


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Significant Dates ▶

[ASTERISK denotes ANNIVERSARIES. All others are CURRENT EVENTS]

MAR

- 21-28 World Youth Week celebrated by World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY: Communist front).
- 25* Treaties creating European Economic Community (EEC) and European Community of Atomic Energy (Euratom) signed in Rome by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. 1957. TENTH ANNIVERSARY.
- 27* Khrushchev succeeds Bulganin as Premier of USSR. 1957.
- 27-5 International Union of Students Congress at Ulan Bator, Mongolia. (IUS: Soviet-line Communist front)
- 29 Martyrs' Day and Youth Day. (Communist China)

APR

- 1* Berlin Blockade begins. In 15 months, US and Britain airlift 2.34 million tons of vital supplies to city. (Blockade lifted by Soviets, 12 May 1949) 1948.
- 4* North Atlantic Treaty signed, including US, Canada and 10 West European countries. 1949.
- 11 International Day of Liberation from Fascism. Celebrated by International Federation of Resistance Movements (Communist front).
- 14 Day of Aid to Spanish Youth. Celebrated by World Federation of Democratic Youth and International Union of Students. (WFDY and IUS: Communist fronts).
- 16* USSR and Germany sign Treaty of Rapallo; secret military accord enables Germany to evade Treaty of Versailles by training men and testing and building weapons in USSR. 1922. FORTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY.
- 17* Lenin delivers "April Theses" in first public appearance after return to Russia. 1917. FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY.
- 18-27* First Bandung Conference: 29 Afro-Asian countries participate. 1955.
- 24 World Youth Day Against Colonialism and For Peaceful Coexistence. Celebrated by WFDY and IUS. (Communist fronts)
- 26* 19 Foreign Ministers meet at Geneva on Indochina; 21 July, agree on armistice effective 11 August. Vietnam partitioned, Laos and Cambodia recognized as neutral. 1954.
- 28 "Expo 67" opens in Montreal with Bloc participation.

MAY

- 1 May Day -- International Workers' Day. First designated by Second International (Socialist Congress) in 1889.
- 7* V-E Day, end of World War II. 1945.
- 15* Third International declared dissolved by Soviets; 1943. Announcement on 22 May 1943 declares other Communist Parties to be autonomous.

Media Lines

13 February 1967

EAST GERMAN NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION FIGURES. According to East German published figures, there are 38 daily newspapers in East Germany, and their combined circulation exceeds 6,000,000 copies per day. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, East Berlin, official organ of ruling SED (Communist) Party, leads the dailies with a circulation of 800,000. Other important dailies and their circulations are: FREIE PRESSE (Karl-Marx-Stadt), 490,000; FREIHEIT (Halle), 400,000; LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG (Leipzig), 360,000; and VOLKSSTIMME (Magdeburg) with about 300,000. There are also eight large illustrated weekly newspapers in East Germany which have a combined circulation of nearly 4,000,000. Comparable figures on other Eastern European countries are not readily available. The significance of the above figures is that in this Communist country there is one Party daily for every third citizen or about 75% percent of all households in East Germany receive SED papers. The circulation figures of the "non-Party" press is relatively low. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Briefly Noted ✓

13 February 1967

History The Glorious Soviet
Made to Thirties
Order

The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution is an occasion for Communists to recall, not only the Revolution itself, (See BPG 199, Item #1055, 12 Sept. 66) but also the 50 years of Soviet rule which followed it. On the whole, they would probably rather not recall those 50 years in too much detail, since there is much in the Soviet history of that period which is hard to reconcile with the current Soviet line, or indeed with any normal person's beliefs about how people ought to behave. This is particularly true for the period of the 1930's.

A Soviet historian, Vladimir Yakovlevich Klimushev, gave on 16 January a broadcast talk for Soviet domestic audiences on "The Party in the Struggle to Build and Consolidate Socialism in 1933-1941." Not surprisingly, Klimushev emphasized the first, second, and third constitution; the "unification" of "the western Ukraine and western Belorussia" (i.e., Eastern Poland) with the USSR; the "restoration of the Soviet system" in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. His talk was more interesting for its omissions:

- 1) Stalin's name was mentioned only once, in its alphabetical position in a list of 15 party leaders.
- 2) No mention was made of mass deaths connected with collectivization.

3) No mention was made of the blood purges of party members, Red Army leaders, and "nationalists" following the murder of Kirov (December 1934) and lasting until 1939, taking a toll of over a million lives.

4) No mention was made of Stalin's use of slave labor camps.

5) No mention was made of the Nazi-Soviet pact, which made possible the Soviet annexation of Eastern Poland and the Baltic States -- as well as encouraging Hitler to start World War II.

All these events are apparently "unhistory," even more than in Khrushchev's day.

Since Klimushev's talk was a live domestic broadcast, only those assets can refer to it which would plausibly have knowledge of such broadcasts. We have presented it here, however, as we suspect that it may typify other yet-to-be published Soviet treatment of the last 50 years during the anniversary year; we expect that articles and books will also appear which will be more notable, like Klimushev's broadcast, for what they do not say than for their actual contents. (This seems especially likely regarding Soviet leadership; thirty of the fifty years were under Stalin, and ten were

under Khrushchev, both now being played down or overlooked in Soviet output.) Some of our assets should be equipped and prepared to supply the missing information.


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Who Smashes Sino-Soviet Struggle for
Whom? Writers' Allegiance

(UNCLASSIFIED) Nowhere is the struggle for leadership of the Afro-Asian movement more pronounced than in the writers' movement. The Afro-Asian Writers' Bureau (AAWB) split last summer and set up two separate secretariats, one in Peking and one (Soviet-controlled) in Cairo, each claiming to carry on the functions of the former Ceylon secretariat (See BPG 196, item #1048, dated 1 August 1966 and item #1096 in this BPG). In recent weeks representatives of the Peking-based Bureau have toured Asian and African countries trying to enlist support for a Peking-oriented writers conference which is to rival a Soviet-sponsored writers meeting to be held in Beirut from either 11-18 or 18-25 March. A preparatory meeting for the Beirut conference was held in Cairo last November. The Chinese have bitterly and repeatedly denounced the Soviet "splittist" activities. On 15 January NCNA reported that revolutionary writers, journalists, and other freedom fighters from 20 Afro-Asian "countries and regions" at a meeting in Peking on the 14th strongly condemned the Soviet revisionist clique for having engineered the Cairo preparatory meeting for the "bogus" Third Conference of Afro-Asian Writers. But it would seem that the Chinese have failed so far to muster the necessary support for their meeting -- for they have not as yet announced a date or

place -- although in mid-December they claimed that their meeting would boycott and "smash" the Beirut conference. (END UNCLASSIFIED)

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WESTERN EUROPE

23. In addition to the Boffa article described (J 10), the Italian Communist press has recently carried a number of perceptive comments on China. It also reveals (J 18) that the Chinese have barred a PCI journalist, accrediting an unknown representative of the obscure pro-Chinese NUOVA UNITA as Italy's Communist journalist: moreover, it claims, the Chinese have recently approved accreditation for other Italian papers controlled by wealthy industrialists.

LATIN AMERICA

24. Castro announces plans for a Cuban "new society" which sounds suspiciously like Mao's all-embracing communes. (J 29) He also appears to be having difficulty winning Soviet approval of a new 1-year trade pact. (J 25)

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(ADVERTISEMENT)

THE TORCH THAT WAS EXTINGUISHED --
The February Revolution Approaches
Its 50th Anniversary

The liberal Russian revolution, called the "February Revolution" because it began on February 23rd on the Old Style (Julian) Calendar, broke out 50 years ago. (On our modern calendar, on 8 March 1917.) This popular uprising, in which workers and soldiers really fought for freedom, made hopes rise throughout the world. It seemed that democracy had triumphed in the citadel of absolutism.

Unfortunately, hopes for Russian liberty were shattered in the so-called October Revolution eight months later -- actually a Bolshevik "putsch," without mass participation. The Communists are already celebrating the October Revolution; we should see to it that the real revolution is not forgotten.

For details, see strategic guidance item #1055: "February 1917: The Real Russian Revolution," issued last September 12th in BPG No. 199.

WORLD COMMUNIST AFFAIRS

CHRONOLOGY

The Chinese "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (GPCR)

Reporting on the tumultuous events in China has further increased and is more confused than ever. Posters appear in the name of various Red Guard units from institutions in Peking and in other cities, and posters attacking a certain leader have sometimes disappeared a few hours later, replaced by others defending the same individual. Newspapers and radio stations announce that they have been taken over by Maoist "revolutionary rebels" who have seized power from "the handful of persons in authority who are following a reactionary, revisionist line": however, the Maoists claim that some of these "take-overs" are phoney, staged by oppositionist elements sailing under false colors ("waving the Red Flag to oppose the Red Flag") to "hoodwink" the people. As of the end of the period, it appears that the press organs in 11 of the 27 provincial capitals have been taken over by Maoist rebels, and the radio stations in 11 (not entirely identical) -- but this is far from "hard" information, and new developments are reported daily: two of the radio take-overs -- Kunming (Yunnan Province) and Harbin (Heilungkiang) -- are reported on the last day of our period, the 30th.

Under these circumstances, it is hardly practicable to follow our usual chronological pattern. Instead, we will attempt to provide an outline summary of what seem to be the principal developments, with specific reference to, or quotes from, only the "hardest" items: i.e., articles from main Chinese press organs or radios or eyewitness accounts by competent observers.

A. The story behind the GPCR: materials appearing in Peking during the first week of January (posters and wall newspapers describing speeches by Mao and Lin Piao to the October "Work Conference" of the CCP/CC, confirmed in part by the January 1 RED FLAG/PEOPLE'S DAILY joint editorial) provide the following information on the genesis of the CR, from the Maoist point of view:

-- Mao reportedly says that he erred in 1958 when he relinquished all positions other than Party Chairman, leaving Teng Hsiao-ping GenSecy and Liu Shao-chi Chief of State. They gradually consolidated their grip on the party and state, which steadily drifted away from a true Maoist course. "Mao tried to rectify the situation by taking up the problem at the ... (CC meeting) in September and October 1965. However, Mao could not ... because the capital had already been firmly fortified by a group of anti-Party revisionists led by Peng Chen, former Peking mayor and the first to suffer in the current purge. Therefore, Mao had no choice but to leave Peking and go to Shanghai in order to launch his attack against the revisionist group in the capital." (Tokyo YOMIURI's Peking correspondent on Jan. 6.) (Note: it was a Shanghai paper, LIBERATION DAILY, which in Nov. 1965 published the first Yao Wen-yuan article seen as launching the CR.)

-- For 8 months, the CR was apparently limited largely to inside maneuvering at the top of the Party, during which Lin Piao's stature visibly increased: we still have little more than published editorials and articles as evidence of what really happened during this period.

-- By late May, Mao was ready to move against Peng and carry his CR to the "people" -- with first priority to the universities. As the Jan. 1 joint RF/PD editorial puts it:

"On 1 June 1966, Chairman Mao decided that the country's first M-L big-character poster, posted first at Peking University, should be publicized. This kindled the raging flames of the GPCR and set in motion the mass movement which has as its main target for attack the handful of persons within the Party who are in authority who took the capitalist road...."

Simultaneously, the Maoist press carried a series of purple editorials on the urgent need to head off a full-scale revisionist counter-revolution (a parallel to Hungary was mentioned). During the months of June and July (with Mao out of Peking again), the CC sent out a number of "work teams" to prosecute the CR: however, it is now revealed by posters that the teams often tended to counter extreme demands and violence by local groups, then already bearing the "Red Guards" name.

-- Returning to Peking late in July, Mao was dissatisfied with the performance of the Party's work teams: either before or during the August 1-12 plenum (where, although strongly supported by Lin Piao, Mao and his supporters reportedly were a minority), he decided to take the conduct of the CR away from the Party apparatus and give it to the "masses," represented by the Red Guards. Unleashed at the huge Aug. 18 rally, the Red Guards rampaged wildly throughout the country: their actions seemed to be increasingly directed against the established Party bureaucracy.

-- Obviously demoted in standing and of uncertain status, President Liu and GenSecy Teng apparently felt impelled at the October "Work Conference" to offer "self-criticism" of certain errors, principally in misguiding the work teams sent out during Mao's absence, thereby opposing the CR: the Maoists denounce this self-criticism as superficial.

B. December highlights: Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, appears in a leading role in the CR, becoming cultural advisor to the Army, dominating a mass meeting, publicly revealing opposition to the CR in top Party circles and implicitly acknowledging that the Maoists are a "temporary minority." Liu and Teng are repeatedly denounced as leaders of the "bourgeois, reactionary opposition" to Mao, Peng Chen and others are arrested and publicly humiliated,

-- and Tao Chu, CCP Propaganda Chief and leader of the CR (who had made the "great leap" from a ranking somewhere around 90th in the hierarchy to a conspicuous 4th in 1966, and who personally made the first public charges against Liu and Teng), falls victim of concerted attacks by the end of the month. As the month ends, the Maoists make the (possibly fateful) decision to carry their GPCR into the factories and fields, insisting defensively that it would help, not hinder, production: the charter and marching order for this "new situation" are set forth in the important Jan. 1 joint RED FLAG/PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial.

C. "Civil war" in January: The decision to carry the CR into industry brings strong opposition from the entrenched bureaucracy in provinces and cities throughout the land, from the local Party organizations and administrative organs, Party-controlled labor and other mass organizations, and from masses of workers. Numerous reports tell of bloody battling against Red Guard intrusions, strikes and widespread disruption of production and transport, etc. The Maoists launch a drive to "seize power" from the existing organs - still referred to as "a handful of persons in authority in (the local) Party Committee who have taken the capitalist road." Following traditional Communist tactics, they aim their top-priority "take-over" efforts at the communications media. Reporting of developments in the provinces thus tends to convey only a Maoist picture: a series of victorious take-overs, with negative developments acknowledged only after it can be reported that they have been overcome. By the 23rd, Mao orders the Army, heretofore held to a "non-interference" policy, to intervene on behalf of the Maoist "revolutionary rebels" when necessary, though a subsequent CC Military Affairs Committee directive prescribes moderation and "persuasion" rather than force. By the end of the month, Maoist media are triumphantly reporting examples of take-overs in which Army units have played a decisive role, --- even against large military formations such as the reported 20,000-man "August First Field Army" in Sinkiang, said to contain a quasi-military division of demobilized soldiers.

Note the increasing stature of Chou En-lai as a moderator, nominally loyal to Mao but publicly condemning extremes and urging moderation, even though he is occasionally attacked (and quickly defended) by posters. Four persons seem to be at the top of the Maoist team, the Mao pair, CR chief Chen Po-ta, and Army chief Lin Piao. (The latter has not been seen publicly since November and there was some speculation as to his status when a major purge of the Army's CR group was announced on the 11th, but his role would seem to be enhanced since the Army has openly entered the struggle.) On the other side, Liu and Teng still seem to enjoy the support of a large majority of the Party CC and apparatus, to the degree that the Maoists feel unable to go beyond verbal attacks on them.

The following seem to be the most significant specific developments of the period:

(1) The "Shanghai example": Within the first week of January bloody battling, strikes, etc, are reported in various places. The first and bitterest

fighting apparently begins on Jan. 3 in the major industrial city of Nanking, where, after almost a thousand casualties, Red Guard attacks are repelled by public security forces supported by the Army, with the arrest of 6,000 of the "rebels." (Nanking seems to be still controlled by the old Liu-loyal bureaucracy.)

On Jan. 5th, however, the local radio in Shanghai, largest of all Chinese cities, announces that one of the two principal S. dailies, WEN HUI PAO, on the 4th "determined to lean on ... the side of the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao ... (and) turned itself into a paper of the rebel revolutionaries." A "message to the people in S. from 11 revolutionary rebel organizations in S., including the S. workers' rebel HQ" follows. It tells how the "handful of persons..." tried to suppress the revolution by various devious means, including inciting the masses ("with the appearance of extreme 'leftists' and the sweetness of 'revolutionary' words") to sabotage production by leaving their jobs and going "north" to "deliver an indictment." Next day, S. radio announces that the other principal paper, LIBERATION DAILY (which in Nov. 1965 first published the first CR article), "has also been placed under the new management of the rev. rebels." Various materials from these papers describing "the present excellent situation of the GCR in S." are broadcast over the next few days, including a commentary on the 8th which concludes that "the bourgeois reactionary line is now approaching total collapse." On the 9th, however, all carry an "urgent notice issued today by the rev. rebellion HQ of S. workers and 31 other rev. mass organizations" which names the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee (SMPC) as leading the opposition:

"... We hereby solemnly warn the SMPC that no schemes aimed at shifting the line of struggle through disrupting production, interrupting communications, and increasing wages and material benefits will ever succeed...."

Because (as noted below) Maoist media publicize this notice throughout the land as a model for all rebels, we briefly outline its 10 points:

1. "Grasp the revolution and stimulate production."
2. Take prompt action to persuade and mobilize workers and functionaries who are exchanging rev. experience elsewhere to return to S. immediately.
3. Authorizations for travel for exchanging rev. experience are cancelled, and money advanced must be repaid.
4. The "circulating funds" of all offices, organizations, and enterprises are frozen.
5. "Matters related to the readjustment of wages, and back payment of wages and material benefits," shall be dealt with later.
6. Paying students higher wages for labor when they are integrated with workers and peasants "is a revisionist practice pure and simple" and must be stopped.

7. Seizing or inciting to seize public buildings, including houses confiscated from capitalists, shall be dealt with by law, and "those who moved into houses seized by force must move back to their original lodgings within one week."
8. Those opposed to Mao, Lin Piao and the CR shall be immediately arrested.
9. All rebels must immediately carry through the above points "and turn on all organs of propaganda to popularize them and educate the masses."
10. Anyone violating these points shall, after investigation, be immediately punished.

The extent of the disruption which had actually prevailed in Shanghai is revealed during the following weeks as the media report a continuing series of "victories" against sabotage: the end of strikes in electricity and water services, rail transport, shipping and shipbuilding, etc.

On the 15th, S. radio declares that the grouping of 32 organizations which had signed the "urgent notice" was "completely under the control of the SMPC," used as "a tool by the SMPC," and "has already been smashed to pieces," -- as it announces the formation of a new "Workers Rev. Rebel Liaison Dept." to replace the old.

An unconfirmed report in the Hong Kong SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST on the 25th from its S. correspondent tells how the S. mayor and a large group of former SMPC officials have been paraded through the city for several days in open trucks wearing dunce caps and bearing placards. But, on the 28th S. radio broadcasts a new "urgent notice" to workers in the suburbs and rural areas, its tone betraying concern about the situation outside the city.

(2) The battle against "economism": Two top-level documents are published on Jan. 11* --

(a) a greetings message signed by the CCP/CC, the State Council, the Military Affairs Committee of the CCP/CC, and the Cultural Revolution Group under the CCP/CC, to the signatories of the Shanghai "urgent notice": it calls their "rev. actions... a brilliant example" and calls on "the workers, peasants, rev. students, rev. intellectuals, and rev. cadres throughout the country to take concerted action and to beat back the new counterattack..."

(b) a joint RED/FLAG PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. "Oppose economism and smash the latest counterattack by the bourgeois reactionary line." It says that the Shanghai "urgent notice" has "vividly and penetratingly revealed the big conspiracy of the reactionary elements ... using the 'sugar-coated bullets' of economic benefits to seduce a part of the masses." This is "economism," "garbage picked up from the rubbish dump of old style and modern revisionism," which "uses bourgeois ultrademocracy to replace proletarian democratic centralism," etc.

"It is a form of bribery that caters to the psychology of a few backward people among the masses, corrupts the masses' revolutionary will, and leads the ... masses onto the wrong road ... to disregard the interests of the state and the collective ... and to pursue only personal and short-term interests...."

*Wall posters on the 10th stated that Mao had returned to Peking to take personal charge of the CR.

(3) A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 22nd frankly admits:

"... Right from the beginning, the GPCR has been a struggle for the seizure of power.... He who has power has everything: he who is without power has nothing. Of all the important things, the possession of power is most important!

Such being the case, the revolutionary masses, with a deep hatred for the class enemy, grind their teeth and, with steel-like determination, make up their minds to unite, form a great alliance, and seize power! power!!! and more power!!!"

(4) The Army enters the fray: On the same day, Mao is reported (by a poster appearing on the 23rd) as ordering Lin Piao to rescind the old directive on "the so-called non-interference" (which is now "false non-interference") and issue a new order that the Army should send help to "the leftwing and revolutionary masses" when they ask for it. On the 23rd, NCNA declares that "the commanders and fighters of the three services of the Chinese PLA have pledged their most resolute support to the rev. rebels seizing Party, state, financial, and other power...." -- carried as top news by all media on the 24th. LIBERATION ARMY DAILY makes it official policy in a short editorial on the 25th and a follow-up on the 27th. The former sets the rationale:

"The struggle to seize power constitutes a general counter-offensive against the attacks launched on the proletariat in the last 17 years by the bourgeois agents who wormed their way into the Party.... It is a conscious mass movement drawing in hundreds of millions of rev. people under the command of Mao Tse-tung's thought.... The PLA must firmly support and assist them (the proletarian revolutionaries), for this is a vital call from our great leader Chairman Mao.... Even though they may be just a minority temporarily, we must support them without the slightest hesitation.

Some people use 'non-intervention' as a pretext to suppress the masses in reality. This is absolutely impermissible....

'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.' The political power of the proletariat seized by the people's army with the gun, too.... We must follow Comrade Lin Piao's instruction...."

Some indication that this mandate was given ex post facto is seen in a wall newspaper reported in Peking on the 23rd describing the dispatch of PLA troops on the 22nd to Fangshan, only 25 miles southwest of Peking to defend rev. rebels who had been beaten and imprisoned by security forces when they launched an unsuccessful attack against anti-revolutionary elements on the 20th. "The dispatch of Army troops to Fangshan served greatly to raise the morale of the rev. rebels and to dishearten the reactionaries," the paper said, -- and this phrase is repeated throughout the remainder of the period, as Maoist media report the successful intervention of the Army in Harbin, Changchun (Kirin Province), Huhehot (Inner Mongolia), Hefei (Anhui), and other places.

(5) Dissension and purges in the Army: Liu Chih-chien, Deputy Director of the Army's Gen. Political Dept. and official responsible for purging the Army of anti-Maoist elements, is denounced by a Jan. 9 poster for blocking the purge: he is among the missing from the "hamelist of members" of the newly reorganized "cultural revolution group" of the Army publicized on the 11th. At the head is Hsu Hsiang-chien, with Chiang Ching (Mrs. Mao) as his Advisor. However, five of the 18 members named are strongly attacked by posters within the following days, including Hsu himself and his First Deputy, Hsiao Hua (the latter two subsequently defended by Chou). Other prominent military coming under heavy attack include the 80-year-old hero Chu Teh, the politically powerful Ho Lung, and Tang Ping-chou, editor of the LIBERATION ARMY JOURNAL. Lin Piao is reported as having denounced Ho Lung, -- but the denunciation of Hsiao Hua, an old associate of Lin's, is attributed to Chiang Ching, -- and so it goes!

It is worthy of note that Ho Lung's nephew, Yang Shang-kun, purged last summer from his job as CC Secretary, is accused by Red Guard wall newspaper COMBAT on the 19th of being "an important spy" who has "often conferred secretly with the Soviet Ambassador and conveyed important secret documents to the USSR," "installed microphones in the residence of Mao Tse-tung to spy on him," etc. Yang is accused of plotting a coup d'etat with three other purged leaders: Peng Chen, former Army Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ching, and Culture Minister Lu Ting-i.

(6) Denunciations and purges of other figures: Few of the top figures in the Party, state and society have escaped denunciation during this period, but it is difficult to determine who has been purged and who is still on his job. Public humiliation seems to be a good criterion, and the three named at the end of the above paragraph were among 20 shown bearing placards in photos displayed in Peking early in the month.

(7) Seizure of power at the top: According to a wall newspaper posted at the Peking Municipal Party Committee HQ on Jan 29, a "Peking Revolutionary Rebel Commune," established at a "congress of representatives of the worker, peasant, soldier and student rev. rebel factions" of 30 "revolutionary organizations" meeting on the 28th in response to Chen Po-ta's call, "will assume and execute the overall power of Peking

Municipality." The 30 organizations are identified as: "the Institute of Politics and Law, which seized the Public Security Bureau; the Mao Tse-tung Thought Combat Corps of the Broadcasting Administration Bureau, which seized the central Radio Station; and the Ching-kang Shan Corps of the Teachers' College, which supported the Maoist faction in republishing PEOPLE'S DAILY; as well as organizations embracing wide circles, such as the Academy of Sciences, the No. 1 Machine Tool Factory, etc."

The take-over of 11 or 12 central ministries had been reported during the period Jan. 14-19, as well as the Peking Public Security Bureau on the 9th and Peking Radio on the 15th. What the rule of the new "Commune" in Peking will mean for the nation as a whole remains to be seen.

Meanwhile Maoist media have reported a continuing series of take-overs of provincial and municipal media, institutions, local administrations and Party Committees throughout the land, often with considerable confusion and leaving much room for doubt as to the validity of the claims.

(8) Noteworthy Miscellany: (a) Beginning with Copenhagen on the 8th, news media in various capitals around the world report the departure of Chinese personnel for Peking, presumably to face the CR: it is indicated that a large part of the diplomatic staffs and most students and other personnel are involved.

(b) Radio Peking on the 29th announces: "the State Council has decided that there will be no holidays during the spring festival of 1967. The spring festival home leaves of workers will be postponed." ("Spring festival" is the Communist label applied to the traditional lunar new year celebration.)

(c) Various posters and wall papers have used the terms "Crimson Guards" and "Red Flag units," presumably to apply to groupings of adult Maoist shock troops, complementing the youthful Red Guards.

(d) Posters reported on Jan. 27 say that the 77-year-old former Acting President of the Nationalist Chinese Government, General Li Tsung-jen, who defected to Peking from his exile in the U.S. in 1965, was arrested as an "American agent," -- on testimony of his young wife of less than a year!

(e) Liu Shao-chi's son, Liu Yun-jo, identified as leader of the "916 Revolutionary Rebellion Regiment" of the 7th Machinebuilding Ministry (aircraft), is reported as criticizing his father at a mass rally on the 6th: on the 20th he is reported arrested on charges of spying for a foreign country!

* * * * *

Chronology Continued

Throughout the period: Soviet and other Communist media continue their recent pattern of coverage of events in China.

January 3: Czech agency CTK publicizes a statement by SecyGen Sallant of the Prague-based WFTU on "the illegal and drastic measures ... taken by special groups in the CPR ... against the All-China Federation of Trade Unions" (reportedly closed late December).

NCNA Cairo describes an AAPSO press conference at which the Soviets tried unsuccessfully to stop the Chinese Liang Keng from finishing a statement, aroused the indignation of the participants, and finally, with "their handful of followers," "fled amidst cries of 'renegades!' and 'shame!'" The Chinese finished and was applauded.

January 4: Radio Moscow gives its version of the above press conference: the Chinese tried to "spread coarse slander against the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union," but met with a worthy rebuff and "shouts of 'shame!'" from those present. AAPSO SecyGen as-Sibai declared the conference closed after the Soviet walk-out and himself left the hall, while the Chinese "continued to talk alone!"

NCNA Budapest reports that Li Shou-pao, Chinese Secy to the World Peace Council, denounces the WPC Secretariat for "scheming and playing tricks on the extension of his Austrian visa," so as to oust him from the Vienna WPC HQ, -- blaming it all on manipulation of the WPC by the Soviet revisionists.

In a Moscow press conference, the three Soviet correspondents ousted from China in December (#9) condemn Chinese anti-Soviet actions and the CR in general. They particularly object to Chinese statements attributed to anonymous Soviet citizens supporting Mao's line. "Chinese newspapers are not beyond even using fake documents. Thus they published ... an anonymous letter from 'one Soviet Komsomol member.' Krushinskiy, who earlier worked in Chinas as a translator, remarked that the specific expressions and vocabulary used in this 'letter' showed clearly that it was originally written in Chinese...."

January 4-8: The French CP holds its 18th Congress, with observers from "more than 40" foreign CPs, including two ministers from Hanoi and a Vietcong delegation, -- but none from China or Albania. Denunciations of Chinese policies come throughout, from SecyGen Rochet's opening report, through Soviet chief delegate Pelshe's speech on the 6th to the closing resolution, -- which calls for the convocation of a world CP conference "as promptly as possible." Pelshe on the conference says the CPSU agrees with other FPs that favorable conditions are being created and declares that "more than 60 parties have come out in favor" of it.

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January 4 and continuing: Beginning with Moscow and Leningrad on the 4th, CPSU officials are reported fanning out over the entire country to address meetings of local party units on the results of the Dec 12-13 CC plenum, which was devoted almost entirely to "the new, dangerous stage" of Mao's "anti-Soviet policy."

January 5: PRAVDA promotes a world CP conference in its editorial -- "Clear Aims, Bold Plans" -- and in an article by Polish Politburo member Loga-Sowinski, who adds that the convocation of the conference should not be dependent on whether or not the CCP or any other party attends it.

French pro-Chinese Communist dissident L'HUMANITE NOUVELLE publishes first installment in French of the purported "programmatic pamphlet" of an underground "Bolshevik CPSU" published by the Albanians December 20. (Belgian pro-Chinese dissident organ LA VOIX DU PEUPLE began serialization Dec. 30.)

The 37-year-old program director of the Moscow State Circus, Eduard Ruschat, defects from the touring circus in Nuremberg, West Germany, and requests political asylum: it is granted Jan. 19.

January 5 and following: Chinese media continue to charge Soviet collusion with U.S. imperialism.

January 5, 13, 17, 20: Tirana Radio continues to broadcast to Poland excerpts from the purported "document of the Provisional CC of the Polish CP" which it began on Dec. 30. (See also Jan 24)

January 6 & 8: Vladimirov article in TRUD paints grim picture of living conditions in Mao's China. He also notes "the fallacy of Chinese propaganda allegations that the CR is spearheaded against the bourgeoisie. China still has some 1.2 million capitalists who still receive large sums from the state as compensation for their seized capital...." PRAVDA on the 8th goes farther to say that "thus far, only the bourgeoisie ... has not been affected...!"

January 8: Reuters article in London SUNDAY TELEGRAPH from a special correspondent in Vienna cites East European sources for a report that the Chinese seized two Soviet SA-2 guided missile units in transit to Hanoi last spring and used or copied some of their sophisticated electronic equipment for their own program. (See Chinese reaction Jan 21-22.)

The CPSU/CC releases the text of an 8500-word "decision" on preparations for the 50th anniversary of the "Great October Socialist Revolution." Boasting of great successes, it concedes no difficulties within the USSR or in the ICM. It asserts that "the 50-year history has proved the correctness and vitality of M-L," -- and makes no explicit reference to the bitter polemical warfare with the Chinese over the true meaning of M-L, though it does say "any attempts to replace M-L with pseudorevolutionary phraseology and dogmas are inevitably a failure." Claiming "the widest, most representative and just democracy of all," it assigns anniversary tasks to the USSR

Academy of Sciences, "the Boards of the USSR writers, artists, composers, film workers, journalists," and even "the Union of Sport Societies and Organizations!"

January 9, 11, 23, 25: The Chinese and Indonesians continue their diplomatic warfare, including:

-- On the 9th, a Chinese Foreign Ministry note "hereby lodges the strongest protest" against the "atrocities of intensifying persecution and eviction of Chinese nationals." (It adds that "the I. Govt is just actively playing the role of an anti-Chinese flunkey in order to get rewards from the U.S. and the Soviet Union.")

-- On the 23rd, the I. Govt expels a Chinese Assistant Naval Attache apparently for conduct at a festival "endangering the relations between the two countries."

-- On the 25th, the Chinese expel an I. Asst Military Attache.

January 10: A Yugoslav CC plenum reaffirms its position that conditions are not ripe for an international CP conference.

Italian CP daily L'UNITA feature by the Party's Sinologist Giuseppe Boffa says that although dissent over such questions as the Great Leap, communes, and military organization had long been simmering in CCP, the current crisis was precipitated at a CC meeting late in the spring of 1966 when Peng Chen criticized Mao and Lin Piao's foreign policy and about half the CC members sided with him. Boffa claims major issues were: (a) Peng advocated joint action with USSR for united front in Vietnam; (b) Peng, Liu, and Teng called for Party control of the Cultural Revolution; and (c) the latter opposed Lin Piao's urge to promote the international scope of Maoism. Boffa says that Liu, Teng and Peng are by no means pro-Soviet but must have come to realization that China can not fight simultaneously against American imperialism and her own "natural allies," the USSR and other socialist countries.

Japanese CP daily AKAHATA announces the expulsion of 3 more senior members on charges such as "acting as an agent for a certain foreign party."

January 10, 13, 16, 18, 27: The multi-faceted problems of the Soviets in their relations with the Indonesian regime is evident in a series of documents:

-- On the 10th, the Albanian ZERI I POPULLIT denounces "the obvious intensification of political and economic relations between the Soviet revisionist leaders and the I. fascist regime, which "proves" that they are "the friends of the assassins of the I. Communists and patriots".

-- On the 13th in PRAVDA and on the 16th over Radio Peace and Progress, the Soviets decry the "anti-Communist hysteria" in I. and recent moves to the right, including agreements opening the door to U.S. private investments.

-- On the 18th a NEW TIMES article by two Soviet journalists who recently visited I. cites opinions expressed there by some people that the coup attempt "was the outcome of provocations by Western counterespionage and Peking," while others, "without touching on the question of possible provocation, linked the cause of the tragic events in I. with the direct interference of the Chinese leaders in the internal affairs of that country."

-- PRAVDA on the 27th denounces Anwar Dharma, the former Moscow correspondent of the PKI daily HARIAN RAKJAT who was expelled last September (and who found asylum in Peking) of "slandering the Soviet people and distorting the policies of the SovGovt in an attempt to turn the readers of HR against everything Soviet." (NCNA publicized a long Dharma statement denouncing the Soviets on Oct. 5, #7.)

January 11: TASS Algiers reports the signing of a contract under which "a large group of Soviet oil and gas specialists will come to Algeria to work for the National Society of Oil and Gas Transportation."

January 11 and continuing: NCNA reports the arrival in Peking of an Albanian military delegation headed by Minister of Defense and Politburo member Balluku, at the invitation of Comrade Lin Piao, -- but Lin is not reported in any contact with them, while Chou En-lai heads the Chinese delegation at the reception. An Albanian political delegation headed by Politburo member Kapo arrives on the 13th. Chou hosts at a banquet for both delegations on the 14th, -- but still no report of Lin. (The Albanians are reported meeting with Mao after the end of the period.)

January 12: Djakarta Radio announces the capture of two more former PKI leaders.

January 13 & 26: Soviet media imply Chinese interest in collusion with the U.S., e.g.:

-- On the 26th, TASS New York comment on the "secret meetings" between the U.S. and Chinese Ambassadors in Warsaw, concluding: "A guarded exchange is said to have been made last year to avoid a direct encounter over Vietnam."

January 15: NCNA Peking publicizes a new statement of "revolutionary Afro-Asian writers, journalists, and freedom fighters from 20 A-A countries and regions" which "strongly condemned" Soviet-engineered preparations in Cairo for a "bogus 'Third A-A Writers Conference!'" (See #9, Dec. 17 for the first statement.)

NCNA Peking: "The Political Science and Law Association of China sends a protest cable to the International Assn of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)

stating the refusal of the Chinese Lawyers to attend its 20th anniversary commemorative meeting and international inquiry meeting on 20 and 22 January 1967 in Paris, and lodged a strong protest" against conspiracy and Soviet manipulation. The last straw apparently came with the decision to "openly invite a UNESCO representative to attend: "This has crudely exposed the ugly features of the IADL and the UN working hand in glove."

January 16-17: Chinese Foreign Ministry sends a note to the Indian Embassy protesting a large number of Indian troop and air intrusions into Chinese territory in 1966. Next day NCNA accuses the "Indian reactionaries" of "scheming to rig up an anti-Chinese alliance in southeast Asia," -- "at the bidding of their backstage masters, U.S. imperialism and the Soviet revisionist leading group."

January 17-18: Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny make an "unofficial friendly visit" to Warsaw, where they re-state "full identity of views" with Polish leaders on the world situation and the WCM.

January 18: Italian CP daily L'UNITA explains (regarding a reader's question) that the Chinese do not permit it to have a correspondent in China, while they accredit as "Italy's Communist correspondent" an unknown and poorly informed reporter of the pro-Chinese NUOVA UNITA and have even approved recent applications for accreditation of some other Italian papers, such as CORRIERE DELLA SERA, "organ of Milan industrialists."

NCNA Damascus: "The Chinese trade union delegation to the third meeting of the International Trade Union Committee in Solidarity with the Workers and People of Aden withdrew from the conference this morning, because the USSR and the WFTU, which controlled the conference, illegally deprived the Chinese delegation of the right to speak."

January 21: AKAHATA reveals the Japanese CP's sensitivity to guilt by association with the CR: "Liberal-Democratic candidates now campaigning for the coming general elections are saying: 'Think of the Red Guards in China. If the JCP should be in power, Japan would be like China today.'" It concludes: "We can say that we will not adopt the method which China is following today."

A communique on 2-day talks between Italian CP SecyGen Longo and Yugoslav boss Tito at the latter's residence in Brioni acknowledges that they "paid particular attention to an exchange of views on current problems of the contemporary ICM" and the talks "showed the existence of full mutual understanding."

PEOPLE'S DAILY commentary on "the 18th anniversary of the founding of the Laotian People's Liberation Army" says: "They have grasped the most effective weapon to defeat U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. This weapon is Chairman Mao's thought on people's war."

January 21-22: With an NCNA commentary on the 21st and a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article next day, the Chinese blast the story on Chinese hi-jacking of Soviet missiles carried by the London SUNDAY TELEGRAPH on Jan. 8 (see above): "The Soviet revisionist leading group is spreading shameless lies through the Western press about China's 'pirating' of Soviet missiles sent to aid Vietnam.... The purpose of this is to belittle our great achievement in guided missile-nuclear weapon test and to besmirch the good international reputation now enjoyed by the CPR." (NCNA)

East German ADN and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND publicize a long "Appeal by the Committee for Preparation of the 50th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution." The adulatory document in one passage contrasts the SED to "the attitude of that group of leaders of the CCP," saying: "Successes in the building of socialism are only possible in fraternal cooperation with the Soviet Union and the rest of socialist countries."

January 22: Western correspondents describe a Moscow police action to break up a demonstration by 50 young Russians protesting the arrest last week of four other young persons, "understood to be facing investigation on possible charges of spreading anti-Soviet material." The demonstrators had gathered at the statue of Pushkin and unfurled banners calling for the repeal of "the unconstitutional Article 70" (of the Criminal Code, providing for a prison sentence of up to 10 years for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda").

January 23: TANYUG Peking reports the appearance of posters announcing the formation of "a revolutionary CP of Bolsheviks" in the USSR, a similar party in Poland, and an "M-L group" in Yugoslavia.

A Soviet-U.S. agreement on reciprocal air service is signed.

January 24: Japanese CP daily AKAHATA, seizing as a pretext a passage from a Peking wall newspaper that "the revisionist JCP refused to accept" amendments proposed by Mao to a draft communique on the visit of a Miyamoto-led JCP delegation in March 1966, tells a revealing "inside story" of Mao's crude last-minute effort to browbeat them into accepting the inclusion in the communique of a denunciation of the CPSU leadership, "and, furthermore, a stand of a united front against the U.S. and the USSR," -- after a satisfactory draft had been carefully worked out to accommodate the differing views of the two parties and accepted by the CCP delegation of Chou En-lai, Peng Chen, Kang Sheng, Liu Ning-i, and Liao Cheng-chih.

"The center of the disagreement ... was not simply whether struggles should be organized against 'Soviet revisionism' but whether a revolutionary double-faced policy should be pursued toward the CPSU leadership -- which is now being forced to take a double-faced attitude in the face of the ferocious escalation of U.S. imperialism's aggression in Vietnam and under pressure from the international anti-imperialist forces -- so that their activities for an anti-imperialist united front can be encouraged and, at the same time, their misbehavior

can be criticized, or whether a stand should be taken to regard the CPSU leadership as an enemy as ferocious as U.S. imperialism, thereby forming a united front against both the U.S. and the Soviet Union."

"... At the eleventh hour ... Mao in his 'bitter criticism' tried to force the Chinese views on our Party.... The only and they main reason why they have insultingly called our Party 'revisionist' is that our Party delegation did not give unconditional approval to Comrade Mao Tse-tung's arguments...."

The Japanese press gives heavy play to the article.

While PRAVDA again rejoices in "world Communist support" of the CPSU, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA carries stories of Chinese oppression of the Moslem peoples of Sinkiang told by four Kazakhs who recently escaped across the border to the USSR. One tells how, in the Chinese drive for forced assimilation, "young Kazakh, Uighur, and Kirgiz girls are taken away from their parents and forced under penalty of death to marry Chinese."

NCNA Peking: "PEOPLE'S DAILY today carries an article entitled 'Let Johnson Weep' written by a group of Red Guards commenting on 'the recent stinking State of the Union message by U.S. robber chieftain Johnson.'" After shrilly denouncing those passages aimed toward conciliation with China, it says:

"But the Soviet revisionist leading group valued it so highly that they published it in their press, accompanied by pictures of J. smiling, to boost him. There is nothing strange in this, for U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism are birds of a feather....

... We shall not only undertake the Chinese revolution, but also undertake the world revolution.... Be it U.S. imperialism or Soviet revisionism...."

Tirana Radio reports that "Enver Hoxha ... has received a greetings message from Kazimierz Szyman (phonetic), SecyGen of the provisional CC of the Polish CP."

January 24-31: Soviet President Podgorny's visit to Italy, including a talk with the Pope on the 30th, does not reveal any unexpected results, but causes minor demonstrations for and against (including bomb explosions). L'UNITA article initialed by PCI foreign specialist Pajetta on the 28th takes strong exception to IZVESTIYA articles on visit, especially one lauding the Fiat firm. "It can happen aywhere that a superficial, hasty journalist knocks out an unfortunate article and writes, let us call it by its name, a piece of stupidity.... But (we) ... say to IZVESTIYA with brotherly frankness: 'Dear comrades, this time you are quite mistaken.'"

January 25: A Moscow article in the LOS ANGELES TIMES summarizes evidence that a high-level Cuban trade delegation which has been in Moscow since Oct. 30 is having difficulty reaching agreement with the Soviets on a new 1-year trade pact.

January 25 and continuing: Sino-Soviet relations plunge to a new low as a result of the Chinese blow-up of a new incident of "bloody Soviet repression of Chinese students." (See March 4, 1965, and continuing for earlier case.) It begins at noon on the 25th as a group of 69 Chinese students returning from Europe to face the CR mount a demonstration at the Lenin Mausoleum in Red Square. According to Soviet accounts, they "took out booklets with quotations from Mao Tse-tung and, on command, raised them over their heads and began shouting anti-Soviet slogans." When the militia (police) tried to get them to move on and stop blocking entrance to the mausoleum, "they began insulting Soviet citizens standing nearby and causing unrest," going "so far as to strike a woman in the face" and "stomping on" another. According to the Chinese Embassy protest, as the peaceful Chinese "began to read aloud quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung after standing in silence, Soviet troops and police pushed and beat up the women students among them. Then, as the Chinese students turned to sing the Internationale, a large number of Soviet troops, policemen, and plainclothesmen attacked them from all sides and beat them up, thus committing a serious, shocking, and bloody incident." The note declares that Soviet Vice Foreign Minister Firyubin, who finally received the Chinese Embassy charge d'affaires at 1920 in the evening after stalling him off all afternoon, keeping him standing outside on the lawn more than an hour, "made a verbal statement which reversed right and wrong," and "even had the cheek to lodge a protest with the Chinese Embassy."

A Chinese Foreign Ministry statement next day expands the incident in the most "undiplomatic" language:

"... Listen, you chieftains of Soviet revisionism, Brezhnev, Kosygin, and the like: all those who suppress student movements, all those who enforce fascist rule over the people, and all those who betray the revolution will come to no good end! The German, Italian, and Japanese fascists ... Chiang Kai-shek ... ~~the Tsar~~... Kautsky ... Khrushchev came to no good end; and you will definitely come to no good end either! This is not the first time that Chinese students have shed their blood in the streets of Moscow... All these debts must be repaid in full!"

PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, "Hit Back Hard," on the 27th uses the most inflammatory language yet:

"... Listen, you handful of filthy Soviet revisionist swine. The Chinese people ... are not to be bullied!"

Blatantly appealing again for "the Soviet people to rise in rebellion," it concludes:

"We believe that the brilliant red banner of M-L, the thought of Mao Tse-tung, will one day be fluttering high over Red Square and in the Homeland of the October Revolution! ... Long live the all-conquering thought of Mao Tse-tung!"

Simultaneously, massive round-the-clock demonstrations around the Soviet Embassy in Peking are continuing on into February. As Prague's CTK correspondent reports from Peking on the 27th:

"The general wave of anti-Soviet hatred is being stirred up by leaflets spread all over the city asserting that 'scores of Chinese students were killed and wounded' in Moscow. The fanatical crowds are chanting: 'Tooth for tooth, blood for blood.'"

A Soviet Foreign Ministry press conference on the 28th emphasizes the planned, provocative nature of the incident, denies the Chinese version of events, and adds that before their train was very far out of Moscow, all but five of the 20 bandaged students had "apparently gotten tired of the bandages and plaster" and removed them.

The Chinese hold an unprecedented press conference in Moscow also on the 28th, excluding the Soviet press, to display "one of the wounded Chinese students" and tell his lurid story: they also present the "chief surgeon of the neurosurgery section of the 'anti-imperialist' hospital" in Peking who flew to Moscow especially to treat the wounded students and who gives grim reports on the extent of injuries.

On the 28th, NCNA Baghdad reports a new fascist atrocity when "more than 30 Soviet thugs streamed out of the Embassy and ... furiously beat up" a group of 10 Chinese students and an NCNA correspondent who had gone there to read a letter of protest. A Chinese Foreign Ministry protest on the 30th emphasizes that this "blatant atrocity" was committed "outside Soviet territory and in the capital of an Asian country": thus it is "also a serious provocation against the people of Asia."

And NCNA Paris on the 30th describes a brutal and bloody assault by French police on a group of 49 Chinese in Paris who were going "in an orderly fashion" to lodge a protest note at the Soviet Embassy on the 27th. "All 49 of them, including 19 girls, were beaten up ... some wounded in the head and bled and others suffered internal injuries...." The French Embassy in Peking joins the Soviet and Yugoslav as a target for hostile demonstrations, with all Chinese employees out on strike, --- though the crowds are smaller and the slogans less insulting!

(Chinese anti-Soviet demonstrations and attacks in Peking grows so insulting and threatening that the SovGovt decides after end of the period to evacuate by air about three fourths of their personnel)

January 26: N. Korean agency KCNA issues an "authorized" statement in English:

"Red Guard papers, wall papers, and handbills in Peking and other parts of China have recently been making the false propoganda that something like a 'coup' broke out and political unrest has been created in our country...."

In this connection, KCNA declares that the propaganda spread by the Red Guard papers, wall papers, and handbills of China is totally groundless fabrication... an intolerable slander against the Party, government, people, and people's army of our country...."

TASS publicizes this in embroidered form on the 27th.

N. Vietnam party daily NHAU DAN condemns and denies the "odious slander by the imperialists" with their "false report that China had hijacked missiles sent by the Soviet Union to help the Vietnamese," who "have always enjoyed the unreserved support and the great and heartfelt assistance of the Soviet Union, China, and the other brotherly socialist countries."

A Soviet LIFE ABROAD article taunts the CPR again for its toleration and use of the colonies of Macao and Hong Kong on its territory.

January 27: AKAHATA denounces a Radio Peking broadcast to Japan on the 25th, "with the general elections near at hand," by a Peking-residing renegade Japanese Communist who "slandered the autonomous and independent stand of the JCP."

January 28: A Soviet Govt statement bears down heavily in warning of the growth of "neo-Nazi and militarist forces" in W. Germany and demanding steps by the Bonn Govt to cut them back. The Bonn Govt denies the charges in a mildly worded reply.

January 28-31: Yugoslav President Tito meets with top Soviet leaders in a visit to Moscow: the communique says only that they "exchanged opinions ... in a frank and friendly atmosphere."

January 29: Cuban Prime Minister Castro announces plans for a Cuban "new society" based on collective farming units and state care of children from the age of one month: children will spend only week-ends with their parents, thus freeing women for productive work.

Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress cites the Sudanese press as condemning the Chinese for economic cooperation with the racist regime in South Africa. "The magazine quotes the following figures: the Chinese trade balance with SA from 1961 to 1963 was 3 million pounds; in 1964, 7 million, and in 1965, 10 million. Last year the figure increased 1.5 times."

Belgrade BORBA says on the Chinese CR that it has "now probably entered one of its final phases -- with prospects that political power will remain at the mouth of the gun barrel." Same issue carries an article reviewing "indications that the Sino-Soviet dispute about their long border is reviving."

January 30: The Czech Govt begins the trial of Czech-born American travel agent Kazan-Komarek who was taken from a Soviet airline diverted from a Moscow-Copenhagen flight to an unscheduled Prague landing (#8, N 15) on charges of anti-Government activities in the late 1940's and early 1950's. (After the end of the period, he is convicted, sentenced to 8 years in prison, and then expelled with suspended sentence.)

1096.

AAPSO's Problems:

Council Meeting in Nicosia

25X1C10b



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SITUATION: (UNCLASSIFIED) The 8th Council session of the Cairo-based, non-governmental Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) in Nicosia, Cyprus (13-17 February 1967) may well lead to a split in the AAPSO movement -- similar to the one that has already occurred in the Afro-Asian Writers' Bureau (see BPG 196, Item #1048, dated 1 August 1966) -- a split which would turn AAPSO, Sino-Soviet tension-ridden for several years, into a sham organization. Since the organization's inception, the Soviets, the Chinese and the Egyptians have exerted decisive influence in its policy-making Council but, in recent years, bitter Sino-Soviet feuding has seriously impeded AAPSO's organizational and other activities, and has disappointed and angered those Afro-Asians who support it for the attainment of constructive goals. It is important to recall that Egyptian alignment with the Soviets in the AAWB was a determining factor last year in the splitting of that organization which had come under Chinese control in 1962: in a Soviet-engineered, Egyptian-backed AAWB "extraordinary" meeting in Cairo last June, the AAWB secretariat was transferred from Colombo to Cairo and the Chinese subsequently announced the transfer of the AAWB secretariat to Peking.

Chinese Have Lost Ground. Until about a year ago, Soviet and Chinese influences in AAPSO's Permanent Secretariat in Cairo had been roughly balanced. The Chinese then lost ground after the departure from the Secretariat to Peking of the Indonesian delegate, following the coup in Indonesia, and after a more recent split in AAPSO's Japanese affiliate which formerly was a supporter of the Chinese line in AAPSO. As a result, the Soviets have gained an upper hand in the Secretariat (run by an Egyptian secretary-general, Yusuf el Sibai) but they by no means control it outright. After protracted search for a Council meeting site, Nicosia was chosen where, significantly, the host AAPSO affiliate and the general atmosphere favor the Soviets. The Chinese have opposed the Nicosia site to no avail. Originally, the Council meeting was to be held in Tanzania, but the Tanzanians postponed the September 1966 date and later signified that they would prefer not to host the meeting, apparently being concerned about the prospects of a Sino-Soviet feud in their country.

Major Areas of Conflict. Sino-Soviet views can be expected to clash on matters of (1) representation, (2) agenda, and (3) the site of the Fifth AAPSO Conference.

(1) Representation. Delegates from AAPSO's affiliates will be eligible, representing as the case may be ruling and opposition parties, exile groups and a few militants representing nobody but themselves. In some instances (such as Ceylon, Kenya, Japan, South Africa, possibly Ghana and others) the Council may have to decide which faction, the pro-Soviet or the pro-Chinese, to admit. (The Tri-Continent Conference (AALAPSO) in Havana in January 1966 had to decide which of two Indonesian delegations to seat.) As at all front meetings, an array of observers will attend -- from other pro-Soviet and/or pro-Chinese front organizations, the European Communist countries, and, given the Tri-Continent Solidarity concept, from Latin America.

(2) Agenda. The agenda will deal foremost with the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism (headed by U.S. imperialism) and for national liberation, etc. -- the standard militant bill of fare of Communist fronts, and particularly of AAPSO, which has no functional charter whatever. It will address itself to the problems of the imperialist policy of war and aggression (particularly in Vietnam), foreign military bases, aggressive military pacts, etc. and also to AAPSO's organization and prospective Fifth Conference.


(3) Fifth AAPSO Conference. In the unlikely event that the recognition of delegations or delegates or agenda matters ("substance") should be dealt with relatively smoothly, the question of the next Conference site can hardly be resolved without an unprecedented clash in AAPSO. The 4th AAPSO Conference held in Winneba, Ghana in 1965 decided that the Fifth Conference should be held in Peking in 1967 -- a decision which the Chinese naturally defend to the best of their ability and with all the means available to them. The Soviets and Indians have announced that they will not attend a Conference in Peking, and the Nicosia Council meeting will deal with a request for change of venue from several AAPSO affiliates*. The Soviet supporters argue in favor of a neutral site where conditions would be more conducive to holding a Conference without a bitter Sino-Soviet struggle -- a partially valid argument but not a realistic proposal, considering the difficulty in finding any other meeting place acceptable to all concerned. Even if a site is found, it may be difficult to induce the host government to offer it. (END UNCLASSIFIED)

*Among others: India, UAR, Cameroun, Nigeria, Madagascar, Angola, South Africa, Senegal, Gambia.

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
CA 7468, January 23, 1966 on the Tri-Continental Conference.

13 February 1967

1097.

MARSHALL PLAN: 20TH ANNIVERSARY

25X1C10b



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"The emerging spirit of confidence is precisely what we hoped to achieve when we went to work a generation ago to help rebuild Europe. We face new challenges and opportunities there -- and some dangers. But I believe it is the underlying will of the peoples on both sides of the Atlantic that we continue to face them together." -- President Lyndon B. Johnson, State of the Union Message, 10 January 1967

SITUATION: (UNCLASSIFIED): In a speech delivered 5 June 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed a European-sponsored program of foreign aid, self-help, and mutual assistance, aimed at restoring a war-ravaged Europe to its feet economically. As the U.S. Department of Commerce* noted five years after the Marshall Plan had begun:

"Postwar recuperation of the European economic structure was hindered by the continued political and economic encroachment of the USSR into Central and Eastern Europe, at the expense of an integrated, balanced European economy. Russia prevented the economic unification of Germany and precluded the return of Germany as a full working-partner in the European economy. Two years after the surrender of Germany, such recovery as had been accomplished was facilitated by assistance from the United States Government....

"The proposal put forth by Secretary Marshall underlined the position of the United States in support of the drafting of a joint agreement as to goals and methods for a period of from 3 to 4 years. The USSR declined to associate with the United Kingdom and France in framing a reply to the Marshall proposal. The latter two countries issued invitations to all other European countries (except Spain) to attend a

*See first citation under "References" below.

conference in Paris. Because the Eastern European countries under Russian influence decided not to take part, the conference was unable to deal with the problem of Europe as a whole, as envisaged in the original proposal. Nonetheless, the 16 countries participating organized the Committee of European Economic Cooperation and submitted a report to the United States in September 1947 setting forth their needs and their willingness to cooperate in a joint recovery program."*

In late June 1947 the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, and the USSR (Bevin, Bidault, and Molotov) had met in Paris to discuss the Marshall proposal. The Soviet delegation first charged that the "steering committee" suggested by Britain and France would "meddle in the internal affairs of sovereign nations," and even before the Big Three meeting broke up on 3 July PRAVDA alleged that the Marshall Plan was a scheme to prolong the postwar boom in the United States and on 29 June TASS described the aid proposal as another instance of "American imperialism."

Czechoslovakia, which had at first agreed to attend the Europe-wide conference in Paris to consider the recovery plan, withdrew after its Premier and Foreign Minister had been summoned to Moscow. Poland, which had also signified its intention of participating in the Plan, later recanted. Then on 6 July PRAVDA announced the establishment of the Cominform in Belgrade representing Communists of nine countries** and six days later the Soviet Government negotiated trade, aid, and barter agreements with its satellite states in Eastern Europe, later to become known as the "Molotov Plan." The dichotomy of European recovery efforts was completed on 22 October when Andrei Zhdanov, speaking for the Cominform, called on Communists everywhere to defeat the Marshall Plan, which he denounced as an "instrument for world domination by American imperialism."

The 16 nations of free Europe were not daunted by the Communist propaganda barrage, however, and on 16 April 1948 they formally established the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC); the zones of Germany occupied by the United States, United Kingdom and France, along with the Free Territory of Trieste, were included in the OEEC. The same month the U.S. Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act (ECA) to furnish means for covering such essential import needs of the participating countries for commodities and equipment as could not be financed by their own efforts, and

*The countries comprised Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

**The USSR, Yugoslavia, France, Italy, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania.

to support those measures of self and mutual help on the part of the participating countries which were necessary to achieve true economic recovery.

Actually the \$12.5 billion dollar total expenditure on the Marshall Plan for Europe is only a portion of a much bigger and continuing effort on the part of the United States to contribute to the economic viability of Europe since World War II. During the period from July 1945 to March 1961 non-military U.S. Government aid in grants and credits for European recovery totaled twice that sum; of this, \$6.7 billion went to the United Kingdom, \$5.3 billion to France, \$3.7 billion to West Germany, \$3 billion to Italy, \$966 million to the Netherlands, and \$703 million to Belgium. Perceptive Europeans recognize this aid, not as a gift for which they must forever carry a burden of gratitude, but as vivid proof of America's own interest in a free and prosperous Europe.

In retrospect, France provides some excellent illustrations of what too many other people may have forgotten about the Marshall Plan -- and U.S. aid in general -- over the years. Sisley Huddleston, the English-born correspondent of the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, THE LONDON TIMES, and other British papers in Paris before and after World War II, recalls in his book (see attached excerpt) that the turning point in French recovery after the War was the application of this Plan, for "had America deserted Europe, had she not behaved with enlightened generosity, Europe would long ago gone Bolshevik."

Today, President de Gaulle implies that the aid program of two decades ago was merely a passing phase of U.S. manipulation of Europe for its own selfish purposes. According to the semi-official French news agency AFP, de Gaulle told a meeting of the Institute of Higher Studies of National Defense in Paris on 20 January 1967:

"The policy of the United States with regard to Europe has passed through three phases. First there was the Yalta phase: the United States, still at war with Japan, wanted to keep its hand free in the Pacific and it gave the USSR a free hand in Europe. Then there was the second phase: Japan was beaten and the United States perceived its mistake and realized that Europe could become a threat to the United States. So the United States reversed its policy; this was the time of the Marshall Plan, NATO, and so forth.

"Finally, there is the third phase, the one which is taking place under our eyes. The United States again wants to have a free hand in the Pacific to settle the Vietnam problem, to continue its policy in the Philippines, to support Japan against Communist China, and so forth. It would like to conclude a gentleman's agreement with the Soviets. But there is a new fact: West Europe exists, and a stable Europe must be centered around this Europe in order to arrive at a*

*The AFP dispatch noted at this point that another version of de Gaulle's statement at the Paris meeting was "a united Europe must be made up of all the countries of Europe..."

tripolar world of Europe, the United States, and Asia. As for West Europe's economic policy with regard to the satellite fringe, business is business. We can imagine that the Americans, once free of the Vietnamese problem, will also act so that business will be business in their relations with these countries."

President de Gaulle might well have remembered, in this connection, another statement* made as recently as 29 July 1963 when he told a press conference:

"As for the Franco-American alliance which has existed since the time of Washington, Franklin, LaFayette, DeGrasse, and Rochambeau, and which was brought to full fruition during the First World War in 1917-1918 and during the Second one beginning in December 1941, it is a fact that it still exists today and that everything requires the two countries to maintain it. As long as, in effect, the Soviet bloc arrays itself before the free world, capable of suddenly submerging this or that territory and animated by a dominating and detestable ideology, it will be necessary for people on both sides of the Ocean who wish to defend themselves to be linked together in order to accomplish this." (End UNCLASSIFIED)


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*For the full text of de Gaulle's statement see Andre Passeron, "De Gaulle Parle," Fayard, Paris, 1966.

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
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13 February 1967

1098 WH.

GUATEMALA: Free Government

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Vs. Guerrillas



* * * * *

SITUATION: An unclassified attachment to this paper provides a background report on the political situation in Guatemala since the inauguration of President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro on 1 July 1966. In brief, the main points are: The Mendez government came to power by free, democratic elections, despite widespread opposition from conservative military leaders. Shortly after his inauguration, Mendez made a determined effort to effect internal peace by offering amnesty to the Communist guerrilla forces which have plagued the country for years. However, the Communists refused the amnesty offer and launched a new campaign of terrorism. At the same time right-wing extremists, charging that Mendez was favoring the far left, unleashed their own campaign against the Communists and the government.


The government struck back hard at both extremes, despite predictions from all sides of its imminent overthrow. A state of siege was declared on 2 November, most of the leaders of the extreme right were arrested, and the army sent troops into the mountain hideouts of the Communist guerrilla forces. The campaign against the Communists has been the most determined and the most effective of any undertaken in recent years and it has produced encouraging results: a number of guerrilla leaders have been killed or captured, heretofore undisturbed rebel bases have been overrun, and dissension among the various Communist groups has grown.

To counteract the government campaign, Cuba has increased its efforts to support the guerrillas. Speeches from Havana, encouraging the rebels, have accompanied increased efforts to smuggle arms into Guatemala, and the training of Guatemalans in Cuban guerrilla schools continues apace. To obtain funds for the rebellion, the Communists have resorted to robbery and kidnaping, thus reinforcing their characterization as bandits, not liberators.

The turmoil caused by the extremists of both right and left has not significantly reduced Guatemala's capacity to expand its economy and ameliorate the privations of most of its citizens. One of the most harmful results has been the flight of capital abroad, but this is decreasing. Nevertheless Mendez Montenegro has vigorously pushed the

preparation of an economic development plan and has actively searched for support of this plan within the framework of the Alliance for Progress. It is noteworthy that Mendez has received strong support from neighboring nations, particularly Mexico.

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


13 February 1967

1099.

THE DRAFT IN THE USSR

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SITUATION: The basis for the Soviet draft is the Universal Compulsory Military Service Law of 1 September 1939, as amended in June 1962. This law sets forth: a) the procedures for conscription; b) the duration of the military obligation (3 years in the Army; 4 or 5 years in the Air Force and Navy); c) the reserve obligation; and d) mobilization regulations. Currently, youths register when they reach the age of 17 and they are normally called up when they are 19. Exemptions and deferments are to be granted to youths for medical and educational reasons, to youths whose induction would work a hardship on their parents, and to married men with two or more children. In 1966, as has been observed during the past several years, 800,000 were inducted into the Soviet Army during September to December. This figure amounts to a bit less than half of the youth reaching the age of military service in 1966. The balance were either deferred for the above-noted reasons, or were placed in a reserve category.

Although the Soviets' draft law appears to be egalitarian, it is carried out in such a way that certain groups (or classes) are favored. For example, sons of CP and Government officials tend to be granted a disproportionately large share of the places in higher educational institutions, and thus they benefit from educational deferments. They are placed in reserve during their university years, and upon graduation serve in the ranks for a year or less, after which they can qualify for reserve commissions. (Similar treatment was given to educated youths in pre-1914 Germany, and this discrimination was an object of Socialist criticism.) Another boon to the already-privileged "New Class" youths results from the Soviets' practice of thoroughly examining a youth's papers during the pre-induction period. Only the most trustworthy (in effect, those whose parents are known and approved of by Party officials) are given assignments to such desirable duty as the rocket forces. On the other hand, it is reported that inductees whose parents are unknown or are not members of the CP are almost all assigned to hard-sweating combat arms such as the infantry and the engineers. In addition, there is a provision in the law for early induction of some draftees who then have a better chance to select a preferred branch of service; this provision is reportedly used for the benefit of the sons of the politically favored.

These inequities undoubtedly contribute to the negative attitudes which sizable numbers of Soviet youth display towards military service. Some other factors influencing this attitude are: the Khrushchev era's generally heavy

emphasis on peace; the rigors of the 3- to 5-year tour of military service*; and the admittedly sagging morale** of the troops now on active duty.

A campaign to correct these negative attitudes has been intensified since its launching in March 1965 when N. G. Yegorychev, Moscow's CP boss, expressed his deep concern for the "military-patriotic education" of Soviet youth. The Komsomol (Communist Youth League) led the campaign in 1965, and in April 1966 "military-patriotic education" gained the strong endorsement of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU. The aim of the campaign was restated in May 1966 by the chief of the Main Political Administration of the Army and Navy, General A. A. Yepishev, who said:

"....Serious changes in the nature of warfare ... call for new criteria in the assessment of our entire work in preparing youth for military service.... Personal technological preparation has increased in importance ...; therefore the right image of military service has to be created among the young."

The major Soviet organizations involved in this "educational" program are the Komsomol and DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy). The latter organization, though "voluntary," has been called upon to mobilize its members for the fulfillment of tasks which include patriotic military propaganda work. DOSAAF was also charged, by a decree of August 1966, with a broad array of tasks for the military indoctrination of Soviet youth. (See attachment).


Some of the devices used in this campaign are trips to battlegrounds, mock battles between selected teams of youngsters, an expanded sports program aimed in part to train young people "in the defense of the Homeland," and a marked increase in the supplies of military toys as evidenced by their abundance on store shelves in December 1966.***

*Soviet inductees receive no leave during their three years of duty, except for emergencies; little compassion is shown by the aloof and tough officers and NCO's who are exceptionally rank - and class-conscious.

**In January 1966 Soviet marshals registered deep concern over the low level of morale, discipline, and political indoctrination in the armed forces. Criticism for failure in these areas was leveled primarily at officers and professional Party and Komsomol officials in the military establishment.

***In contrast, US toy manufacturers noted that the market for military toys during Christmas 1966 was very disappointing.

Close observers of Soviet military affairs conclude that the intensity of the Soviets' campaign is a rough measure of the severity of the problems being encountered in conducting a draft and military training program. They note that the Soviets' draft system functions (albeit with glaring deficiencies) and that the pre-induction attitude of Soviet youth is clearly negative though not so strongly so that there is a manifest resistance to draft calls. If the Soviet press were free to shine enough light on this situation, then it is believed that informed persons the world over would be aware that the USSR, too, has serious problems with the military draft. 25X1C10b




13 February 1967

1100.

RECENT FRAUDS AND DECEPTIONS
IN SOVIET PROPAGANDA

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SITUATION: The most striking illustrations of Soviet frauds in the foreign sphere are the forgeries which appear to have increased sharply during late 1966. In the handling of domestic news the Soviets have continued to withhold and distort information on important developments. Although the foreign target audiences of Soviet forgeries differ substantially from the domestic target of Soviet propaganda, as do the techniques employed, the objectives are the same: to gain or expand the influence of the Soviet state by any means.

In support of their foreign propaganda program the Soviets and their cohorts have created or inspired an unknown number of forgeries (probably amounting to several hundred) during the past decade. A lull in the use of forgeries by Moscow & Co. during 1961-62 was followed by a sharp and steady increase in their counterfeits, reaching a high point in intensity in late 1966. Examples of recent forgeries* are:

a. Mogadiscio: A forgery making a thinly-veiled link between the Peace Corps and US intelligence agencies and published in AL HAKIKA was reportedly supplied by the local Novosti staff;

b. Lusaka: Forgeries alleged that the US was planning a coup in Zambia;

c. Beirut: A counterfeit US Army document suggesting covert US involvement in Moroccan affairs was surfaced in Lebanon;

d. Caracas: A forged letter allegedly from the US Ambassador to a high-ranking Department of State official implied that the Ambassador was involved in the planning of a coup in Uruguay.

*Although these recent forgeries cannot at this time and may, in fact, never be definitively attributed to the Soviets or other Communist sources, they nevertheless conform to the pattern of past Soviet forgeries.

These examples, like other forgeries which have been observed over the years, show that the primary Soviet aim is anti-US propaganda. Further similarities will undoubtedly show up when current forgeries are compared with past forgeries. For this purpose, the unclassified attachment provides descriptions of Soviet forgeries which have been studied in detail.

Assessment of 46 Soviet forgeries perpetrated during 1957-65 (see references) reveals that most of them are readily detectable from abundant technical errors and also from their implausibility. In spite of these flaws, the forgeries have served some of the Soviets' interests of the moment. With the lapse of enough time for the forgeries to be analyzed and publicized, however, the Soviets' reputation has sometimes been adversely affected. Soviet officials obviously believe, however, that the gains from these forgeries more than offset the occasional damage of their reputation.

Although it is impossible to measure the Soviets' gains and losses from their forgeries, it is possible to shed light on the attitude which underlies the Soviets' extensive use of forgeries. The Soviets have shown a general contempt for objectivity and for real public opinion. As they see it, the public's views are to be molded, not listened to; and besides, by the Soviets' reckoning, the public's memory is short.

This manipulative outlook is clearly illustrated by Soviet internal propaganda. A major objective of Soviet domestic propaganda is to convince Soviet citizens that the Party infallibly represents the will of the masses who, thus, have no need for elections through which to express their preferences. In the complementary sphere of "agitation" the Soviets' objective is to mold mass opinion and to inspire the masses to carry out their assigned tasks. With information policy guided by these objectives, it follows that all events and statements are screened and almost all are reported in distorted form.

The Soviet people are the most competent judges of the degree of news distortion by USSR media. Free World visitors to the USSR have almost invariably reported that many Soviet citizens are contemptuous of the Soviet press. Soviet citizens have over the years told Westerners their own joke which has it that there is no news in PRAVDA (TRUTH: the CPSU newspaper) and no truth in IZVESTIYA (NEWS: the Government newspaper). Rephrased, the joke confirms that Soviet propaganda and "agitation" objectives are systematically pursued by withholding and modifying news.

Some illustrations of Soviet withholding of news are:

a. the severe 1963 crop failure in the USSR, which was not reported meaningfully in the Soviet press until well after the reading public in the West was aware of it.

b. the April 1966 earthquake in Tashkent was scantily reported at first as having caused minimal damage, whereas subsequent reports gradually expanded on the seriousness of the disaster and 2 months after the event the republic CP boss Rashidov stated that 45,000 families had been left homeless;

c. a majority of the numerous Soviet failures to make a soft landing on the moon were unreported;

d. the influenza epidemic of 1965, which affected several million Soviets and which accounted for a substantial part of the increase of 109,000 in Soviet mortality in that year, was barely mentioned in the press and the severity of the epidemic was not revealed until almost 2 years had elapsed.

The usual Soviet practice of distorting the news is dramatically illustrated by two incidents concerning the Sinyavsky-Daniel affair. A month before the trial, IZVESTIYA broke Soviet journalistic silence on the arrest (which had taken place 4 months earlier) and detention of the 2 writers in an article which not only violently and abusively attacked them but which also took quotes so far out of context that the writers' expressions were completely distorted. This article was followed up by published "letters to the editor" which applauded the article's point of view; the fabrication of such letters endorsing official policy is a familiar tactic, more than once exposed. The second incident was the reporting of the speech by Soviet author Mikhail Sholokhov at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in March-April 1966. In that speech Sholokhov, who to all appearances was representing Soviets writers, blasted Sinyavsky and Daniel and implied that nothing short of execution would have been a just punishment. While Sholokhov's speech was published, subsequent events have shown that large numbers of prominent writers had an exactly opposite but unreported view of the justice meted out to Sinyavsky and Daniel.

With such lack of restraint in the management of domestic news, the Soviets controlling the press can hardly be expected to restrain themselves in the presentation of material concerning the free world. The Soviets' virulent press and radio treatment of President Kennedy's assassination, especially during the latter part of 1966 and early 1967, is a recent case in point. Another case is the reduction of Truman Capote's 343-page "In Cold Blood" to a 58-page translation retitled "An Ordinary Murder"; the shortened Russian version gives the strong impression that premeditated murder is a commonplace in America.

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February 1967

MARSHALL PLAN -- 20TH ANNIVERSARY

CPYRGHT

Excerpt from: "France -- The Tragic Years" by Sisley Huddleston

The turning point in French recovery was the application of the Marshall Plan of financial and economic aid. Had America deserted Europe, had she not behaved with enlightened generosity, Europe would long ago have "gone Bolshevik." The Marshall Plan was the turning point for two reasons: first, because it furnished a material basis for reconstruction; second, because it forced France to make a choice. On the first point, it is unnecessary for me to expatiate. But on the second, I will add a few reflections.

France, in my view, had, after the disillusionment of the Liberation, lost hope. The tribulations of the war and the occupation, the violence and the injustice which accompanied the victory and left few families untouched, the mismanagement which followed the establishment of a constitution which was infinitely worse than the constitution of 1875, and might easily have resulted in one-chamber government, that is to say, in a dictatorship of the political parties which offered themselves at the elections and practically forbade any opposition, the malpractices, the scandals, the exactions, the requisitions, the spoliations of all sorts, the division of France into two groups of citizens, the ultrapatriots and the near traitors, the restrictions, the controls, the excessive functionalism, the toleration, if not the encouragement, of a black market worse than any that flourished during the war, the suppression of independent opinion, the refusal to pass a generous amnesty bill, the shameful exploitation by the false Resistants of their privileged position, the lawlessness that declared itself in every domain of daily life, the continual rise of the cost of living, the steady depreciation of the currency, the inadequate wages, the gross immorality reflected in the press, the pusillanimity of the politicians, the partiality of the radio for the Communists, the constant strikes of a frankly revolutionary character, all these things and more that I might enumerate discouraged the better citizens of France, who could be heard to say (how many times have I heard them say it!) that France was better off under the occupation than under the succeeding governments!

France felt that she was alone, helpless, having lost her rank among the nations, fallen into decadence, no longer a nation, and with nothing to indicate that she could ever be a nation again. Communism actually offered to many an escape from the feeling of frustration. In these conditions, the

Marshall Plan was received with joy. It had a salutary effect. It stimulated the French. It was fought ruthlessly by the Communists, who rightly saw that it would prevent France from turning completely to Bolshevism. They described the Plan as an attempt to make France a satellite of America, when they far preferred her becoming a satellite of Russia. The choice had to be made, however reluctantly, by the governments. Materially, they were compelled to choose the American Plan, whatever its consequences, and soon they had, by the sheer force of Communist opposition, to choose it morally as well. The breach between Communism and (may I call it?) Americanism grew wider every month. The good effects of the Plan were soon felt, and any immediate return to Communism was at last improbable.

The pact with England concluded at Dunkirk, the port by which the English left France, paradoxically regarded as a symbol of mutual help and of union, though it passed without much notice, operated in the same sense. The Atlantic Pact, which definitely linked up France with America, carried the process a step farther. But I am bound to state that these measures seemed to come too late and were always insufficient to create the full sentiment of the unity of the Western world. The menace of Bolshevism was hardly appreciated for years, though it was obvious from the commencement. The Socialists, in particular, without whom no government could live, were slow to understand that an absolute severing of all relations with Communism was essential: they looked on the Communists merely as rivals for political power. No drastic laws against a mortal enemy have yet been taken, though it is apparent that there is a Fifth Column in France bent on sabotage, declaring openly that, in the event of war, the Communists will refuse to fight, or rather will fight against their own country. If it were not tragic, it would be comic to watch the attempts to fashion European unity. Three or four competing bodies have been formed which seem chiefly designed to serve the political ends of European "leaders," and some of these European "leaders" do not in the least see that the first step to European unity is the unity of their own countries. France is not yet united; there is no full appeasement of old quarrels, no firmness in dealing with dissidents. Nevertheless, there is at last hope, and it is a hope which has its roots in the Atlantic Pact.

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February 1967

Guatemala: Free Government versus Guerrillas

Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro was inaugurated as President of Guatemala on 1 July 1966. In the presidential election held in March 1966 Mendez had received a plurality of the votes cast for the three candidates. At the same time his party, the PR (Partido Revolucionario), won a majority in Congress. According to Guatemalan law, the Congress picks the president if no candidate receives a clear majority in the nationwide vote. Thus the newly elected Congress chose Mendez for the office on 25 May and he was inaugurated at the beginning of July.

Mendez' victory was a major surprise for Guatemala since the outgoing regime of Col. Enrique Peralta Azurdia had strongly backed a military candidate: Col. Juan de Dios Aguilar de Leon. In past Guatemalan elections the "official" candidate has always been victorious. Furthermore, military influence on Guatemalan politics is normally enough to guarantee the success of a military candidate against a civilian. Since 1839, when the country became independent, only eight civilian presidents could be numbered among the 26 leaders of the republic. In 145 years of independence, Guatemala had been governed by military men for 80 years. As might have been expected, a flurry of rumors arose after the March elections to the effect that the military and the outgoing government would stage a coup d'état rather than permit Mendez to take office. It is to the credit of Col. Peralta, however, that his government insisted on the legality of the elections and on the right of Mendez to become president.

Communist guerrillas in Guatemala did their part in attempting to provoke a preventive military coup by mounting a campaign of violence and terror during the spring of 1966. Although guerrilla activities have been going on for many years, the pace picked up during the spring and at the same time moved onto the streets of the capital, where kidnappings, terrorist bombings, and gunfights became almost commonplace. To counter the terrorist campaign the Peralta government proclaimed a state of siege.

The first official act of the Mendez government after the inauguration was to lift the state of siege, restoring all constitutional guarantees. Shortly thereafter Mendez made an open request to the guerrillas to abandon their opposition and reintegrate themselves into the national life. This offer included a general amnesty for those persons who had committed political crimes since 1960 provided they turned in their arms and released kidnapped officials.

Although the Communists had backed the Mendez candidacy in March 1966, against the regime's candidate Aguilar, it now called the election a "diversionist maneuver" and refused the amnesty offer.

The Communists' stepped-up campaign during the first months of the new government aroused serious concern among the rightist extremists who had been opposed to Mendez' inauguration. Some of them commenced a counter-terror campaign, organizing a group calling itself the White Hand. This

organization was suspected of having planted bombs in Guatemala City, and three of its leaders were arrested in August for possession of arms and subversive propaganda.

The situation appeared to be headed toward further deterioration when President Mendez began a strenuous crackdown on both rightist and leftist extremists. In a radio broadcast on 7 September he said that "groups of unpatriotic persons ... are engaged actively and criminally in undermining this nation's foundations to subvert its legality, obstruct the government's first steps, and overthrow this government of law and moral reconstruction." He declared that the armed forces had been put on the alert and were prepared to do what was necessary to "obtain the country's general pacification." The crackdown was speeded up when a state of siege was declared on 2 November 1966 (it has since been extended at least until 2 March 1967).

The government's campaign against the Communist guerrillas has been marked by military probes into the mountainous areas in Northeastern Guatemala which had previously been the home grounds of the guerrilla bands. The campaign has been the most determined and most effective of any undertaken by the Guatemalan army in recent years, and it has produced encouraging results: several bands have been encircled in the mountains, heretofore undisturbed rebel bases have been overrun, and in the cities and towns the army and police forces have captured several bands of terrorists. The young leader of the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR), Luis Augusto Turcios Lima, was killed in an automobile accident early in October; there was immediate speculation that he had been assassinated by a rival Communist group, but this could not be proved. Turcios Lima's sister, Melida Turcios Lima, was captured on 25 October 1966, his successor, Cesar Montes apparently narrowly escaped capture in November, and Cesar Montes' second in command, "Chino" Arnoldo, was killed in a clash on 24 November 1966 in Las Delicias.

An encouraging factor in the government's campaign has been the support accorded by the nation's peasants. On 26 November 1966 the London Times reported that more than a thousand peasants had staged a march through Zacapa department, scene of a major part of the guerrilla fighting, protesting against the constant terrorism and calling for arms to fight the guerrillas. On 2 December 1966 the Yugoslav news agency Tanjug also reported that demonstrations in support of the government led by students and peasants had taken place on that date.

At the same time, dissensions and divisions among the various Communist groups have festered. The chief guerrilla group, the FAR, had previously been led by Marco Antonio Yon Sosa who heads the 13th of November (MR-13) Movement and who had been a favorite of Fidel Castro and had received enthusiastic support from Cuba until his guerrilla movement splintered in 1963 with the departure of Turcios Lima. Then it became apparent that it would be more profitable for Castro to support Turcios Lima, who was willing to subordinate his group to the direction of the Communist Party. In his

speech at the closing session of the Tricontinental Conference, Castro denounced Yon Sosa for his ties with the Trotskyites. Yon Sosa has since then allegedly divorced himself from the Trotskyites: in a statement published in the 15 June 1966 issue of the Salvadorean Communist publication Verdad, Yon Sosa said that he had broken with the Fourth International because some of its members in his organization had misappropriated party funds for their own sectarian interests!

To counteract the Guatemalan government's campaign, Cuba has increased its efforts to support the guerrillas, both materially and polemically. Late in September 1966 the Mexican press revealed that an organized band of arms smugglers, composed of Mexicans and Guatemalans in exile, had been caught red-handed attempting to smuggle arms purchased in Mexico to the rebels in Guatemala. Subsequent press articles added the significant information that the éminence grise of the operation was Julian Lopez Diaz, Third Secretary for Press and Cultural Relations in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. The Guatemalan leader of the smugglers was Victor Hugo Martinez Pantaleon, militant member of the Guatemalan Communist Party. This band was arrested only five weeks after the committal for trial of a group of Mexicans charged with subversion -- including the running of a guerrilla training school -- led by the exiled Spanish Communist Victor Rico Galan, known previously to have been a backer of Yon Sosa's guerrillas.

In Havana, the Castro regime ceaselessly exhorts the Guatemalan Communists to continue and strengthen their campaign of violence and terror. On 26 July Castro singled out the FAR as a guerrilla movement which has had "considerable success." On 13 June the Cubans issued a joint communique with the FAR and the Guatemalan Communist Party; this quoted Castro's remark that all Latin American peoples should fight simultaneously against "imperialism" and applauded the Guatemalan Communists' decision to take up arms. On 14 July Flavio Bravo, Central Committee member of the Cuban Communist Party, gave a speech endorsing the guerrillas' rejection of Mendez and praised their violence. He reaffirmed the Cuban line that armed struggle was the only choice in "all or almost all" of Latin America. The Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO) declared 6 February 1967 as a day of solidarity with the people of Guatemala. In its document proclaiming this event the organization stated:

"The struggle of the Guatemalan people to rid themselves of domestic and foreign exploiters ... has been successful during the past few years.... After a brief period of demagogic promises that lasted no more than three months, the government of Mendez Montenegro ... unleashed a ferocious repressive campaign against revolutionary, democratic, and popular forces, especially the peasant masses that constitute 73 percent of the population ... it has tried to halt the patriotic, revolutionary, and anti-imperialist movement of the Guatemalan people who are directed and led by the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) commanded by maximum leader Cesar Montes....

"On the occasion of the celebration of the worldwide day of solidarity with the people of Guatemala on 6 February, the AALAPSO Secretariat calls on all member organizations and national committees to wage an intensive campaign ... to support firmly the unyielding posture of the revolutionary fighters and of FAR and its leaders."

On 7 February, speaking on behalf of the FAR as its representative in Cuba, Francisco Marroquin stated: "Our revolution does not involve the polls. Our decision is to fight with our weapons in our hands, with the firm intention of winning or dying for Guatemala."

To help implement this "solidarity" the AALAPSO has formally announced the establishment of schools for training guerrilla cadres from other countries. One of the training schools is already in operation in Havana, training Guatemalans, among other nationalities.

To finance their own efforts, the Guatemalan terrorists have increasingly resorted to kidnaping and robbery, thus reinforcing the conviction of most Guatemalans that the rebels are actually more common bandits than "liberators."

The turmoil caused by the extremists of both right and left has not seriously reduced Guatemala's capacity to expand its economy and thus ameliorate the privations of most of its citizens. Mendez Montenegro has vigorously pushed the preparation of an economic development plan and has actively searched for support for this plan within the framework of the Alliance for Progress. At the same time, Guatemala has received strong encouragement and support from its neighboring countries, particularly Mexico, and there is every reason to believe that its economy will continue to expand at an encouraging rate, despite the Communists' efforts to disrupt it.

February 1967

MILITARY YOUTH INDOCTRINATION STRESSED

[Following is the translation of an unsigned item in the Russian-language newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 26 August 1966, page 1.]

A few days ago the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the VLKSM (Vsesoyuznyy Leninskiy Kommunisticheskiy Soyuz Molodezhi -- All Union Lenin's Young Communist League) approved the exemplary statute pertaining to patriotic military schools for youth in military schools, military units, DOSAAF* educational organizations, schools and elements of the civil aviation, river, maritime and air force detachments.

The statute indicates that patriotic military schools are organized for the following purpose:

To educate students who are boundlessly dedicated to communism, to their Soviet Homeland, to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and to the Soviet Government in a spirit of proletarian internationalism and friendship among all the peoples of the USSR;

To carry out occupational orientation of the adolescents;

To inculcate the students with high consciousness of their social and military duty. To instill them with discipline, love for military service and for the occupation of a Soviet officer, to give them a sense of Soviet military pride, an aspiration for heroic deeds for the glory of the Soviet Homeland, and also to train the young people for entrance into military schools;

To inculcate the students with the necessary moral will power characteristics to make them physically fit. To give them some concrete military experience, and to prepare them for the fulfillment of the sports norms qualifying them for the rating of "Ready for the Defense of the Homeland."

The schools consist of members of the senior classes of general educational schools, trade schools, or from schools of the working and rural youth who enroll in the schools voluntarily. There is no tuition for attending the schools. The instructors at the schools are reserve and retired officers, military personnel from army units and ships, as well as cadets from military schools, instructors and teachers of DOSAAF educational organizations. The

*Vsesoyuznoye Dobrovol'noye Obshchestvo Sodeystviya Armii Aviatsii i Flotu - All-Union Voluntary Society for the Cooperation with the Army, Air Force and Navy.

personnel from schools and elements of civil aviation, personnel of naval stations, airports and air force detachments also serve as instructors.

Each patriotic military school has its own banner, oath (a solemn pledge), and a uniform.

A council consisting of the school director, a representative of the komsomol rayon committee, city committee (oblast committee), group leaders (instructors), secretary of the school komsomol organization, platoon commanders and representative of the parent committee is organized for the purpose of managing the school.

The school term begins in September and ends in April-May. The whole course covers one to three years. Training is conducted no more than twice a week for two academic hours per session, after school hours. The educational work must ensure the all around mental and physical development of the students, their inculcation with practical experience in accordance with the specialty of the school.

In the summer time military-sports camps are organized for the students with funds contributed by trade union organizations, by public education and health agencies, and by enterprises with the aid of military schools and civil aviation elements, personnel of naval stations, airports and air force detachments, as well as with the assistance of the local VLKSM committees.

A challenge Red Banner of the VLKSM Central Committee was created as an award for the best patriotic military establishments. It is awarded annually on the eve of the Victory Holiday.

Facts Analysis Service
Chicago, Illinois

Morale in the Red Army

Soviet marshals in late 1965 registered deep concern over the low level of morale, discipline, and political indoctrination in the armed forces of the USSR. Criticisms for failures in these areas were leveled primarily at officers and at professional Party and Komsomol officials in the military establishment. Serious shortcomings of military personnel stationed in the Belorussian Republic, such as drunkenness and amoral behavior, appear to have precipitated the campaign. Defense Minister Malinovsky and the armed forces' political spokesman, Gen. Yepishev, placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of the officer corps. The head of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Marshal Krylov, concentrated his concern on the broader problem of the poor motivation of youth, a problem which also concerned conservative Party spokesmen.*

These statements by Soviet marshals drew expressions of surprise by Western observers. Some commented that the Soviets were merely treating a normal disciplinary problem in an open manner rather than, as usual, suppressing such unfavorable information. Other Western observers point out, however, that the marshals may well have been mustering support for a policy of increasing the patriotic-military education of youth prior to induction. Bearing out the latter conclusion is the strong emphasis placed on the military indoctrination of youth. According to Krasnaya Zvezda (the Red Army newspaper) of January 19, 1967, more than 8,000 war games were held for youth in 1966. These games included storming of defenses and river-crossing exercises. Visits to military establishments were also emphasized. Evidently viewing results in 1966 with satisfaction, Krasnaya Zvezda recommended that Pioneers and schoolboys be included in future programs.

*See the following articles:

Marshal Malinovsky in Krasnaya Zvezda, Dec. 29, 1965;

General Yepishev in Komsomolskaya Pravda (the Communist Youth League Newspaper) of Dec. 28, 1965;

Marshal Krylov in Sovetskaya Rossiya (Soviet Russia) of Oct. 7, 1965.

February 1967

ABRAHAM BRUMBERG LETTER TO DAVID M. BURNS,
U.S. CULTURAL ATTACHE, BAMAKO

Forged Document Identification Data

From: Abraham Brumberg, Executive Director,
Problems of Communism, Press and
Publications Service, USIA

TO: David M. Burns, U.S. Cultural Attache,
Bamako, Mali

Ostensible date: 27 October 1961

Synopsis

The writer of the letter is shown to refer to the closing of the USIS Cultural Center in Bamako, Mali; to note that USIA intends to publish a special article on this "outrageous act"; and to solicit the addressee's help in preparing material for the article and in interpreting the closing of the Cultural Center as part of the Cold War. The forgery implies that persons connected with the USIS Cultural Center had been engaged in illegal activities, but states that the article about the closing of the Center should aim to show that the "events in Bamako" had been instigated by "outside and anti-Nationalist forces." The letter is designed to cause distrust among African peoples toward U.S. nationals and also to intensify racial opposition to the United States by its inclusion of such statements as "in my opinion the African Negroes are not more capable than our own."

The forgers mailed photostat copies of the letter to several African embassies in Cairo and to the Sunday Express of Lagos, Nigeria, in February 1962. The letter was not published, but at least one African diplomat in Cairo was informed by a Malian official that the document was believed to be authentic. Attached to a copy of the forgery sent to one embassy was a forged handwritten note which read: "Dear Sir, You will find here something very interesting. Use it as you wish. NA." The forged initials were those of an officer of the U.S. Embassy, Cairo, who was in the habit of initialing outgoing U.S. Embassy transmittals. The official investigation of this incident revealed that no correspondence had ever been exchanged between Mr. Brumberg and Mr. Burns. The letter did not follow standard U.S. government format for informal letters exchanged between U.S. officials.

Because the purpose of this forgery is identical with several others--to cause ill-will toward the United States among African peoples by "proving" U.S. intervention in local affairs--it would seem to be the work of the

same fabricators. Derogatory references to non-white peoples, the mailing pattern, and other similarities (such as the comparison of Africans to wild animals) can be noted both in this forgery case and in an earlier anti-United States propaganda exercise--a false document which ostensibly originated with the Ku Klux Klan in late 1960 which was discussed in the U.S. Senate document of June 1961. The Ku Klux Klan letter was mailed to several African and Asian diplomats in the United States; it warned African and Asian delegates to the United Nations to stay away from hotels and restaurants of New York City and closed with the statement: "There is no welcome in America for a Black and Yellow United Nations."

USIA CIRCULAR MESSAGE

Forged Document Identification Data

From: Edward R. Murrow
Director, USIA

To: All Principal USIS Posts

Ostensible date: 25 April 1963

Synopsis

Apparently designed to strengthen the position of anti-U.S. participants in the Congress of the International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY) at Oslo, Norway, in August 1963, this forged USIA circular requested USIS representatives abroad to make sure that "our sympathizers" among the youth leaders influence the Congress proceedings "in our favor" and give "financial aid to those friendly to us." U.S. delegates to the Congress described some of the circular terminology as "utterly un-American." Available evidence strongly suggests Soviet involvement in this propaganda attempt.

BRADY LETTERS (LATIN AMERICA)

Forged Document Identification Data

From: J. Edgar Hoover, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

To: Thomas A. Brady

Ostensible dates: 2 January 1961 (first letter) and 15 April 1964
(second letter)

Synopsis

Groundwork for the launching in July 1964 of the forged Brady letters was laid with the circulation of an earlier forgery, the "suppressed" USIA press release into which had been threaded false claims of a "Mann Plan" for the overthrow of the Brazilian and Chilean governments, among others, during 1964. As a prelude to the surfacing of the Brady letters, U.S. and other diplomatic installations in Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, and Montevideo received circulars from a "Committee for Struggle Against Yankee Imperialism" which warned of "hundreds of American CIA, Pentagon, and FBI agents" masquerading in Latin America as diplomats. The first sheet named "some of the American agents who took a direct part in the recent coup d'etat in Brazil" and the second sheet gave "the names of some of the American agents among those who are involved in the preparation of a coup d'etat in Chile." The name of Thomas Brady was listed as one of the "American agents" who had allegedly been involved in the Brazilian coup in April 1964.

Investigation has failed to produce the slightest evidence that a committee with this name exists anywhere in Latin America, and it must be assumed to be a phantom organization created for the express purpose of the mailing to support the forgery. The letterhead showed not only the name of the committee but also the slogan "Latin America for the Latin Americans" in large print, in both Spanish and Portuguese. Both languages were used in the text of the circular, one above the other and side by side. On one of the two sheets of letterhead the Spanish for "imperialism" was incorrectly spelled with the initial letter "e", which might suggest that the letterhead was done by someone usually careless, unfamiliar with the language, or both. At the same time, examination showed the printing method to be letterpress for the letterhead and offset printing for the text, processes hardly in keeping with the capabilities of a "committee" that defied identification. The envelopes carried Uruguayan postage stamps and postmarks, the latter generally illegible, but sample envelopes were found to be of probably Brazilian and Argentine manufacture.

Another mailing from the same committee, addressed to Uruguayans and Latin Americans, came to attention at the end of December 1964. It denounced alleged U.S. pressure on the military of Uruguay to take over the government and, following the pattern set by the first circular, went on to list five U.S. officials involved in the planned coup, four of whom the "committee" claimed were CIA agents.

The two Brady letters, surfaced in Argentina on 23 July 1964 and re-played elsewhere in Latin America in fairly rapid succession, were designed to lend credence to overt propaganda charges of U.S. involvement in the overthrow of the Brazilian government of Joao Goulart. At the same time they were intended, with the help of the phantom committee mailing, to support overt propaganda charges that the U.S. was then meddling in pre-election activities in Chile. The first letter, an innocuous one ostensibly dated 2 January 1961, was published to give authenticity to the second one, dated

15 April 1964. In the second letter the forgers had the Director of the FBI writing to Brady to convey "personal appreciation to each agent stationed in Brazil for the services rendered in the accomplishment of 'Overhaul'" and referring also to the part played by "the CIA people" in "this large scale operation." Not content with providing "proof" of U.S. coup involvement, the forgers added a slighting reference to living conditions in Brazil. Technical scrutiny revealed that the completely fabricated second letter was prepared on a typewriter of European manufacture and the signature showed signs of forgery. There is also proof that the first letter was spurious. In a television speech on 5 August 1960 Raul CASTRO indicated that the Cubans held a letter identical with the first Brady letter, but it was one which had been sent to another man to congratulate him on his years of service. The forgers simply re-typed the letter, changing the name of the individual and date of the letter.

PEACE CORPS CIRCULAR MAILED IN IRAN

Forged Document Identification Data

From: Mr. Cleo Shook
Director of U.S. Peace Corps Workers in Iran

To: The Peace Corps

Ostensible date: No date shown on document.

Synopsis

The forgery is an ostensible background briefing memorandum addressed by Mr. Shook to Peace Corps members assigned to Iran in which Mr. Shook is shown to describe the Iranian people, their customs, and their religion in highly derogatory terms. In some respects, this forgery resembles a USIA brief forged and circulated earlier in Brazil. It shows Mr. Shook as referring consistently to Iranians as "the natives" and as portraying them generally as backward, indolent, ignorant people who are religious fanatics but morally degenerate. It is especially designed to antagonize the Moslem clergy against Americans by the inclusion of phrases describing Islam as "reactionary" and Moslem religious customs as "savage" and "wildly fanatic" and by advice to the Peace Corps volunteers to prevent the young Iranians "from going to the Mullahs to learn Islam, which bars the country from modern life." Several hundred reduced-size photographed copies of the forged memorandum were mailed in Tehran, Iran, to addressees in Iran, some of whom were newspaper editors. The Iranian stamps and postmarks appear to be genuine.

The following factors give indication of probable Communist Bloc manufacture:

1. Since early 1964, the Communist movement has sought to convince the Moslem world that its "scientific socialism" is consistent with the ethics and social doctrines of certain Moslem teachers. The Soviets, for their part, engaged in a strenuous campaign to win the good will of Moslem religious leaders in the Near East and to seek to influence them to become anti-American. The forgery fits into this Soviet propaganda campaign.
2. Other themes implicit in the forgery are similar to those of other forgeries known, or strongly suspected, to have been produced by a Communist Bloc intelligence service. It is designed to spread ill will toward Americans by showing that Americans in Iran have little genuine respect for the people of Iran and that Americans consider Iranians as backward and degenerate. Moreover, the letter is designed to show that the very opinions of Americans about the qualities of the people criticized in the letter are in fact descriptive of Americans themselves. Also, the forgery was clearly planned to indicate that Americans have a ridiculous sense of superiority which causes them to intervene in foreign countries in order to re-fashion them after a corrupt American model.
3. Immorality of Peace Corps members and of local citizens was a subject discussed in another forged Peace Corps letter. That letter appeared in Somalia and was ostensibly written by Peace Corps Director Sargent Shriver to Harris L. Wofford, Peace Corps representative in Addis Ababa. Identical words and similar emphasis were used in discussing the subject in both forgeries -- a fact which suggests a common inspiration if not a central point of origin. The subject of U.S. immorality -- especially of Americans serving overseas -- is frequently treated in similar terminology in Communist Bloc press and radio propaganda stories.
4. Other forged U.S. documents known to be, or strongly suspected of being, of Communist Bloc intelligence service manufacture, have also appeared in the form of reduced-size photographed copies, rather than original documents -- a condition which renders technical analysis of the forgeries more difficult, as Communist Bloc intelligence services are well aware. Also, other Communist Bloc-produced forgeries of U.S. documents most frequently have been mailed in locally-procured envelopes with genuine postage.
5. Some expressions used in the forgery are cliches commonly found in Communist Bloc English language publications. Examples of these are "historic winds" and "torch bearers of progressive ideas."
6. The forgery contains certain typographical errors which consistently appear in Soviet-produced documents written in the English language.