own network of agents, he would be made assistant to the deep-cover resident in New York,⁵ who would have direct communications to Moscow. On arrival in New York he should go to a Finnish club and get them to help him find a place to live. He could live wherever he wished, but should keep Moscow informed. He should let them know he had arrived safely by putting a red thumbtack on the "Horse Carts" sign near the Tavern-on-the-Green restaurant in Central Park. If he suspected surveillance the thumbtack should be white.

He was not ordinarily to meet Svirin in person. He was given a list of numbered places—"banks"—where messages could be hidden. When he had banked a message he should go to the railing in front of 150 Central Park West and put a chalk mark on the horizontal bar corresponding to the number of the bank. If he needed a meeting he could mark one of the railing posts. He should watch a different location for the signal that Svirin had banked a message for him.

He could lay low for the first three months, establishing his cover and making sure that he was not watched. On the

twenty-eighth of each month during this period, at ten o'clock in the morning,⁶ he was to be at the Prospect Park subway station in Brooklyn and simply walk through the south exit; thus Moscow would know that he was alive and well. After three months he should begin to circulate, joining all the Finnish clubs and exploring all means to build up his agent network.

It was *Major* Hayhanen, this time, who ducked into the car-trunk on the Porkkala side of the border and emerged as Eugene Maki on the Finnish side. The promotion and his elaborate instructions gave him a renewed sense of purpose and responsibility, which Hanna, when he reached Tammisto, dimmed but could not dispel. He took her to Turku, his port of sail, in order to be with her as much as possible while completing his preparations for the voyage. It was a torn and poignant month, the Maki idyll continually interrupted with Hayhanen business. As soon as he got settled he would send for her, he said, because it was the thing to say.

The Promised Land

He sailed on October 10, via Stockholm and London. From London he sent a wish-you-were-here picture postal to his Lapp benefactor, care of general delivery, Helsinki. It would tell Vorobyev and Moscow he had got that far. He docked in New York October 21, and was passed through the immigration and customs formalities without incident. He found temporary lodging at a cheap hotel in Harlem. He put a red thumbtack on the "Horse Carts" sign.

He walked the streets and rode the subways, getting used to the dizziness of the city. He spotted his message banks—a hole in a cement wall on Jerome Avenue, a bench in Riverside Park, the space under a lamp post in Fort Tryon Park, the iron fence on Macombs Dam Bridge. He sampled the night-life, thinking of Hanna's fascination with its distant glamor. He went shopping, and because he missed Hanna he bought a present for Aleksa, splurging on a modish fur coat. He applied to a Finnish club and obtained room and board with a Finnish family in Brooklyn. He left a message for Svirin suggesting that the Jerome Avenue bank be changed to a more convenient place in Brooklyn, a gap in a mortar joint between some stone steps in Prospect Park, and asking

that Svirin forward his package to Aleksa. On the twenty-eighth, as scheduled, he walked through the Prospect Park subway station. Svirin answered his message and gave him a new signal location, the metal fence at the 86th St. entrance to Central Park; by a horizontal mark on the first post Maki could indicate that he had left a message at Bank No. 1, etc.

In November he enciphered his first message to Moscow since the London postcard, his Letter No. 1: He wanted to set up a business as his cover means of livelihood; he needed \$5,000 for this purpose. He had forgotten the name of the chemical used to dissolve the backing from soft film. Did he have any mail, and what was going on at home generally? He would send details about where he lived and worked later on; when would he receive the promised one-time pads? Did Aleksandra Ivanovna get the package, and how was she? ⁷

He photographed this message with his Exacta, developed and trimmed the film, and placed it in a small round silver case. He snapped the lid on—a Finnish 50-markka piece, its special construction undetectable save for a tiny hole through which a needle could push the two halves apart. He put the coin in a magnetic change-container. He went to Riverside Park, sat on the designated bench, and left the container fixed to a steel brace on its under side. He put a mark across the second post of the 86th St. fence. Every day now he walked past a fence off New Utrecht Avenue in Brooklyn; soon a vertical mark appeared on the second post there; the message had been picked up. He went back to 86th St. and rubbed his own mark off.

Then he waited, rather idle and lonely for Hanna, and drinking perhaps too much. He got a job in a body and fender shop. In December Moscow's reply found its way back through the same machinery, reversed. Maki pushed a hollow American nickel open and took out a microfilm showing ten columns of five-figure groups. Using his own cipher, he converted it into the Russian text of Moscow's first message:

1. We congratulate you on a safe arrival. We confirm the receipt of your card to "V" and the reading of your Letter No. 1.
2. For organization of your cover we have given instructions that \$3,000 be transmitted to you. Consult with us prior to investing it in any kind of business, advising the character of this business.

Colonel Abel's Assistant

3. According to your request we will transmit separately the formula for the preparation of soft film and the news, together with a letter from your mother.
4. It is too early to send you the one-time pads. Encipher short letters, and for longer ones use inserted numbers, transmitting separately the corresponding insertions. All the data about yourself, place of work, address, etc. must not be transmitted in one cipher message.
5. The package was delivered to your wife in person. Everything is all right with the family. We wish you success.
Greetings from the comrades. No. 1, 3 December.

Maki put the film back into the coin and snapped it closed. \$3,000. Not as much as he'd asked for, but as much as he really expected. It would cover the down payment on one of those little neighborhood garages he'd seen advertised. He thought of his work in the big garage at Valga, punctuated by weekends with Aleksa. That made him think of Hanna—everything made him think of Hanna—and how utterly unimportant all other people were. Hanna in New York, Hanna riding in a new American car. He put the trick nickel in his pocket and went out to buy some American vodka. Next day when he wanted to check the message over he couldn't remember where it was. Funny, he thought, how he'd picked up Hanna's habit of hiding things away so carefully he couldn't find them himself. He had no premonition that on some Brooklyn corner a newsboy would spill his change and see one nickel spring apart.⁸

Living was unbelievably expensive in New York; just keeping a supply of his favorite brandy on hand put a big dent in Maki's salary. By the time he'd made up his mind which garage to buy he'd already let too much of the \$3,000 slip through his fingers to make the down payment. And he couldn't get out of his head the picture of Hanna riding in a sleek American car. He still had enough money to make the picture real. And it was not complicated; Hanna was in preferred immigration status as the wife of an American citizen. She arrived in February 1953, and they took an apartment in Brooklyn and bought a car.

Maki now sent Moscow his Letter No. 2, the first in a long series of bimonthly equivocations and deceptions about his operational activities. As he had learned in Finland, he could

either have Hanna or pursue his operational career, not both; and he had chosen. Of course he had to go through the motions, and sometimes these motions were considerable.⁹ For one thing, he had to keep a watch on Svirin's New Utrecht Avenue signal fence. One spring day he found a number 6 chalked there. You add 2, he remembered, and that means you meet at this Brooklyn subway station on the next eighth, eighteenth, or twenty-eighth of the month. You both get on a subway train, but keep apart, and ride past three stops. Then you both get off and take one going in the opposite direction. Then if you haven't been followed you transact your business. Then you get off and Svirin keeps on going.¹⁰

Maki thus held his first meeting with Svirin. All this to collect your salary and a routine message, he thought; much easier to let the old man, the courier Svirin had mentioned, put them under the Fort Tryon lamp post in a hollow bolt.¹¹ It was complicated enough at best, this triple deception. Moscow must be made to think he was busily building up an agent net. Hanna had to have an explanation of where he got his money and of certain mysterious activities he couldn't share with her. (He hinted to her that illegal traffic in narcotics was a real gold mine.) He had to have some honest source of income in the eyes of neighbors and the U.S. authorities. (He was fired from his body-and-fender job in May; he watched the want-ads and worked off and on as shipping clerk, vacuum cleaner salesman, or utility man.) He wasn't really on the square with anyone. Least of all Aleksa. That summer he discovered that a shot of liquor before breakfast would steady him and clear his brain.

In the fall he had his second and last meeting with Svirin in person.¹² Svirin gave him a less routine message this time. In order to reduce his dependence on official-cover channels he was being assigned a courier, a Finnish sailor under the pseudonym Asko, whose ship called at New York three or four times a year. Asko could carry messages for Moscow and bring back hollow coins and pencils. Maki should meet him at a certain movie theater in Brooklyn. Maki would wear a blue tie with red stripes, Asko a blue tie with flowers. There were greeting formulas for recognition.

The appointment came off as scheduled. Maki and Asko set up joint locations—under the seat of a telephone booth in a New York bar, atop a partition in the men's room of a Brooklyn bar—where Finnish notes could be tacked to signal a meeting or to say that a message to or from Moscow had been deposited in one of their "banks." Such a message would be on microfilm, concealed, say, in the split cover of a matchbook. Asko had previously been using a bank in a Riverside Park lamp post with another deep-cover man—this man couldn't understand Finnish, and so Asko had a hard time doing business with him—but he and Maki agreed on a bench in Brooklyn's Sunset Park and a place behind the toilet in another Brooklyn bar as the most convenient banks for them. For future meetings they chose yet a third Brooklyn bar. It was always fun when Asko came to town.

It may have been Asko, though, who caused Maki a bit of work once early in 1954. Normally Moscow did not trouble him with assignments; he was supposed to be operating on his own initiative.¹³ But now some agent, they notified him, had lost contact with his principal, wasn't receiving messages, and had posted a danger signal; Maki was to meet this man and give him a message setting up new arrangements. He always suspected that Asko's language difficulties with the man he'd worked for before had something to do with this confusion. He took care of the unwelcome chore, anyway, and never heard any more about it. He was soon to begin getting more assignments than he would have liked to think about.

The Master Craftsman

Colonel Rudolph Ivanovich Abel was both an artist and an imaginative, accomplished artisan, and he took pride in his art. *Arts*, rather, for intelligence tradecraft is hardly a single craft, with its range of skills from forgery to radio repairing. He was proud, for instance, of his forged New York certificate attesting the birth in 1897 of one Martin Collins, an identity he might have to fall back on some day. True, he had not staked his present and last previous identity on his forger skill: ¹⁴ six years ago, in 1948, it was as U.S. citizen Andrew Kayotis that he had arrived in New York via Le Havre and Quebec because the real Kayotis, after gambling away his other valuables during a Copenhagen fling, with desperate

bravado put up and lost his authentic U.S. passport in a final game.¹⁵ And the imposter Kayotis, once he was inside the country, had melted into Emil Goldfus, who held the photostat of an authentic New York certificate of birth in 1902, because there was no danger that the real Goldfus, having died at the age of some fourteen months, would prove embarrassing. Goldfus was safer than the completely imaginary Collins, but he would not be afraid to become Collins if necessary; he did his forging meticulously well.

Another painstaking pleasure for the master craftsman was the fabrication of the hollow containers he used to transmit or store messages, money, and other secret valuables—the wooden pencil inside which he kept on microfilm the letters from his family and Moscow's radio schedule, the trick sanding block where he stored his one-time pad,¹⁶ the hollow bolts, screws, and nails with threaded heads, the cuff links with removable faces, the toothpaste tubes opened at the bottom, the matchbox with the double sliding compartment, the dry cell with the threaded top, the metal cylinders and plugged lengths of pipe to hold money and other bulky items. He spent a good deal of time making these devices for himself and his agents, and it was satisfying work, the creation of physical projections of an orderly, inventive mind.

He had developed his own formula for secret ink and his own method of making microdots, both improvements over what Moscow had given him.¹⁷ He enjoyed thinking up new ways to transmit microdots—under the staple in the binding of a magazine mailed to an accommodation address in Paris, say, or under the stamp on a letter to one of the "stamp dealers," Vladinec and Merkulow, in Moscow. He liked to hunt up better message banks than the usual iron fences and park benches—a spot under the carpet in a theater, for instance, or an aperture behind a telephone booth. He would try out a new bank by leaving something in it for ten days to see if it remained undisturbed.

Photography was his special hobby, and since it also provided his cover occupation he could indulge in it openly. He now had a separate penthouse studio, on Fulton Street in Brooklyn, after five cramped years in his earlier studio-apartments on West 99th St. and on Riverside Drive. Aside from

photographic work, the new studio was a convenient place to keep his machine tools, his radio receivers and equipment, and his Morse printer, rather than in his Hicks Street apartment. Radio was a lesser specialty of his, but he made friends among the neighbors by fixing their receivers for them.

Partly, perhaps, because radio was not his first love, he was less than enthusiastic about Moscow's project that he set up a transmitter so he could send messages to them as well as receive their traffic. He understood the desirability of getting communication channels independent of the official-cover people and their diplomatic facilities, but he was at a loss for a safe practical way to set up a powerful secret transmitter in the crowded New York area, with radio and TV sets all around to pick up its interference and the radio police, the so-called FCC, keeping such a close watch. Even the proposed two-minute bursts of ultra-high-speed Morse would not be likely to go undetected. It might work in the open country if he could find a sufficiently secluded high spot, but then he would need a more portable and hidable transmitter than the elephantine set proposed by Moscow.¹⁸ Perhaps he could make one himself. He would also need an operator, if he was to have any time for his other duties and his agents. Certainly something had to be done, if only against the eventuality of war, when there would be no diplomatic communications, when one would be willing to run greater risks, and when submarines lying off the coast could figure as relay points as well as operational recipients.

He himself would be out of it then, unless war came sooner than anybody expected. He was getting on toward sixty, and in less than three years he'd have his thirty years of service in. He looked forward more and more to his retirement. The work was fine, but it was really quite a sacrifice to stay so long away from his wife and daughter and from Mother Russia. He hoped this new assistant they were giving him turned out to be a better prospective replacement than Big Shot had. Flamboyant character! And arrogant: thought he was the boss already, before he was dry behind the ears. Wanted *twenty thousand dollars* for a cover business. Kept running back and forth to Moscow. Cracked up his sports car¹⁹ on the parkway; \$1,800 just in doctor-bills. He'd be quite a time recuperating, back in the Crimea.

The Abel Assistant

The new man might be just the opposite—that is, over-cautious—to judge by what Moscow said, that during his two years in New York he had asked for a number of name-checks but hadn't produced a single agent. Abel himself had spent the first year just looking around, but after that you should start producing. He would soon be able to form a first-hand opinion of this man: On Labor Day, at Moscow's direction, he was to meet this "Vic"—using for himself the code-name "Mark"—at a movie house in Flushing, on Long Island. Vic would be wearing a blue-and-red-striped tie and would make certain motions with his pipe as a recognition signal. Mark should arrange regular and frequent future meetings, provide training and supervision as necessary, and pay him a major's salary plus expenses.

Vic—whom the reader will have recognized as Hayhanen-Maki—agreed to meet Mark at least once a week. At each meeting they firmed up the time and exact arrangements for the next, with an alternate date in reserve against unforeseen circumstances. The usual arrangement was for Vic to wait in his car near a specified street corner; Mark had no car and did not drive. If contact between them were broken each was to check the sign at the entrance to Tillary Street Park every day for a signal from the other. It was convenient that they both lived in Brooklyn.

Mark's developing impression of Vic was not bad, at least by comparison with the late lamented Big Shot. He was intelligent, seemed interested and responsive, and caught on quickly to new techniques. He had even done some original work in microdot methods. On the other hand, his preposterous narcotics-trade cover showed poor judgment,²⁰ and his reasons for not having produced any agents were thin: he was afraid that fraternizing in the Finnish clubs might blow him, he said; Moscow kept him too busy with specific assignments; they had refused him enough capital to get started in a garage business. Mark told him to go ahead and join the clubs and promised that when he had some more training in photography he could set up his own studio.

At least he was useful as a leg-man and chauffeur, and that was a good way for Mark to get a better idea of his capabilities.

He used him a lot in those capacities during the rest of 1954 and early 1955. One of Mark's assignments, for example, was to check secretly on the activities of a man who lived in Queens, perhaps an agent Moscow didn't trust. He turned this assignment over to Vic. They drove to Queens together and Mark pointed out the man's house; whenever Vic had a free day he should drive up and mount surveillance on it. Mark didn't much like this counterintelligence business, which proceeded from the assumption that no one was to be trusted. A similar distaste subconsciously motivated his attempt shortly thereafter to shunt another job to Vic, that concerning an agent under the code-name Quebec.

One day Mark had found in his bank in the bridge-wall near Central Park reservoir a broken slot-head bolt. He took it to the studio, unscrewed the head, shook out a rolled and tissue-wrapped frame of microfilm, and put it in his viewer. He scanned the message:

QUEBEC, Roy A. Rhodes . . . former employee of the US Military Attache . . . recruited to our service in January 1952 . . . on the basis of compromising materials . . . is tied up to us with his receipts and information . . . in his own handwriting. After he left our country he was to be sent to the school of communications . . . at San Luis, California. He was to be trained there as a mechanic of the coding machines.

He fully agreed to continue to cooperate with us in the States . . . He was to have written . . . special letters, but we had received none. . . . It has recently been learned that Quebec is living in Red Bank, N. J., where he owns three garages. The garage job is being done by his wife. . . . His brother . . . works as an engineer at an atomic plant in Camp, Georgia . . .²¹

He had Vic drive him to Red Bank to make inquiries, and on the way told him something about the case. In Red Bank he found that Quebec's wife was indeed running a garage business, but had no idea of her husband's present whereabouts; probably he was out west somewhere. It was a wild goose chase, thought Mark; blackmail was the least dependable of agent motivations, especially when you weren't in a position to exercise a continuity of psychological pressure. He reported his findings to Moscow, suggesting that if they wanted to pursue the matter they might assign it directly to Vic; the job would increase his sense of responsibility, he wrote a little speciously.²²

When in a few weeks Vic received Moscow's instruction to locate Quebec, with a further lead on relatives in Howard, Colorado, Mark turned over to him the original message in its bolt container and gave him three weeks free of other duties to go out west and see if the relatives knew the defaulting agent's address. On the way Vic could make some observations Moscow had requested about certain installations in the Chicago and Detroit areas.²³ It was close on to Christmas before he got back; he had not been able to make the observations in Chicago and Detroit, he said, because he had been sick throughout the whole trip, but he had telephoned the Quebec relatives and got an address in Arizona for the delinquent. Mark told him to report direct to Moscow, hoping Moscow might let it drop there.

As time went on Mark came to the conclusion that Vic would perform competently if given a specific task and specific instructions on how to go about it, but poorly if left with a general assignment calling for his own initiative and judgment. He had indiscreetly had a woman with him, Mark learned quite by accident, on the trip west that drew the blank in Chicago and Detroit.²⁴ Moreover, he treated alcohol altogether too much like water, even if he did carry it well. Mark had several talks with him about that, without any lasting effect, and so beginning in 1955 confined his independent assignments to the simple ones—taking a hollow pencil from Asko in a routine reliability check and sending it back to Moscow through one of Svirin's banks; knocking on a door at a Boston address Moscow wanted checked and sending Moscow a description of the man who answered it. Even on cases like that of Quebec last year—there was this other one-time agent Moscow wanted to reactivate, but it turned out that his own Atlantic City relatives wouldn't trust him as far as they could throw him—Mark was afraid Vic might encourage Moscow's unrealistic pursuit of dubious agents, and so used him only as chauffeur.

That's just the way the Quebec business had turned out. In the spring Mark received instructions from Moscow to contact Quebec and get him back on the job. In Arizona yet, and separated from his wife, undoubtedly the fulcrum of the blackmail lever. Well, he wouldn't; his home leave was coming up,

and talking to them in person there in Moscow he could make them see the light. His more important business at home would be to report on Vic, though; he would tell them that Vic would do as an assistant, working under supervision, but that he seemed to lack motivation and as a replacement he would be quite inadequate for the foreseeable future. He wanted to impress on them the urgency of getting a competent man out to take over so as not to delay his own retirement.

Five Grand for Helen Sobell

Mark scheduled his departure for not later than the end of June, so as to make the west-east transit in Vienna easy, before the Soviet forces pulled out under the terms of the new treaty. He gave Vic the equipment and some money to set up his promised photo shop, suggesting that he locate in Newark and take advantage of the relative freedom from assignments to get it started during his own absence. He also repaired the AC-DC shortwave receiver which had burned out when he tried to plug it in on Vic's car—not knowing that the car had a twelve-volt battery²⁵—and gave it to Vic to practice reading Morse; Vic might some day have to handle the Moscow traffic if Moscow never came through with an operator. He had things about in shape to leave when Moscow sent him word to give \$5,000 to Helen Sobell.

This was not so simple as it sounds, with Morton Sobell serving thirty years for espionage and his wife still under surveillance. It wouldn't do to simply walk up to her address, or even telephone to arrange a meeting. Best hide the money and then get word to her where to pick it up. He had Vic drive him upstate to Bear Mountain Park, taking the \$5,000 in two tin cans. They walked up the Major Welch trail. They put one can under a heavy flat rock and tacked a sign like a disused trail marker on a nearby tree. The other can they hid in the hollow between some rocks at the root of a tree which already carried a trail marker, and they added an x-mark and the figure 2 to this sign.

Mark, his departure imminent, had to leave it to Vic to get word to Helen Sobell, but he gave him detailed instructions. Vic should go to a sympathetic friend of Helen's²⁶ and say that he was Morton's brother—Mark furnished him credentials

to that effect—that he was lying low but anxious to help, and that Helen should contact him at such-and-such a place and time. Helen would know enough to be careful. Mark handed him two photographs of her to avoid recognition complications.

This matter arranged, Mark took off. He caught a plane to Houston, and a train from there to Mexico City. Leaving the country this way, all you needed was a smallpox vaccination and a citizen's travel permit, and he had seen to these. In Mexico City he chalked the letter T on the telephone pole opposite 191 Chihvahaa St., on the street side. The next afternoon, at three o'clock, he was outside the Balmora theater looking at pictures of the current film. A sightseer standing next to him was smoking a pipe and carrying a red book in his left hand. Mark asked in English, "Is this an interesting picture?" The man said "Yes. Do you wish to see it, Mr. Brandt?" They went inside and transacted their business, principally arranging another such contact in Paris, where Mark-Goldfus-Abel should telephone the Soviet Commercial Mission at a certain time and speak a set French phrase. In Paris he would get his instructions for travel to Vienna and for contact there, and then he would be off to Moscow.²⁷

In Moscow he reported on the status of the Sobell money and other unfinished business. He was able to persuade them not to pursue the quest of Rhodes-Quebec as an agent, but he was less successful in getting them to accept his evaluation of Hayhanen. It was one thing to question the motivation of a debased creature of the capitalistic environment, another to entertain such doubts about a Soviet citizen who had proved himself with many years in the Service and met the highest Party standards. They seemed to suspect rigidity and perhaps even some professional jealousy on Abel's own part, and pointed out that it was Abel's job to see that his assistant's enthusiasm was maintained and his full capabilities developed. The best Abel could do was to get a compromise agreement that on his return to New York he should secretly observe Hayhanen's performance for a while without revealing that he was back. They disclosed to him for this purpose the Eugene Maki cover name and his Newark address.

A final point of conflict with the headquarters staff was the matter of setting up transmitting equipment in New York. They argued down his objections, gave him a refresher course in radio techniques, and told him they already had an operator en route. He agreed to take more vigorous action on his return.²⁸ Thus settling his official business, he managed to spend most of his time during the remainder of 1955 with his wife and daughter, a delightful foretaste of his coming retirement. Toward the end of the year there arrived a message which Hayhanen had dispatched through his courier Asko: he had given up attempts at surveillance of that suspect agent whose house Mark had shown him in Queens, because surveillance was too obvious in such a suburban district; but he had delivered the \$5,000 to Helen Sobell. That last was a tricky job involving some risk, thought Abel; perhaps the man has something in him after all.

Back in New York after the turn of 1956, Abel with some distaste set his agents to make a full check on Eugene Maki. They found immediately that he had indeed rented a store-apartment suitable for a photo shop and had opened a bank account, giving his occupation as "color photographer." But the details of his life in Newark, as they were gradually revealed, grew less and less favorable. He had made no further attempt to activate the photographic business, as far as could be found. He had a woman named Hanna living in the apartment with him as his wife. He rarely went out alone; she was almost always with him. They had a reputation in the neighborhood for keeping a slovenly house and drinking constantly. There were rumors that they dabbled in narcotics, perhaps not just as stock in trade. Maki had never applied for membership in any of the Finnish clubs in the New York area. There was no evidence of operational activity.²⁹

Abel reported all this to Moscow in early April. Meanwhile Moscow, as he later learned, having received an inquiry from Helen Sobell about her \$5,000, had sent Maki a request for full particulars on how he had passed the money to her. Showing continued trust in him, however, they had also furnished him the name and photograph of a potential courier, a member of a foreign airline crew, whom he should meet at a theater in Queens after an exchange of notes in a message bank there. Maki had failed to make this contact, but had sent a message

describing how he passed the \$5,000 to Helen Sobell through an intermediary on September 15 last year.³⁰ Moscow had instructed him to make a new contact with Helen to arrange a joint check on this intermediary, and Maki had pleaded that it was too dangerous.

Moscow now informed Abel of all this and asked his recommendations. Abel replied in May: he had checked the Bear Mountain caches and found them empty; Maki had just moved to Peekskill, to a house he had bought last September and had renovated;³¹ he recommended that Helen Sobell be given another \$5,000 and that Maki be recalled for interrogation about the source of his funds for buying the house, about the woman Hanna, and about his operational activities or lack thereof.

Moscow was cautious. There was evidently some bad blood between Maki and Abel. It was quite possible that the unproved intermediary had taken the Sobell money. The neighborhood stories from Newark were inconclusive; they could be inventions, or a smoke-screen for cover. Finally, if Maki had indeed turned bad, it would be well to hold off and find out what compromising associations he may have built up. Svirin would be coming home in October; he could do some investigating first. In the meantime Abel could reestablish contact with Maki and keep him under observation. They authorized a new payment to Helen Sobell.³²

Abel was annoyed. Recontacting Maki in July, he told him that since his photographic enterprise had flopped he had better apply now to Moscow for home leave; he had talked to them about it while he was there, he said. He added rather pointedly that while waiting for an answer Maki could make another contact with Helen Sobell so that Abel himself could personally give her the new payment of \$5,000. As Abel expected, Maki stalled around on that assignment. Abel tried to keep him busy as a chauffeur, notably in searching out a suitable spot for the radio transmitter, although the promised operator never arrived.

Exit Maki; Exit Abel

In October Moscow was convinced by Svirin's report³³ that they had a bad egg in Maki, but they were relieved that apparently no one else was involved. They now agreed with alacrity

to his home leave. Abel wanted him to go right away, taking the Mexican route which didn't require a passport, but Maki, stalling and with Hanna's security in mind, insisted on applying for one. Abel, concerned at having Maki running around loose for more weeks or months, tried to get him to come live with him in a hotel. Maki gave the excuse that ever since he'd been hauled in on a traffic charge last summer he'd been detecting signs of surveillance on him, probably the FBI or narcotics agents, and he didn't want to risk compromising a second man. Abel didn't believe him, but to be on the safe side promised to forge him a birth certificate to support a new identity in case Eugene Maki had to disappear.³⁴

The passport was issued early in December, but Maki stalled about leaving. He was getting worried: Mark was so curt now, and Moscow noncommittal. As if aware of his fears, Mark told him Moscow had sent notification that he was being promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. In January 1957 Moscow, now impatient, told Abel to get Maki under way. Abel again wanted him to go via Mexico, but Maki, still stalling, insisted on asking Moscow's approval for departure from New York by ship. Moscow, leaning over backward not to alarm him, agreed and told Abel not to see him any more; they would handle him themselves from here on out. They were afraid that Abel's stiff hostility might precipitate a bolt.

Abel had a final meeting with Maki in February, to give him the forged copy of an Oregon birth certificate. In emergency Maki would become Lauri Arnold Ermas, born in 1920 in Portland. On the eve of his departure from the States he should leave notification of his ETD and mode of travel in a magnetic container on the railing of a Prospect Park fence; Abel would check this bank for it every Friday. They said goodbye with forced cordiality, each with suspicion of the other in his eyes.

Maki-Hayhanen embarked, finally, on the S.S. Liberté on April 24. Moscow watched his progress anxiously. The ship docked at Le Havre on April 30. On May 2, as scheduled, the Soviet Commercial Mission in Paris received a telephone query in Russian: "Can I send two parcels to Russia through the Morey firm?" On May 3 at 10 a.m., as scheduled and confirmed by the telephone call, the man in the blue tie with red stripes appeared at the Chardon Lagache Metro station. He asked

for a travel advance, and was given it. He was told to take a train to Munich and thence a plane to West Berlin, where he could cross over to the east sector on the elevated. There he should telephone to 502805 between 5:30 and 6:00 p.m. and ask for Mr. Wojchek. Regardless of the answer, he should be at the Kaulert photo shop at 7:00 p.m., where someone would address him as "Andrey Stepanovich."

On the evening of May 3 Hayhanen was seen to walk, as scheduled, down the Avenue Victor Hugo. There was no newspaper in his pocket. Good; that meant that he would proceed as arranged to Berlin. But in Berlin the imaginary Mr. Wojchek waited in vain for his telephone call on May 5. Again on May 6 nothing. KGB officers all over Europe were alerted. But by the time they found out where Hayhanen was he was beyond their reach, in the solicitous hands of the Americans, recounting his years of training that ripened to this rottenness and betraying the lifetime service of another at its very close.

Hayhanen had known his boss only as "Mark," and didn't know where he lived in Brooklyn or the address of his studio. But he could tell enough about the studio from his conversations with Mark for the American authorities to identify it. Surveillance was mounted on it. When the radioed warning came that his erstwhile assistant was missing, Emil Goldfus disappeared. Martin Collins moved from hotel to hotel, getting ready to leave the country. But the studio still had to be made as sterile as possible: he had to take his chances and go back to Fulton Street. Thereafter he knew he had picked up an ineluctable tail. He couldn't shake it long enough to board a train or ship or plane. Early on the morning of the summer solstice, 1957, still in his nightshirt in a room at the Latham Hotel, Collins-Abel was arrested. He hasn't talked. In the federal penitentiary at Atlanta they prize his skill with things electric and mechanical, his quiet helpfulness, his paintings and designs for prison Christmas cards.

DOCUMENTARY NOTATIONS

1. The *Komitet Informatsyy* was not dissolved until 1952, but some of its functions were transferred back to the MGB as early as December 1948.

2. "Big Shot" was Abel's nickname for a high-level official sent to New York early in 1953, apparently to break in as Abel's replacement in the deep-cover residency. The 1948 antecedents to this move are postulated here. Big Shot's penchant for fast cars is not a matter of record.
3. Names and titles of RIS headquarters officials are presented here with somewhat greater definitude than is actually established.
4. This is one of Hayhanen's several divergent explanations for having sought a new certificate.
5. Whether Hayhanen was to start from scratch building up an agent net or was to be turned over an existing net is a question complicated by uncertainty as to his planned status in relation to Abel. It may be that he was originally intended to report immediately as Abel's assistant and take over the direction of some already active agents, but that some unforeseen circumstance—conceivably "Big Shot's" presence—made it advisable to leave him on his own for two years. For the purposes of this narrative it is assumed that his independent operation was deliberately planned as a test of his potential and as a means to build up a reserve against the contingency that Big Shot might be ineffective or even blow the Abel residency.
6. Hayhanen's recollection of the date and time of these monthly appearances is not clear.
7. The contents of this message are inferred from Moscow's reply. Hayhanen says it was a request for money without specifying the amount or purpose.
8. Hayhanen's denial that he ever received the Moscow message No. 1 can be viewed with some skepticism. Turned over to the FBI after the newsboy discovered it, it was deciphered when Hayhanen's defection provided the key.
9. Hayhanen insists that his operational activities were as slim as herein described. Although his statement is taken at face value for the purposes of this narrative, it is in fact open to considerable doubt: it is hard to believe that Moscow would make so few demands of an operative, be so entirely misled by him, or knowingly acquiesce in such a lack of production. Hayhanen talks freely about many phases of his life and work, but some of the information he did supply on operational activities had to be elicited by repeated questioning.
10. This procedure was described for one of the meetings with Svirin, not necessarily the first.
11. Precisely what business was transacted with Svirin is not known; a supply of soft film may have been passed. Hayhanen did not learn that the courier who serviced Svirin's drops was an "old man" until Abel told him later.

12. Hayhanen acknowledges only two meetings with Svirin but has told conflicting stories, and the real number is uncertain. The whole question of what role Soviet officers under official cover, like Svirin, play with respect to deep-cover operations, whether merely that of a communications channel or one including some kind of supervisory function, is a critical one unresolved by the information on this case. It is not known what business was actually transacted at this fall meeting, either; the Asko message may have been delivered by other means.
13. See note 9, above.
14. Although Abel is adept at graphic arts, it is questionable that he personally did the forging herein credited to him.
15. The real Kayotis, an unstable person, it is said, won a large sum gambling in the United States, left in mid-1947 for a three-year European visit, and was last heard from in Lithuania. Abel says he bought the Kayotis passport in Copenhagen for a thousand dollars while on his way to the United States. Abel's story probably implies too casual a procedure for the documentation of Soviet operatives: the Soviet authorities presumably acquired the Kayotis passport by bribery, confiscation, or some such accident as the narrative suggests, and furnished it to Abel in Moscow.
16. These things were found so concealed in 1957; they may not have been kept thus in 1954.
17. Hayhanen says that Abel's microdots were better than his own, and his own better than those he had been taught to make in Moscow. But he has alluded also to smaller Moscow microdots made on a special film of Soviet manufacture, and these may have been the same as Abel's.
18. It was actually a year later, when Abel was in Moscow, that this proposed transmitter was shown to him.
19. The type of car in which Big Shot had his accident is not in fact recorded.
20. It seems illogical that Hayhanen would have admitted narcotics-trade activity, whether as cover or not, to his new boss; but he says that later he told Abel the fictitious story that he suspected surveillance by narcotics agents.
21. This message, typed in English, was found in the bolt buried in Hayhanen's basement; Hayhanen implausibly disclaims knowledge of it. Since transmission of the message in plain text would be irregular and insecure, this version is presumed to be Abel's transcript from cipher, passed to Hayhanen when the case was turned over to him. It was effective in obtaining a confession from Sgt. Rhodes.
22. Abel's part and his motives in getting the case assigned to Hayhanen are a matter of supposition here.
23. Hayhanen has mentioned Chicago and Detroit installations as general intelligence targets, not as an objective on this particular trip.

SECRET

Colonel Abel's Assistant

24. Hayhanen had in fact taken Hanna with him, but there is no evidence that Abel knew that he had not travelled alone.
25. Hypothetical explanation for this accident.
26. This friend is postulated as the reason for the forged credentials.
27. The travel and contact procedure described here is reconstructed from Abel's proposals for Hayhanen's travel and from evidence of his own plans for escape from the country in 1957. His mode of travel and points of contact in 1955 are not known.
28. The entire content of these Moscow discussions is hypothetical.
29. There is presumptive evidence that Abel made this investigation, whether by agreement with headquarters or on his own initiative; but there are considerations both in favor of the presumption and against it. As illustrated in Hayhanen-Abel assignments and elsewhere, it is Soviet practice to double-check on agents and operatives. Abel was back in New York for full half a year before getting in touch with his assistant, and did not reveal this fact to him even afterwards. He could not have failed to become quite suspicious of Hayhanen if only because of his alcoholism, and it hardly seems credible that Hayhanen had kept Hanna secret both from Abel and from Moscow all these years, as he maintains. On the other hand, if this investigation was made and it turned up evidence of his dissolute life with Hanna, as it would, one might expect Moscow to have acted more promptly in recalling him, and to have made sure as well that Hanna was not left in New York free to tell whatever she knew. The narrative tries to reconcile these opposing considerations as best it can.
30. What particulars Hayhanen actually invented to cover his embezzlement is not known.
31. The dating of Hayhanen's purchase of the Peekskill house to coincide with his exappropriation of the Sobell money is arbitrary. He has said that he and Hanna recovered it in September and spent it on hotels and liquor.
32. It is assumed in this narrative that the second \$5,000 for Helen Sobell was a replacement for the first, which Moscow must therefore have known was not received. It is possible, however, that two different payments were intended. Under this supposition Moscow's request for particulars on the method of passing the first was a routine check, and a fully trusted Hayhanen was asked to make a second contact with Helen for the purpose, presumably, of passing more money.
33. The only positive indication that Svirin made such an investigation and report is the apparent firming up of Moscow's decision on Hayhanen at the time of Svirin's return. If he did, the assignment has a bearing on the relationship, discussed in note 12 above, between Soviet official and deep-cover operatives.
34. See note 14.

On the importance of knowing whether a foreign agent works for money, ideals, venture, dignity, or love, and what it is he loves.

EXPERIENCE WITH TYPES OF AGENT MOTIVATION

Paul Tollius

Late in World War II, as a young, relatively inexperienced Chief of Station, I had an eye-opening introduction to human motives for intelligence agency. The young Moroccan waiting in my office at the American Legation in Tangier was said to have worked very successfully for the Germans in the past. He was now offering to collaborate with the United States. His motive for changing over, and indeed the condition attached to his offer, he made clear, was that I do away with his rival for the hand of a fair maiden living in Tetuan, over in the Spanish zone. I thought he was joking, and must have betrayed my incredulousness before I realized that he was absolutely serious. I have to confess that our interview that day failed to produce any plan for collaboration.

At our second meeting, however, I managed (without promising to do his unworthy rival in) to persuade him to furnish some proof of his own worthiness, the good faith of his offer. On the spot he tendered the information that 100 tons of canned fish consigned to Germany were being stored under our very noses, in a huge warehouse near the Legation. The German intelligence services had bought it some time back, he said, but as German and neutral ships had become scarcer and scarcer they had not yet devised a way to get it to a German port.

We found the fish, mostly tunny, just as he had described it; but I never saw the agent again. The full story of his motivation took some reconstructing. His original bloodthirsty proposition may have been prompted by unwarranted conclusions from the fact that another Moroccan who had worked for the Germans had been found dead in the well on the prop-

erty where I lived in Tangier. (I think he fell in trying to get a drink.) When the agent realized from his first contact with me that there was little likelihood of our literally wielding the axe on his rival, he made us the instrument for as devastating a blow as he was able to deliver him at the moment: it was the rival's father, I learned later, when as Allied representative I took over the German consular files in Spanish Morocco, who had sold the fish to the Germans. They had paid him, but left the fish for cover in his name, and he was hoping against hope that it would never be delivered, that the ending of the war would leave him with both the money and the fish.

Motives and Results

The brief collaboration of my Moroccan did not justify any great psychoanalytical effort on my part, but the motivation of a continuing agent is, or should be, the subject of constant study on the part of his case officer. Why is it, if we are getting the desired results out of an agent, that we worry about his motivation? Given the complexity of human behavior, you may say, the determination of any but the most superficial motives is a job for an expert, and if we like what the agent is producing we shouldn't particularly care why he produces it.

Maybe we shouldn't, until something goes wrong; but if we don't, by then it is likely to be too late. Results, the take from an operation, are without question a primary consideration, but so is the agent's possible disaffection if it should result in his passing our information to the enemy. And even short of that extreme, unless a case officer knows what it is that drives his agent he cannot know to what lengths the man will go, freely or under pressure, what risks he is willing to take, at what point he will break, tell another intelligence service what he is doing, or simply stop producing. Perhaps nothing is really more important than learning just why an agent is willing to take the chances entailed in clandestine activity. And the closer the case officer comes to a true assessment of his agent's motivation, the more likely that he will be able to run a successful, long-term operation.

The experience of almost twenty years in the active handling of agents has begun to provide us with a body of knowl-

edge about their psychology from which it should be possible to draw certain generalizations. Despite the complexity of the subject, several types of needs or wants which lead men to become agents can be distinguished and described. There is the ideologically motivated agent, a kind that was not difficult to find during the war. There is the seeker for personal security—often, after the defeat of Germany, the same agent who had earlier been motivated by the highest principles. There is the agent pursuing one aspect or another of financial gain, the camp-follower of intelligence networks since primitive man first spied on enemy tribes. There is the adventurer, the hater, the criminal, the patriot, the man driven by religious zeal.

Ethically, the motives can be noble, crass, or base, and I believe this moral scale is not without useful application in the assessment of an agent. A few case histories may serve to show how the value of an operation is affected by the character of the agent's motivation and by our understanding it.

The "Practical" Mercenary

The agent who is working for purely "practical" reasons—money—can be expected to play it practical all the way. And one eminently practical step he can take is to keep the intelligence service or the police of his own country informed of what he is doing, as a kind of insurance policy against the chief occupational hazard of spying. This is why the "fearless" agent is suspect. It is not man's normal nature to be free of fear when he is doing dangerous work. Although an occasional agent who frightens you by his disregard for his own—and unfortunately *your* own—security is fearless simply because he is not well balanced, the lack of fear is most often due to "reinsurance" with the local service. And it is not long before the agent who is in touch with his own service begins to wonder what the Russians or another Communist service would pay for what he knows. If he doesn't get the idea by himself, his local service is likely to give him guidance and help in establishing contact with other services and agents.

There may, of course, be practical reasons for not taking out this insurance. Testing one agent who claimed, and perhaps had convinced himself, that he was not working for the

money but out of patriotism—many mercenaries will not admit their true motivation—I posed him a theoretical question, ostensibly about one of my other agents. “Why,” I asked, “didn’t this man, since he was working solely for money, go to the police of his country and tell them about his activity as a means of ‘reinsurance’?” “Oh,” he replied, “the police would have made him turn over most of his pay to them.” This danger, I am certain, that the police, corrupt in many countries of the world, would demand a large cut, is the only deterrent preventing a good many mercenary agents from keeping the local police or intelligence service fully informed.

The Ideological Zealot

Among the ideologically inspired agents plentiful during and for a time after the war, of particular interest were the anti-Franco Spaniards, and especially those of Socialist bent, those whose frustration and pent-up fury had been wreaked on the Communists during the last grim defense of Madrid. Case officers who recruited Spanish Socialist agents early in World War II from the refugee camps in French Africa have attested to their vitality and devotion to the Allied cause. Most Spanish Socialists with whom I became acquainted were motivated by the expectation that the Allies would finish their wartime job by effecting Franco’s downfall. A chain of these men with whom I came in contact in 1945 lived with the hope that their efforts would culminate in the defeat and destruction not only of Hitler but of the dictatorship in Spain. These agents worked unsparingly and with fervor.

In 1950, when I renewed contact with groups of these agents, I at first found their motivation cooled but their work still sustained by the same hope. When in 1946 the U.N. countries had recalled their ambassadors from Franco Spain, there had been general elation and a feeling among them that their objective was finally in sight. But in October 1950 the United States and other U.N. powers resumed diplomatic relations with Franco. Now the bottom fell out of these agents’ motivation.

Their disillusion soon began to color their work. A close scrutiny of their efforts as reflected in their reports revealed a substantial falling off in both the quality and the volume of information produced. As good case officers, we made every

effort to revitalize their spirit and motivate them anew. This effort continued for several years, until a final assessment convinced us that the spark was gone, the desire to work for U.S. intelligence no longer there. Not only in these Socialists: other Spanish republican elements scattered around the world, particularly in France and Latin America, had also lost heart. Our worst problem was with those who remained agents, in spite of having concluded that the fight was over, for entirely practical considerations, the necessity of earning a livelihood. Continuing to go through the motions and in some instances camouflaging their disinterest, they were harder to assess and more troublesome to terminate when their contribution had become of questionable value.

The Patriot, Bound by Personal Tie

An agent whom I had inherited from another U.S. agency seemed a questionable individual. We were in great doubt about his true reason for working for the United States and had some reason to believe that his close acquaintance with Communist leaders in his country might mean, not that he represented a penetration of the Party on our part, but that he was a Communist agent. I was constantly pushing him to prove by the revelation of Communist Party secrets that he was in fact on our side. We spent the better part of a year in close fencing over this issue, and during this time I took great care about what leads were given him.

In 1948, a revolution, rather bloody for his peace-loving Mediterranean country, broke out. He was in the midst of the fighting and obviously very close to the Communist element which bore the brunt of the battle. Before the final scrimmages in which the Communist element was routed, the agent sought refuge in my home. I hid him for some three days. Whether because his presence was suspected or because of a lot of sniping was coming from the direction of my house, I was called on by armed riflemen wanting to search the house. I told them in a voice loud enough to be heard by the agent in hiding that I could not permit them to search the home of an American diplomat but that as I had nothing to hide I would be glad to have them in and talk with them. They were young boys, obviously nervous with a rifle, more friendly than hostile.

They came in and I brought out a dozen cans of American beer. The beer was a happy choice, something they had not had and all that was needed to distract them. They were much more interested in carrying this loot off to their comrades than in searching the house. They were in such a hurry to go that one young man forgot his rifle and I had to call him back for it. A few days later, in a jeep with license plates bearing the American flag, I drove the agent about a hundred miles into the back country to his father-in-law's home. He emerged when things had quieted down and returned to work.

Whatever his leanings may have been before, this agent never forgot his rescue from a precarious situation. Before this incident, he told me years later, he had felt that the United States never trusted him and he therefore had little reason to trust us. He feared that we were even capable of exposing him to the Communists. Throughout the next ten years he proved beyond doubt his devotion and honest intent to serve the aims of U.S. intelligence.

Double Agent or Regenerate Adventurer?

An agent's motivation can be changed, either by circumstances or through the efforts of an interested and patient case officer. Some of the less desirable motive forces—money-hunger, hatred, love of adventure, fear—can be redirected and tempered by a careful program of indoctrination designed to bring out whatever finer purposes the agent has. Even the motivation of the enemy-controlled agent can be and has been changed through this process combined with a demonstration of superior tradecraft. It is surprising to see the effect on a double agent, one whose whole aim has been to serve his Russian master faithfully, when he comes to believe that the U.S. case officer is the superior of his Russian handler. This superior skill, coupled with bits of intelligence calculated to convince him that we know infinitely more about him and the Russian than he ever suspected, causes him to wonder whether he is working for the wrong or losing side.

It is often necessary to work with an agent when the direction of his primary allegiance is not clear and his motivation difficult to fathom. One such agent came to our attention by virtue of his contact with a known Soviet intelligence offi-

cer. Our preliminary investigation of him had not even begun when it was reported from another area that the man had come in and told the story of his work for the Soviet case officer. He came quite clean, a fact verified by close surveillance and substantiated by his willingness to help entrap the Soviet case officer and get him declared *persona non grata*. He admitted freely, however, that his walking in to confess was mostly a means of buying insurance with the authorities of his own and the U.S. government. It was also, although he did not say so, a means for protecting his job with a steamship line which regularly called at U.S. ports.

Probably the best present test for double agency is a close analysis of the importance of the agent's take and the sensitivity of the target to which he has access. There are few intelligence services today that willingly give a double agent access to highly sensitive material. Now a close scrutiny of the use of this agent by the Russians led us to believe that they may have planned that he eventually become an unwitting double agent. The peculiarity of the requirements given him—the procurement of unclassified material with limited commercial distribution, for example, material the Soviets could get through any number of contacts—led us to the conclusion that they were being used for test assignments.

Further, the usually penurious Soviets seemed eager to pay exorbitant prices for this material, evidence that they believed the agent's motivation to be monetary and were building up in him a dependence on his new income. The superficial Soviet conclusion that the agent was motivated by greed was derived from his having bargained hard when first contacted, rationalizing his act in working for an unfriendly service with the justification that if he made them pay enough his crime would become honorable or at least forgivable.

While it was evident that this agent needed money and that this need motivated him, motivation is rarely simple, comprising only one element. It is as complicated as human nature, and changes with changing circumstances. This man had got along without money for a long time, and fundamentally he was not the type to whom money meant much. When he had it he spent it; when broke he cut down to cigarettes and coffee. His fixed weekly pay from the steamship line covered the sup-

port of his estranged wife and children. He must, we thought, be driven by some more compelling motive.

We kept the agent under close observation, using surveillance and technical means. It gradually became apparent that he considered his life to date pretty much a shambles. His two marriages had ended in failure. Although he was easily successful with women, now in middle age the fascination of the chase was gone. In a less than morose or despondent stock-taking of his own worthwhileness, he had apparently concluded that his ledger was heavily weighted on the debit side.

We could only theorize, on the basis of our study, that he wanted somehow to do something worth while for himself and country. By chance he had become involved in a rather shady business which he finally recognized as an opportunity to do something against the Russians and for the West. This was the only solid reason we could find for his decision to carry on in the work. And if eyebrows should be raised at this conclusion, it can be added that he also needed money, the most common motivation of the cold-war agent, and that he was intrigued at the idea of being a "spy."

Was this enough to explain what made him tick? It would have to be, for the present, until the rope from which all agents dangle became so short as to reveal his soul. Sooner or later we would know, but probably not for a good long time, perhaps not until after his termination.

The Hungerer after Recognition

An intelligent European exiled from his native land had become through his ability and hard work a kind of financial seer in his adopted country. He was an intense, strange person whose driving force permitted him no rest and whose complex character defied analysis. He was recruited by a case officer who spoke his native tongue and was able to develop with him a personal rapport that made for successful working relationships. Among other things, this officer didn't mind that the agent dictated his reports, using him as secretary.

On the departure of this case officer the agent was turned over to a younger, less experienced one, who had been born with a silver spoon in his mouth. At bottom democratic and

basically unaffected, he nevertheless usually left an impression of aloofness and perhaps condescension on many less well born. This new case officer found it unpalatable to act as a secretary. In meeting after meeting he cajoled the agent to write out his reports. He tried every trick and gimmick to this end. While the agent became more and more taciturn and stubborn, the officer grew increasingly determined that he would get him to write rather than dictate. A year of effort along these lines ended in making a once productive operation barren.

With a view to salvaging this operation a complete reassessment of the agent was now made. A careful scrutiny led to the conclusion that the agent's work for us was based largely on a desire to be accepted as an equal by the service. He also wanted to be accepted in the American community and in diplomatic circles. He needed this recognition both for its own sake and as a means of expanding his business contacts. If this analysis was correct, he should respond to carefully arranged invitations to cocktail parties of the local government and diplomatic set. A new case officer who could arrange such invitations was assigned, and he effected a complete about-face on the part of the agent. The question of dictating reports was never brought up, and after each party the reports began to flow as never before.

Motivation Misemployed

This is the case of Mr. X, exiled one-time general secretary of a European Communist Party, who in his late fifties showed the physical toll of a life divided between open and underground struggle but remained a mental giant beside the pigmies then leading the Party he had led. X was a short, bent, burly, grey-haired myopic, shambling along on his cane, whose very quietness seemed a veil to cover the dangerous quality lurking in a slowed and greying but still fierce bear.

He had challenged Stalin's high-handedness and come out only slightly scarred. He had been held a prisoner for some months in Moscow, but was finally released to return home. Ultimately he broke with the Kremlin. His brother-in-law, who had also been released from prison in Moscow, with considerably less prudence continued his Party contacts. In a

street rendezvous with Kremlin agents in a Western European city he was stabbed to death.

Now Stalin was dead and the Soviets wanted X back. Since leaving the Communist Party he had become an important left-wing Socialist. The Kremlin bosses, X concluded, wanted to replace the Party leaders in his native land. These had been hand-picked by Stalin and were undoubtedly somewhat suspect.

A contact of mine who was a close friend of X called on me urgently one day to report that an important Soviet official had visited X. The Russian had offered him a trip to Moscow to talk things over with a view to resuming the Party leadership in his country. X had turned the proposition down. My contact believed, however, that he could get him to reconsider and accept with U.S. backing. Controlled general secretaries are not easy to come by; X was worth a real try.

Every means we could muster and many hours of work and planning went into this venture. It was of no avail: X would not go back. He feared he would meet the same fate as his brother-in-law if the Russians ever got him into the Soviet Union. He was eager to establish himself favorably in the eyes of the West but gave good reasons why he could not undertake this operation:

If he went back and even became general secretary again, he would still have to do as the Kremlin told him on all major matters. He was sure that a general secretary was only a puppet.

He no longer believed in Communism and would soon be found out by the Kremlin.

He would do nothing that might reflect on his sincerity and dedication to socialism or that could unfavorably affect his role in a new government in his country. It was in the cards that sooner or later a new government would be formed in which socialism would, after an interim, play an important if not dominant role.

He was mortally afraid of the Russians.

X did agree to another Russian proposal, a meeting in France or Italy to discuss their plan, and was willing to go

with U.S. backing if we had a distinct prior understanding that he would accept no Russian proposal to return to the fold. This opportunity to explore exactly what the Russians had in mind was deemed not worth to the United States the cost of a round trip for X and his wife. It was rejected, and this was the end of the X affair.

It should have been fairly evident to us from the first meeting with X that he could not be induced to go back to Communism by our glowing offers. Although he worked for a living, money was no inducement. He had no burning desire for revenge, nor was he attracted by the possibility of deceiving the Russians. From our viewpoint his motivation was negative. His having no children or close relatives blocked another channel through which some agents can be enticed. For this operation his basic interests were diametrically opposed to our desires.

Nevertheless we had doggedly persisted. In insisting on the all which X refused we ended up with nothing. We failed to develop the obviously more realistic opportunity to use X as a key man and continuing bait for the Russians. Surely what the Russians had really planned was to use him as a penetration of the Socialist Party; this must have been the main reason they wished to rehabilitate him. And X had been agreeable to a working arrangement which might even have given us time to create a motive he did not now have. We failed because we did not understand the motivation of the agent; we had lost sight of the agent's own desires. If X had been a weaker character and we had been able to persuade him to accept the Russian offer, it would have been a sorry affair indeed.

Ethics and Pragmatics

These cases illustrate how motives noble, crass, and base are made to serve intelligence objectives, but not with equal value. It can be argued that full control of an agent is more readily achieved if he is motivated by some base desire or want: the unprincipled man soon compromises himself, exposes himself to blackmail, or falls subject to some other hold. It is my view that no type of crook can be trusted and that the best agents will be found among those who are moved by the nobler purposes.

Some intelligence officers scoff at motivation based on friendship and respect, feeling that neither is necessary or even desirable. As each case is a matter for the individual agent and the individual officer, it is certainly true that operations have been run in which even hostility was the order of the relationship between them. There are agents considered so low and despicable by the case officer that the working relationship has been reduced to pure physical control and intimidation. In my view, these agents won't last, are the source of many double agents, and are intrinsically unworthy of the time and money they cost. The crass and base desires, perhaps good enough for the short haul, are not of the stuff that will pay off over any prolonged period of time.

The higher motives, such as ideological zeal for U.S. objectives, patriotism, a parent's aspirations for his children, or religious devotion, are extremely reliable ones. In my own experience the best agent motivation has been his respect for the case officer and friendship with him, backed by an identity, even if not a total one, between his aims and the basic aims of the United States and its allies. There can be no question, even among those who may think these views ingenuous, that the case officer must know as nearly as possible what it is that drives his agent on.

How a set of mathematical curves and formulas can be used to convert data derived from the still photograph of a new whirlybird to specifications for its performance in action.

THE CALCULATION OF SOVIET HELICOPTER PERFORMANCE

Theodore A. George

The chariness of the Soviets in disclosing facts about their military establishment and the technical characteristics of their equipment extends even to items not used primarily for military purposes. Despite stringent security, however, they are not able to continue concealing a new item once it is in series production and has been issued in quantity to field units. Recognizing this fact, they finally relax to the extent of demonstrating new equipment they have in service at such public affairs as the May Day Parade, attended by all foreign military attachés stationed in Moscow. Or alternatively, a picture of a new item may appear in a Soviet military journal over some such caption as "Another Great Proletarian Achievement" or "The Highest Performance in the World."

The U.S. technical intelligence analyst thus finds before him one or more photographs of some new item of equipment along with a terse Soviet description of it implying that it has successfully passed user tests and may actually be in production. This is of course not enough. Its performance and characteristics must be determined as accurately as possible if its influence on Soviet military capabilities is to be properly gauged. The analyst can prod the field collector with requirements and wait for more information to come in. On the basis of his appreciation of the Soviet state-of-the-art in the new item's field, he can meanwhile make some guess as to what its performance should be. But on many important items he can do much more, and does. By assembling all the available information, obtaining dimensions from an accurate scaling of the photographs, and making certain assumptions

if necessary, he proceeds systematically to calculate the probable performance of the new piece of Soviet military equipment. This article shows by way of example how the principles of mathematics and engineering can be applied to estimate the performance of a new Soviet helicopter.

Required Data

The helicopter is a very complex machine, comprising a myriad of moving parts, black boxes, and structural members. Since, however, the principles of helicopter engineering are well understood and the laws of nature apply as inexorably in the USSR as in other parts of the world, it is possible, relying to some extent on U.S. developmental experience, to arrive at a number of significant conclusions about a Soviet helicopter from its outward appearance. The first step is to obtain accurate dimensions by scaling one or more good photographs. Some of the more important dimensions to be obtained are the aircraft's total length, its landing gear dimensions, the diameter of its rotor or rotors, and its rotor blade root chord and tip chord length (the width of the blades at their inner and outer ends). From these dimensions can be derived a number of values which will be needed in subsequent calculations—the area of individual rotor blades, the area of the rotor disc (the whole circle swept by the rotor), the rotor solidity ratio (total blade area divided by disc area), and the cross-section areas of various parts of the aircraft. The outward appearance of the helicopter should also help to establish whether it is powered by a gas turbine or a reciprocating engine and will show whether it has single, twin, coaxial, or tandem rotors.

All information about the aircraft obtained from other sources, overt and covert, is now assembled and recorded in table form. Two important additional specifications needed are engine horsepower (rating for normal continuous operation and for take-off) and the linear speed of rotor blade tips. But if reliable information on these is not available they can usually be estimated: the rotor disc area will usually give an indication of the engine horsepower of a helicopter of given size, and the speed of sound constitutes for the rotor tip speed an upper limit which cannot be approached (even in forward

flight) without undesirable air compression and separation effects. The type of rotor and its blade and disc area will also show the gross weight of the aircraft.

Weights and Payload

Having assembled the above information, obtainable with some interpolation from a good photograph, the analyst can now calculate probable performance values. His first computation, in my judgment, should be the weight of the helicopter empty. This he determines by aggregating the weights of its various sections and component parts, specifically the rotor blades, rotor hub assembly, body group, landing gear, engine section, power plant, power plant accessories, rotor mast, transmission drive shaft, transmission, starting system, cooling system, lubrication system, fuel system, instruments, flight control equipment, electrical system, furnishings, and communication equipment. Established mathematical expressions for the weight of each of these components in terms of the specifications determined above have been shown by statistical analysis to yield sufficiently accurate results. For example, the weight of the main transmission for a single overhead rotor powered by a reciprocating engine is 0.081 $\left(464 \frac{HP_M R}{V_T}\right)^{0.88}$, where HP_M is the take-off horsepower rating of the engine, R is the rotor disc radius, and V_T is the rotor tip speed. Similar expressions have been established for each of the other sections, and the sum of these is the weight of the aircraft empty.

This net weight may now be subtracted from the previously determined gross weight to give a figure for the useful load, comprising the load of fuel, the weight of the crew, and the payload. The fuel weight can be calculated from the range of the helicopter, or if this is unknown it can be assumed at approximately 200 nautical miles, the average range of most modern helicopters. The number of crew members, usually one to three, can be estimated from the size of the aircraft, and each can be taken to weigh with his personal equipment 200 pounds. The useful load less the weight of fuel and crew is the payload, and we have thus obtained our first important performance value.

Ceilings, Speed, and Climb

In order to establish the hover ceiling for the helicopter, the altitude it can maintain without forward flight, it is necessary to plot two curves, power required against altitude and power available against altitude; the altitude at which these curves intersect is the hover ceiling. The power available diminishes with altitude, the gradient of the curve depending on the type of engine in the aircraft. Plotting data can be obtained from any standard propulsion handbook. The power required, on the other hand, increases with altitude. The same factors apply to propulsion forward, and similar curves can be used to obtain the maximum and normal cruising speeds at any given altitude.

The graphs developed for obtaining the hover ceiling and forward speed can also be used for calculating the vertical and maximum rates of climb. The maximum is attained in forward motion because the power required for forward flight is less than that required for hover. The rate of climb is a function of the surplus power available under given operating conditions, and the maximum rate of climb can be expressed mathematically as $33000\eta \left(\frac{ahp}{W} - \frac{Bhp_{MIN}}{W} \right)$, where η is propulsive efficiency, ahp is power available, W is gross weight, and Bhp_{MIN} is the minimum power required for forward flight under any conditions. The rate of climb thus calculated can be used further to establish absolute and service ceilings for the craft. The absolute ceiling is reached when the maximum rate of further climb is zero, and the service ceiling is defined as the point where rate of climb drops to 100 feet per minute. The altitudes at which the available and required levels of power satisfy the equations $33000\eta \left(\frac{ahp}{W} - \frac{Bhp_{MIN}}{W} \right) = 0$ and $= 100$ are therefore the absolute and service ceilings respectively.

Range and Endurance

There are a number of performance values which depend on fuel consumption rate. These include range (longest one-way flight), radius (round trip with stop), endurance (time in the air), cruising speed for maximum range, and cruising speed for maximum endurance. These values can be obtained

from the performance curves already determined plus the SFC/BHP curve (specific fuel consumption *vs* brake horsepower developed) of the engine. Since a SFC/BHP curve for this particular engine is not usually available, a curve typical for its power and type (reciprocating or gas turbine) can be obtained from a propulsion data handbook. This assumption is not likely to lead to any serious error.

The cruise fuel rate in pounds of fuel per pound of gross weight per hour ($\frac{dR_F}{dt}$) can now be expressed as a curve plotted against forward speed. The minimum value of $\frac{dR_F}{dt}$ will coincide with the velocity (and corresponding power setting) for maximum endurance; and a tangent to the curve from the point of origin will indicate the velocity and fuel rate for maximum range. If the amount of fuel carried by the aircraft is known or can be determined (e.g., from the size of the fuel tanks), the range and radius can be calculated from these results. Conversely, however, the range of the helicopter can frequently be assumed to be 200 nautical miles and the amount of fuel it must carry can then be determined by reverse process. The radius of a helicopter is usually less than half the range because of fuel consumption in the second warm-up and take-off for the return trip.

There are a number of other performance values which are of considerable importance in estimating the effectiveness of a helicopter in service. Some of these, such as life expectancy of component parts and time required for overhaul, can not be determined by analytical methods, but only by testing the aircraft under field operating conditions. Others, such as stability and control values, can be found by calculation but in my opinion do not warrant the effort required. The fact that the Soviets have decided to mass-produce a given helicopter model is sufficient indication that it responds to its control instruments with reasonable promptness and that it does not suffer from serious aerodynamic instability. Lengthy computations to arrive at these conclusions are hardly necessary.

The principal calculations made in estimating Soviet helicopter performance are therefore those outlined above in very

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Helicopter Performance

abbreviated summary. The summary outline will have been enough, I hope, to show the reader how, with relatively little to go on, it is possible to arrive at significant conclusions about a new Soviet model. The performance values thus obtained are of course mere approximations, which should accordingly be used only in the absence of more reliable data. As soon as overt or covert collection media can furnish dependable information, the calculated values should be discarded in favor of more accurate figures based on observation or actual tests of the aircraft.

Describes the system of handwriting analysis currently used by intelligence for operational assessment.

GRAPHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT IN ACTION

James Van Stappen

The two articles on handwriting analysis which appeared in the Summer 1959 issue of the *Studies*¹ debated its validity as an assessment technique without making reference to a graphological service that has been most successfully rendered to intelligence operations for the past several years. The purpose of the present article is to describe the system used in this service and indicate the nature of its results, in the hope that a sketch of graphology in operation will help dispel the confused mists which surprisingly still shroud the whole subject.

Contrary to popular opinion, a top-flight graphologist is not a product of the world of Swami, but rather a graduate in psychology of at least one first-line university, probably having done postgraduate work of a clinical nature. Usually he has obtained this schooling in Europe.² All German universities now make a basic course in graphology prerequisite for

¹ "Handwriting Analysis as an Assessment Aid," by Keith Laycock, and "The Assessment of Graphology," by E. A. Rundquist, pp. 23-51.

² A representative international list of universities where graphology is taught would include the following:

University of Hamburg, Germany—Prof. Dr. med. Rudolf Pophal
University of Munich, Germany—Prof. Dr. Lutz Wagner
University of Freiburg i. Breisgau, Germany—Dr. F. Kaeser-Hofstetter. (Institut f. Psychologie & Charakterologie—Prof. Dr. Robert Heiss.)
Istituto di Indagini Psicologiche, Milano, Italy—Prof. Marco Marchesan
Psychiatrische Klinik der Mediz. Akademie, Duesseldorf-Grafenberg, Germany—Dr. Gerhard Gruenewald
Psychologisches Institut der Universitaet Wien, Austria—Dr. H. Rohracher
Institutet foer Tillampaed Psykologi, Saltsjöbaden, Sweden
University of Berlin, Germany—Dr. W. H. Mueller

a degree in psychology, and for those who wish to become specialists in the field a two-year period of directed graduate work is required. This additional time is largely spent analyzing original specimens of handwriting, experience for which there is no substitute.

The scientific graphologist is rapidly becoming a sought-after man. In most European countries he has been licensed for years, and his services are required as a part of standard operational procedure in personnel administration. The Federal Association of German Employers is one of his larger subscribers in the commercial field, and his findings were employed in the selection of officer material from the ranks of the German army during World War II. Even in the United States, a long list of regular subscribers includes the Military Prison at Fort Leavenworth, the Manhattan Children's Court in Brooklyn, the National Hospital for Speech Disorders in New York, and King's County Hospital in Brooklyn. In 1949 Columbia University granted a Ph.D. in Pure Science on the basis of a thesis devoted to the analysis of delinquent children's handwriting.

The Lewinson Method

The system we use in servicing intelligence operations is a slightly improved and simplified form of one developed and validated by Thea Stein Lewinson and Joseph Zubin in a study³ carried out at Columbia University, where Dr. Zubin was Professor of Psychology. Their work came as the culmination of a trend toward statistical evaluation of handwriting begun in 1925 by the great English expert on handwriting identification, Robert Saudek, and carried on in this country and in England by such scholars as Gordon W. Allport at Harvard University and Philip E. Vermon at Cambridge,³ followed by many others. The Lewinson-Zubin study demonstrated statistically that handwriting alone could distinguish between normal persons in good mental health and persons suffering from any form of mental illness, and developed further and tested a measurement and evaluation system that was already being used by Mrs. Lewinson.

³ See bibliography.

The procedure cannot be fully described in the space available here, but a statement of the principles used and the simplified presentation of a sample case will illustrate its main features. For purposes of analysis by this method, handwriting is regarded as a formed line having three dimensions (vertical, horizontal, and depth), in each of which it exhibits a dynamic property of contraction, balance, or release. Twenty-one major characteristics of this line are distinguished and grouped for measurement and evaluation into four components as follows:

I. FORM COMPONENT

- a) Ornamentation/simplification of form.
- b) Contraction/amplification of contour.
- c) Contraction/amplification of connecting form.
- d) Thinness/broadness of stroke.
- e) Sharpness/pastiness of stroke borders.
- f) Tension/flabbiness of stroke.

II. VERTICAL COMPONENT

- g) Height of middle zone.
- h) Proportion of upper and lower zones to middle.
- i) Direction and degree of deviation from horizontal line.
- j) Amount of fluctuation from horizontal.
- k) Space between lines.

III. HORIZONTAL COMPONENT

- l) Space between letters.
- m) Breadth of letters.
- n) Direction and degree of slant.
- o) Amount of fluctuation in slant.
- p) Left/right tendency (at margins and in letter forms).
- q) Distance between words.
- r) Breadth of margins.

IV. DEPTH COMPONENT

- s) Increase/decrease of pressure.
- t) Extent of pressure control.
- u) Depth/disappearance of connections.

Each of these 21 graphological elements is graded on a seven-point scale, from +3 (representing maximum contraction) through 0 (representing balance) to -3 (representing maximum release). The results are entered on a standard work-sheet, the distribution of ratings within each component is calculated, and a figure which might be called the efficiency quotient is obtained by dividing the number of zero ratings in each component by the number of those above and below the balance point. These figures are the decimals entered in parentheses on the right of the work-sheets shown in Figure 1.

The distribution of ratings in each component is also plotted as a graph to give a better visual picture of the dynamics of the writing in these four respects, and a composite graph summarizes the resultant tendencies of the whole. An interpretation of the personality characteristics therein indicated is then rendered in an analytical report of considerable length. An analyst will work ten or twelve hours, plus or minus fifty percent, on most specimens.

A Live Illustration

The interpretive aspect of the process is best illustrated by a real case from our files. Each of the four analytic components reflects a different aspect of character, but here, for simplicity's sake, we shall examine only a personality's overall viability as shown in his efficiency quotients and in his composite curve. The subject is an agent, a political criminal in the eyes of his country's government, who has demonstrated the stamina of his character in his actions. Escaping from prison, an act which made him even more a "wanted" man in the eyes of the security police, he would make no attempt to leave the country but would continue his underground activities until he was arrested again. Then he would go back to prison and escape once more, and the entire process would be repeated.

In 1956 his letters dating from 1949 were submitted to a graphological analysis. Figure 1 a, of the two which we used to illustrate the work-sheet, carries his early, normal read-




FIGURE 1

ings, and figure 1 b those in 1956. For all his remarkable ability to bounce back, his final letters indicated a considerable degree of general breakdown. Note that the parenthetical efficiency quotient has dropped in every component, and the composite from 0.18 in 1949 to 0.13 in 1956. Figure 2 is the corresponding graphic representation, the solid curves as

Graphology In Action

CASE NUMBER 5243

AGE 38 SEX M F




FIGURE 2

of 1949 and the broken lines as of 1956. The readings for an ideally well-balanced person yield a high convex normal distribution curve. Note how here the broken lines drop at the center and lift at the ends relative to the solid lines, showing an excess of both relaxation and tension and a serious tendency toward inversion of the normal distribution curve.

In 1957, partly as a result of this analysis, the agent was removed to a safe place and began a long recuperation. During this period he wrote an extensive diary of his entire eight years' activity. This diary validated every statement made in the report of graphological analysis executed two years before the diary was available.

Areas of Efficient Use

This sample case illustrates one kind of service that is being rendered case officers, routinely but on written request only, with respect to their agents—a periodic checking of the handwriting in agents' reports when, after initial assessment and perhaps training, they have been launched on a mission. In addition to revealing imminent physical or mental breakdown it has sometimes exposed double agents when an incongruity between the excited tone of their reports and the mildness of their assignments aroused suspicion. But there are other persons for whose assessment graphology provides not just an efficient but the *only available* method—the unknown source who supplies your agent information, the agent who refuses to submit to ordinary assessment, the VIP who cannot be asked to undergo tests, and the writer of anonymous letters.

These five categories are the ones on which this service has produced great quantities of valuable information in the past, and they seem to constitute the best area for efficient application of the technique. Many of the intelligence services that employ graphology—and they represent nations on every continent of the world—use it in the selection and assignment of their own staff personnel; a few even go so far as to teach case officers some of the fundamentals to help them find the soft spots in potential defectors or recruits. I do not endorse the use of this technique, however, on subjects available for observation and testing by standard methods which are much faster and easier to apply. Graphology should not try to replace or compete with standard techniques

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Graphology In Action

for direct assessment, but apply itself to cases where these cannot be used.

Reliability of the Results

The operations chiefs and case officers to whom this service is available must have some estimate of how much they can rely on its findings. Many smugly believe it to be infallible. Some, on the other hand, are too skeptical even to try it out. The truth, as usual, lies somewhere between. Graphology is no more 100% accurate than any other means of measuring human character. But it does render judgments more accurate than can be reached by unsystematic observation, and renders them *without* observation, surreptitiously or from afar. Hundreds and hundreds of operational cases of all types and in many languages have been successfully handled by the service, and a large percentage of the findings have later been confirmed by ordinary direct assessments or by the subject's actions.

The reliability of the graphologist's analysis, however, is conditioned on the degree to which the handwriting sample submitted to him fulfills his ideal requirements. Ideally, in order for him to establish a working base and make all the observations involved, he should be furnished the subject's approximate age, sex, ethnic origin and country of elementary education, approximate extent of education, and profession or general line of work. The sample for analysis should be an original three or four pages written on unlined paper with a nib pen of the writer's choice. It should have been written spontaneously and without knowledge that it would be analyzed. A second sample, written at a different time, if one can be obtained, aids in establishing a norm. But these requirements are rarely all fulfilled; and it is possible, at some disadvantage, to analyze writing done with a ballpoint pen or graphite pencil, or a sample on lined paper. When originals are not available, properly focused photographs, if the scale is specified, can be made to serve with some difficulty. Least reliable are photostats or other crude reproductions. The lack of data on the writers of anonymous letters does not make analysis impossible, but like these other compromises with requirements it does qualify our confidence in the findings.

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Graphology In Action

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The summer articles on graphology advocated a test run or a series of studies to establish its validity. It seems to me that anyone acquainted with the research represented in the appended bibliography—chosen from works available in English—and aware of the mounting number of well-validated cases in the files of this service would feel no need for an elementary validity test at this late date. Such a test might, however, be useful in identifying capable analysts: there are probably fewer than a dozen competent graphologists in the United States.

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The role intelligence actually plays in the Executive Branch's forging of national security policy is described and appraised by an indubitable authority.

INTELLIGENCE AS FOUNDATION FOR POLICY

Robert Cutler

An integral and in fact basic element in the formation of national security policy is the latest and best intelligence bearing on the substance of the policy to be determined. That statement is not a theoretical truism, but a description of what has by and large actually been practiced in the Executive Branch under the administration of President Eisenhower. It is based on first-hand observation: for periods totaling almost four years I was in continuous touch with the procedures for formulating, adopting, and coordinating the execution of national security policies within the Executive Branch. I assisted the President at 179 meetings of the National Security Council—almost half of all the meetings it held in the first dozen years of its existence. I presided at 504 meetings of the Council's Planning Board (earlier called its Senior Staff). I was a member and for a while Vice Chairman of its Operations Coordinating Board; I participated in meetings of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy; I represented the President on a small group which considered special operations. It is from this experience that the conclusions of this article are drawn.¹

¹In 1951, in the early organizational stages of the Psychological Strategy Board, the author served as its Deputy Director and representative at meetings of the NSC Senior Staff, later to become the Planning Board. In early 1953 President Eisenhower asked him to study the organization and functioning of the NSC mechanism and make recommendations to strengthen and vitalize its structure and operating procedures. He then became the President's principal assistant with reference to the operations of the Council. He was moved from the position of Administrative Assistant (January-March 1953) to that of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, where he served from March 1953 to April 1955 and from January 1957 to July 1958.

NSC Operating Procedures

The function of the National Security Council, as defined by National Security Act, is "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security, so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of Government to cooperate more effectively in matters affecting the national security." The Act also gives to the Council the duty of "assessing and appraising the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power." The Council advises the President both on policy and on plans for its execution, but its primary statutory function thus lies in the *formation* of policy. The role of the Council as a planning body is subordinate to its policy function.

The Council and its subsidiary Planning Board² and Operations Coordinating Board³ constitute an apparatus available to the President to help him reach policy decisions on national security. The National Security Act is sufficiently flexible to allow each President to use this personal aid as best suits his convenience. One President may use the Council mechanism in one way, another in another. The *best* use is made of it when a President uses it in a way that satisfies his personal requirements. It has never been felt necessary to test

² The NSC Planning Board, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, is composed of officials of the departments and agencies which are represented at the Council table with reference to a policy matter there under consideration. These officials have a rank equivalent to Assistant Secretary or higher. Each is supported by a departmental or agency staff. Each has direct access to his department or agency chief and commands all the resources of his department or agency for the performance of his duties.

³ The NSC Operations Coordinating Board, of which the President's Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination is Vice Chairman, is composed of officials of the departments and agencies concerned with the policies referred to the Board by the President for assistance in the coordination of planning. These officials have a rank equivalent to Under Secretary or higher. Each is supported by a small departmental or agency staff. Each has direct access to his department or agency chief and commands all the resources of his department or agency for the performance of his duties.

whether the Congress can constitutionally require by statute that a President consult with specified persons or follow specified procedures in coming to a policy decision in this field.

Under President Eisenhower, the normal procedure for operating the policy-making aspects of the NSC mechanism has involved three main steps. First, the NSC Planning Board formulates recommendations as to national security policy and circulates them to Council members and advisers well in advance of the Council meeting at which they are scheduled to be considered. Then the Council considers and approves or modifies or rejects these recommendations, and submits to the President such as it approves or modifies. Finally, the President approves, modifies, or rejects the Council's recommendations, transmits those policies which he approves to the departments and agencies responsible for planning their execution, and—as a rule where international affairs are concerned—requests the NSC Operations Coordinating Board to assist these departments and agencies in coordinating their respective planning for action under the approved policies.

Thus a policy is first determined by the President, and then the departments and agencies plan how to carry out their responsibilities to the President under it, being assisted in the coordination of this planning by the OCB. It is, of course, fundamental that the planning to execute policy responsibilities be carried out by the respective departments and agencies which are directly charged by the President with such responsibilities. No person or body should intervene, at a lower level, between the President and the department head directly responsible to him.

During the period 1953–1958, with which I am familiar, the great bulk of national security policy determinations were made by the President through the operations of the NSC mechanism just described. Because this method of policy formulation was the usual one, such policies were commonly but erroneously referred to as “NSC policies.” Since it is the function of the President to determine policy in all areas under his executive control and responsibility, and national security policy may be formed in any way which he finds convenient and appropriate, the policies so formed, whatever body or individual may submit the recommendations therefor, are the *President's* policies.

There were occasions during this period when national security policy was determined by the President as a result of Cabinet deliberations (though this was a rare occurrence) or by his executive decision based on conferences with one or more of his principal department or agency heads, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or others within whose special competence some particular subject would naturally fall. There should always be complete flexibility for every President to determine however he elects the matters of high policy which it is his responsibility to decide. Because of the utility and convenience of the NSC mechanism, however, and because the present Chief Executive values the advantages of integrated recommendations and joint deliberations based on them, it has been the more or less standard operating procedure during his tenure to seek to form national security policies through the procedures outlined above.

Factual Intelligence and Estimates

In this article the term "intelligence" is used to embrace both factual intelligence and estimates based thereon. In forming national security policy both are of prime importance.

The gathering of intelligence facts is today a matter of enormous scope and hardly conceivable complexity, bearing no resemblance to the simple if hazardous personal mission of a Mata Hari. There are, indeed, many individuals working in the field of intelligence, in and out of formal government service, who must exhibit personal bravery and rare ingenuity, taking risks beyond the ordinary call of duty. Because all is grist that comes to the intelligence mill, one need not seek to measure the results of these individual efforts against the results of the world-wide scientific and technological operations employed in modern intelligence gathering.

In our continuing confrontation by a power openly dedicated to swallowing all mankind in the maw of Communism, the rapid gathering of germane intelligence on the activities of other nations in every field of endeavor has put the United States into an electronic business that is world-wide, highly scientific, incredibly complicated, and extremely expensive. It is staggering to realize the limitless ramifications of current technological procedures, the almost overwhelming amount of raw material that comes flooding in every hour of the day

and night to be sifted, analyzed, codified, and—most urgent of all—communicated clearly to the decision-makers. For in the last analysis the valid use of intelligence is to build intellectual platforms upon which decisions can be made. It is not gathered to be stored away like a harvest. It must be delivered, succinct and unequivocal, within the shortest time feasible to focal points for use.

This prompt delivery is essential both to those who conduct our foreign affairs or direct our defensive military mechanisms and to those who frame our decisions of high policy. The sound concept that the national intelligence effort should be centralized is not inconsistent with a demonstrable need that each of the several departments have its own intelligence arm. The man who may have to dispatch a SAC bomber, an ICBM, a Polaris submarine, or a Pentomic task force has a dual function with regard to intelligence: he has a part in acquiring the latest intelligence for use at central headquarters, all the way up to the President; he also must himself have and use the latest intelligence in carrying out his crucial responsibilities.

It is for these reasons that the National Security Act in 1947 created a Central Intelligence Agency and a Director of Central Intelligence, who at one and the same time is chief officer of the Central Intelligence Agency, Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, and Foreign Intelligence Adviser to the President and National Security Council. Through the series of NSC Intelligence Directives the President has sought to make the gathering and dissemination of intelligence more rapid and efficient. These Directives put emphasis on the centralization of authority and responsibility in the intelligence field, on making the separate intelligence organizations of the armed services and other departments and agencies contributory to, and not independent of, such central authority, while still allowing them to meet their specialized needs.

The President has shown a constant awareness of the urgency of perfecting the national intelligence effort. He gave close attention to the reports on this effort made by the committee under General James A. Doolittle (October 1954) and by the Hoover Commission's Task Force on Intelligence Activities under General Mark Clark (May 1955). In February 1956

he formally established a President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, first chaired by Dr. James R. Killian and now by General John E. Hull. He gave this Board the continuing mission of reviewing the conduct of our foreign intelligence activities and reporting thereon periodically to the Chief Executive.

The operation of the many intelligence arms in the critical field of intelligence gathering and dissemination at all levels involves a truly vast annual expenditure. But in terms of national survival, the prompt delivery of correct intelligence to the President, the ultimate decision-maker, is an undebatable necessity.

Beyond this requirement for current factual intelligence there is an additional requirement for intelligence estimates. These estimates may be addressed to a particular country, area, situation, armament, or function and set forth both the pertinent facts and the likely future actions predictable thereon, or they may seek to arrange logically and with precision the broadest spectrum of intelligence materials into a considered appraisal of what over-all developments may be in future time.

Both types of intelligence estimates can be of the greatest possible help to policy-makers and planners. Their preparation requires expert competence and their coordination calls for objective thinking by those who have the authority to agree or differ on behalf of their organizations. Because of the prophetic nature of any estimate, it is of great consequence that the final text should seek not compromise but clarity. Many of the coordinated national intelligence estimates with which I worked during these four years clearly and fully set forth dissenting views held by competent members of the U.S. Intelligence Board.

Intelligence Orientation for the Makers of High Policy

The prompt circulation of daily bulletins and special and national estimates as basic orientation for those who make the recommendations and decisions on high policy is an obvious necessity. The Planning Board, responsible for doing the spade-work in forming policy, needs to review the special and national estimates in detail, dissecting them and arguing over them until they become familiar material. And Security

Council members need to get them in time to study and weigh them before the subjects to which they relate are taken up at the Council level. Both Planning Board and Council members should be *inseminated* with their contents, as I once told one of the chiefs of British Intelligence. In the Planning Board this insemination has been a feature of its standard operating procedure since 1953, as I will illustrate in a moment. At the Council level the education of the members is carried on in several ways.

In the NSC. The Council members receive daily, weekly, special, and general intelligence publications, and their function requires that they be familiar with this material. In 1953, moreover, in order to insure that Council members are kept fully acquainted with current intelligence, an innovation was introduced at their meetings. Until then, the oral briefing on current intelligence was given each day in the President's office to him alone. Now it became a part of the Council's established procedure to make the first agenda item at each meeting a briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence.

This oral briefing, assisted by the visual presentation of maps and charts on easels behind the Director's seat, reviews the latest important intelligence throughout the world but focuses on the areas which are to be taken up later in the meeting. It normally consumes from fifteen to twenty-five per cent of the meeting time, being frequently interrupted by specific questions from the President and other Council members. These questions often give rise to colloquies and extemporaneous expressions of views which are of consequence to the policy recommendations that are to be discussed. I have always believed this direct confrontation of the Council each week with current and special intelligence to be an important aid to policy consideration and formulation. Yet the British Cabinet and the War Cabinet under Sir Winston Churchill, to the best of my knowledge, carried on their policy deliberations without the benefit of this stimulating and thought-focussing device.

There are other ways in which the Council, as the supervisory body to which the Director of Central Intelligence reports, is kept informed about intelligence problems. The Director submits annually to the Council a summation of the

problems that have faced the intelligence community in the preceding period and the measures and means adopted for dealing with them. The President and Council must also from time to time review and revise the National Security Council Intelligence Directives, which constitute the charter for the operations of the intelligence community.

The revision of one of these detailed and often complicated NSCID's, especially in relation to the functional gathering and rapid dissemination of intelligence, may require months of prior study by a panel of specialists—perhaps scientists, technologists, or communications experts, persons of the highest intellectual and scientific standing—brought together to advise on methods and procedures. Many of the panel studies necessary for the purposes of the experts involve most carefully guarded secrets. Yet it is important that the Council understand, in general terms, how the vast intelligence community of modern days is organized, administered, and operated. The principles which emerge from the findings and recommendations of these highly classified studies are matters for action by the Council, and especially by the President.

In times of particular crisis the function of intelligence is conspicuous in its importance. In such historical crises as Indo-China in 1954, the Chinese off-shore islands in 1954-1955, and Lebanon in 1958—to cite a few at random—the intelligence appraisal of the Director of Central Intelligence, the foreign policy appraisal by the Secretary of State, and the military appraisal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were indispensable ingredients in the deliberations held before the die was cast and the policy set by the President.

In the Planning Board. The Planning Board necessarily probes deeply into the latest intelligence on each subject that comes before it. A CIA Deputy Director is in regular attendance at the Board table, bringing to its deliberations an informed knowledge of the contents of special and general intelligence estimates. He participates from his point of view in the debate on current matters, and it would be as unthinkable to overlook his views as to overlook those of the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is seated at the table as adviser on military issues.

The CIA Deputy Director and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs seek to coordinate the preparation of intelligence estimates with the forward agenda of the Planning Board. To that end the agenda is tentatively scheduled for a period of two months or more ahead so that the flow of intelligence materials can be arranged to meet the policy-makers' demands. Of course, history sometimes takes a hand, and the scheduled forward agenda has to be suspended for the immediate consideration of a special estimate that has been urgently called for. There can be nothing static or cut-and-dried in scheduling ahead the Planning Board's work-load (and consequently the Council's forward agenda); it is entirely unpredictable how long a time may be consumed in the preparation of particular policy recommendations or what interruptions may be forced by extrinsic happenings. Whatever the order of business, however, one factor is essential: a foundation of the latest and best intelligence to build upon and a constant rechecking of intelligence material as time marches on to the Council deliberation and the Presidential decision.

In the OCB. Turning for a moment from policy formulation to the coordination of plans for carrying out approved policy, we find that in this work of the Operations Coordinating Board current intelligence is again a necessary ingredient. At the weekly meetings of the OCB over which the Under Secretary of State presides, there are in regular attendance senior representatives of Defense, Treasury, Budget, USIA, AEC, and ICA, and the two cognizant Special Assistants to the President. At the informal Wednesday luncheon which always precedes the OCB meeting the Director of Central Intelligence has an opportunity to thrash out problems of a sensitive nature. At the more formal Board meetings which follow he is a full participant. The coordination of planning in the responsible departments and agencies for the execution of a policy which the President has approved requires the same up-to-the-minute intelligence that the making of the policy did.

The Annual Policy Review. The annual Estimate of the World Situation produced by USIB member agencies is awaited each year with the greatest interest—and anxiety—by those in the policy-making apparatus. It is an invaluable production, presenting as it does a distillation of the painstaking

efforts of the entire intelligence community to state as of the year-end the dimensions of the foreign threat to our national security. It is written with scrupulous care, it is well documented, and it sets forth with clear distinction, where differences of opinion occur, the opposing views of the experts who cannot agree with the majority estimate. I conceive this annual basic estimate to be of great consequence—as a stimulant, as a guide, as a frank expression of differing views on matters which may be of highest significance. It is this estimate which constitutes each spring the point of departure for the recurring review of our basic national security policy.

The first step in this review is to schedule the Estimate of the World Situation for discussion at two or three meetings of the NSC Planning Board. At these meetings it is subjected to 7 to 10 hours of controversial discussion in a search for better understanding. Its contents are analyzed and dissected so that attention can be focussed upon its most important conclusions. In some years distinguished consultants from "outside of government," such men as General Gruenther, John J. McCloy, Arthur W. Burns, Karl R. Bendetsen, and Robert R. Bowie, have been invited to these Planning Board meetings. They have been asked, after study and review of the high points in the Estimate, to discuss them with the Planning Board at a meeting of several hours' duration. Then these points, together with the consultants' and the Planning Board's reaction to them, have been brought before the National Security Council at several meetings wholly devoted to their consideration. Short papers presenting the policy issues and their implications are prepared by the Planning Board as a basis for Council discussion at these meetings.

The purpose of the procedure just described is not, of course, to try at the Planning Board or Council level to change or modify any part of the annual Estimate. The purpose is to sharpen understanding of the important aspects of the Estimate and to study and discuss in open meeting the policy implications thereof. Through this procedure the Council members become sharply aware of the high points in the Estimate and the differences in view regarding them, and can join in a give-and-take discussion without feeling bound by the more formal presentation of carefully prepared policy recommendations. Almost as important as the ultimate policy decision

itself is the intellectual controversy which precedes it, the educative and consolidating effect of full and frank discussion, the exposure of views which have not become fully formed in departmental exercise, the emergence of novel and interesting ideas at the highest level.

The way in which this product of the intelligence community serves as a regular precursor to the Planning Board's annual review of basic policy is a cogent illustration of the community's essential role in the shaping of national security decisions.

A Model Case

It may be appropriate, at the close, to describe what in my view is the *ideal* procedure for formulating a national security policy. Let us take as an example not the annual broad policy review which may consume several months, but a national policy on the State of Ruritania.

First, the Ruritania item is scheduled far ahead on the Planning Board agenda, with three to five or more sessions devoted to it. At the first of these sessions the Board will have before it a national intelligence estimate on Ruritania. It will also have before it a factual and analytical statement, prepared by the responsible department or departments or by an interdepartmental committee, on the military, economic, political, and other germane aspects of the Ruritania policy problem. To this compilation of factual data and analysis, whether supplied in separate memoranda or as a staff study, have contributed the vast resources of the informed departments and agencies of government, the brains and experience of the operating personnel who work day after day in the particular area of Ruritania and have learned at first hand the strengths and limitations involved, the very persons who staff the departments and agencies that will be called upon to implement this policy they are working on when and if it receives Presidential approval.

The intelligence estimate and the departmental material are explained, discussed, and chewed over in one or more meetings of the Planning Board. A senior representative of a responsible department is likely asked to attend at the Board table and be questioned and cross-questioned about the factual information and tentative policy recommendations

submitted by his department. The Board seeks to squeeze out of the material all the juice that it contains.

After these proceedings, a draft policy statement is prepared by the responsible department or by an interdepartmental or special committee. This draft will consist of a set of "general considerations" (drawn from the intelligence estimate and the factual and analytical material as a basis for policy recommendations), a statement of the "general objectives" of the proposed U.S. policy toward Ruritania, a more detailed proposal for "policy guidance" in the several areas of U.S.-Ruritania relations, and appendices covering anticipated financial costs of the proposed policy and comparison of military and economic expenditures and other data for past and future years.

At as many Planning Board meetings as required this draft statement is discussed, torn apart, revised. In the intervals between the meetings revised texts are drafted by the Planning Board assistants for consideration at the next meeting. Finally, from this arduous intellectual process emerges either full agreement on the correctness of the facts, the validity of the recommendations, and the clarity and accuracy of the text, or—as is often the case—sharp differences of opinion on certain major statements or recommendations. In the latter case, the draft policy statement will clearly and succinctly set forth, perhaps in parallel columns, these opposing views.

When the draft policy has been thus shaped, reshaped, corrected, revised, and finally stated, it is circulated to the Council at least ten days before the meeting which is to take up policy on Ruritania. Council members will thus have sufficient time to be briefed on the subject and familiarize themselves with the contents of the draft, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will have time to express in writing and circulate to Council members their formal military views on the exact text which the Council is to consider.

That is my concept of how the integrating procedure of the NSC mechanism should work when it is working at its best. Some such procedure is the desired goal, a goal often approximated in actual performance. The views of all who have a legitimate interest in the subject are heard, digested, and combined, or in the case of disagreement stated separately.

In a good many instances the views of experts or knowledgeable people from "outside of government" are sought and worked into the fabric at the Planning Board level. The intelligence estimates, the military views, the political views, the economic views, the fiscal views, views on the psychological impact—all are canvassed and integrated before the President is asked to hear the case argued and comes to his decision.

It is certainly true that human beings are fallible and that the instruments which they create are always susceptible of improvement. The mechanism which I have described, and its operation, can and will be improved as time goes on. But the main course of this integrative process seems to me mechanically and operatively sound. And it must be grounded on the firm base of the best and latest intelligence.

A German cryptanalyst presents his own version of the reason Rommel was beaten at the gates of Egypt.

THE LOST KEYS TO EL ALAMEIN¹

Wilhelm F. Flicke

How slight and unimpressive are often the initial causes which lead to great changes in the course of events; how our picture of great men varies according to what we know about them and the point of view from which we regard them; how easily the fame of great generals grows pale when we know the secret of their successes!

Any history of World War II will doubtless mention one name on the German side with particular respect—Rommel. This name has become a symbol of German generalship. In the deserts of North Africa Rommel and his men won astonishing victories and boldly chased the British to the gates of Alexandria. But his real aim had been to chase them further—out of Alexandria, across the Nile, across the Suez Canal—and suddenly his victorious march stopped. At El Alamein, almost within sight of Alexandria, it was unexpectedly all over.

What had happened? What was the secret of his unexampled victories, and what was the secret of their sudden end? There is no doubt that Rommel was a man of great energy and distinguished military capacity. It would have been hard to find a better general early in 1941 when it became a ques-

¹ Excerpted from an unpublished manuscript, *War Secrets in the Ether*, which tells in popular form the history of the German and other communications intercept services. The author habitually attributes to the intelligence product of these services an exaggerated and often decisive influence on the course of world history. Moreover, writing shortly after the end of the war, he apparently did not have at his disposal the authoritative testimony now available which blames the German failure to take Egypt and Suez primarily on the High Command's unwillingness to give Rommel the numbers of tanks and guns he needed. This account can therefore be presumed to exaggerate the importance to Rommel of the intercepted messages it cites; but that they were of some importance is attested in other sources, notably in Ciano's Diaries.

tion of stopping Wavell in Africa. There is no doubt the British fought stubbornly on the Delta's edge in the summer of 1942. But that is not the whole story.

Cairo Calling Washington

In the fall of 1940 the Italians had crossed the Egyptian frontier and advanced east to Marsa Matruh. There they had been forced to halt. On 9 December 1940 General Wavell started his counteroffensive and by mid-March 1941 had thrown them back to the border of Tripolitania. Meanwhile the German Afrika Korps had been formed and transported to Tripolitania, and General Rommel now assumed command over all German and Italian forces in Italian North Africa.

Rommel went to work with great energy. On 24 March 1941 his Afrika Korps and some fresh Italian divisions attacked the British, who were weakened by three months of combat and an extremely long supply line, and within 18 days drove them out of Cyrenaica. This operation came to a standstill approximately on the Sollum-Djarabub line, and from early April 1941 the front was generally calm. Nothing noteworthy occurred. At least nothing outwardly noteworthy. In reality, something was being prepared quietly which belongs among the most interesting chapters in the history of this war.

An officer whom, for reasons which will become apparent, I shall call General Garrulus was stationed in Cairo as U.S. military attaché. Experience has shown that often when people get a lively interest in a new field of endeavor they merely cause mischief. For Garrulus, in his new post, the significance of the North African theatre was dramatized by Rommel's actions, and the entire Near East seemed about to become the focal point of the war. For an ambitious man Cairo seemed just the right place to be. So Garrulus decided to act. But how can a military attaché act? He writes reports. And how are these reports conveyed nowadays? By radio.

So Garrulus set to and sent one radiogram after another to Washington—reports on the political situation and, above all else, reports on everything connected with the British military preparations and operations. They were enciphered, of course, but the death of any cryptographic system lies in its frequent use. All these radiograms were intercepted by the Germans.

They bore the address MILID WASH or AGWAR WASH and hence were easily recognized. By early July the system had been solved in essence and parts of the messages could be read.² They proved to be a mine of important information. Garrulus reported to the War Department in Washington on the reinforcement of the British forces in western Egypt, on their equipment with modern arms, on each transport of war materiel that arrived, on the withdrawal of the Australian 9th Division from Tobruk and its replacement by British and Polish units, and on preparations for an offensive aimed at encircling and annihilating the Axis troops.

All these reports were passed currently to General Rommel. They were not yet complete, to be sure, for the cryptographic system had not been solved in its entirety, but they were adequate to keep him posted. Hence it was no surprise to him when in the grey dawn of 18 November 1941 the

² The wartime chief of Italian military intelligence, General Cesare Ame, credits his service with both the initiative and the execution of this operation. The following is translated from his *Guerra Segreta in Italia*, 1940-43, pp. 96 ff:

"In the period immediately preceding the declaration of war against the U.S., the Military Intelligence Service, by means of a happy initiative carried out in the greatest secrecy, succeeded in entering into possession of precious American cryptographic material (codes and deciphering tables in active use).

"During the military action . . . in North Africa the British headquarters each evening forwarded a summary of the principal operations of the day to the American representative in Cairo. The summary included information and situation details of great interest. This summary, enciphered in the American code, was immediately transmitted to Washington.

"Because the American command had committed the grave error of not replacing its codes immediately after war began, as would have been good practice, our service intercepted the dispatches, deciphered them rapidly, and during the same night retransmitted them in our own cipher not only to the Supreme Command but also to the Headquarters of the North Africa troops, thus making it knowledgeable of the most delicate and interesting information on the adversary."

An Italian employee of the U.S. embassy in Rome had in fact stolen the basic code, and German and Italian cryptanalysts were left only the problem of working out successive reencipherments. Some years after the war this employee had the *sang froid* to come back and ask for his old job again.

British offensive under General Sir Alan Cunningham broke loose along the entire front. Rommel had made good preparations and was able to hold his front for a time, but he could not prevent the British from making a break south of Sidi Omar and thus throwing his southern flank off balance. On 19 November the British took Sidi Rezegh and on the same day Churchill proclaimed the impending destruction of the Axis troops in North Africa.

Both sides brought up all the troops they had. Slowly but surely the British drew a ring around the Axis divisions. Nevertheless, despite all tactical successes, the onslaught of the British did not achieve decisive results. Wherever the British started an action, Rommel immediately sent forces to oppose them. He even sent a column behind the British in the direction of Halfaya and cut their line of supply. He always did the right thing at the right time.

Small wonder, for Garrulus was sending one telegram after another to Washington. He ranged all over the battle area, saw and heard everything, knew all preparations, every intention, every movement of the British forces, and he transmitted it all to the United States. The German intercept station copied each message and sent it promptly by teletype to Berlin, where it was deciphered and forwarded by the speediest possible means to Rommel. The whole thing took only a few hours. By now the cryptosystem had been completely solved.

The British were much surprised. Preparations for the offensive had been so thorough that destruction of the Axis troops in its very first phase had been considered certain. Something had not clicked. General Auchinleck, Commander in Chief in the Near East and Wavell's successor, flew from Cairo to Cunningham's headquarters and on 26 November relieved him of his post. A young general of 44 years, Ritchie, was appointed commander of the British Eighth Army. On 8 December Rommel pushed through a weak point in the British encirclement, disengaging his troops without being detected. Before the British recovered from their surprise he had escaped to the westward. On 11 December Churchill stated in the House of Commons that the Libyan campaign had not gone as expected.

In the days that followed, the victorious British occupied several towns and captured some 25,000 men. But mean-

while Rommel had established his shattered units near El Agheila. He had also received dependable information regarding his opponent; Garrulus had seen to that. On 21 January he advanced 16 kilometers into the British line with 3 armored columns. The British were taken by surprise and had to retreat. On the 27th Rommel was north and northeast of Msus. On that day Churchill declared "We are facing a very bold and clever foe, and I may well say a great general!" On the 29th Benghazi was taken. Rommel was promoted to Colonel General. On 10 February operations came to a standstill 100 kilometers west of Tobruk. Rommel was not strong enough to break through the new defensive front of his opponent.

Intercept Procedure

Two great stations had been copying the Garrulus messages since the beginning of the year to make sure that none should be missed, and their intercepts were transmitted with "urgent" precedence by direct wire to Berlin. I should like to illustrate by example the effectiveness of this German operation. The British had carefully planned and prepared an action against Rommel's airfields. They meant to drop parachutists during the night with explosives to destroy the facilities. The action had been so carefully planned that it could not have failed its objective. Garrulus, radiant with joy, reported this to Washington. The message was sent about eight o'clock in the morning by the station in Cairo; it was received in Lauf immediately and transmitted to Berlin. At nine o'clock it was on the cryptanalyst's desk; at ten o'clock it was deciphered; at 10:30 it was in the Führer's Headquarters; and an hour later Rommel had it. He had half a day to warn his airfields. The British project was executed shortly after midnight. The parachutists got a warm reception; the action miscarried. Only at one airfield which disregarded the warning the British met with success.

February, March, and April passed quietly on the front. Rommel knew precisely how matters stood on the British side: their supplies and equipment, their strength, their plans. Both sides were bringing in reinforcements. After the middle of May the British began to spot extensive German movements and counted on an offensive in the near future.

Keys To El Alamein

On 26 May Rommel's famous offensive began. German tanks broke through at Bir Hakim and heavy tank battles raged for days near Acroma. Approximately 1,000 tanks and 2,000 to 2,500 self-propelled guns were engaged on the two sides. On 10 June Bir Hakim, the key to the British defense system, was taken. The Axis troops drove through in three columns. Sidi Rezegh was taken, and on the 19th the Egyptian frontier was reached. On the 21st encircled Tobruk was taken, along with 25,000 prisoners. This had been a bold masterstroke.

By 25 June Rommel had occupied Sollum, the Halfaya Pass, and Sidi Omar, and was in front of Sidi Barrani. Garrulus was still radioing his reports and Rommel was receiving precise information every hour. The British were amazed; Rommel seemed to have second sight. No matter what the British undertook he always anticipated it as if the British High Command had been keeping him posted.³ On 27 June General Ritchie was relieved as commander of the Eighth Army and Auchinleck assumed command in person.

Quickly the British retreated to Marsa Matruh. Here were the fortifications Wavell had laid out when Graziani was at the gates of Egypt. Now Rommel was at the gates of Egypt. In less than four weeks he had chased the British out of all Cyrenaica. Their only hope lay in the Qattara depression which stretches 60 kilometers inland from the coast between Marsa Matruh and Alexandria. The British were resolved to hold the rectangle Alexandria-Port Said-Suez-Cairo. Would they succeed? They were determined to hold Singapore, but had lost it. They were determined to hold the Balkans, but had to withdraw. Now Rommel was near El Alamein, and British domination in the Near East was threatened.

The Propagandists Blow a Source

Then the miracle occurred. No, it was no miracle; it was a tragicomedy. It was as idiotically funny as a passage from a dime novel. It was Saturday, 27 June 1942. I tuned in the Deutschlandsender's six p.m. broadcast. "We are offering a

³ Ame (*loc. cit.*) says, "On 20 June we had a complete picture of the sharp crisis which gripped the British forces . . . Demoralized and badly led, they would not have been in a position to oppose Axis troops if these had exploited the favorable conditions offered and had pointed decisively toward the Delta."

drama with scenes from the British or American information bureau," the announcer said. "This is going to be some stuff," I thought, but left the receiver on while I went ahead with some work.

Suddenly I pricked up my ears: the drama had as its subject "Events in North Africa" and was commenting on political and military matters. One of the characters represented the American military attaché in Cairo, and now there followed a discussion of his extensive supply of information and the way he sent it to Washington. I was speechless. To think that the German broadcast was putting on something that countless people were trying to keep secure! The drama was authentic, and only too well played.

On 29 June, 36 hours after this radio drama, the messages from Garrulus to Washington suddenly ceased. The German intercept operators listened and searched in vain. No further MILID or AGWAR message was ever heard.⁴ When messages began to flow again, the Americans were using a system which defied all our efforts at solution.

⁴ Ame (*loc. cit.*) says only that "from 25 June on the intercepts, although they contained noteworthy considerations and observations, no longer gave a wide vision of the adversary situation." He apparently attributed the falling off of the channel to tightened British security on information passed to the Americans. But Leonard Mosley's *The Cat and the Mice* (London, 1958) carries a quite different account of how this source was lost. Mosley has it (pp. 80-84) that British interrogation of signal officers captured in an early June attack on Rommel's mobile monitoring unit disclosed that one of the unit's tasks was to copy the regular evening message from the U.S. military attaché in Cairo and decipher it, using the code which had been stolen by the Italians. On getting this information the British also monitored these "long, detailed, and extremely pessimistic" messages for ten days, and then let the sender know that they were being intercepted.

It may be supposed, not inconsistently with Flicke's or Ame's story, that Rommel was at this stage doing his own monitoring to shortcut the communications lag. It seems reasonable also that the British were instrumental in stopping the messages, but Mosley's version of the method used is even less credible than Flicke's tale:

"And now tell me, General [Garrulus], what do you think of the Ambassador's wife?"

'She's a honey,' said the general. 'Beautiful, too.'

'Then why,' asked his hostess, 'did you tell Washington last night that she looked like a horse?'"

Rommel, on the Egyptian threshold, remained without information. The British regrouped their forces; he knew nothing about it. They introduced new units; he was not told. New weapons were unloaded in Alexandria and Port Said; Rommel did not find out about them. The great general now had to rely upon himself and his reconnaissance at the front.

On 3 July Rommel tried a strong thrust to the south. It failed. The next day, using all available troops, he mounted a major attack near El Alamein. After heavy fighting and initial successes he had to withdraw. Since 26 May the British Eighth Army had lost 75,000 men, plus 1,100 tanks and 450 planes. It was in bad shape, but now it held.

Both sides dug in, and began to build up reinforcements. Decisions of great historical moment seemed to be impending. Mussolini betook himself to the Egyptian front in order to be present at the entry into Cairo. Churchill visited Cairo on his way back from Moscow. Lieutenant General Montgomery was made commander of the British Eighth Army, and General Alexander the successor to Auchinleck. Rommel was appointed General Field Marshall. All eyes were on him.

Rommel finally decided to attack. In the morning hours of 31 August he advanced against the southern flank of the British position at El Alamein but immediately encountered strong resistance. He threw in all his tanks and used his old trick of having trucks drive around in the rear to kick up a dust and simulate another strong tank force advancing. There was hard fighting, but after two days Rommel had to withdraw. He had 12 divisions and at least 600 tanks, but he had no Garrulus telegrams. His operations came to a standstill, soon to turn into retreat. The dream of a campaign through Asia Minor was at an end. Mussolini returned to Italy. The period of Rommel's great victories was over.

The capabilities of terrain intelligence rethought for promptness and precision in the age of missiles.

TERRAIN INTELLIGENCE FOR THE PENTOMIC ARMY*

Clifton A. Blackburn, Jr.

Over the Mulde River, behind the Iron Curtain in East Germany, there is a highway bridge. This bridge has a load classification of 50 tons. The national highway it carries has a concrete surface 26 feet wide. The approaches to the bridge are unusually steep (11% grade) and the roadway across it is unusually narrow (12 feet). The bridge has 3 spans and 2 piers. The piers are made of stone and contain demolition chambers. The spans are approximately 62 feet long, and the center span clears the surface of the water by 16 feet at normal high water, which occurs in May.

About 25 miles north of this bridge the national highway passes through a forest. About 600 acres in extent, the forest is composed of old beech and oak trees. The trees are in full leaf by about the middle of May and lose their leaves about the middle of November. During the foliation period, more than 90% of the ground within the forest is completely concealed from aerial observation. The ground is covered with forest litter but there is no underbrush. The larger trees in the forest have trunks ranging from about 16 to 25 inches in diameter at shoulder height and are spaced about 12 to 15 feet apart.

How do we know all this about a relatively obscure bridge and forest behind the Iron Curtain? A former German Army engineer interrogated at a refugee camp in 1955 reported that the bridge had demolition chambers. A photograph taken by a barge operator in 1949 was found to show these chambers,

* Based on two articles which have been copyrighted by the Society of American Military Engineers and printed in the July-August 1958 and November-December 1959 issues of *The Military Engineer*. They are used thus by permission.

as well as the number of spans and the steep grade of the approach to the bridge. A German waterway publication provided the clearance figure, the time of high water, and the clearance between the central piers. The barge operator's photograph showed the spans to be of equal length and the piers to be made of stone. An aerial photograph taken in 1951 showed the width of the roadway and its surface material.

A large-scale German topographic map, revised in 1939, located the forest and provided an accurate idea of its size. Three refugees from separate villages on the outskirts of the forest reported on separate occasions in 1950, 1951, and 1956 that the forest was composed of beech and oak trees. They also gave estimates of the trunk diameters and foliage periods that were in general agreement. A 1955 aerial photograph showed that only small changes had occurred in the forest's acreage. This photograph, taken in June, also showed the extent of the canopy and partially confirmed the species of its trees. A ground photograph from a pre-war tourist guide corroborated and refined the refugee information as to trunk diameters, showed trunk spacing, and showed the forest floor to be clear of underbrush. The lack of underbrush was confirmed by one of the refugees who had hidden there in his escape to the West in 1956.

Now add to this bridge and this forest all the other natural and man-made features of the East German countryside—rivers, roads, towns, hedgerows, soils, railroads, and landforms, to name only a few. Then multiply East Germany by all the other countries of the world to get some idea of the hundreds upon hundreds of thousands of items of data which must be identified, evaluated, and organized to make up the dossiers of long-range terrain intelligence. In these dossiers are stored the preconditions of the battles of the future. For battles are not fought in a vacuum but on a jungle-covered Guadalcanal, on a barren Heartbreak Ridge, or in flooded Pripet Marshes. They are fought along a Rhine flowing through fertile farmland, around minute Saharan oases, on a tiny Iwo Jima, or on the subcontinents of a Festung Europa. It is these rivers and ridges, forests and floods, islands and oases, swamps and sand dunes that are the subject matter of terrain intelligence.

Terrain and the Space Age

The new and cataclysmic spectre of a decisive two-day strategic air battle or two-hour missile war has not exorcised the old implacable military need for terrain intelligence; on the contrary. The air age and even the space age will not divorce future military action from the ground. Lieutenant General James M. Gavin, the man so intimately associated with the age of missiles even in the popular mind, has written unequivocally:

The frontiers of the free world must . . . be firmly defended on the ground. For this is where freedom begins. It begins where men will stand and fight. It begins today along the 38th Parallel in Korea and the 17th Parallel in Indochina and at the Brandenburger Gate in Berlin.

Finally . . . one thing stands out quite clearly: the control of land areas will be decisive in this period and through control of land areas we will provide the reassuring confidence in its own survival that the Western world needs. And from control of the land areas we will be in a position, if the need arises, and I believe it most certainly will, to command space.¹

The task of the terrain intelligence producer, never an easy one, becomes yet more demanding in this age. Changes are taking place in the organization, equipment, and tactics of his old customer, the U.S. Army. Indeed, these changes are replacing his old customer with a new one, a Pentomic Army of vast mobility, ready to place powerful forces anywhere in the world in a minimum of time. The new customer is a modern and streamlined striking force with nuclear capacity to engage in a general war or win a small war quickly.

This enormous strategic and tactical mobility demands greater amounts of terrain intelligence and simultaneously gives the producer less time to prepare it. A striking force may leave today for the Middle East or tomorrow for central Europe or the next day for Africa or the islands of Indonesia. When this force reaches the battle area its battlefield mobility will make it a voracious consumer of terrain intelligence; and this intelligence has to be supplied before it sets out on its mission.

As things stand today, however, it could *not* be so supplied. If an airborne Pentomic division were alerted today to leave

¹ "Why Missiles," in *Army*, November 1957.

tomorrow on a "no drill" strike mission, it could not take with it adequate operational terrain intelligence on its objective. An airborne division is not itself capable of collecting, evaluating, and storing terrain information or of producing adequate terrain intelligence on a world-wide basis—or even on a selective basis—for operational planning.

The *capability* does exist elsewhere. It exists within an already established and operating group of terrain intelligence producers in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. There is no reason, from the standpoint of capability, that this group could not begin today to support the Pentomic Army with operational terrain intelligence on individual, carefully selected potential trouble spots of the world. A package could be put into the hands of the planners before trouble starts and into the hands of the strike force as it leaves for the battle area—a package of basic terrain intelligence that needs only the veneer of weather data and enemy disposition and capabilities to make it a complete operational planning document.

Why Not Now?

Before he can provide this support, the terrain intelligence producer must turn from encyclopedist to eclectic. His ideal goal is to know the whole world as intimately as his own back yard; but he cannot plot for the Pentomic Army commander all the anthills and dandelions in all the earth's back yards. He must select with foresight, with care, and above all on good advice, first, the areas where operations may occur, and second, the kinds of terrain intelligence likely to be needed.

For guidance on the *where's* he can consult the considered judgment of the whole intelligence community about potential trouble spots in the world of 1959, 1960, or 1961. Not the spots where diplomats will be arrayed in battle or those where economic conditions will gradually increase the influence of Communism, but those that might reasonably become the objectives of a Pentomic striking force landing for a shooting war—trouble spots like the 17th parallel in Indochina in 1954, the 38th parallel in Korea in 1950, the western border of Poland in 1939. The guidance he gets may not be uniform and

construction possibilities, but he will know which bridges will accommodate his Honest John missile launcher and which will not. The package must not include unneeded trappings, but it should permit few if any terrain surprises for the commander of the striking force.

For many years, long-range terrain intelligence efforts have been expended on bulky, small-scale,² generalized, strategic-level studies designed with no clearly identifiable user in mind. The time is long since ripe for redirecting these efforts to produce streamlined, large- or medium-scale, detailed, operational-level intelligence packages specifically designed for a Pentomic Army ready to leave tomorrow to fight anything from a minor police action to a world-wide nuclear war.

The need clearly exists. The capability to answer it exists. The "tooling up" has begun within the Corps of Engineers, and prototypes are being circulated for user reaction. It is a laborious process, but next year's model must show that the long-range terrain intelligence producer has begun to assemble a modern package.

² *I.e.*, scaled down at high ratio.

cannot of course be sure, but it can provide a sufficient basis for selecting the priority areas for terrain intelligence.

Deciding *what* terrain intelligence to produce on each of the priority areas is a matter of knowing the consumer's requirements. A superior product can be designed by tailoring the supplier's capabilities to the user's needs. Let the user and the producer get together at the working level and find out what the one needs and what the other can do. But even without this intimate guidance, the producer can formulate some general ideas about what he can do to help.

For one thing, an airborne striking force must get back to the ground to accomplish its mission. With existing capabilities, the battle group commander can be furnished far in advance a clear idea of the limitations imposed by forests, slopes, and soils upon successful landing of a battle-ready force.

In operations after landing, whole Corps may have to cross a river in a single night, making multiple stream crossings on a very wide front. The commander can have in his possession, before he even leaves for the battle area, intelligence on the river's banks, velocities, widths, and other features that will affect his use or placement of amphibious personnel carriers, light tactical bridges, and air-mobile assault bridges.

The Pentomic Army commander will be firing atomic missiles, but not every part of the area will be suitable for emplacement of missile launchers. There is no reason why he should not know in advance the location, physical advantages and disadvantages, and access possibilities of all the potential missile launching sites within his battle area.

To provide the Pentomic Army with long-range intelligence such as this, a new and specially designed product will be required. It must be a lean and efficient package, yet containing all the basic terrain intelligence a commander needs for the early phases of his operation. There should be no broad and meaningless generalizations. There should be no extraneous matter and no omissions, because the user will have had a voice in its planning and it will have been designed with his specific needs in mind. The tank commander will not be burdened with information on airdrop sites, but he will know where the bogs are that can swallow up his tanks. The airborne commander will not be furnished a survey of urban re-

History of special intelligence operations with the Sixth Army in New Guinea and the Philippines.

THE ALAMO SCOUTS

Eustace E. Nabbie

Colonel Allison Ind's recent book, *Allied Intelligence Bureau*,¹ which described a number of the unorthodox reconnaissance and raider activities carried out in the World War II South West Pacific Area, failed to mention a small intrepid group of men called "Alamo Scouts" who performed for the U.S. Sixth Army services similar to those rendered by OSS detachments in other overseas commands. It is the purpose of this article to bridge a gap thus left in the intelligence history of that Area and time.

Origin and Training

General Walter Krueger, whose Sixth Army was then called simply the "Alamo Force" in deference to Australian General Blamey's seniority under MacArthur, was personally the originator of this group of Scouts bearing the name of the famous Texas shrine. It is my belief that his main aim in creating them was to insure that in his area of responsibility there would be no fiasco like that of Kiska island in the Aleutians, which, it will be recalled, U.S. Navy and Army air forces bombarded for more than 20 days in ignorance of the fact that the Japanese troops had already been withdrawn, and which was then taken by an assault landing with self-inflicted casualties. The Scouts' principal mission was therefore reconnaissance behind enemy lines, an activity which in this Area meant torture and death for any of them that were captured. They were volunteers, hand-picked for their intelligence, spirit, and physical stamina.

The first volunteers "for an unusual mission" did not know exactly what they would be called upon to do; it was only as the exploits of the Scouts became more generally known that

¹ New York: David Mackay, 1958. Reviewed in *Studies*, Vol. III, No. 1.

secrecy was lifted from the nature of the work. It was specified, however, in General Krueger's order of 28 November 1943 setting forth a charter for the Scouts:

1. The Alamo Scouts Training Center (ASTC) is hereby established under the supervision of Headquarters Alamo Force at the earliest practicable date prior to 1 January 1944, and at a location in the vicinity of the present Headquarters [Goodenough Island, off the southeastern tip of New Guinea].

2. The training center will train selected volunteers in reconnaissance and raider work. The course will cover a six-week period. Specially selected graduates will be grouped into teams at the disposal of the Commanding General, Alamo Force, and will be designated "Alamo Scouts"; the remainder will be returned to their respective commands for similar use by their commanders.

3. Commanders of combat units will be called upon from time to time to furnish personnel for the above training. Personnel so selected must possess the highest qualifications as to courage, stamina, intelligence and adaptability.

The instructors for this Training Center were to be drawn from the Army members of an all-service organization known as the Amphibious Scouts, to which I happened to have been assigned. This group, originally formed in the Solomons by the Navy, had moved to Fergusson Island, south and east of Goodenough, on a beautiful bay well protected from the seasonal wind. There it had a training site which served also as a base for PT boats making the run to New Britain Island.

Early in December, Lt. Col. Frederick Bradshaw, Deputy G-2 of the Sixth Army, who was to become the first commanding officer of the ASTC, and I learned through grapevine channels that the Navy unit was being disbanded. We immediately made arrangements to move into the established camp and take over its rather crude facilities in being. With native work teams and assistance from the U.S. Army Engineers we then pushed back the jungle and built better facilities. By about 1 January 1944 we were ready to receive the first class of potential Scouts.

Members of the first class came from the 158th Regiment (the Bushmasters), formerly stationed in Panama and adept at jungle fighting, and from the 32nd Infantry Division, veterans of Buna and Gona in New Guinea. Succeeding classes were drawn from the dismounted 1st Cavalry Division, the 33rd Division, and the 41st Division. The instructor force was

augmented by graduates from the first class, and several Australian army officers were attached to the Center at one time or another to train the Scouts in jungle fighting and survival. U.S. Marine or Army Air Corps officers were sometimes added to a team if its mission called for specialized personnel not available in the Training Center.

Eyes for Island-Hopping

The Scouts' first reconnaissance mission was carried out by Lt. John R. C. McGowan and five men on 27 February 1944. The team was put ashore by Catalina and rubber boat on the southeast tip of Los Negros island in the Admiralty group. Air reconnaissance during the previous two weeks had detected no activity on the island, and the Army Air Corps had concluded that the Japanese had been evacuated. McGowan's team nevertheless found Japanese troops there and were able, unobserved, to ascertain that they were healthy and apparently well fed. The Scouts returned safely to the point where their rubber landing boat had been cached and were picked up by the "Cat" at daybreak the following morning. McGowan was taken by PT boat from the Catalina base to the task force commander, who, on the strength of his report, ordered reinforcements for the "reconnaissance in force" of the island being conducted by the dismounted 1st Cavalry Division. On the morning of 29 February a successful troop landing was made on the northeast coast of Los Negros.

This operation established a pattern that came to be almost routine. Before each landing of U.S. and allied troops, sometimes as early as D-day minus 14, an Alamo Scout team would be put ashore by PT, Catalina, Mariner, or submarine. After Los Negros came Madang and Wewak on the coast of New Guinea. Then when Hollandia (where an Australian team sent in by Theater Headquarters was betrayed by unfriendly natives and killed by the Japanese) had been taken, Sarmi, Biak, Noemfoor, Sansapor, and Japan Island followed in quick succession. In advance of each of these actions an Alamo Scout team made a pre-landing reconnaissance or conducted line-crossing operations to establish the strength and disposition of the enemy forces, and its reports enabled the Army G-3 to complete his plans for the assault. In one case,

at Sansapor on the north coast of New Guinea, the planned pre-landing bombardment and aerial strikes were called off because so few Japanese were found in the area.

As the Sixth Army moved northward the ASTC moved with it, setting up nearby headquarters and keeping in close personal touch with the Army G-2. For the later New Guinea operations the Center was located at Mange Point, south of Finschafen. In the Philippines, while the Sixth Army was near the beach on Leyte the Center was in Abuyog. On Luzon it followed the Sixth Army down the Lingayan Plain toward Manila, arriving finally at Subic Bay about 1 March 1945, where it set up shop on the east side of the bay four or five miles south of Olongopau. It was here that teams were trained and held until time for their operational briefing by Sixth Army G-2 officers at San Fernando, Pampanga.

The Philippine Guerrillas

During the Luzon campaign the work of the Alamo Scouts was broadened and diversified into two general types, first, the collection of information from guerrilla and civilian sources and by personal reconnaissance, and second, the organization of guerrilla activities. The Philippine guerrillas, nurtured and developed since 1942, had already for some time been in radio contact with General MacArthur's Philippine Regional Section. Now those in areas assigned to the Sixth Army were turned over to General Krueger, and the Sixth Army G-2 controlled all contact with them and the direction of their activities. For this purpose a Special Intelligence subsection of G-2 manned by Alamo Scout officers was established.

Alamo Scout teams thus made the initial personal contact with guerrilla units and remained the instrument for organizing their actions in support of the regular forces. The guerrilla effort had been inadequately coordinated, various political frictions hampered teamwork, and some units had no recognized leader. The Scout teams became coordinating agencies, mediating quarrels, appealing for unity of effort, expelling chronic agitators. Where leadership was lacking or disputed, Scout officers assumed command.

From the outset, a troublesome obstacle to the organization of efficient guerrilla operations was the undefined status of the many autonomous guerrilla units with respect to central authority. Since little was known concerning the composition and activities of many of these units, there being no overall command as in Mindanao or the Visayas, several months passed during which scores of Filipino fighting groups were neither fish nor fowl, neither bandits nor allies. The confusion and resultant dissatisfaction among cooperating groups were resolved by a decision to recognize bona fide units as components of the Philippine Army and give their officers and men formal status and proper pay.

This decision gave to us in the Special Intelligence subsection the lever we needed to extend control, through Scout teams in the field, to those guerrilla leaders who had not acknowledged our authority. Some of them, as might be expected, attempted to play off General MacArthur's Theater Headquarters against the Sixth Army, but with little success. Effective liaison was established between the two echelons, and guerrilla leaders attempting this gambit were soon put in their place.

The policy of official recognition also brought us problems. No sooner had it been announced than a flood of claims for pay and status threatened to inundate the Special Intelligence section. Many of these were clearly spurious, and procedures had to be set up to determine the legitimacy of each claim. American units employing guerrillas submitted rosters to the Sixth Army G-1, who referred them to the Special Intelligence section for verification. Upon verification and after formal approval by United States Army Force, Far East, lists of recognized units were published.

For radio communication with the guerrillas on Leyte and Luzon, a Filipino Message Center was set up adjacent to the U.S. Army Message Center, staffed with members of the U.S. Filipino Regiment and with former local employees of the Philippine Government's Bureau of Posts and Roads. These latter, given a minimum of training, made ideal communicators: every Philippine postmaster of pre-war days had to be able to operate a telegraph key. Many of the guerrillas with whom they were in contact were also former postal employees

trained in radio communications. The more than 70 guerrilla radios with which General MacArthur's Headquarters was in contact at the time of the Luzon landings were put gradually under the control of this Filipino Message Center and their messages fed into Army channels via Sixth Army G-2.

As the situation on Luzon became more stable the guerrilla network came to be a sort of general-utility coded telegraph service. The newly established Philippine Government was in dire need of some of its experienced officials still hiding out in the hills and jungle. It would telephone the Headquarters at San Fernando, and we would send its messages to the outlying provinces directing such-and-such persons to report to Manila. Finally, as the war ended, I arranged with the Director of Posts and Roads for the transfer of the whole network to the Philippine Government.

A Tidy Record

General Krueger's experiment with the Alamo Scouts was designed to give Army Headquarters what every division and lower command already had—an organized reconnaissance agency. Its purpose was to obtain strategic and tactical information primarily for the Army G-2, but at the same time for units being employed or about to be employed in combat. It accomplished this and more.

That the idea was sound and that this new application of standard principles was practical and valuable is attested by the results of more than 60 missions. The commanders who were beneficiary of these missions recognized that information provided by the Alamo Scouts saved lives, changed plans of attack, and led to the destruction of enemy positions and enemy shipping. Scouts made two successful prisoner-rescue raids, and they brought in 60 Japanese prisoners for questioning.

The experiment was a success; and remarkably, thanks to thorough planning, careful selection of personnel, conscientious training, and luck, its cost in lives was zero. On all these missions not a single Alamo Scout was killed.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR II

SPILLET OM NORGE (The Gamble for Norway). By *Sverre Hartmann*. (Oslo: Ernst G. Mortensens Forlag. 1958. Pp. 244. In Norwegian).

This account of Hitler's gamble in ordering that the invasion of Denmark and Norway be mounted on less than three months' notice and without any real military intelligence groundwork is a byproduct of the author's research for a broader scholarly work on the Scandinavian entry into World War II. In the course of investigating the reasons Denmark and Norway were drawn into the war, his publisher explains, Mr. Hartmann assembled much material on the military preparations made by the German staffs. He also held detailed talks with General Erich Buschenhagen, von Falkenhorst's former Chief of Staff, with Lt. Colonel Erich Pruck, former head of Abwehrstelle Norwegen, and with Lt. Colonel Berthold Benecke, former director of Kriegsorganisation Norwegen and then head of Abwehrstelle Norwegen's intelligence section. The book seems, on internal evidence, to be based chiefly on these interviews.

Although Germany carried on extensive espionage in many countries before World War II, Norway was considered, like Switzerland, Portugal and Sweden, a base for intelligence and counterespionage work against third countries and not a major intelligence target itself:

The German Legation in Oslo kept Berlin informed on Norwegian affairs only through overt sources, primarily by following the Norwegian press and sending in representative clippings of articles, interviews and official notices. The documents from the German Foreign Ministry show that they were able to obtain a remarkably good insight into the situation through studying the newspapers. These were often extremely frank, and in many fields it was quite unnecessary to set up any particular intelligence operations on political and military affairs.

Until the turn of the year 1939/40 there had been no work whatever by the German General Staff on even a routine hypothetical plan for the invasion of Norway.

The German Navy drew up a few study plans in October 1939. That was all. The conquest of Norway was largely improvised. Another time, if there should be another time, the preparations would certainly be far more solid and systematic. In 1940 the invasion succeeded in spite of the improvisation, because the country was militarily unprepared.

The first third of *Spillet om Norge*, apparently based chiefly on Colonel Benecke's reminiscences, is a rather disorganized set of notes and anecdotes about German intelligence operations in Norway against England and the USSR from 1937 through 1939, touching upon personalities, cover arrangements, communications methods, interservice and personal rivalries, and so forth. In its mid-section the book switches to the memories of General Buschenhagen, and the story comes alive. It tells of the frantic scramble to mount the invasion ahead of expected British/French occupation. One of the greatest problems, of course, was maintaining secrecy up to the moment of attack. The elaborate precautions worked out and the air of general snafu which prevailed are illustrated in examples that would be hilariously funny if the reader could forget that the operation succeeded because the Allies were even less well prepared.

A typical story is that of the guidebooks. The best collection of reference material available to von Falkenhorst's staff was the Baedeker guide on Norway. With elaborate security precautions the staff therefore bought a small number of copies, not more than one in any single town or single section of a large city: a sudden demand for the book in Germany might come to the attention of Allied agents. As a blind, rumors were circulated that the invasion of other areas was impending. Thus when a battalion of mountain troops began intensive training in the Berlin Fronau area, their commanding officer was told that they were to be sent to Scotland, but that this must under no circumstances be divulged to anyone. When the whole battalion swarmed into the bookshops and bought up every Norwegian Baedeker in the area, von Falkenhorst's staff learned to its collective horror that

the battalion leader, in order to safeguard the plan for invading Scotland, had prudently misinformed a few of his closest colleagues, in strictest secrecy, that they were training for an attack on Norway.

Written for a popular audience, the book is nevertheless a useful contribution to the literature on the early phase of World War II. Its anecdotal form and lack of chronological continuity are somewhat frustrating to the serious reader, but it does add up to a fairly clear picture of German intelligence operations (with occasional comment on psychological warfare and false-intelligence operations) in Norway and of the intelligence and security problems encountered in the hasty mounting of the invasion.

SECOND BUREAU. By *Philip John Stead*. (London: Evans Brothers Limited. 1959. Pp. 212. 18/-.)

Much has been written about three aspects of intelligence activities in France during World War II—the work of the Free French intelligence service; the activities of the French Resistance, with its intelligence overtones; and the operations of the French Section of the British Special Operations Executive, which infiltrated agents back into France to work with the Resistance. *Second Bureau* takes up yet a fourth aspect, the wartime history of the regular French military intelligence service, comprising the *Deuxième Bureau* and its supporting organizations for clandestine collection and counter-espionage. Its British author has written several books on specialized French themes, notably the biography of the great detective *Vidocq* and a history of *The Police of Paris*.

While *Second Bureau* is the first comprehensive book in English on this topic, a number of works published in French provided not disinterested sources on which the author could draw.¹ He also talked with several senior officers of the serv-

¹ In particular, one should note *Le Deuxième Bureau au Travail* by General Gauché (Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1953), *Chemins Secrets* by Colonel Georges Groussard (Paris: Bader-Dufour, 1948), and the three volumes published under the collective title *Mes Camarades Sont Morts* by Pierre Nord (Colonel Brouillard) (Librairie des Champs-Élysées, 1947-1949). Stead also had access to the *Bulletin de l'Amicale des Anciens Membres des Services de Sécurité Militaire et des Réseaux T. R.*

ice, among them Colonel Paul Paillole, General Louis Rivet, and Colonel Georges Groussard. His thus apparent reliance on sources whose reputations are professionally at stake gives his book an extreme bias in assessing the value of the contribution made by the French military intelligence services in the war, and it must in this sense be received with caution. This warning can be given without in any way deprecating the skill and devotion of the officers of the regular French military establishment who carried on its intelligence activities under incredibly difficult conditions, both in Metropolitan France and in North Africa.

After examining the reports of the Deuxième Bureau dating from immediately before the French declaration of war up to the fall of France and concluding that "the failure of 1940 was not a failure of Intelligence," Mr. Stead begins his most interesting account of the tremendous difficulty of maintaining any French military intelligence at all after the imposed armistice. Although the service preserved many of its assets and held them together in unoccupied France, it had for the most part to function in double clandestinity, kept secret not only from the Germans but also from the Vichy government. This was particularly true with respect to counterespionage and its attempts to eliminate and neutralize German agents in the face of continuous German pressure on Vichy. Then in 1942, at the time of the North African landings, the service's main assets in files and leadership had to be transferred to North Africa, where they were committed to General Giraud, with his strong anti-Gaullist propensity. Stead is all on the side of the military "professionals" when he writes of their ultimate merger with the "amateurs" under Jacques Soustelle.

This book's treatment of problems of organization and keeping an intelligence service afloat in times of bitter adversity, its account of operational difficulties such as that of maintaining communications, and its description of particular operational successes in France and North Africa are recommended as valuable reading, but they should be read with a full appreciation of the author's bias.

THE SECRET INVADERS. By *Bill Strutton* and *Michael Pearson*. (London: Hodder and Stroughton. 1958. Pp. 287. 16/-.) In paperback abridgement as **THE BEACHHEAD SPIES** (New York: Ace Books. 1958. Pp. 191).

Story of the British Combined Operations Pilotage Parties which collected intelligence for World War II invasions by sea, sending swimmers in to observe and report on beach gradients and composition, shoals, land contours, and defenses. Written from the perspective of Lt. Commander Nigel Willmott, who organized the project, carried out its first reconnaissance on the island of Rhodes, and finally participated in the intelligence scrutiny of the Normandy beaches.

THE SECRET CAPTURE. By *S. W. Roskill*. (London: Collins. 1959. Pp. 156. 16/-.)

A documentary account of the May 1941 voyage of North Atlantic convoy OB 318 westbound from England, centering on its escort's capture of the German submarine U 110. Rebutts the "first" claim of USN Rear Admiral D. V. Gallery in his *We Captured a U-boat* and stresses the intelligence value of the U 110's documents and instruments taken intact. Painstaking detail makes the story a vivid and authentic vignette from the Battle of the Atlantic; its intelligence interest lies only in the Admiralty's feat of keeping the capture secret both from the Germans and from all but a few British officers.

ESPIONAGE AND PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS

THE SPRINGING TIGER. By *Hugh Toye*. (London: Cassell. 1959. Pp. 238. 25/-.)

Subhas Chandra Bose bore watching in World War II, and his story is still of interest, featuring an unhinged extreme of Asian nationalism, mistaken about practically everything. This study of the Azad Hind leader and his Indian National Army, apparently the result of Mr. Toye's pursuit as an historian of a subject which was once his concern as a British intelligence officer, is faithful to the facts; but the author lacks the poetic gift for treating madness.

The Indian National Army, which Bose built up and supported in Southeast Asia with a furious activity—political, diplomatic, and economic—was an extraordinary instrument, in fact an ideal instrument, for intelligence operations of all sorts, if not for the direct combat which Bose of course preferred it undertake. It is therefore noteworthy that this instrument accomplished very little of significance for the Japanese or for itself during the course of the war. In the field of propaganda, where Bose's opportunities seemed as unlimited as his ambitions, he could not break the British policy of silence, a response which he found bitterly exasperating. In espionage and subversion he had two minor successes, the defection of a British Indian outpost and the establishment of communications with a party of spies landed in India by submarine.

These little triumphs so exalted Bose that his visions began to blind the Japanese as well, and they withdrew their earlier objections to his control of the spy schools and networks for India. The great moment for the Azad Hind came with the invasion of India, wherein INA irregulars attached to the Japanese divisions were to unlock the floodgates of imprisoned nationalism. Bose was so involved in enthusiastic preparations for the administration of liberated India that he did not recognize the failure of the invasion until after the disaster was complete.

WORLD WITHIN. By *Tom Harrison*. (London: Cresset. 1959. Pp. 349. 30/-.)

This is an authentic story of the virtual reoccupation in 1944 and 1945 of the interior wilderness of Borneo: a small group of paramilitary officers of the Australian SRD (Z Special) parachuted into the inaccessible uplands won the support of the overwhelming mass of the natives without revealing their activities to the coastbound Japanese until after the Allied landings at Brunei Bay, Tarakan, and Balikpapan. The author, an anthropologist who had tardily become an officer of the British SOE and been seconded to Z Special for this purpose, was the first of the group to drop among the head-hunters and the one who directed its most important operations.

The account of these unique events, fabulous as it is, carries no area or tradecraft lessons for the intelligence officer of today, who will never have occasion to master the intricacies of polite behavior in the communal longhouse or devise tactics appropriate to a platoon of poison-dart blowpipers. Even in 1944 there was no other place in the world like Borneo, and today that Borneo is gone. What is of permanent value, for the intelligence officer as well as all others concerned with establishing viable relations with unfamiliar segments of mankind, is the example of the author's appreciative understanding of outlandish peoples, his penetration through the superficialities of their cultures to their underlying humanity, his affection for their individuals as men.

The first third of *World Within* describes from intimate association the pre-1944 life and people of the Kelabit longhouse at Bario on the Plain of Bah. This description, an anthropological masterpiece, is free of the stilted jargon and pat generalizations which characterize much anthropological writing. It is also free of the infection which in some measure mars the rest of the book (like many in which authors relive the impudence and glory of their exploits in unorthodox warfare)—ill-concealed self-satisfaction and a compulsion to allot praise and blame to former colleagues and superiors, settling old scores by appeal to posterity.

The reader of this third, before Mr. Harrison gets involved in his personal and operational biography, will learn how an

economy with no gold and little goods accumulation can be rich, how a society with no calendar and little formal system can be efficient, how a culture streaked with superstition can nevertheless cleave to fundamental values. Further, he will be led subtly to the author's implied conclusion that once you live with them you find the samenesses among men, whether wild men of Borneo or British aristocracy, more important than the curious differences which our impersonal studies are likely so to highlight that we cannot see behind them.

KNIGHTS OF THE FLOATING SILK. By *George Langelaan*.
(London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd. 1959. Pp. 320. 21/-.)

The early days of World War II found George Langelaan a corporal in the British Field Security police, and these memoirs of his work as an intelligence agent begin with his unit's activities in unmasking German agents among the refugees who clogged the Belgian highways ahead of the retreating Allied armies. Back in England after Dunkirk, his familiarity with France and mastery of the language—he was born in Paris and had a good deal of French schooling—made him a natural selection for intelligence assignment as secret agent in France. His book touches lightly on his agent training, a subject which has been better covered elsewhere.

The episodes he relates from his activities in France carry a number of object lessons in security—the unreliability of plastic surgery in keeping your voice unrecognised over the telephone, the need to have a ration card forged well enough to pass scrutiny when submitted for exchange, the danger of keeping a British Red Cross flag pinned under your vest lapel. They also describe some painful and painstaking techniques for escape from detention, telling how an agent confined in a Vichy prison drank soapy water day after day until he was vomiting blood in order to obtain transfer to a hospital, then after being operated on for ulcer escaped and dragged himself across the Pyrenees, and how the author himself was helped by the French Resistance to escape with several others from a prison camp. After he returned to England, Langelaan was posted to Algiers, but his short chapter on intelligence and psychological warfare there, notable for his

admiration of C. D. Jackson and newspapermen as practitioners of the psychological warfare art, has very little depth.

Several chapters are devoted to British security and counterespionage activities during the war, telling for example how a German agent sent to England to learn about the state of British defenses was allowed to sight concentrations of aircraft and naval ships repeatedly moved up along his route. The help of everyday people in trapping spies in Britain is entertainingly described, as well as the careful, detailed work put into developing several counterespionage cases which turned out to be false.

It is to be regretted that several of the chapters on counterespionage cases have been left out of *The Masks of War*,² the American edition of *Knights of the Floating Silk*. The British version faithfully follows its French original, published in 1950 under the title *Un Nommé Langdon*,³ except for the elimination of a few pages at the end.

HISTOIRE DE LA LIBÉRATION DE LA FRANCE. By *Robert Aron*. (Paris: Fayard. 1959. Pp. 779.)

This excellent book is not a history of military or resistance operations, but of the confrontation and counterplay of political forces exerted between D-day and VE-day to determine what sort of country *France libérée* would be. From the viewpoint of intelligence operations, however, its account of the abortive rising in the Vercors in June–July 1944 does make manifest the capabilities and limitations of a resistance movement. It perceptively portrays the divergent motives of the actors—the allied high command, de Gaulle, the FFI, the Communists—which help to explain, perhaps even to justify, this tragedy.

SISTERS OF DELILAH. By *E. H. Cookridge*. (London: Oldbourne Press. 1959. Pp. 224. 16/–.)

This collection of short accounts (some true and some in whole or part imagined) of female spies of the past quarter-

² Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1959. \$3.95.

³ Paris: Robert Laffont. 420 frs.

century auspiciously claims that its "facts will show better than any theory how and why women spy." The "why," the author states, is "the supreme satisfaction of exerting power over men through physical attraction"; but the twelve major and innumerable minor examples he cites do not sustain this titillating thesis. The twelve must be taken one at a time; that is about as far as the "facts" permit Samson's brothers to generalize if they would avoid his fate.

Nine of Cookridge's heroines have been described before in greater or less detail by other writers, notably by Kurt Singer.⁴ Two of his ladies appear to be unique products of his own experience in English newspaper and intelligence service work—Marikka Revay, Lisbon *spitzelin* and specialist in the entrapment of British seamen as of 1941, and "Anita," alias Anna Vavrinova Ignatiev, allegedly a crude MVD operative in a Levantine fly-trap. On another, Josephine Baker, whose World War II intelligence work had previously been acknowledged, Cookridge has added operational details, attributing them to her French case officer.

Following Singer, Cookridge accredits the story of Banda Wilhelmina Van Deeren, allegedly the illegitimate Javanese offspring of World War I agent Gertrud Margarete Zelle MacLeod—Mata Hari. Banda, a CIA (Cookridge has Central Intelligence Office) agent pursued by her mother's nemesis, is claimed to have been executed in December 1950 by the Chinese Communists in North Korea. The elements which make this illegitimate mother-daughter story a natural for press

⁴In *The World's Greatest Women Spies* (London, 1951) and *Spies over Asia* (London, 1956) Singer reviews the following cases: Lydia von Stahl, Soviet agent in Paris in the mid-thirties, German double agent, and possibly a Soviet redouble after the war; Malvina von Bluecher, alias Mrs. Valvalie Dickenson, agent of Canaris under doll-vendor cover in New York City; Ruth von Kuehn, joint German-Japanese agent in Honolulu from 1935 to 1941; Mathilde Carré alias the Cat, née Micheline Ballard; Baroness Anna Wolkoff, incredibly mis- or unmanaged Sicherheitsdienst agent in London in 1939-40 who subverted the chief of the U.S. Embassy's cipher office, Tyler Kent; and Banda Wilhelmina Van Deeren, alleged illegitimate daughter of Mata Hari. The cases of Jenny Hoffman, German operative in New York in 1938, and Baroness von Falkenhayn and Renate von Natzner, who lost their heads for a Polish intelligence service man in 1935 in Berlin, have been described by other writers.

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Recent Books: Espionage

agents will undoubtedly enshrine it in the literature of the spy-writers for so long as they credulously borrow from each other. There is of course no trace whatever of a CIA agent of Banda's name, description, or career.

IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

SECRET MISSIONS OF THE CIVIL WAR. By *Philip Van Doren Stern*. (New York: Rand McNally. 1959. Pp. 320. \$5.)

Mr. Stern's wide research into the background of the Civil War and the assassination of President Lincoln focussed his attention on the wealth of material he describes as "the conspiratorial aspects" of the conflict. These range, in present-day terms, from clandestine acquisition of intelligence through counterespionage to maritime operations, political action, and psychological warfare. They include, almost as an ironic forecast, a bit about the bureaucratic struggles for domination of the Northern secret service from Allan Pinkerton's appearance on the scene through Lafayette C. Baker's rise to power. Baker's own work, *History of the United States Secret Service*, is described as "filled with much valuable material but marred by the sensationalism, charlatanism and shameless mendacity that characterized the man himself."

What the author-anthologist has done is to sift from the mass of material available (some of it finally released as late as 1953 by the National Archives) the better-written dramatic stories of espionage, plotted sabotage, and heroic endeavors on behalf of both South and North. He has also excellently interpolated his own concepts of the relationships of these to the chronology and fortunes of the war. The acquisition and transmission of intelligence where it counted; the South's devising and trying to carry out such schemes as the Copperhead plot, plots in Canada, and the firing of New York City; its many maritime ventures for economic survival, with its bold ships such as the *Sumter*, the *Fingal*, and the *Shenandoah*, successor to the *Alabama*, and its *Torpedo Service*; the stories of female spies—all these personal accounts of developments in the area of espionage and unconventional warfare foreshadow much that has been done in subsequent wars by the United States and, for that matter, a number of other nations.

The book includes a brief but informative postscript, or appendix, on codes and ciphers of the Civil War. The author

credits Major Albert J. Meyer (who at the beginning of the war constituted the entire U.S. Signal Corps) with much of the North's beginning in this field and, with a characteristically human bit of historic illumination, notes that one of Meyer's best students was J. E. B. Stuart, who went over to the Confederates.

It is true that in some form or other the material in *Secret Missions of the Civil War* can be found elsewhere, but Stern has created a helpful, entertaining, and instructive product in bringing it together and weaving in his own brief but meaningful interpretations.

QUANTRILL AND HIS CIVIL WAR GUERRILLAS. By *Carl W. Breihan*. (Denver: Sage Books. 1959. Pp. 174. \$3.50.)

A depraved, misanthropic exhibitionist using the guise of the Civil War to glut himself on brigandage, retribution, and murder, William Clarke Quantrill was an extremely able and consistently successful guerrilla leader. Of a high degree of intelligence and originality, he conceived of a guerrilla ethic compounded of light and darkness, of God and the devil, and he combined in his own nature dual sets of attributes—courage, daring, imagination, and loyalty alongside vindictiveness, brutality, and complete amorality.

Early in the conflict Quantrill developed a concept of total war and *Schrecklichkeit* which he outlined to the Confederate Secretary of War, James A. Seddon, when they met in Richmond in the fall of 1861: "I would cover the armies of the Confederacy all over with blood! . . . I would break up foreign enlistments by indiscriminate massacre. . . . There would be no prisoners. . . . Kansas should be laid waste at once! . . . Hated and made blacker than a dozen devils, I add to my hoofs the swiftness of the horse and to my horns the terror of a savage following."

In his guerrilla depredations his deeds supported these words. According to General Tom Hindman, at one time Quantrill's superior and commander of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department, Quantrill destroyed wagon trains and transports, tore up railways, broke telegraph lines, captured towns, and compelled the Union to keep active in Missouri a

large force that might have been employed elsewhere. More than 60,000 Federal troops were thus tied up fighting an enemy that never exceeded 3,000 to 4,000 men. Several thousand of the Union troops engaged against the guerrillas were killed outright; other thousands were put permanently *hors de combat* with physical wounds or battle fatigue in the engagements against Quantrill and his chief lieutenants, William C. "Bloody Bill" Anderson and George Todd.⁵ In addition to the damage they inflicted on military objectives, Quantrill and his men murdered thousands of civilians, many in cold blood, destroyed millions of dollars worth of private property, and leveled settlements in Kansas ranging from hamlets like Olathe and Shawneetown to towns as large as Lawrence, with a population of 1,200.

Quantrill's tactics provide a lesson in guerrilla warfare. Operating out of territory generally sympathetic, mounted on the best horses available in the area, and armed with the advanced Colt revolving pistol,⁶ Quantrill's men were invincible when they employed hit-and-run techniques. A prearranged signal would assemble the guerrillas from the countryside; they would rendezvous, strike, and scatter back into the countryside, taking up farming tools or going into hiding. The only important guerrilla defeats occurred when the guerrillas attempted to storm fortified stone or brick buildings in towns—when they violated Quantrill's creed of fighting only when he had the advantage and even then running if things became too hot. Another important tactic utilized by the western guerrillas in the later years of the war was the wearing of complete Federal blue uniforms at all times, confusing the enemy and sometimes deceiving him into costly confidence.

⁵ After the winter of 1863/64 Anderson and Todd led bands of guerrillas independent of Quantrill.

⁶ The guerrillas customarily carried in their belts and on their saddles from two to eight 5- and 6-shot pistols and a Sharps carbine, which together gave them a tremendous volume of firepower. In the early years of the war the Yankee cavalry on the Kansas-Missouri border was armed only with single-shot muzzle-loading carbines or muskets and sabers.

Quantrill's treatment of the civilian population where he operated also provides a stern model for guerrilla troops. A civilian population will generally divide into three segments—a small group friendly to the guerrillas, another small group friendly to the invaders, and a great, lethargic mass neutral and passive, seeking merely to be left alone. Quantrill did not recognize this third category. If anyone were not actively for him, he was against him and would be treated as a complete enemy. Intimidation thus brought many neutrals reluctantly to Quantrill's side. Or some particularly vicious act of Quantrill's would arouse the Federals to violent counteraction, frequently against the neutral masses, which with the help of clever propaganda would turn them loathingly to Quantrill as the lesser of two evils.

The question often arises as to whether a depraved, amoral bandit such as Quantrill hurts or helps the cause with which he sides. Certainly it is an aid to propaganda for one's guerrillas to be dashing men of principle such as John Singleton Mosby or John Hunt Morgan. But against this must be weighed the tremendous military advantage gained by having a Quantrill, an Anderson, or even a Jesse James as an ally. Quantrill's military contribution to the Confederacy was of inestimable value in spite of the moral burden of his black name and dark deeds.

Mr. Breihan's book does not do justice to the fascination of its subject. The author uses the style of popular pulp writers, stressing and repeating the lurid details of murder and rapine and overwriting to the point of absurdity. He frequently disagrees with another recent book on Quantrill, Richard S. Brownlee's *Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy*,⁷ denying for example that Jefferson Davis gave Quantrill a commission, as Brownlee says, and speaking of George Todd as a man of patriotic conviction, whereas Brownlee calls him "a murderous killer." In assessing the value of the rival interpretations one is influenced by the fact that Breihan's *Quantrill* has no documentation, no bibliography, and no index, whereas Brownlee's *Gray Ghosts* is completely documented and has a fine bibliography and a detailed index.

⁷Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1958.

THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. By *James Dunwody Bulloch*. (New York: Thomas Yoseloff. 1959. Vol. I. pp. 460; Vol. II, pp. 459. \$15.) Reprint of original publication by G P. Putnam's Sons. (New York. 1884.)

This is a detailed account of the author's years spent in Europe purchasing the ships that became Confederate blockade runners during the Civil War. In addition to the ships, he obtained the arms for them and arranged to evade British law by having them mounted at neutral ports. After the defeat of the Confederacy he was exiled from the United States. An unreconstructed rebel, Bulloch was very bitter about the defeat and over the implication that his operations had been of a reprehensible nature, and his book was written as a defense of these activities.

From the intelligence point of view these volumes are an admirably circumstantial description of the technique used by an undercover purchasing agent who gave remarkable assistance in the Confederate prosecution of the war. Although such an activity was considerably simpler in those days than it is today, they remain in this sense exceedingly valuable.

EVASIONS AND ESCAPES ⁸

THE TUNNELLERS OF SANDBORSTAL. By Lt. Cmdr. *John Chrisp*. (London: Robert Hale. 1959. Pp. 172. 15/-.)

Cmdr. Chrisp was one of the British officers who could not be evacuated from Crete in May 1941, and his attempt to evade German capture and make a get-away with a few companions in a small boat ended in failure. Taken prisoner of war, he and about two dozen others were marched some hundred miles to their first holding area on the north shore of Crete, a camp inadequately guarded and poorly fenced, with a friendly population outside. Looking back on this period, Chrisp recalls the escape opportunities that were squandered. Had he and his companions been seasoned prisoners, many of them could have escaped, but no attempts were made: the first phase of reaction to capture had set in, and their will to escape had given way to apathy and resignation. Then as the prisoners were transported through Greece most of them were still mentally unprepared, and several more opportunities were wasted by all but two commando officers. The moral is one which instructors in evasion and escape have tried to teach—that the best opportunities often arise in the earliest periods of capture, before the captive is lodged in his permanent prison. The psychological let-down on first capture can be forestalled by proper training.

Brought to the German POW camp of Sandborstal near the Baltic, Chrisp found the usual POW escape committee active, but notes in retrospect that most prisoners of war become so obsessed with the all-important problem of getting out of the camp that they give too little thought to the difficulties of the further journey home. After months of planning and digging Chrisp and a group of fellow-prisoners managed to tunnel their way out in the spring of 1942. All were recaptured through indiscretion or when their luck failed, Chrisp a hundred miles away on the Weser, and one officer within a hundred yards of the Kiel Canal. Later Chrisp and two other

⁸ On this subject see also the review of *Knights of the Floating Silk* on page 101 of this issue.

officers smuggled themselves into a baggage truck and were driven out of the main gate, but were then discovered and returned to camp. Now considered dangerous escapees, they were transferred to the toughest prison of all, Colditz Castle. There Chrisp worked with the escape committee and aided in several escape attempts before the war ran out.

BID THE SOLDIERS SHOOT. By *John Lodwick*. (London: William Heinemann. 1958. Pp. 296. \$4.50.)

A sophisticated and glittering autobiography of World War II adventure in the French Foreign Legion and British sabotage forces, featuring a dozen incarcerations and a number of escapes from confinement, some of them ingenious.

MISCELLANY

COMMANDER BURT OF SCOTLAND YARD. By himself (*Leonard Burt*). (London: William Heinemann. 1959. Pp. 246. 18/-.)

These episodes from the author's career include several of peripheral intelligence interest—the repatriation, interrogation, and character analysis of the wartime traitors William Joyce and John Amery; the interrogation and character analysis of the atom spies Alan Nunn May and Klaus Fuchs; some not very impressive operations against frogmen saboteurs at Gibraltar; and the security measures for the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to England, with personal recollections of a human General Serov. There are also some sensible tips on the art of interrogation, not well illustrated, however, in the excerpts from interrogations actually quoted.

“Rodionov: A Case-Study in Wartime Redefection.” By *Alexander Dallin* and *Ralph S. Mavrogordato*. In *The American Slavic and East European Review*, Volume XVIII, Number 1, February 1959, pp. 25–33. (New York: Columbia University Press [for The American Association of Slavic Studies, Inc.])

Vladimir Rodionov was a Red Army lieutenant colonel captured by the Germans in the summer of 1941. Under the battle name Gil' he headed a SS-sponsored unit, Druzhina I, in front line and German anti-partisan operations in 1942 and early 1943. In August 1943 he and his entire group suddenly rejoined the Soviets. Thereafter this unit fought its former German sponsors with conspicuous success. Apparently Rodionov himself was killed in April 1944.

From fragmentary German documentary sources and other material the authors piece together these activities and attempt to analyze the motivational complexities of Rodionov's double defection. The available documentation is not sufficient to establish the hypothesis that Rodionov may have been

from the beginning a Soviet provocation agent, although there is a strong presumption that this was the case.

"The Top-Secret Label." By *J. Yudin*. (Moscow: *New Times*, No. 16. April 1959. Pp. 10-13.)

Yudin uses H. H. Ransom's *Central Intelligence and National Security* and other recently published material to demonstrate in typical fashion that the intelligence community, which "has brought all branches of government into its worldwide web of intrigue and subversion," plays a crucial part in formulating the U.S. national policy of "cold war and constant threat to peace."

SUPPLEMENT TO CUMULATIVE INDEX to Publications of the House Committee on Un-American Activities; 1955 and 1956 (84th Congress). (December 1958. Pp. 334.)

Adds to the *Cumulative Index*, which covered the Committee's publications from 1938 to 1954, the references for the years 1955 and 1956. They are listed in three categories—individuals, publications, and organizations.

NEW PAPERBACKS

A Man Escaped, by Andre Devigny. (New York: Berkley Publishing Corp., 1959. Pp. 222. 50 cents.) One of the better books on escape.

The Coast Watchers, by Commander Eric A. Feldt. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1959. Pp. 240. 50 cents.) Copies of the original 1946 edition are scarce.

10,000 Eyes, by Richard Collier. (New York: Pyramid Books, August 1959. Pp. 320. 50 cents.) Probably the best book on intelligence activities of the French Resistance.

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Articles and book reviews on the following pages are unclassified and may for convenience be detached from the classified body of the *Studies* if their origin therein is protected.

The editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection, in scanning current public literature for intelligence materials, and of Mr. Pforzheimer and many other intelligence officers in preparing reviews for this issue of the *Studies*. Most noteworthy in this respect are the reviews of *Spillet om Norge*, done by [redacted] and *Quantrill and His Civil War Guerrillas*, done by [redacted]

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