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June 1953

Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP78-03362A000800020001-8

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OTR VAULT COPY NO. 375-A

Clandestine Mission and Organization of CIA

Document No. []
 No Change []
 Deleted []
 Class: []
 Auth: []
 Date: []
 By: []
 02/10/78

Coming on the third day of the second week of this course, any mention made of the mission and organization of CIA clandestine services is naturally an extension - and in this case a generalized extension - preceding lectures. [redacted] in his lecture concerned with the

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Mission and the Organization of CIA emphasized the overt offices of the Agency; [redacted] gave a run-down of the Intelligence Community, of which CIA is a major part. Here we are concerned with the mission and organization of the clandestine services; perhaps more pertinent to your immediate situation than any other segment in all the discussions, because by and large, you are a part of that service labelled as clandestine.

We have spoken about the need for information; but have pretty generally confined ourselves to that information collected overtly. We all recognize, however, that there is a small percent - 20 to 25 percent of the information which goes to make up intelligence through the production process. This 20 percent, we shall say, is information particularly vital, information which will fill gaps in the overall picture and provide intelligence to policy makers so that they may make decisions which will strengthen our national security and will arm this country with intelligence in advance, so that dealings in foreign affairs may be more effective.

Not only is the need for this information, this vital 20 percent, which is normally withheld from us by a foreign government, but also there is a need, as has been pointed out to you, for quick and secure

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communications and the assimilation of this information, procured clandestinely, with the whole intelligence picture of which it is a part. For example, if it is learned through clandestine means that a certain country is planning to invade another area across the border - the typical example would be Russian troops invading Yugoslavia - then if it pertains to national security - and such a move would certainly in a remote form endanger the national security of the U.S. or of our allies - obviously a course of action must be taken after deliberation. Certainly there will be no waiting for developments in this case. Immediate action must be taken - and taken on the basis of this critical information against a background of any other facts, overtly or covertly procured, which is already available.

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This, then, is the point at which CIA comes in to play a significant part. As [redacted] pointed out to you, the authority, or charter for CIA is found in the National Security Act of 1947 - Public Law 253. The mission of CIA is particularized on on page 4 of that law - which you have before you. Now more particularly, sections 4 and 5 under paragraph d are the places which incorporate in a general way the authority for clandestine activity.

Section 4 - "For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council -

to perform for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National

Security council determines can be more efficiently accomplished

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Now in this there is nothing which specifically empowers CIA to engage in clandestine activities and collection efforts; however #4 rather clearly indicates that there is latitude for such activity in the statement that CIA shall "perform . . . such additional services of common concern as the NSC determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally. Here, then, you have, in a general statement, the jumping off point for clandestine activity. It is obvious that from the standpoint of efficiency alone, it would be of inestimably greater value to have such activity coordinated in one agency than to have Army, State, the Air Force, or the Atomic Energy Commission, sending personnel abroad to engage in clandestine activity under a variety of covers and have them all running operations against the same or various targets. At this point, we do not infer that the various agencies do not in relative degrees of clandestinity collect information. Certainly the State Department, for instance, has developed certain sources of information. However, in the real sense of the meaning of clandestine mission, it is CIA that performs the collecting techniques or the collecting functions of this government so far as secret intelligence is concerned that requires clandestine action. For instance, if there is any occasion when this agency can efficiently collect, let us say, Order of Battle information, we do so; since anyone connected with G-2 could not get the information. In that case we perform at the request of the Army such information. We have people in various sections of the world who can and do collect such information.

Another example of this agency's doing something centrally because it can be done more efficiently than it would be were it farmed out to

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various agencies is the [REDACTED] something of which you have already heard. It certainly would be contrary to economy for State, Army, etc. all to have an elaborate mechanism for this purpose. So the job is performed by CIA while all the other agencies of the government benefit [REDACTED] process.

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We now come to section 5 of the National Security Act of 1947 and find a provision which appears to include the catch-all quality found in much legislation in democratic countries where it is not practical to itemize ad infinitum: . . . that we are to perform such other functions and duties that are related to intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may from time to time direct." General as this statement is, it is the basis for our authority to engage in certain activities, as directed by the NSC, which are unorthodox. These unorthodox practices, within the framework of section 5, are used to combat the efforts of the enemy -- at this moment the Soviet Union.

We have, then, in sections 4 and 5 the charter for our activities on the clandestine side. The National Security Council, however, issued what is called National Security Council Directive #5 - which you and I cannot obtain, since the classification is extremely high. In essence we have in NSCD #5 the specific statement, as opposed to the general nature of the aforementioned sections 4 and 5, that the espionage activities of the government, clandestinely performed, will be assigned to CIA. We have in this then a charter spelled out for us issued by the National Security Council. In addition, we have in National Security Council Directive 10/2 the specific statement that CIA will be the Agency

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the newspapers and in magazines of the hacking, slashing, and accumulation of error in these fields. Where the information for these news pieces comes from one cannot say, nor can we say if the writers guess well or badly; suffice it to say that these people can say what they will. We cannot. Odd as it may seem, as officials in this Agency none of us can confirm or deny such reports. We can have only the average reader's interest in them.

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You have before you now a chart which shows the DD/P complex and at this point I shall say that the break-down discussed will be elementary. For those of you who are old hands in the Agency it is an old story; for those who are new the limitations of the discussion will not be entirely satisfactory. It is accepted in CIA that the whole break-down of the Agency should not be unveiled at once. It is, frankly, a security concept, and rightfully so. On the need to know basis we reveal one part; later in your training, if you are assigned to other segments, the structure will be revealed in greater detail. The structure of an intelligence organization is extremely sensitive; even the names of the parts may reveal the type of activity, although on a chart an extended breakdown is not listed.

It is sufficient, however, for us to discuss the DD/P complex in rather general terms. This is not in any way a reflection on your sense of responsibility. If you need to know the information, you will get it.

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To come to the chart specifically now, we see the DD/P complex, which stands for the clandestine side of CIA. Under the Deputy Director, Plans - who is, as was pointed out to you, on the same level as the Deputy Director of Intelligence, and the Deputy Director, Administration. Under the DD/P we find the Chief of Operations, who acts as his deputy, as you know.

Now, although it doesn't show it on the charts, I'll explain a couple of other boxes that would fit into that general orbit that surrounds the DD/P. He has an executive secretariat which is his own personal staff and which does much of the paper work at the very top level there for him and which can get a bird's eye view down into all the operations and activities that go on under the DD/P. He has also an Inspection and Review Staff. There's one person here who will take part in that activity. I will shortly make mention of that; it isn't pertinent right at this time. There is also a Plans and Programs Coordination Staff at this very top level and that again assists the Deputy Director for Plans in overall coordination of the activity that goes on underneath him. The activity is so complex and is so extremely diversified that you need top level staffs that are immediately responsible to the DD/P himself who will keep him advised of everything that is going on. So you see these terms FI, PP, PO. As I told you "PO" should read "PM"; TS should read TSS, and ADMIN - Administration. That is the functional level. In Sherman Kent's book that you have excerpts of in your kits, he speaks of the problems of functional and regional intelligence methods of dealing with intelligence problems. It has been rather well presented there and that problem has been well ironed out in this way.

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At the level up here, FI which is Foreign Intelligence, that's the staff that is concerned with functional aspects of espionage and counter-espionage. PP - Political and Psychological Warfare Staff - and again its title there perfectly well reveals its concerns. PM - is the Paramilitary Operations Staff which renders support to many operations that are conducted that have paramilitary aspects to them. Technical Services Staff - is that staff that will provide those people who are concerned with operations with any single thing that you can imagine that would assist and support in the conduct of an operation. If you need in your operations something to do with wire-tapping, if you need a little peculiar type of currency or something of that sort you will find that TSS is extremely helpful. The Admin Staff of course is concerned with administrative support of covert operations and works very closely with the Deputy Director for Administration who is on the other side of the CIA structure - a close tie-in. Now underneath those staffs, you have the operating divisions which most of you are employees of. There are seven of those - FE, WE, WH, SR, NE, EE, AND SE. FE - Far East, WE - Western Europe, WH - Western Hemisphere, NE - Near East, Africa, SR - Soviet Russia, EE - Eastern Europe and SE - Southeastern Europe. They are broken down into branches that have geographical country desks and actually are concerned with the running of operations and within each one of those operating divisions you have the FI function or FI type of operation - espionage and counterespionage operation and also the PP function and the PM function, so that in each one of those there is repeated the staff concerned for functional type of activity as it would be carried out in actual operation.

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Now this Inspection and Review Staff - it is attached at the top level of the DD/P; it is that staff that might say: Let's look at the efficiency of these things, let's check up and see where things are going wrong. The Inspection and Review people can look into any operation and see what is the matter and what is good or whatever the DD/P wants to know about it - an overall body that has inspection rights.

Now one last point - within the FI staff there is a unit which is that particular unit which works closely with OCD. Do people run off in all directions running operations? We've already said no - at least they should not. How then do these various staffs and area divisions know where it is pertinent to run operations to get information or to conduct operations of unorthodox types? The requirements will come from any outside agency or the NSC - do we have the information that is needed? Who determines whether or not we have to use clandestine means to get the information? OCD will send, if they determine the information is not available in Washington or anywhere else, the requirements to this particular unit of the FI staff. There FI will review it again so far as our DD/P capabilities are concerned. DD/P will say it can perform the job or that it cannot; and if it can perform the job, it will be that unit in the staff that will determine who will do the job- the screening type of section or unit in FI that will say this will be done by such and such a division. These are the requirements and the requirements will be set up and the division will set up operations, plans to conduct the operations, get the information, the information to be obtained, come back to Washington and go up again to FI, back again to OCD and ultimately to the consumer who is interested.

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