## CORIETACKITIAL

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## Office Memorandum • United States Government

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	1. On 28 October 1958 a visit was made to	
	to monitor the progress of RD-128,	
	Task Order 7, study of noise modulated Participating in	
	discussions concerning this program were:	
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tors representing mark and space. An exact duplicate of the key generator

signal used at the transmitter must be available at the receiver for comparison purposes, and it is here that the principal shortcoming of the multiplier-integrator technique is evident. Precise time information

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is needed to keep the two reference signals in synchronism, since the slightest drift causes the correlation detector cutput to fall off sharply, and with very much "loss of sync" the intended receiver is no more able to demodulate the incoming noise signal than is the enemy intercept station. Attempts have been made to transmit the reference signal to the receiver on another frequency, according to but the path losses and distortion introduced make such a solution practically worthless.	. 2
5. In the second method, an impulse is sent into a complex filter, and	
the output of the filter, which appears as a badly distorted noise signal, is transmitted to the receiver. There it is fed into a complementary filter	
and emerges as a reasonable facsimile of the original pulse. These two	
filters, observed, are merely a split delay line. The structure	2
of the delay line is changed constantly according to a prearranged code to	0.54
frustrate enemy analysis. Precise time synchronism is not necessary with	25X1
matched filter systems, but the complexity of the filters makes it doubtful	25X1
that this is a suitable approach for our noise modulated	2
for and that it was being constructed at	2
It is a 60 wpm system using a 10 kc bandwidth.	25X1
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6. said that it was now possible to predict certain things	2
about the proposed noise modulated that were not certain	2
when the program began. A crystal oven in the field unit now appears almost	
inevitable, since the stability of the transmitted signal is extremely critical. If more than about 10 cycles of frequency drift occurs, according	
to preliminary calculations, the message could be missed completely. FSK	
modulation will probably be used and about 23 db of signal compression is	
anticipated. It may be advisable to begin transmitting the signal gradually	
so that there is no abrupt increase in noise level on the operating frequency.	
strongly urged that a similar to that used to	2
be incorporated into the receiving equipment to combat	2
multipath. He said that 7 to 8 db of signal power would be lost if multipath reflections - which contain a sizable amount of the transmitted energy - are	
not recovered and correlated. The contractor inquired whether a short burst	
of CW could precede the transmitted message for time and frequency synchroni-	
zation. He was told that such a solution was highly unsatisfactory and asked	
to investigate the suitability of a 100 millisecond recognition signal using	
a very simple code which would carry little or no information but which might	
solve the recognition problem. He was told that the base station would	2
know	2

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