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the mental health agency in each State to assume responsibility for the coordination of mental health training and research within the State's jurisdiction. A technical advisory committee, composed of scientists and educators in the field of mental health, cooperating with scientists in universities and industry, should be established in each State to advise and assist the mental health agency and other State departments concerned with the coordination of training and research activities.

6. State institutions which are not accredited for residency or as affiliate training centers for psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, social workers, nurses, and other professional groups should receive support from governors and legislatures in their endeavors to raise the level of teaching and supervision in their institutions to secure accreditation.

7. The States should provide stipends for graduate training in the psychiatric field, should adjust salary scales, and should provide educational leaves of absence so that State mental hospitals may compete effectively for the limited personnel available to fill treatment, teaching, and research positions.

8. One of the important obstacles to adequate evaluation of procedures and therapies is a lack of uniformity in statistical methods in mental hospitals and clinics throughout the country. All States should cooperate with the United States Public Health Service and the American Psychiatric Association in the adoption of uniform terminology for statistical reporting procedures in the field of mental health.

9. Joint action by groups of States may provide one of the most fruitful means of attacking mental illness. This can be partially achieved by periodic regional mental health conferences, regional programs such as that now sponsored by the Southern Regional Education Board, and by active participation in the Interstate Clearinghouse now established through the Council of State Governments by request of the Governors' Conference. The clearinghouse, in cooperation with existing public and private agencies, will provide a medium for exchange of pertinent information among the States, will assist the States in organizing more effective mental health programs, and will help in developing interstate agreements so that groups of States can utilize to the fullest extent existing training and research facilities.

10. State and community mental health organizations should play important roles in educating the public to the problems of mental health and to the methods of improving psychiatric services. The States should encourage and support mental health education in the schools, good relationships between hospitals and their surrounding communities, and the provision of adequate community psychiatric services. These may, in the long run, be most important in determining the mental health of the Nation.

Govs. C. Elmer Anderson, Minnesota; Edward F. Arn, Kansas; Frank G. Clement, Tennessee; George N. Craig, Indiana; Frank J. Lausche, Ohio; William C. Marland, West Virginia; Robert B. Meyner, New Jersey; Johnston Murray, Oklahoma; William G. Stratton, Illinois; G. Mennen Williams, Michigan.

BIPARTISANSHIP IN THE FORMULATION OF MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICIES

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, the Milwaukee Journal, one of America's great newspapers—a politically independent paper—published on March 21 a lead editorial calling for a return to bipartisanship in the formulation of

military and foreign policies. This is a matter to which too little attention has been paid in recent months. Because of the importance of this editorial I ask that it be printed in the body of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

IF IKE WANTS BIPARTISAN POLICY, HE BETTER CONSULT DEMOCRATS

Both major political parties have consistently pledged that "politics stops at the water's edge"—that foreign policy must be bipartisan.

Two things, however, currently threaten bipartisan foreign policy, and therefore weaken the country in facing its world problems:

1. There have been consistent attacks by administration speakers on past policy, which in fact was largely bipartisan and which remains basically the policy of today.

2. The Eisenhower administration has virtually ignored the Democratic Party in the field of foreign policy and military policy, which today is an inseparable adjunct of foreign policy.

Attacks on past policies are, by implication, also attacks on top Republicans who helped create or carry out those policies. Included in this group are President Eisenhower himself and Secretary of State Dulles, who were identified with the foreign policy of the previous administration. Yet attacks are made not just by the rabid fringe of the Republican Party. Vice President Nixon, for instance, charged the other night that Truman-Acheson policies resulted in turning 600 million persons over to the Communists (nobody has shown how it could have been prevented).

Even the President has at times gone political to say nasty things about past policies in which Republicans played a big part. An example is the President's implication the other day that former President Truman should have gone to Congress before fighting to save South Korea. There was no time to go to Congress and Eisenhower himself praised the decision at the time.

The President has appointed far fewer of the opposition party to share the administration responsibility of policymaking in foreign affairs and defense than Roosevelt and Truman did. The few Democrats Eisenhower has appointed are largely those who deserted their party in the last election—such as Governor Byrnes, of South Carolina, who holds a United Nations assignment as a Democrat.

Further, the President has not consulted Democratic leaders—including those in Congress—in shaping major defense and foreign policies. No Democratic Senators accompany Dulles to international meetings, as Republicans used to accompany Dean Acheson. No Democrats sat in on the New Look defense policy or Secretary Dulles' massive retaliation policy.

The administration demands support for these policies—but apparently it must be blind support. When Adlai Stevenson questioned the New Look, Defense Secretary Wilson brushed the questions aside with "I'm too busy," and the statement that he saw no reason to listen.

The President has irritably brushed Democratic questions aside and the Vice President has called them divisive. If there had been bipartisan consultation, these questions would have been more or less automatically answered. Yet to date neither the Democrats nor the Nation have been given clear explanations of what New Look or massive retaliations mean.

This ignoring of the opposition party,

under the Truman administration after the war. Truman usually rose above partisanship where defense and foreign policy were concerned.

Under the administration preceding Eisenhower's, Republicans held many of the Nation's top posts. Dulles, present Secretary of State, was ambassador at large and negotiated the Japanese peace treaty. Dwight Griswold, of Nebraska, headed the American mission to Greece. Warren Austin headed the United States delegation to the United Nations.

Paul Hoffman headed the Marshall plan. Robert Lovett was Secretary of Defense, William Foster was Economic Cooperation Administrator, Walter Gifford was Ambassador to Great Britain, John J. McCloy was German High Commissioner, Senator Vandenberg was a bulwark of strength behind foreign policy.

There are many other names—Henry Cabot Lodge, John Sherman Cooper, Charles P. Taft, George W. Perkins, Charles M. Spofford, Paul H. Nitze, Thomas D. Cabot, Charles A. Coolidge high among them.

In 1949 the late Senator Vandenberg said: "During the last 8 years, certainly, there has been a clear disposition on the part of the Executive to work in far more intimate cooperation and liaison with his constitutional partners in the Congress in respect to foreign policy."

There was consultation constantly with Congress. In some few instances, Republicans did not agree with subsequent policy, and in even fewer instances felt they had not been consulted enough. But, by and large, they had full voice in both shaping and execution of policy.

Today neither participation nor consultation exists. That lies at the base of current squabbling. It is responsible for the feeling of top Democrats that they are being ignored in foreign affairs and defense policies—areas vital to them not as Democrats, but as Americans. It is responsible for growing cries for fuller explanations.

The President is, as he says, President of all the people. He will succeed in foreign and military affairs only if he consults with the representatives of all the people. He will succeed only if he returns to that old and sound thesis that in foreign and military affairs, policy must be bipartisan—in formation as well as in execution.

SECURITY RISKS IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD a letter which I have received from Hon. Philip Young, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, with reference to an article which appeared in the Washington Evening Star of Last Tuesday. I also ask unanimous consent that the article itself be printed.

There being no objection, the letter and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C., March 25, 1954.
Hon. FRANK CARLSON,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Post
Office and Civil Service,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR CARLSON: The Evening Star for Tuesday, March 23, carried an article written by Mr. L. Edgar Prina, which indicated that the General Services Administration in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee listed a total of that these were in-

cluded in the total of 2,486 security risks which I submitted to your committee.

You will recall that when I appeared before the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service I furnished to that committee figures for each department and agency of the Government showing the number of security risks that had been fired and the number which had resigned where there was derogatory information in the hands of the agency pursuant to section 8 (a) of Executive Order 10450. That agency breakdown shows for the General Services Administration 100 terminations and 50 resignations. The additional 18 which made up the total GSA figure of 168 were other types of separations, including deaths. These 18 were not included in the figures submitted to your committee or in the total of 2,486.

I called this to the attention of the Evening Star and on Wednesday, March 24, the Star printed a retraction and regretted its error. I attach a copy of the original story and the retraction for your information and that of your committee.

Sincerely,

PHILIP YOUNG,
Chairman.

DEAD PERSONS FOUND IN TOTAL OF 168 GSA SECURITY RISKS—ONE OR TWO DIED DURING INVESTIGATIONS—SUBVERSION HELD ISSUE IN 10 CASES

(By L. Edgar Prina)

General Services Administration's security risks include dead persons.

This was revealed today with the release of testimony given by the GSA security chief to the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Independent Offices last month.

Thus, a charge first made by the Star on January 3 and subsequently denied by Chairman Young, of the Civil Service Commission, has been confirmed.

In explaining to Democratic members who were digging into the 1953 GSA figure of 168 security risk separations, Baron Shacklette, Director of the agency's Compliance Division, said:

"Those who were not terminated either voluntarily resigned or died or were caught in a reduction in force, or something of that nature."

ONE OR TWO DEATHS

Representative YATES, Democrat, of Illinois, asked:

"You mean, of the 168 there is included those who died while the investigation was going on?"

"There were 100 terminations, 50 resignations for their own reasons, and 18 separations for other causes, among which there would be reduction in force and one or two deaths," Mr. Shacklette replied. "I don't know exactly how many."

In testifying before the Senate Civil Service Committee earlier this month, Chairman Young denied that any deaths were included in the 2,486 risks separated last year throughout the Government.

In 10 of the 168 GSA cases there was "an issue of disloyalty * * * or an issue of subversion," Mr. Shacklette testified. He said he did not think any one of the 10 was a member of the Communist Party.

ARREST RECORDS CITED

Mr. Shacklette told the subcommittee that 583 other persons had derogatory information in their files as of December 31 and 144 of the cases involved charges of disloyalty. All were pending further investigation or adjudication.

The security officer gave this explanation of the high number of security risk cases in GSA, which employs some 27,000 persons:

"We have a lot of people in the laboring force. A large number of those people have arrest records."

Representative COTTON, Republican, of New Hampshire, interrupted: "You aren't counting traffic violations in that total, are you?"

"No, sir," Mr. Shacklette replied. "Arson, assault, burglary, crimes against the family and children, aggravated disorderly conduct, embezzlement, falsification of Government documents, forgery, gambling, homicide, larceny, narcotic offenders, robbery, sexual perversion. At the end of December we had 17 cases of sexual perversion against whom we had issued security restrictions. Five rape cases."

CORRECTION—YOUNG'S 2,486 TOTAL OF SECURITY RISKS INCLUDED NO DEATHS

Chairman Philip Young, of the Civil Service Commission, in a letter to the Star has pointed out that in testimony before the Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committee concerning 2,486 security risks among Government employees he did not include dead persons in the 100 discharges and 50 resignations credited to the Government Services Administration.

In a story printed in the Star yesterday it was stated that General Services Administration security risks included dead persons and that this charge previously had been denied by Mr. Young. Yesterday's account quoted Baron Shacklette, Director of GSA Compliance Division, as testifying in response to this question from Representative YATES, Democrat, of Illinois:

"You mean of the 168 there is included those who died while the investigation was going on?"

"There were 100 terminations, 50 resignations for their own reasons, and 18 separations for other causes, among which there would be reduction in force and 1 or 2 deaths."

Mr. Young in his testimony before the Senate committee stated that the 2,486 security risks included only those persons discharged or those who resigned where derogatory information was at hand. He presented a breakdown of the figures which included for GSA 100 discharges and 50 resignations. The 18 other separations referred to by Mr. Shacklette were not included.

The Star regrets the error.

NEW MEXICO SENATORIAL ELECTION

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, during the past few days I have received a great many requests from New Mexico for copies of the minority views dealing with the Chavez-Hurley election contest. So far as it is possible for me to do so, I intend to comply with the requests and to send to all persons throughout New Mexico who request them copies of the minority views. The people of New Mexico have been very much interested in the matter, and they appreciate the thorough attention which was given to it by Members on both sides of the Senate. I am going to send to residents of New Mexico, so far as it is possible for me to do so, copies of the excellent brief prepared by the minority member of the subcommittee, the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri [Mr. HENNINGS]. I think it will be possible for the people of New Mexico who read that fine report to obtain a very satisfactory idea of the work which he, together with other persons, did in the preparation of the document.

I hope the people of New Mexico will be as interested in reading that report as I have been.

REDUCTION OF EXCISE TAXES

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. 8224) to reduce excise taxes, and for other purposes.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE] has asked me to announce to the Senate that he desires to be recorded against all amendments which may be offered to the pending measure except those which may be accepted by the chairman, the distinguished Senator from Colorado [Mr. MILLIKIN].

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SCHOEPEL in the chair). The bill is open to further amendment.

THE DAIRY-FARM SITUATION

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, I want to speak briefly today with reference to a problem which is becoming acutely serious in my home State of Tennessee. It is concerned with the dairy-farm situation.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. MILLIKIN. Is the Senator addressing himself to an amendment to the excise-tax bill, or to another subject?

Mr. KEFAUVER. To another subject.

Farmers in my State are experiencing the most drastic cut in income on record. Let me give the Senate an example.

In January 1952 the farm value of a milk cow in Tennessee was \$181. In January 1954 the farm value of that same cow had dropped to \$96.

Between those 2 periods total dairy herds in Tennessee had increased, in round numbers, by about 68,000 animals.

But the total value of those herds had dropped by about \$50 million.

Thus, the total investment of the dairy farmers of Tennessee in herds alone has dropped \$50 million in a 2-year period.

That is the investment drop. What about day-to-day income? Here the picture is just as dark.

In 1952 condensery milk was selling at \$4.98 per hundredweight. In 1954 the prospective price is \$3.57 per hundredweight.

In the Knoxville market class I milk is down \$1.40 per hundred pounds; in Memphis the drop is \$1.28; in Knoxville it is \$1.47; and in Chattanooga the drop has been \$1.29.

Mr. President, this picture itself would be serious enough—a drop in inventory value of \$50 million in 2 years and a 20-percent drop in milk prices—but an even more serious blow is aimed at the dairy farmers of Tennessee—scheduled for April 1, in fact.

The Secretary of Agriculture has announced a drop in support prices from 90 percent of parity to 75 percent of parity as of that time.

Mr. President, this amounts to an additional drop of 60 cents per hundred pounds of milk to the farmers.

Mr. President, if anyone thinks the dairy farmers of Tennessee are not concerned about the problem, they should

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In their April 28, 1948, report to the Senate and House, Commissioner Olds and Claude L. Draper summarized this control in these words:

1. Phillips Petroleum Co. is the largest holder of natural-gas acreage in each of the fields, with 20 percent of the Panhandle field total and 15 percent of that in the Hugoton field. It holds nearly one-sixth of the combined gas acreage in the two fields.

2. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., a subsidiary of Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, comes second in the Hugoton field with 14 percent of the acreage, and Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. third with just under 10 percent.

3. Three companies (Phillips Petroleum, Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp., and Canadian River Gas Co.) control more than half of the Panhandle field and, adding Texoma Natural Gas Co. and Cities Service Gas Co., we find five companies controlling nearly three-quarters of the acreage.

4. Seven companies (Phillips Petroleum, Stanolind, Panhandle Eastern, Republic, Cities Service, Northern Natural, and Skelly Oil Co.) control considerably more than half of the total Hugoton field, and, with the addition of 3 others, we have 10 companies in control of approximately two-thirds of the enormous acreage in that field.

5. Considering the combined acreage of the 2 fields, we find well over three-fifths of the acreage controlled by 10 companies (Phillips Petroleum, Stanolind, Cities Service, Canadian River, Shamrock Oil, Republic, Northern Natural, Hagy, Harrington & March, and Skelly Oil).

It should be borne in mind that this analysis does not include acreage which some of these companies may control under long-term contracts, being limited to ownership of fee or leasehold.

The table has been extended to show what increasing field prices will mean to the owners of these very large acreages. This extension also gives some idea of what such increases will cost the gas-consuming areas over the life of the reserves. The extension of the table is based on the arbitrary assumption that the reserves are distributed throughout the acreage at about 7,500,000 cubic feet per acre which produces total reserves closely approximating those presently estimated for the 2 fields. The probability is that these larger owners have taken up the better acreage so that the figures, if anything, probably underestimate the advantages which will flow to them.

On this basis, the figures show that an increase of 5 cents per thousand cubic feet would add \$2,100,000,000 to the potential income from the fields over their life. Of this total, \$1,616,450,000 would go to the dominant interests listed in the table.

Similarly, an increase of 10 cents per thousand cubic feet would provide additional revenue over the life of the 2 fields totaling \$4,200,000,000, of which \$3,232,900,000 would go to the group of 25 large holders shown in the table. These amounts are without adjustment for income taxes. For the pipeline companies alone this would mean an increased take over the life of the fields of more than \$1 billion. Small wonder that they have done their best to mobilize royalty owners, small producers, and representatives of the producing States in favor of a change in the Federal Power Commission's regulatory practice which will enable them to gather in such a rich reward for having bought gas reserves and leases at distress prices from people who otherwise had no outlet for the gas.

To the Phillips Petroleum Co. alone a 5-cent increase would mean ultimately about \$390 million and a 10-cent increase \$780 million. To Stanolind the corresponding gains would be \$225 million and \$450 million;

to Panhandle Eastern \$165 million and \$330 million.

Assuming that the fields will sustain production for 25 years, the group of 25 big holders of the acreage could count on an additional \$60 million a year, with a 5-cent increase and \$120 million a year with a 10-cent increase, and this does not include figures for the much larger reserves in the gulf coast area of Louisiana and Texas, in which such corporations as Standard Oil of New Jersey's Humble Oil, Electric Bond & Share's United Gas Co., and the Chicago corporation have annexed great blocks of natural-gas acreage.

As far as I can determine, the present Commission does not share the former Commission's feelings about natural-gas rates. The present Commission has been busy granting rate increases as fast as it can handle them. Barron's magazine said last November 16:

Another significant development during the third quarter of 1953 was the breakup of the log jam of rate increases pending before the Commission, which at one time exceeded \$200 million. In a recent speech FPC Chairman Kuykendall noted that the Commission as of October 19 had 51 rate cases still pending.

One significant feature of the settlement of recent rate cases has been the evolution of the conference method of reaching an agreement, rather than long, drawn-out formal hearings. The negotiation, or conference method was successfully used in recent rate cases involving Texas Eastern Gas Transmission, which received two rate increases amounting to \$30.8 million; Tennessee Gas Transmission for \$77.9 million; and Texas Gas Transmission for \$10.5 million.

This brings me to the Phillips Petroleum case and the following section from a Public Affairs Institute report:

The case arose out of petitions by the cities of Detroit and Milwaukee, the county of Wayne, Mich., and the State of Wisconsin for an investigation by the Federal Power Commission of the reasonableness of rates at which Phillips Petroleum was delivering gas to Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co. for resale to distributing companies in Michigan and Wisconsin. The Commission, as a preliminary, undertook an investigation to determine whether it had jurisdiction to regulate these rates.

The case was undertaken at the time when, following the United States Supreme Court decision in the Interstate Natural Gas Co. case, the natural-gas industry was moving to amend the Natural Gas Act to exclude such sales from Federal Power Commission regulation. The Commission, in 1951, with Chairman Buchanan dissenting, decided, after continued attempts to amend the act had failed, that Phillips Petroleum sales were a part of, or incidental to, its production and gathering of gas and, therefore, not subject to its regulatory jurisdiction.

The Commission's decision was appealed by the representatives of the consuming areas and was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The United States Supreme Court first refused to grant a writ of certiorari but has since reversed itself and agreed to hear argument in the matter. This will lead to a final decision as to whether, under the Natural Gas Act, sales of natural gas to interstate pipelines by Phillips Petroleum and other independent producers are subject to Federal Power Commission regulation.

The Supreme Court's initial refusal to hear further argument in the case, thereby affirming the decision of the lower court, was reported to have placed the majority of the

Commission in a dilemma from which the Court's January 18 change of mind has accorded them at least temporary relief. According to the Wall Street Journal of January 19, 1954:

"The Supreme Court's decision to grant a rehearing of the Phillips case brought a feeling of relief not only to the company and the natural-gas industry generally, but also to the Federal Power Commission. The FPC has been arguing all along that Phillips' sales should be regulated by the States, not the Federal Government, and it had been reluctantly preparing to take over a big new regulation job."

"This is a lifesaver for us," one high FPC official said of the Court's rehearing announcement. "The appeals court's ruling was a horrible decision because it didn't give us any guideposts. Now we can hope for a ruling that'll give us some ground rules in the event we still end up regulating these sales."

"Successful conferences" and "lifesaver" announcements by the Supreme Court of the United States are words that should be put down alongside those by Senator DOUGLAS, of Illinois. He told the other body on March 12 that it would be hard to tell whether the demise of the FPC's gas-regulatory power was a case of murder or suicide.

Any change from a cost to a fair field price base would make regulation of natural-gas rates by the FPC an expensive fraud. It would be expensive for all taxpayers—note that the Commission is asking \$1,680,000 for regulation and surveys, natural-gas industry, this coming fiscal year. It would be expensive for natural-gas consumers—part of the money they pay for natural gas would be used by the pipeline companies to join in a little ritual before the FPC. It would be a fraud because there would be no regulation of rates if they were based on the fair field price, the highest monopoly price the traffic will bear.

Far better we should discontinue the pretense that the FPC is regulating natural-gas rates. The consumer then would not be suffering the delusion that he is being protected against exploitation at the hands of natural-gas companies. Nor would we be calling upon our taxpayers to foot a \$1,680,000 bill for meaningless little rituals next fiscal year.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. MOSS).

(Mr. MOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, the pending bill asks more than 15½ millions for the Civil Service Commission. Of this amount, almost \$3 million is for the Commission's work in carrying out the so-called employee-security program set up by Executive Order No. 10450 last year.

Let me make it clear that I believe—and I am sure every Member of this body agrees with me—that we should have only loyal and trustworthy individuals in our Government service. I would not hire a Communist or a drunk to work for me, and I do not think the United States Government should employ such individuals either. The necessity of an

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adequate program to secure that objective is not and must not become a partisan issue. I am confident that no one in this House—on either side of the aisle—will question the honest desire of Members to thoroughly examine such a vital program for the purpose of insuring its effectiveness and improving its procedures; and above all, keeping it from becoming a political football.

The previous administration set up the original Federal loyalty program in 1947 under Executive order No. 9835. In 1950, the 81st Congress set up procedures for removing security risks from sensitive agencies such as the Defense and State Departments. The main feature of Executive order 10450 was to extend the security risk removal provisions of the 1950 law to nonsensitive agencies such as the post office. Since there was little new in this, we might have expected the security program to continue working as quietly and effectively as it had done in the past.

The announced objectives of Executive Order No. 10450 were to insure loyal and trustworthy employees in the Government, and to provide fair, impartial and equitable treatment for Government employees.

No one could quarrel with the stated goals of the President's security program. But the noblest statement of purposes is meaningless unless translated into action. And, unfortunately, in this case performance falls far short of promises.

It is obvious by now that the new security program, as administered to date, has utterly failed to achieve its advertised aim of assuring fair, impartial, and equitable treatment to Government employees. And after months of effort, committees of this Congress have been unable to obtain the simplest and most basic information to reassure them that the national security has been receiving any better protection than have the reputations of our Federal workers.

The demoralization of the security program had its inception in the announcement by the White House last October that 1,456 security risks had been separated from Government under the new program, with the added statement that all but 5 were holdovers from the previous administration.

I will not evaluate the intentions of those who made that announcement, but the Washington Daily News said editorially that "there can be no doubt that the idea was to use the security program for political purposes."

Spokesmen for the majority party promptly seized upon this announcement as proof that 1,456 Communists or traitors or subversives had been removed from Government jobs. Among their spokesmen making this interpretation of the number 1,456 were a member of the White House staff, a Governor, and at least one Cabinet member.

Like other Members of Congress who are concerned with problems of our civil service, I was deeply disturbed by the 1,456 announcement. If it were true that 1,456 spies or disloyal persons had been found in our Government, then we had a very serious situation, calling for

immediate legislative action to prevent a recurrence of such infiltration.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield there?

Mr. MOSS. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. McCORMACK. As I remember, the gentleman in the White House frankly apologized to the American people, admitting that he made a serious mistake.

Mr. MOSS. I think it is to his great credit. He is the only one who has apologized.

Mr. McCORMACK. It was the personal counsel of the President.

Mr. MOSS. That is correct.

If it were not true, then equally vigorous action was needed to prevent continuation of a slur which was reflecting unjustly on the loyalty of thousands of patriotic Government workers. We have been trying for months to find out whether any suspected spies, saboteurs, traitors, or Communists have been unearthed in our Government and, if so, what has been done to remove them. To this day, the officials in charge of the security program have been either unwilling, unable, or under orders not to furnish this information to the Members of Congress.

Philip Young, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, is charged with a major share of responsibility for the operation of this program. He has been a particularly uncooperative and evasive source of information.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. YATES. I should like to point out, in confirmation of what the gentleman is saying, certain portions of the hearings on the Civil Service Commission before our Appropriations Subcommittee; for example, on page 1018. I asked Mr. Young, who is Chairman of the Commission, how many of the employees who were considered security risks had been investigated. He said he did not know, his records did not indicate. I asked him whether he would supply it for the record and he said:

I believe we would prefer not to, Mr. YATES, as part of the breakdown under this security order.

I asked the same thing on page 1024, and he said that he did not have that information compiled.

I said:

Can you supply it for the record?

And again he said:

We would prefer not to.

I asked him the same question subsequently in the record. I said:

Is there a relationship between the 3,200 figure and the 2,200-figure announced by the President of the United States?

And Mr. Young replied:

There might or might not be.

I asked:

I am asking now whether there is.

And Mr. Young replied:

I do not know.

Throughout he showed a complete desire to frustrate me in the information I was seeking. Before other committees I think probably witnesses who refused to give testimony have been accused of resorting to the fifth amendment. I wonder whether or not a similar comparison could be made with respect to Mr. Young.

Mr. MOSS. I would say to the gentleman that his action before the House Committee on the Civil Service, if it had been before some committees of this Congress, might well earn him that label.

His first reaction to requests for information was the astonishing statement that he was "not interested in whether a person was discharged for being disloyal or for being drunk." He next took the attitude that the Civil Service Commission had neither the responsibility nor the authority to furnish information about the program to Congress. He implied in a letter that no breakdown report on the program had been made to the National Security Council, but after persistent questioning admitted under oath that a report and breakdown had been furnished to that agency as far back as October 22, 1953. He continually praised provisions in the 1950 law for protection of employees, without mentioning that under his administration very few, if any, of those involved had been given an opportunity to use the provisions or even knew they were being charged with anything.

Congress got practically no cooperation from the administration in its efforts to learn the truth, but many of the country's newspapers—many Republican—performed a notable public service in digging up the facts. And the facts show very plainly why the officials responsible for this "numbers game" do not want it exposed to the light.

The fact is that supposedly responsible administration officials have perpetrated what, in my opinion, amounts to a deception upon the Congress and the people. All the totals so far released of alleged "security risks" are inaccurate and entirely meaningless.

Executive Order No. 10450 and Public Law No. 733 provide mandatorily that persons accused as security risks must be notified of the charges against them and given an opportunity to reply. If an individual is a security risk, then he must be evaluated and removed under the procedures of the order. That is the only possible way in which an individual can legally be declared a security risk.

Philip Young has admitted under oath that the great bulk of persons he calls security risks were never evaluated as security risks at all, but left the Government under normal civil-service procedures. As an example, Mr. Young claims that during 1953 he found 117 security risks in the State Department, 52 in the Treasury Department, and 150 in the General Services Administration. But responsible officials from each of those agencies have testified during appropriation hearings in direct contradiction that during the same period they did not separate one single individual as a security risk under the full procedure set up by Executive Order No. 10450.

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Many so-called security risks do not know to this day that they have been so tagged by Mr. Young. Some are still working for the Government. The State Department security officer admitted that he reported as security risks 291 persons who merely transferred to another agency.

Charges that the numbers 1,456 and 2,200 represented mostly spies or traitors have been completely refuted. If Mr. Young has turned up even one actual subversive he has presented no evidence of it. But of all the prominent majority party spokesmen who made these false accusations, to my knowledge only one has been man enough to apologize publicly.

Now, in response to months of demands for basic information on the security program, Mr. Young has come up with another meaningless figure. His intention, of course, can only be to attempt to further confuse the Congress and the public in the hope that he can hide his errors by further use of meaningless and worthless totals.

Mr. Young has given us no information showing how many people, if any, have actually been declared security risks under proper legal procedures. He will not tell us whether we have any spies, subversives, or Communists in government.

But he has come up with another installment in the numbers game. He has picked the number 429 from somewhere and he says it represents individuals who left the Government in whose files he was able to locate "information indicating, in varying degrees, subversive activities, subversive associations, or membership in subversive organizations." To understand the significance of this figure we might compare it to courtroom procedure. If he were a district attorney, Mr. Young would be announcing that he had secured 429 convictions, when, in fact, he did not have 429 convictions or even 429 indictments, but only 429 charges on which action might or might not be taken, ranging all the way from serious accusations to idle gossip.

As an example, unsubstantiated accusations of subversive association have been made against former Ambassador Arthur Dean, and presumably went into his file. Mr. Dean has since resigned. I do not believe Mr. Dean is a security risk, but with that information in his file I can only assume that Mr. Young has him so listed. And if Secretary of State Dulles ever resigns, his former associations with Alger Hiss would likewise undoubtedly win him a place on Mr. Young's list of totals.

The most serious part of the whole business is that Mr. Young, with a large backlog of present employees not yet investigated, has had security officers neglecting the important work to search dead personnel files for information which is useless for any purpose except an attempt to save face and becloud the real facts.

Apparently it is going to be official policy to continue to play this "numbers game." Mr. Young told the Congress repeatedly that no one knew how many of

the alleged security risks were holdovers from the previous administration. But only a few nights later, on TV, the official spokesman of the majority party said that the majority of the 429 were holdovers. Must we assume that Mr. Young is furnishing, for political purposes, information he will not give to the Congress for the protection of the national security?

The Congress has a right to know what is being done to protect our national security by insuring loyal and trustworthy Government employees. I, for one, am serving notice that I do not intend to rest until we get some responsive and meaningful answers.

Under the present security program, the Civil Service Commission is charged with grave responsibilities for protection of the national security for maintaining employee morale. It is obvious that the Commission, under Mr. Young's guidance, is devoting a great deal of time and effort to playing questionable politics with the security program.

Congress has been unable to obtain any information which would reassure it that such preoccupation has not injured the national security. Unless there is a marked change in the present unwillingness of the Civil Service Commission to cooperate in trying to insure the effectiveness and improve the procedures of the security program, I respectfully suggest that the Congress should give serious consideration to transferring the Commission's duties under the program to some other agency which will take a more responsible attitude.

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENTS

Excerpt from President Eisenhower's state of the Union message on February 3, 1953, outlining the purposes of the security program he intended to propose:

All these measures have two clear purposes: Their first purpose is to make certain that this Nation's security is not jeopardized by false servants. Their second purpose is to clear the atmosphere of that unreasoned suspicion that accepts rumor and gossip as substitutes for evidence.

October 23, 1953:

White House announced that 1,456 Government workers either had been dismissed or had resigned while facing action against them in the new Federal employee security program which became effective May 27. The announcement said that 863 employees were dismissed up to September 30 and that 593 resigned.

"In all of the resignation cases," it was announced, "the agencies and departments had unfavorable reports on these employees." James C. Hagerty, press secretary, added the information that only 5 of the 1,456 were persons given jobs under the Eisenhower administration on an interim basis pending investigation. Mr. Hagerty said he thought individual agencies might announce their part of the total later. (Washington Post, Oct. 24, 1953.)

January 7, 1954: President Eisenhower announced in his state of the Union message:

Under the standards established by the new employee security program, more than 2,200 employees have been separated from the Federal Government. (From the official text.)

EXAMPLES OF MISUSE OF FIGURES

November 7, 1953: The New York Times carried this headline at the top of its back page: "United States Aide Reports—One Thousand Four Hundred and Fifty-six Reds Ousted."

Under a Newark dateline from a special correspondent, this lead paragraph followed:

NOVEMBER 6.—Bernard M. Shanley, special counsel to President Eisenhower, deviated from the text of a prepared address today to observe that "1,456 subversives had been kicked out of Government jobs since the President assumed office."

November 25, 1953: Senator JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Republican, Wisconsin, spoke on a nationwide radio hookup. One paragraph of the text was as follows:

For example, the new administration in the first 10 months in office, has gotten rid of 1,456 Truman holdovers who are all security risks, and over 90 percent of the 1,456 security risks were gotten rid of because of Communist connection and activities or perversion. One thousand four hundred and fifty-six, I would say, is an excellent record for the time President Eisenhower has been in office. (From full text in U. S. News & World Report.)

On a later Meet the Press program, December 13, Senator MCCARTHY again said that 90 percent of the number discharged "for Communist activities and perversion" ran "over 90 percent"—from NBC transcript.

December 16, 1953: Gov. Thomas Dewey, in a speech at a \$100-a-plate Republican dinner at Hartford, Conn., referred to the issue in this paragraph:

The Democrats are also afraid that the American people will discover what a nice feeling it is to have a Government which is not infested with spies and traitors. In less than 11 months the Department of Justice has discovered and dismissed 1,456 security risks planted in the Government of the United States under Democratic administrations. (From New York Times text.)

January 21, 1954: Postmaster General Arthur Summerfield, addressing the New York City Industrial Conference Board, declared:

Almost 2,200 people who were security risks are no longer using up your tax money. I am here to tell you we are not hiring any new ones. Somehow I do not feel too amiable inclined toward people who make treason a preoccupation. (From the Post Office Department release.)

[The Eisenhower team has] "gotten rid of nearly 1,500 Communists, fellow travelers, and their ilk, whom the Trumanites had left in office."

"Under Truman, American taxpayers were providing salaries and expense accounts for hordes of spies, saboteurs, and fellow travelers. Now they are not." (From leaflet put out by Carlton G. Ketchum, national finance director of the Republican National Committee.)

GOOD WORK BY THE PRESS

December 21, 1953: The Washington Daily News began a series of eight articles disclosing individual cases of persons fired or charged under the security program. The cases described included a woman charged with bearing a baby less than 9 months after marriage, 10 years ago to her present husband, a man who failed to note on his job application that

he was in an Army psychiatric ward during the war, and a man who had not yet gotten his job back although he had been cleared by his hearing board and ordered reinstated. The author's conclusion was that the system was "not working perfectly" for the individual or the Government.

January 1, 1954: The Washington Post, in a column by Murrey Marder, declared that the administration, "in its zealousness to show that it has been cleaning security risks out of Government," has produced "a set of statistics which has been transformed into a seriously distorted political issue."

January 5, 1954: The Washington Evening Star declared editorially that the Civil Service Commission "owes the public a full explanation of how this total was arrived at and what it covers."

January 3, 1954: The Washington Evening Star, in a three-column review of its efforts to analyze what its reporter, L. Edgar Prina, called "an almost meaningless figure," said that it appeared that the figure, 1,456 included persons who never were fired or forced to resign, as the White House announcement implied, but who instead were separated through voluntary resignations, reductions in force—even by death—without ever knowing they had been accused of anything.

The Star story also reported that the Navy had originally prepared a release, announcing 8 persons fired and 12 suspended as security risks, but after learning that the Civil Service Commission had counted the Navy for 192 of the 1,456, the Navy announced the separation of 192 persons "against whom a security question existed."

The Star said the Air Force rebelled against conforming to the "official" figure and canceled a release on the subject.

January 17, 1954: A Washington Post editorial declared that—

These 2,200 separations thus do not afford any meaningful index to the administration's security vigilance.

It looks—

The editorial continued—

as if the President has been handed a phony figure. We wish he would demand a breakdown of it and give the results of that breakdown to the public.

January 28, 1954: Regarding President Eisenhower's expressed concern over an unjustified stigma on persons dismissed, the Washington Post declared editorially:

One reason the administration is reluctant to break down the figures, it may be inferred, is that few of the 2,200 cases involve actual or suspected disloyalty (and that the total includes some perfectly routine departures). * * * The stigmatizing which worries the President has been intensified by the administration itself, and disclosure, rather than buckpassing, is the way to correct it.

February 1, 1954: Roscoe Drummond, of the New York Herald Tribune, quoted the statements on security risks by "a politically minded member of the White House staff," "a politically minded Cabinet member," and "a Communist-hunting Senator" with the observation:

The facts do not support or provide any excuse for these exaggerations. They are careless, irresponsible, and purposeful. Most who indulge in them are too bright not to know what they are doing.

February 3, 1954: Joseph C. Harsch, special correspondent to the Christian Science Monitor discussed the risk situation and commented:

The administration is caught between the presidentially recognized injustice to many innocent individuals and the presidentially recognized monstrosity of a Republican administration clearing Democrats of charges pinned on them by Republicans.

February 4, 1954: the Washington Post, in an editorial, said that an administration breakdown of its security program figures, if it comes, should provide the following information:

The number of cases in which charges relating to loyalty were presented to the employees; the number in which adverse findings were made after hearings held in accordance with procedures prescribed under the new security program; the number cleared after hearings; the number who resigned without having any charges filed against them and without any knowledge that they were the subjects of suspicion; the number whose dismissal or resignation entailed allegations of unreliability or unsuitability on grounds wholly unrelated to loyalty.

[From the Washington Daily News of March 5, 1954]

CLEANING THE RECORD

The murky tabulations of security risks issued by the administration were not fully explained by the several statements of Civil Service Chairman Philip Young to congressional committees this week. But Mr. Young did clear up two important misconceptions about the risks:

The false idea that most or all of the security risks listed by the administration so far were traitors, subversives, Communists, or something of the kind.

Mr. Young's figures show that only about 17 percent of those rated as security risks by the administration had any substantial information relating to subversion in their personnel files when they left the Government.

Even that does not mean all 17 percent were subversives, Mr. Young emphasized. Many resigned without knowing of the charges and having a chance to explain; others were fired for entirely different reasons. Few, it is clear, went through all appeal procedures and were finally dismissed as subversives.

The false idea that the new administration security program was responsible for removing all the listed risks, whether they were subversives or merely alcoholics or blabbermouths.

Mr. Young's figures show that more than half of some 2,429 persons listed as risks resigned, many voluntarily and without having been informed of the charges. And of those fired, Mr. Young said, "the great bulk were separated under regular civil-service procedures"—not the new security program.

These two misconceptions developed essentially from some—not all—Republicans' attempt to make political capital out of the situation.

President Eisenhower himself left an erroneous impression in a prepared statement (doubtless prepared for him by somebody else) at his December 2 press conference:

"Fear of Communists actively undermining our Government will not be an issue in the 1954 elections. Long before then, this administration will have made such progress

rooting them out under the [new] security program * * * that this no longer can be considered a serious menace. As you already know, about 1,500 persons who were security risks already have been removed."

Others went much further. Some of their statements are detailed in Anthony Lewis' article on this page. There can be no doubt that the idea was to use the security program for political purposes.

That was a bad idea for the country, and in the end for the politicians themselves.

With one exception none of the Republicans who made the false political claims has been man enough to admit that he was, to put it charitably, mistaken.

But by now everyone from the White House down must realize that the full truth would have been best from the start, which is what this newspaper has been hammering at since our story on December 7, 1953, the first in any newspaper to call attention to the discrepancies in party leaders' statements.

Of course, even one subversive in Government is one too many, but it isn't necessary to smear the entire Federal service with deliberately distorted versions of its condition in order to clean up the dirty spots, and keep the service clean.

[From the Washington Star of March 10, 1954]

YOUNG CAN'T ACCOUNT FOR HAGERTY FIGURES ON SECURITY OUSTERS

Chairman Young, of the Civil Service Commission, today said he has no idea where White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty got his information that all but 5 of the first 1,456 security risks separated were Truman administration holdovers.

Under questioning by Democratic members of the Senate Civil Service Committee, Mr. Young stated that the CSC never supplied such information at any time. He added that statistics on who hired the security risks have not been kept by the Commission.

[From the Washington Star of March 11, 1954]

ADMINISTRATION DOESN'T KNOW SCORE IN ITS "NUMBERS GAME"

The security risk "numbers game" was in such a state of confusion today that administration spokesman found themselves at odds even as to who had told what and to whom.

Testifying at a Senate hearing yesterday, Chairman Philip Young of the Civil Service Commission said that he had no idea where James Hagerty, White House press secretary, got his information that all but five of the first 1,456 Federal employees dropped as security risks were Truman holdovers.

He added that such information definitely did not come from Civil Service Commission because no such statistics had ever been kept there.

TWO VERSIONS

In answer to a query from the Star, on the other hand, Mr. Hagerty said he got his data from the Civil Service Commission. Informed of Mr. Young's statement, he said that still was his best recollection.

"I didn't pick the figure out of the air, I know that," he said.

Mr. Young could not be reached immediately for further comment.

Mr. Hagerty made his original statement about Truman holdovers at a press conference last October 23 when the White House announced results obtained in the first 4 months of the security program.

MR. YOUNG'S COMMENT

The Washington Daily News, in John Cramer's column on January 15, quoted

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Chairman Philip Young, of the Civil Service Commission:

I, as a taxpayer, am not interested in whether a person was discharged for being disloyal or for being drunk, and I don't think the average person is. They just want to know that we are getting rid of this type of person on the Government payroll.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. YOUNG

After more than 2 months, the questions asked still remain unanswered.

JANUARY 15, 1954.

Hon. PHILIP YOUNG,
Chairman, Civil Service Commission,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. YOUNG: As you are no doubt aware, wide publicity has been given to figures from the Civil Service Commission indicating 1,436 Government employees had been removed as security risks under the new personnel security program. Recently this number has been raised to 2,200.

The Executive order setting up the new security program defines as "security risks" all Government employees guilty of espionage, subversive activities, or unauthorized disclosure of security information as well as those who are members of subversive organizations or associated with subversive persons. In addition, under the new order, Government employees may be classed as security risks if their behavior is unreliable or untrustworthy, if they have had personal habits such as immoral conduct or addiction to alcohol, if they are sex perverts, or if there is any reason to believe they may be subject to coercion or pressure from those attempting to undermine our national security.

No breakdown has been made showing the number of employees discharged because of questionable loyalty and the number classed as security risks for other reasons. The total number of discharged employees has been used by many persons in a manner that suggests all, or nearly all, of these employees were discharged because of disloyalty to the United States.

If we had 2,200 spies or unquestionably disloyal persons in our Government last year, it is a very serious situation calling for legislative action amending civil service laws on hiring and firing of security risks. We must make sure our laws are strong enough to prevent a recurrence of the deplorable situation.

If, however, the majority of the 2,200 persons classed as security risks are loyal Americans, we need to take equally vigorous action to prevent repetition of a slur which reflects unjust doubt on the loyalty of thousands of patriotic Government employees.

As a member of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, which has the duty of considering legislation affecting Government workers and the civil service system, I wish a thorough report on the Government loyalty question. Therefore, I request that you furnish to me as soon as possible the following information regarding the 2,200 persons removed from Government employment as security risks:

1. How were the figures compiled showing 1,436, and later 2,200, security risks were removed from Government employment?

(a) Were all of the 2,200 persons involved informed of the charges against them and given an opportunity to appeal before being removed?

(b) How many of the 2,200 persons were discharged and how many, if any, resigned?

(c) Are any of the 2,200 persons still employed by the Government?

2. How many of the 2,200 persons were removed because of questionable loyalty?

(a) How many, if any, had committed espionage, sabotage, or treason?

(b) How many, if any, were members of the Communist Party?

(c) How many were removed on other loyalty grounds such as associating with subversive persons?

3. How many of the 2,200 persons were removed for reasons not involving loyalty, such as bad personal habits, excessive drinking, or the possibility of being subject to coercion?

4. How many of the 2,200 persons had been cleared by a previous loyalty board? I am sure you will agree Congress must be fully informed in order to carry out its duty of enacting necessary legislation.

I would appreciate immediate acknowledgment of this letter informing me whether I will receive the information requested and when it will be forthcoming. Thank you very much.

Sincerely,

JOHN E. MOSS, JR.

UNITED STATES CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION,

Washington, D. C., January 19, 1954.

Hon. JOHN E. MOSS, JR.,

House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. MOSS: I have received your letter of January 15 inquiring about the employees' security program and asking various questions with respect to it.

Under the provisions of Executive Order 10450 establishing this program the heads of the individual departments and agencies are specifically responsible for the matter of security in their own agencies. In addition, the Civil Service Commission has certain responsibilities enumerated in the order concerning the maintenance of a security index, compilation of lists of employees to participate as members of hearing boards, as well as certain reporting functions given in section 14 requiring the Commission to render information to the National Security Council.

The Civil Service Commission has neither the responsibility nor the authority to release any information that it may possess concerning the employees' security program. It expects to render a report to the National Security Council in a few weeks and I would assume that, at that time, the National Security Council and the White House would arrive at some determination as to what information might be released on the details of the program.

Please be assured of our very sincere interest in your inquiry, and I shall be very glad to sit down and talk with you about this further if you so desire.

Sincerely,

PHILIP YOUNG,
Chairman.

JANUARY 26, 1954.

Hon. PHILIP YOUNG,

Chairman, Civil Service Commission,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. YOUNG: Your letter of January 19, if I understand it correctly, takes the position that the Civil Service Commission has the information I requested but is not authorized to furnish it to me.

I do not understand your contention that the Civil Service Commission has no authority to furnish the information requested. I know of no law or executive order prohibiting an executive department from furnishing such information to a Member of Congress, and you do not cite any such law or Executive order in your letter.

I am aware of the Presidential directive of March 13, 1948, forbidding release of confidential files relating to loyalty investigations without express permission of the President. I agree with this order and recognize its necessity in order to protect Government personnel against the dissemination of unfounded or disproved allegations. This order does not, of course, apply to the present situation. I have not asked for confidential files of investigative reports. I do

not seek the names of individuals nor the identity of informants. With one exception—a request for an explanation of the manner in which the total was compiled—every question I asked could be answered by a simple yes or no, or by a number.

Under section 13 of Executive Order 10400, the Attorney General is charged with advising departments and agencies on the employee-security program. According to press reports, the Attorney General stated on January 21 that it is up to the Civil Service Commission to decide if any breakdown of the security-risk figure should be released.

In my letter of January 15, I stressed the fact that Congress must be fully informed so that it may enact whatever legislation is needed to protect the national security. The need for a clarifying statement on loyalty firings and on dismissals for other reasons is obvious to me. There is a great difference between dismissing 2,200 persons for drunkenness, which would call for an extensive temperance program in the Federal service, and the dismissing of 2,200 Government workers for acts of disloyalty which should call for drastic action to counteract a major threat to the security of our country.

There is another compelling reason for prompt clarification of previous statements on the employee-security program. The administration has already made public announcement of the number of security risks removed from the Government. The numbers 1,436 and 2,200 have been repeatedly used in ways suggesting all, or nearly all, of these persons were disloyal to the United States. The responsible officials have refused to give further information to either refute or confirm those charges. This attitude has helped to foster unjust and entirely unwarranted suspicion of many persons who left the Government voluntarily or were discharged for economy reasons. The whole situation inevitably injures the morale of civil service workers and undermines public confidence in our Government.

In your capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission—the agency most directly concerned with assuring fair play to career Government workers—I should think you would feel some responsibility for repairing the damage caused by misunderstanding and distortion of information furnished by the Commission. I frankly do not understand your apparent reluctance to take corrective action.

You refer in your letter to the possibility of information being available after the next report by the Civil Service Commission to the National Security Council. In view of the fact that the first report was made on October 22, 1953—3 months ago—it is reasonable to assume you should be in a position to decide policy at least to the extent it applies to that original report and take immediate steps to release the requested breakdown. Failure to do so must force me to the conclusion that your policy is to withhold these facts from the public and the Congress as well.

Sincerely,

JOHN E. MOSS, JR.

UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,

Washington, D. C., February 18, 1954.

Hon. JOHN E. MOSS, JR.,

House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. MOSS: I refer to our previous correspondence concerning a breakdown of separations of Federal employees under Executive Order 10450.

Yesterday I called upon the heads of the departments and agencies to furnish information concerning these cases as outlined in the attached statement.

Sincerely,

PHILIP YOUNG,
Chairman.

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[Press release, United States Civil Service Commission, Washington, D. C., Wednesday, February 17, 1954]

STATEMENT BY PHILIP YOUNG, CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, CONCERNING INFORMATION ABOUT EMPLOYEE SECURITY PROGRAM THAT WILL BE FURNISHED TO NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The basic objective of the employee security program is to make sure that there is no employee on the Federal payroll nor any applicant appointed who can, because of his position, endanger the national security. The American people must be assured that Federal employees are persons of integrity, high moral character, and of unswerving loyalty to the United States. This we have attempted to do. Today the head of each department and agency is responsible for the security of his agency.

There are many criteria for determining the security reliability of employees. A person not measuring up to those standards may have voluntarily resigned his position or may have been discharged. In either case he is no longer on the Federal payroll in a job in which he might endanger the national security. To attempt a classification of these persons by assigning a specific reason in each case for regarding the individual as a security risk would be futile and meaningless. The criteria in section 8 (a) of Executive Order 10450 are many and are broadly stated. It is only the rare case where any single criterion would be controlling. Many things must be and are taken into account, including in many cases the job held and its relationship to the national security.

The American people have been informed from time to time that this program has been making progress. Many hundreds of persons whose files contained information giving cause for belief that such persons did not measure up to the security standards are no longer on the Federal payroll. Some were discharged, and some resigned. Some of those who resigned undoubtedly knew of the derogatory information concerning them; others doubtless did not.

A short time ago it was indicated that a study would be undertaken to determine whether it was feasible to make any classification of those who did not measure up to the security standards. That study indicates that a classification according to the particular reasons for regarding these individuals as security risks would be neither feasible nor in the public interest. However, a classification according to broad categories of information in the individuals' files is feasible. Accordingly, in order to make available to the National Security Council as much information as can feasibly be assembled about the program, I have called upon the heads of the executive departments and agencies to analyze their security cases on the basis of the following types of information contained in the files:

1. Number whose files contained information indicating, in varying degrees, subversive activities, subversive associations, or membership in subversive organizations.
2. Number whose files contained information indicating sex perversion.
3. Number whose files contained information indicating conviction of felonies or misdemeanors.
4. Number whose files contained any other type or types of information falling within the purview of Executive Order 10450, as amended.

Heretofore the statistical data that the various departments and agencies have been furnishing to the Civil Service Commission concerning the employee security program has not included any classification of cases either according to causes for regarding the individuals as security risks or according to information about them.

It should be pointed out again that no individual has a right to a Government job. Working for the Government is a privilege that a citizen must earn. He must meet the standards required for his particular assignment, whether under Civil Service, the security program or any other criteria established for and on behalf of the American people.

FEBRUARY 24, 1954.

DEAR MR. YOUNG: Thank you for your letter of February 18. It does not answer the questions asked in my previous correspondence—in fact, it raises additional questions.

I am pleased to note that you apparently no longer contend as you did in your letter of January 19 that you are not authorized to release information on the employees' security program. However, you still have not stated that you intend to release any information. May I suggest that you make a prompt announcement stating just what information you are going to release and when you are going to release it.

I am disturbed by your indication that you called upon the heads of departments only last week to furnish information concerning security cases. Executive Order 10450 became effective in May 1953, more than 9 months ago. Surely you are aware that section 9 (a) of that order directs the Civil Service Commission to establish and maintain "a security-investigations index covering all persons as to whom security investigations have been conducted by any department or agency of the Government under this order." It also states that "the security-investigations index shall contain the name of each person investigated" and "adequate identifying information concerning each such person." In addition, section 9 (b) states that "the heads of all departments and agencies shall furnish promptly to the Civil Service Commission information appropriate for the establishment and maintenance of the security-investigations index."

You must also know that section 14 (a) of Executive Order 10450 directs the Civil Service Commission to "make a continuing study of the manner in which this order is being implemented by the departments and agencies of the Government" in order to ascertain deficiencies in the program which tend to weaken the national security or deny individual employees fair, impartial and equitable treatment. Section 14 (b) directs all departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate with the Civil Service Commission in accomplishing this study.

If you have complied with these provisions of Executive Order 10450, why is it necessary now to ask the agencies for this information? If you did not have this information, how could you or any other official compile the figures 1,456 and 2,200 which were publicly announced?

As a member of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, I believe it is my duty to try to ascertain whether the new employee security program is properly safeguarding the national security and affording individual employees fair and equitable treatment. For this purpose, I asked questions carefully drawn up to bring out the number of persons, if any, removed from Government jobs as spies, traitors or saboteurs under section 8 (a) 2 of Executive Order 10450 and to show whether the persons classed as security risks had been notified of the accusations against them and given an opportunity to defend themselves. Your request to the departments for information seems to carefully avoid both of these vital questions. I hope this is not your intention.

I note with interest that you do not ask the departments how many employees they have separated under the new security program. Instead you merely ask what kind of information is contained in personnel files.

It should not be necessary to point out to you that these files often contain anonymous accusations which have no basis in fact whatever. This was strongly demonstrated recently in some shocking and wholly groundless charges against Chief Justice Earl Warren. Your request for the number of files having derogatory information in them might be helpful in showing how many persons wrote anonymous letters accusing Government workers, but it is of no value whatever in showing what action the agencies took on those accusations under Executive Order 10450.

It would almost appear that you are now trying to find something in enough files to back up the figures which have been so widely publicized and so strongly attacked as erroneous.

Your request for information is so worded as to permit classifying in the same category persons guilty of treason and persons who are unquestionably loyal but are unfortunate enough to have a relative living behind the Iron Curtain. I can assure you that any breakdown which classifies actual subversives with loyal citizens whose only fault is having a suspected relative will neither satisfy nor deceive Congress.

You state in your press release that "To attempt a classification of these persons by assigning a specified reason in each case for regarding the individual as a security risk would be futile and meaningless." I find it impossible to reconcile this statement with the procedures established by law for removal of security risks. The law (title 5, section 22-1 of the United States Code) provides: "That any employee having a permanent or indefinite appointment, who is a citizen of the United States whose employment is suspended * * * shall be given after his suspension and before his employment it terminated * * * a written statement within 30 days after his suspension of the charges against him * * * which shall be stated as specifically as security considerations permit."

If the departments do not know the specific reasons for classifying an individual as a security risk, how can they notify that individual of the charges against him? And if the departments are giving proper notice to individuals of the specific charges against them, why is that information not readily available?

You are no doubt aware that a number of persons in high positions have used the figures 1,456 and 2,200 in such a manner as to indicate that all or nearly all of these persons were discharged for disloyalty to the United States. Some of the persons making those charges are officials of the administration itself.

As Chairman of the Civil Service Commission you have a definite responsibility for dealing with problems affecting our Government workers. It is hard to imagine anything more damaging to the morale of the Government service than the present accusations of widespread treason being made by supposedly responsible officials.

It is because of widespread misuse of these questionable figures that I now feel the facts must be made known and be as widely publicized in order that the American people may know how very few of their employees merit the label of "traitor" or "subversive."

COUNTING TRANSFERS AS SECURITY RISKS

Excerpts from the testimony of Robert W. S. McLeod, Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, State Department House Appropriations Subcommittee on Department of State, Justice and Commerce, January 25, 1954, page 44:

Mr. McLEOD. * * * we have had a total of 590 separations on which a security question existed. That was from January 1, 1953, to

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December 31, 1953. We can break those down as follows:

Transferred to other agencies, 291.
PROCEDURES OF 10450 NOT USED

Excerpt from testimony of Philip Young, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, before the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, March 10, 1954:

The third point I would like to make deals with the protection granted to employees under this program. For those persons whom an agency head proposes to terminate under the provisions of Executive Order No. 10450 the procedure calls for a statement of charges and an opportunity to answer. A hearing may be granted, if the employee so desires, before a security hearing board composed of three employees of other Government agencies. The sample regulations, furnished to all agencies by the Justice Department, and adopted by agencies with some minor modifications, provide that when a hearing is held the employee will have the right to present witnesses on his behalf and may cross-examine any witnesses offered in support of the charges. The hearing board reports its decision to the head of the agency who makes the final decision. If the employee is terminated, there is also provision for a determination by the Civil Service Commission, upon the employee's request, as to whether the former employee may be employed in another agency.

Excerpt from the testimony of Robert W. S. McLeod, Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, State Department, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, January 25, 1954, page 45:

SECURITY RISKS

Mr. McLEOD. * * * So far we have not successfully finally completed the procedure in a single case under this order.

On January 12 and February 8, 1954, Elbert P. Tuttle, General Counsel of the Treasury Department testified before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on the Treasury-Post Office Departments to the effect that there had been 130 dismissals of security risks during 1953. All 130 had been removed under Executive Order No. 9835. No security risks had been removed under Executive Order No. 10450.

Excerpt from testimony of Baron Shacklette, compliance officer, General Services Administration, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Independent Offices, February 24, 1954, page 1646:

Mr. SHACKLETTE. * * * There have been no separations after a full hearing to date in GSA. None of them has gone the full route as provided in the Executive order.

WHERE DID THE VICE PRESIDENT GET HIS FACTS?

Excerpts from testimony of Philip Young, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, before the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, March 10, 1954:

Senator JOHNSTON. How many of this 2,400 that you are talking about have been hired in Government since January 1, 1953?

Mr. YOUNG. I can't tell you that, Senator, because I don't know how many have been. * * * It would be an extremely difficult figure to try to break out, because, again, it means going back and looking at every single individual case.

Senator JOHNSTON. I want you to give me that, plus this: I want the percent that you

fired for that reason, that you have hired since February 1, 1953—the percent. And I want to know the percent that was working for the Government prior to that time, and the percent you have let go.

Mr. YOUNG. That would be a practically impossible figure to get, Senator, without a terrific amount of time and work, to attempt to find out when each one of these individuals came on the payroll.

Mr. YOUNG. As I have been pointing out, Senator, it would be extremely difficult to attempt to break down to 2,486 cases from the point of view of determining as of what date they actually came on the Federal payroll. * * * It means going back through 2486 individual files, which are scattered all over the country, and in some cases, in other parts of the world.

Senator COOPER. * * * Can you say whether or not those 429 were in the Government at the time of issuance of the Executive order? Is that known?

Mr. YOUNG. It is not known, Senator—the date when any one of these individuals was put on the payroll.

Excerpt from speech made by Vice President Nixon as official spokesman of the Republican Party, March 13, 1954:

Now, how has this policy worked?

Well, since May, when the policy was adopted, fairly and effectively under this program we have been weeding out individuals of this type; and to give you an idea I have here a breakdown of the files of over 2,400 people who have left the Federal payroll either by resignation or discharge under this program since May, and the great majority of these, incidentally, were inherited from the previous administration.

CONCLUSION

To any rational individual, the documentation above can lead only to complete confusion. It is the best possible evidence of the necessity for giving the facts to the Congress and the public.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, we have no further requests for time.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. NEAL].

(Mr. NEAL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Chairman, I am in hearty accord with the position taken by the committee—that money advanced by the Government for completing construction of Tennessee Valley Authority facilities should bear the same rate of interest that the Government is required to assume on bonds sold to the public, since this is the only source of Government's borrowed funds.

TVA power consumers have always enjoyed cheaper power rates than those prevailing in other areas of the Nation whose taxpayers have borne the brunt of the creation and maintenance of TVA facilities.

Even now there is pending a commitment of Government funds for the purpose of canalizing the Green River in Kentucky solely for the purpose of subsidizing TVA's coal supply to fuel its steam plants.

The Atomic Energy Commission's operations at Oak Ridge may require more power from time to time. If that is so,

Government should encourage the creation of productive capacity to supply this power for defensive purposes, but power so supplied by this facility will be amply paid for out of AEC funds furnished by the taxpayers who reside in all parts of the United States.

It is, therefore, only fair to the general public that TVA assume the interest on funds advanced by the Government at the same rate paid by Government for the purpose of securing moneys to be loaned in this manner.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I suggest the Clerk read the first paragraph of the bill.

The Clerk read the first paragraph of the bill.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. GRAHAM, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H. R. 8583) making appropriations for the Executive Office and sundry independent executive bureaus, boards, commissions, corporations, agencies, and offices, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1955, and for other purposes, directed him to report it had come to no resolution thereon.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Speaker, I call up the conference report on the bill (H. R. 5337) to provide for the establishment of the United States Air Force Academy, and for other purposes, and I ask unanimous consent that the statement on the part of the managers be read in lieu of the report.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the statement.

(For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House of March 25, 1949.)

The SPEAKER. The question is on agreeing to the conference report.

The conference report was agreed to, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY AT OAK RIDGE, TENN.

(Mr. BAKER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and to include therein a telegram from the president of the Oak Ridge, Tenn., Chamber of Commerce, and an editorial from the Oak Ridger, the daily newspaper published in Oak Ridge, Tenn., issue of Tuesday, March 16, 1953, entitled "Panama-Ridge Parallel.")

Mr. BAKER. Mr. Speaker, I have been a Member of Congress a little over 3 years. During that time I have fre-

quently urged upon the floor of the House that the Atomic Energy Commission get out of the business of being the landlord to the thousands of residents of the atomic city, Oak Ridge, Tenn.

As I stated here just a few days ago, there have been many promises of a disposal program for Oak Ridge, but so far no performance, no plan or draft of a bill granting home ownership to these thousand of citizens at Oak Ridge and removing the stigma of a company town from Oak Ridge has yet been presented to Congress or made public.

I have received thousands of letters and telegrams urging home ownership for Oak Ridge. The following is a telegram from the President T. L. Clines, of the Oak Ridge Chamber of Commerce, of March 25, 1954:

Oak Ridge Chamber of Commerce finds it hard to reconcile delay in presenting property disposal bill to Congress with the many assurances received over past year. Greatly concerned that further delay will block all chances of passage this year. Every day's postponement will make it just that much harder to achieve your often expressed desire for normalcy in city of Oak Ridge. Respectfully urge immediate presentation of proposed legislation.

These fine citizens are justifiably impatient. I cannot too strongly urge the Atomic Energy Commission, Bureau of the Budget, and all other Government agencies responsible for action to give us immediate action so that these thousands of fine persons who are working tirelessly to save the United States from destruction may be first-class citizens and not tenants at sufferance of a Government landlord in a company town.

The following editorial from the Oak Ridger, of March 16, 1953, portrays the situation:

PANAMA-RIDGE PARALLEL

The current issue of Reader's Digest contains an article about the Panama Canal. It tells of the various factors that make the canal extremely vulnerable to enemy attack and reports on conditions about the canal in general.

A part of the article struck home with us particularly. It seemed, from this account, that there's quite a parallel between the canal government community and Oak Ridge.

For example, consider these excerpts describing conditions there:

"When the first Americans went down to the jungle in 1904 to dig the canal they faced incredible dangers and hardships. Special inducements such as free hospitalization, 25 percent more pay than similar Government employees in the United States get, and the advantages of living in a tax-free area were held out to lure these men from the safety of their homes and jobs up North. They were given to believe they were establishing new homes where the opportunities they created would pass on to their children.

"What has happened? At first they were charged reasonable rents for the shacks they inhabited—but rentals have been raised to exorbitant levels. Today these termite-ridden barracks, neither modernized nor maintained in decent repair, shock the visitor from the North. Free medical attention has been taken away, and not long ago the United States Government announced that the 25 percent pay differential would also be abolished or reduced.

"The Canal Zone is like nothing else in the world which the American flag flies. It is not a

State, a Territory, a possession, a mandate, or even a district, like the District of Columbia. You might say it is a kind of Indian reservation where the inhabitants pay American taxes but have no vote; where the landlord owns all the tepees and the trading posts—but the inhabitants can live there only so long as they have jobs. If you are retired or fired, you and your family are shipped out immediately like refugees. You are not permitted to buy or own a place to live, and it doesn't matter how long or faithfully you have worked there, when your useful days are over—out you go. * * *

"One oldtimer, recently retired after 45 years of faithful service, told me: 'The Canal Zone was the only home I knew. But as soon as my retirement papers came through I was practically deported.' He added: 'We oldtimers remember the ringing speeches of Teddy Roosevelt, General Goethals, and other great American leaders who assured us that we were building a new homeland for our children and our children's children. Now there is sadness—even bitterness—in our hearts. We oldtimers have a name for this: Betrayal at the Ninth Parallel.'"

Reading this, and then glancing at the calendar, makes us all the more impatient that the Atomic Energy Commission, the Bureau of the Budget, and Congress tell us something positive quickly about the long-promised property disposal program.

How much longer are we expected to be patient? We don't want our similarities to the Panama Canal to go any further than they already have.

SPECIAL ORDER GRANTED

Mr. WILLIS asked and was given permission to address the House today for 12 minutes, following any other special orders heretofore entered.

THE HOUSING PROGRAM

(Mr. PATMAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include his own individual minority view on H. R. 7839.)

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, the housing bill has been under consideration by the Committee on Banking and Currency for several weeks. The bill was reported out last Friday night. When the bill comes before the House on Wednesday or whenever it shall be appropriate to consider it, I expect to offer an amendment to strike out all of title II which is the title which would permit the raising of interest rates from the traditional spread of 1½ percent above the long-term rate to 2½ percent, and also strike out controls which would be reinstating regulation (S).

INDIVIDUAL MINORITY VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE WRIGHT PATMAN ON H. R. 7839

This housing bill as reported has more harm in it than good. It would be better to have no bill at all than to pass this bill with all of its bad features.

The interest rate increase of 1 percent on home mortgage loans is indefensible. On a 25-year home mortgage for \$9,600, an increase of one-half of 1 percent in interest means \$814 the borrower must pay, or 15 percent more. This illustration is for an increase of one-half of 1 percent, whereas the bill provides for an increase of twice that much.

The financing plan of this housing bill was referred to as a fraud and a hoax by an important housing official, who stated it is "completely and absolutely unworkable."

We have 12 million substandard dwelling units in the United States. One-third of

our Nation is ill-housed. We need to build 2 million new homes each year for the next 10 years to provide decent housing in America. The administration has programed less than 1 million new starts for this year. The home builders want to build 1,400,000 homes and recondition 500,000 more this year. The mortgage bankers and landlords—who profit from housing shortages—naturally want the smallest number started this year.

CONGRESS DELEGATED MORE POWERS THAN RETAINED

Twelve powerful men who have more control over the economic affairs of our country than the United States Congress or the Executive were not brought before the committee or consulted on this important bill.

Their actions will determine whether this bill or any other bill involving credit or money will work.

Congress in delegating such enormous powers to a small group has delegated more powers that are necessary for an expanding, dynamic, progressive economy than it has retained for itself.

The cost and availability of credit and money are determined in our national economy by the Federal Open-Market Committee.

This Committee, operating under powers granted by Congress, makes it possible for money to be easy or hard; to make interest rates high or low; or to create a climate that causes our Nation to progress or suffer a depression.

The 12 men composing the Federal Open-Market Committee consist of the 7 members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and 5 representatives of the Federal Reserve banks, each of whom is selected by a board of 9 directors of the Federal Reserve bank he represents. The 9 directors consist of 6 members named by the private commercial banks and 3 named by the Board of Governors. A more correct statement is the Federal Open-Market Committee consists of the 7 members of the Board of Governors and 5 presidents of Federal Reserve banks who are obligated to the private bankers for their selection.

A comparable situation would be created if the railroad owners helped to fix freight rates by having their representatives members of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

The Federal Open-Market Committee can hold interest rates short- or long-term at any rate it desires.

Mr. Marriner S. Eccles was Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board longer than any other person. He was doubtless more familiar with every detail of the operations of the Federal Reserve System than any other person.

Mr. Eccles, in answer to questions—when he was before congressional committees—often stated that the Federal Open-Market Committee had the power to determine the availability of credit, interest rates, prices of Government bonds, and other important matters.

When Mr. Eccles was testifying before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, in March 1947—and while Senator MIKE MONRONEY was then a Member of the House and a member of the Banking and Currency Committee of the House—a question was asked by Mr. MONRONEY and an answer given by Mr. Eccles, as follows:

"Mr. MONRONEY. Do you mean to say that with your present Open-Market Committee, and the operation of the Federal Reserve, as it now stands, that, regardless of what the national income is, or other economic factors, you can guarantee to us that our interest rate will remain around 2.06 percent?"

"Mr. ECCLES. We certainly can. We can guarantee that the interest rate, so far as the public debt is concerned, is where the Open-Market Committee of the Federal Reserve desires to put it."

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