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
# STUDIES in INTELLIGENCE

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25X1

# CONTENTS

## CLASSIFIED ARTICLES

	Page
Priority National Intelligence Objectives	
Ludwell L. Montague	1
<i>View from the upper edge of the guidance gap.</i>	
SECRET	
Intelligence Photography . . . . . Kenneth E. Bofrone	9
<i>Essential elements of good ground photos.</i>	
CONFIDENTIAL	
Snapshots at Random . . . . . Jane Schnell	17
<i>Intelligence product of the camera fan's fun.</i>	
OFFICIAL USE	
Human Scent and Its Detection . . . . . Spencer Tebrich	25
<i>Toward scientific exploitation of a neglected sense.</i>	
OFFICIAL USE	
Cover: Property Restitution . . . . . Frederick D. Barathy	39
<i>A postwar U.S. program without benefit of intelligence and counterintelligence participation.</i>	
CONFIDENTIAL	
Communication to the Editors . . . . .	45
<i>Amateur psychodiagnosis of Dr. John.</i>	
CONFIDENTIAL	
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature . . . . .	51
<i>The German service's first effort at pressagentry.</i>	
CONFIDENTIAL	
<i>Shape of tomorrow seen from yesterday.</i>	
OFFICIAL USE.	

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25X1

25X1

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UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES

	Page	
“Truth” Drugs in Interrogation . . . [redacted]	A1	25X1
<i>Narcosis in therapy and police practice, with possible applications in intelligence.</i>		
Impunity of Agents in International Law		
[redacted]	A21	25X1
<i>Precedent and authority in Powers' circumstances.</i>		
Operation Columba . . . . . T. J. Betts	A35	
<i>British pigeon fanciers give their all.</i>		
English Mission . . . . . [redacted]	A43	25X1
<i>Glimpses of the sixteenth-century popish underground.</i>		
Public Texts in Intelligence		
Walter Pforzheimer and the Editors	A51	
<i>Bibliography of basic English-language readings.</i>		
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature		
<i>Intelligence in U.S. national strategy . . . . .</i>	A61	
<i>Military intelligence in action . . . . .</i>	A64	
<i>Clandestine operations . . . . .</i>	A68	

25X1

SECRET [redacted]

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300260001-6

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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*Evolution and role of "the most broadly controlling document in the field of requirements."*

## **PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES**

**Ludwell L. Montague**

Clyde Heffter, in the "Fresh Look at Collection Requirements" which he takes in a recent issue of the *Studies*,<sup>1</sup> notes the "conspicuous hiatus" between such high-level guidance documents as Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/3, Priority National Intelligence Objectives, and the collection requirements actually produced at the working level, particularly with respect to the question of determining relative priorities among such requirements. He invites discussion of the problem of "how to formulate needs and priorities in such a way as to facilitate the satisfaction of needs in a degree roughly proportionate to their priorities, through the most effective use of the collection means available."

In the nature of the case, collectors are likely to be more keenly aware of this problem than people working in other phases of the intelligence process, but its existence and gravity should be of concern to researchers and estimators as well, for it is their work that ultimately suffers from any diffusion and misdirection of the collection effort. The hiatus between general guidelines and practical requirements that Mr. Heffter points out is real, and its consequences are serious. He has considered it from the collectors' viewpoint. The purpose of this article is to complement his analysis with an examination from the other side of the gap—specifically, to describe the development of the PNIO concept and to review what the PNIO's are and are not intended to be. Conclusions as to what is wanting for the determination of practical priorities are substantially the same from either point of view.

### *Evolution of the PNIO's*

From the outset it was understood that the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the coordination of

<sup>1</sup> IV 4, p. 43 ff.

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PNIO's

U.S. foreign intelligence activities included a responsibility to provide authoritative guidance for intelligence collection and production from a national (as distinguished from departmental) point of view. To this end, National Security Council Intelligence Directive 4, adopted by the NSC in December 1947, prescribed two specific duties:

(1) To prepare "a *comprehensive outline* of national intelligence objectives [generally] applicable to foreign countries and areas."

(2) To select, on a current basis, the sections and items of this outline having *priority* interest.

By "comprehensive outline" the drafters of NSCID 4 meant an integration of such then existing departmental documents as the Army's *Index Guide* and the Navy's *Monograph Index*. What they had in mind has actually been accomplished by the preparation of the National Intelligence Survey outline (*NIS Standard Instructions*, June 1951). However, the publication of DCID 1/2 (15 September 1958) was considered necessary to meet the formal requirement for a "comprehensive outline" of national intelligence objectives.

The 1947 directive had the fault of prescribing a method rather than a mission. Manifestly, national intelligence objectives have never been determined by the selection of "sections and items" from a "comprehensive outline." They are no longer required to be in NSCID 1, of 15 September 1958, whose subparagraph 3b (1) is the present-day survivor of the original NSCID 4.

The fact is that no priority national intelligence objectives were formulated until 1950, and that their provenance then was unrelated to NSCID 4. In May 1950 the Joint Intelligence Committee produced JIC 452/7, "Critical Intelligence Objectives of the Department of Defense with Respect to the USSR." This document identified as critical intelligence objectives five generalized aspects of Soviet military capabilities. In September its text, with the addition of two highly generalized references to political warfare, was adopted as DCID 4/2, "Priority National Intelligence Objectives." In June 1952 this DCID was amended to cover explicitly not only the USSR but also "its Satellites (including Communist China)."



The preoccupation of DCID 4/2 with Soviet military capabilities was a natural consequence of its origin and of the circumstances of the time, the shooting war then in progress in Korea. In August 1953, however, an armistice having been signed, the adequacy of the DCID as priority guidance for a *national* intelligence effort was questioned. The Board of National Estimates was directed to study the problem and to propose a suitable revision. Its study, in consultation with research and collection personnel throughout the Agency, extended over a period of ten months, followed by six months of inter-agency coordination.

It was represented to the Board that the almost exclusively military character of DCID 4/2 resulted in claims of priority for the collection of any desired item of military information over any other information, no matter how significant the latter might be in relation to the national security. Such claims were plainly out of consonance with the current estimate (NIE 99, October 1953) that, for the near term at least, the Kremlin would probably avoid military action with identifiable Bloc forces, that the active threat to U.S. security was likely to be a vigorous Communist political warfare campaign designed to undermine the Western power position, and that there was danger of a weakening of the unity of the Free World. They were also plainly out of consonance with NSC 162/2, Basic National Security Policy (October 1953), which emphasized a need for intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of friendly and neutral states as well as of the Soviet Bloc.

The Board concluded that the list of priority national intelligence objectives must be expanded to cover at least the most significant of these non-military concerns, and that there must also be some discrimination between military objectives of greater and of lesser consequence. This expansion of the list and need for discrimination within it led to the development of three general categories of priority within the listing. A single list in absolute order of priority was considered infeasible and also undesirable, as likely to introduce self-defeating rigidity into the system.

The revised DCID proposed by the Board of National Estimates and adopted by the Director of Central Intelligence with the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee

(DCID 4/4, December 1954) was the prototype of the present DCID 1/3 (4 January 1961). The differences between the two represent only those adjustments normally to be expected as responsive to developments in the situation.

*Criteria for PNIO Selection*

The DCID has an annex that sets forth certain criteria to govern the selection of priority national intelligence objectives. A gloss on these criteria is in order at this point.

It is stipulated, first, that the PNIO's should be directly related to the intelligence required in the formulation and execution of national security policy. Through its role in the preparation of national intelligence estimates, the Board of National Estimates is cognizant of the intelligence requirements of the NSC and its subordinate policy boards. It is also cognizant of the most critical problems inherent in the estimates required to meet their needs. Its identification of these substantive problems as priority national intelligence objectives can provide a basis for identifying priority research and collection requirements, but of course does not in itself define such requirements.

Second, since the bulk of the intelligence required in the formulation and execution of national security policy will be the product of routine intelligence collection and research, the PNIO's should be limited to the critical problems which require special attention and effort. This principle should be axiomatic. There is, however, constant pressure to make the listing more inclusive, with a consequent danger of its becoming so nearly all-inclusive as to deprive the word "priority" of meaning. This pressure, which apparently springs from a desire to get everyone's favorite topic listed as a priority objective in order to insure that it will not be neglected, has to be resisted.

Third, in order to afford a stable basis for intelligence planning, the DCID should be designed to remain valid over an extended period. This consideration requires the exclusion of topics of momentarily urgent, but transitory, interest, which will require and receive ad hoc treatment in any case. The present practice is to review and revise the DCID annually, the process sometimes extending the period between revisions to as much as eighteen months.

Fourth, since broad generalities are of little practical use, the PNIO's should be specific enough to provide discernible guidance for the allocation of research and collection resources, but not so specific as to constitute in themselves research and collection requirements. The application of this criterion presents the greatest difficulty in the formulation of PNIO's and is the source of complaints from those collection personnel who refuse to accept them, with Mr. Heffter, as "a constitution which requires both laws and courts to interpret it." The criterion has served on the one hand to rule out the kind of generality found in the 1950-52 DCID 4/2, and on the other to keep the PNIO in rather broad terms, especially in comparison with specific collection requirements—that is, to maintain its character as the statement of a critical substantive intelligence problem rather than an itemizing of the essential elements of information needed for its solution.

*Role of the PNIO's in Guiding Research and Collection*

The function of the PNIO's as stated in the DCID, is to serve as a *guide* for the coordination of intelligence collection and production. They are intended to be only the first step in a process beginning with a need for information felt at the national policy planning level and extending to the servicing of specific collection requirements in the field.

In this first step, the Board of National Estimates, with the advice of other Agency offices and in coordination with USIB representatives, identifies the critical substantive problems inherent in the general body of intelligence required for purposes of national security policy. This is as far as estimators can properly go in relation to the total problem. The identification and formulation of collection requirements related to these priority national intelligence objectives requires analysis by research personnel to determine the elements of information essential to a solution of the problem, the elements already available or readily obtainable through research, the additional information obtainable through routine collection and the residual information of such critical importance as to warrant a priority collection effort.

Obviously, not every bit of information somehow related to a priority national intelligence objective will be required with equal urgency. Many are procurable by routine means. It is

therefore necessary that research personnel exercise discrimination and restraint in formulating collection requirements, claiming priority for only those aspects of a priority objective that actually do require a priority collection effort. As Mr. Heffter has pointed out, the criterion here is not a possible incidental relationship of the collection requirement to a PNIO, but the importance (the essentiality) of the desired information for a solution of the critical problem designated in the PNIO and its unavailability from other sources. If research analysts present unjustified claims for priority collection, citing some not cogent relationship to a PNIO, collectors must exercise their own judgment and authority in rejecting them.

If a particular system of intelligence collection is unable to satisfy all of the legitimate requirements levied upon it, determinations have to be made as to which requirements will be accorded priority. In this operational context, however, priority can never be determined solely by reference to the PNIO's. One requirement related to a PNIO and certified by a responsible research agency to be a really essential element of information, being well suited to the particular mode of collection, may consequently be accorded the desired priority. Another such requirement may be totally unsuited to that mode of collection and therefore unworthy of any consideration whatever, no matter what the PNIO to which it is related. All sorts of gradations are possible between these two extremes. In these circumstances collection officers must assume the responsibility for deciding between the importunate claimants for their services. Their decisions may be informed and guided by the PNIO's and other instruments that Mr. Heffter cites, but they must be made primarily in terms of the collector's expert professional knowledge.

Problems such as these are inherent in the administration of intelligence research and collection. No reformulation of the PNIO's could obviate them—unless, indeed, the PNIO's were to be transformed into a community-wide listing of coordinated collection requirements in an absolute order of priority. Even if this were done, something like the present PNIO's would then have to be reinvented to guide the coordinators of collection requirements. The problem lies, not in the PNIO's, however imperfect they may be, but in the gap

between them and the scramble to obtain priority for individual collection requirements.

*What Can Be Done About It?*

In 1954 the Board of National Estimates was keenly aware that the formulation of PNIO's was only a small part of the total problem. It recommended that the then Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination be directed to review existing procedures for the development and coordination of collection requirements in relation to the PNIO's, and to propose improvements. The Special Assistant made such a study and concluded that no action was advisable. Like Mr. Heffter, he considered that a single community-wide mechanism for coordinating collection requirements, assigning priorities to them, and allocating particular collection resources to their service would be a Rube Goldberg contraption, more a hindrance than a help. The Board of National Estimates would heartily agree. It had not meant to propose the invention of such a machine, but it had hoped that serious study of the subject might bear such fruit as a more general understanding of mutual responsibilities and more systematic procedures for cooperation in the common cause.

For six years, however, the gap has remained, and collectors as well as estimators evidently find it to be not a Good Thing. And now Mr. Heffter comes forward with some constructive suggestions and a welcome invitation to professional discussion of the problem. Rejecting as impractical the idea of a community-wide coordination of collection requirements in priority order, he suggests that the situation could be alleviated if more systematic use were made of the findings of the several USIB subcommittees under their assigned authority, in their respective fields, "to recommend . . . intelligence objectives within the over-all national intelligence objectives, establish relative priorities on substantive needs, review the scope and effectiveness of collection and production efforts to meet these objectives, and make the necessary substantive recommendations to the departments and agencies concerned." This would be precisely the kind of implementation of the PNIO's which the Board of National Estimates has advocated for many years.

More important than any procedural proposals, however, is Mr. Heffter's recognition of the fundamental need for a truly professional doctrine and discipline in relation to this subject. The professional discussion which he seeks to stimulate is a necessary step toward the satisfaction of that need.

It is now time for someone to join the discussion from the viewpoint of the research components of the community.

*Elastic requirements for useful photos, but stringent specifications for the best.*

## INTELLIGENCE PHOTOGRAPHY

Kenneth E. Bofrone

In the days and months after the Nazi blitzkrieg suddenly overran France, British topographic intelligence, ill prepared to support the evacuation at Dunkirk and subsequent raids on the French coast, resorted to photo intelligence from post cards, travel folders and brochures, and tourist snapshots collected by public appeal.<sup>1</sup> That they were driven to this kind of improvisation illustrates the wisdom of building up in advance an intelligence photo collection even on objects and areas where no intelligence need is foreseen. It also shows that casual photos taken without any regard to the requirements of a photo interpreter can be useful. Nevertheless their usefulness is increased and the interpreter's work eased in proportion as his requirements—most of them stemming from his need to take measurements—are fulfilled.

There are times when a single photograph is *the* documentary evidence upon which a critical decision must be based. The specially skilled personnel of a photographic intelligence center may spend days and sometimes weeks exploring with their computers and precision measuring devices a single 35 mm. negative, extracting information that could not be imagined to reside in it. It may yield only one required fact, but sometimes that tiny piece of acetate and silver becomes the key to a cabinet full of hitherto inaccessible secrets. In the story of the Yo-Yo missile guidance system told in a recent issue of the *Studies*,<sup>2</sup> photographs of a grass-covered bunker ending in two large triangular discs provided the critical information that led to a break-through.

<sup>1</sup> See James Leasor's *The Clock with Four Hands*, reviewed in *Studies* IV 1, p. 99.

<sup>2</sup> V 1, p. 11 ff.

The history of these Yo-Yo prints also illustrates the tribulations imposed on the photogrammetrist trying to get his measurements when the necessary technical data does not accompany the film. The make of camera that took them was not reported, nor the focal length of the lens, nor any estimate of camera-to-target distance. Even the size of the negatives was uncertain, there being no black border to show that they had not been cropped. Nevertheless a crude indicator for scale was found—a number of cows shown beyond the bunker in one of the pictures. These were identified as of the Angus breed, the average hip-to-ground height of Angus cattle was obtained from the Department of Agriculture, and the task of triangulation could begin. The resulting measurements of the visible parts of what turned out to be a new kind of radar system were later verified by repeated photographic coverage as being within 10% of the actual dimensions.

#### *Measurements*

When the focal length of the lens and the camera-to-target distance are known, the scale of the image on the negative is immediately available as their quotient. Measurements of the target's image, usually made in hundredths or thousandths of a foot, can be converted by this scale into the target's true dimensions:

$$\text{image dimension} \times \frac{\text{distance}}{\text{focal length}} = \text{true dimension}$$

The scale will be accurate, of course, only for objects in a plane at exactly this distance from the plane of the camera lens; the computation of the size of objects shown nearer to the camera or farther away is more complex.

If the focal length is not reported, but an object of known size—preferably something better standardized than cows—is shown, the scale will be the quotient of a measured dimension of that object's image by its true dimension; and the size of other objects in the same range plane can then be found with the formula:

$$\text{unknown image dimension} \times \frac{\text{known true dimension}}{\text{known image dimension}} \\ = \text{unknown true dimension}$$




For the most accurate measurement of fine detail, however, the photogrammetrist uses angular measurements and trigonometric computations, based on the angular field of view of the lens and the size of negative used in the camera. The standard 50 mm. lens for a 35 mm. camera, for example, takes in a horizontal angle of  $38.2^\circ$  and a vertical angle of  $26^\circ$ , while a 400 mm. telephoto lens takes in only  $5\frac{1}{2}^\circ$  by  $3\frac{1}{2}^\circ$ . At a given range the lateral distance from the center point of the field of view to one of its extremes will be the product of the range distance by the tangent of half the maximum angle in question.

Fortunately, measurements are not always needed, even of military equipment in denied areas. Specialists on the type of equipment in question can often identify a known model by its distant, poorly defined silhouette, and the knowledge that such a piece of equipment was seen in that location is what is important. New models or modifications of old ones are a different matter; their capabilities have to be determined by the measurement of critical parts. And here especially the refinements that make the difference between a tourist snapshot and the most informative photograph, while small, are important. They are of two kinds, qualities inherent in the negative itself and a sufficiency of accompanying data about it.

#### *Photographic Requirements*

The first requirement is the highest resolution—sharpness of image—of which camera and film are capable. It can be achieved by focusing the lens properly, by holding the camera steady, and by using a relatively high shutter speed ( $\frac{1}{100}$ th second or faster) to minimize camera and subject movement. The film, when there is a choice, should also be selected with a view to resolution; and here, unless light is good and motion minimal, it is necessary to compromise between fast film and the slower fine grain. Panatomic-X (ASA 25) or its equivalent is an excellent choice when light conditions are good and the finest detail is necessary. For poor light or when a very fast shutter is required, films such as Tri-X Pan (ASA 200) should be used. As a compromise, Plus-X Pan (ASA 80) is the best all-purpose film. Color film is desirable only when color is an important feature of the subject; that now on the mar-



Print from 35 mm. negative taken with a Lietz 400 mm. telephoto lens  
at a distance of 700 feet. Note the required black border.

ket gives rather poor resolution as the color fringes blur into one another. With improvements, film of the type of Eastman's Kodacolor may in the future be the answer to this problem.

The second requirement is that photographs not be cropped. If a print is submitted it should be made from the full negative. The analyst's ability to take fine measurements from a photograph is keyed, as pointed out above, to knowledge of the angular field of view of the camera lens and the size of the negative used. If a print has been cropped or masked, the angular relationship is left without its frame of reference. But if prints are made with a little of the negative's clear margin showing on all four sides, the resulting black border assures the interpreter that he is working with the full frame.

Third, if a print is submitted, the contrast should be neither light nor heavy, but medium. The details important to photoanalysis are frequently in shadow areas, which would be blackened by heavy contrast. But whenever possible, the original negatives, not prints, should be submitted. The best of prints will contain only about 35 of the 200 to 300 different tonal shades of gray that the negative may have, and each tone may represent additional information. The photogrammetrist, to be sure, will not use the original negative for fear of damaging it, but he will make a positive transparency that has all the qualities of the negative by contact printing on a piece of film designed for this purpose.

#### *Accompanying Data*

The analyst can sometimes improvise, as we have seen, but he will be able to get the most out of each photograph if it is accompanied by the following information:

Where the picture was taken—geographic location, province, city, town, and as nearly as possible the exact position. On a train the notation might be, "Ten rail clicks south of milepost 147 on x-y rail line," or on the highway, "300 yards SSE of intersection of highways N30 and N12." Further, the compass direction in which the camera was pointed; the more accurate the azimuth reading the more valuable the photo will be.

*Photography*

Date and time. Precision as to the time of day within five minutes will give the analyst a secondary method of making height determination by reference to astronomic data on sun position computed for the area in question.

Make and model of camera; different models may have different frame sizes, the Robot "Star," for example, producing a 1" by 1" negative and the Robot "36" a 1" by 1 $\frac{3}{8}$ ". Paramount is the importance of recording the focal length of the lens, which is always engraved on the front of the lens rim.

Camera-to-subject distance, with method of measuring it—paced, map reference, eye estimate, etc.

Any unusual conditions at the scene—sounds, smells, colors, smoke, anything that might help to identify an unknown activity.

For all these purposes some system of numbering the exposures to key them to the data is necessary. Film for 35 mm. cameras is convenient in this respect because each frame is numbered during manufacture.

*Special Techniques*

Every lens has a distortion pattern of its own, displacing the photographic image from its true position. When the camera and lens to be used on a photographic mission are available to the photo analyst, he has them calibrated on an optical bench, recording the distortion pattern of the lens and the precise alignment between lens and plane of film. This calibration in advance is not often possible, but the photographer can easily provide calibration data himself. He stands, with his camera, between two parallel lines, such as the curbs of a street, or even better a straight stretch of railroad tracks, and makes one exposure looking down these lines with camera held level in normal position. Then he turns the camera 90° about its lens axis so that the horizontal dimension of the frame is vertical and makes a second exposure of the same view from the same position. If these two negatives are submitted along with the photos taken by the camera, the optical technician can plot the pattern of distortion and compute its effect on measurements in the latter.

A real photographic study of a subject requires views from various positions, even if they can be taken from only one direction—distant views to show the entire area and the position of the subject in its environs; medium ones for definition of the relationships of components of the subject to each other; close-ups for details of structure, size, and functioning of individual components. These three kinds of view can be taken either by moving progressively closer to the target or by successive use of wide-angle, normal, and telephoto lenses. There is no such thing as too many photographs of a subject, particularly of telephoto views, in which atmospheric interference and the foreshortening of the field present additional problems to the photo interpreter.

When a subject is too broad or tall to get into a single frame, it can be covered by a series of exposures—a procedure called panorama or partial cyclorama. The photographer takes a position at an identified point and starts with a picture of one of the extremes. Then from the same position he takes a second shot with a 30% to 40% overlap of the first, and so continues until he has covered the area. If possible, this procedure should be duplicated from a second or even third position, recording the relationship of each camera position to the others.

Of all the techniques used in ground photos, stereophotography probably has the greatest versatility and value. The simulated third dimension can be of great help in distinguishing between components of a subject or several similar objects in proximity to one another. Although 35 mm. stereo cameras are available on the market, they are of little use at distances beyond 50 or 60 feet. Stereophotographs at greater distances are best made with an ordinary camera, taking pictures of the same object from two or more slightly separated stations with the optical axis of the lens parallel in all shots. As a rule of thumb, the distance between camera stations should be one foot for each 100 feet of range. This distance, called the stereo base, should be reported. Stereophotographs can be made from a moving vehicle by holding the camera in fixed position and making successive exposures as rapidly as possible. The interval between exposures and the speed of the vehicle, if they can be estimated, will provide a stereo base.

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*Photography*

These refinements of technique, together with accurate and complete data accompanying submitted films, enhance the intelligence value of reports based upon photography. But the elaboration of sophisticated requirements should not be allowed to obscure the most important requirement: *Take pictures.*

*Intelligence market for the  
product of the camera fan's fun.*

## SNAPSHOTS AT RANDOM

Jane Schnell

Everyone who has taken photographs in a foreign country has collected potential ground photographic intelligence. The traveller turns his camera upon anything that excites his interest—the civil engineer on peculiarities in the construction of dams, roads, bridges, and city buildings; a woman perhaps on clothing, jewelry, and hair styles; a doctor on things related to disease and therapy; a farmer on crops and tools and methods of farming. The more widely travelled the man behind the camera and the broader his interests, the more discriminating he is likely to be in photographing subject matter peculiar to a particular place. But the potential intelligence thus collected is often lost; there are two minimum requirements for transforming it into actual photo intelligence. One is that the pictures must be identified, at least by the name of the place or subject, the direction the camera was facing, and the date. The other is that they must get to the market.

The most omnivorous and insatiable broker for the photo intelligence market is the CIA Graphics Register. If you have a batch of photos taken anywhere abroad, properly identified and preferably with negatives, the Register would like to look them over. If they were taken in London or Paris or Vienna, say, the pickings may be slim, but the Register would like to decide for itself. And if it knows in advance that you are going to have a tour in some less well frequented place, it may be interested enough in promoting your hobby to supply you with camera and film. With a minimum of effort, adding to the pictures you normally would take anyway a notation of the place, time, and direction and as much descriptive data as you can, you are likely to produce some useful photos.

### *Targets of Opportunity*

The results will be much better, however, if you add to this minimum effort a little more and become as familiar as you

can with photo collection manuals and lists of requirements on the area. Graphics Register can refer you to general publications on these subjects;<sup>1</sup> and attaché offices in all the U.S. diplomatic missions have such manuals and requirements lists in detail for their particular areas. You can pick out of the listings a few things that are of interest to you and accessible for photographing in the course of your normal day-to-day activities. One standing requirement, for example, is photographs of prominent persons in almost any field, especially the military, political, economic, and scientific. If an election is coming up and campaigning is in progress, why not take a few pictures of the speakers? If they are within 50 feet of a 35 mm. camera, the heads can be enlarged to an identifiable likeness. The closer the better, naturally, but the main thing is to get them on film and in focus.

The fact that an object may have been photographed previously by no means disqualifies it: changes, or the absence of changes, in it over a period of years or of weeks may be important. And changes aside, it is amazing how many pictures of the same object can be taken without telling the whole story. Although I must have seen hundreds of photographs of the Eiffel Tower before I went to France, it wasn't until I walked under it that I realized the first balcony has a big hole in it. So looking up, I photographed the tower through the hole; and then, just for fun, I kept trying to find another photograph that showed there was such a hole in the middle of the balcony. It was three and a half years before I saw one. A good photographic practice is to take the normal view of an object and then try to think up a different viewpoint and take that also. Few people look up, and it is often by looking up that you find an extraordinary picture.

If a new gas storage tank is being built in the city where you are stationed and you drive past it going to work every day, why not photograph it once a week or once a month? The photos will tell how long it takes to build it, what types of materials and methods of construction are used, and how much gas storage capacity is being added. Maybe you don't know what a gas storage tank looks like, and all you see is a

<sup>1</sup> See appended bibliography for a sample list.



big tank being built. Take a picture of it anyway; obviously it is built to store something. What you don't know about it the analyst will. That is what he is an analyst for, but he can't analyze it if you don't get him the pictures.

*Captions*

A bit of extra effort put into captioning your shots will pay off, too. One kind of information you may not be in the habit of noting for your own purposes, technical data, may be of importance to the Register. This includes the kind of camera and lens, the type of film, and the speed of exposure, as well as a serial number for each roll and frame. You should especially make note if you have used a telephoto or wide-angle lens. Information on the type of film and exposure speed will not only assist in its development but also make it possible for you to get advice on how to correct any mistakes you make and improve your technique.



*Roll 20, frame No. 3. 2 May 1959. 1100 local time.  
Malaya, Kelantan state. Town, road, waterway.*

*Main road between Kota Bharu and Kuala Trengganu looking south at ferry toward village of Jerteh. Note cut at right for bridge under construction (see frames 1 and 2 for other shots of bridge).*

Most important, however, is good identifying data about each picture. The essential elements are the date (and the time of day may be useful); the precise place; the subject or subjects, with special note of particular features of intelligence interest; and the direction the camera was facing, by compass or with reference to landmarks. It might be noted, for example, that frame no. 7 of roll 2 was exposed at 1330 on 17 November, one mile east of Otaru, Hokkaido, on the road to Sapporu, looking north and showing a Soviet trawler in the bay. Or from a second-floor street window of the Hotel Europe in Bangkok, looking down on a passer-by identified as so-and-so on his way to the corner to hail a samlor.

These essentials can frequently be supplemented to advantage with additional comments or with printed matter bearing on a particular picture. Perhaps the idea of the target came from facts you read in the newspaper; clip the article out and send it along. You find your way around unfamiliar cities with the help of guidebooks, free tourist maps, and maps bought at local survey offices or book stores. The analyst can use the same material to find his way around your photographs; if you can't send copies, at least make reference to the tools of travel you used. In the absence of printed material it is extremely useful to draw a sketch showing the relationship of pictured objects. A sketch is particularly good when there are several shots of the same subject from different vantage points, or of different subjects near each other, or of subjects that are not mapped. The analyst never complains that he is given too many facts about a picture.

### *Spies and People*

You may want to shoot beyond your targets of casual opportunity and make trips or excursions expressly for the purpose of getting useful pictures. Fine; but since you are presumably abroad on some other government business, it is paramount that you remember you are taking pictures for fun. You should never take photos at the risk of your proper work, your purpose in being there. This need for discretion is of course a greater limitation in some places than in others. Once you have decided upon a target, the thing to do is become as familiar with it as possible, learn for sure just what the limitations of law and discretion are, and forget completely

why you want the pictures. Try to take them for some other reason than intelligence collection.

I once wanted to photograph a new electric power plant in Malaya. So far as I knew, nobody would question my taking the pictures; but it is a little odd for a girl to go around photographing power plants. First, I had to find it, somewhere around a certain town. I drove out the main road from that town, which finally passed under some high power wires. After taking pictures of the road in both directions, and the wires and towers in both directions, I drove on, planning to take the next road turning off either right or left parallel with the wires. But at the next turn a sign pointed to the power plant.

I photographed the side road and then drove down it until I came to a one-way bridge with a policeman at each end and the power plant on the other side. The first policeman waved me to a stop. I got out of the car, camera in hand, and went up and asked him why. He said I had to wait a few minutes, the Sultan was coming. I asked what was the big building on the other side of the river. "That's our new power plant," he said proudly. "That's nice," I said, "Does it work now?" "Oh, yes." "Golly," I said, "Can I take a picture of it?" "Sure, why don't you go to the other end of the bridge, you get a better shot." So I shot a lot of pictures, some including the bridge and a nearby railway bridge, with a lot of kibitzing, until the Sultan came past in his Mercedes. Then I thanked the policeman and left, congratulating myself that nothing could have been easier. If I'd been as smart as I thought I was I'd have got a good picture of the Sultan and one of the policeman. No matter how much you see, if it isn't in your camera it's worthless.

The biggest hazard to the camera fan who has ulterior motives is people—himself, ordinary people, and people who might suspect him. If you act suspicious even the ordinary people will become suspicious. If you act quite ordinary even the suspicious people will think you quite ordinary. That is why it is important for you to forget the reason you are taking your pictures. Just take them; but know what you will say if you are questioned. Sometimes if people are watching me take pictures it makes me nervous, so I retaliate by turning my camera on them to make *them* nervous. In the places



*Roll 27, frame 11. February 1960.  
Burma, Kachin state, Shwegu village. Sociological.  
Man cutting bamboo.*

I've been they are either so pleased they stop being inquisitive or suspicious or else they are embarrassed and go away. I have been told that in the Middle East they often throw things, and that in the Soviet bloc it can be quite dangerous; but in Asia usually they giggle. Some friends of mine in Borneo used a polaroid camera to divert the people with pictures of themselves while they took candid shots. One Dyak requested a photo of the tattoo on his back; he had never seen it!

The necessary equipment for ground intelligence photography consists of one camera and plenty of film. A camera, like a pair of shoes, is an individual and personal matter. I prefer a 35 mm. negative because its 20 or 36 frames per standard roll last longer without changing film, and larger cameras are too heavy and bulky. I would not use a smaller one, of the subminiature class, except for some special reason; the negative is so small that enlargement potential is seriously limited. And ordinary people, if they bother to think about it, think spies use tiny cameras that can be hidden. If you

go around more or less like a tourist with a popular-sized one you avoid being conspicuous.

There are many publications on cameras and photographic techniques, on special lenses, on the respective advantages of black-and-white and color, of fine-grain and fast film. I haven't tried to touch on these subjects. All I have tried to do is point out that an opportunity exists for travellers interested in photography to make a considerable contribution to basic intelligence through collecting ground photos. I collected them because I thought it important, because it helped me learn about the place where I was living, and because it was fun.

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*Nature, source, and behavior of  
a human characteristic vulner-  
able to intelligence exploitation.*

## HUMAN SCENT AND ITS DETECTION

Spencer Tebrich

The olfactory sensibilities of dogs have made them a useful adjunct of intelligence and security services for as long as such services have existed. In World War II the German and currently several East European counterintelligence organizations have made notably regular use of them for tracking and identifying suspects, fugitives, and subjects of surveillance. It is curious that this anachronistic animate operational aid has simply been accepted into the age of science and technology without much effort to discover whether it could be replaced or improved upon, to define its precise capabilities with a view to countermeasures, or even to determine how it really works. The very familiarity of the fact that a dog can detect a man's odor from a considerable distance and can also distinguish one person from another by odor alone may explain why there has been little serious consideration of the parameters of the dog's capabilities or what it is about a human being that he smells.

Just what is the odor that a dog identifies as human scent? This is the first question that must be answered in a systematic inquiry into the phenomenon. Knowledge of the nature of this odor would open the way to a definition of the abilities of the dog. It would make possible experimental studies to determine the effects of weather, terrain, and other factors on the persistence and spread of the scent. It would provide a base point in the search for techniques to neutralize human odor or otherwise counteract the effectiveness of dogs. Since every person appears to have a different odor, it could also lead to a technique for identifying individuals. A more visionary but still potential outcome of the study of human odor could be the development of a "mechanical dog," a device that would automatically detect the presence of an individual by his scent.

These eventual applications of value to intelligence cannot be approached, however, until the basic questions are answered. This paper summarizes the results of current research in this field.

*Characteristics of the Scent*

In 1924 L. Löhner, of the Physiological Institute of the University of Graz, published a paper comparing human and canine perception of human odor.<sup>1</sup> In an experiment devised to determine if humans could differentiate between individuals by odor, he had used a group of males between 20 and 40 years old, racially similar agrarian people from the Bavarian Alps. All were given the same diet during the testing period and they bathed before each test. Then they took sun baths with test cloths on various parts of their bodies—armpits, pubic region, the hair on the head, and, for a hairless region, the upper back or the palm of the hand. With practice, the men could distinguish among cloths which had been on different parts of the body, but they could not distinguish one individual from another. Löhner apparently didn't get dogs to sniff these cloths, but he pointed out that trailing dogs can take a scent from clothing off any part of the body, and he concluded that whereas humans differentiate among odors from different regions of the body, dogs recognize some common component which identifies the individual.

In another paper, published in 1926, Löhner reported some experiments with a female Doberman pinscher and blocks of wood which had been held by various individuals.<sup>2</sup> He said the dog could identify a block which had been touched by only one finger for a period of one or two seconds. Furthermore, the human odor was not masked when odorous substances such as bergamot, oil of cloves, or wild marjoram oil were applied to the test blocks. Trying to determine how long a block retained the hand scent, he found that it was lost faster in warm weather than in cold, and most slowly if the block was kept in a closed jar. It was not removed by soaking for two minutes in warm water, but could be eradicated

<sup>1</sup>Löhner, L., Pflüger's Archiv für die Gesamte Physiologie des Menschen und die Tiere, 202, 25-45, (1924).

<sup>2</sup>Löhner, L., Pflüger's Archiv für die Gesamte Physiologie des Menschen und die Tiere, 212, 84-94, (1926).

by placing the block in a hot air dryer at about 150° C. for five to ten minutes or in boiling water for ten minutes.

It is possible to draw several conclusions about the nature of human scent from these experiments and from other evidence.

First, the odorous substance must be somewhat volatile, since it could be removed by hot air. There are other considerations that support this conclusion. For instance, it is difficult to imagine how a dog could detect a person from a distance if the odorous material were not volatile. In one series of our own experiments, portions of trails were laid by rowing a boat along the shore of a lake, and it was found that a dog, trailing on shore, could determine which way his human quarry had gone without its having set foot on the ground. The shore line must therefore have been marked for him by vaporized scented matter.

Second, its volatility can nevertheless not be very high under ordinary conditions. Since it remains on sticks and clothing for a considerable length of time, it must have a fairly low vapor pressure.

Third, it must be rather persistent (in the chemical warfare sense), hence chemically stable and relatively dense with respect to air. Dogs can follow a trail hours after it was laid, and their actions indicate that pockets of scent collect and persist in particular places under the proper conditions.

Fourth, since warm water did not remove the scent from Löhner's test blocks, it is not readily soluble in water. There is evidence that a dog can identify an individual by scent, although apparently with more than usual difficulty, even after a number of successive baths. Either it is very difficult to wash the scent off even with soap, or else it is replaced rapidly after a bath.

Some of our own experiments lead to further conclusions. In these a male Labrador retriever named Skimmer, after sniffing the hand of one individual, would select a stick he had handled from among three or four handled by other persons. The experimental variations of this basic test procedure were each repeated at least three times, a different set of sticks being placed in different order on a different section of a wooden floor at each repetition. In practice the tests were



not necessarily consecutive: it was found the dog would lose interest after a few hours of work on any single day.

In one set of tests, although Skimmer was still given the individual's scent by holding a hand over his nose, he selected the right stick just as well if, instead of having been held in the hand, it had been placed only under the arm or had only been rubbed through the hair. A female miniature poodle named Onyx, given the hand scent of an individual, also readily selected a stick which had only had contact with his hair. This essentially was a continuation of Löhner's experiment, demonstrating that the hand, armpit, and hair all contain some common element by which a dog identifies a person.

In another series of tests, however, the sticks were not handled, but urine samples from the four test individuals applied to them; and Skimmer could not identify these sticks.

Then an attempt was made to extract the odorous material from samples of hair. Hair cuttings from the four test individuals were treated with a fat solvent, carbon tetrachloride or perchloroethylene. When the solvent was removed by evaporation at room temperature, there remained a small amount of very pale yellow fatty material which had a slight and not unpleasant odor. It was solid at room temperature, liquid under body heat. These extract samples were tested on Skimmer as follows.

Three individuals each handled a stick, but the fourth's was marked only by a small amount of the material extracted from his hair sample. Skimmer, given a hand scent by the fourth individual, readily picked the correct stick. The test was repeated, using a different person's extract each time, always with success. It was also reversed, all four sticks being handled but the dog given the scent from one of the bottles of extract. Again he could equate the extract with the hand scent on the stick. The experiment was repeated on Onyx, the miniature poodle, with the same results. But when a stick was rubbed with the hair which remained after the extraction process, Skimmer could not identify it.

Thus it is possible to obtain from human hair an extract which contains the odor identifying the individual. Moreover, since several weeks or even some months elapsed between the cutting of the hair and the tests with Skimmer,

the experiments also indicate that an individual's characteristic odor does not change over quite a period of time. It could be that a person's scent is a permanent individual characteristic.

The additional conclusions one can draw from these experiments may be summarized as follows.

Fifth, dogs appear to find some common individual scent produced by different parts of the human body, whereas to a human the different parts of the body have different odors. Urine, however, does not contain the individual's scent.

Sixth, the substance of human scent, although not very soluble in water, is susceptible to fat solvents and can be extracted from hair by the use of these.

Seventh, the characteristic scent does not change from day to day.

#### *Source of the Scent*

If we assume, as we have, that what a dog identifies as the characteristic scent of an individual is the property of some very specific material, and if we further assume, as seems reasonable, that this specific and characteristic material would have a unique source, the next step would be to look about for the most probable source for it. Since it is transferred to an object by contact with the skin or hair, the scent is apparently present on the skin; and a logical source for it might therefore be one of the various secretions normal to the human skin.<sup>3</sup>

The skin is normally covered with a part aqueous, part oily film made up of the secretions of several different types of glands. Some of these glands are found all over the body, others only in certain parts. The most familiar of them is that which produces the eccrine sweat whose evaporation serves to control body temperature. It is about 99% water, and the materials that make up the remaining 1% are very similar to those of urine. The glands are all over the body, the rate at which they operate depending on temperature, exercise, and emotional factors. Eccrine sweat probably has

<sup>3</sup> The information on skin secretions in this section is derived from Rothman, Stephan, *Physiology and Biochemistry of the Skin* (University of Chicago Press, 1954).

some odor, one which becomes more noticeable with bacterial decomposition.

Another type of gland produces a kind of sweat known as apocrine, which contains fatty as well as water-soluble ingredients. There are apocrine sweat glands in all the hairier parts of the body (armpits, perimammillary regions, mid-line of the abdomen, pubic and anal regions) except on the head, where they are found only in the external ear canal and the nasal vestibule, not in the scalp or on the face. Apocrine sweat contains odorous materials, and the odor becomes more pronounced with bacterial decomposition; it is probably the main source of so-called "body odor." These glands do not respond to temperature changes, but they are readily activated by mental stimuli. In animals, at least, they appear to be related to sexual attraction. Beyond that, not much is known as to why they exist.

A third set of glands secretes a fatty material that serves to lubricate and protect the skin. These are called sebaceous glands, and their secretion sebum. There are sebaceous glands over the entire body except for some parts of the feet, the palms of the hands, the palm sides of the fingers, and between the fingers. But sebum is found on all parts of the skin, including those where there are no glands, because it flows over the skin very rapidly. It is said to be very difficult to get even a small portion of the palm free from sebum, and it is estimated that it flows over wet skin at the rate of some 1.3 inches per second.

Sebum is liquid at body temperature, a solid at ordinary room temperature. Chemically, it is a very complex mixture of free and combined fatty acids, wax alcohols, sterols, terpenoids, and hydrocarbons, with compounds of relatively high molecular weight predominating. Many of the compounds do not occur anywhere else in the body. If it is removed from the skin, the glands operate very rapidly to replace it, but when the sebum layer reaches a certain thickness they slow down and stop until it needs renewal again.

In order to complete the catalog of organic materials found on the skin, it should be mentioned that a small amount of fatty material is released by skin cells that are in process of being discarded. This process is quite slow.

If we now examine each of these skin secretions in the light of what we know about human scent, we should be able to decide which of them is the most likely source of the scent, or whether several are equally possible sources.

Of eccrine sweat, the 1% that isn't water is water-soluble. But Löhner's experiments indicated that human scent is not readily soluble in water, and we found that an individual's scent can be extracted from a hair sample by using a fat solvent. Moreover, eccrine sweat contains materials similar to those found in urine, which we concluded does not carry the characteristic odor of the individual. So eccrine sweat does not appear to be a good candidate.

Apocrine sweat, since it is the main cause of the familiar "body odor," might be supposed to be the source of the individual's characteristic scent. But we saw that dogs can as readily take a scent from a person's hand or the hair on his head as from his armpit, the only one of these three areas equipped with apocrine glands. So if we stick to our assumption of a single unique source for human scent, apocrine sweat is also a poor candidate.

The fatty material from the decomposition of skin cells is produced so slowly that it could not be replaced promptly after having been removed by a good bath. Yet a dog can detect the human scent even after a series of baths. We can therefore probably ignore skin cells as a source.

This elimination leaves sebum the only remaining candidate. It seems reasonable that such a fatty substance containing heavy alcohols and hydrocarbons and having a point of fusion between room and body temperatures would have the limited volatility, the persistence, and the solubility characteristics we have attributed to human scent. The rapid replacement of sebum removed from the skin would explain why the most thorough bath or series of baths does not eliminate the individual scent. Sebum, like the hair extracts by which Skimmer identified our test individuals, is soluble in fat solvents; in fact, these extracts were prepared in the same way many investigators of sebum have obtained their samples. There does not seem to be any reason why sebum could *not* be the source of individual scent, and we may therefore make the working hypothesis that it is, although it cannot be said

we have proved that it is the unique source or that other skin secretions do not also contain the scent.

From this hypothesis it would not follow that sebum is the only thing about an individual the dog can smell. There are, in fact, observations indicating that dogs do use other human odors as cues. Those who work with police dogs have observed that they sometimes seem to be drawn to a person for no other reason than that he has done something which he fears will be detected. The cue here could be a copious amount of one of the emotionally controlled secretions, say apocrine sweat. If sebum provides an ever-present identification of the individual, the variable intensity of apocrine and perhaps eccrine sweat odor may give an indication of his emotional state.

*Individuality of the Scent*

In 1955 H. Kalmus, of University College, London, published a paper on the ability of dogs to discriminate between identical twins.<sup>4</sup> In a series of experiments with trailing dogs and retrievers he found that they could distinguish between identical twins when confronted simultaneously with both scents, but that if they were presented only one scent at a time they would confuse one with the other. No other pairs of individuals, even blood relatives, were so confused. Kalmus concluded that there is more similarity between the scents of identical twins than between those of other individuals and inferred that individual scent is probably genetically controlled.

If it is true that scent is genetically controlled, and if the source is sebum, there should be a marked difference in the composition of the sebum of different species. There is. Rothman says,<sup>5</sup> "It seems that the chemical composition of sebaceous gland and other skin products shows more striking species differences among mammals than that of any other organ or organ product." For instance, human sebum contains a good deal of squalene (a compound structurally related to cholesterol), which is replaced in sheep sebum (wool fat, lanolin) by a structurally similar terpenoid called lanosterol. Such differences in composition could produce major

<sup>4</sup> Kalmus, H., *British Journal of Animal Behavior*, 3, 25-31, (1955).

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 3.

species differences in scent, if one grants that the components are odorous to the dog.

It is not so easy, however, to account for the fact that each individual appears to have his own characteristic scent. It would be absurd to suppose that each individual's sebum contains some unique chemical compound to produce his individual scent. But the complexity of sebum and the possibility of structural variations within its many compounds makes another hypothesis possible. Of the fatty acid series, all the normal straight-chain monobasic acids from seven to twenty-two carbons (both odd and even) have been identified in human sebum. These include both saturated and unsaturated chains with one, two, and three double bonds. The wax alcohols present an equally large array of related compounds, this time with both straight and branched chains present. If one postulates individual variations in the comparative quantity of even a few of these components, there could be a large number of possible combinations. Only five individual compounds each present in any one of ten possible proportions would give more than 600,000 combinations.

Thus it could be surmised that human scent, as a species, is the property of a major component (or set of components) characteristic of human sebum (say squalene), but that each individual has a unique mixture of various minor ingredients (say certain fatty acids or long-chain alcohols). Individual scent would be a blend, the major scent modified by various additives, like a series of different perfumes compounded on the same basic theme. Such chemical individuality is not without precedent, and it may even turn out to be the rule that the chemistry of living organisms displays individual variations around some central theme. In blood groupings, which have been studied rather extensively, it has been found that each individual appears to have his own characteristic pattern of blood types and sub-types, while genetically related individuals (racial groups) show characteristically similar patterns. It is possible, by determining the presence or absence of a comparatively few factors, not only to identify blood as human, but also to obtain information about the donor's genetic background and, potentially at least, to identify the individual.

*Parameters of Detection*

If one is willing to make a number of simplifying assumptions, it is possible to estimate the approximate amount of human odor a dog would have available at a given distance from a man. The calculation is rather crude, but at least it gives a quantitative idea of the order of magnitude of the dog's ability.

Take a man standing in a field with a wind blowing across his body and a dog 100 yards down wind. Scent is transferred from the man's body to the air and is carried down wind to the dog. We will assume the man and dog have maintained their positions long enough that a continuous cloud of scent is present between them. As it goes down wind, the cross section of the cloud will grow larger and the concentration of the scent in the air smaller in rough proportion to the square of the distance. The concentration at any particular point will vary, however, not only with the rate of emanation of the scent, wind speed, and distance, but also with corrective factors expressing the effects of weather and terrain on the width and height of the cloud, the earth's drag on the part of the cloud near the ground, and the tendency of the concentration to decrease with altitude.

Having noted the apparent similarities in limited volatility, density, and persistence between human scent and chemical warfare agents, we shall adopt the values for these corrective factors that have been worked out for the travel of clouds of chemical warfare agents. Prentiss<sup>6</sup> gives values for conditions which he lists as "favorable," "average," and "unfavorable" for a chemical gas attack. These conditions equally well describe good, average and poor working conditions for a dog.

For the rate of transfer of the scent from man to air we can make an estimate on the following basis. Rothman<sup>7</sup> estimates that an adult produces an average of at least 200 micrograms of sebum per minute. We have noted that the sebum layer on the skin tends to maintain equilibrium, being replen-

<sup>6</sup> Prentiss, Augustin M., *Chemicals in Warfare* (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1937).

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 3.

ished as fast as it is lost. So we can use this average rate of sebum production to represent the average rate at which it is transferred to the air. But presumably not all the many ingredients of sebum are odorous to the dog, and we shall therefore arbitrarily take ten percent of this rate, or 20 micrograms per minute ( $2 \times 10^{-2}$  mg/min) as the rate of transfer of the scent from man to air.

Taking this expression as the rate of scent transfer, a distance of 100 yards, a wind speed of 6 miles per hour, and the values of corrective factors for "average" conditions, we get a concentration of scent available to the dog of approximately  $10^{-12}$  milligrams per milliliter of air. For "favorable" conditions, using a wind speed of 2 mph, the concentration would be about  $10^{-11}$  mg/ml, and for "unfavorable" conditions, with a wind speed of 12 mph, it would be about  $10^{-13}$  mg/ml. It is possible, to judge from practical experience, that under "unfavorable" conditions 100 yards would be a little beyond the dog's effective range.

The spread between the concentrations available to the dog under favorable and under unfavorable conditions is about two orders of magnitude ( $10^{-11}$  to  $10^{-13}$  mg/ml). Since scent concentration varies inversely with the square of the distance when everything else is constant, a variation in the distance by a factor of 10 would give this concentration change of two orders of magnitude. It jibes well that a practical rule of thumb for the effective range of a sentry dog's detection by scent is 50 to 500 yards, depending on conditions, a minimum and maximum distance separated by our factor of 10.

The concentration of scent available to the dog is exceedingly small. The value obtained for "average" conditions ( $10^{-12}$  mg/ml) represents only one millionth of a microgram of odorous material in a liter of air, a microgram being a millionth of a gram. By weight, since a liter of air weighs somewhat over one gram, this means that the air 100 yards down wind contains one ten thousandth of a millionth of one percent of the odorous material.

Although these results seem at first sight incredible, man in his own sense realm can also detect by smell exceedingly small amounts of odorous materials in air; and there are several substances which he can recognize in concentrations simi-



lar to those just calculated. Some minimum concentrations detectable by humans are the following: <sup>8</sup>

vanillin .....	10 <sup>-18</sup> mg/ml
synthetic musk .....	10 <sup>-12</sup> mg/ml
mercaptan .....	10 <sup>-11</sup> mg/ml
skatol .....	10 <sup>-18</sup> mg/ml

In the light of these data, our fantastically small figures for the concentrations a dog can detect are not particularly unreasonable. It is only necessary to make the obvious postulate that some things which have little or no odor to a human must be quite odorous to a dog.

#### *Toward Intelligence Applications*

These tentative findings should provide a beachhead for scientific study of the detection of human scent and its present and potential applications in intelligence work. With respect to the current use of dogs for security patrol and tracking and to the converse problem of evading them, the parameters of the dog's ability and the influence thereon of weather, terrain, and other factors can be defined more precisely in laboratory and field experiments when controlled by measured quantities of sebum in refinement of the uncertain emanations of an individual. If the constant odorous component of human sebum, which we have suggested above may be associated with squalene, can be identified and isolated, chemical experimentation should in time turn up a counteracting agent. Potentially, at least, physical or chemical analysis of the variant minor components appears also to offer an alternate means of positive individual identification.

The more universally important senses, because they are more important, have in the past century been supplemented with inorganic aids which make them much more capable than the animal originals. We have long been accustomed to seeing and hearing much more by means of instruments than with our natural powers, and to recording sights and sounds by mechanical artifact. Once we have identified the medium of human scent analogous to the light and air vibration which stimulate sight and sound, it seems reasonable to

<sup>8</sup> Moncrieff, *The Chemical Senses* (John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1946).

suppose that we shall also find mechanical means to improve upon animal olfactory capabilities and not only to detect but to record the otherwise unknown presence of an individual. Our mechanical dog, when he is born, should be much more unobtrusive than his natural ancestor, should be able to tell us just whom he has smelled, and should maintain a reliable permanent record of his visitors.

*A striking instance of the post-war hiatus in U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence activity.*

### **COVER: PROPERTY RESTITUTION**

**Frederick D. Barathy**

Of the many opportunities presented Soviet intelligence in the early postwar years to work unhampered in the Allied occupation zones of Germany, probably none was more nearly ideal than that offered by the large, unprecedented program for the return of confiscated property from the U.S. zone, under which the Military Government played helpful host to restitution missions from the countries looted by the Nazis, including those of the Soviet Bloc, from late in 1945 to June of 1949. Although virtually no instances of intelligence activity were detected, the presumption remains, reinforced by certain indications, that the Soviets took full advantage of the situation. The obverse opportunities, on the other hand, for U.S. intelligence recruitment of Bloc mission members apparently went unexploited.

#### *Operation of the Program*

Established for the just purpose of restoring to its rightful owners property of all kinds, from art treasures to industrial plants, that had been removed to Germany from the occupied countries, the program was administered by a Restitution Control Branch of the Military Government headquartered at Frankfurt am Main and directing, under the policy guidance of a small staff in Berlin, a field organization with units in the individual *Laender*. These would locate claimed property, the mission of the claimant country would come to identify it, and the property would be placed under Military Government control until it could be shipped out. Each claimant mission was assigned an RCB officer to work with it, but unless it was a large and active mission—like the French, with a staff of up to 30 members—it would share his time with several other missions.

Czechoslovakia and Poland, Yugoslavia, the USSR, and ultimately the early Axis allies Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria had felt the Nazi heel and seen many of their national assets forcibly removed to Germany. They especially wished to recover scientific equipment, important precision machinery, refined minerals, and industrial materials thus commandeered. In its anxiety to put to rights the injustices perpetrated by the Germans, the U.S. Military Government welcomed the missions from these countries into a setup for intelligence operations about as perfect as can be imagined. The missions not only had a good legitimate reason for being in West Germany but enjoyed official recognition, a sympathetic attitude, and logistic support. They could bring in a healthy complement of regular personnel—about 30 for the Bloc countries together—and additional specialists without restriction for knotty restitution problems. There was almost no surveillance and a liberal policy toward travel. No restriction was placed on communication with home governments. It was normal that chiefs of mission or their deputies would periodically go home to report progress and receive instructions.

It is true that mission officers were required to get RCB orders for their travel in the zone—a regulation to which the Bloc missions in particular religiously adhered—and that as a rule their RCB officer would accompany them on their property inspection trips. This was not a counterintelligence practice, however, but a safeguard against the possibility of illegitimate deals between the mission officer and the property holder at the expense of the claimant. The few cases of such illicit activity reported would bring the warning that a second offense might result in expulsion of the officer as *persona non grata*. Some offenders were removed by their own chiefs of mission.

#### *Grounds for Suspicion*

In 1947 a member of the Yugoslav mission, reported for trying to obtain technical information from a German metal manufacturer while ostensibly on restitution business, was given such a warning. By this time, with the cold war in full bud, the suspicion was growing that the Bloc countries were using their missions for non-restitution activities. Casual surveillance of their members was attempted, partly with Mili-

tary Government personnel and partly with the Army CIC; but no further evidence of improper behavior was detected. The whole emphasis of policy, moreover, remained on European restoration rather than on counterintelligence or other cold war measures. Surveillance, the monitoring of travel, the double-checking of mission activities, and even obstruction of the shipment of war-essential materials were held to a minimum: it was feared that such acts might be officially protested as unfriendly by the governments concerned.

The only major U.S. use of the restitution program to gain leverage in a cold war issue had occurred earlier, in 1946, when an American plane was downed over Yugoslavia. RCB received instructions then to withhold shipment of a considerable amount of agricultural equipment until the political ramifications of the incident could be settled. The shipment was delayed, in fact, for several months.

The Bloc missions were in general of high caliber, prompt, assiduous, and capable in presenting claims and handling cases. Only the Soviet mission was comparatively aloof and not very punctual or thorough. It did effect restitution of some machinery and some university libraries, but on the whole manifested little interest in the program. Although its staff accreditation time was tremendous, its office was frequently closed and the whereabouts of its personnel unknown; but when it was open there were always at least two officers there.

A final sign of the likelihood of ulterior activities in the Bloc missions was given in their reaction at the end of 1948 to plans for phasing out the program for a few months and then closing it down. By now the bulk of the restitutions had been made, and for many of the missions the cost of continuing to maintain a staff in Germany would be altogether out of proportion to the value of the property they might still recover. Nevertheless there was an avalanche of protests, not only from the missions themselves, whose staffs might have had a personal reluctance to return to the comparative austerity of life in their homelands, but from the governments they represented, especially in the Bloc. It was argued that three years and a half was not enough for the intricate work of locating looted property and tracing and proving ownership, and that the Americans had dragged their feet on some of the

most lucrative claims. But the Military Government was adamant, and June 1949 saw the end of the unique and expensive U.S. program.

*Dissidence and Defection*

Although U.S. intelligence apparently took no advantage of the program to recruit members of the mission staffs, a number of the Bloc officers defected on their own initiative, especially toward the end. During the initial stages, two Hungarians temporarily attached to the Hungarian mission pleaded with U.S. officials for assistance in removing the assets of a textile factory—money, stock, and some personnel—out of Hungary to the West, preferably to the United States. The Military Government could not act, of course: it was policy not to disturb political relations with any country engaged in the restitution program. It had to take the same correct attitude toward an intriguing plan of the Czech mission to withhold shipment of a sizeable amount of recovered precious stones and jewelry, sell them, and give the proceeds to the Czech exile movement then beginning to form in the United States.

Early in 1948 the Polish mission chief, a rough and outgoing but shrewd man, told the RCB that his deputy had been caught buying marks on the black market, a common practice, and would be sent home. Such charges were not a matter for RCB action except as the Military Government, on German complaint, might decree an offender's expulsion. Within a few days, however, the deputy decamped to New Zealand, and it was learned from his colleagues that the black market charge had been trumped up in an effort to forestall his politically motivated defection.

A Hungarian specialist brought in to work on the restitution of certain types of property with which he was familiar also defected in 1948, shortly after his job was completed, to England. Two other Hungarians fled to Sweden when the program was closed down.

With one other dramatic exception, the bulk of the staffs of the Bloc missions returned meekly home to their police states in June 1949. It was known to the top officers of the RCB that the chief of the Czech mission, an astute, well educated,

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*Property Restitution* **CONFIDENTIAL**

and very courteous gentleman, planned not to go back. But he had the calm audacity, after closing his mission with all the proper formalities, to return to Prague and ship out some of his personal property before leaving for England under the very noses of the Czech authorities.

### COMMUNICATION TO THE EDITORS

#### *Inside Darkest John*

Dear Sirs:

In "The Defections of Dr. John,"<sup>1</sup> Delmege Trimble provided us with an intriguing recital of facts but with only clues about their causes. Probing of the wellsprings of John's defection and redefection is necessary because of the wounds already inflicted by turncoats on the Western body politic and the menacing likelihood of deeper cuts to come unless we learn to detect betrayal before it is unsheathed.

Early in his article Mr. Trimble points to the utility of psychological probing: "Erich Ollenhauer may have come closer when he remarked, after John redefected and began to show increasing signs of a persecution and messiah complex, 'This is a case for the psychiatrists rather than the politicians.'" It is.

One psychiatrist who has studied and written extensively about people like Otto John is Dr. Edmund Bergler. Two of his books<sup>2</sup> are particularly pertinent to an understanding of both the case at hand and the dynamics of clandestinity, including spy-handling and spy-catching.

In the varicolored spectrum of intelligence types, the figure who often seems on first encounter the strangest and most obscure is the psychic masochist. He appears to move in an irrational world of his own. In fact, however, he is not living in another world, as closer acquaintance shows; his values are not random but rather reversed and also unconscious. Unlike the perversion masochist, the psychic masochist derives no conscious gratification from the forces that drive him. Stabilized on the level of rejection, as Bergler would put it, he devotes his life to death, bondage, and the pursuit of unhappiness.

No layman's summary of Bergler's work in masochism can be accurate, and lack of space increases the distortion. But

<sup>1</sup> *Studies IV 4*, p. 1 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *The Basic Neurosis* (Grune and Stratton Inc., New York, 1949) and *Principles of Self Damage* (Philosophical Library, New York, 1959).



*Darkest John*

it may not be too far off Bergler's mark to say that the masochist

(1) felt deprived, as a child, of his mother's comfort, food, or affection;

(2) tried to retaliate, could not, repressed retaliatory wishes, and instead found pleasure in being refused or denied by his mother and, later, by a mother substitute;

(3) became an injustice-collector who, with unconscious cunning, now contrives situations that can end only in his own defeat and humiliation; and

(4) savors, like the connoisseur he is, each drop of self-pity: "Wrongs like these are done only to me."

The masochist complains loudly but accepts and even provokes new injuries from the source of his grievances. He suspects slights and hidden disparagements in situations that seem perfectly straightforward to others. His career is likely to be one of high promise and "inexplicable" failure. He is prone to other neurotic, chiefly hypochondriacal, symptoms. In his love-life he tends to equate sex with the forbidden and to be or seem promiscuous in order to be found out and punished.

How well does John fit Bergler's pattern? Unfortunately, Mr. Trimble tells us nothing of Otto's parents or of his relationships with them. But he does say that "Otto felt no fraternal jealousy" of his "younger, brighter, and sturdier" brother. Here is repression with a vengeance.

We find that Otto studied assiduously for the German foreign service and then, in opposing Hitlerism because of conscious moral revulsion, subconsciously chose the one course guaranteed to destroy his prospects. Moreover, he did not join forces with an effective opposition party or group. And when World War II erupted, he became "a chief promoter" of the fantasies of Prince Ferdinand and his hopeless pretensions to the vanished Hohenzollern throne. Again his instinct for the fated failure was unerring.

In 1941, acting as a go-between among some anti-Nazi groups that had achieved an "ineffectual half-dozen different attempts to remove Hitler," John seemed to deviate from the masochist's pseudo-aggression by getting in touch with the Allies and providing information. The next year, however,

*Darkest John*

CONFIDENTIAL

“he was turned in to the Gestapo by an aging and jealous prewar mistress.” Psychologically it is no accident that John chose this harpy for his Nemesis. His service for the British had been only the prelude to the disaster that he ensured when he handed to the vindictive mother-substitute the weapon that she promptly turned against him. Here, as elsewhere in his life, John acted in a way that seems wholly illogical but is actually completely consistent with the goal of self-destruction.

Released, he was able for a time to ensure the failure of his mission to the British simply by refusing to name the conspirators whom he represented and thus provoking suspicion about himself. When faced with the threat of restored confidence in 1944, he was rescued because “the British ascertained that he had transmitted information concerning allied military intentions to Berlin.” It would be helpful to know how the British uncovered this fact. Was John their source, directly or not? And why, incidentally, was he providing intelligence to a government that he was supposedly sworn to destroy?

The documentary evidence bearing on John’s whereabouts on 20 July 1944—the lists of applicants for Spanish visas and the travel manifests—leaves little doubt that he was in Spain when the climactic day arrived. More interesting than his absence from Germany is his later lying about it and, especially, the clumsiness of the lie. Almost anyone who was at OKW headquarters that day and who survived could have exposed its falsity. Moreover, Otto told not one story about his role in the plot, but several. It is as though, subconsciously, he wanted his falsehoods discovered, wanted to be charged as a fraud whose claim to significant anti-Fascism—the hub of his public life—was spurious.

We learn that in 1946, after seeing a film about the Belzen concentration camp, John had “a species of nervous breakdown” and that “the lower part of his face began to discharge a pus-like fluid.” The conscious frustration that he adduced as the cause of these phenomena is unconvincing. Nervous breakdowns are the product of intolerable unconscious stress, not of witting frustration. Bergler, who has written at length about the oral basis of masochism, would probably find

CONFIDENTIAL

*Darkest John*

it significant that the fluid was discharged from the region of the mouth. But why 1946, when the danger and tension of war had ended? Perhaps the answer lies not in what the Germans did to the inmates of Belzen but in what they did not do to John. "He revisited with the wrath of a prosecutor the country which he had fled as a political persecutee. He kept aloof from other Germans . . . trying unsuccessfully to pose as an Englishman . . ." Here was behavior designed to arouse the indignation, perhaps even the contempt and hatred, of his fellows. Here was a chance to collect an accusation worse than *liar*, the epithet of *traitor*. But it did not happen, because the Germans were then preoccupied with their own problems.

Three years later he did manage, by extreme provocation, to evoke a little hostility among his countrymen. Appearing as "the chief German assistant to the British prosecution" and "deliberately twisting facts and evidence to the advantage of the prosecutors," he annoyed a number of his compatriots. Consequently there were no conversion symptoms and no breakdown in 1949. In fact, as Rudolf Diels<sup>3</sup> relates, John now sought out, in Wiesbaden and elsewhere, the very Germans likeliest to despise him, and solicited their aid in obtaining governmental employment!

In 1949 John also married—"the *mother* of the girl he had been expected to wed." We remember that the mistress who turned him in to the Gestapo was also "aging." The pattern of the dominant, punishing mother is repeated in the marriage. An American who knew both Otto and his wife recalls how she ruled him and how he, the conversationalist, was mutely attentive in her presence. It is also consistent that John kept his mistress after his marriage and continued to share in the sultry parties at Wowo's apartment. There was always the tingling chance that his wife-mother would find out—and spank.

The fact that John succeeded in becoming BfV chief may seem incompatible with the theory of deep psychic masochism. His success was not a result of chance, an idiot good fortune that persisted in smiling blindly no matter how he tried to

<sup>3</sup> *Der Fall Otto John, Hintergruende and Lehren* (Goettinger Verlagsanstalt, 1954).

win her frowns. On the contrary, he moved realistically and effectively to eliminate his chief rival, Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz. But as Bergler has pointed out repeatedly, clever neurotics play for high stakes. The attainment of eminence, the immediate goal, ensures a deeper and more disastrous fall, the ultimate goal.

From the moment of John's appointment, like the moment of his marriage, he invented naughty irresponsibilities that were likely to lead to punishment. He started by hiring a Soviet spy or ex-spy as his secretary. He embarked upon projects so ridiculous as to guarantee humiliation as failure's bonus. Senior police officials and high-ranking members of the West German government began to detest him. Then—at last!—the attacks began, and John could delectate while complaining “about the bad things people were saying about him,” could be gleefully “convinced that the newspaper story of changes planned by the Interior Minister was aimed at him.”

The “enemies” whom he had created were all “Nazis,” of course. John's preoccupation with what he considered the Nazi threat is revealing. Both before and after his defection to the East, he complained shrilly about the “growing influence of the Nazis.” No matter what Fascist tendencies the analytic eye could discern in the Germany of 1954 (or can spot today), avowed Nazis were hard to find. Aggression against them was unreal, was pseudo-aggression. Bergler has pointed out that masochists, like other neurotics, are incapable of real aggression and show only its counterfeit.

The BfV chief attended the 20th-of-July decennial and “made an exhibition of himself, sobbing loudly and denouncing two other mourners as Gestapo agents.” It is hard to imagine conduct better calculated to evoke a punch in the nose than calling a 20th-of-July mourner a Gestapo stool-pigeon. By this time John's deterioration had progressed, one suspects, through deepening psychic masochism toward paranoia.

After this outbreak the chancellery might have obliged him by kicking him out had he not owed his appointment to the occupying powers. Bilked of the boot, he had to move out on his own. And so Otto, in the ultimate act of pseudo-aggression, ran away from home.

He knew, from his own experiences in Britain and the BfV, that refugees and defectors encounter suspicion more often than acceptance. He had every right to expect, at the very least, a couple of sound psychic slaps, so that he could turn the other quivering little cheek. But what happened? A full-dress press conference attended by 400 Western and Communist reporters. Plans for a Ministry of German Unity, which he would head. A prolonged visit in the USSR. And even in the West, "a surprisingly good British press."

Hell hath no fury like a masochist unscorned. Now he had to go back; there was no other way to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

If the West had understood Otto John, if some superior had been kind and sagacious enough to slip him just a crust of insult now and then, he might have been one of the most brilliant intelligence officers in Europe. Instead, he was regarded and treated like a normal person. Inevitably, he considered respect and kindness a form of weakness. Inevitably, he became more disturbed the more he was cheated of pleasure-in-displeasure. The West tried to use John not only without understanding him but, as it happened, in contravention of his nature. It was like trying to turn over a garden with a tennis racquet.

Consequently his life followed the course of his own unconscious choosing and became the debacle toward which he had aspired from his youth. Misunderstood, mistreated, and maligned, he can now look forward to a serene old age, his heart warmed by the dear familiar curses, his faith in mankind renewed by the jeers of the younger generation. At last he has what he wanted.

At our cost.

ALFRED PAUMIER

### INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

GEHEIM (Secret: A Documentary Report on the German Secret Service). By *Wolfgang Wehner*. (Munich: Suddeutscher Verlag. 1960. Pp. 317. DM 14.80.)

For fourteen years Reinhard Gehlen observed a virtual fetish of secrecy for himself and his emerging Bundesnachrichtendienst. A series of articles in the German weekly *Muenchner Illustrierte*, beginning in November 1959, which now appears in book form as *Geheim*, abruptly—though probably only momentarily—reverses this policy. Since the author's efforts are BND-inspired, it is to be presumed that someone in the BND is convinced this effort will impress friends, inspire in the German public a supreme confidence in the BND, and cause hostile services to quake in their boots.

Unfortunately, the book is not likely to have any of these effects. It is an odd and poorly organized mixture of case reviews, history of the Gehlen organization and its General Staff predecessor, Fremde Heere Ost, and ostensibly accurate material on the American and German intelligence community in postwar West Germany. The case reviews are unimpressive substitutes for spy novels; they reveal a good bit less than the opposition has exposed. The BND is represented as dominating and inspiring the entire postwar development of intelligence collection in Germany. The book creates an unwarranted caricature of an omniscient General Gehlen. Its incredible image would have been complete had it reproduced the double-page photograph accompanying one of the *Muenchner Illustrierte* installments showing the almost never photographed General treading water in Lake Starnberg and had captioned it "General Gehlen collecting naval intelligence."

It is to be hoped that the BND, an increasingly effective intelligence ally, will develop a sense of balance in its public relations and come to cultivate neither unreasoned staff secrecy nor a yen for eliciting hero worship.

QUINCY BEHNFIELD

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND THE SHAPE OF TOMORROW. By *William M. McGovern*. (Chicago: Regnery. 1961. Pp. 191. \$4.00.)

None of us whose Washington battle-stations lay at the bosom of the wartime intelligence community can forget the lieutenant professor or associate commander William McGovern. A less martial figure never wore uniform. In our one-time university jobs we had had academic colleagues who occasionally appeared before their classes tieless, uncombed, or in mismatched shoes; but somehow, upon joining the colors, even the most unconscious of them managed to spruce up to dress requirements. Not so the splendid McGovern: one day he had forgotten his shoulder boards; on another, the top and bottom parts of the uniform were of different fabrics; on another, a button of his tunic would be widowed of its buttonhole or his overseas cap stuck on backwards; almost always down his front would run the track of cigar ashes.

It is reported by sources believed to be usually reliable that Admiral King twice crossed Constitution Avenue specifically to correct such derelictions. The story is credible, for Commander McGovern, then late of the Northwestern University faculty and a walking storehouse of knowledge, horse sense, and good ideas, had become the Navy's chosen instrument on the Staff of the Joint Intelligence Committee. One is led to speculate that Admiral King—not generally known for the quality of forbearance—realized that one price of McGovern's contribution to high-level intelligence work was the incandescent eccentricity of his military bearing.

Some sixteen years after the fact, Professor McGovern has addressed himself to *Strategic Intelligence and the World of Tomorrow*. Both the title and the chapter headings—"Can the Future be Foretold," "Secret Intelligence," "Economic Intelligence," "Ethnological Intelligence," "Ideological Intelligence," "Prospects for the Future," and "Grand Strategy and National Policy"—hold out an alluring invitation to the devotees of this journal.

Never was a deadfall more artfully baited. The guile of the late Colonel Green of the *Infantry Journal* in thinking up George Pettee's title, *The Future of American Secret Intelli-*

*gence*, is innocence itself by comparison; after all, Pettee did write a useful essay on his wartime experience with overt economic intelligence and targetting. The McGovern book's title is as good as any other, if you grant that it had to be published; its faults lie in the very substance of practically every paragraph of its hundred and ninety pages of text.

To begin with, internal evidence strongly suggests that the book was dictated in very short order and not very carefully proofed for repetitions, contradictions, confusions, and errors of fact. The frame of reference and parts of the text are clearly derived from Professor McGovern's wartime experience, other parts from his general knowledge and a desultory study of open literature, and one part at least, it seems, from his lecture notes on some prewar anthropology course. There is little of it that will not appear simplistic, irrelevant, out of date, or incorrect to the relatively well-informed reader. These are strong words, but let me illustrate—I hope not unfairly—what I have in mind.

1. Early on, the following appears: "By means of radar our men were able to spot the approach of enemy vessels or enemy aircraft long before they were visible to the naked eye. . . . Unfortunately radar does not function below the surface of water, but the newly developed sonar was able to overcome this handicap in large measure." There are many similar sentences throughout the book, *e.g.*: "The armed forces of Iran are not nearly as good as those of Turkey . . ." (p. 164). "I am sure that Italy will remain true to her treaty obligations, but I seriously doubt she can render any spectacular military assistance" (p. 161). "The situation in Black Africa, Africa south of the Sahara, inhabited mostly by Negroes, is somewhat confused" (p. 158). "If [the armed forces of Indonesia] were drawn into a military conflict with the Western powers, they would present no serious menace" (p. 159). This sort of statement is what I have in mind when I say simplistic.

2. In the economic chapter great stress is laid on the intelligence of raw material distribution—a matter whose importance has been known to strategists for generations, and a primary canon for both intelligence and strategic planning since these arts have come of age. It is not that what he says is wrong, it is that he says it in a context which suggests that both the intelligence community and the stockpilers of



OCDM have been woolgathering and need to be prodded into action.

3. The ethnological chapter is the longest (40 pages), the chattiest, the fullest of irrelevancies, and probably the most dated. It contains a note on the principal races of the world, it takes account of prejudices and animosities between them, it gives a few pages to language and its role in the formation of national character, and ditto for religion, with the comment that he is in favor of religious toleration and that he does not believe Arabs and Israelis will become reconciled to each other "in the immediate future." It is unkind but true to note that the tone and many of the ideas seem closer akin to nineteenth than to twentieth century thinking.

4. In the chapter on ideology, which he feels to be a "very important" and to this reader's surprise "a much neglected source of strategic intelligence," we are sunk deep in the past. His examples of right- and left-wing totalitarianism are not those of today: Marx, Lenin, and Hitler get several pages and Mao a brief mention; but to Stalin, Khrushchev, Franco, Castro, and the others of the present era there is no reference at all. He introduces nationalism as a phase of ideology and again draws upon history for lessons. We are presented some vignettes of ancient Greece and Rome, the Middle Ages, the Reformation, and then on into the French Revolution and the nineteenth century. There is almost nothing about present-day nationalisms. If his intent is to let the past point out its own lessons I have two quarrels with him: a) his references to the past contain too many errors to carry conviction, and b) most of the lessons which he derives just do not apply to today's situations. One's understanding of men like Diem, Nkrumah, Sukarno, Nasser, etc. who today cause us most concern is not improved by the implied analogy. Indeed he considers not a one of them nor the particular kind of nationalism each represents, and his historical elucidations, ostensibly in aid of the intelligence estimator, are accordingly of little or no concern even if they are correct.

But let me stop. This is a book which adds little if anything to the sparse literature of our calling. Even sadder, it does no favor at all to the reputation of a man who justifiably cut quite a swath in World War II intelligence.

SHERMAN KENT

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*Intelligence Articles V 2*

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*Effects of narcosis and considerations relevant to its possible counterintelligence use.*

### **“TRUTH” DRUGS IN INTERROGATION**

The search for effective aids to interrogation is probably as old as man's need to obtain information from an uncooperative source and as persistent as his impatience to shortcut any tortuous path. In the annals of police investigation, physical coercion has at times been substituted for painstaking and time-consuming inquiry in the belief that direct methods produce quick results. Sir James Stephens, writing in 1883, rationalizes a grisly example of “third degree” practices by the police of India: “It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper in a poor devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence.”

More recently, police officials in some countries have turned to drugs for assistance in extracting confessions from accused persons, drugs which are presumed to relax the individual's defenses to the point that he unknowingly reveals truths he has been trying to conceal. This investigative technique, however humanitarian as an alternative to physical torture, still raises serious questions of individual rights and liberties. In this country, where drugs have gained only marginal acceptance in police work, their use has provoked cries of “psychological third degree” and has precipitated medico-legal controversies that after a quarter of a century still occasionally flare into the open.

The use of so-called “truth” drugs in police work is similar to the accepted psychiatric practice of narco-analysis; the difference in the two procedures lies in their different objectives. The police investigator is concerned with empirical truth that may be used against the suspect, and therefore almost solely with *probative* truth: the usefulness of the suspect's revelations depends ultimately on their acceptance in evidence by a court of law. The psychiatrist, on the other hand, using the same “truth” drugs in diagnosis and treatment of the mentally ill, is primarily concerned with *psychological* truth or psychological reality rather than empirical

fact. A patient's aberrations are reality for him at the time they occur, and an accurate account of these fantasies and delusions, rather than reliable recollection of past events, can be the key to recovery.

The notion of drugs capable of illuminating hidden recesses of the mind, helping to heal the mentally ill and preventing or reversing the miscarriage of justice, has provided an exceedingly durable theme for the press and popular literature. While acknowledging that "truth serum" is a misnomer twice over—the drugs are not sera and they do not necessarily bring forth probative truth—journalistic accounts continue to exploit the appeal of the term. The formula is to play up a few spectacular "truth" drug successes and to imply that the drugs are more maligned than need be and more widely employed in criminal investigation than can officially be admitted.

Any technique that promises an increment of success in extracting information from an uncompliant source is *ipso facto* of interest in intelligence operations. If the ethical considerations which in Western countries inhibit the use of narco-interrogation in police work are felt also in intelligence, the Western services must at least be prepared against its possible employment by the adversary. An understanding of "truth" drugs, their characteristic actions, and their potentialities, positive and negative, for eliciting useful information is fundamental to an adequate defense against them.

This discussion, meant to help toward such an understanding, draws primarily upon openly published materials. It has the limitations of projecting from criminal investigative practices and from the permissive atmosphere of drug psychotherapy.

#### *Scopolamine as "Truth Serum"*

Early in this century physicians began to employ scopolamine, along with morphine and chloroform, to induce a state of "twilight sleep" during childbirth. A constituent of henbane, scopolamine was known to produce sedation and drowsiness, confusion and disorientation, incoordination, and amnesia for events experienced during intoxication. Yet physicians noted that women in twilight sleep answered questions accurately and often volunteered exceedingly candid remarks.

In 1922 it occurred to Robert House, a Dallas, Texas, obstetrician, that a similar technique might be employed in the interrogation of suspected criminals, and he arranged to interview under scopolamine two prisoners in the Dallas county jail whose guilt seemed clearly confirmed. Under the drug, both men denied the charges on which they were held; and both, upon trial, were found not guilty. Enthusiastic at this success, House concluded that a patient under the influence of scopolamine "cannot create a lie . . . and there is no power to think or reason."<sup>14</sup> His experiment and this conclusion attracted wide attention, and the idea of a "truth" drug was thus launched upon the public consciousness.

The phrase "truth serum" is believed to have appeared first in a news report of House's experiment in the *Los Angeles Record*, sometime in 1922. House resisted the term for a while but eventually came to employ it regularly himself. He published some eleven articles on scopolamine in the years 1921-1929, with a noticeable increase in polemical zeal as time went on. What had begun as something of a scientific statement turned finally into a dedicated crusade by the "father of truth serum" on behalf of his offspring, wherein he was "grossly indulgent of its wayward behavior and stubbornly proud of its minor achievements."<sup>11</sup>

Only a handful of cases in which scopolamine was used for police interrogation came to public notice, though there is evidence suggesting that some police forces may have used it extensively.<sup>2, 16</sup> One police writer claims that the *threat* of scopolamine interrogation has been effective in extracting confessions from criminal suspects, who are told they will first be rendered unconscious by chloral hydrate placed covertly in their coffee or drinking water.<sup>16</sup>

Because of a number of undesirable side effects, scopolamine was shortly disqualified as a "truth" drug. Among the most disabling of the side effects are hallucinations, disturbed perception, somnolence, and physiological phenomena such as headache, rapid heart, and blurred vision, which distract the subject from the central purpose of the interview. Furthermore, the physical action is long, far outlasting the psychological effects. Scopolamine continues, in some cases, to make anesthesia and surgery safer by drying the mouth and throat

and reducing secretions that might obstruct the air passages. But the fantastically, almost painfully, dry "desert" mouth brought on by the drug is hardly conducive to free talking, even in a tractable subject.

#### *The Barbiturates*

The first suggestion that drugs might facilitate communication with emotionally disturbed patients came quite by accident in 1916. Arthur S. Lovenhart and his associates at the University of Wisconsin, experimenting with respiratory stimulants, were surprised when, after an injection of sodium cyanide, a catatonic patient who had long been mute and rigid suddenly relaxed, opened his eyes, and even answered a few questions. By the early 1930's a number of psychiatrists were experimenting with drugs as an adjunct to established methods of therapy.

At about this time police officials, still attracted by the possibility that drugs might help in the interrogation of suspects and witnesses, turned to a class of depressant drugs known as the barbiturates. By 1935 Clarence W. Muehlberger, head of the Michigan Crime Detection Laboratory at East Lansing, was using barbiturates on reluctant suspects, though police work continued to be hampered by the courts' rejection of drug-induced confessions except in a few carefully circumscribed instances.

The barbiturates, first synthesized in 1903, are among the oldest of modern drugs and the most versatile of all depressants. In this half-century some 2,500 have been prepared, and about two dozen of these have won an important place in medicine. An estimated three to four billion doses of barbiturates are prescribed by physicians in the United States each year, and they have come to be known by a variety of commercial names and colorful slang expressions: "goofballs," Luminal, Nembutal, "red devils," "yellow jackets," "pink ladies," etc. Three of them which are used in narcoanalysis and have seen service as "truth" drugs are sodium amytal (amobarbital), pentothal sodium (thiopental), and to a lesser extent secenal (secobarbital).

As with most drugs, little is known about the way barbiturates work or exactly how their action is related to their chemistry. But a great deal is known about the action it-

self. They can produce the entire range of depressant effects from mild sedation to deep anesthesia—and death. In small doses they are sedatives acting to reduce anxiety and responsiveness to stressful situations; in these low doses, the drugs have been used in the treatment of many diseases, including peptic ulcer, high blood pressure, and various psychogenic disorders. At three to five times the sedative dose the same barbiturates are hypnotics and induce sleep or unconsciousness from which the subject can be aroused. In larger doses a barbiturate acts as an anesthetic, depressing the central nervous system as completely as a gaseous anesthetic does. In even larger doses barbiturates cause death by stopping respiration.

The barbiturates affect higher brain centers generally. The cerebral cortex—that region of the cerebrum commonly thought to be of the most recent evolutionary development and the center of the most complex mental activities—seems to yield first to the disturbance of nerve-tissue function brought about by the drugs. Actually, there is reason to believe that the drugs depress cell function without discrimination and that their selective action on the higher brain centers is due to the intricate functional relationship of cells in the central nervous system. Where there are chains of interdependent cells, the drugs appear to have their most pronounced effects on the most complex chains, those controlling the most "human" functions.

The lowest doses of barbiturates impair the functioning of the cerebral cortex by disabling the ascending (sensory) circuits of the nervous system. This occurs early in the sedation stage and has a calming effect not unlike a drink or two after dinner. The subject is less responsive to stimuli. At higher dosages, the cortex no longer actively integrates information, and the cerebellum, the "lesser brain" sometimes called the great modulator of nervous function, ceases to perform as a control box. It no longer compares cerebral output with input, no longer informs the cerebrum command centers of necessary corrections, and fails to generate correcting command signals itself. The subject may become hyperactive, may thrash about. At this stage consciousness is lost and coma follows. The subject no longer responds even to

noxious stimuli, and cannot be roused. Finally, in the last stage, respiration ceases.<sup>10, 28</sup>

As one pharmacologist explains it, a subject coming under the influence of a barbiturate injected intravenously goes through all the stages of progressive drunkenness, but the time scale is on the order of minutes instead of hours. Outwardly the sedation effect is dramatic, especially if the subject is a psychiatric patient in tension. His features slacken, his body relaxes. Some people are momentarily excited; a few become silly and giggly. This usually passes, and most subjects fall asleep, emerging later in disoriented semi-wakefulness.

The descent into narcosis and beyond with progressively larger doses can be divided as follows:

- I. Sedative stage.
- II. Unconsciousness, with exaggerated reflexes (hyperactive stage).
- III. Unconsciousness, without reflex even to painful stimuli.
- IV. Death.

Whether all these stages can be distinguished in any given subject depends largely on the dose and the rapidity with which the drug is induced. In anesthesia, stages I and II may last only two or three seconds.

The first or sedative stage can be further divided:

- Plane 1. No evident effect, or slight sedative effect.
- Plane 2. Cloudiness, calmness, amnesia. (Upon recovery, the subject will not remember what happened at this or "lower" planes or stages.)
- Plane 3. Slurred speech, old thought patterns disrupted, inability to integrate or learn new patterns. Poor coordination. Subject becomes unaware of painful stimuli.

Plane 3 is the psychiatric "work" stage. It may last only a few minutes, but it can be extended by further slow injection of the drug. The usual practice is to bring the subject quickly to Stage II and to conduct the interview as he passes back into the sedative stage on the way to full consciousness.



*Clinical and Experimental Studies*

The general abhorrence in Western countries for the use of chemical agents "to make people do things against their will" has precluded serious systematic study (at least as published openly) of the potentialities of drugs for interrogation. Louis A. Gottschalk, surveying their use in information-seeking interviews,<sup>13</sup> cites 136 references; but only two touch upon the extraction of intelligence information, and one of these concludes merely that Russian techniques in interrogation and indoctrination are derived from age-old police methods and do *not* depend on the use of drugs. On the validity of confessions obtained with drugs, Gottschalk found only three published experimental studies that he deemed worth reporting.

One of these reported experiments by D. P. Morris in which intravenous sodium amytal was helpful in detecting malingerers.<sup>22</sup> The subjects, soldiers, were at first sullen, negativistic, and non-productive under amytal, but as the interview proceeded they revealed the fact of and causes for their malingering. Usually the interviews turned up a neurotic or psychotic basis for the deception.

The other two confession studies, being more relevant to the highly specialized, untouched area of drugs in intelligence interrogation, deserve more detailed review.

Gerson and Victoroff<sup>12</sup> conducted amytal interviews with 17 neuropsychiatric patients, soldiers who had charges against them, at Tilton General Hospital, Fort Dix. First they were interviewed without amytal by a psychiatrist, who, neither ignoring nor stressing their situation as prisoners or suspects under scrutiny, urged each of them to discuss his social and family background, his army career, and his version of the charges pending against him.

The patients were told only a few minutes in advance that narcoanalysis would be performed. The doctor was considerate, but positive and forthright. He indicated that they had no choice but to submit to the procedure. Their attitudes varied from unquestioning compliance to downright refusal.

Each patient was brought to complete narcosis and permitted to sleep. As he became semiconscious and could be stimulated to speak, he was held in this stage with additional amytal while the questioning proceeded. He was questioned

first about innocuous matters from his background that he had discussed before receiving the drug. Whenever possible, he was manipulated into bringing up himself the charges pending against him before being questioned about them. If he did this in a too fully conscious state, it proved more effective to ask him to "talk about that later" and to interpose a topic that would diminish suspicion, delaying the interrogation on his criminal activity until he was back in the proper stage of narcosis.

The procedure differed from therapeutic narcoanalysis in several ways: the setting, the type of patients, and the kind of "truth" sought. Also, the subjects were kept in twilight consciousness longer than usual. This state proved richest in yield of admissions prejudicial to the subject. In it his speech was thick, mumbling, and disconnected, but his discretion was markedly reduced. This valuable interrogation period, lasting only five to ten minutes at a time, could be reinduced by injecting more amytal and putting the patient back to sleep.

The interrogation technique varied from case to case according to background information about the patient, the seriousness of the charges, the patient's attitude under narcosis, and his rapport with the doctor. Sometimes it was useful to pretend, as the patient grew more fully conscious, that he had already confessed during the amnestic period of the interrogation, and to urge him, while his memory and sense of self-protection were still limited, to continue to elaborate the details of what he had "already described." When it was obvious that a subject was withholding the truth, his denials were quickly passed over and ignored, and the key questions would be reworded in a new approach.

Several patients revealed fantasies, fears, and delusions approaching delirium, much of which could readily be distinguished from reality. But sometimes there was no way for the examiner to distinguish truth from fantasy except by reference to other sources. One subject claimed to have a child that did not exist, another threatened to kill on sight a stepfather who had been dead a year, and yet another confessed to participating in a robbery when in fact he had only purchased goods from the participants. Testimony concern-

ing dates and specific places was untrustworthy and often contradictory because of the patient's loss of time-sense. His veracity in citing names and events proved questionable. Because of his confusion about actual events and what he thought or feared had happened, the patient at times managed to conceal the truth unintentionally.

As the subject revived, he would become aware that he was being questioned about his secrets and, depending upon his personality, his fear of discovery, or the degree of his disillusionment with the doctor, grow negativistic, hostile, or physically aggressive. Occasionally patients had to be forcibly restrained during this period to prevent injury to themselves or others as the doctor continued to interrogate. Some patients, moved by fierce and diffuse anger, the assumption that they had already been tricked into confessing, and a still limited sense of discretion, defiantly acknowledged their guilt and challenged the observer to "do something about it." As the excitement passed, some fell back on their original stories and others verified the confessed material. During the follow-up interview nine of the 17 admitted the validity of their confessions; eight repudiated their confessions and reaffirmed their earlier accounts.

With respect to the reliability of the results of such interrogation, Gerson and Victoroff conclude that persistent, careful questioning can reduce ambiguities in drug interrogation, but cannot eliminate them altogether.

At least one experiment has shown that subjects are capable of maintaining a lie while under the influence of a barbiturate. Redlich and his associates at Yale<sup>25</sup> administered sodium amytal to nine volunteers, students and professionals, who had previously, for purposes of the experiment, revealed shameful and guilt-producing episodes of their past and then invented false self-protective stories to cover them. In nearly every case the cover story retained some elements of the guilt inherent in the true story.

Under the influence of the drug, the subjects were cross-examined on their cover stories by a second investigator. The results, though not definitive, showed that normal individuals who had good defenses and no overt pathological traits could stick to their invented stories and refuse confession. Neu-

rotic individuals with strong unconscious self-punitive tendencies, on the other hand, both confessed more easily and were inclined to substitute fantasy for the truth, confessing to offenses never actually committed.

In recent years drug therapy has made some use of stimulants, most notably amphetamine (Benzedrine) and its relative methamphetamine (Methedrine). These drugs, used either alone or following intravenous barbiturates, produce an outpouring of ideas, emotions, and memories which has been of help in diagnosing mental disorders. The potential of stimulants in interrogation has received little attention, unless in unpublished work. In one study of their psychiatric use Brussel *et al.*<sup>7</sup> maintain that methedrine gives the liar no time to think or to organize his deceptions. Once the drug takes hold, they say, an insurmountable urge to pour out speech traps the malingerer. Gottschalk, on the other hand, says that this claim is extravagant, asserting without elaboration that the study lacked proper controls.<sup>13</sup> It is evident that the combined use of barbiturates and stimulants, perhaps along with ataraxics (tranquillizers), should be further explored.

#### *Observations from Practice*

J. M. MacDonald, who as a psychiatrist for the District Courts of Denver has had extensive experience with narco-analysis, says that drug interrogation is of doubtful value in obtaining confessions to crimes. Criminal suspects under the influence of barbiturates may deliberately withhold information, persist in giving untruthful answers, or falsely confess to crimes they did not commit. The psychopathic personality, in particular, appears to resist successfully the influence of drugs.

MacDonald tells of a criminal psychopath who, having agreed to narco-interrogation, received 1.5 grams of sodium amytal over a period of five hours. This man feigned amnesia and gave a false account of a murder. "He displayed little or no remorse as he (falsely) described the crime, including burial of the body. Indeed he was very self-possessed and he appeared almost to enjoy the examination. From time to time he would request that more amytal be injected."<sup>21</sup>

MacDonald concludes that a person who gives false information prior to receiving drugs is likely to give false information also under narcosis, that the drugs are of little value for revealing deceptions, and that they are more effective in releasing unconsciously repressed material than in evoking consciously suppressed information.

Another psychiatrist known for his work with criminals, L. Z. Freedman, gave sodium amytal to men accused of various civil and military antisocial acts. The subjects were mentally unstable, their conditions ranging from character disorders to neuroses and psychoses. The drug interviews proved psychiatrically beneficial to the patients, but Freedman found that his view of objective reality was seldom improved by their revelations. He was unable to say on the basis of the narco-interrogation whether a given act had or had not occurred. Like MacDonald, he found that psychopathic individuals can deny to the point of unconsciousness crimes that every objective sign indicates they have committed.<sup>10</sup>

F. G. Inbau, Professor of Law at Northwestern University, who has had considerable experience observing and participating in "truth" drug tests, claims that they are occasionally effective on persons who would have disclosed the truth anyway had they been properly interrogated, but that a person determined to lie will usually be able to continue the deception under drugs.

The two military psychiatrists who made the most extensive use of narcoanalysis during the war years, Roy R. Grinker and John C. Spiegel, concluded that in almost all cases they could obtain from their patients essentially the same material and give them the same emotional release by therapy without the use of drugs, provided they had sufficient time.

The essence of these comments from professionals of long experience is that drugs provide rapid access to information that is psychiatrically useful but of doubtful validity as empirical truth. The same psychological information and a less adulterated empirical truth can be obtained from fully conscious subjects through non-drug psychotherapy and skillful police interrogation.

*Application to CI Interrogation*

The almost total absence of controlled experimental studies of "truth" drugs and the spotty and anecdotal nature of psychiatric and police evidence require that extrapolations to intelligence operations be made with care. Still, enough is known about the drugs' action to suggest certain considerations affecting the possibilities for their use in interrogations.

It should be clear from the foregoing that at best a drug can only serve as an aid to an interrogator who has a sure understanding of the psychology and techniques of normal interrogation. In some respects, indeed, the demands on his skill will be increased by the baffling mixture of truth and fantasy in drug-induced output. And the tendency against which he must guard in the interrogatee to give the responses that seem to be wanted without regard for facts will be heightened by drugs: the literature abounds with warnings that a subject in narcosis is extremely suggestible.

It seems possible that this suggestibility and the lowered guard of the narcotic state might be put to advantage in the case of a subject feigning ignorance of a language or some other skill that had become automatic with him. Lipton<sup>20</sup> found sodium amytal helpful in determining whether a foreign subject was merely pretending not to understand English. By extension, one can guess that a drugged interrogatee might have difficulty maintaining the pretense that he did not comprehend the idiom of a profession he was trying to hide.

There is the further problem of hostility in the interrogator's relationship to a resistance source. The accumulated knowledge about "truth" drug reaction has come largely from patient-physician relationships of trust and confidence. The subject in narcoanalysis is usually motivated *a priori* to cooperate with the psychiatrist, either to obtain relief from mental suffering or to contribute to a scientific study. Even in police work, where an atmosphere of anxiety and threat may be dominant, a relationship of trust frequently asserts itself: the drug is administered by a medical man bound by a strict code of ethics; the suspect agreeing to undergo narcoanalysis in a desperate bid for corroboration of his testimony trusts both drug and psychiatrist, however apprehensively;

and finally, as Freedman and MacDonald have indicated, the police psychiatrist frequently deals with a "sick" criminal, and some order of patient-physician relationship necessarily evolves.

Rarely has a drug interrogation involved "normal" individuals in a hostile or genuinely threatening milieu. It was from a non-threatening experimental setting that Eric Lindemann could say that his "normal" subjects "reported a general sense of euphoria, ease and confidence, and they exhibited a marked increase in talkativeness and communicability."<sup>19</sup> Gerson and Victoroff list poor doctor-patient rapport as one factor interfering with the completeness and authenticity of confessions by the Fort Dix soldiers, caught as they were in a command performance and told they had no choice but to submit to narco-interrogation.

From all indications, subject-interrogator rapport is usually crucial to obtaining the psychological release which may lead to unguarded disclosures. Role-playing on the part of the interrogator might be a possible solution to the problem of establishing rapport with a drugged subject. In therapy, the British narcoanalyst William Sargant recommends that the therapist deliberately distort the facts of the patient's life-experience to achieve heightened emotional response and abreaction.<sup>27</sup> In the drunken state of narcoanalysis patients are prone to accept the therapist's false constructions. There is reason to expect that a drugged subject would communicate freely with an interrogator playing the role of relative, colleague, physician, immediate superior, or any other person to whom his background indicated he would be responsive.

Even when rapport is poor, however, there remains one facet of drug action eminently exploitable in interrogation—the fact that subjects emerge from narcosis feeling they have revealed a great deal, even when they have not. As Gerson and Victoroff demonstrated at Fort Dix, this psychological set provides a major opening for obtaining genuine confessions.

#### *Technical Considerations*

It would presumably be sometimes desirable that a resistant interrogatee be given the drug without his knowledge. For narcoanalysis the only method of administration used is

intravenous injection. The possibilities for covert or "silent" administration by this means would be severely limited except in a hospital setting, where any pretext for intravenous injection, from glucose feeding to anesthetic procedure, could be used to cover it. Sodium amytal can be given orally, and the taste can be hidden in chocolate syrup, for example, but there is no good information on what dosages can be masked. Moreover, although the drug might be introduced thus without detection, it would be difficult to achieve and maintain the proper dose using the oral route.

Administering a sterile injection is a procedure shortly mastered, and in fact the technical skills of intravenous injection are taught to nurses and hospital corpsmen as a matter of routine. But it should be apparent that there is more to narcotizing than the injection of the correct amount of sodium amytal or pentothal sodium. Administering drugs and knowing when a subject is "under" require clinical judgment. Knowing what to expect and how to react appropriately to the unexpected takes both technical and clinical skill. The process calls for qualified medical personnel, and sober reflection on the depths of barbituric anesthesia will confirm that it would not be enough merely to have access to a local physician.

#### *Possible Variations*

In studies by Beecher and his associates,<sup>3-6</sup> one-third to one-half the individuals tested proved to be placebo reactors, subjects who respond with symptomatic relief to the administration of any syringe, pill, or capsule, regardless of what it contains. Although no studies are known to have been made of the placebo phenomenon as applied to narco-interrogation, it seems reasonable that when a subject's sense of guilt interferes with productive interrogation, a placebo for pseudo-narcosis could have the effect of absolving him of the responsibility for his acts and thus clear the way for free communication. It is notable that placebos are most likely to be effective in situations of stress. The individuals most likely to react to placebos are the more anxious, more self-centered, more dependent on outside stimulation, those who express their needs more freely socially, talkers who drain off anxiety by conversing with others. The non-reactors are those clinically



more rigid and with better than average emotional control. No sex or I.Q. differences between reactors and non-reactors have been found.

Another possibility might be the combined use of drugs with hypnotic trance and post-hypnotic suggestion: hypnosis could presumably prevent any recollection of the drug experience. Whether a subject can be brought to trance against his will or unaware, however, is a matter of some disagreement. Orne, in a survey of the potential uses of hypnosis in interrogation,<sup>23</sup> asserts that it is doubtful, despite many apparent indications to the contrary, that trance can be induced in resistant subjects. It may be possible, he adds, to hypnotize a subject unaware, but this would require a positive relationship with the hypnotist not likely to be found in the interrogation setting.

In medical hypnosis, pentothal sodium is sometimes employed when only light trance has been induced and deeper narcosis is desired. This procedure is a possibility for interrogation, but if a satisfactory level of narcosis could be achieved through hypnotic trance there would appear to be no need for drugs.

#### *Defensive Measures*

There is no known way of building tolerance for a "truth" drug without creating a disabling addiction, or of arresting the action of a barbiturate once induced. The only full safeguard against narco-interrogation is to prevent the administration of the drug. Short of this, the best defense is to make use of the same knowledge that suggests drugs for offensive operations: if a subject knows that on emerging from narcosis he will have an exaggerated notion of how much he has revealed he can better resolve to deny he has said anything.

The disadvantages and shortcomings of drugs in offensive operations become positive features of the defense posture. A subject in narco-interrogation is intoxicated, wavering between deep sleep and semi-wakefulness. His speech is garbled and irrational, the amount of output drastically diminished. Drugs disrupt established thought patterns, including the will to resist, but they do so indiscriminately and thus also interfere with the patterns of substantive information the in-

*"Truth" Drugs*

terrogator seeks. Even under the conditions most favorable for the interrogator, output will be contaminated by fantasy, distortion, and untruth.

Possibly the most effective way to arm oneself against narco-interrogation would be to undergo a "dry run." A trial drug interrogation with output taped for playback would familiarize an individual with his own reactions to "truth" drugs, and this familiarity would help to reduce the effects of harassment by the interrogator before and after the drug has been administered. From the viewpoint of the intelligence service, the trial exposure of a particular operative to drugs might provide a rough benchmark for assessing the kind and amount of information he would divulge in narcosis.

There may be concern over the possibility of drug addiction intentionally or accidentally induced by an adversary service. Most drugs will cause addiction with prolonged use, and the barbiturates are no exception. In recent studies at the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital for addicts in Lexington, Ky., subjects received large doses of barbiturates over a period of months. Upon removal of the drug, they experienced acute withdrawal symptoms and behaved in every respect like chronic alcoholics.

Because their action is extremely short, however, and because there is little likelihood that they would be administered regularly over a prolonged period, barbiturate "truth" drugs present slight risk of operational addiction. If the adversary service were intent on creating addiction in order to exploit withdrawal, it would have other, more rapid means of producing states as unpleasant as withdrawal symptoms.

The hallucinatory and psychotomimetic drugs such as mescaline, marihuana, LSD-25, and microtine are sometimes mistakenly associated with narcoanalytic interrogation. These drugs distort the perception and interpretation of the sensory input to the central nervous system and affect vision, audition, smell, the sensation of the size of body parts and their position in space, etc. Mescaline and LSD-25 have been used to create experimental "psychotic states," and in a minor way as aids in psychotherapy.

Since information obtained from a person in a psychotic drug state would be unrealistic, bizarre, and extremely diffi-

cult to assess, the self-administration of LSD-25, which is effective in minute dosages, might in special circumstances offer an operative temporary protection against interrogation. Conceivably, on the other hand, an adversary service could use such drugs to produce anxiety or terror in medically unsophisticated subjects unable to distinguish drug-induced psychosis from actual insanity. An enlightened operative could not be thus frightened, however, knowing that the effect of these hallucinogenic agents is transient in normal individuals.

Most broadly, there is evidence that drugs have least effect on well-adjusted individuals with good defenses and good emotional control, and that anyone who can withstand the stress of competent interrogation in the waking state can do so in narcosis. The essential resources for resistance thus appear to lie within the individual.

#### *Conclusions*

The salient points that emerge from this discussion are the following: No such magic brew as the popular notion of truth serum exists. The barbiturates, by disrupting defensive patterns, may sometimes be helpful in interrogation, but even under the best conditions they will elicit an output contaminated by deception, fantasy, garbled speech, etc. A major vulnerability they produce in the subject is a tendency to believe he has revealed more than he has. It is possible, however, for both normal individuals and psychopaths to resist drug interrogation; it seems likely that any individual who can withstand ordinary intensive interrogation can hold out in narcosis. The best aid to a defense against narco-interrogation is foreknowledge of the process and its limitations. There is an acute need for controlled experimental studies of drug reaction, not only to depressants but also to stimulants and to combinations of depressants, stimulants, and ataraxics.

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"Truth" Drugs

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*Legal grounds for holding another nation's agents not personally liable for their directed violation of a nation's laws.*

### **IMPUNITY OF AGENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW**

International rules and institutions have existed since the earliest days, but it was not until the 16th and 17th centuries that there were developed the laws governing relations between European states which became the basis of our present-day international law. The disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire and the emergence of sovereign states representing great concentrations of military, economic, and political power led to the development or formulation of new rules by which nations sought to govern their dealings with one another. At the same time the concept of sovereignty as a power constituting the sole source of laws was enunciated, and with it an explanation of the concept of the nation.

The rules of international law and the concept of sovereignty in a sense limit each other; and particularly in the treatment of crimes like espionage and subversion, international law is confronted with what Philip C. Jessup once called the "taboo of absolute sovereignty." The state is especially jealous of its power to punish those who it believes have tried to undermine its authority, and the principles of international law can apply in matters affecting the security of a state only at the discretion of that state. The Swiss diplomat Emerich de Vattel, whose book *Le Droit des Gens*<sup>1</sup> had an influence on American political philosophy, was one of the early writers in international law who observed that men "put up with certain things although in themselves unjust and worthy of condemnation, because they cannot oppose them by force without transgressing the liberty of individual Nations and thus destroying the foundations of their natural society." Vattel was particularly concerned with the relationships, duties, and responsibilities of nations during times of stress.

<sup>1</sup>*Law of Nations*. Fenwick, Trans. (Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1916.)

### *Principles of National Jurisdiction*

The concept of sovereignty carries along with it the rule that the laws of a country are supreme within its own territorial limits. Consequently, generally speaking, whether a particular act constitutes a crime is determined by the laws of the country within whose borders it was committed. In extension of this *territorial* principle for determining national jurisdiction, however, there have been developed, in accordance with the varying experience of individual nations, at least four other pragmatic principles which a state may choose to follow in determining whether it can try a person criminally for acts committed in violation of its laws. A *nationality* principle would determine jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national character of the person committing the offense, so that his own state would try him under its law. Under a *protection* principle, jurisdiction would go to the state whose national interest was injured by the offense, wherever it was committed. A *passive personality* principle would similarly determine jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national character of the *person* injured. And a *universality* principle, finally, would give it to the state having custody of the offender.<sup>2</sup> In any case, however, a state may claim jurisdiction only with respect to an act or omission which is made an offense by its own laws.

The principle of *territorial* competence is basic in Anglo-American jurisprudence, and it has been incorporated in many other modern state codes. Its basis is the sovereign, which has the strongest interest, the best facilities, and the most powerful instruments for repressing crimes in its territory, by whomever committed. It is obvious that under the territorial principle the sovereign must exercise exclusive control over the acts of persons within its territory; there is no question of its right of jurisdiction to punish acts that constitute a threat to its authority.

The concept of sovereignty is so strong, however, that it may also, in the *protective* principle of jurisdiction, push beyond state borders with power to try persons outside engaging in acts against the security, territorial integrity, or po-

<sup>2</sup> Research in International Law Supplement to the *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 29 (1935).

litical independence of the state. This principle was formulated in statutes of the Italian city-states in the 15th and 16th centuries, and many modern states apply it to both aliens and citizens. Conflicts arise, of course, where the prohibited acts are carried on in another state in which such acts are not illegal. Without agreement, it is difficult to see how the protective theory can be effective in such cases without an infringement of the sovereignty of the second state.

In the United States, the rule seems to be that the protective principle is not applied unless the legislation designating the crimes so specifies. In the Soviet Union, espionage cases apparently do fall under the protective theory of jurisdiction. In the October 1960 *International Affairs*, G. Zhukov wrote:

It should be noted that American plans of space espionage directed against the security of the USSR and other Socialist countries are incompatible with the generally recognized principles and rules of international law, designed to protect the security of states against encroachments from outside, including outer space.

This position would give the USSR (and other Bloc countries) jurisdiction over espionage offenses against them, no matter where perpetrated.

#### *Scope of Immunities*

On the other hand, the USSR has, in effect, recognized the immunity of American military attachés within its territory by not prosecuting the charges of espionage leveled against them. It thus honors the provisions of international law and agreement whereby officers, diplomatic representatives, consuls, armed forces, ships, aircraft, and other persons and instrumentalities of a state may be immune from the exercise of another state's jurisdiction even under the territorial principle and consequently not subject to legal penalties.<sup>3</sup>

While diplomatic immunity as applied to embassy officials is universally accepted, the question of what persons outside

<sup>3</sup> "Diplomatic Immunity from Local Jurisdiction: Its Historical Development Under International Law and Application in United States Practice," by William Barnes. Department of State Bulletin, 1 August 1960.



this category can claim a similar immunity becomes more difficult. There is nevertheless some authority in international law for the proposition that if a man is a duly commissioned agent of his government, albeit without diplomatic immunity, any illegal acts he performs within the scope of his duties may still be considered not his personal violations but his government's national acts, raising questions public and political between independent nations. Under this theory the offended nation ought not try the individual before ordinary tribunals under its own laws but should seek redress according to the law of nations.<sup>4</sup>

This theory and variations of it have found acceptance in a number of situations. For example, in the Claims Convention between France and Mexico of 25 September 1924, Mexico assumed liability for certain acts of its revolutionary forces, accepting the even broader principle that the "responsibility of the State exists whether its organs acted in conformance with or contrary to law or to the order of a superior authority."<sup>5</sup> The applicability of the theory in any particular case depends, of course, not only on its being accepted by the offended nation but also on an acknowledgment by the offending nation that the offender is in fact its commissioned agent, that it authorized or now adopts his acts as its public acts. For this reason texts on international law have denied its application to the acts of secret political agents and spies:

... An agent . . . secretly sent abroad for political purposes without a letter of recommendation, and therefore without being formally admitted by the Government of the State in which he is fulfilling his task . . . has no recognized position whatever according to International Law. He is not an agent of a State for its relations with other States, and he is therefore in the same position as any other foreign individual living within the boundaries of a State. He may be expelled at any moment if he becomes troublesome, and he may be criminally punished if he commits a political or ordinary crime. . . .

Spies are secret agents of a State sent abroad for the purpose of obtaining clandestinely information in regard to military or political secrets. Although all States constantly or occasionally send spies

<sup>4</sup> Secretary of State Webster to Attorney General Crittenden, 15 March 1841. See 2 Moore International Law Digest 26 (1906).

<sup>5</sup> Hackworth 557 (1943).

abroad, and although it is not considered wrong morally, politically, or legally to do so, such agents have, of course, no recognized position whatever according to International Law, since they are not agents of States for their international relations. Every State punishes them severely when they are caught committing an act which is a crime by the law of the land, or expels them if they cannot be punished. A spy cannot legally excuse himself by pleading that he only executed the orders of his Government, and the latter will never interfere, since it cannot officially confess to having commissioned a spy.<sup>6</sup>

Nevertheless governments do sometimes officially confess to having commissioned their clandestine agents and do interfere in their prosecution under the law of the offended land. Although the several historical cases on record have not afforded a fully adequate test of this ground for claiming personal impunity they do include some in which the offended nation has accepted it. In three cases the United States has been involved.

#### *Paramilitary Raid*

During the 1837 insurrection in Canada the rebels obtained recruits and supplies from the United States. A small steamer, the *Caroline*, was used for this purpose by a group encamped on the American side of the Niagara River. On 29 December 1837, while moored at Schlosser, on the American side, with 33 American citizens on board, this steamer was boarded by an armed body of men from the Canadian side under the orders of a British officer. They attacked the occupants, wounding several and killing at least one American, and then fired the steamer and set her adrift over Niagara Falls. The United States protested. The British Government replied that the piratical character of the *Caroline* was established, that American laws were not being enforced along the border, and that destruction of the steamer was an act of necessary self-defense.

In November 1840 British citizen Alexander McLeod was arrested by New York State authorities on a charge of mur-

<sup>6</sup> H. Lauterpacht, *Oppenheim's International Law* (Longman's, 7th ed., 1948), Vol. I, pp. 770, 772.

der in connection with the Caroline affair. On 13 December 1840 Mr. Fox, the British Minister at Washington, asked on his own responsibility for McLeod's immediate release, on the ground that the destruction of the *Caroline* was a "public act of persons in Her Majesty's service, obeying the order of their superior authorities," which could, therefore, "only be made the subject of discussion between the two national Governments" and could "not justly be made the ground of legal proceedings in the United States against the persons concerned." On 28 December 1840 the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Forsythe, replied that no warrant for interposition in the New York State case could be found in the powers with which the Federal Executive was invested, and he also denied that the British demand was well founded.

When on 12 March 1841, however, Mr. Fox presented the British Government's official and formal demand for McLeod's release on the same grounds, Daniel Webster, who had meanwhile become Secretary of State, wrote to the Attorney General communicating the President's instructions and laying down the following principle:

That an individual forming part of a public force, and acting under the authority of his Government, is not to be held answerable, as a private trespasser or malefactor, is a principle of public law sanctioned by the usages of all civilized nations, and which the Government of the United States has no inclination to dispute.

Webster answered the British on 24 April, admitting the grounds of the demand, but stating that the Federal Government was unable to comply with it. He apparently believed, however, that the British action would give New York State cause to exempt McLeod from prosecution. McLeod brought a habeas corpus proceeding, but his discharge was refused by the New York court. He was brought to trial on the murder charge and acquitted. In a final note to Lord Ashburton disposing of the Caroline matter, Mr. Webster wrote:

This Government has admitted, that for an act committed by the command of his Sovereign, *jure belli*, an individual cannot be responsible in the ordinary Courts of another State. It would regard it as a high indignity if a citizen of its own, acting under its

authority and by its special command in such cases, were held to answer in a municipal tribunal, and to undergo punishment, as if the behest of his government were no defense or protection to him.<sup>7</sup>

*Confidential Factfinder, No Spy*

On 18 June 1849 Secretary of State Clayton issued to Mr. A. Dudley Mann, who was then in Europe, instructions for a mission it was desired he undertake as a special and confidential agent "to obtain minute and reliable information in regard to Hungary," then in revolt against the Austrian Imperial Government. Mr. Mann proceeded to Vienna, where he found the revolution practically quelled, and therefore did not visit Hungary. The text of his instructions, however, was made public in 1850 when President Taylor released it to the U.S. Senate in response to a Senate resolution. The Austrian chargé d'affaires in Washington, Mr. Hulsemann, then entered an official protest, declaring:

Those who did not hesitate to assume the responsibility of sending Mr. Dudley Mann on such an errand, should, independent of considerations of propriety, have borne in mind that they were exposing their emissary to be treated as a spy. It is to be regretted that the American Government was not better informed as to the actual resources of Austria and her historical perseverance in defending her just rights . . . the Imperial Government totally disapproves, and will always continue to disapprove, of those proceedings, so offensive to the laws of propriety; and that it protests against all interference in the internal affairs of its Government.

Mr. Webster, by now again Secretary, replied:

. . . the American Government sought for nothing but the truth; it desired to learn the facts through a reliable channel. It so happened, in the chances and vicissitudes of human affairs, that the result was adverse to the Hungarian revolution. The American agent, as was stated in his instructions to be not unlikely, found the

<sup>7</sup>The texts of the early diplomatic communications regarding the Caroline affair and the McLeod case can be found in the report on *People v. McLeod*, 25 Wend 482 (N.Y. 1841). Others can be found in British and Foreign State Papers 1841-1842, volume 30. 2 Moore 24 (1906) contains a complete summary of the affair. So does "The Caroline and McLeod Cases" by P. Y. Jennings, appearing in 32 Am. Jr. Int. Law 82 (1938). The latter also contains information on the aftermath of the case in which McLeod sought reimbursement from a Claims Commission. A learned critique by Judge Talmadge of the decision in *People v. McLeod* is found in 26 Wend Appendix 663 (N.Y. 1842). Textbooks such as BISHOP p. 584 (1953) and 1 HYDE 239 (2d Edition 1931) give summaries of the affair.

condition of Hungarian affairs less prosperous than it had been, or had been believed to be. He did not enter Hungary nor hold any direct communication with her revolutionary leaders. He reported against the recognition of her independence because he found she had been unable to set up a firm and stable government. He carefully forebore, as his instructions require, to give publicity to his mission, and the undersigned supposes that the Austrian Government first learned its existence from the communications of the President to the Senate.

Mr. Hulsemann will observe from this statement that Mr. Mann's mission was wholly unobjectionable, and strictly within the rule of the law of nations, and the duty of the United States as a neutral power. He will accordingly feel how little foundation there is for his remark that "those who did not hesitate to assume the responsibility of sending Mr. Dudley Mann on such an errand, should, independent of considerations of propriety, have borne in mind that they were exposing their emissary to be treated as a spy." A spy is a person sent by one belligerent to gain secret information of the forces and defenses of the other, to be used for hostile purposes. According to practice, he may use deception, under the penalty of being lawfully hanged if detected. To give this odious name and character to a confidential agent of a neutral power, bearing the commission of his country, and sent for a purpose fully warranted by the law of nations, is not only to abuse language, but also to confound all just ideas, and to announce the wildest and most extravagant notions, such as certainly were not to have been expected in a grave diplomatic paper; and the President directs the undersigned to say to Mr. Hulsemann that the American Government would regard such an imputation upon it by the cabinet of Austria, as that it employs spies, and that in a quarrel none of its own, as distinctly offensive, if it did not presume, as it is willing to presume, that the word used in the original German was not of equivalent meaning with "spy" in the English language, or that in some other way the employment of such an opprobrious term may be explained. Had the Imperial Government of Austria subjected Mr. Mann to the treatment of a spy, it would have placed itself without the pale of civilization, and the cabinet of Vienna may be assured that if it had carried, or attempted to carry, any such lawless purpose into effect in the case of an authorized agent of this Government the spirit of the people of this country would have demanded immediate hostilities to be waged by the utmost exertion of the power of the Republic—military and naval.<sup>8</sup>

*German Saboteur*

Werner Horn, a German, was indicted in the Federal District of Massachusetts for unlawfully transporting explosives early in World War I from New York to Vanceboro, Maine.

<sup>8</sup> 1 Moore 218 (1906)

Horn claimed immunity from trial upon the indictment in a petition for habeas corpus. His contention, which the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit called "without precedent," was as follows:

That your petitioner is an officer in the army of the empire of Germany, to wit, a first lieutenant in the division of the aforesaid army known as the Landwehr; that a state of war exists between the empires of Great Britain and Germany, which state of war has been recognized by the President of the United States in an official proclamation; that your petitioner is accused of destroying part of the international bridge in the township of McAdam, province of New Brunswick and Dominion of Canada; that he is now held in custody by the respondent on the charge of carrying explosives illegally, which allegation, if true, is inseparably connected with the destruction of said bridge; that he is a subject and citizen of the empire of Germany and domiciled therein, and is being held in custody for the aforesaid act, which was done under his right, title, authority, privilege, protection, and exemption claimed under his commission as said officer as described aforesaid.

Claiming thus that the felony for which he was indicted was incidental to an act of war cognizable only by the law of nations, Horn quoted Webster's statement in the Caroline affair: "That an individual forming part of a public force, and acting under the authority of his government, is not to be held answerable as a private trespasser or malefactor, is a principle of public law sanctioned by the usages of all civilized nations, and which the Government of the United States has no inclination to dispute." The Circuit Court did not dispute the principle, but, noting that "this exemption of the individual is on the ground that his act was a national act of his sovereign," held that the petition failed "entirely to show either express or implied national authority for doing the acts charged in the indictment; therefore no question of international law is involved, and the District Court has full jurisdiction to proceed to trial of the indictment found by its grand jury."<sup>9</sup>

#### *European Cases*

In 1887 the German Government arrested and put on trial one Schnaebeler, a French customs inspector who had operated

<sup>9</sup> Horn v. Mitchell, 232 F. 819 (1st Cir., 1916). Affirmed on other grounds 243 US 247 (1917).

a network of secret agents in Germany. The arrest was made during an official visit he paid to Germany to hold a customs conference. In the course of his interrogation he admitted that he had been inciting German nationals to treason. The French Government intervened on the grounds that Schnaebele enjoyed extraterritorial protection during his visit to Germany. These grounds, which obviated any need for French acknowledgment of his commission as a subversive agent, were apparently considered sufficient: Bismarck ordered Schnaebele released.<sup>10</sup>

In the 1920's the Italian secret service, using Italian agents in Switzerland, lured one Cesare Rossi from his Swiss hotel room to the Italian enclave at Campione, where he was arrested and taken to Italy. The Swiss Government protested these "acts attributable to the authorities of another state" which "not only violate national dignity but which also cause a state of unrest and suspicion . . ." It is not known whether the Italian authorities acknowledged such an attribution of their agents' acts in the diplomatic talks which followed, but the affair was settled in de facto accordance with the principle of agent impunity: on 21 November 1928 the Swiss Government announced that it considered the matter closed, since the Italian official involved in illegal intelligence activities had left Switzerland and two Italian nationals who had illegally relayed information had been deported.<sup>11</sup>

In Sweden there is apparently a trend toward the rule that if an apprehended agent is acknowledged by his government to have been acting under orders he cannot be brought to trial in the apprehending country; his illegal acts become a matter for diplomatic discussion between the two governments. A case since World War II on which details are not available was disposed of in this way by a Swedish court.<sup>12</sup>

#### *War and "Imperfect" War*

None of these cases offers a precise precedent for one in which a peacetime espionage agent is apprehended by the target country and then released to his government upon its

<sup>10</sup> Johannes Erasmus, *The Intelligence Service* (Institute of International Law, Goettingen University, 1952), p. 55.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54.

<sup>12</sup> Believed to be documented in Rytt Juidiskt Arkiv No. 15, 1946.

acknowledgment of his commission. In those that are otherwise quite close, war is an element in the circumstances, with the offended nation often a third party. Webster's final note on the Caroline affair specifically cited *ius belli*. The blamelessness of the mere instruments of a government waging however unjust a war is well recognized. Vattel wrote:

But as to the reparation of any damage—are the military, the general officers and soldiers, obliged, in consequence, to repair the injuries they have done, not of their own will, but as instruments in the hands of their sovereign? It is the duty of subjects to suppose the orders of their sovereign just and wise . . . When, therefore, they have lent their assistance in a war which is afterwards found to be unjust, the sovereign alone is guilty. He alone is bound to repair the injuries. The subjects, and in particular the military, are innocent; they have acted only from a necessary obedience.<sup>13</sup>

Yet there appears to be a similarity between the wartime situation in which a uniformed member of a force gathering information behind enemy lines, when captured, is treated as a prisoner of war rather than executed for spying and the peacetime situation of an intelligence agent whose acts are acknowledged and adopted by the sending state. In both the agent is a mere instrument of the state. The basis for the traditional practice of holding the agent personally responsible seems to be the clandestine nature of his acts. When these are adopted by the sending state they are no longer clandestine, and the ultimate responsibility is fixed.

As for *ius belli*, texts on international law recognize that no clean-cut distinction can be made between war and peace in this respect. A contemporary authority cites some of the older texts for the proposition that:

If a country feels that it is being threatened by the unlawful conduct of another country—such as perhaps by preparations for aggression—that country should be free to protect itself against such a threat with the help of defensive measures. This includes the employment of agents for the purpose of determining enemy intentions.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> 3 Vattel, Section 187.

<sup>14</sup> Erasmus, *op. cit.*, p. 115, footnote 120, citing Heffter-Geffeken (p. 495), Venselow (p. 227), Vattel (pp. 598 and 607), and Rogge, *Nationale Friedens-Politik* (p. 596).



The older texts point out various types of hostile acts short of formal war that a sovereign might commission his subjects to perform.<sup>15</sup> Judge Rutherford says:

If one nation seizes the goods of another nation by force, upon account of some damage, etc., such contentions by force are reprisals. There may be likewise other acts of hostility between two nations which do not properly come under the name of reprisals, such as the besieging of each other's towns, or the sinking of each other's fleets, whilst the nations in other respects are at peace with each other. These are public wars, because nations are the contending parties. But as they are confined to some particular object, they are of the imperfect sort . . .<sup>16</sup>

Vattel commented that:

A war lawful and in form, is carefully to be distinguished from an unlawful war entered on without any form, or rather from those incursions which are committed either without lawful authority or apparent cause, as likewise without formalities, and only for havoc and pillage.<sup>17</sup>

He indicated that all hostile acts were lawful wars, if made with lawful authority and apparent cause, and "not for pillage and havoc." This rule had its application in admiralty cases. Justice Story stated:

Every hostile attack of a piratical nature in times of peace, is not necessarily piratical. It may be by mistake, or in necessary self-defense, or to repel a supposed meditated attack by pirates—it may be justifiable, and then no blame attaches to the act; or, it may be without just excuse, and then it carries responsibility in damages. If it proceed further; if it be an attack from revenge and malignity, from gross abuse of power and settled purpose of mischief, it then assumes the character of a private unauthorized war, and may be punished by all the penalties which the law of nations can properly administer.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Judge Talmadge discusses this point in his learned critique of the decision in *People v. McLeod*, cited in footnote 7 above.

<sup>16</sup> 2 Rutherford, Section 10, as cited in 26 Wend Appendix 663 (NY 1842).

<sup>17</sup> 3 Vattel, Section 67.

<sup>18</sup> *The Marianna Flora. The Vice-Consul of Portugal, Claimant.* 24 US (11 Wheat. 1, 41) 1 (1826) ; 6 L. Ed. 405, 414.

These texts, therefore, in enunciating the principle of personal impunity, are not speaking of war only in terms of formal declared war, but including also hostile acts when otherwise peaceful conditions exist. As Rutherford points out:

In the less solemn kinds of war, what the members do who act under the particular direction and authority of their nation, is by the law of nations no personal crime in them; they cannot, therefore, be punished consistently with the law, for any act in which it considers them only as the instruments, and the nation as the agent.<sup>19</sup>

A principle of international law which emerges from a study of the older texts might then be stated as follows. *Where an individual, under orders from his sovereign, commits a hostile act upon a foreign nation, this cannot be said to be a controversy between individuals, to be decided by a court under domestic law where there is a common judge and arbiter. This is a controversy between nations, who admit no judge except themselves.* While this rule arose during periods of historical development when concepts of hostilities and relations between nations were much more rudimentary than at present, the basic problems of the rights and responsibilities of nations were similar to what they are now. This principle has been recognized by the United States since the early days of the Republic. The third Attorney General of the United States, writing to the Secretary of State on 29 December 1797, declared:

It is well settled in the United States as in Great Britain, that a person acting under a commission from the sovereign of a foreign nation is not amenable for what he does in pursuance of his commission to any judiciary tribunal of the United States.<sup>20</sup>

#### *Broader Considerations*

We have not attempted in this discussion to take into account the broader implications of general international acceptance of a rule of law that the state is responsible for all the acts of a subject carried out pursuant to orders of the sovereign. It can easily be seen that a nation might demand

<sup>19</sup> 2 Rutherford, Section 18, as cited in 26 Wend Appendix 663 (NY 1842).

<sup>20</sup> Quoted in 26 Wend Appendix 663 (NY 1842).

limitations placed on the rule, and in many cases a nation might totally reject the rule for its purposes. Questions such as the following would have to be pondered by all nations. Could a murder committed pursuant to orders by an agent of a foreign nation be permitted to go unpunished if the foreign nation demanded his return? What would be the implications for a small nation if a strong nation flooded the country with illegal espionage agents acting under orders, and upon capture made a request for their return? Would war or the threat of war as an alternative to punishment act as a deterrent on the use of authorized confidential agents collecting information from foreign countries?

Some of these questions have been raised in the past and have moved many writers not to recognize the right of a sovereign to expect the return of an agent who pursuant to orders has committed an offense against another sovereign. We have not attempted to present here the opposing viewpoint of these writers or to discuss the limitations on the rule of personal impunity as it appears in international law. The purpose of this paper has been simply to explore the precedents and authorities in international law to determine if there is any basis for the proposition that a government has the right to the return of one of its officers who has been apprehended abroad for criminal acts committed pursuant to its orders. There is such a basis.

*A wistful wartime offering from pigeon fanciers, accepted with indulgence by Allied intelligence, is vindicated by the enemy.*

## OPERATION COLUMBA

T. J. Betts

In early March 1944, when SHAEF staff in London was beginning to go all out with preparations for the June invasion of Normandy, we in G-2 were approached by a group of British pigeon fanciers determined to volunteer to intelligence the services of their pigeons. Their argument was simple: they bred carrier pigeons which were guaranteed to return to their owners' lofts; could we not use these birds in some way to bring information back from Europe?

Actually, carrier pigeons were already being used quite successfully as a link between the French Resistance and various intelligence headquarters in London. They had proved effective and valuable in supplementing the overtaxed and precarious radio links that were so hard to establish and so easy to blow. Thus the pigeon fanciers' idea was not novel. But we did not see how birds that would return to lofts scattered all over England would fit into systematic communication with resistance or espionage operations: checking up on our messages would keep us paging pigeons from one end of the UK to the other.

The best idea we could conjure up was a scatter-shot project. It was known that northwest France, Belgium, and Holland formed a region that was saturated with pigeon breeders. There might be some prospect of results if we dropped the offered pigeons by parachute at random in that region. They would be packaged in neatly crated pairs with an attached letter saying in effect: *These birds if released will return to England. If you are a pigeon breeder, hold them until you or your friends have something to tell us. If you don't keep pigeons, give them to someone who does and let him take it from there.* From the counterintelligence viewpoint the pro-

posal seemed very safe, since carrier pigeons do not possess national characteristics, are resistant to interrogation, and once in a loft would be indistinguishable from local birds. The real question was whether any substantial number of recipients would have anything of significance to tell us.

*Light Risk, Low Stakes, Little Return*

As we weighed the potential of such an operation, we came more and more seriously to doubt that, while safe, relatively simple, and very cheap to mount in terms of energy expended, it would pay off at all appreciably in terms of information received. In other words, it came to a balance but the weights on each side of the scale were so slight that the whole thing looked insignificant. The project might therefore have been turned down but for the deciding weight cast in by the attitude of the pigeon fanciers. They were earnest, decent people, and their pigeons obviously represented their greatest treasure in a grim, war-torn world. They all tended to be thin; we suspected that they were sharing their scanty rations with their birds. Above all, we were conscious that they were seeking to give up their most dearly loved possessions in the Allied cause. You just can't say no to a high sacrifice offered in the hope that it will help. And it might pay off, after all: surprise jackpots had been hit in the past. So we adopted the scheme, dubbed, naturally, in a staff thickly laced with University dons, "Operation Columba."

The work-up of the plan was uncomplicated. The pigeon men provided neat standard travelling cases, each adapted to and containing two feathered tenants. The parachute designers, accustomed now to delivering anything by air from a jeep to the *Daily Mail*, quickly whipped up the necessary gear. The American and British Air Forces agreed without demur to drop our birds in the course of their regular night operations. G-2 contributed the letter, printed in French, Flemish, and Dutch, that was to find the pigeons friends and homes on the other side of the Channel.

Only two snags appeared. One was of apprehension. While the Air Force commanders and their staffs had been very cooperative, we were morally sure that opposition would spring up eventually at the pilot level. It was quite true that the operation involved no additional danger; the planes would drop

the birds from normal flight altitudes and without having to pinpoint their targets. Nevertheless we could understand the natural feelings of the pilot who, keyed up to his best to deliver a massive load of destruction at great personal risk, would find himself sidetracked en route by Operation Columba. It was too much like stopping off at the supermarket on the way to your wedding. We knew, before the first pair of pigeons was dropped, that we could soon expect ungracious references to what might euphemistically be rendered "those *fluttering* birds." We realized thoroughly that a long life for Columba depended on getting early results.

The second hazard was brought out by the pigeon fanciers themselves. They told us something that most of us had never known and that had not greatly impressed those who at one time or another had had cognizance of it. It seemed that total war had included pigeon warfare earlier. When Britain had braced to meet invasion in 1940, fears had arisen that enemy agents in England might be using carrier pigeons as a means of secret communication with the Continent. As part of the counterespionage campaign it had therefore been decided to ban destruction of the predatory hawks, falcons, and kestrels nesting in the chalk cliffs along England's east coast. Now our men pointed out that the predators would not discriminate between patriotic British pigeons and treacherous Axis birds; please then would we have these enemies of the pigeon restored to their true status as vermin. Grumbles arose in G-2: was this a pro-intelligence or an anti-hawk project? Nevertheless we went ahead and had the predators declared free game. This wrapped up the operation, and in about a week after it had come to our attention the first pigeons were dropped behind enemy lines.

A week went by without a reaction. Then a second. Then a third. Comments on "those *fluttering* birds" began to bubble up to us through the chain of command. We also began to harden ourselves for the task of telling the pigeon men that their patriotism, devotion, and sacrifice had come to nothing. Then in the fourth week a delegation of the pigeon fanciers came up to see us. A bird, one bird, had returned! It had brought back a message. The message, to the effect that there were "lots of Germans around Lier," was however hardly news.

While not substantively helpful, the return provided some encouragement; at least it would stave off the day of reckoning with our pigeoneers. We reported the good news to the Air Forces, possibly with a little exaggeration of the information's importance, and asked for Columba's continuation. The airmen loyally obliged.

This general sequence was repeated as the pattern of the whole operation until it came to its natural end with the Normandy invasion. Every two weeks or so, just as our hope for the pigeons was at the vanishing point, in would come another vague, unenlightening message. In all, after the dispatch of hundreds of birds, five or six responses were recorded. None of them had material intelligence value.

*Modest Jackpot by Accident*

But that was not the whole story. As the pigeon dropping went on, we began to get indications of uneasiness among the German military government people in the Low Countries. They had picked up, of course, a few parachuted crates and so become aware of Operation Columba almost from its first implementation. They could not have been very anxious about it as an Allied source of information, but apparently they became outraged at their inability to control this physical penetration of their defenses. From underground sources we received reports of enemy fumings and proclamations, the latter ranging from paternal and advisory to minatory and vindictive.

Pigeon fanciers were warned against harboring strange birds. They were threatened with liquidation of their cotes in the event of detection. Later they were told that harboring of alien pigeons was espionage and carried with it the penalty of death by shooting. No one, apparently, was ever shot for this offense, nor so far as we could find out were any lofts destroyed (although healthy apprehensions may well have hastened some of the birds, stringy as they were, into the pot rather than into the cote). Our original calculation that there is nothing self-betraying about a pigeon in a loft seems to have held up: the Germans' intentions were probably lethal enough, but they just never caught anybody.

All this sound and fury, however, did have a fine subversive effect on the pigeon fanciers and their friends. These people,

as we had already noted among their British colleagues, felt that a man's inalienable right to the pigeons of his choice was subject to no question. The stronger the German reaction, the more the pigeon men lined up with the Resistance. And as they perceived that the enemy was unable to identify violators and reluctant to resort to mass reprisals over such ridiculous things as pigeons, the curve of local effrontery and rebelliousness shot up. The whole affair became cumulative, and what had started out as a dubious intelligence operation developed into a serious contribution to the build-up of resistance.

Nor was even this all, we discovered after reentry into the Continent. As a matter of routine we had cleared Operation Columba in advance with the deception specialists. They had given us an almost perfunctory response to the effect that from their point of view they saw no harmful implications in the undertaking. But the Germans found implications. After they had picked up a few baskets of parachuted birds, their intelligence began a systematic plotting of the points of impact. It was not long before they could conclude that the drops were all falling north of the Somme River and the historic Amiens-Abbeville line. Now why was this? they asked themselves, and gave themselves a pregnant answer.

They might have reconstructed our thought that the pigeon-rich lowlands formed the safest and most logical area for the random dropping of carrier birds. But no; to them it was abundantly clear that this was only one more symptom of Allied interest in the Strait of Dover at its narrowest. Clearly we would try to cross the water hazard near Calais, just as any systematic professionals would, including themselves. They could not have regarded the pigeon-drop locations as primary evidence, but they came to accord them distinct value in confirmation of a theory that was already pretty well established. Thus Operation Columba made a small but significant unplanned contribution to the deception scheme that masked the Allies' intent to land in Normandy, well to the south and across the Seine from the Pas de Calais.

To sum up, then, this operation, undertaken as an inconsequential gamble with little expectation of returns was an intelligence failure; but



a definite plus in contributing to the saturation of local enemy counterintelligence faculties and in building up opposition and resistance to the Germans; and a significant though minor element in the Allies' deception scheme.

*Reflections*

This story of an intelligence failure, attended in its planning and execution by doubts and annoyances, has in retrospect the virtue of being gently amusing. But if the debris is looked over dispassionately, certain typical and permanent values can also be found in it.

Columba was launched primarily in order to take some advantage of unused resources. Many, if not most, intelligence operations are similarly undertaken in terms of the means available rather than of the ends sought. The happy picture of the unerring intelligence officer laying out his essential elements of enemy information and then devising foolproof means to check them out is a much idealized depiction of the state of the art.

Operation Columba was very much like trying to catch minnows with a salmon net: the shiners all got away. Unfortunately most intelligence operations have this shortcoming in greater or less degree, because the devising and creation of intelligence means is usually a slow and rigid process. Either you have to tailor a particular activity to one precise end, a process which is expensive and time-consuming, or you have to resort to a standardized procedure that never quite fits the precise needs of the moment.

No intelligence operation is an island. In the case of Columba we owed our plusses in subversion and deception to this fact. It is equally easy to damage or blow another operation by the execution of a project that in itself is sound, safe, and reasonable. The danger zone, of course, extends beyond the area of intelligence: the adversary can often derive material profits from intelligence operations which we have effectively executed but which nevertheless give him leverages—military, economic, or political. The work of the intelligence planner is not done until he answers satisfactorily both questions: *what happens if I fail?* and *what happens when I succeed?*

All this seems to point toward one major conclusion. If intelligence is a science, as we all hope it is, then it clearly belongs among the social sciences. This is not because its field and findings are often vague, as epitomized in Operation Columbia. It is rather because its ultimate application is to man. We may search for statistics, for technical and technological characteristics, for the existence and capacities of such things as roads and bridges, but in the last analysis we are always trying to find out what some men are going to do with these data and these means. We may be forced to analyze all capabilities, but each such analysis is also a tacit confession that we are unable to work out exactly what the other fellow is doing or plans to do.

This is not to be construed as an assertion that precision is alien to intelligence. Fuzzy problems are usually those that demand the most rigorous approach. Thus the sociologists, like ourselves, have continual recourse to the electronic computer. Thus the economists, like ourselves, resort to the theory of games and other advanced studies in probabilities. Intelligence is indeed a product of disciplined and precise thought; but its techniques, mechanisms, and occasional incantations should not blind us to the fact that its ultimate objective is the searching penetration of the mind of man.

*Clandestine methods of the Jesuits in Elizabethan England as illustrated in an operative's own classic account.*

## ENGLISH MISSION

It is generally realized that the Jesuits of the renaissance were adept in the conduct of affairs requiring secrecy. But knowledge of the clandestine methods they used is not general, even among intelligence officers whose experience would give them a special appreciation of the subject. Considerable insight into these methods is offered in a priest's own narrative of his experiences operating underground in Elizabethan England. Written in Latin after his mission was completed, the book was made accessible to modern English readers ten years ago.<sup>1</sup> Its highlights can be quickly summarized.

In early November 1588, John Gerard, S. J., aged 24, acting under the direction of the Rome headquarters of the Society of Jesus, made with three other priests of the Society a clandestine entry into his native country. It was only a few months after the defeat of the Spanish Armada, and the Queen's security agents were alert for strangers even in remote provinces. Landed near Norfolk in the dark of night, they found that every path they tried led to a farm house where dogs set up an alarm. They had to hide in a clump of trees and wait in the rain for daylight. At dawn each went his own way, according to immemorial usage in such circumstances.

Gerard's story describes, step by step, how he found Catholics to shelter him and enable him to reach London, where he reported to Fr. Garnet, the Superior on the English Mission, to begin his 18 years of undercover duty in England. Captured in 1594 and imprisoned for four years, he made a famous escape from the Tower of London and successfully resumed his clandestine activity. It was not until the exposure of the Gunpowder Plot in 1605, which brought down upon

<sup>1</sup> John Gerard, *The Autobiography of an Elizabethan*, translated from the Latin by Philip Caraman. (Longmans, Green and Co., 1951.)

the Jesuits the full crushing force of an aroused State and made the extermination of priests seem inevitable, that he was exfiltrated under diplomatic cover in the entourage of the Spanish Ambassador.

Gerard apparently put his story into writing for the guidance and benefit of trainees at a training and staging area in Belgium. Later he became Confessor to the English College in Rome, where he died at the age of 73. A study of his experiences, even at this remove in time, shows the primal and inevitable nature of certain methods required for successful clandestine action. Above all, it shows the ruling power of motivation. To see these fundamentals demonstrated in an unfamiliar cultural context renews one's sense of their force.

#### *Tradecraft*

Organization and line of authority in the Society were not complicated. The commanding officer was the General of the Society of Jesus, at Rome. Staff-wise, English affairs were taken care of on behalf of the General by Father Persons, an English Jesuit at headquarters. In the English College at Rome English recruits were trained for duty in their native country. The Superior on the English Mission resided under cover in England and reported directly to the General. Communications were maintained by means of couriers over whom a high degree of control was exercised through religious sanctions.

Although Gerard's book is not in any modern sense a tradecraft manual, it is possible to derive from it a confident sense of how he and his Superior made expert use of the standard paraphernalia of covert action—cover, aliases, safe houses, secret printing presses, invisible ink.

Gerard, having been brought up a member of the upper class, was able to maintain successfully the cover of a gentleman at leisure. He was the object of the candid envy of other priests because he was familiar with the technical language of falconry—a useful resource in idle conversation with laymen. He was a tall, dark man, "very gallant in apparel, and being attended with two men and footboy is exceedingly well horsed." When visiting the sick, he amended his cover to that of a doctor.

The construction of hiding places, or what the security police called "priest holes," became a matter for experts. The skill of these "hides" specialists is shown in the fact that after a raid on a safe house or on a large manor house, followed by a close search lasting over a week, priests sometimes emerged faint and tottering from hideouts concealed between walls, under gables, or beneath fireplaces. An especially skilled carpenter called Little John died mute under torture rather than reveal the whereabouts of the hides he admitted having constructed.

On occasion it became necessary to provide clandestine burials for priests who had died on the English Mission. These were effected at night near a deserted monastery or ruined abbey.

Funds were obtained from the laity. Members of certain great Catholic families poured money into Gerard's coffers; he seems never to have lacked in this regard. He remarks on the expense of the various houses it was necessary for him and his Superior to maintain in London and in the country. He was able to offer annuities to persons in a position to facilitate the accomplishment of his mission: he granted a liberal one to a prison warder who had been of some service to him in the Tower.

Specialists in audiosurveillance and interrogation may note with particular interest the incident of a warder who, feigning friendship for an imprisoned priest, offered to show him how he might talk secretly "through a cleft in the wall" with the priest in an adjoining cell. The place was "purposely so contrived that the sound of their words must needs be carried to another place, not far off, where this keeper would stand and some other with him, to have a double witness in their double hearing."

The Jesuits themselves appear to have made use of counter-intelligence deception. After Gerard's escape from the Tower, the Government received a false report that he was about to go to Ireland. "Gerard hath been lately in London, and hath disguised himself with an artificial beard and periwig of a brown color, somewhat dark. His beard is very long, cut after the spade fashion, very even and formal." (When

an Elizabethan spoke of a "very long" beard, he *meant* long, upwards of two feet.)

*Prison*

Gerard's basic instructions forbade him to meddle in political matters, and he professed loyalty to the Queen and to England. The question of whether a Catholic priest could be loyal to a Protestant government was the subject of much English dialectic, entailing as it did an ambiguity which the State found it increasingly difficult to live with. It was only after the discovery of the Gunpowder Plot, however, that the ambiguity became intolerable;<sup>2</sup> at the time of Gerard's arrest in the spring of 1594 the temper was still in some respects relaxed. Moreover, Gerard's connections with those in high places were good.

Refusing to disclose any information that would help the authorities in arresting others on the English Mission, he spent three years confined with other priests and Catholic laymen in the Clink, where the guards grew fat on regular bribes. In return for these payments the inmates were allowed facilities for saying mass, hearing confession, and receiving visitors. Needless to say, it was not money alone that made this possible; there was considerable popular feeling in favor of the old church. During this time in the Clink, and later in the Tower itself, Gerard successfully maintained clandestine correspondence with his Superior and others, including the "saintly and martyred widow" who kept his safe house, which was used even during his imprisonment to shelter young recruits for the English College until passage to the Continent could be arranged.

He continued operating thus under relatively slight handicaps until a certain priest who seemed "a little unsteady" and perhaps jealous of "all the people he saw coming to me" turned informer and told the authorities that Gerard received letters in the Clink from Rome and Brussels. "Two of the

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<sup>2</sup> The atmosphere created by uncertainty as to what was treasonable is indicated in a passage from John Donne, who had a Catholic background and delayed for years his commitment to the Church of England. Donne is calling down a curse upon an enemy:

"May he dream of treason, and think to do it, and confess, and die,  
And no record tell why."

Queen's pursuivants came without warning to my room with the head warder. Providentially they found no one with me except two boys—I was giving them instructions before sending them abroad." They found nothing but a hair shirt under Gerard's doublet, but he was taken to the Tower of London for safer keeping. His new warder went to the Clink to fetch a mattress from Gerard's friends and returned with money and instructions to treat him well.

Three days later, however, before the Lords Commissioners,<sup>3</sup> when Gerard refused to disclose details relative to his foreign correspondence or the whereabouts of his Superior, a warrant for putting him to torture was produced. The Lords Commissioners begged him not to force them to such a loathsome measure. These formalities over, he was hung from his wrists, his feet dangling, for about 5 hours. This was to be repeated daily until he either confessed or died. The Commissioners left the room after it became apparent he would not speak.

He was eventually helped back to his cell.

On the way we met some prisoners who had the run of the Tower, and I turned to speak to my warder, intending them to overhear.

"What surprises me," I said, "is that the Commissioners want me to say where Father Garnet's house is . . . I will never do it, even if I have to die!"

I said this to prevent them spreading a report that I had confessed. I also wanted word to get around through these men that it was chiefly concerning Father Garnet that I had been questioned, so that he might get to hear and look to his own safety. The warder was not pleased at my talking in their hearing.

The message got through to Father Garnet. In a report to the General of the Society, written eight weeks later, Garnet says: "He [Gerard] hath been thrice hanged up by his hands until he was almost dead, and that twice in one day. The cause was for to tell where his Superior was . . ."

The authorities did not carry through to the end. Although Gerard was rendered physically helpless for a time, he seems to have largely recovered in the following months.

<sup>3</sup> Edward Coke and Francis Bacon were among them.

He resumed his usual cell life, performing the Society's discipline, known as the Spiritual Exercises, and conducting his clandestine correspondence. He explains in some detail that he used orange juice instead of lemon or citron for invisible ink because once orange juice has been brought out with heat it stays out, whereas the other two fade away. Consequently the recipient of a letter written in orange juice will know whether or not it has been read. "If it has been read and contains something that compromises him, he can disown it." As a matter of routine, he never used true names in his letters.

#### *Escape*

Gerard's escape from the Tower exhibits good planning, teamwork, and a variety of clandestine techniques. In a small tower nearby there was a Catholic layman, John Arden, who had been in prison for ten years under sentence of death. He walked daily on the roof of his tower and eventually he and Gerard began to communicate by signs. The warder was coaxed and bribed to allow Gerard to visit Arden to say mass. He even sent his wife to get the things necessary for the sacrament from Gerard's assistant, John Lillie, in the city. With mobility thus established, Gerard observed that Arden's tower was quite close to the moat, "and I thought it might be possible for a man to lower himself with a rope from the roof on to the wall beyond the moat." Arden was eager and willing but had no outside help; Gerard had Lillie. He sought the permission of his Superior to make the try, and Father Garnet agreed to it provided the risk of life was not too great.

Then I asked John Lillie and Richard Fulwood (he was attending Father Garnet at the time) whether they were prepared to take the risk, and, if they were, to come on a certain night to the far side of the moat, opposite the squat tower I had described . . . They were to bring a rope with them and tie it to a stake; we would be on the roof of the tower and throw them an iron ball attached to a stout thread, the kind used in stitching up bales. They must listen in the darkness for the sound of the ball touching the ground, find the cord and tie it to the free end of the rope. This done, we would draw up the rope by pulling the other end of the cord which we held in our hands. I told them to pin a piece of white paper or a handkerchief on the front of their jackets, for we wanted to be sure of their identity before throwing the cord. Also, they were to bring a rowing boat so that we could make a quick get-away.



The first attempt aborted because of unwitting intruders on the riverside. On the second attempt, which proceeded as planned, Gerard's physical condition was such that he almost collapsed while clinging to the rope; but it was successful. By daybreak he was with Father Garnet at a safe house in the country. He was careful to make arrangements to protect the illiterate warder of his cell from possible punishment. Although this man had refused a large bribe to let his prisoner walk out, he had for some months been willing to carry letters and to grant what he judged to be harmless favors. In return, Gerard arranged his flight to the house of a friend a hundred miles from London and gave him an annuity of 200 florins a year, which enabled him to live comfortably with his family.

Gerard had eight more years of undercover work in England. He was particularly successful with the old established families in the conservative counties. His physical endowment and social position, combined with his undoubted abilities and the aura of special interest arising from the perils he had endured and still faced, gave him an almost hypnotic influence over certain men and women and insured for his Society a ready source of shelter, hospitality, and money. In the course of his mission he sent at least 30 recruits to the Continent.

He was the only one to survive of the four priests who landed together in 1588. Two were executed in Fleet Street three years later; the third was active for a number of years before he gained, to use the language of the time, the crown of martyrdom. The Superior was executed in the aftermath of the Powder Plot, along with many others with whom he had worked.

#### *Motivation*

The purposes of a clandestine mission are basic to the motivation of its agents. For the Jesuits martyrdom was a glory, and their motivation was rooted in acceptance of this end. Although the ultimate aim of the English Mission, to return Canterbury to Rome, was not achieved, its operatives were regarded as accomplishing the mission when they were able to perform rites for those who otherwise would have been deprived of them, to make converts, to send recruits to the College, and above all to suffer martyrdom.

A lay intelligence service must make do with a motivation less absolute than that afforded by religion. If the cogency of its purposes declines or the achievement of its avowed end becomes remote, it risks making the means the end. Then operations tend to be admired as demonstrations of technique, professionalism may become a fetish, and the mere apparatus of intelligence proliferates as results lose definition. The maintenance of an inspired service depends on the maintenance of an inspired policy for it to serve. In this sense, we get the motivation we deserve.

*A selection of the most broadly  
informative books on intelli-  
gence available in English.*

### **PUBLIC TEXTS IN INTELLIGENCE**

Unclassified writings on an activity so well protected from public inquiry as intelligence must necessarily show great deficiencies when assessed as material for professional reading. Some number of the thousands of books published in this field have professional value, to be sure, but many of these are devoted to recording the story of particular individuals or isolated episodes rather than to a study of the nature or the history of intelligence. The following bibliography has been selected from among books available in English that are the most broadly illuminating or at least serve to fill important gaps in the picture. Whether viewed as a symposium on intelligence methods or as a composite history of intelligence they are at many points grossly inadequate, but they do offer matter that should be part of the intelligence officer's basic equipment.

The selections fall into the following categories:

The Intelligence Process—theory, procedure, organization

Operational History:

From the earliest times up to World War II

Activities of the Western Allies in World War II

Organized resistance under the Nazis

German intelligence in World War II

The Soviet Services

Evading Capture and Escape from Imprisonment

#### **THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS— Theory, Procedure, Organization**

*Ladislav Farago, WAR OF WITS: The Anatomy of Espionage and Intelligence. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls. 1954. Pp. 379.)*

The only comprehensive unclassified essay covering both the organization and procedures of world intelligence agencies and their activities in the espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and propaganda fields. Marred by theoretical crudities, factual inaccuracies, and uncritical

journalism, it nevertheless is useful as a composite of the most important information on intelligence doctrine publicly available in 1954. With source citations and index.

[Available in translation as *Det Tysta Kriget* (Stockholm: Ljus Forlag, 1956), and *Les Secrets de l'Espionnage* (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1955)]

*Sherman Kent*, STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE for American World Policy. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1949. Pp. 226.)

Foresighted early work on the theory and ideal operation of national intelligence production, by the present Chairman of the Board of National Estimates. Lays down many principles which have since become established in practice.

[Available in translation as *Inteligencia Estratégica para la Política Mundial Norteamericana* (Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar, Biblioteca del Oficial, 1951), and in pirated Japanese and Chinese editions]

*Harry Howe Ransom*, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1958. Pp. 287.)

The best current account of the development, organization, and problems of the U.S. intelligence system, with particular attention to the production of national estimates. Includes a valuable bibliography.

*Roger Hilsman*, STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL DECISIONS. (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. 1956. Pp. 187.)

An academic study of the theory of intelligence, with emphasis on its relation to policy. Valuable for its provocative thesis that policy is likely to go its own way in disregard of intelligence, while intelligence tends to turn scholar, gathering and piecing together facts for their own sake. The author has recently become director of State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

*Washington Platt*, STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1957. Pp. 302.)

A study of intelligence production from the perspective of the working analyst, with an emphasis on useful tools and methods which makes it tend to treat social science methodology as something peculiar to intelligence. The author had experience in combat intelligence during World War II and in intelligence production thereafter.

*Don Whitehead*, THE FBI STORY: A Report to the People. (New York: Random House. 1956. Pp. 368.)

A laudatory account of FBI operations, both anticriminal and in the maintenance of internal security.

[Available in the following foreign editions: *The FBI Story* (London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1957); *Le F.B.I.* (Paris: Morgan, 1957); *Le Storia dello FBI* (Milan: Sugar Editore, 1958); *Historia del F.B.I.* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sopena, 1958)]

*U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government*, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: A Report to the Congress. (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1955. Pp. 76.)

The unclassified report of the intelligence task force of the second Hoover Commission, under the chairmanship of General Mark W. Clark. Considers problems of intelligence at the national and departmental levels, including those of personnel and security administration and functional organization.

[Also published as House Document No. 201, 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955]

## OPERATIONAL HISTORY

### Through World War I

*Richard Wilmer Rowan*, THE STORY OF SECRET SERVICE. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran. 1937. Pp. 732.)

The best comprehensive history of espionage and its practitioners from Bible days to the end of World War I. Often sketchy and sometimes overdramatized, the treatment is generally sound and at its best illuminated by perceptive reflections on the ways of human kind.

[Also available in a British edition, *The Story of Secret Service* (London: John Miles Ltd., 1938) ]

*John Bakeless*, TURNCOATS, TRAITORS AND HEROES. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott. 1959. Pp. 406.)

The most nearly complete account of espionage in the American Revolution, covering—in an impossible attempt at encyclopedic narrative—both sides' activities on the American continent. The author has had extensive military intelligence experience.

*Phillp Van Doren Stern*, SECRET MISSIONS OF THE CIVIL WAR. (New York: Rand McNally. 1959. Pp. 320.)

Integrated and annotated anthology of the best accounts of clandestine operations undertaken by both North and South during the American Civil War.

Admiral Sir *William James*, THE CODE BREAKERS OF ROOM 40: The Story of Admiral Sir William Hall, Genius of British Counter-Intelligence. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1956. Pp. 212.)

Biography of Britain's Director of Naval Intelligence during World War I, by the officer in charge of communications intelligence. Centers on the decipherment of German messages, including the notorious Zimmermann telegram.

[Published in Great Britain under the title *The Eyes of the Navy* (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1956). For other reading on this subject, see Chapter IX, "Secret Intelligence—1917-1919," in *The Sky Was Always Blue*, by Admiral Sir William James (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1951); *The Man of Room 40*, by A. W. Ewing (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1940);

**Basic Texts**

40 O.B., by Hugh Cleland Hoy (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1932); and *The Zimmermann Telegram*, by Barbara W. Tuckman (New York: Viking, 1958) ]

*Herbert Osborn Yardley*, THE AMERICAN BLACK CHAMBER. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1931. Pp. 375.)

Querulous history of the first modern U.S. organization for communications intelligence, by its founder and director during World War I and through the twenties.

[Available in the following foreign editions: *Secret Service in America* (London: Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1940); *Le Cabinet Noir Américain* (Paris: Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Critique, 1935); *Amerikas Svarta Kammar* (Stockholm: Tidens Forlag, 1938) ]

**The Western Allies in World War II**

*Constance Babington-Smith*, AIR SPY: The Story of Photo Intelligence in World War II. (New York: Harper. 1957. Pp. 266.)

Description by a leading RAF photo interpreter of the development of photo intelligence techniques first by British and then by Allied personnel and their use in the European theater. Shows the role of air photography in planning the D-Day landings, in bombing and damage assessment, in industrial analysis, and in learning the secrets of German countermeasures, radar, and the new "V" weapons.

[Published in Great Britain under the title *Evidence in Camera* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1958) ]

*Ewen Edward Samuel Montagu*, THE MAN WHO NEVER WAS. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1954. Pp. 160.)

Account of a classic British hoax which misled the Germans about the coming Allied invasion of Sicily. The body of a Marine officer was floated onto a beach in southern Spain with secret documents indicating that Greece would be the point of invasion. Illustrates exemplary intelligence planning with respect to documentation, both personal and official, and estimate of German reactions. The author was in charge of this operation.

[Available in the following foreign editions: *The Man Who Never Was* (London, Evans Brothers, 1953); *De Man Die Niet Bestond* (Utrecht: Uitgeverij Het Spectrum, 1954); *L'Homme Qui N'Existant Pas* (Paris: Juilliard, 1954); *Mies Jota Ei Ollutkaan* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1954). For further study see: Ian Colvin, *The Unknown Courier* (London: William Kimber, 1953); and Sir Alfred Duff Cooper, *Operation Heartbreak* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), a fictionalized version of the operation]

*Richard Collier*, TEN THOUSAND EYES. (New York: E. P. Dutton. 1958. Pp. 320.)

Probably the best English-language account of the Resistance agent networks in France which under the direction of Free French Head-

quarters in London secured information on the beach and inland defenses of Hitler's Atlantic Wall.

[Available in foreign editions: *Ten Thousand Eyes* (London: Collins, 1958); *La Guerre Secrète du Mur de l'Atlantique* (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1958); *Tiendinzend Ogen* (Hoorn: U.-M. "West Friesland," 1958)]

*Philip John Stead*, SECOND BUREAU. (London: Evans Bros., 1959. Pp. 212.)

Wartime history of the regular French military intelligence service, comprising the Deuxième Bureau and its supporting organizations for clandestine collection and counterespionage. Based on French-language accounts and on conversations with many officers of the service, it shows the difficulty experienced in maintaining operations after 1940 in double clandestinity, secret from both the Germans and the Vichy Government.

*Joint Committee of the Congress*, REPORT: Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946. Pp. 580.)

Summarizes the exhaustive congressional hearings on the surprise Japanese blow, details the prior intelligence available, and analyzes the poor coordination displayed in its collection, evaluation, and dissemination.

[For the full text of the congressional hearings see *Hearings Before The Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, Parts 1-39 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945-46)]

*Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden*, SUB ROSA: The O.S.S. and American Espionage. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1946. Pp. 237.)

Fragmentary but authentic examples of OSS clandestine intelligence and paramilitary operations in Europe, Africa, and Asia. The authors were OSS parachutists.

[Available in a Swedish edition: *O. S. S.* (Stockholm: Ljüs, 1947)]

*Elizabeth P. MacDonald*, UNDERCOVER GIRL. New York: MacMillan, 1947. Pp. 305.)

A rather too sprightly feminine travelogue which nevertheless contains in autobiographical form the most detailed information publicly available on OSS operations, especially in black psychological warfare, in the Far East.

Colonel *Allison Ind*, ALLIED INTELLIGENCE BUREAU: Our Secret Weapon in the War against Japan. (New York: David McKay, 1958. Pp. 305.)

Kaleidoscopic scenes from the operations of the clandestine AIB amalgamated from American, British, Australian, and Dutch personnel under General MacArthur's command in the Southwest Pacific. The author, its Deputy Controller, emphasizes the activities of the Australian Coast Watchers concealed on Japanese-held islands, but also devotes

sections to guerrilla and agent activity in the Philippines and to sabotage operations.

[For further reading see Eric A. Feldt, *The Coastwatchers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946; New York: Ballantine Books, 1959) ]

### Resistance under the Nazis

*Maurice James Buckmaster*, **SPECIALLY EMPLOYED: The Story of British Aid to French Patriots of the Resistance.** (London: Batchworth Press. 1952. Pp. 200.)

The work of the French Section of the British Special Operations Executive as described by its chief. Covers the organization of resistance, many aspects of tradecraft, and the operations of a number of individual agents in France.

[For further reading on this subject see Buckmaster's *They Fought Alone* (New York: Norton, 1958; and British editions) ]

*Rémy* (Gilbert Renault-Roulier), **MÉMOIRS OF A SECRET AGENT OF FREE FRANCE.** Vol. 1: *The Silent Company*, June 1940-June 1942. (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1948. Pp. 406.)

The first of Rémy's six volumes on his experiences. Describes his escape from France and his joining the Free French Intelligence Service in London, his trips back to set up an agent net, and his second escape with his family.

[Volume II has also been translated, as *Courage and Fear* (London: Arthur Barker Ltd., 1950). The other four are: *Comment Meurt Un Réseau* (Monte Carlo: Raoul Solar, 1947); *Une Affaire de Trahison* (Monte Carlo: Raoul Solar, 1947); *Les Mains Jointes* (Monte Carlo: Raoul Solar, 1948); . . . *Mais le Temple Est Bâti* (Monte Carlo: Raoul Solar, 1950) ]

*David Lampe*, **THE SAVAGE CANARY: The Story of Resistance in Denmark.** (London: Cassell. 1957. Pp. 236.)

High spots and personalities of the Danish resistance, with much material on resistance tradecraft.

[Published also as *The Danish Resistance* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1960) and in Danish as *Den Utaemmede Kanarieflugl* (Copenhagen, Gyldendal, 1957) ]

*David Armine Howarth*, **ACROSS TO NORWAY.** (New York: William Sloane. 1952. Pp. 286.)

The story of Norwegian escapees assembled at a British base in the Shetland Islands (where the author was deputy commander) to sail their small boats back and forth as transport for saboteurs, agents, and refugees. Also describes contacts with the Norwegian resistance and evasion from capture by the enemy.

[Originally published in England under the title *The Shetland Bus* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1951) ]



*Christopher Montague Woodhouse*, APPLE OF DISCORD: A Survey of Recent Greek Politics in Their International Setting. (London: Hutchinson. 1951. Pp. 320.)

An authoritative account of Greek resistance against the Germans during World War II and the internal postwar struggle, with emphasis on the political background. Col. Woodhouse commanded the Allied Military Mission to the Greek guerrillas.

### Germany in World War II

*Ian Goodhope Colvin*, MASTER SPY: The Incredible Story of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris. (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1951. Pp. 286.)

Ambivalent attitude and pro-Allied activities of the head of the German Abwehr, based on published documents and interviews with many of his former associates. Climax is the Admiral's involvement in the plot to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944, for which he paid with his life. [Available in the following foreign editions: *Chief of Intelligence* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1951); *L'Amiral Canaris, Notre Allié Secret* (Paris: Editions de la Paix, 1955); *Admiral Canaris, Chef des Geheimdienstes* (Vienna: Wilhelm Frick Verlag, 1955); *Canaris* (Barcelona: Editorial AHR, 1956); *Mysteriet Canaris* (Bergen: John Griegs Forlag, 1952). For further reading see: Karl Heinz Abshagen, *Canaris* (London: Hutchinson, 1956); Paul Leverkuehn, *German Military Intelligence* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954) ]

*Walter Schellenberg*, THE LABYRINTH: Memoirs. (New York: Harper. 1956. Pp. 423.)

Political intrigues and intelligence accomplishments in the Third Reich through the eyes of Himmler's chief of foreign intelligence. [Available in the following foreign editions: *The Schellenberg Memoirs* (London: André Deutsch, 1956); *Le Chef de Contre-Espionnage Nazi Parle* (1933-1945) (Paris: René Juillard, 1957); *Los Secretos del Servicio Secreto Alemán* (Barcelona: Mateu, 1958); *Memoiren* (Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1959) ]

*Herman J. Giskes*, LONDON CALLING NORTH POLE. (New York: British Book Centre. 1953. Pp. 208.)

Story of a remarkable radio deception set up by the Germans after their capture of a Dutch officer parachuted into Holland by the British SOE to work with the resistance: undetected for nearly two years, it netted 54 agents and quantities of British weapons and explosives parachuted in to the Dutch. Contains also material on other operations of the Abwehr's counterintelligence branch. The author was chief of the counterespionage unit in Holland.

[Available in the following foreign editions: *London Calling North Pole* (London: William Kimber, 1953); *Abwehr III F* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij

*Basic Texts*

de Bezige Bij, 1949); *Londres Appelle Pole Nord* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1958); *La Burla Maestra De La Guerra* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Americana, 1954); *Spione Uberspielen Spione* (Hamburg: Hansa Verlag Josef Toth, 1951). For further study see Pieter Dourlein, *Inside North Pole* (London: William Kimber, 1953); Joseph Schreider, *Das War das Englandspiel* (Munich: Walter Stutz Verlag, 1950) ]

*Charles Wighton and Gunter Peis, HITLER'S SPIES AND SABOTEURS:*  
Based on the German Secret Service War Diary of General Lahousen. (New York: Henry Holt. 1958. Pp. 285.)

General Lahousen headed the Abwehr's sabotage section during part of the war. This elaboration from his diary gives case histories of his agents in Great Britain, Ireland, and South Africa and of the saboteurs he landed by submarine on the U.S. coast who were rounded up by the FBI.

[Published in Great Britain under the title *They Spied on England* London: Odhams Press, 1958] ]

### THE SOVIET SERVICES

*Simon Wolin and Robert M. Slusser, THE SOVIET SECRET POLICE.*  
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1957. Pp. 408.)

Historical development and philosophical bases of the Soviet state security services from the establishment of the Cheka in 1917 until 1956, presented largely through the accounts of defectors and victims. The editors have contributed documentation and an excellent summary.

[Published in Great Britain under the same title (London: Methuen & Co., 1957) ]

*David J. Dallin, SOVIET ESPIONAGE.* (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1955. Pp. 558.)

A scholarly historical study of Soviet intelligence activities in Europe, Canada, and the United States, based on published materials, some unpublished documents, and interviews with former Soviet agents and others.

[Available in the following foreign editions: *Die Sowjetspionage* (Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1956); *Espionaje Soviético* (Buenos Aires: Agora, 1957) ]

*Peter Deriabin and Frank Gibney, THE SECRET WORLD.* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. 1959. Pp. 334.)

With its four appendices the most detailed and factual compilation, for all its character as an exposé, on the organization and activity of Soviet State Security from 1946 to 1953.

[Published in Great Britain under the same title (London: Arthur Barker, 1960) ]

*Alexander Foote*, HANDBOOK FOR SPIES. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. 1949. Pp. 273.)

Classic case history of the operation of a Soviet wartime intelligence net. The author was a senior member of a group of agents in Switzerland collecting information from Germany and reporting to Moscow by radio.

[Available in the following foreign editions: *Handbook for Spies* (London: Museum Press, 1949); *Les Secrets d'un Espion Soviétique* (Brussels: Editions de la Paix, 1951); *Handbuch für Spione* (Darmstadt: C. W. Leske Verlag, 1954); *Manual Para Espias* (Barcelona: Editorial AHR, 1954) ]

REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION . . . to Investigate . . . the Communication . . . of Confidential Information to Agents of a Foreign Power. (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty. 1946. Pp. 733.)

Details on Soviet espionage, subversion, and agent recruitment in Canada officially uncovered after Igor Gouzenko's defection in 1945.

[Available in the following foreign-language editions: *Russisk Spionage i Canada* (Copenhagen: Schultz Forlag, 1947); *Le Rapport de la Commission Royale* (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1946) ]

REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON ESPIONAGE. (Sydney: Government Printer for New South Wales. 1955. Pp. 483.)

An excellent account of Soviet espionage and subversion in Australia brought to light by the defection in 1954 of MVD agent Vladimir Petrov and his wife.

[See also: *Official Transcript of Proceedings of the Royal Commission On Espionage*; Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, *Empire of Fear* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956; London: André Deutsch, 1956). *Empire of Fear* is also available in foreign editions: *L'Empire de la Peur* (Paris: Morgan, 1957); *Imperio del Miedo* (Mexico City: Ediciones Zenit, 1957); *Fryktens Land* (Oslo: J. W. Cappelens Forlag, 1956); *Sant Vittnesbörd* (Stockholm: Sven-Erik Berghs Forlag, 1956) ]

## EVASION AND ESCAPE

*Aidan Merivale Crawley*, ESCAPE FROM GERMANY: A History of R.A.F. Escapes during the War. (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1956. Pp. 291.)

The sanitized version of an official history prepared for the British Air Ministry. Describes the escape intelligence organizations (one of which the author headed) in the German POW camps and the prisoners' continual efforts, successful and unsuccessful, to get away.

[Available in the following foreign editions: *Escape from Germany* (London: Collins, 1958); *R. A. F. Te Woet* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Nieuwe Wieken N. V., n. d.) ]

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*Basic Texts*

*Clay Blair, Jr.*, BEYOND COURAGE. (New York: David McKay. 1955.  
Pp. 247.)

Stories of American airmen who, shot down behind enemy lines in the Korean War, evaded capture and returned.

[Available in the following foreign editions: *Beyond Courage* (London: Jarrolds Publishers, Ltd., 1956); *Met de Moed der Wanhoop* (Utrecht: Uitgeverij Het Spectrum, 1955) ]

## INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

### INTELLIGENCE IN U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY

STRATEGIC PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By *Robert T. Holt* and *Robert W. van de Velde*. (University of Chicago Press. 1960. Pp. 237. \$5.50.)

Half doctrinal discussion and organizational proposals, the other half case studies of three propaganda campaigns, this is a useful addition to the limited store of analytical-casebook literature available on psychological operations, particularly propaganda. Although the subject of propaganda is predominant, the authors did not intend to limit themselves thereto: their thesis is that "the United States has failed to develop total strategies [because] it has never truly understood the nature of the psychological instrument" and its relationship to the three traditional instruments of statecraft, the military, the economic, and the diplomatic. (The charge should rather be that it has lagged in implementing an acute recognition of these things on the part of many of its officials.) They propose a cabinet-level organization for Strategic Psychological Operations not only to carry on the propaganda functions hitherto inadequately handled by information agencies but also to oversee the psychological aspects of military, economic, and diplomatic programs.

This SPO proposal, complete with organization charts and detailed functional breakdowns, may be over-elaborate and to some extent unrealistic. Solution of the problem of psychological effectiveness by the creation of a new agency is too simple. It misses the fundamental point made over the past ten years by psychological advisers and special committees, most recently by the President's [Sprague] Committee on Information Abroad, that the problem can be met only by breaking down resistances, especially in the middle echelons of certain agencies, through prolonged education and motivation, that mere changes in machinery will not suffice. The authors nonetheless make an able presentation of the problem and suggest some of the changes necessary for its solu-

tion. Further, their discussion gives the reader an introductory acquaintance with the multiplicity of coordinated functions and activities involved in launching propaganda programs.

The analytical section is good as an introduction to the basic elements of propaganda, but too brief (some 56 pages), having been subordinated to the elaboration of the SPO organization. It treats only white propaganda attributed to official sources, omitting, except for a brief reference to black radio, gray and black propaganda. The first half of the section covers objectives, doctrine, techniques, and tactics. Only the more obvious tactics such as deception, enlightenment, terror, and reassurance are discussed. Indirect propaganda is mentioned, but there is no acknowledgement of more sophisticated tactics such as the oblique approach, the kiss of death, overcommitment of the opponent, quotation out of context, and so forth.

The second half of the analytical section is devoted to intelligence requirements, an essential subject which is often neglected in handbooks on propaganda techniques. The need for comprehensive intelligence upon which to base propaganda operations is clearly presented in a discussion of the selection of audiences, their availability, receptivity, and responsiveness, the credibility of the message, and the like. The importance of accurate intelligence in depth is also well illustrated in the hundred-odd pages of case histories that form Part II of the book, particularly in the detailed presentation of Radio Free Europe's efforts to determine which messages might provoke fruitful responses from the various segments of its audience.

The three case studies of Part II not only describe comprehensive propaganda campaigns in detail but support the authors' charge that the United States has failed to exploit the psychological aspects of diplomatic, economic, and military programs and to integrate them with propaganda operations in an overall psychological strategy. The three are well selected to illustrate different situations and different combinations of the instruments of statecraft—military coordination of all activities in wartime Italy; an uncoordinated use of diplomatic, economic, and psychological instruments in the

all-out effort to swing the 1948 Italian elections; the activity of a private propaganda organization, Radio Free Europe, in support of U.S. foreign policy in East Europe during the 1950's.

The position of the authors with regard to SPO and propaganda could have been more simply presented in their introductory chapter. Here their attempt to be succinct and definitive bogs down in concepts and definitions that form a frame of some distortion. It is an unfortunate beginning for a book which otherwise is clear, direct, and especially in case study, rich with material for thought.

**AMERICANS AT WAR: The Development of the American Military System.** By *T. Harry Williams*. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1960. Pp. 139. \$3.50.)

Originally delivered by the author as three J. P. Young Lectures in American History at Memphis State University in October 1956, this work traces the character of the American military system from the Revolution to 1860, its Civil War bifurcation into the systems of the North and of the South, and its subsequent development to the modern era of global conflict. The book is notable here for the striking fact that in all this span the subject of intelligence is not once broached, an omission hardly conceivable in any comparable history of European military development. It is pointed out that Elihu Root's use of the German General Staff as a model in his reorganization of the U.S. Army early in the present century was one of the few influences from abroad on our military organization. Perhaps our historical fear of an overly strong military establishment was one of the reasons why our war efforts through World War II have been largely improvisations, why little thought had been given in advance to who the enemy would be or where the war would be fought. In any event, nothing could make it clearer than this broad outline of the development of the American military system that only in the most recent years has intelligence as a military function entered the ken of the American commander.

### MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN ACTION

HITLER CONFRONTS ENGLAND. By Rear Admiral *Walter Ansel*. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1960. Pp. 348. \$7.50.)

This is a study of amphibious operations, a thing as old as warfare, yet unique in the twentieth century. In the days when each man carried all the weapons he would use and armies lived off the countryside, such operations were a matter of having enough boats to get the men across the water. Now they have been transformed in their requirements for planning, logistics, and intelligence by new dimensions such as air power and the transportation of tanks and heavy equipment to land on heavily defended hostile shores.

The first major German amphibious operation in World War II was the invasion of Norway—successful, but incurring heavy naval losses at the hands of the British. Then after the devastating blitzkrieg that overran the Low Countries and France and trapped the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk, there occurred one of those mysteries of the war that can be explained only by the personality of Adolf Hitler. Although the German armor was ready and eager to smash the British, Hitler held it back and allowed the B.E.F. to make its amphibious escape relatively unscathed. Then followed Operation Sea Lion, the plan for an amphibious move against England.<sup>1</sup>

Walter Ansel's well-researched analysis, based on official documents and interviews with most of the available senior German officers who were concerned, reaches some interesting conclusions. Hitler didn't try to crush the British at Dunkirk because he was confident he could make terms with them. For the same reason, and also because the rapidity of the blitzkrieg's total success was unexpected, there was no planning what to do after the fall of France. The Germans sat on the Pas de Calais looking across the Channel without the vaguest idea of their next move. And when the planning for Operation Sea Lion was ordered, it was of such short duration—a deadline of about two months from the start—so unrealistic, and so uncoordinated that it is difficult to believe

<sup>1</sup> See also *Operation Sea Lion*, by Peter Fleming (New York, 1957).



Hitler was ever serious about it. By comparison with Operation Overlord, the Allied planning for the Normandy landing, the German effort was ridiculous. It impels the reader to Admiral Ansel's apparent conclusion that Hitler thought he could talk the British out of the war.

The book is plentifully interlarded with intelligence references: the reasonably accurate air reconnaissance reports of the Luftwaffe, the not-so-accurate overestimates of British ground order of battle, and the assessments of the naval intelligence staff. But most striking to the intelligence professional is how the lack of any centralized coordinating and estimating led the Germans into major errors. If they had tried Sea Lion, the Nazi disaster would have dwarfed that of Xerxes at Salamis.

MONS: The Retreat to Victory. By *John Terraine*. (New York: Macmillan. 1960. Pp. 224. \$4.50.)

This excellent book is an account of the first battles fought by the British Expeditionary Force in Europe in World War I. At one point its intelligence-minded author comments, "It is hard to think of a day of war when action on such a huge and momentous scale was conducted in such a fog of uncertainty and misconception." Elsewhere he quotes the first Von Moltke's remark at a staff conference, "Gentlemen, I have observed that there are always three courses open to the enemy, and that he usually takes the fourth." Both of these observations characterize the appalling intelligence estimates on both sides in the initial battles of the war.

On the Allied side the French staff failed to take into consideration the altered conditions of twentieth century warfare, to recognize the German plan of operations, and to conceive of the strength of the German Army. They were convinced the Germans would not use reserve divisions. Their estimate of the strength of the German right wing, which drove through Belgium, was nearly 100% off—15 corps as against an actual 28. They remained blind to the possibility of a German advance through Belgium conducted in enormous strength until it became a reality: it was 15 August before they finally saw that the main German effort was in the north.

The British underestimated German enterprise; only Kitchener believed that it could be a long war, "that the Germans were about to attempt one of their much-advertised enveloping maneuvers on a scale that nobody has so far conceived." He felt more and more certain that the B.E.F. might easily advance into a gigantic trap.

The Germans were also blind. "Engrossed with their own sweeping maneuvers, [they] knew little about their enemies. They had no idea, for example, of the whereabouts of the B.E.F." They were left behind at the intelligence turning-point: "At the Supreme Headquarters of both the French and German Armies decisions of the first importance were taken on August 25th. The pendulum of error took a definite swing across the line of battle; as Joffre shed his delusions, Von Moltke became more and more immersed in his, with results that were to prove fatal to the German cause."

Mr. Terraine's book should be required reading for military intelligence officers as well as military commanders.

**STRINGFELLOW OF THE FOURTH: The Amazing Career of the Most Successful Confederate Spy.** By *R. Shepard Brown*. (New York: Crown Publishers. 1960. Pp. 307. \$4.00.)

The late Douglas Southall Freeman, probably the foremost historian of the Confederacy, noted that material on the activities of one Frank Stringfellow was very scarce. Mr. Brown's book on these activities does not now invalidate this observation, but tends to confirm it: one gets the impression that the author's reconstruction of many of the episodes involving Stringfellow rests on rather meager evidence, and there is more in his book about well-known battles than there is about its hero.

Stringfellow was a scout and spy assigned to the Fourth Virginia Cavalry, taking his orders directly from Jeb Stuart and, after Stuart's death at Yellow Tavern, from Robert E. Lee. He unquestionably scored amazing successes in crossing Union lines and operating as an agent in both Washington and Alexandria. On his first mission he crossed into Alexandria, assumed the cover of a dentist's assistant, and set up a network of informants with such dispatch that he

was back in time to do scout duty at the battle of First Manassas. He went to a Union Army regimental dance disguised as a girl. He again went behind Union lines to visit his mother, slightly wounded when the family home was shelled during the Wilderness battle. He spent some time in Washington trying to set up a network and was spotted by Pinkerton's counterintelligence men. He was a scout on Stuart's ride around McClellan's army in front of Richmond.

Although Stringfellow's exploits are documented in dispatches and in a series of lectures he gave after the war, these sources obviously provided lean pickings for his biographer.

### CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

THE CONSPIRATORS. By *Geoffrey Bailey*. (New York: Harper. 1960. Pp. 306. \$4.95.)

The complex of events known as the great Soviet purges remains, even two decades after its close, obscure to Western observers. No satisfactory account of what really occurred can yet be reconstructed. None probably will be, until the hoped-for day when Soviet archives are opened.

The author of this book, writing under the pseudonym Geoffrey Bailey, makes an attempt to explain one of the major facets of the purges—the destruction of Marshal Tukhachevskiy and the flower of the Soviet high command on the eve of World War II. His valiant effort is not completely successful, but he does contribute to an understanding of the case.

The Bailey thesis seems to be derived largely from Walter Krivitskiy, who contended that the evidence used by Stalin against his generals had been manufactured by the Gestapo and fed to the Soviets through White Russian military organizations abroad. According to Krivitskiy, Stalin had General Evgeniy Miller, Chief of the Russian Armed Services Union, a White organization with headquarters in Paris, kidnapped during September 1937 in order to conceal the German origin of the evidence he had used. The not altogether clear Krivitskiy account, however, also indicates that the Soviet authorities, aside from the fabricated German evidence, had discovered (or thought they had discovered) evidence of a real conspiracy in the Red Army.<sup>1</sup>

Bailey believes that an army conspiracy against Stalin did in fact exist, and there is some support for this view in other sources. For what it may be worth, Alexander Orlov, a defector from State Security, says he was told that there was an army conspiracy.<sup>2</sup> Walter Schellenberg, a leading figure in German intelligence, believed that there was a real Soviet generals' plot against Stalin which Reinhard Heydrich betrayed to the Russians by means of evidence that was fabri-

<sup>1</sup> Walter Krivitskiy, *I Was Stalin's Agent* (London, 1940), pp. 233-266.

<sup>2</sup> Alexander Orlov, *The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes* (New York, 1953), pp. 236-237.

cated in part.<sup>3</sup> Wilhelm Hoettl, an Austrian who entered the German intelligence service only in 1938, is not certain that a generals' plot actually existed, but does state that Heydrich forged materials to prove its existence.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, there were indications for a time after the exposure of Stalin's "errors" that Marshal Tukhachevskiy and other officers associated with him had been posthumously rehabilitated by the Soviet regime. If there were firm evidence of actual conspiracy by Tukhachevskiy, it is not likely that his good name would be restored.

Bailey undertakes to weave into his book the story of a series of intelligence operations that have no connection with the Tukhachevskiy case and little relationship to each other. The thread on which these beads are strung is the émigré Russian Armed Services Union, its operations against the USSR, and Soviet counterintelligence activity against it. The latter was centered in the fascinating and incredible "Trust" operation which developed from 1921 to 1927: utilizing controlled anti-Soviet agents and organizations within the Soviet Union and penetrations of the White Russian military organizations abroad, the Soviet security service was able to neutralize, manipulate, and destroy the counterrevolutionary effort sponsored by ex-tsarist officers from points outside of the country.

There is a direct methodological connection, bridging the political change of the Bolshevik revolution, between the OGPU's Trust and the Okhrana's Assev, who operated in the first decade of the century. The line is also direct from OGPU to its successors—the NKVD, the MVD, and the KGB of our own day. No one who engages in current intelligence operations in or against the USSR can afford to ignore the security lessons which the Trust case contains. This part of Bailey's story, of considerable value to the intelligence expert, will confuse the lay reader with its complexity and the flow of unconnected incidents.

<sup>3</sup> Walter Schellenberg, *The Schellenberg Memoirs* (London, 1956), pp. 40-49. See also the similar story of Alfred Naujocks, who claims to have supervised the fabrication and personally sold it to a Soviet agent, in Gunter Peis' *The Man Who Started the War* (London, 1960), to be reviewed in a future issue.

<sup>4</sup> Wilhelm Hoettl, *The Secret Front* (New York, 1954), pp. 77-87.

"Bailey," who is clearly a white Russian refugee, makes much use of undocumented information from refugee circles and refugee publications. Most of this data, since it is not sourced, cannot be evaluated. The footnotes in the book convey an impression of scholarship not borne out by the material used, and many of the references actually cited are secondary sources. The bibliography, nevertheless, although not providing much support for the text, will be useful to students of Soviet intelligence operations. The photographs of personalities that illustrate the volume are also worth while, many of them now rarely seen and difficult to locate.

Although Bailey certainly has not said the last word on the Tukhachevskiy case and its antecedents, he has performed a useful service in summing up the word-of-mouth and other material on the subject that is presently available, scattered and never properly explored. One could only wish that he had also sourced and evaluated these verbal accounts that have circulated among the émigrés for years.

**MINISTER OF DEATH: The Adolf Eichmann Story.** By *Quentin Reynolds, Ephraim Katz, and Zwy Aldouby.* (New York: Viking. 1960. Pp. 246. \$5.00.)

Adolf Karl Eichmann will ultimately rank close to the top of the list of the Nazi perverts. He was probably individually responsible for more mass murder of Jews than any other German. Still fresh in the public mind is his abduction from Argentina by the Israeli intelligence service last May, fifteen years after his disappearance in Europe, and the resulting crisis in relations between Israel and Argentina, whose sovereignty was undoubtedly violated. It is notable that this crisis could be laid to rest, after U.N. Security Council hearings, principally because the Israeli Government steadfastly refused to admit advance complicity in the operation.

While the Eichmann case has focused world attention once again on the Nazi extermination program, it represents to the intelligence officer one of the great professional operations of postwar days. Quentin Reynolds, with the assistance of two Israeli journalists, has given the first comprehensive report on the intelligence aspects of the case in this book, the first quarter of which is devoted to the work of the

Israelis in locating Eichmann. The last part traces his wanderings and desperate efforts to hide over a fifteen-year period, and about a hundred pages in between describe his wartime career and the atrocities he committed.

The excellent investigative job of the Israelis—and especially their persistence—can be pointed up by a brief recapitulation of Eichmann's escape effort. At the war's end he tried to organize a redoubt in the Austrian Alps and found that nobody wanted to be caught with him. He was rejected by his former associates in the S.S.; posed as a Luftwaffe corporal and was interned in a PW camp; escaped; posed as a Waffen S.S. lieutenant in another PW camp; escaped; worked as a lumberjack. A Nazi underground reportedly got him to Rome and then Damascus, where he worked for two years with other Germans in the import business. In June 1950 he went to Argentina and got a job with a construction company in Tucumán, where he was reunited with his family for the first time. Then followed a variety of jobs in several South American countries, a year in the Middle East, and back to Buenos Aires in 1959. During this period he used at least six aliases.

After the war the Sheruth Yedioth, underground intelligence service of the Haganah,<sup>5</sup> commenced a systematic tracing of Nazi war criminals who had gone into hiding. A special squad of five was put on the Eichmann case. Their work, interrupted in 1948 by the Arab-Israeli war, was later resumed by the General Security Service which operates under Israel's Central Institute for Intelligence and Security.

The search was extensive and painstaking, for Eichmann had covered his tracks well. An agent was posted to watch his father's electric appliance shop in Linz, and another as a maid in his wife's household in Bad Aussee. One agent spent months tracking down a photograph of the fugitive. Another located a document in his handwriting. X-rays showing a skull and collarbone fracture were found. Dozens of false leads were traced. Finally Frau Eichmann was picked up on a visit to Austria and followed back to Argentina. The Israeli airline El Al announced its inaugural

<sup>5</sup> See Dekel's *SHAI*, reviewed in *Intelligence Articles* IV 2, p. A49.

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*Recent Books: Clandestine*

flight to Buenos Aires. The return trip carried Eichmann and his captors.

Two paperbacks also deal with the case. *Eichmann: The Man and his Crimes*, by Comer Clarke (New York, Ballantine Books, 1960. Pp. 153), chiefly a recitation of Eichmann's atrocities, has little accurate information about the intelligence episode. *The Case Against Adolf Eichmann*, edited by Henry A. Zeiger with a foreword by Harry Golden (New York, Signet, 1960. Pp. 191), is a compilation of captured documents, war-crime statements, affidavits, etc., dealing with the Nazi effort to exterminate European Jewry, and is not even concentrated exclusively on Eichmann.



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Articles and book reviews on the following pages are unclassified and may for convenience be detached from the classified body of the *Studies* if their origin therein is protected. The authors of articles are identified in the table of contents preceding page 1.

The editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection, in scanning current public literature for intelligence materials, and of the many intelligence officers who prepared book reviews for this issue of the *Studies*. Most noteworthy in this respect are the following:


Holt and Van de Velde's *Strategic Psychological Operations*



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Books on military intelligence ..... Lyman Kirkpatrick

Bailey's *The Conspirators* .....



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
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