



~~A~~ Record Copy



25X1C10b



Significant Dates ▶

[ASTERISK DENOTES ANNIVERSARIES. All others are CURRENT EVENTS]

JUL

30 (to 5 August) PEN (Poets, Essayists, Novelists -- non-Communist) International Conference, Abidjan, Ivory Coast.

AUG

- 1* Warsaw Uprising begins; later crushed by Germans while Red Army refuses and blocks assistance. 1944.
- 2-9 World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession, 16th Assembly, Vancouver, Canada. (Non-Communist.)
- 6* U.S. drops atom bomb on Hiroshima. 1945.
- 8* Soviet Union declares war on Japan. 1945.
- 14* Japan surrenders to Allies. 1945.
- 15* Republic of Indonesia proclaimed. (After four years of intermittent warfare, Netherlands transferred sovereignty to interim Indonesian government 2 November 1949.) 1950.
- 20* Leon Trotsky murdered in Mexico City. 1940.
- 23* Soviet Union and Nazi Germany conclude non-aggression pact, opening way for German attack on Poland, and its partition between Germany and the USSR. 1939.
- 25* Paris liberated by Free French forces with U.S. Army. 1944.
- 27* Kellogg-Briand Pact (Treaty of Paris) signed, renouncing war as instrument of policy.
- 28 Aug-Sept 2. 10th International Congress of Linguists, Bucharest. (Includes non-Communist participants.)

SEP

- 1* Germany invades Poland; World War II begins. 1939.
- 3-8 17th Pugwash Conference on "Scientists and World Affairs," Ronneby, Sweden.
- 8 Summit meeting of Organization of African Unity, Kinshasa, Congo.
- 11* Constituent Assembly election, South Vietnam. Despite Viet Cong threats, 80.8% of voters turn out. 1966.
- 13-15 Conference on Portuguese Colonies, South and South-West Africa, Zimbabwe, and Rhodesia, Conakry, Guinea. Sponsored by the World Peace Council (Communist front).
- 17* Soviet Union invades Poland, proceeds to occupy eastern half of country. (See under 1 September above.) 1939.
- 18* UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold dies in plane crash near Ndola, Northern Rhodesia. 1961.
- 25 (to 1 October) Fourth General Conference of BITEJ (Travel Bureau of World Federation of Democratic Youth -- Communist) meets in Budapest in conjunction with FIYTO (federation of non-communist commercial travel agencies).

Briefly Noted ✓

5 June 1967

The Changing Soviet Line Moscow Rewrites Tibetan History

The following two quotations illustrate the change in Moscow's line on Tibet in the light of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Small Soviet Encyclopedia, vol. 9 (1960):

"With the support of imperialist circles and the Chiang Kai-shekites, Tibetan reactionaries organized a plot against the Central People's Government and in March 1959, began an armed uprising... The defeat of the reactionary rebels by units of the People's Liberation Army, which was actively supported by broad sections of the Tibetan population, foiled the dangerous plot by the internal and external enemies of the Chinese People's Republic and opened up the prospect of building a new, democratic and Socialist Tibet before the Tibetan people."

Tashkent Radio, 3 April 1967:

"Blood is flowing again and hundreds of Tibetans have been killed or have committed suicide after torture. Monasteries and shrines are being desecrated and sacred books destroyed. The Tibetans fought for their national freedom and independence in 1959, when tens of thousands of Tibetans were killed by the Chinese and tens of thousands more were forced to flee. In January 1965, the Tibetans rose again against Peking's policy; for Peking's proclamation of sham national autonomy has not satisfied them. The Tibetans will continue their struggle for survival

and independence and their liberation struggle, like that of other nationalities, will never be subdued."

Moscow's pious sympathy for the Tibetan people seems even more cynical when contrasted with the 1960 statement and in view of her own policy of offering "sham autonomy" to various nationalities within her own boundaries.

25X1C10b

Miscellaneous Notes on Consumer Benefits

More on 50th Anniversary Celebrations

As part of the 50th Anniversary celebrations, the Soviet government has promised its citizens more consumer goods. The following items are just two of the myriad which appear in the Communist and Western press, pointing up economic shortcomings in the Soviet Union.

(UNCLASSIFIED) Flour Returns to State Stores in Moscow. Flour is being sold in state stores for the first time since the autumn of 1963. This is partially due to the favorable wheat crop of 1966 but is also an extra bonus for the jubilee year. While importing wheat, Russia had also made selected exports for political purposes while denying her own citizens the privilege of purchasing flour for their own use.

More and Better Shoes. According to EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA and IZVESTIYA the shoe industry is beset by a

shortage of modern plant equipment and quality raw material. The annual output of shoes is scheduled to increase from 522 million pairs in 1966 to 760 million in 1971. In order to meet this schedule new factories will have to be built and modern equipment imported. Improvement in the quality of domestic hides and artificial leather will also be necessary. Artificial leather is of such poor quality that it can only be used for sandals and summer footwear. Modern facilities for treating, storing and shipping hides are also lacking. Consequently, the regime has had to import large quantities of shoes from "Socialist" countries as well as the decadent West.

* * *

ADVERTISEMENT

+ + + + + + + + + +

+ + + + + + + + + +

50TH ANNIVERSARY

+ + + + + + + + + +

Soviet Revolution

+ + + + + + + + + + 25X10-10b




+ + + + + + + + + +

ADVERTISEMENT

25X1C10b

* * * * *



* * * * *



Propagandist's Guide to WORLD COMMUNIST AFFAIRS



#14

25 April-22 May 1967

ICM AND "SOCIALIST CAMP" AFFAIRS

1. Although Soviet media continue to acclaim the Karlovy Vary conference of European CPs (#13) as a great triumph and demonstration of unity with world-wide significance (media of other participants are generally much more restrained on the subject), the hollowness of the victory quickly becomes apparent. Immediately after its close, the participating British CP releases (A 27) a major new policy document which differs widely from Soviet policy in important aspects. Ten days later, the non-participating Rumanian CP boss Ceausescu publishes a major statement which expands on that Party's previously expressed stance of independence, including a strong affirmation of the right of any party not to participate in any international meeting. He strongly reiterates Rumanian opposition to any form of "an international coordinating center" and to "the setting up of compulsory norms of conduct for CPs." And in a surprising new thrust, he brands it as inadmissible for any member of one party to maintain relations with any other party "over the head of the leadership" and for any party to establish relations with any members or groups in another party (in the view of the most observers, a thinly-veiled charge of underhanded Soviet relations with sympathizers within the Rumanian CP).
2. Meanwhile, true to form, the Chinese and Albanians scathingly denounce KV as deceitful, hackneyed, and sterile, -- "symbolic of the utter bankruptcy of Europe's new scabs."
3. Soviet media continue to report statements by other parties calling for the convening of a world CP meeting, and they join in the call with the Greeks (A 29), but clandestine reporting indicates that in the aftermath of KV most parties see the prospects for one deferred indefinitely.
4. Bilateral meetings between European parties continue, producing two more new 20-year friendship treaties, USSR-Bulgaria (M 10-13) and Hungary-E. Germany (M 18-21): neither departs notably from the pattern of the recent series.
5. Castro's relations with the established CPs of Latin America are further inflamed by increased Cuban militance -- and the publicity caused by a series of "red-handed" captures: one of Castro's closest political theorist-collaborators with the guerrillas in Bolivia (A 25); a courier in Colombia (M 3); an agent with a clandestine radio and full paraphernalia in the Dominican Republic (M 8); and three Army officers attempting a landing on the coast of Venezuela (M 12). Unabashed, he boastfully acknowledges the landing attempt and declares he'll continue to aid "fighters against imperialism" anywhere in the world. (M 1, 4, 18)

6. Radio Tirana broadcasts to Poland purported extracts from two more seditions documents of an underground, anti-Gomulka "Polish CP." (M 8 & 14)
7. Chinese media attack the Soviet revisionists heavily along many lines and expel a PRAVDA correspondent from Peking, while Soviet media reciprocate on a somewhat lower key.

INTERNATIONAL FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

8. ~~SECRET NOTORN~~ report from a usually reliable source states that the Chinese have indefinitely postponed their attempt to hold a rival AAPSO conference in Peking this year -- an intent which they announced after the Soviet-dominated Council meeting in Cyprus (#11, Feb. 13-16) voted to change the venue for the 5th conference to Algiers. The postponement probably reflects China's difficulties in rounding up delegates. Actually, the prospects for the Algiers AAPSO conference now appear doubtful, too.
9. Castro is confidently proceeding with plans for his own Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) conference in Havana July 28.

COMMUNIST CHINA

10. The new Maoist drive to crush opposition loyal to Liu (#13) gains little or no ground during this period: on the contrary, the regime's media again warn against anarchy and violence as reports of clashes and even "large-scale, bloody repression" of Maoists increase. (Note: a number of experts on China believe that the poster and Red Guard bulletin reports of strife and massacres are intentionally exaggerated by the Maoists to provide grounds for ousting oppositionist leaders who can be held responsible, -- and there is little "hard" evidence to prove or disprove such views.)
11. As Maoist-led rioting breaks out in Hong Kong, the Chicom regime delivers stern demands to the British Govt, stirs massive demonstrations in Peking, maltreats a British consul in Shanghai, etc. The British ignore the Peking demands; the Hong Kong police (largely Chinese) remain loyal and handle the crowds firmly; and the situation is again relatively calm as the period ends. (M 6. and continuing)
12. Chinese media continue their heavy barrage of attacks on the Soviets on: collusion with U.S. imperialism (dragging this into articles on other subjects and other countries), India, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Pope; on the Soviet "new system" of economic management and agriculture; on practicing economic imperialism in milking the socialist camp and countries of Asia and Africa; etc. (Chrono, A 26 & continuing)
13. Chinese-Indonesian political strife continues, but on a somewhat lower key. (A 25 & continuing)

14. On the 2nd anniversary of Mao's statement supporting the Dominican rebels, PEOPLE'S DAILY sounds the call to armed struggle to "the Dominican and other Latin American people." (M 12)

SOVIET AFFAIRS

15. Soviet media continue extensive criticism of Chinese events, though perhaps less intensely than last month. (A 29 & continuing, and M 7, 8)

16. An IZVESTIYA attack on W. German-Japanese talks is rebuffed by the Japanese. (M 16 & 18)

17. Appointment of CC/CPSU Secretary Andropov to relieve Semichastny at the head of the security police (KGB) is seen as resulting from a series of failures in recent months but indicates also closer party control of intelligence operations. (M 19)

18. The June issue of ATLANTIC MONTHLY contains an essay on the Russian people written by Svetlana Alliluyeva (Stalina) in Switzerland after she had read DR. ZHIVAGO. (M 21)

19. The long-delayed 4th Congress of Soviet writers convenes on the last day of the period, with indications that it will be as bland, non-controversial, and conservative as can possibly be managed. (M 22)

20. The USSR increases to \$122 million its long-term loan for reconstruction of the Cuban sugar industry. (M 7) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ This is an increase of almost 50% over the September 1966 agreement.

21. ~~SECRET REPORT~~ Further deliveries of Soviet military hardware to Cuba, the UAR, Algeria, Morocco, and Uganda are reported during this period.

22. ~~SECRET REPORT~~ The Deputy Chairman of the Soviet-Japan Friendship Society in Japan in April reportedly makes some progress in efforts to woo the JCP and JSP and to encourage the two to form a common front in Japan.

EAST EUROPE

23. EAST GERMANY: Despite Ulbricht's "hard" speech at the SED Congress (#13, A 17-22), the E. German regime sends 3 communications to Bonn in apparent efforts to draw the W. German Govt into intergovernmental negotiations; Bonn appoints a special commission to consider answers. (M 1 & 17)
E. German Foreign Minister Winzer visits UAR, Syria, Lebanon, Algeria and Iraq on a hurried trip apparently intended to exploit what they believe is Arab disenchantment with Bonn, but returns emptyhanded. (See also item #1131, this issue)

24. ALBANIA: The Albanian regime decrees a set of harsh new "revolutionary initiatives" to "revolutionize the life of our country, -- including reduction or abolition of personal plots for peasants, abolition or reduction of production material incentives in favor of moral incentives, intensifying of work and reduction of high wages." (A 30)

25. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~. Czech expenditures for defense and security in 1967 will be 14.2% above 1966.

WESTERN EUROPE

26. SWEDEN: At its 21st Congress, the Swedish CP reelects Chairman Hermansson and decides to continue to follow his "liberal" ways: it even changes the party's name to "Left Party -- Communist," which it admits is an effort to identify itself more closely with the socialist left. (M 13-16)

27. FRANCE: "Bloody strife" between pro-Moscow and pro-Chinese local Communists reaches Paris, according to the Chinese. (M 7)

ASIA

28. JAPAN: The JCP continues to struggle against Chinese-supported "split-ters," expelling two more prominent members. (M 8 & 13)

29. MONGOLIA: Mongolia again protests a "new provocation organized by the Chinese Embassy" in Ulan Bator and expels the Chinese school-teacher offenders. (M 22)

30. THAILAND: The premier announces further Communist terrorist activities in the northeast. (M 1 & 8) ~~SECRET NOFORN~~: Communist activities show a 30% increase in armed clashes in March over February, with an accompanying increase in village propaganda activities. ~~SECRET NOFORN~~

31. INDIA: The Soviet-aligned Indian CP seeks collaboration with the Chinese-line CPI(L) and a political coalition to win power from the Congress Party at the central level, -- with Soviet blessing and Chinese denunciation. (M 7)

32. PHILIPPINES: A battle with Hukbalahap (Communist) guerrillas in Bataan kills 4 soldiers and 3 Huks.

LATIN AMERICA

33. CUBA: A ~~SECRET NOFORN~~ report on the debriefing of the Cuban Army officers captured during the May 8 landing attempt in Venezuela describes a special commando unit formed in Cuba a year ago to promote and support armed clandestine penetration of LA countries. ~~SECRET NOFORN~~


34. VENEZUELA: ~~SECRET NOFORN~~ Guerrillas ambushed a Venezuelan Army truck convoy on May 17 near the site of the Cuban-supported landing, killing 4 soldiers. The V. Govt is preparing a strong case for action by OAS. ~~SECRET NOFORN~~

35. BOLIVIA: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ The Bolivian Govt expects to bring Castro's French friend and theoretician of guerrilla war, Debray, to trial.


36. ECUADOR: 2,000 pro-Chinese students storm the Central University of Ecuador in Quito in an unsuccessful attempt to take control. (M 17)

37. GUATEMALA: ~~SECRET NOFORN~~ The Security situation in Guatemala is reportedly deteriorating; further trouble is expected. Guerrilla activities since last August have killed at least 100 victims, and Govt forces have killed some 80 alleged guerrillas in the field. ~~SECRET NOFORN~~

25X1C10b



25X1C10b



CHRONOLOGY

WORLD COMMUNIST AFFAIRS

Continuing from preceding numbers: The situation in China appears to be more confused and unpredictable than ever: we treat it again in outline summary.

A. The new Maoist drive to eliminate the opposition headed by Liu & Co. apparently makes little or no headway. Regime media in Peking and the relatively few "Maoist-seized" provinces continue to attack "the number one Party person in authority taking the capitalist road" (Liu Shao-chi), his book, and the "handful of persons" supporting him, -- but with no discernible concrete progress towards ousting him. On the contrary, with increased reporting of bloody strife among Maoists as well as between Maoists and their opponents, regime media are again warning against anarchy and violence and solemnly predict a long, hard struggle ahead, with "many other" cultural revolutions before China is safe from a "capitalist restoration." Noteworthy items include:

(1) A 26 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, "Down with Anarchism," admits:

"At this very moment, anarchism has again appeared to scatter the targets of our struggle and divert the general orientation of the struggle."

(2) Wall posters in Peking on April 28 reveal that "under Mao's instructions the Party CC's cultural revolution group on 22 April released from prison 139 middle school Red Guards affiliated with the United Action Committee, which is comprised mainly of sons and daughters of high cadres," as reported by Tokyo SANKEI Bureau Chief Shibata. Some posters attack and others laud the release of the UAC Red Guards.

(3) May Day brings an unprecedented turnout of the top leaders (Mao's first MD appearance since 1962), including several who have been subjected to repeated poster attacks in recent months, such as the 81-year-old military veteran Chu Teh, standing in 4th position, after Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai. None of those closely identified with Liu are seen, however, nor any regional chiefs other than Li Hsueh-feng of the North China Party Bureau and Chang Kuo-hua of Tibet. The large turnout was undoubtedly intended to convey an impression of unity, but, as Tillman Durdin reports to the NYTIMES from Hong Kong, "it did not, on balance, represent the accretion of much real strength for the Maoists."

(4) Red Guard media report the ousting of two important anti-Maoist provincial chiefs shortly after May Day: Ulanfu, top Party, government, and military chief of Inner Mongolia reportedly relieved by a relatively unknown Liu Hsiang-chuan: Ulanfu is accused of wanting to turn Inner Mongolia into an independent kingdom. THE EAST IS RED, student newspaper of the Peking Geological Institute, on May 9 reports a May 7 CC decision to oust Li Ching-chuan, CC Politburo member, Southwest China Party Bureau

chief, and political commissar of the Chengtu Military Region, and appoint a preparatory committee to set up a Szechwan Provincial Revolutionary Committee. It contains detailed charges of the use of PLA troops in "large-scale, bloody repression of the revolutionary masses" in that province (which has 100 million people and vast grain producing areas). Thus far, the regime's formal media have made no mention of these reported ousters -- while wall posters and other sources increasingly depict bloody clashes in Szechwan, Heilungkiang, and elsewhere.

(5) The most systematic attack on Liu's book (HOW TO BE A GOOD COMMUNIST, or ON SELF-CULTIVATION) to date comes in a joint RED FLAG/PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on May 7. Among other charges, it claims that Liu in his 1962 edition "deleted Stalin's name and all the passages he originally quoted...", and that "nowhere does it so much as mention Mao Tse-tung's thought." (A review of the 1962 edition shows that it does retain some passages attributed to Stalin and actually adds numerous Mao quotes not in the earlier versions.)

(6) The CCP on May 16 releases the text of a hitherto secret CC circular dated 16 May 1966: "this great historic document, drawn up under Chairman Mao's guidance, smashed the scheme of the Peng Chen counter-revolutionary revisionist clique for a capitalist restoration. For the first time it systematically presented the theory, line, principles, and policy of the GPCR..." All papers front-page it on the 17th, and a joint RED FLAG/PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 18th emphasizes its "tremendous significance." The latter concludes: "The present GPCR is only the first, and in the future there are bound to be many others."

(7) PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on May 21 warns:

"Lately an evil wind of struggling by force is seen in some places and units and among some mass organizations... We must firmly curb this evil wind...."

Toronto GLOBE AND MAIL correspondent Oancia on the 22nd describes security measures in Peking verging on martial law, with troops carrying fixed bayonets on their rifles patrolling the streets "in addition to the usual guards on duty."

B. Names in the news: In addition to those mentioned above, the following prominent CCP names warrant special note:

(1) Chiang Ching (Mao's wife) is boosted in prestige as all papers on May 10 front-page the text of a militant speech she allegedly made almost 3 years ago, at the July 1964 Festival of the Peking Opera. (Observers point out that her name was not even mentioned in any of the reporting associated with the Festival in 1964.)

(2) Chen Yi continues to be attacked by Red Guard posters and a Guard detachment broke into the Foreign Ministry building on May 13, apparently attempting to ransack the files for material to be used against him.

However, he is reported still performing at least his ceremonial duties as Foreign Minister receiving the Cambodian Foreign Ministry's secygen as late as May 16.

C. Miscellaneous: The Chinese on May 6 expel PRAVDA correspondent Pasenchuk: NCNA says that P, "who has always assumed a hostile attitude toward China, went so far as to attack by name, open and virulently, Chairman Mao ... and to smear China's GPCR in his dispatch of 14 April."

* * *

April 25 and continuing: Bolivian Army patrols operating against Communist guerrillas (who had ambushed them on March 23 and April 10) capture 3 foreigners and identify one as Jules Regis Debray, a militant French Communist friend and writer-collaborator of Cuban Premier Castro, author of a 1965 article, "Castroism, the Long March of Latin America," and a 1967 Havana-published book, REVOLUTION WITHIN A REVOLUTION. Confirming the capture of Debray and his companions in a May 4 interview with WASHINGTON POST's Goshko, armed forces commander Ovando adds that many guerrillas in Bolivia "were trained in special guerrilla schools in Cuba and that others received training in similar schools in Russia." He concludes that "the situation is grave because they are backed and financed by international sources bent on the overthrow of the Bolivian Government."

April 25 and continuing: Chinese-Indonesian political strife continues, while the Indonesian Govt attempts to dissuade and prevent its people from actions against Chinese residents in I. Highlights include:

-- While Djakarta Radio on the 25th accuses the Chinese of "tampering with the facts about events in Indonesia involving Communist Chinese elements," ANTARA on the 26th admits that I. youths in Medan on the 24th stormed and ransacked a number of Chinese houses, adding that security troops rushed to the scene, arrested the suspected instigators and promised "stern measures" against culprits. ANTARA adds, though, that a group of Chinese awaiting repatriation had marched demonstratively to the Chinese Consulate, chanting and yelling in Chinese, apparently provoking the I youths.

--- NCNA May 13 charges that "the Yugoslav Tito renegade group is stepping up its collusion with the I. fascist regime," citing "secret meetings held from 8 to 11 May between Y. Deputy Foreign Minister Pavicevic and Suharto, Adam Malik, and other butchers of the I. people."

--- A May 18 Chinese Embassy note to the I. Foreign Ministry protests new "bloody atrocities" against Chinese nationals in Malang, East Java, on May 12 and 13.

* * *

April 26 and continuing: Media of the participants generally extol the results of the April 24-26 Karlovy Vary conference of European CPs (see #13), led by the Soviets, who expand on its "international significance" and declare that its decisions "will become an increasingly important factor not only in the struggle for security in Europe but also for improving the

international atmosphere in the whole world." (PRAVDA, May 17). On a more restrained note, however, Italian CP SecyGen Longo in a televised Rome press conference May 12 sees the "new significance" of KV in its recognition of the autonomy and independence of each party. (See major Rumanian statement May 7.) The Chinese and Albanians, of course, scathingly denounce it. PEOPLE'S DAILY May 4 calls it "symbolic of the utter bankruptcy of Europe's new scabs":

"The meeting was convened by the Soviet revisionists to engineer further actions against China. At the meeting Brezhnev led the attack. Outside the meeting the gang undertook intense anti-China activities....

On the question of European 'peace and security,' the KV meeting fell back on a lot of hackneyed phrases, some picked up from the old revisionists, some from Khrushchev, some from Tito, and some from the imperialists. This lengthy 7,000-word statement is crammed with deceitful phrases....

What Brezhnev, Kosygin, and company call "security in Europe" means security for the privileged bourgeois stratum in the countries where the revisionist groups are in power....

The KV meeting was a meeting in the service of U.S. imperialism...."

April 27: Immediately after Karlov Vary, the British CP releases a major policy statement on "Questions of Ideology" which differs widely from Soviet policy in advocating complete freedom of religion, artistic expression, and "the free confrontation of different scientific theories and, when necessary, prolonged debate." It also recognizes the need for a diversity of democratic parties, "including these which do not accept, or oppose, the advance of socialism."

In Paris, a state security court convicts two couples of spying on NATO for E. Germany and sentences them to terms ranging from 12 to 20 years.

April 27 and continuing: Chinese media attack the Soviet revisionists heavily and repeatedly throughout the period: the charge of Soviet collusion with U.S. imperialism against China is now commonly included even in articles on other subjects, and even in tirades directed primarily against other countries -- the USA, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The "new system" in Soviet economic management (production geared to profitability) and in Soviet agriculture also comes under exceptionally heavy attack, interpreted as further evidence of Soviet revisionist degeneration toward the restoration of capitalism. Noteworthy items include:

--- PEOPLE'S DAILY Observer April 30, "Soviet Revisionist Ruling Class Are Rank Traitors to the Vietnamese Revolution," responding to Brezhnev's public complaint at the East German Party Congress April 18 of Chinese Chinese refusal to take "united action" to help Vietnam, lists ten examples of how, over the last two years, the Soviets have "worked hand in glove with U.S. imperialism in a series of conspiratorial activities, unscrupulously

resorting to the 'peace talks' hoax and alternating this with war black-mail."

-- A Chinese Defense Ministry May 2 accusation that 4 U.S. fighter planes had intruded into Chinese airspace includes the charge that the U.S. imperialists are expanding their aggressive war in Vietnam "with the coordination and instigation of the Soviet revisionist leading clique." PEOPLE'S DAILY takes up the theme on May 3, following which 500 Chinese demonstrate at the Soviet Embassy, pasting up slogans accusing the Soviets of conspiring with the U.S. to bomb China. (Reuters, from "Soviet sources.")

-- PEOPLE'S DAILY May 5 devotes half a page to extracts from Soviet publications "revealing the extent to which capitalism is being restored in accelerated tempo in the Soviet countryside." Same issue of PD has a short commentary, "Renegades Peddle Opium," based on Soviet publication of Bible stories for children, concluding that

"you should also include that one about Judas Iscariot. It would be a great help to the Soviet people in recognizing your dirty features as a handful of renegades if you acquaint the Soviet readers with the story of that traitor who betrayed Jesus Christ for 30 pieces of silver."

--- NCNA May 6 reports that the Soviets have banned the distribution of PEKING REVIEW in the USSR, saying: "Always timid as mice, the Soviet rev. ruling clique stands in mortal fear of the dissemination in the S.U. of Mao Tse-tung's thought, M-L at its highest level in our era...." PEOPLE'S DAILY same day brands Soviet implied accusations of Chinese-West German collusion as "lies fabricated in league with U.S. imperialism to slander China."

--- PEOPLE'S DAILY article May 7 exploits a statement by Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev to TRUD, in which he "smugly declared: 'I would like to make it perfectly clear that neither in the Asian countries, in the countries in the Near East, nor in any other country have we been running at a loss in selling commodities.'"

"That is to say Soviet revisionist foreign trade must never 'run at a loss,' which means putting financial interests first. This one sentence really speaks volumes. But where has it the least flavor of socialism! Where is the difference between it and the foreign trade of imperialism, capitalism! ...

The Soviet revisionist leading clique frequently boasts of its 'aid' through foreign trade to the EE countries and countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Patolichev's statement has now poked another hole in the disguise covering such 'aid.' In the Soviet revisionists' foreign trade activities, 'aid' is a lie while the earning of profits is true; 'mutual benefits' and 'support' is a lie while exploitation and profits is true....

Most severely exploited by the Soviet revisionists' unequal value exchange are the 'fraternal' countries and a number of other countries in Asia and Africa... markets for industrial goods and sources of agricultural products and consumer commodities....

Of course, the Soviet revs' foreign trade does not exist merely for the sake of profits: it is the Soviet rev. clique's tool for pushing their policies of rev. and great-power chauvinism, and it serves their general line of 'Soviet-U.S. collaboration for world domination.'..."

--- NCNA May 17 says that the mass demonstrations in Peking over the situation in Hong Kong (see below) included "big character posters and cartoons deriding U.S. imperialism, British imperialism, and Soviet revisionism as paper tigers."

--- A thousand demonstrators outside the Soviet Embassy in Peking on May 20 carry oversize caricatures depicting Liu Shao-chi and Khrushchev as great friends.

--- "Routine" collusion charges include: collusion with the Pope (A 27); collusion with the U.S. in betrayal of the Arabs over Palestine (M 15); with the U.S. in European troop redeployment; with the U.S. in a proposed "international anti-ballistic missile defense" (M 10, 17); with India and Indonesia in SE Asian defense (M 16); etc.

* * *

April 29: All Moscow papers feature a communique on an April 28 Moscow meeting of a Greek CP delegation headed by First Secy Koliyiannis with Suslov and Pelshe, at which both "condemned the splitting activities" of the Chinese and "stressed the necessity of convening an international conference" of CPs.

April 29 and continuing: Soviet media continue to give considerable attention to events in China, mostly through critical reporting of chaos and strife resulting from the "political bacchanalia taking place there ... by the Mao Tse-tung group in its unprincipled struggle for power." (Quote from Radio Moscow April 29.) They cite other sources when possible: e.g., PRAVDA on A 29 publishes a Jordanian CP statement condemning "the crimes of the Mao Tse-tung group and his pernicious 'thought'" which have brought "complete anarchy" to China, "unleashed a case campaign of hatred against the CPSU, the Soviet people, and the USSR Govt," etc.

April 30: Albanian papers publish an Albanian Party-Govt statement "On the Further Development and Intensification of the Revolutionary Movement and the Working Masses' Creative Initiatives." Emphasizing the need to "revolutionize the life of our country," it decrees 4 "revolutionary initiatives":

"I. On the Reduction in Size of Cooperative Members' Plots in the Agricultural Cooperatives and the Abolition of Personal Plots on State Farms.

II. On Intensifying Direct Cadre Participation in Productive Work and on the Reduction of High Wages, without Affecting Low and Medium Wages.

III. On the Abolition or Limitation of Several Incentives and on the Priority of Moral Incentives over Material Incentives.

IV. Some Palliative Measures for Agricultural Cooperatives and on an Eventual Drop in the Price of Consumer Goods for all the People."

May 1: May Day is celebrated by Communist govts and parties (and also by some non-Communists) around the world. The celebration in Moscow is relatively low-key, with the French Chief of General Staff, Gen. Ailleret, as the first Western military guest on the Lenin Mausoleum since Gen. Eisenhower in 1945: the Chinese diplomats again walk out when Marshal Grechko implies that they are hindering united action in Vietnam. In contrast, the militant celebration in Havana is keyed to the guerrilla struggle in Latin America, extols Che Guevara as a leader in this struggle, broadcasts recordings of his last major speech, and displays signs with his words: "We must create two, three, and four Vietnams in LA."

May 1 & 8: At his regular press conferences, Thai Premier Kittikhachon describes stepped-up Communist terrorist activities in the northeast.

May 1 & 17: In West Germany Chancellor Kiesinger's May Day speech in West Berlin, he challenges East Germany to test his proposals for easing relations between the peoples of the East and West (see #13, April 17-22). On the 17th West German spokesman Ahlers announces that Bonn is ending its policy of returning E. German communications unopened and has formed a special committee to deal with answers to three recent letters: one from E.G. Premier Stoph to Kiesinger announced on May 11; and one each from the E.G. Ministers of Transport and post to their W.G. counterparts.

May 3: The Colombian Govt announces the capture of a courier involved in smuggling counterfeit passports to Cuba.

May 4: Cuban CP daily GRANMA publishes a full-page summary of Uruguayan CP SecyGen Arismendi's Lenin Day speech in Montevideo, a version which acknowledges but tones down A's stress on the continuing possibility of bloodless revolution. Observers see the act as intended to repair Castro's strained relations with the Soviet-line CPs in LA on the eve of the conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) scheduled to open in Havana July 28.

May 6, 7: Radio Moscow announces that the Chinese have decided to expel PRAVDA correspondent Pasenchuk, the fourth Soviet journalist since the CR began last summer. PRAVDA's editorial next day is on the theme expressed by its heading, "Fear of Truth." (A play on words: "pravda" means "truth.")

May 6 and continuing: Hong Kong is thrown into a major crisis potentially threatening British control. The disturbances begin with a clash between police and Maoist-led sympathizers with workers at an artificial flower factory and are rapidly expanded into violent riots and orderly demonstrations. Peking first reacts on the 15th with a strong Foreign Ministry protest to the British Embassy denouncing large-scale "bloody atrocities" which "are the result of long premeditation and are a component part of the British Govt's scheme of collusion with U.S. imperialism against China" because the British authorities "mortally fear and bitterly hate China's GPCR."

"... The Chinese Govt demands in all seriousness that the British Govt instruct the British authorities in Hong Kong as follows:

Immediately accept all the just demands put forward by the Chinese workers and residents of Hong Kong;

Immediately stop all fascist measures;

Immediately set free all the arrested persons...;

Punish the culprits responsible for these sanguinary atrocities, offer apologies to the victims, and compensate for their losses;

Guarantee against the occurrence of similar incidents."

Anti-British demonstrations in Peking build up to a rally of 100,000 on the 18th attended by Chou En-lai, Chen Po-ta, Chen Yi, and Kuo Mo-jo. In Shanghai, demonstrators break into the residence of the British Consul on the 16th and destroy the furnishings. The British ignore Peking's threats, and the Hong Kong police (largely Chinese) seem to be controlling the situation as the period ends, in the face of loudspeaker appeals to them to turn against the British.

May 7: Rumanian CP daily SCINTEIA features a major theoretical article by SecyGen Ceausescu, "The Leading Role of the Party in the Stage of the Completion of Building Socialism," which, in its long international section, expands on the RCP's independence views (with apparent reference to recent Soviet pressures):

"Each CP has the legitimate right to participate in an international meeting if it considers it necessary and useful, just as it has the legitimate right not to participate. Internationalist solidarity is not a conference.... CPs who uphold that non-participation in a conference must not affect, in any way whatsoever, comradely relations between parties... are perfectly correct.

Such an approach ... contributes to eliminating old practices of linking inter-party relations to the acceptance or non-acceptance of a point of view and of exerting pressure in one form or another, all of which result in sharpening divergencies in the Communist movement.

... The normal development of the Communist movement and the assertion of each CP as a vanguard political force of the working class and its people are incompatible with the existence of an international coordinating center, with the practice of setting compulsory norms of conduct for CPs....

... It is inadmissible under any form for a party member to establish or maintain, over the head of the leadership, relations with other parties, to supply information, and to participate in actions against the political line of his party....

... Relations must unfold in an organizational framework, from party to party. An attempt by a party to establish relations with members or groups within another party outside the organized framework means an encroachment upon the principle of proletarian internationalism, an action splitting the unity of that party....

... It is the essential duty of each party not to undertake anything which might aggravate the divergencies in the Communist and workers movement, which might further deepen the abyss of division...."

Indian CP weekly NEW AGE publishes a resolution of its National Council with proposals aimed toward developing a "democratic" coalition capable of winning power from the ruling Congress Party at the central government level. In an April resolution, the CP had called for steps toward collaboration with the Chinese-oriented CPI (L). Moscow blesses and Peking denounces these moves.

The USSR increases to \$112 million its long-term loan for reconstruction of the Cuban sugar industry.

May 7, 8: Most authoritative of the continuing Soviet attacks on Chinese treatment of national minorities comes in a KOMMUNIST article signed by Tursun Rakhimov (Turkic origin) denouncing "the chauvinist, nationalist policy of the present CPR leaders" with their "attempts at forced assimilation of minority groups." Next day the leading independent Vienna newspaper KURIER supports the Soviet line in an interview by its chief editor Hugo Portisch with "Former Cultural Affairs Minister of Sinkiang Zia Samedi," conducted "in a small cafe in the hills at the foot of the Altaj Mountain range" (Soviet Turkestan). Subject describes Chinese forced assimilation, "Sinozation," forced marriages, starvation, genocide. He says that since he entered the S.U. he has published two novels and is working on a third, all about the various Uighur uprisings against the Chinese during the past century.

"Question: 'The content of your novels reveals that there have been continuous clashes between Uighurs and Chinese. Would you interpret this to mean that Sinkiang is striving for independence?'"

Samedi did not reply directly. Instead he said: 'I am not authorized to say anything about this,; But he added: 'This is an affair of the Uighurs in Sinkiang....'"

May 7: NCNA May 7 reports from Paris that the "revisionist group in the French CP on 5 May sent hooligans to make trouble and sabotage a mass meeting called to express solidarity with the Vietnamese people's struggle against U.S. aggression" which was "organized by the Paris regional committee of the French Communist Movement M-L."

"... Using clubs and iron bars, they assaulted the defenseless French revolutionaries ... Regis Bergeron, chief editor of L'HUMANITE NOUVELLE, was attacked and injured.... A dozen others were seriously injured and hospitalized. The hooligans attacked wildly. They tore up portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Chairman Mao Tse-tung, as well as a portrait of President Ho Chi Minh...."

May 8: Japanese CP daily AKAHATA complains that since the split 12th World Congress against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs last summer the 15 million yen which the Chinese had been sending to Gensuikyo for relief of atomic victims has been going instead to "those who bolted from the Japan-China Friendship Association." These "splitters" are now using the Chinese funds in "desperate efforts to split the anti-nuclear movement and the atom-bomb victims movement in Vietnam."

Radio Tirana in Polish describes "a brochure entitled 'The CP of Poland (KPP) Fights and Calls to Fight,'" which was "recently published in Poland."

"The establishment of the KPP enables all true revolutionaries to detach themselves ... from the Gomulkaites, from the traitors of socialism.... All true revolutionaries should join the struggle in the ranks of the KPP.... The political struggle against the traitors of socialism must be merciless...."

Dominican Republic President Balaguer announces the capture of an agent of Cuban intelligence, with a clandestine radio and other espionage paraphernalia.

May 10, 13: Brezhnev visits Sofia to sign a new 20-year treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. The treaty includes much the same provisions as the treaty which it succeeds, though it is milder in its references to the German menace.

May 12: PEOPLE'S DAILY articles claim support in an article signed by a CC member of the "CP of Brazil" and by "the broad masses of the Soviet people." while NCNA describes a letter of "firm support and warm acclamation" from "the CC of the Revolutionary CP of Chile." And in its turn, PD on the 2nd anniversary of Mao's "statement supporting the Dominican people's resistance to U.S. armed aggression" incites revolution:

"The Dominican and other Latin American people have come to realize that they have no alternative but to wage armed struggle.... Only by taking up the rifle will they be able to wipe out U.S. imperialism and its lackeys...."

May 12 & 17: Radios Moscow and "Peace and Progress" cautiously express concern at the rightist drift in Indonesia.

"Official circles in Djakarta usually affirm that the anti-Communism carried out in I. has nothing to do with anti-Sovietism. This explanation can be taken with a grain of salt.... The belligerent anti-Communism being pursued undermines normal relations of I. with its old and reliable friends, the socialist nations...."

May 12, 17, 18: Venezuela announces May 12 that she has captured two Cuban Army officers and killed two in a landing attempt on the 8th. On the 17th, the Venezuelan CP publishes paid newspaper advertisements denouncing the "insurrectional line" being followed by Cuban-backed guerrillas, while simultaneously the Central University is plastered with leaflets signed by the pro-Cuban Revolutionary Leftist Movement denouncing the Govt's charges against Cuba as a "farce" to justify repression. Next day, however, a Cuban CP statement boastfully acknowledges that 3 Cubans whom it names were in fact involved in the attempt: "We are lending and will continue to lend aid to all those who fight against imperialism in any part of the world."

May 13: Radio Tirana broadcasts to Poland an "excerpt from 'The Polish October -- A Betrayal of Socialism,' a pamphlet distributed throughout Poland by the Polish CP."

Japanese CP daily AKAHATA announces the expulsion of another two prominent members who, while holding high positions in the Japan International Trade Promotion Council, "became agents of a certain foreign country" clearly indicated to be ComChina.

May 13-16: The Swedish CP holds its 21st Congress in Stockholm -- and decides to change its name to "Left Party -- Communists" as part of its effort to disassociate itself from the old Communist image and identify itself with the socialist left, according to its statement issued on the 15th. It reelects Chairman Hermansson and indicates it will continue to follow his "liberal" ways.

May 16 & 18: IZVESTIYA comment by V. Kudryavtsev on W. German Foreign Minister Brandt's visit to Japan recalls "the old wind of pre-war years" and concludes: "as the Miki Brandt consultations showed, Tokyo and Bonn are not against returning to their old game now...." On the 18th, at a press conference of the Japanese Foreign Office, Public Information Director Kinya Niiseki states that IZVESTIYA had regrettably distorted the facts.

May 17: 2,000 pro-Chinese Communist students storm the Central University of Ecuador in Quito in an unsuccessful effort to take control, the second failure in 3 days of rioting. (Reuters)

May 18: Manila announces that 4 soldiers and 3 Huk guerrillas were killed in a battle in Bataan province. (NYTIMES)

May 18-21: An Ulbricht-led E. German Party/State delegation goes to Budapest and signs a new 20-year treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance which contains no notable departures from the old or from the series concluded with other EE states in recent months.

May 19 & 21: Moscow announces on the 19th that Yuri Andropov, CPSU/CC Secretary in charge of relations with foreign ruling parties, formerly a Komsomol (Youth League) official and Soviet Ambassador to Budapest during the 1956 uprising, will take over the Committee of State Security (KGB), relieving Vladimir Semichastny, former Komsomol chief. On the 21st, it announces that S. will be a Deputy Premier of the Ukrainian "Union Republic." Journalists speculate that Semichastny's ouster is the direct result of a number of obvious failures in recent months, especially the repeated exposure of Soviet espionage activities and personnel in all parts of the world (as chronicled in our regular installments).

May 21: The June issue of the Boston-published ATLANTIC MONTHLY contains an essay which Svetlana Alliluyeva (Stalina) wrote in Switzerland after she had read Pasternak's DOCTOR ZHIVAGO and which "contains her reflections on the spirit of the Russian people and particularly the yearnings of Russian writers under the restrictions of the present Soviet regime."


A long, Ignatyev-signed PRAVDA article on Latin America promises Soviet backing for LA "patriots" in their struggle against "U.S. imperialism and local reaction" and approving implicitly of guerrilla struggle as well as constitutional opposition.

May 22: Ulan Bator Radio announces a Mongolian Foreign Ministry protest over a "new provocation organized by the Chinese Embassy on 21 May" at the railway station, where Chinese teachers from their school in U.B. rioted violently, shouted "provocative slogans and threats and curses addressed at our country" and physically assaulted Mongolian militiamen. The offenders are expelled.

May 22 and continuing: The long-delayed fourth congress of the Soviet Union of Writers convenes in Moscow on the 22nd. Before Brezhnev and most of the Politburo, the Party Secretary charged with ideological matters, P. Demichev, delivers a message from the leadership calling on the writers to continue as "fighters for Party spirit and allegiance to the people, for the unshakeable ideological principles of Soviet literature." Soviet writers should intensify their "offensive against bourgeois ideology," strike hard against "vulgarizers of Marxism," and "help those misled by hostile propaganda to find the right track." Editor Tvardovsky of the most liberal Soviet literary journal NOVY MIR is elected to the Congress Presidium, as well as Editor Kochetov of the most conservative OKTYABR. Pasternak's name is included when Congress Chairman Fedin asks for a moment of silence in memory of about 20 Soviet writers who have died since the last congress in 1959. Earlier, the most prominent writers of the French left, Louis Aragon and Jean-Paul Sartre, announced they rejected invitations to the Congress in protest over the Union's stand with the Government in its harsh treatment of Sinyavsky and Daniel last year.

1130.

HANOI'S AIMS REVEALED IN DOCUMENT



25X1C10b

* * * * *

(Editor's Note: Three days after Hitler became Chancellor, he gave a lecture to top German military leaders, telling them that his over-riding aim was to restore German power, particularly military power: pacifism and socialism should be "rooted out"; the people should be so indoctrinated that there could not be another collapse of morale on the home front; and the army should be strengthened by every possible means. He stated his view that the only solution to German economic problems was to conquer territory in the East and "ruthlessly to Germanize" it, and he clearly implied that Germany would go to war unless the French took action before German rearmament was completed. One of the generals present took extensive notes on this meeting, but they were not available to the public for 20 years. Had they been known and publicized at the time, it seems possible that subsequent history might have been somewhat different.

The record of General Nguyen Van Vinh's lecture, now available to us one year after the lecture took place, appears to be just as valuable a document. It needs to be made more widely known.)

* * *

SITUATION: On 28 January 1967, elements of the US 101st Airborne Division operating in Ninh Thuan province seized the notebook of a People's Revolutionary Party cadre member who had attended the 4th COSVN (Central Office, South Vietnam) Congress in April 1966*. This notebook contained

*The PRP is the Southern arm of the Lao Dong (North Vietnamese Workers'--read Communist--Party) which nominally split off from the Lao Dong in 1961, evidently for purposes of concealment. The COSVN is the PRP's Central Committee and functions as headquarters for military operations and for the National Liberation Front, which includes non-PRP elements but is controlled at each level by the PRP. The location of COSVN is believed to be Tay Ninh province, on the Cambodian border northwest of Saigon. (For details, see unclassified USIA report R-13-67, 20 April 1967: "The Viet Cong: The Front Technique.")


a record of two speeches made at the Congress, one an emotional diatribe by a leader believed to be General Nguyen Chi Thanh, the Commander of NLF forces in the South, the other a discussion of North Vietnamese-Viet Cong policy by General Nguyen Van Vinh, who is Chairman of both the Reunification Department of the Lao Dong Central Committee and the Reunification Commission of the North Vietnamese Government. The latter document merits particular attention. (Unclassified translation attached.)

The Vinh speech has been released to the press in Saigon and Washington and has been distributed widely by USIA. If there is any question about the authenticity of the document, due to its being circulated by the U.S., this should be dispelled by the unflattering remarks it contains about the United States. So far as we know, Hanoi has made no attempt to deny the authenticity of the document. And most important, there is in existence another less complete, but confirmatory account of Vinh's remarks.

In his speech, Vinh began by discussing the resolutions of the 9th, 11th and 12th plenums of the Lao Dong Central Committee (referred to in the translation as "Resolution #9", "Resolution #11", and "Resolution #12"), which took place in the summer-fall of 1964, the summer-fall of 1965, and January-February 1966; from this springboard, he then proceeded to outline the military situation, the North Vietnamese strategy for negotiations, the state of North Vietnamese defenses, and the support and policies of other Communist governments. When reading the speech, it is important to remember that Vinh was somewhat in the position of having to justify Lao Dong-NLF policy, which had failed to anticipate the large-scale intervention of the United States; also, while Vinh was quite frank about some problems and shortcomings, especially those which his listeners could be expected to remedy, he had no intention of allowing any doubts to arise on the possibility of ultimate success, the situation in the North Vietnamese support area, or the backing being received from other "socialist" countries. The speech contains many interesting points, but the most important is perhaps the long description of Hanoi's plans for continuing to fight while negotiating -- a plain indication that a truce would not in practice be honored by Hanoi and the NLF. In this, the document completely knocks the props from under criticisms of U.S. policy as being too firm in demanding a halt to infiltration from the North prior to negotiations and in refusing to accept the North's conditions.

A guide to important points in the Vinh lecture is given in an unclassified attachment.

25X1C10b



1131.

EAST GERMANY CONTINUES TO PRESS FOR
THIRD WORLD RECOGNITION

25X1C10b


* * * * *

SITUATION: (UNCLASSIFIED): While East Germany has brought pressure to bear on the other East European Satellite countries not to follow Rumania's move in recognizing the West German Government, it has also been beseeching the uncommitted governments of the Middle East and North Africa to recognize its own regime. In the latter instance, there have been no immediate signs of success thus far.

Foreign Minister Otto Winzer recently returned to East Berlin from a trip to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Algeria, and Iraq without having made any concrete gains in East Germany's long-standing quest for diplomatic recognition. The trip was obviously timed to take advantage of what East Germany hoped was Arab disenchantment with the Bonn Government: Arab League Secretary General Hassunah had recently gone to West Germany in an apparently unsuccessful bid to get more aid for the Arabs and to prevent any increase of German assistance for Israel. Before leaving on his trip, Winzer denounced Bonn's policies toward the Israelis and the Arabs and stressed East Germany's common interests with the latter. But while on the trip, during which he offered economic aid in exchange for diplomatic recognition, it soon became apparent that recognition will not come until some time in the future -- if at all. See the attached interview which Winzer gave the East Berlin radio correspondent in which he speaks of his discussions only in terms of results which "will bear fruit in the future."

Arab propagandists reported Winzer's trip with varying degrees of accuracy: some papers reported that Egypt would grant diplomatic recognition to East Germany within two months while others stated Lebanon was not even considering recognition. In actual fact, Winzer returned emptyhanded. The Arab League is scheduled to consider the entire German question when it meets in September, but it seems unlikely that even Egypt and Syria, the two countries most favorably disposed toward the Communist regime in East Germany, will press full diplomatic recognition of it.

Meanwhile, it can be expected that East Germany will continue its quest for recognition not only in the Arab World but also in other nations of the "developing" areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America -- as outlined in the (attached) article from the FOREIGN AFFAIRS BULLETIN published 25 January 1967 by the Press Department of the East German Foreign Affairs Ministry: "scientific and industrial" feet in the door aiming toward "long-term relations."
(END UNCLASSIFIED)



REFERENCES

PROPAGANDA NOTE #154 (E), 19 May 1967, "Ernst Wollweber: The Career of An Outstanding Communist Sabotage and Espionage Chief" (unclassified attachment useful wherever East Germany attempts to gain diplomatic recognition or infiltration via trade and aid as a glaring example of the long history of its role in international subversion)

BIWEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE Item #1101, 27 February 1967, "East Germany Maintains 'Die-Hard' Opposition to European Mainstream"

BIWEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE Item #1020, 9 May 1966, "East Germany: Soviet Spearhead in Central Europe"

(Copies of all available from Headquarters upon request)

THE REPORTER Magazine, 20 April 1967 (a report from Leipzig which says East German efforts to persuade the world of great economic achievements are contradicted by facts)

1132 c.

COMMUNIST EXPLOITATION OF BAPTISTS



25X1C10b

* * * * *

"Churches must be free from the interference of the states, and all churches should, as far as their principles permit, abide by the laws of the state." (From the statement issued by the 1955 London Conference of the Baptist World Alliance)

"Baptists are one of the most widely spread Christian sects... In their overwhelming majority they were hostile toward the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Soviet State. [Nevertheless] the Soviet Government, which separated State and Church, granted the Baptists freedom to practice their cult." (From the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 2nd Edition)

* * *

SITUATION: (UNCLASSIFIED) How do the Baptists in the Soviet Union and other Bloc countries fare under Communist domination? There is growing evidence, even in the Soviet press, that some of them are carrying on militant activities "underground" and that the encouragement they receive from publications abroad is having a telling effect on the Communist regimes' atheistic campaigns. Last summer there was an unusual number of items in Soviet media reporting on the Moscow Government's efforts to quash the activities of Baptists who live in the USSR and of those who visit there and bring religious literature with them from the Free World. Two examples of this follow. The 16 July KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA published an article about the domestic activities of the Baptists under the headline "Thieves with a Prayerbook -- Spiritual 'Pastors' as They Are." It said in part:

"Baptist pastors daily rob children of their youth, poisoning their immature minds and hearts with religious narcotics. For the crimes they have committed, the presbyter of the Evangelical-Christian sect, V. Golub, and the preachers N. Butkov and A. Balatski have been brought before the People's Court of the Kamennobrodski region of Lugansk. These are not grey-bearded old men but quite young: Golub, the oldest, is only 36... These beguilers of souls decided to organize a school of their own to teach religious music. Here, under the pretext of learning to play stringed instruments, the children were taught psalms... The 'prophets' got what they deserved -- not for their faith but for the evil they had committed."

Ten days earlier, in another typical report aimed at denigrating Baptists, TASS distributed for its worldwide outlets this report about tourists "smuggling religious books" being expelled from the USSR:

"Three British motor tourists and a Dutch subject have been expelled from the USSR for attempting to smuggle in Baptist religious literature, TRUD reports today. Anthony Richard Hippisley and his wife Anne Marie tried to smuggle through the border checkpoint in Brest 400 religious books donated by the British Foreign Biblical Society for illegal circulation in the USSR. These books were concealed in eight secret compartments in their specially equipped Volkswagen. Driving an Opel Rekord, two Baptist priests -- Murrey John, a British subject, and Fisser Johannes, a Dutch subject -- tried to smuggle 300 similar books into the USSR across the Lyauskeny checkpoint in Soviet Moldavia. TRUD, the newspaper of Soviet trade unions, writes that the religious literature and the cars with secret compartments have been confiscated and the smugglers expelled from the USSR."

(See the attached unclassified selection of clippings from Free World papers on other cases in 1966, as well as the translations of the 5 June and 30 August articles in IZVESTIYA attacking the Baptists.)

The 29 March 1967 issue of the Swiss Radical Democratic NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG gives the background of the Baptist controversy in the Soviet Union. The officially recognized Baptist leadership is the All-Union Council of Evangelical-Christian Baptists; aside from the Russian Orthodox Church, this is the only church organization permitted to function legally on a USSR-wide basis.* Like the official Orthodox hierarchy, this All-Union Council is controlled by the Soviet regime. In 1960, the All-Union Council (no doubt at the insistence of the regime) decreed new statutes which were designed to discourage missionary activities and the introduction of children into service. Obviously, the aim of these statutes was to let the Baptist church gradually wither away for lack of new members. Many church members became aroused not only at the content of the statutes, but also at the undemocratic way in which they were imposed from outside. The result was a counter-movement, launched by A. F. Prokofiev and G. K. Lriutchkov in 1961; the movement calls itself the "Initsiativniki" ("Initiators"). The Soviet regime has responded

*The All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists was formed in 1944 and today claims a membership of around 500,000 believers. In 1927, following the initial increase in many religious sects in the decade after the Revolution, there were 500,000 members of the Baptist Union and 4,000,000 members of the Union of Evangelical Christians. The two groups steadily declined under pressures brought about by the Soviet regime and today their combined membership totals only that of the 1927 Baptist segment. (Not treated in this Guidance, but nevertheless a problem of similar magnitude, is the fate suffered by Baptists in other Communist countries, including 90,000 in Rumania, 35,000 in Hungary, 9,000 in Bulgaria, and lesser numbers in East Germany, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Cuba -- the latter having arrested in recent years several Baptist ministers on espionage charges.)

with, among other things, two decrees (of 18 March and 22 September 1966) which place new restrictions on worship and the religious instruction of children, and forbid religious demonstrations of any kind. The two news stories quoted above are reflections of the Soviet policy of trying to make religion die out.

(Further information on the history of confrontation between the Baptists and the Communists is contained in the attached article, "Russian Baptists Quote Lenin in Plea for Religious Tolerance," an unclassified item prepared by USIA which may be used for background purposes.)


Attention was again focused on the Baptist problem last fall when the Government-sanctioned Evangelical-Baptist Church leadership held an All-Union Congress in October in an attempt to bring the dissident "Initsiativniks" back into the fold. (Note -- ~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~. This may have been partially successful, but the American Embassy in Moscow reports that "the seriousness of the Government's continued concern is well reflected by repeated references in the press to public demonstrations by the schismatics and to the apparent willingness of their leaders to accept martyrdom rather than submit to the demands of the Soviet authorities.")

PRAVDA VOSTOKA reported on 22 October a trial of four Baptists in Tashkent, the chief defendant being N. P. Khrapov, described as the head of the South Asian Branch of the dissident Union of Churches of Evangelical Christians-Baptists. The article said Khrapov had recently served three years in prison for "antisocial activity" and it gave considerable details of illegal publications allegedly being distributed by the "Initiators". The group's journal VESTNIK SPASENIYA (Herald of Salvation) and a number of underground pamphlets were said to contain "slander against Soviet society."

How serious a problem the Soviet Government considers the dissident Baptists today is perhaps best illustrated by an article in the September 1966 issue of the official atheistic propaganda organ NAUKA I RELIGIYA (Science and Religion) which complained that the "Initiators" are producing a number of illegal publications and have adopted a policy of such overt defiance to authority as:

"...collective singing of psalms in buses and at bus stops, in railway cars and at stations, religious processions and services in the streets, in squares, and in buildings of state institutions, and the creation of special schools and groups for instructing children in religion."

Another problem which the Baptists present to the Soviet Government is their stand on military service: see unclassified attachment to BPG Item # 1057 of 12 September 1966, "Communist Exploitation of Conscientious Objectors," which notes reports of Baptists being arrested in Moscow for demonstrating against military service and sentenced to prison terms in Cherkessk for refusing on religious grounds to serve in the Army. (END UNCLASSIFIED)



REFERENCES

Book Dispatch #6027, 24 April 1967, "Communism and Religion" (for section on Baptists in attached booklet of selected translations from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia).

BPG #196 Item 1045, 1 August 1966, "Communists and Religion" (for listing of previously available material on this subject).

BPG #211 Item 1105, 13 March 1967, "The Christian Peace Conference" (for background on how Communists exploit this group),

Kurt Hutten, "Iron Curtain Christians," Augsburg Publishing House, Minneapolis, 1967 (a translation of "Christian hinter dem Eisernen Vorhang" published by Quell-Verlag, Stuttgart, Germany, 1962 -- useful for its treatment of Communism vs. Religion in general and in this instance for its individual sections on Baptists in various Bloc countries),

"Religion in Communist Dominated Areas," a periodic newsletter distributed by the International Affairs Commission of the National Council of Churches in New York (for the report on the 5 June 1966 IZVESTIYA article and for continuing reports of this nature -- yearly subscription costs \$10.00),

"The Russian Baptists -- Propagandists for Stalin and Khrushchev," Christian Beacon Press, Collingswood, N.J., 1960 (a profusely illustrated booklet containing many press clippings reporting how the Communists exploited Baptists at home and abroad for propaganda purposes in the 1950's),

1133.

VIETNAM WAR: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

25X1C10b

* * * * *

SITUATION: In the event that the U.S. decides it is necessary to mine or bomb Haiphong Harbor or its approach channels, we can expect a major propaganda barrage from the opposition. Hard intelligence has indicated that the East Germans are even planning to send a camera team to Haiphong to film the bombing of the harbor for propaganda purposes.


To date U.S. planes have not bombed the Harbor and the SS Dartford, which was flying the British flag when recently damaged in Haiphong Harbor, is now believed to have been hit by North Vietnamese antiaircraft fire or debris from exploding SAMs. The SS Dartford was not the object of accidental U.S. bombing as was feared when the news first broke.

The U.S. has apparently refrained thus far primarily because of the foreign shipping (mostly Soviet and Chinese) that regularly offloads in Haiphong Harbor. The great bulk of supplies for North Vietnam comes from the USSR rather than from closer-by China and much of this materiel moves by sea past U.S. warships into Haiphong. Aerial reconnaissance suggests that the Soviets have limited sea-borne goods to those usable for peaceful as well as military purposes such as oil, trucks, medicines, pontoon bridges, structural steel, machine tools, etc. Soviet equipment whose war use is unmistakable such as radar sets, antiaircraft guns, SAMs, aircraft and the like is believed to be routed by rail through China.

According to experts, the most reliable recent figures in open sources on Soviet and other foreign equipment shipped to North Vietnam appeared in a WALL STREET JOURNAL article of 14 February. The WSJ staffer had been briefed by State and Defense experts and the text into which he wove the statistics they gave him can supply the basis for discussion on the subject. The article is included as an unclassified attachment.

25X1C10b

25X1C10b



June 1967

Guide to Lecture by Nguyen Van Vinh, Chairman
of Reunification Department, Lao Dong Central Committee

Vinh's remarks in his lecture to the 4th COSVN Congress, held in April 1966, were wide-ranging. Some sections remain somewhat obscure, as they refer to doctrinal positions taken at the earlier plenums of the Lao Dong Central Committee. Moreover, the treatment of various subjects in the lecture often overlaps. Nevertheless, Vinh's lecture provides clear and decisive evidence on questions of major interest.

The following are major points which emerge from the record:

1) There is close control by the North Vietnamese regime over the Viet Cong, and the former closely supports the latter. The existence of Hanoi control is evident from the very fact that the speech was given by a North Vietnamese leader and recorded by a Viet Cong member, and also from the whole tone and setting of Vinh's remarks, accompanied as they were by remarks by the NLF Commander, Nguyen Chi Thanh. Specifically, Vinh expounds the significance of the resolutions of the Lao Dong Central Committee (pp. 1-5). He says, for example: "Execution of the resolution is a major requirement," (p. 3)--evidently a requirement for his Southern listeners as well as for the North. He uses the first person plural, clearly including his audience among the "we" or "our" (e.g., "Our advance must pass through many transitory steps"- p.5). On page 7, Vinh says: "We have main force units, regional troops, guerrillas, and the masses..." On page 9, Vinh claims that "the enemy" will have to increase his strength to 700,000 or 800,000 men "in order to be able to stop reinforcements from North Vietnam. Without doing so they will be unable to stop our growth in the South." This is a frank statement of the importance of North Vietnamese infiltration to the war. Further on, Vinh says (p. 11) that one of the goals is to "advance toward national unification." In discussing negotiations, Vinh envisages close coordination between Hanoi and the Viet Cong; one might negotiate while the other continues fighting (p. 15). Towards the end of his remarks, Vinh states:

"We can thus conclude that even if the Americans intensify their air raids, we will still stand firm to protect the North and reinforce the South...The Northern citizens have clearly realized their responsibility with regard to this matter. Therefore, they have provided reinforcements to the best of their ability." (pp.20-21)

2) Although Hanoi refuses to be dominated by any particular Bloc country, it receives large quantities of supplies from Communist states. Indeed, Hanoi seems to profit by playing off the Soviet and Chicom rivals against each other. It is possible that, in the interests of boosting morale, Vinh may have somewhat exaggerated the quantity of material aid (pp. 18-21) or the willingness of the big Communist powers to spring to the defense of North Vietnam (p. 9). But attention should be given to his statement that China provides nearly half the budget of "the South" (presumably the NLF) and

that Soviet aid became extensive after the fall of Khrushchev (p.21). One may wonder if the Chinese provide such support without making some effort to use it to increase their influence. And it appears that the step-up in Soviet aid preceded the big increase in U.S. aid and support to Saigon in early 1965, which of course was a response to ominous Viet Cong successes.

A rather striking series of revelations appears on p. 15:

"China holds the view that conditions for negotiations are not yet ripe, not until a few years from now, and, even worse, seven years from now. In the meantime, we should continue fighting to bog down the enemy, and should wait until a number of socialist countries acquire adequate conditions for strengthening their main force troops to launch a strong, all-out, and rapid offensive, using all types of weapons and heeding no borders. What we should do in the South today is to try to restrain the enemy and make him bogged down, waiting until China has built strong forces to launch an all-out offensive."

In other words, Hanoi and the Viet Cong should confine themselves to guerrilla warfare and await liberation by modernized Chicom forces in seven years. It is easy to see why this Chicom proposal has little attraction for Hanoi; aside from uncertainty as to whether China can meet any such timetable (an uncertainty which has increased since Vinh spoke), such a procedure would tend to weaken Viet Cong morale and make Hanoi a vassal of Peking. Vinh says, "We must achieve decisive victory within the next four years" (p. 21), and he admits that "we are worried" over the disunity in the "socialist camp" (p. 21).

3) While Vinh assumes an air of confidence, various remarks indicate some of the problems facing Hanoi and the Viet Cong. On page 5, he admits that "at certain moments, certain people underestimated the U.S. imperialists and overestimated the heroism of the Southern people." "Our strength," he says, "does not suffice to defeat the Americans." (p. 7) On page 13, he says that ARVN troops occupy "over 250 districts": it is believed likely that he meant 250 district capitals, as there are only about 250 districts in all. (On p. 18, Vinh says that forces must be introduced into the cities.) Vinh indicates that quite a number of "nationalist countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America" have doubts about the ability of Hanoi and the Viet Cong to defeat the Americans (p. 14). He complains that the build-up of forces on his side has been slow; in saying that the guerrillas were previously 10 percent of the population, and that now the proportion is as small as 1 percent in some areas, he seems to imply that the overall proportion of guerrillas to population has declined (p. 16). In another place (p. 17) he says the building of guerrilla forces has been unsatisfactory. There are difficulties with the recruitment of youth: "It is necessary to carefully consider why we cannot recruit youths to replenish our forces." The enemy would have been defeated if he had been unable to replenish his forces, but (unlike the VC guerrillas) he was able to replace and supplement his strength (p. 17). Remarks on pp. 16 and 17 also suggest that the Viet Cong has often failed to retain control of

areas it has "liberated." Vinh makes no mention of napalm or poison gas, but the use of chemical defoliants, he says, has made the Lao Dong Central Committee "very concerned" (p. 18). While claiming that transportation capabilities have doubled, Vinh says transportation on roads is almost nonexistent in daylight, and that the requirements of the 4th Zone (the North Vietnamese area bordering on the Demilitarized Zone) and the South are not being met (p. 20). He indicates that North Vietnamese missile units have failed to meet the 100 percent "kill rate" set by the Soviet Union. Although MIG 21's are dodged by the enemy, "the MIG 21's have not yet been widely used" (p. 19). As already noted, Hanoi is worried over the lack of unity in the "socialist camp"--yet North Vietnam itself insists on pursuing an independent line.

4) For Hanoi, the war is not merely a military struggle, but a political one, and success depends on deceiving the enemy, particularly by pretending to negotiate while continuing the fighting. Like other Communists, the leaders in Hanoi turn the formula of Clausewitz around; they believe that politics is the continuation of war by other means. It had been necessary to defeat the French colonial army militarily to get the French out of Vietnam, but in 1966, the Lao Dong believed that "after defeating a greater bulk of the puppet army and an important part of American troops, we can push the Americans out of South Vietnam by coordinating the political struggle with diplomacy" (p. 5). In an interesting passage, Vinh says that a situation in which the "puppet troops" have not been completely annihilated provides a condition for the Americans to withdraw, while if the "puppet administration" is completely eliminated, there are no conditions for the Americans to withdraw; this seems to mean that in the former case, the Americans could withdraw without a complete loss of face and with some self-deception as to an agreement being possible "between Vietnamese" (between the Saigon government and the Hanoi-directed National Liberation Front), while in the latter case, there would be a simple military contest between Vietnamese Communists and the United States, which the Communists would be unable to win (p. 5). The Americans must be forced to "eat rice with chopsticks" (engaged in a political-guerrilla competition), and the Vietnamese Communists should avoid "eating rice with spoons and forks" (engaging in a war of position) (p.8). Vinh says: "Under these conditions [of politico-guerrilla warfare], if they force us to surrender while we are not defeated, then they are defeated" (p. 8); this epigram appears to signify that if there was a Viet Cong military surrender which did not involve an end to the VC's political struggle, the U.S. would have failed to achieve its political objective.

Vinh reveals that the 11th (1965) Lao Dong Resolution foresaw the possibility of a situation where fighting and negotiations were conducted simultaneously (pp. 13-16).

"Fighting while negotiating is aimed at opening another front with a view to making the puppet army more disintegrated, stimulating and developing the enemy's internal contradictions, and, thereby, making him more isolated in order to deprive him of the propaganda

weapons, isolate him further, and make a number of people who misunderstood the Americans clearly see their nature" (p. 13).

Such tactics, Vinh notes, were used during the Vietnamese war against the French and in China (i.e., prior to 1949). They cannot, however, be employed "as long as we have not yet acquired adequate strength" (p. 14). Further on, Vinh indicates that the required conditions for negotiation amount to conditions overwhelmingly favorable to his side: e.g., enemy troops should be withdrawn and their bases dismantled, or in a slightly different version, the "puppet forces" must be concentrated in barracks, must not herd people into strategic hamlets, and the Americans must be stationed at the wharves. (p. 16).

In the Lao Dong system of thought, "fighting while negotiating also represents a principled step in the evolution of the war" (p. 14). This exercise in bad faith might take place in several ways: "It is possible that the North conducts negotiations while the South [the National Liberation Front] continues fighting, and that the South also participates in the negotiations while continuing to fight" (p. 15). As the Lao Dong sees it, no considerable success can be achieved in negotiations if fighting stops while the negotiations are going on. But--"If we conduct negotiations while fighting vigorously, we can also take advantage of the opportunity to step up the political struggle, military proselyting (sic), and activities in the cities. Thus, we will take advantage of the opportunity offered by the negotiations to step up further our military attacks, political struggle and military proselyting (sic)" (p. 15). Vinh indicates that "a number of East European socialist countries" hold similar views: they think "that conditions do prevail, and are ripe for achieving success (The Americans would withdraw their troops, and we will continue the struggle to achieve total success). These socialist countries also posed a number of conditions: cessation of the bombing of the North; gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South" (p. 14).

Note: Various letters are used in the Vinh document as cover for different organizations or units. They may be translated as follows:

| | |
|---------------|---------------------------------|
| C - Company | |
| D - Battalion | TW - Lao Dong Central Committee |
| E - Regiment | TCK - General offensive |
| F - Division | TKN - General uprising |

5 June 1967

Comrade Vinh's Talk

- I. Presentation of the spirit of resolutions.
- II. Some additional ideas
- III. Defense situation in North Vietnam-aid for South Vietnam.
- IV. Support of the socialist camp.
- V. Relationship among countries in the socialist camp.

x

x

x

- I. Presentation of the spirit of resolutions.
 - 1) Introduction of the contents of resolutions.
 - 2) Necessary conditions to be held fast.
 - 3) Some ideas on the nature and characteristics of the war.
 - 4) Strategic missions and guidelines.

A. Introduction of the contents of resolutions.

- Resolution #9 assessed the balance of forces between us and the enemy and set forth plans and guidelines to win the special war.

- Resolution #11 assessed the situation of the special war developed to a high degree and having the factors of a limited war.

- Resolution #12 noted the characteristics and nature of the special war developed into a limited war which still have the character of the special war. Determination of the party to win the limited war.

B. Necessary conditions to be held fast.

There are two points to be held fast:

- a) Dialectics on ideological methods.
- b) Steadfast determination and spirit of thorough revolution.

a) Dialectics on ideological methods:

It is necessary to pay attention to the difference between the natural world and the development of human society.

The rules concerning the development of the natural world can be asserted. For example, at 99.5 degrees water does not boil. It will boil at a fixed temperature. At zero degrees it will freeze and become ice.

As for the development of human society, there may be this possibility or the other. For example, we assert that when 200,000, 300,000 or 400,000 Americans have been annihilated, the enemy will be defeated. Yet, sometimes when a small number of the enemy has been annihilated, he is defeated; sometimes when a large number of the enemy has been annihilated, he is not yet defeated. The former resolution (11th) stated that victory would be won in a relatively short period of time, from several to four years. It was a flexible statement. The latter resolution (12th) also stated that decisive victory would be won in a relatively short period of time (a few years). This must also be understood as a flexible statement, since it is impossible to ascertain one or two years. However, the time must not be spoken of as unlimited, and in speaking of a protracted struggle one may not say it is protracted, unlimited. As far as thinking methods are concerned, if one thinks mechanically and inflexibly he will be unjustifiably optimistic, or become pessimistic when he has not yet seen victory. How long a time depends on subjective and objective factors, and on the evolution of these factors.

b) It is necessary to have a steadfast determination and a spirit of thorough revolution.

Speaking of war is speaking of the worst difficulties and hardships in life. To win the war is a very difficult undertaking which requires boundless energy. When we speak of achieving success within a relatively short period of time, it means that we assert our determination, and when we saw so, the difficulties have been taken into consideration. When we say that even if the Americans introduce such and such number of troops we still can defeat them, it means that we assert our determination to overcome all difficulties in order to achieve success. When we speak of winning the war, even though the Americans increase the number of their troops, and achieve decisive success within a relatively short period of time, it means that we are determined to overcome countless difficulties before success is achieved. Such a statement is not theoretical, but is 50 percent practical. It is on the basis of this statement that we strengthen our determination to defeat the U.S. aggressors. Therefore, it is necessary to have the spirit of thorough revolution and a very high determination.

With regard to the general offensive (TCK) and general uprising (TKN), it was requested that a concrete plan, including the quantity of weapons needed, the number of armed forces needed, etc., be made known in order to carry out the undertaking confidently. For secrecy's sake, it is not yet necessary to reveal information on these matters.

Therefore, we must firmly grasp the above two matters and express unanimous agreement with the TW (the Lao Dong Party Central Committee), and, in the process of struggle, try to understand them better and supplement the resolution.

Execution of the resolution is a major requirement. Yet, the greater requirement is to execute the resolution creatively in the days ahead. In the course of the war, it is possible that some locality, district, or province may be levelled and may sustain serious losses.

3. Some matters concerning the characteristics and nature of the war.

There has been much discussion on the nature of the war--special, limited, colonialist, and neocolonialist. The matters which we discuss here have also been discussed in the North.

Speaking of the special war, limited war, colonialist, or neocolonialist war is trying to find answers to the following questions: Do the political and military war and the three-pronged offensive still exist? Do TCK and general uprising (TKN) still exist?

In general and unified terms, to speak of a just war and an unjust war. When a war develops, it is called variously an aggressive war, a national liberation war, a war among the imperialists, or a war between the two camps.

Formerly, we spoke only of limited war and world war. The scope of the war was then understood likewise. When we spoke of limited war, we took into account its scope. And when the U.S. imperialists began to change their war strategy (the "flexible reaction strategy"), they defined war as follows: world war, limited war, and the war whose scope is inferior or to that of the limited war (special war). When they spoke of special war, we did not just follow him. In fact, the enemy actually changed his strategy.

The TW resolution said: in the Americans' view, the conduct of the special war relies mainly on the puppet army and administration. With the characteristics of the present situation, the war that is most

appropriate for a neocolonialist policy in a country where there exists a national liberation movement is the special war. The special war is just a type of limited war, but its scope is inferior to that of the limited war. And since the special war takes place in South Vietnam, it bears the character of a conflict between the two camps, gradually becomes a limited war, and will develop to a higher intensity and larger scope. It is now obvious that the war has become a limited war, since the enemy has increased the number of his troops to more than 200,000.

At this point, how must the "special" concept be understood? Special war must be understood in the sense that it is a "separate" type of war, not in the sense ascribed by the Americans. Previously, there was an erroneous analysis: if the imperialists increase the number of their troops to 200,000, the war will become an old-type aggressive war. (In calling a war special the Americans take into consideration its scale --large or small-while we understand "special" or "separate" as the nature of the war). To speak of (words unintelligible) is to speak of the purpose of the war: it has a neocolonialist nature. Even if the number of enemy troops is increased to 300,000, 500,000 or 600,000, the purpose of the war remains to impose neocolonialism.

The fact that the imperialists firmly maintain neocolonialism is due to the following reasons:

- Old-type colonialism has been opposed and cursed by the peoples in the world and the oppressed peoples, and therefore, has no conditions for survival; and colonial systems have continuously disintegrated everywhere. The U.S. imperialists realized that if they did not resort to new-type colonialism they would not be able to maintain colonialism.

- Science and techniques have developed. Various countries which had won independence but which were under the bourgeois' control also needed aid to maintain their regimes. Therefore, the Americans have taken advantage of this situation to penetrate into these countries and gain net profits.

- The U.S. imperialists are wealthy imperialists. They have engaged in large-scale business, retail business. They possess ample capital, and could use money and merchandise to influence, dominate, and exploit many other countries using neocolonialist methods, and, thereby gain greater net profits. While no imperialists whatsoever could wage aggression through old colonialism, the imperialists could still deceive a number of people by waging aggression through neocolonialism.

Although the present limited war in the South still has its "separate" nature and still lies within the category of implementation of a neocolonialist policy, it still relies upon the puppet army and administration.

Formerly, during the French domination period, we had to defeat the French expeditionary troops, and only by basically defeating these troops could the French be defeated, whereas at present we must crush mainly the puppet army. As far as the American troops are concerned, we do not fight them in the same way as we did against the French.

To defeat the enemy in the South is to basically defeat the puppet army and to defeat part of the American troops, and, thereby, smash the Americans' aggressive will. If we fail to see the role of the puppet army and administration, we will fail to use our own forces to a certain extent to basically smash the puppet forces, and, thereby deprive the Americans of their military and political base. Likewise, without defeating an important part of the American forces we cannot crush their aggressive will. In reality, today the relations between fighting the Americans and fighting the puppets have become increasingly clearer. In the old colonialist period, only by defeating the aggressive army would the imperialists consent to being defeated. With neo-colonialism, after defeating a greater bulk of the puppet army and an important part of American troops, we can push the Americans out of South Vietnam by coordinating the political struggle with diplomacy.

With regard to strategy, the situation in which the puppet troops have not yet been completely annihilated does also provide a condition for the Americans to withdraw. This is true with regard to the question of sovereignty: if we completely eliminate the puppet administration, there are no conditions for the Americans to withdraw. If we speak only of a local war, there may be errors in strategy and possibly in leadership over the strategy. Our advance must pass through many transitory steps.

Evaluation and comparison of the enemy forces and our forces:

So far, our evaluation has been correct. But at certain moments, certain people underestimated the U.S. imperialists and overestimated the heroism of the Southern people. Evaluation of the Americans is very difficult. Some people believe that it is difficult to defeat the U.S. imperialists, because it is often said that the U.S. imperialists are the most powerful imperialists: their manpower is great, their forces are large, and they have atomic weapons. In expressing this view, these people create the impression that the imperialists are strong. This is also a reality. The people who believe in this view are not few.

For years, there has been a constant discussion of this problem in our camp. Without the war in Vietnam, how can this problem be solved? How can one explain our victories over the U.S. imperialists who have gross national product of 650 billion dollars against our gross national product of 3 billion, who have a population of 200 million against our population of 30 million, who have 3 million men in their armed forces against our armed forces of 1 million men in both zones?

Yet despite this big difference between the two sides--one side is two large and other too small--our small country dares fight the Americans and defeat them. It is difficult to make people believe that a small country such as ours can defeat the U.S. imperialists who have great economic and military potentialities. Therefore, our struggle is a great contribution to the discussions of the evaluation of and comparison between our forces and the enemy's. Usually, people easily discern the enemy's strong points and do not see his weak points. Only through defeating him can we see his weak points. For instance, intelligence services of various countries--no matter how clever they are--cannot know all the techniques of the U.S. planes. We know them because we have downed these planes and studied these aircraft, we have interrogated the captured pilots.

We know the enemy's material strength, his tactics and techniques. But there are things we cannot know even through our intelligence service or through documents which have been supplied to us in order that we could understand and evaluate the enemy better.

It is said that U.S. planes are modern. If we do not attack them, they remain modern. However, if we attack and down them, they become outmoded. (The enemy has said that his planes have become outmoded)

Summarily appraising a small country such as ours which dares to fight against and win over the Americans is an important problem. As for estimating how many troops the enemy will introduce and at what rate, this task sometimes cannot be done thoroughly. Basically, our Party has evaluated the U.S. imperialists relatively accurately.

(At that time) our Party made such an evaluation. But later it changed its mind from time to time. Thus, it was afraid of the Americans dared not fight them. It kept on discussing and arrived at no conclusion. If it dared fight them, it would have been able to understand them better and evaluate them more correctly.

Under the present war situation, the forces of both sides have increased greatly. U.S. and satellite troops have increased quickly. Ours have increased too. Both sides have used these forces to fight each other. Now the problem consists of finding the best way to compare the two forces. The fact that U.S. forces are strong is obvious to all. But against whom are they fighting? They are strong, but are they capable of defeating us? To which side does the evaluation of the comparative balance of forces swing? It is obvious that the comparative balance of forces gradually swings in our favor. We may not imagine that we only have endurance. We must see that our strength is growing.

The Americans are stronger than us militarily and materially. Yet, how do they use this strength, and how are they fighting against us? We have main force units, regional troops, guerrillas, and the masses, whereas they cannot introduce into the South as large military forces as they want. As far as the material factors are concerned, we have to use a weak force to fight against a strong force. Yet, considering all factors combined, it is we, not the enemy, that are strong. Thus, a comparison of the forces of both sides shows that we are stronger than the enemy. Our victory over him is not chancy, nor is it temporary. Previously, we said we could defeat the Americans even if they had 150,000 or 200,000 troops. It was a theoretical statement. However, this statement has now become a fact which has been proved by realities.

In short, (two words unintelligible), why are we victorious?

- We have the correct leadership of the Party.

- The Southern people and army, and the Vietnamese people and army are heroic.

- We firmly grasp the rules of the people's war.

- We insure self-reliance.

- We enjoy the wholehearted supported of the peoples in the world, and of our camp.

If we speak only of the quantity of forces, other countries also have forces. Yet, if we go deeply into the realities, we find that the quality and combat value of our people are very great. Our fourteen million people are better than 70 million (Indonesian) people and the 200 million American people. This fact cannot be explained by the matter of quantity.

It does not suffice to say that we use a weak force to fight against a strong force. We must also understand how strong our main points are, and must explain under what conditions we are strong. Thus, we must say that our South is strong. Yet, our strength does not suffice to defeat the Americans. It is now fit to say that there can be no unlimited escalation in the North, and there can be no complete destruction in the present situation in the South.

In the Korean War, what was different from the situation in South Vietnam was that when the Americans introduced (520,000) troops (including satellite troops) into Korea, they sent them all to the frontline because their rear base was secure, whereas in South Vietnam, when the Americans introduce 300,000 or 400,000 troops they cannot send them all to the frontline. Taylor recently said that "we should calculate the

number of troops we must introduce, and when and under what circumstances these troops must be introduced in order to defeat the enemy," and that "if we introduce our troops at a time when the adversary is strong, we cannot defeat him." Therefore, the Americans have realized that they did not introduce their troops at the right time.

The second condition is that when troops are introduced there must be a strong administration, which is nonexistent in South Vietnam. At present, the Americans still hold that because the number of Americans introduced into the South is insufficient they cannot win. Therefore, as long as they still believe that if they introduce more troops they can win, they will pursue the war. As soon as they see that no matter how many troops they introduce they are still defeated, then their aggressive will be crushed. Formerly, the French sent 250,000 troops to fight against us. After a period of time, they realized that they could not win even if they introduced more troops. In Algeria, with 700,000 French troops and 100,000 puppet troops, the French could not win the war. They realized that to win the war, the most important factor is not strength, but tactics.

Now we are fighting the Americans with existing number of troops and weapons. In a war of position, they can defeat us. But with our present tactics, we will win, and they will be defeated. It is the same as if we force them to eat rice with chopsticks (if we eat rice with spoons and forks like them, we will be defeated; if chopsticks are used, they are no match for us).

Under these conditions, if they force us to surrender while we are not defeated, then they are defeated.

In combat, a number of localities and comrades may be hurt. But it is incorrect to base oneself on the fact that when some localities are damaged and some comrades are sacrificed, we are then defeated.

In South Korea, the enemy sent all his troops to the front. In South Vietnam, he has introduced between 300,000 to 600,000 troops who must fight on the frontline and, at the same time, protect the rear. But the latter can fulfill only one of these tasks. If they oppose our people's movement in the South, they will be unable to stop reinforcements from North Vietnam. If they concentrate their force to stop reinforcements from North Vietnam, they cannot stand firm on the front in the rear. If all their troops are sent to the front, their rear will be left unguarded. If they leave part of their troops in the rear, they will not be strong enough to fight us on the front. To fulfill both tasks, they must have a million troops. To introduce a million troops into South Vietnam, the United States must double its mobilization rate.

If the war is expanded to North Vietnam, the balance of forces will be changed. The front will be changed too. The enemy will have to fight not only the Vietnamese people, but also the Chinese people. The enemy is still afraid of this outcome. Establishing their front in Laos is not an easy task. If the Americans attack Laos, because of the 1962 Geneva Accords they will face North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and China which will join the war to a certain extent. They are planning to send their troops to Laos. But does this mean the opening of a new front? The Americans are capable of doing this. But they are weighing the pros and cons because if they send troops there, the form of the war will change.

The enemy has not achieved unanimity concerning the problem of expanding the war to Laos and North Vietnam; but they have achieved relative unanimity concerning the problem of introducing troops into South Vietnam.

Thus, they introduced troops at a moment when their special war had failed and they were in a state of strategic passivity. If they raise their strength to 400,000 men, this means that their 300,000 men have been defeated. But the introduction of 400,000 men into South Vietnam means that they would raise their strength to 700,000 or 800,000 men in order to be able to stop reinforcements from North Vietnam. Without doing so they will be unable to stop our growth in the South. That is why the Americans cannot thoroughly use their power in the war against us.

4. Strategic missions, guidelines, and leadership:

There are some misunderstandings concerning the strategic missions, guidelines, and leadership and the relations among the three problems.

Strategic missions are clearly stated in the resolution of the 12th Party conference. There are two strategic missions: the general strategic mission, and the strategic mission in South Vietnam. The strategic mission in South Vietnam consists of defeating the imperialists and feudalists, and achieving land reforms. Its immediate task consists of overthrowing the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys.

To what extent the war will develop? How must the Americans be restrained and defeated? The exertion of strategic leadership varies in each period of time. Yet, the strategic mission remains unchanged no matter how many troops the Americans may introduce into the South. Each time the enemy introduces more troops, some people contend that the enemy has not been fully evaluated, and that the strategic missions have not been clearly set forth. In fact, the strategic mission has already been set forth, and it remains unchanged. We continue to pursue it. As long as the war remains within the South, the strategic mission remains unchanged. When the war is extended to the North, the strategic mission will be different. Some people asked why we did not assert in

advance that limited war would break out, so that the mission we had set forth would become out of date. This problem is not like having an ample shirt made so that it suits one when he grows up. That is not correct.

When the war in the South remains within the limits of a special war, we must restrain and defeat the enemy in this, and must at the same time take precautionary measures against limited war. When the war has become a limited war, we must restrain and defeat the enemy in this war, and, at the same time, take precautionary measures against the enemy's expansion of the war throughout the country.

As far as the leadership is concerned, it is necessary to restrain and defeat the enemy in the above types of war in the South, not to allow the enemy to expand the war, and to restrict the losses he inflicts on the people. This effort is ours to exert. It is wrong to say that we failed to restrain and defeat the enemy in the South. We must see that we defeated the enemy's special war, and, as a result, the enemy had to introduce more troops to wage the limited war.

In speaking of winning victory over the enemy in the special war we did not mean a total victory, but a decisive victory. Today, in restraining and defeating the enemy in the limited war in the South, we also speak of achieving decisive success within a relatively short period of time. The contents of the guidelines and strategy involving protracted fighting and the contents of achieving decisive success within a relatively short period of time are not mutually contradictory. They are the same. In indoctrinating the cadres and party members ideologically, we must speak of protracted fighting and the determination to fight and win, and must not disseminate to the lower echelons the idea of achieving decisive success within a few years.

It is wrong to say that the Party leadership is not correct when the enemy sent part of his forces to the 4th zone or farther, while we estimated that there was little possibility of the enemy sending troops to the North.

At present, in terms of restraining and defeating the enemy in the South, the Party's strategic leadership remains correct. Although the enemy has not yet acquired the conditions for sending his troops to the North, we have to take precautionary measures. At present, we must understand that fighting a protracted war and achieving decisive success within a relatively short period of time remain the same. In a resistance war, it is right to speak of protracted war and self-reliance, and the urge to fight and win quickly represents a rightist tendency.

Today, is a great error not to speak of achieving decisive success in a relatively short period of time. Therefore, we must achieve and are determined to achieve that objective. If we fail to achieve that objective, it is because of ourselves, not because of the socialist camp. We may not speak of protracted fighting as unlimited fighting. It is erroneous to understand protracted as unlimited.

Contents of the significance of decisive victory:

These contents are stated in the resolution. To achieve the same solution as that in Laos, the contents of which we have already realized, the U.S. imperialists will agree immediately.

We want to achieve decisive victory which is: to exterminate and disintegrate the puppet authorities and troops to the point that the puppet force is no longer the military and political leaning point for the Americans, that the U.S. troops must play the main role and resort to political measures. When such a situation occurs the puppet troops will not be strong enough to protect their regime.

But U.S. troops have been introduced. Thus we must wipe out an important part of them in order to defeat them.

There are three ways to achieve decisive victory:

- Wipe out the majority of puppet troops and foil the enemy's political goals;

- Wipe out an important part of U.S. troops and crush their aggressive will;

- Achieve the goals: national independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, and advance toward national unification. On the basis of wiping out puppet troops, we can, to a certain extent, wipe out part of U.S. troops. If the war is pursued for two or three years, we can do what the Koreans did: overcoming 380,000 Americans. The fact that southern guerrillas can wipe out the Americans--although not many Americans have been killed--is an optimistic event.

Ba's ideas: The introduction of U.S. troops into the South was not wanted by us. But it is an opportunity for us to defeat them. Sometimes the enemy can understand this only after fighting with us for several years. Thus, shortening this time is very important.

Some individuals have asserted that since the Americans have introduced their troops we cannot defeat them and that the Americans have caused us heavy casualties. These assertions are obviously belied by realities.

To achieve decisive victory in a relatively short period, we must concentrate our forces in both zones. We must not speak only of an unlimited period.

We will not do what Algeria has done. And we will not do what Korea did in using armed troops to liberate the South Koreans. We will do what the Soviet Union did in the war against Germany.

To achieve decisive victory, it is necessary to have very high determination. We must endeavor to achieve it and be convinced that we are able to achieve it. To do so, we must face very great difficulties, even difficulties we cannot anticipate.

The task of wiping out and disintegrating a large number of puppet troops must go along with the task of foiling the enemy's reinforcement plan. Therefore, this task must be accompanied by mass struggle and military proselyting.

Our achievements in 1965 were very great. They can be regarded as big leaps, as a great progress (defeating from 8 puppet D in 1964 to 46 D is a great victory, causing the Americans to be frightened and to rush in to rescue the puppets).

It is necessary to prevent the enemy from increasing his troops, thus causing him to stop. In 1965, he wanted to increase his troops, but could not. In the future, it is necessary to prevent him from supplementing his troops in time. When the casualties of the puppets reach between D and regiments and battle groups and those of the Americans between C and D, the war will be settled. The enemy will be unable to stand firm in the rear, to pacify it. These are the basic causes of his defeat.

The greatest desire of the U.S. and other imperialists is to occupy the South, apply the neocolonialist policy, and check our Southern people's movement.

We will defeat the enemy: in several years, we will be able to wipe out and disintegrate 300,000 to 400,000 puppet troops and 200,000 U.S. troops. The Americans will be unable to introduce sufficient troops to fill the gaps left by the wiped out and disintegrated U.S. and puppet troops.

On the other hand, in introducing more troops the Americans must develop their logistic service. But, at the same time, we intensify our attacks against their logistic establishments, isolate their bases, cut off their transport roads. In the future, in certain areas puppet troops will have to eat soup for months. U.S. troops will also encounter difficulties. Thus, in the future, the attacks against logistic bases will be intensified by 10 times. This is a very important strategic mission.

The problems of general offensive and general uprising and fighting and negotiations.

General offensive and general uprising: uprisings have been carried out. Now with the arrival of the Americans, what are the problems of the general offensive and general uprising?

In the past, we did not have any doubt about this capacity in the puppet-controlled areas. Now the areas where this capacity still exists are still large. The U.S. troops occupy only 15 important districts. Puppet troops occupy over 250 districts. We realize that since we have the capacity to defeat puppet troops, we have the capacity to carry out general uprisings and liberate these areas. We do have the capacity to liberate the district capitals and a number of provinces.

In the old-type colonial war, the enemy would not consent to being defeated and withdrawing until his vitality had been annihilated to a certain degree. In the new-type colonial war, when the greater bulk of the puppet army and an important part of the American troops will have been annihilated and disintegrated, the enemy has to agree to withdraw under definite conditions. For example, with regard to areas where American troops are stationed we use military and political means to attack them; in areas where they are still strong, we encircle them. When negotiations are held, the American troops may agree to withdraw from these areas, under definite conditions. We then proceed to solving the problems of the remaining areas. With regard to the centers such as Saigon and Cholon we must combine the old experiences with creative ideas to carry out the task.

Fighting and Negotiating:

The resolution of the Party's 11th conference clearly stated that in the process of achieving success, a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously may arise. At present, the situation is not yet ripe for negotiations. Fighting while negotiating is aimed at opening another front with a view to making the puppet army more disintegrated, stimulating and developing the enemy's internal contradictions, and, thereby, making him more isolated in order to deprive him of the propaganda weapons, isolate him further, and make a number of people who understand the Americans clearly see their nature.

In a war between a powerful country which wages aggression and a weak country, as long as we have not yet acquired adequate strength a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously does not exist. Fighting continues until the emergence of a situation where both sides are fighting indecisively. Then, a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously may emerge. In fighting while negotiating, the side which fights more strongly will compel the adversary to accept his conditions. Considering the comparative balance of forces, the war proceeds through the following stages:

--The fighting stage.

--The stage of fighting while negotiating.

--Negotiations and signing of agreements.

Whether or not the war will resume after the conclusion of agreements depends upon the comparative balance of forces. If we are capable of dominating the adversary, the war will not break out again, and conversely. Therefore, fighting while negotiating also represents a principled step in the evolution of the war. Thus, a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously will unmistakably emerge. In our anti-French resistance, there were also times when fighting and negotiations were conducted simultaneously. The same situation had emerged in China.

At present, there are three viewpoints with regard to war and peace.

--The Americans find it necessary to negotiate, but negotiate from a strong position, partly because they have deceitful motives, and partly because the situation has compelled them to negotiate. Yet, they want us to make concessions to them.

--A number of countries want us to enter into negotiations, any form of negotiations--so that a big war does not break out and that the war can be ended--regardless of the interests of Vietnam. Some other countries wonder whether we can defeat the Americans, and if not, we should enter into negotiations. (Most of these countries are nationalist countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.) A number of East European socialist countries hold the view that conditions do prevail, and are ripe for achieving success (The Americans would withdraw their troops, and we will continue the struggle to achieve total success.) These socialist countries also posed a number of conditions: cessation of the bombing of the North; gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South.

--China holds the view that conditions for negotiations are not yet ripe, not until a few years from now, and, even worse, seven years from now. In the meantime, we should continue fighting to bog down the enemy, and should wait until a number of socialist countries acquire adequate conditions for strengthening their main force troops to launch a strong, all-out, and rapid offensive, using all types of weapons and heeding no borders. What we should do in the South today is to try restrain the enemy and make him bogged down, waiting until China has built strong forces to launch an all-out offensive.

--Our policy: to continue fighting until a certain time when we can fight and negotiate at the same time.

This is also a fighting method: repulsing the enemy step by step, and achieving decisive success.

The Party Central Committee entrusts the Politburo with the task of deciding on the time for negotiations.

The problem of choosing the opportunity and deciding to negotiate:

-Basing ourselves upon the actual situation in the South.

--Considering the opinions of the friendly countries which have provided us with quite a large volume of assistance, in order to gain their maximum support.

The future situation may lead to negotiations. Yet, even if there are negotiations, they are conducted simultaneously with fighting. While negotiating, we will continue fighting the enemy more vigorously. (It is possible that the North conducts negotiations while the South continues fighting, and that the South also participates in the negotiations while continuing to fight). Those who are in charge of conducting negotiations negotiate and those in charge of fighting continue fighting, because the decisive factor lies in the battlefield. The enemy wants us to stop fighting to his advantage. But we have to fight. Therefore, the enemy also fights. We must fight to win great victories with which to compell the enemy to accept our conditions. If we stop fighting (at that stage), no considerable success can be achieved in negotiations. If we conduct negotiations while fighting vigorously, we can also take advantage of the opportunity to step up the political struggle, military proselyting, and activities in the cities. Thus, we will take advantage of the opportunity offered by the negotiations to step up further our military attacks, political struggle, and military proselyting. At present, the Americans have put forth deceitful arguments. Therefore, we must put forth conditions to prove that we fight for the aspirations and interests of the people, and, thereby, to win the support of various countries.

If the enemy wants to negotiate, he must accept a number of conditions, such as, to permanently cease their war of destruction against the North, withdraw his troops from the South, and dismantle his military bases. The failure to pose the above conditions is tantamount to implicitly accepting the Americans' presence in the South.

Depending on the situation prevailing at the time, we will impose conditions. For example, the puppet forces must be concentrated in barracks, must not repress the people, must not carry out espionage activities, must allow the people to move about freely or choose their places of residence, must not herd the people into strategic hamlets and concentration centers; the American troops must be stationed at the wharfs.

The basic situation prevailing in the South for the past years requires that we attack the enemy more vigorously. This front involves millions of people. While attacking, we must concentrate all our forces on fighting the enemy.

II. Some additional opinions:

1. Building of the armed forces and armed struggle.

Generally speaking, this is a difficult task, which must be continued. However, guerrilla warfare must be stepped up and developed further. In the recent past, the building of the regional forces, main force units, and guerrillas, on the whole, has continued to develop. Yet, considering the proportion, the building of these forces has been slow.

Previously, the guerrillas comprised 10 percent of the population.

In the western highlands, the highest proportion is only 3.5 percent, and, in some areas, the proportion is 1 percent.

Formerly, the French imperialists tried to find out why we had numerous mobile units while we had only (5 F's), whereas they had only a small number of mobile units (only ten to 15 percent) although they had large forces. The greater part (60 to 70 percent) of enemy forces have been dispersed to cope with the guerrillas, and 20 percent have to cope with the regional troops. Thus, only 10 percent of enemy forces are available to cope with our main force units.

As the Americans have increased the number of their troops, we must develop our guerrilla and regional forces to restrain and fight the enemy everywhere. We must thin out 60 to 70 percent of the enemy regular forces in order to enable our main force units to carry out their task of annihilating the enemy on the main battlefields.

We must firmly maintain and broaden our control over areas which have been liberated and which will be liberated. We have to do so because of the following reasons.

--In China, it was said that the annihilation of enemy vitality resulted in the liberation of the land.

--In our country, we must speak of annihilating enemy vitality and firmly maintaining our control over the liberated areas and enlarging the liberated areas.

If we speak solely of annihilating enemy vitality, and not of control over the liberated areas, sometimes a situation may emerge where the enemy has been annihilated but the areas under our control cannot be enlarged. In such a case, if the enemy is still strong he may still be capable of re-occupying these liberated areas. Therefore, after liberating an area, we must immediately organize its defense, and must enlarge it.

How should we best develop and deploy our forces to maintain our control? What has enabled certain areas to maintain their control? Experiences must be drawn.

By developing guerrilla warfare and pinning the enemy down, we will create conditions for our main force units to annihilate him.

The experience drawn is that it must be insured that the Party chapters and branches thoroughly understand the necessity of leading the guerrillas, and developing guerrilla warfare. The Party branch committee must build up the guerrilla force.

At present, there is a contradiction between the build up of the guerrilla forces, the regional troops and the main force units. The building of the guerrilla force to supplement the main forces has not been satisfactory. There was a situation when the enemy would have been defeated if he could not supplement his forces. Yet, he could replace and supplement his forces. Although we have achieved successes and have the just cause, we have encountered difficulties in recruiting youths to supplement our forces. It is necessary to carefully consider why we cannot recruit youths to replenish our forces.

2. The enemy's use of aircraft and artillery, and spraying of poisonous chemicals.

How have the people endured and coped with the enemy's air attacks, shelling, and spraying of poisonous chemicals? What experiences have been acquired?

In addition to the ideological measures, it is necessary to:

--Dig trenches.

--Insure that dwellings are widely spread out.

--Narrow the enemy-controlled areas, herd him into the cities, and not allow him to concentrate his forces to attack areas under our control.

The TW is very concerned about the enemy's spraying of poisonous chemicals. It is necessary to collect the chemicals sprayed so that we can ask friendly countries to analyse them, and, thereby to find appropriate preventive measures. Party members in areas which are not subjected to the spraying of poisonous chemicals, or which are lightly sprayed, are urged to step up their production, and to cultivate many kinds of plants and many crops.

3. The cities:

We should introduce our forces into the cities in order to strengthen our forces there. We must conduct investigations of the urban situation. Everyone must carry out propaganda activities and enlighten the masses to a certain extent. We must take advantage of the enemy's internal contradictions to lead the masses' struggle, and make the masses understand the political significance of the struggle for the improvement of their living conditions and for democracy.

III. Situation of the defense of the North and reinforcement of the South.

The enemy advocated attacking us vigorously at the beginning of the year (February 1965) so that he could put forth his peace negotiations policy and compel us to negotiate. The enemy was firmly confident he could compel us to sit down at the conference table and the socialist camp would force us to negotiate. Taylor proposed that the Americans attack us continuously, so as to exert pressure on us. But the reality has emerged contrary to the enemy's expectations, and has made him more passive.

At first, due to lack of experience, we encountered difficulties and confusion. The greatest difficulty arose from the blockade of roads. After some months, we acquired experiences, and have strengthened our national defense forces.

At present, the air defense force in the North is a rather strong force in Asia. The density of the anti-aircraft net with conventional weapons is even higher than that of countries in our camp. The enemy himself said that "we danced on the muzzles of their anti-aircraft guns" when he ran into a dense fire net formed by conventional weapons. Our missile force also constitutes the strongest anti-aircraft force, as compared with Asian countries, including China.

We have MIG 17's and MIG 21's. MIG 21's have a speed comparable to that of the various types of modern aircraft used by the Americans to attack us. Yet, the above two forces are still insufficient. It is necessary to have a greater force, with better long range weapons, at least medium-range rockets. (We are trying to get these.)

At present, the enemy conducts his heaviest raids against the 4th military zone. In other areas, he only attacks us suddenly and then flees. Captured enemy pilots states: "If we want to attack a wide area, we must have eight aircraft carriers, and many more air tankers and airfields. With five more aircraft carriers we can fly only 500 sorties at the most. If we want to attack Hanoi, we must have even more aircraft and must attack it in many phases."

Recently, our anti-aircraft force has achieved good results. The conventional weapons have contributed to fighting enemy aircraft flying at the lowest altitude. The missiles have an effective range from 800 meters to 35 or 50 kilometers. Recently we have downed many enemy aircraft with mobile missiles. (We have shot down a large number of enemy aircraft, but reported a small number). Though newly formed, this armed service has scored fairly good achievements. At the beginning, it took one to eight, or one to five missiles to shoot down one enemy aircraft. Now it takes one to two missiles to shoot down one enemy aircraft. The kill rate set by the Soviet Union was 100 percent. Due to the rapid training they had received, our missile units have failed to react in time in complex cases.

A missile has a bigger diameter than two arms' length, and is twenty meters long. It is radar-guided when launched. It pursues and catches up with the target because its speed is faster than that of the target. When firing missiles, members of missile units acclaim: "Dragons are pursuing aircraft." Although the speed of the MIG 17's equals 60 percent of that of enemy aircraft, they have scored great achievements, and, in some cases, downed two enemy F-105's. The enemy did not think that we dared use MIG 17's to fight him. Technically speaking, if our equipment is poor we cannot identify the enemy. Enemy aircraft always dodge our MIG 21's. Yet, the MIG 21's have not yet been widely used.

The enemy is afraid of us because we are both heroic and bold. We can counter enemy aircraft at any altitude. Cuba, the Soviet Union, China, and Korea, have voiced their readiness to help us, but we see that we are still able to fight alone.

There are some conclusions I want to present so that we can rejoice:

--The enemy has been unable to destroy our agricultural economy. Despite the fact that the youths have gone to the battlefields, the women and aged people have insured production and attained the planned norm of five tons per hectare. The youths have gone to the battlefield, the women have assumed the three responsibilities, engaged in all fields of activity in the rural areas, and simultaneously engaged in production and combat.

A team of women from a fruit factory, commanded by women cadres and equipped with machineguns, heavy machineguns, and 20mm and 12mm guns, put up a demonstration for women from foreign countries. The latter said that "if we were Americans we would have left Vietnam long ago." Another example: when she saw enemy aircraft appear, Miss Hang, a female guerrilla, rushed into the combat trench. But there was a snake in the trench. She wondered if she should fight the snake or shoot at enemy aircraft. She jumped into the trench and shot enemy aircraft. Only after shooting down an enemy aircraft did she return to kill the snake. The comrade Party Secretary concluded that Miss Hang had held firm to the Party's viewpoint: to direct the spearhead at the main enemy.

--Now we can conclude that no matter what the enemy does, he cannot destroy us. During the past year, our brother countries gave us a quantity of equipment larger than that provided during the previous five years.

Despite the present intensity of the war, the cost of living in the North has not risen. The masses' daily life remains normal. Our lines of communication are uninterrupted. At the beginning, we learned from the Korean Engineer Corps, but now the progress we have made far exceeds that of the Korean Engineer Corps. Owing to our strong defense system, the enemy has encountered difficulties in bombing our installations. Although the Ham Rong bridge has been riddled with bullets, it is still standing, and the people living in the surrounding area have not moved away.

Transportation is possible. Despite the fact that we are in a war situation, our transportation capabilities have doubled, and we are using all means available. Yet, we still fail to meet the requirements of the 4th zone and of the South. The transportation operations on the roads are almost non-existent in daylight. But at night, there are all kinds of transportation means, such as floating bridges, rafts, cable chains, rails installed on rafts for trains to cross over rivers, and so forth.

Although the Americans can destroy our industry to a certain extent, they cannot destroy our national defense industry, because we do not yet have a major one. The socialist countries' aid has been increased.

We can thus conclude that even if the Americans intensify their air raids, we will still stand firm to protect the North and reinforce the South.

Reinforcements to the South:

The Northern citizens have clearly realized their responsibility with regard to this matter. Therefore, they have provided reinforcements to the best of their ability.

IV. International support

On the one hand, we find that international support is fairly good, and, on the other hand, we are worried. The reason for this is that we are fighting the enemy at a time when there is a lack of unity within the socialist camp. This is a reality. Disunity still exists. We cannot just sit by and wait until the socialist camp is united to achieve decisive victory. On the contrary, we must achieve decisive victory within the next four years. Therefore, it is necessary to try to win maximum support. We say that our Party's leadership is correct and our people are heroic. Yet, without international support, our success would be limited although we still can achieve it. Generally speaking, the countries in the socialist camp unanimously agree with our line, and wholeheartedly assist us.

Since the downfall of Khrushchev, the Soviet Union has provided us with much assistance in all fields. Three fourths of the weapons sent to the South have been received from the socialist camp. Half of the South's budget has been provided by our camp, mainly China. The quantity of weapons provided has been so large that we could not transport all of them. During the past year, the quantity of equipment provided for the building of the North equalled that received during the five previous years. We have sent back those materials for which we did not yet have requirements, so that we do not lose them or have to maintain them. The socialist camp has agreed to construct mobile missile launching pads, and to establish factories to construct mobile missile launching pads for us.

Nevertheless, we are not satisfied in certain respects. If there were no disunity within the socialist camp, our success would have been greater. Yet, we also find that if we did not obtain the great assistance from our camp, we would not have been able to achieve such great successes. Our party has highly evaluated the support of the socialist camp. If we do not try to gain the support of the socialist camp, we will be guilty of our duty to our people. We cannot accept the line of this country or that country in order to obtain aid, nor can we accept aid from one country without accepting aid from another, because otherwise we will be guilty before the entire camp, and before our people.

V. Realtions within the Socialist Camp

China said: We must unite and insure the purity of Marxism-Leninism. Yet, only a number of countries have sided with China. The same situation also exists with regard to the Soviet Union. As for us, all countries in the camp, except Yugoslavia, are siding with us. Recently, our party did its best to contribute to the unity within the socialist camp.

At a time when there is a polemic among various countries, we must have an independent line. We must be confident in no one but our own Party. We advocate opposing revisionism, and, at the same time, must take precautionary measures against dogmatism, and must constantly preserve international solidarity.

China said: To positively oppose imperialism without positively opposing revisionism will finally lead to compromise with imperialism. That is not true. If one is revisionist, he does not oppose imperialism, and advocates peaceful coexistence with imperialism.

We do not hold the view that the Soviet leadership is as revisionist as the leadership under Khrushchev, and that it is somewhat more dangerous than Khrushchev.

We hold that the Soviet leadership still contains some revisionists, some indecisive elements, and also active elements.

China said Khrushchev fell because of external causes.

We do not think so. We think that Khrushchev fell because of internal causes, and, of course, the external struggle also was a very important contribution to his downfall.

According to China, things do not have two or three characteristics. This is true. Yet, in a transitional period when we are not yet positive about everything, we cannot attribute to environmental things this characteristic or another. Instead, we must continue to follow them up before we can draw a correct conclusion.

N.Y. TIMES
19 April 1967

CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT

The Fearful Ulbricht

Walter Ulbricht seems to have exceeded even his own previous records for cant and hypocrisy in his four-hour speech to the congress of East Germany's "Socialist Unity" party. Herr Ulbricht now says Germany can be united only after the West German working class has seized control, overthrowing "militarism, neo-Nazism and the power of the monopolies."

As Herr Ulbricht may recall, the authentic revolt of German workers erupted not in the Federal Republic but in his own "German Democratic Republic" fourteen years ago on June 17—and was crushed by Soviet tanks while the Communist leaders hid for their lives.

Herr Ulbricht's sterile response to Chancellor Kiesinger's sixteen specific proposals for closer links between the two parts of Germany is disappointing

but not unexpected; Ulbricht is a frightened man.

He is frightened less of the kind of uprising that took place in 1953 than of the creeping isolation of East Germany even within the Soviet bloc. He panicked at the prompt, positive response of other Communist regimes to the initiatives launched by the Kiesinger-Brandt coalition.

Panic accounts for his abrupt trip to Moscow, for the feverish conclusion or renewal of bilateral treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and for East Germany's blasts at Rumania after that regime had accepted diplomatic relations with Bonn.

Herr Ulbricht has slowed Bonn's diplomatic offensive but is doubtful that he can sidetrack it. The Soviet bloc is no longer a monolith taking orders from the Kremlin. Even the Poles and Czechs may one day find compelling the advantages of closer relations with West Germany.

WASHINGTON STAR
23 April 1967

East Zone Reds Elect Fuchs, Eisler to Central Committee

BERLIN (AP)—Atom spy Klaus Fuchs and propagandist Gerhart Eisler, once regarded as the No. 1 Communist spy in the United States, were elected yesterday to the Central Committee of the East German Communist party, the official news agency ADN reported. Walter Ulbricht was unanimously re-elected first secretary.

Eisler was convicted and sentenced to prison terms in the United States for contempt of Congress and falsifying visa information, but jumped bail and sailed to East Germany aboard the Polish liner Batory on May 7, 1949. He is now 70 years old.

Fuchs, 55, who worked as an atomic scientist in the United States and Britain during and after World War II, was convicted

and was sentenced to 14 years in prison. He was released after serving nine years and returned to East Germany, where he now is deputy director of a nuclear research center.

New Politburo Named

The elections took place at the seventh Communist party congress in East Berlin. It wound up yesterday.

The 2,000 delegates elected a new 15-member Politburo, plus six candidate-members, and a new Central Committee.

Delegations from 67 nations were present. The Soviet delegation was led by Leonid I. Brezhnev and that of Poland by party chief Wladyslaw Gomulka, both of whom were present for Ulbricht's closing speech.

Ulbricht called the West

it thought it could get around such Communist demands as recognition of East Germany and of existing borders, including the border between East and West Germany.

West Berlin Mentioned

Ulbricht brought up the matter of the neutralization of West Berlin. In his speech earlier in the week Brezhnev hardly mentioned West Berlin.

One Western source evaluated the contrast in the reference to West Berlin this way: "Ulbricht was reminding his Soviet comrades that the problem of West Berlin is still there and that despite the present days of East-West detente in Europe in Europe, it will have to be settled one day. He restated his government's claim to sovereignty in a

CPYRGHT

**Ehemalige Nazis in der
CPYRGHED-Führung**

Vy. BERLIN, 7. Mai. Dem neuen Zentralkomitee der SED, das von zwei Wochen auf dem Parteitag der SED gewählt worden ist, gehören mindestens dreizehn ehemalige Nationalsozialisten an. Nach einer Mitteilung des Untersuchungsausschusses freier Juristen sind darunter zwei Minister sowie ein Staatssekretär. Von den 131 Vollmitgliedern des Zentralkomitees nennt der Untersuchungsausschuss sechs ehemalige Nationalsozialisten, den Minister und Vorsitzenden des Komitees der Arbeiter- und Bauerninspektion, Heinz Matthes, den Staatssekretär für Forschung und Technik, Herbert Weiz, den Präsidenten des Turn- und Sportbundes der „DDR“, Manfred Ewald, den Vizepräsidenten der Akademie der Landwirtschaftswissenschaften, Erich Rübensam, das Präsidiumsmitglied der Einheitsgewerkschaft FDGB, Horst Heintze, und den Schriftsteller Bernhard Seeger. Unter den 50 Kandidaten des Zentralkomitees der SED befinden sich weitere sieben ehemalige Parteigenossen.

FORMER NAZIS IN SED LEADERSHIP

Berlin, 7 May. At least 13 former National Socialists are among the members of the new SED Central Committee elected two weeks ago at the SED Party Congress. According to a report by the Investigating Committee of Free Jurists, they include two Ministers and one State Secretary. Of the 131 full members of the Central Committee, the Investigating Committee has identified six former Nazis:

Heinz Matthes, Minister and Chairman of the Committee of Worker and Peasant Inspection
Herbert Weiz, State Secretary for Research and Technology
Manfred Ewald, President of the Gymnastics and Sports Association
Erich Ruebensam, Vice President of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences
Horst Heintze, Member of the Presidium of the Free German Trade Union Association (FDGB)
Bernhard Seeger, Author

An additional seven former Nazis are among the 50 Candidate Members of the SED Central Committee.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG
8 May 1967

Foreign Affairs Bulletin

published by the Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Volume 7

January 25th 1967

No. 3

Collaboration with Developing Countries

CPYRGHT

The GDR's scientific and industrial relations with a great number of developing countries, which have shown a very favourable trend particularly during 1965-66, form a substantial part of the country's economic exchanges. They are a decisive means of promoting and deepening the collaboration with these countries which in the new stage of their development have taken steps to strengthen and safeguard their national independence.

Arrangements to send specialists (outside commercial contracts) have helped these countries a great deal in building up and strengthening their own economies.

Training of Technical Personnel

When sending specialists and training local staff the interests of the country concerned are taken into consideration and due regard is being paid to the principle of equality and mutual respect of sovereignty.

Thus, in 1965, advisers and specialists were sent to 19 developing countries and the number of trainees which came to the GDR from 48 countries to acquire technical knowledge, had nearly doubled as against 1964.

successful efforts in expanding her relations with the Arab and African countries. As a result, agreements on scientific and industrial collaboration were signed.

Experience made so far shows that on the basis of such long-term agreements the developing countries can be granted many-sided and effective help in widely varying scientific and industrial fields.

On the other hand, a number of developing countries have built up successfully certain branches of industry and thereby gathered a great deal of valuable experience from which the corresponding sectors of the GDR's industry can benefit through the exchange of knowledge and experts.

Moreover, it is possible to take up favourable cooperative activities in various industrial fields, including agriculture.

Government agreements concluded with a number of countries, including the UAR, Syria, Yemen and Mali, have shown good results. Other examples are the arrangements made with Algeria, Kongo-Brazzaville, Guinea and Burma, which form a sound basis for developing scientific and industrial exchanges.

Along the Lines of the 1st UNCTAD Conference

The GDR considers the cultivation of this type of relationship to be an essential contribution towards the realization of the requests voiced by the developing countries at the 1st UN Conference for Trade and Development held in 1964.

Most favourable results have been achieved in scientific and industrial collaboration with the UAR, Syria, Mali and Guinea. In the spirit of genuine equality of the partners the GDR aims at a long-term cooperation, utilizing in the best possible way the discoveries made by science and industry.

Collaboration is growing in importance also in the field of planning. Under the conditions of the scientific revolution all-round economic, scientific and industrial exchanges are in line with the fundamental requirements of international contracts.

They provide good possibilities for entering into long-term relations involving a division of labour between the GDR and the African, Asian and Latin American countries which have embarked upon the non-capitalist way of development.

Successful Development of Relations

In 1966 the GDR has made further

GDR FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES ARAB TOUR

East Berlin: Deutschlandsender in German to Germany 2040 GMT 16 May 1967

(Interview given by GDR Foreign Minister Otto Winzer in Beirut to our Middle East correspondent Horst Kaeubler--recorded)

(Text) Kaeubler: Mr. Foreign Minister, in the past few days you visited the UAR, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Republic of Lebanon. Would you kindly outline the motives for your mission to a number of Arab states before the microphone of the GDR radio?

to put it off a little while. Meanwhile, the Seventh SED Congress has opened new perspectives for developing the GDR's foreign policy. It made good sense to talk with the statesmen of the Arab states about these new perspectives of our foreign policy, our domestic development, the great plans of the GDR, and to inform them of and discuss some of the problems. I can say that these talks were extremely fruitful, fruitful for me and the GDR inasmuch as we became acquainted with the new problems in the Arab States we visited.

The statesmen of the UAR, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Republic of Lebanon used the opportunity to expound the fundamentals of their foreign policy, some problems of their domestic development, and questions of international relations in the Arab area. Summing up, I may say that the motives for my mission were to develop good relations between the GDR and the Arab states and to open up new horizons.

Kaeubler: Mr. Foreign Minister, you had conversations in Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut with the leaders of these three states. Can you tell our listeners something about the substance of your talks?

Winzer: It is general knowledge that the economic, maritime, and aviation relations and the cultural, scientific, and technical cooperation between the GDR and the Arab states I visited are developing very well. It is necessary further to develop political relations between our states. This requires primarily a knowledge of GDR foreign policy as outlined at the Seventh SED Congress. A knowledge of the great intentions of the GDR is needed. Conversely, it is necessary to have a closer knowledge of the problems of the Arab states. So there was an extremely wide range of topics in my conversations in Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut. I may say that my discussions will bear fruit in the course of time; that is, our relations will develop in the political as well as in the economic and cultural field.

Kaeubler: After this first stage of your mission and shortly before your departure, may I ask your impressions of the states you have visited?

Winzer: I can say that my impressions are extremely good. I can say that on the whole the mutual understanding between the statesmen with whom I had an opportunity to speak and the GDR government is developing increasingly. It should be mentioned that my visit to the Republic of Lebanon was the first in many years which offered an opportunity for detailed and thorough talks with the foreign minister and Premier of the Republic of Lebanon, with many parliamentarians and other representatives of economic life.

Here in Beirut, I gave information about our policy and my partners briefed us on the policy of neutrality and nonalignment of the Republic of Lebanon. On this basis, we discussed how political relations will develop in addition to our economic and cultural relations.

Summing up, after the first stage of my visit to Arab countries, I can say that it was fruitful and will bear fruit in the future.

COMMUNIST PERSECUTION OF BAPTISTS

May 1967

LOS ANGELES TIMES
24 August 1966

Soviet Imprisons Six Baptist Leaders

BY VINCENT J. BURKE

Times Staff Writer

MOSCOW—Forty young Soviet men and women were baptized in the Don River on May 2 and the six Baptist leaders who organized the mass religious rite have been sentenced to prison.

In disclosing this Tuesday, a Soviet newspaper reported that the Baptist leaders also were convicted of illegally operating a Sunday school and printing religious tracts on an underground printing press.

After the Orthodox Church, the Baptists are the second largest religious group in the Soviet Union with more than half a million adherents.

The article said without elaboration that the six defendants were sentenced to prison terms of varying length.

The mass baptism occurred in Rostov on the Don and the defendants were tried by a regional court at Rostov, the newspaper said.

An account of the trial, published in Teachers Gazette, indicated that youthful believers who were called as witnesses were defiant and contemptuous of the court.

"They behaved angrily and fanatically," the article said.

Moreover, among the spectators at the trial some young women gazed "with admiration at the defendants

and with disapproval at the atheistic public."

The author noted that this display of youthful admiration of Christian beliefs does not correspond with the conventional Soviet view of the Baptist in the Soviet Union.

"We think of them as quiet old people who have not got rid of the remnants of the past," the article noted.

The success of the Baptist group in propagating the faith among Soviet youth was cited as conclusive evidence of serious shortcomings of the government's program of "atheistic education." The author said it was too late to indoctrinate youths in atheism if they are believers at the age of 17 and 18.

Student Baptism

Those baptized at the mass immersion rite were said to have included a girl student at a construction engineering college at Rostov, who is a member of the Komsomol (Young Communist League).

What is the origin of his religious attitude among "yesterday's school girls, who live among our Soviet youth and study science with all the others?" the article asked.

It said the trial testimony gave the answer:

In the underground printing house in the suburbs of Rostov the brothers and sisters in Christ were diligently multiplying in hundreds of copies Baptist magazines, entitled "Herald of Saving," "Rules of Behavior of Children" and "The Brothers' Papers."

A government witness told the court that the magazines constituted "active propaganda of religion," asking how else one could describe a passage which called on youth to "take into your hands the spiritual word of God." The mass

baptism, organized without knowledge of local authorities, "violated social order and called forth indignation of the people of Rostov."

At the "illegal" Sunday schools, the article said, "illiterate and fanatic teachers taught children of 8 to 11 of God's teaching, systematically educating in them a religious world outlook."

Call for Disobedience

The religious tracts were said to have sometimes contained "direct calls to the believers not to obey Soviet laws."

The group accused of illegal activities was termed a faction within the regular Baptist organization.

Within this group, the article said, parents forbid children to attend the cinema, to participate in regular social life, to be active in "Young Pioneers," the Soviet organization for children, and make their children "read the Bible."

WASHINGTON POST
September 1966

Soviets Jail 3

MOSCOW — Three women members of a Fundamentalist Baptist sect have been sentenced to three-year jail terms for secretly holding religious classes for children in Yzhny, a village on the Volga River east of Moscow. It was the fourth such case reported this year.

The Baptist Church, officially registered with Soviet authorities, estimates there are about 250,000 "unregistered" Baptists in the nation. The newspaper Sovietskaya Rossiya said the women were not sentenced for their religious views, but for organizing classes to teach Christianity to children.

RUSSIAN BAPTISTS QUOTE LENIN IN PLEA FOR RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE

By Arthur Channing

Back in 1903, when he was seeking popular support for his revolutionary cause, V. I. Lenin made an eloquent defense of religious freedom in Russia. After his Bolsheviks gained power in 1917 and established the world's first Communist regime, however, he discarded his seemingly liberal views and helped to launch the campaign against all religions that his successors are still waging today.

The Russian Church of Evangelical Christians-Baptists recently reminded the present Soviet leadership of Lenin's previous stand in an appeal for religious freedom addressed to the USSR's highest party and governmental authorities.

This quotation from a 1903 Lenin statement was included in the Baptists' letter:

"Each person must have complete freedom not only to observe any faith but also (to) propagate any faith.... None of the officials should even have a right to ask anyone of his faith: this is a matter of conscience and nobody should dare to interfere in this field."

The Baptists cited a number of other instances in which Communists have taken public positions that are now being contradicted by the party's day-to-day persecution of religious believers throughout the USSR.

Their letter, written in April, 1965 but unknown outside of the Soviet Union until a copy reached contacts in Western Europe in July, 1966 -- pointed

out that the original Soviet constitution of 1918 professed to recognize the right of each citizen to immunity from both "religious and anti-religious propaganda." Later, however, the constitution was changed to fit the present policy of denying believers the right to propagate their faith but giving the party's atheist agitators a free hand in conducting anti-religious propaganda.

The Baptist appeal also charged that Soviet authorities had violated provisions of the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (ratified by the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1962) dealing with freedom of conscience, convictions and religious beliefs. Specific reference was made to Article 5 of the Declaration which states that parents "must have the possibility of securing for their children a religious and moral upbringing in conformity with their own convictions."

Since 1929, the letter said, the revised Soviet constitution has permitted the wholesale persecution of believers, thousands of whom perished in prisons and labor camps.

"Can one say that all these nightmares are of things of the past?" the Baptist appeal asked. "No! The crime has not yet ended. It still continues. And here is a vivid example of this: At the very time you are reading this letter, hundreds of believers are being deprived of liberty illegally. They are languishing in prisons, labor camps and in exile. Some of them died in agony as martyrs. The children are being taken away from their parents. Thousands of Evangelical Christian-Baptist communities are deprived of all rights. Their meetings are being held in private homes which sometimes can accommodate only 25 to 30 percent of a Baptist community, and even under these

trying conditions the believers cannot get together without harassment. Quite often their meetings are dispersed by police and volunteer militia, and their homes confiscated. All this testifies to the fact that the crime has not yet ended."

The letter included a plea for restoration of the original wording of the constitution and for the honoring of its provisions concerning religion. It was addressed to L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Constitutional Committee of the Supreme Soviet (parliament); legislative committees of the Supreme Soviet; the USSR Council of Ministers; and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Court.

"As rulers," the Baptist spokesmen said in conclusion, "you carry the responsibility before God, not for the violation of church canons, but for the violation of natural laws of truth, liberty, equality and fraternity."

Although there has been no indication of an official Soviet reply to the Baptists' plea for religious tolerance, press reports from Moscow in late August revealed that six of the church's leaders had been sentenced to prison for taking part in a baptismal ceremony for 40 young men and women. The Baptists, according to these reports, also were charged with giving religious instruction and secretly printing religious tracts.

In an earlier incident, two young parish priests of the Russian Orthodox Church, Fathers Nicholas Eshliman and Gleb Yakunin, were suspended from performing their religious duties after writing similar letters of protest to Soviet and church officials. The priests charged, in December 1965, that Soviet officials had undermined the church's own leadership and, in effect,

held the power of veto over all religious activities. They pointed out that no priest can be ordained without approval of the regime's Council on Affairs of the Church. More than ten thousand churches and dozens of monasteries, training seminaries and convents were closed by Communist authorities between 1961 and 1964, the priests added, although such actions supposedly are prohibited by Soviet law.

CPYRGHT

THE SUNDAY TIMES
10 July 1966

Russia puts squeeze on Baptists

By a Special Correspondent

THE EXPULSION of four Western Baptists, three British and one Dutch, from Russia last week for trying to "smuggle" Bibles into the country follows a spate of trials and mass arrests of Soviet Baptists.

Baptist women accused of running illegal Bible classes and Sunday schools have recently been put on trial in places as far apart as Western Ukraine and Soviet Kirghizia in Central Asia. Sentences were harsher than usual, with none under five years' hard labour.

Last month there were anti-Baptist riots in the town of Mtsensk, Russian Federation, and special militia units had to be called out to control potential lynching parties determined to "get the Baptists."

The wave of anti-Baptist incidents is believed to be linked with the emergence of a militant group within the Russian Evangelical Christian Baptist Church following dissatisfaction among the faithful with the present Church leadership. One of their leaders summed up their dispute with the Council on Affairs of the Church as follows: "We abide by God's laws only, and the leadership of the Evangelical Baptist Church has bowed to the temporal too."

Long-term aims
The new group want to oust the present leadership, which is recognised by the Council for Religious Affairs, and hope to achieve this in a democratic way at an all-union congress of Russian Baptists. But their aims go further than changing a church leadership that "has turned its back on Christ's teachings."

The Baptist Organisational Committee, as the leaders of the militant group call themselves, demand an immediate end to State interference in the upbringing of Baptist children and claim the right to withdraw their children from anti-religious instruction classes at school.

Unlike the official church leadership, the organisational committee does not seem to believe in passive resistance. Illegally printed leaflets have urged the faithful to "fight temporal laws" and to be guided in all their actions by "God's laws alone."

"Speakers" of the group have been calling on officials of district, regional and republican councils as well as the Council of Religious Affairs in Moscow, petitioning the Convocation of Baptist Congress.

Soviet officials believe there is already a big enough religious revival going on in the Soviet Union without British Baptists distributing Bibles in the country.

CPYRGHT

Kuroyedov on Baptist Schism and Laws on Religion

Interview at Readers' Request: SOME QUESTIONS ON RELIGION AND THE CHURCH. (Izvestia, Aug. 30, p. 4. Complete text.) From time to time Izvestia publishes articles concerning religion, the church, and atheist work. They usually evoke many letters from readers.

The editors, feeling that the thoughts expressed in the letters are of interest of the public, asked Vladimir Alekseyevich Kuroyedov, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' Council for Religious Affairs, to answer some of the questions raised by readers.

Question.—Are there many believers in our country? What status do Soviet laws grant to religious organizations and what procedure do they provide for these organizations' activities?

Answer.—It is impossible to answer the question of how many believers there are, since our country conducts no state census of citizens in regard to their attitude toward religion. No official documents contain indications of whether a person professes a religion or is a nonbeliever. It is very important to emphasize this circumstance, for it is one of the conditions for ensuring freedom of conscience in the U.S.S.R. Under the Soviet Constitution, the church in our country is separated from the state, and the schools from the church, in order to ensure freedom of conscience. In conformity with this, state agencies do not interfere in the internal devotional activities of religious organizations. Religious organizations, in turn, do not interfere in any state affairs.

The Soviet state, taking into account the fact that a part of the population consists of believers, permits church associations to function freely in order to satisfy the religious needs of the believers. These associations are granted the use of church buildings without charge and are granted the possibility of training clergymen, publishing religious literature, manufacturing articles of worship, etc.

Our laws strictly protect the rights of believers. An insult to the feelings of believers or any kind of discrimination against them is prosecuted according to law.

It is precisely in these conditions, which have been created in our country, that it is possible genuinely to ensure every citizen the freedom to believe or not believe in God, the freedom to perform religious rites or to spread antireligious propaganda.

Everything stated above is a commonly known truth. Foreign church delegations visiting the Soviet Union acknowledge that the church in our country exists freely and independently.

Yet from time to time some Western publications print slander and various insinuations about the status of religion in the U.S.S.R. For example, the newspaper *Le Parisien Libere*, in its issue of April 4, 1966, presented as a sensation a report of new Russian Republic legislation concerning the church and, in so doing, offered the peremptory conclusion that "a new offensive against Christian worship" was being organized in our country.

Let us see how matters actually stand.

At the beginning of this year the Presidium of the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet adopted two decrees and a resolution concerning legislation on religious cults. Similar resolutions and decrees were adopted by the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of other Union republics. Any unbiased person, after reading these documents (published in *Vedomosti Verkhovnoy Soveta RSFSR*, No. 12, March 24, 1966), will recognize that there can be no talk of an "offensive" against the church and against believers' rights or of any infringement of these rights.

These decrees and resolutions were adopted to clarify the prevailing legislation on cults; they concern chiefly the question of combating violations of the law on the separation of church and state and of schools and church, and they clarify it along the following lines:

set forth specifically which violations of the above law entail criminal liability. The Russian Republic Criminal Code (Art. 142) had not previously defined these specific violations. It should be particularly emphasized that the sphere of criminal punishment has been considerably narrowed. And for various types of violations an administrative penalty has been introduced in place of criminal responsibility.

Essentially, it is a matter of reducing the punishment of persons who are first offenders against the law on separation of church and state. However, increased responsibility is established for citizens who had previously been convicted of such violations and also for those who have undertaken organized activities aimed at the committing of such violations.

From all this it is apparent that the new judicial acts do not at all infringe upon the rights of believers, all the more so since the resolution of the Presidium of the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet states that discrimination against believers is punished according to criminal procedure. In particular, this concerns such instances as "refusal to hire citizens or to admit them to educational institutions, dismissal from work or expulsion from educational institutions, and the deprivation of citizens' privileges and benefits that have been established by law, as well as other substantial limitations of the rights of citizens because of their attitude toward religion."

It is not fortuitous that believers and also the clergy correctly understood these new normative acts of the Union republics and approved them.

To the credit of certain foreign church publications, it should be said that they gave an objective interpretation of the new Soviet acts on religion and the church. Such an influential church publication as the *Bulletin of the World Council of Churches* declared in No. 17, May 26:

"At the beginning of April various news services carried reports from Moscow that a decree of the Supreme Soviet in Russia (the Russian Republic) introduced restrictions on freedom of religion. A study of the text, actually containing three decrees, showed that these decrees on the whole confirm, clarify and in some cases introduce greater flexibility into existing laws. Contrary to what was printed in the newspapers, none of these decrees forbids freedom to collect [contributions] for the needs of the church or sanctions discrimination against persons because of their religion.

"To illustrate the alleviation of previous conditions, it may be noted that some law violations previously punished by imprisonment now only entail a fine of up to 50 rubles."

The bulletin goes on to give, on similar aspects, a concrete analysis of each of the new normative acts of the Presidium of the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet concerning religious cults.

Thus, no matter how much *Le Parisien Libere* wanted to slander the Soviet government's policy toward religion, it failed. The new legislative acts in the sphere of religion and the church are in no way a persecution of religion or a violation of the principle of freedom of conscience in the U.S.S.R.

Of course, freedom of conscience in our country does not mean, as some clergymen would like, that the activities of religious organizations should be completely unrestricted and that they may do whatever they wish, without regard for the laws and customs of our country.

Every state has special laws on religion and the church, establishing a definite framework for the activity of religious associations. It is natural that we too have laws on religion and the church. The basic one is the Soviet government decree "On Separation of Church From State and of Schools From the Church," issued Jan. 23, 1918, and signed by V. I. Lenin.

The chief requirement which the law sets for religious organizations is that they confine their activities to satisfying the religious needs of their members and to other lawful order and without infringing upon the person or rights of citizens. The law forbids the use of meetings of believers for addresses opposing the interests of Soviet society, as well as the inatte-

ment of believers to shun the performance of civic duties and participation in state and socio-political life. Any kind of fanatic rite which harms people's health, any kind of fraudulent actions to stimulate superstitions, etc., is contrary to Soviet law and is condemned by it.

Our legislation stipulates that each religious congregation must without fail register with the authorities before it may begin activities. Registration bears witness to the fact that the religious association has received official permission for its activity in conformity with the law; as for the state agencies, they undertake to protect the rights of the believers of this religious association. A religious association may be refused registration only if the dogma and performance of rites or any other of its activities entails a violation of the laws or an encroachment upon the person or rights of citizens.

It is appropriate to note here that the majority of the clergy in the U.S.S.R. tries to observe the legislation on cults and behaves loyally toward all the measures of the Soviet government in domestic and foreign policy. In this connection one cannot fail to point out the contribution made by the Russian Orthodox Church, headed by Patriarch Aleksy, and other churches of the Soviet Union to the cause of the struggle for peace, against the threat of another world war and for the strengthening of friendship among peoples.

Q.—Many readers, including believers, have commented indignantly on the actions of certain latter-day Baptists. What is this about?

A.—In the U.S.S.R., as we know, there exists a church of Evangelical Baptist Christians, headed by its religious center, the All-Union Council of Evangelical Baptist Christians (A.-U.C.E.B.C.). A group of so-called "initiators" arose in this organization several years ago; this group opposed the A.-U.C.E.B.C. leadership and waged a struggle to replace it.

This kind of struggle for power and all sorts of internal dissension and schisms are frequent occurrences in the history of religious organizations. But in this instance the dissension stemmed not only from the careerist and mercenary interests of certain persons, but to some extent also from political aims. This is unequivocally clear from the slogans advanced by the "initiators": for revocation of Soviet laws on religious cults, laws which they declared to be "Satanic"; for unrestricted religious propaganda, not only in places of worship, but on streets and squares, in parks and in all public places; and for abolition of the atheist education of pupils in the schools.

Having failed to obtain the support of the mass of believers (not even one-twentieth of all the Baptists followed them), the leaders of this group quit the A.-U.C.E.B.C. and proceeded to set up their own independent organization, first under the name of "the initiators," then "the organizational committee for convening an all-Union congress of Evangelical Baptist Christians," and later "the council of Evangelical Baptist Christian churches." What is more, after falsely declaring themselves the spiritual center of all Baptists, they demanded (1) of the government that it remove the lawfully existing religious center, the A.-U.C.E.B.C., and put them in its place. Ignorance or impudence—it is hard to say which predominates in this illegal demand. After all, the believers themselves have to decide who is to head a religious organization, and state agencies cannot interfere in the matter.

Upon failing in this adventurist attempt to seize the leadership of the organization of Evangelical Baptist Christians, the secessionists' leaders chose the course of an organized struggle against the Soviet legislation on cults. In leaflets, letters and various circulars distributed among the Evangelical Baptist Christian religious congregations, they began to include materials of a slanderous nature regarding the Soviet state and its policy in the field of religions; they distorted the meaning of the legislation on cults and called on believers not to carry out the requirements of this legislation. The "initiators" attempted to organize religious processions on the streets of a number of

cities, conducted prayer meetings in public places, in various institutions, parks and gardens, and began to teach religion to children, in violation of the established regulations.

The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' Council on Religious Affairs and other central agencies and local bodies of authority explained to the leaders of this secessionist group the illegality of their demands and actions. But the latter did not heed any explanations and continued to break the law. Therefore, it was necessary to call some of them to account.

In speaking of the "initiators" one should of course make a distinction between the leaders and the rank-and-file Baptists, the great majority of whom are honest Soviet citizens. They became involved in criminal activities out of ignorance, through their lack of knowledge of the legislation on cults, ignorance of which the instigators and provocateurs took advantage.

It is necessary patiently to elucidate to these believers the Soviet legislation on cults, which ensures them the full opportunity to satisfy their religious needs and protects their civic right of freedom of conscience. The believers will then realize the illegality and the absolute needlessness for them of the existence and activity of such an underground center as the so-called "council of Evangelical Baptist churches," the leaders of which are deceiving believers and are least of all concerned for the believers' interests.

Many Baptists have already realized this and have broken with their latter-day leaders.

Q.—How are those comrades mistaken who think that the most reliable means of overcoming religious delusions in people's minds is simple to restrict substantially or prohibit altogether the activities of all religious organizations in our country?

A.—They are wrong, of course, and here is why. It has been well known for a long time that any sort of ban or administrative pressure is a faulty method for struggling against religious ideology.

Atheist convictions, like any other convictions, cannot be imposed upon anyone by force, by decree or by any other administrative means. The founders of Marxism-Leninism said this more than once. It is generally known, for example, how sharply F. Engels opposed representatives of an extremist trend toward religion, who put forward the demand that the "state of the future" prohibit "all religious preaching and all religious organizations." Engels ridiculed them and stressed that persecution is the best means to strengthen religious convictions.

We all know what great significance V. I. Lenin ascribed to implementation of the principle of freedom of conscience in our country. In thoroughly exposing the social and ideological roots of religious beliefs, he called for scientifically based atheistic propaganda among believers. Vladimir Ilyich at the same time persistently reiterated the necessity to "avoid, unquestionably, any insult to religion."

The Marxist-Leninist conception of the essence of religious ideology underlies the policy of the Soviet state toward religion and the legislation on freedom of conscience. Consequently, if there are citizens in our country who believe in God, the state must ensure them freedom of religious belief.

The ideological struggle against religion should not infringe upon the rights of believers. Many decisions by the Party and the government point out quite clearly the inadmissibility of administrative measures here. If the activity of a religious organization proceeds within the framework of Soviet laws, it may go on until the believers themselves leave it.

A great deal of attention is now being devoted to observance of the legislation on cults. The requirement of strict observance of the laws on cults applies equally to religious organizations and to local bodies of authority. At the beginning of this year the government of the U.S.S.R. reorganized two Councils—the Council on the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Council on Affairs of Religious Cults—into a single Council on Religious Affairs under the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. The Council's role and responsibility in enforcement have been considerably raised, and it has been given corresponding powers.

- 8 -

CPYRIGHT

CPYRIGHT

USSR - Izvestiya [The News],
Moscow, June 9, 1966

Comment: GROWING DISSENT IN SOVIET UNION

The following article in the organ of the Soviet government is significant for several reasons:

1. It confirms unpublished information regarding activities of those Baptists who oppose the official All-Union Council of the Evangelical Christians-Baptists in the USSR. It also confirms numerous reports about the prevalence of "search" witnesses and other forbidden acts.

2. It corroborates the existence of "illegal fraternal letters" and other pieces of underground Baptist, Orthodox and other literature which are circulated throughout the Soviet Union. The distribution of such illegal pamphlets, declarations, and other documents was undoubtedly one of the reasons why the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Socialist Federal Republic (RSFSR) recently specified such activities as criminal and punishable according to Article 142, RSFSR Criminal Code.

3. It indicates that some people in the Soviet Union are still under the spell of the ritual-murder myth in spite of half a century of Communist education. While this superstition used to have an exclusively anti-Semitic character, here it is related to Baptists who are being accused by the populace of Mtsensk of committing ritual murders. The writer says that though it was "disgusting" for him, he had to defend Baptists because ritual murder is contrary to their teachings.

4. The author of this article in the leading Soviet daily also accuses the local Communist Party authorities and the public of "unforgivable inertia" in ignoring religious activities in their midst. This can be interpreted either as another confirmation

of the fact that the Soviet atheistic education on the whole is far from being successful (Communist publications often express their displeasure with the quality of anti-religious propaganda); or, since party members pay so little attention to religion, it might mean that religion has actually been largely forgotten.

5. The information in this article concerning the dissent within the established Baptist church in the Soviet Union seen in the context of Orthodox dissent as represented by two Orthodox priests, Eshliman and Yakunin, suggests that there is present in the contemporary Soviet Union a strong spiritual ferment. This ferment, however, is not only religious. It is also manifest in the struggle of poets, writers and intelligentsia against state limitations on freedom of thought and expression. - BSII/

THE PROPHETS AND THE VICTIMS

By N. Shtanko, Mtsensk-Orel

On the outskirts of Mtsensk, at the end of the quiet Sadovaya Street, there stands a whitish, run-down house. With its unwashed windows, it looks unkindly upon the hustling and bustling life on the Moscow-Sinferopol highway.

Almost every day now one can see a crowd of angry people near that house. If it were not for the police, the infuriated people would indeed smite it from the face of the earth. So are the minds and hearts of these people shaken by the tragedy which has recently occurred in this house. In a fanatic frenzy, a woman here stabbed to death the child of her neighbors. In broad daylight. Before the eyes of his father and mother.

Valerik Mitichkin would have been three years old in July. The people on this street knew well this little tow-

head. They also knew for a long time his murderess -- the sectarian Mariya Rykova. They knew her and quarreled with her for many years. An outburst of sorrow, anger and outrage evoked by this murder shook Sadovaya Street and then, spreading like waves, it shook the entire city of Mtsensk.

Baptists Accused of Ritual Murder

Upon the request of our readers the editorial board sent me to Mtsensk. I spoke with scores of people, read the documents, and met the murderess in the prison in Orel. This case is indeed terrible and entirely exceptional. And therefore, already now, not waiting for the completion of the investigation and clarification of all the dark and sinister aspects of this case, we are obliged to speak about it.

A wave of national indignation now shakes Mtsensk. People everywhere talk about the tragedy on Sadovaya Street. The report grows by all kinds of assumptions and fantastic conjectures. I heard already in Tula and in Orel some quite shocking versions of this tragic story. Even rumors of a "sectarian terror" are spreading.

Unfortunately, with the exception of the police, nobody in Mtsensk did anything to clarify the situation. The police must deal with the rumors and protect the Mtsensk sectarians from rage and wrath.

As soon as I arrived at the sinister house, two women approached me, and then two more, and afterwards, several men. Soon the street was crowded with an outraged mob. The people shouted one after another:

"We wrote about the Rykova hornet's nest three years ago."

"Nobody could live with Mariya."

"She frightened our children."

"She recruited everyone into the sect."

"Those parasites should have been under control a long time ago."

"They eat Soviet bread, but they trample Soviet laws under their feet."

I never thought that I should ever be forced to become a defender of the people. I appeared in the struggle against the hail of outrage, an-

gry questions and passionate appeal to rash actions, I felt sorry that the secretary of the Mtsensk Municipal Committee of the party, Comrade Parkhomenko, was not in my place. He could certainly reply more reliably to the most substantial and, alas, also just accusation: why the municipal organizations failed to listen in time to the voice of the public.

The enraged people around me were not evil people. I replied to them, opposed them, agreed with them, argued -- and the discussion which had a stormy beginning ended with a peaceful tone.

Why did the anger of the people fall not only on the murderess and those around her, but on all sectarians? Why did the enraged people so persistently connect the faith of Mariya Rykova with her crime?

I saw the murderess, already in the prison -- a sturdy woman with broad shoulders, strong hands and rugged features, with a face on which an expression of narrowminded obstinacy is frozen stiff. She replies readily, remembers well all details, names and circumstances. She speaks calmly about the murder.

Baptists and Jehovah's Witnesses

Mariya Rykova came to her religion in this way: She was brought up by her grandmother who zealously instilled in her the faith in god ("I do not teach you evil, but good"). Then there was Aunt Katya who persuaded the girl that faith in the church was not "true," and who brought her to the Jehovahists. However, she did not like something or other about the Jehovah's Witnesses, and there was a time when she did not attend any sect at all. Unfortunately, not one experienced and intelligent person appeared at that time. Instead, there came Aunt Tanya, who introduced her to the congregation of the Evangelical Christians-Baptists. However, the seeds planted by the Jehovah's Witnesses obviously started to sprout. As soon as the dissenters appeared in the Baptist congregation, Mariya followed them.

The people before whose eyes the

- 10 -

bestial murder of the child occurred, did not discuss all these sects and the differences between them. They saw that the tragedy occurred on religious grounds, and knew that the murder was brought about by actions resembling some kind of a ritual. Thus, Rykova dressed the child before his death in a specially made, clean smock. They knew that the murderess was a Baptist. So they accused all the sectarians without any exception.

It was disgusting for me to defend the Baptists. Poisoning of people's souls by religious dope is always fraught with dangerous consequences. In what innocent forms it is conducted! Often enough the Baptists only plough the souls of their brethren in Christ, but then other, quite fanatical sects sow in the prepared ground.

Nevertheless, one must be objective. Ritual murder is contrary to Baptist convictions. Otherwise that sect would be prohibited by law. Only misinformation on this matter and the quite poor situation of the educational work in Mtsensk can explain panic and rumors spreading from one end of the city to another: "The Baptists will stab our children," and such solutions as: "Let us chase out the Baptists!"

Opposition Among Baptists

There are people treading our soil who deserve that all the furor of this anger fall upon them. They are not many -- in all, just a few persons. They hide from the law and from the people -- and secretly spin their black deeds. From them the threads lead even here, to the outskirts of Mtsensk.

Such people recently began to appear with petitions in the offices of the district or of the republic, and even in the capital city. They call themselves Baptists, but immediately they stress that the official Baptist church "does not agree with the teachings of Christ" and that they have split with it.

These people act conspicuously and sometimes openly provoke scandals in their neighborhood. The petitions which they submit to the authorities

contain illegal demands (not requests, but demands!) drawn under two points:

Firstly: to instruct their so-called "Organization Committee" to call an all-union congress of Baptists which would remove the current leadership of the Baptist organization and install in its stead the leaders of the "Organization Committee." Secondly: "to stop the intervention of the school and state in the education of the children of believers."

They addressed such a petition to the Council on Religious Affairs and to other authorities. The officials patiently explained to them that the convocation of a congress of the believers is an internal affair of the religious congregations themselves, because a separation of the church and the state exists in our country. If the government would ask the present leaders of the Union of the Evangelical Christians-Baptists to call a congress, it would violate the law. Even more illegal would be an instruction as to which leaders should be removed and which should replace them.

They explained to them also that in our country there exists a law on general education, and that every child must obtain secular education regardless of the convictions of his parents.

When the more intelligent of these petitioners are asked why they are dissatisfied with the leaders of the Baptist congregation, they reply approximately thus: "We recognize only God's laws, but the present leadership of the Baptist church recognizes even the secular ones."

Baptist Dissenters Oppose Soviet Law

This is, then, the substance of the matter. The people who are behind these petitioners do not want to recognize the laws of the Soviet government and do not wish to take into account the fact that the sectarians are not only believers, but also Soviet citizens. Our laws protect the rights of the believers and the freedom of their expression of faith. However, the laws obligate the believers as well as the atheists to fulfill their duties as citizens, as stipulated by the Consti-

tution of the USSR, and to observe Soviet laws. The leaders of the "Organization Committee" act, in fact, against the law. However, they recognize some laws: They receive their pension regularly and gladly accept their paid vacations and other benefits of our society against the establishment of which they protest.

They instruct these messengers to ask that their illegal demands be obtained by any means, even by scandal. They tell them that this is "a struggle for the true religion." As a rule, the petitioners themselves understand the subtlety of the petition only poorly. They are just prepared to "stand up for their faith," "to suffer" for it. With that they travel to the provincial centers and the capital city.

Recently I had an opportunity to talk with two such petitioners. What did they defend so stubbornly?

Anna Fyodorovna Istratova works in Tula in a factory as a charwoman; she is 52 years old and single. She left her job and in accordance with the instruction of her sectarian leaders, she came with the petition. Istratova has only a very vague idea of what is written in the petition: "I ask that the others, the registered Baptists, do not oppress us, because there is no truth in them."

Akim Ivanovich Bobylev (62 years old, receives a good pension) came to the province of Bryan with full confidence that he was working for the decision that their congregation be registered at the official Council on Religious Affairs. He was quite surprised when it turned out that he was working for something else -- for the revocation of the legal forms of existence of the sect.

Baptist Opposition Called "Adventurers"

Behind the backs of such, mostly backward and shamelessly stupefied people, there stands a small group of adventurers of the so-called "Organization Committee" who struggle for the rule over the Baptist congregation and its treasury. This group is led by one

Vins. These two instruct the petitioners, manipulate them from their hiding place, and induce them to act "in the name of the people." Meanwhile they have no right to speak even in the name of the Baptist congregation, because they succeeded in stupefying and trapping less than five percent of all the Baptists.

Having lost their case within the congregation, the "Organization Committee" members developed a stormy incendiary activity. They recruit their supporters by deceit and provoke them to all kinds of impudent and aggressive actions. They need now some "victims of persecution," "martyrs for faith," in order to inflame the believers' interest, which is cooling off.

These are the Baptists with whom Mariya Rykova was associated for the last two or three years. They also led her to disregard the secular laws. They inflamed her fanaticism and her readiness to "defend Christ's faith" by any means.

During this particular activity of the "Organization Committee" members, an abrupt change occurred in Rykova's conduct. Until then she fervently prayed at the clandestine meetings of her sect, openly spread her views and recruited for the sect as much as she was able. She even promised to give a cow to Valerik's mother, Nina Mitichkina.

However, all this did not attract any special attention of the public. It is true that the neighbors on her street wanted the local authorities to watch what was going on in that family and at the same time they also wondered about her means of living. The family was a large one, their income small, but they purchased a motorcycle, then a scooter, and tried to get a car. However, nobody paid attention even to these signals.

Illegal Baptist Pamphlets

And then there came March. In the sect the propaganda to resist Soviet laws increased. Mariya received some incendiary literature which admonished her to resist the "secular laws" and

- 12 -

in her home after the murder uncovered several issues of the illegal "fraternal letter" (last issue was of April) and the notorious "Address to all believing mothers of Evangelical-Baptist religion of the registered and non-registered congregations in the USSR" with the appeal: "Let us join in our efforts to pray that God will consecrate the lives of our children from the cradle to His service," and with the call to "save our children from the influence of the world."

We do not know how these documents were interpreted by Mariya Rykova's secret spiritual father, one Zamuruyev, and the visiting "Evangelicals." However, we may assume that they had no scruples in realizing these appeals.

In April, the older son Vanya was admitted to the Pioneer [Communist children's] organization. Mariya snatched off his kerchief. She forbade her first-grader daughter Lyuba to wear the star of the October Revolution. She went then to the school and declared that her children were believers and could not join the Pioneers and the October children's group.

Mariya's mother, Anastasya Vasilyevna, was distressed by the children's rough deal and brought a new kerchief for Vanya and tried to persuade her daughter not to mutilate her children's souls. However, her daughter did not give in and split with her mother. At that time Anastasya Vasilyevna herself began proceedings to deprive her daughter of her rights as a mother and to take her children away from her. Even this signal was disregarded.

On Sunday, May 22, Mariya's husband took her on the motorcycle to a secret prayer meeting. She returned all excited. We do not know what was discussed at the meeting. Preserved was only one document of that date: a draft of Rykova's declaration that her son was allegedly persecuted in school for his faith. On the same day Mariya learned from her husband that he took his neighbor on his motorcycle to see

that they had decided not to accept her gift.

A Baptist Woman Becomes Insane

During the morning of May 23, Mariya invited Nina (Valerik's mother) to her house and told her that if she would not return the loan immediately, she would have to pay dearly for that. And she also warned that that was a great secret. Nina and her husband wondered about the meaning of this and thought that perhaps a reform was expected. The husband took the money [government loan] and went to work. In about an hour the wife, too, left the house. On her way she was stopped by Rykova at her fence:

"Why do you drag Valerik along? Leave him here."

And so the mother left him, as she had done many times before. In the factory she learned that Mariya had come to the accountant and asked him whether the money had been returned. The mother hurried home. Mariya did not open her door and told her through the window that she would not give her the boy until she heard that the money was returned. Nina ran to her husband who then went to get his son. Rykova showed him a knife through the window and said that unless they brought a receipt showing that the loan had been returned, Valerik would live only until two o'clock. The house was tightly locked from the inside; Mariya sent her children away somewhere.

Valerik's frightened parents went to the police. In a few minutes the patrol car arrived, having stopped on the way for Rykova's husband. His talk with his wife was futile. Nina looked through the window and became hysterical. Mariya held on her lap the crying little boy dressed in some kind of smock. In her hand she held a knife.

Everybody started to break down the window and the door. They got into the house. However, it was too late.

It is hard to imagine that such a horrible deed could be committed by a person with a normal mind. Yet even if Rykova suffered a nervous breakdown, is it not quite clear what it was the result of?

- 13 -

"Unforgivable Inertia" of Local
Communists and Public

Whatever the experts will say, whatever the court decision will be, the murder of Valerik Mitichkin is on your conscience, Gennadiy Kryuchkov and Georgiy Vins! You were hiding in your dens, you inflamed dark passions in the souls of your followers, you sent out the petitioners who were stupefied by you to "suffer for faith," while you preferred to hide behind their backs.

You prophets of evil, you sow only evil, although you preach about goodness and love for fellow man. In what a sinister world originated your basic thesis which you impress upon your flock: "Do not become subject to any secular laws, be subject only to divine laws"! Whoever can foresee what monstrous forms this thesis can assume in the inflamed brain of some half-illiterate fanatic leafing now through the "Holy Scriptures" in order to find there God's instruction how to "care" better for his faith!

Before my departure from Mtsensk, Aleksandr Petrovich Buzanov, party organizer of the workshop at the "Vtortsvetmet" factory, looked me out

in a restaurant. He came to find whether I would agree to come to his workshop and explain the situation.

"I hear from the people all the time: 'Why don't you lock up the Baptists? Why don't you send them into exile?' But I am not informed."

I could not speak there. However, I "informed" the thoughtful party organizer as much as I was able. After this meeting I thought on my way home about the question which the newspapers always ask: "Where have you been, people?" The tragedy in Mtsensk sheds light on the strange and unforgivable inertia of the local organizations and public. No conclusions were drawn, no lessons were learned. Not even the propaganda workers were called there in time and were not told everything that had transpired; they were not sent to the place where now passions are teeming. Not even the representatives of the municipal council went to their districts with a word to their voters, which was needed at that moment.

This tranquility is surprising. And also dangerous.

* * * * *

NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG,
29 March 1967

The Baptists in the Soviet Union
A new Chapter in the Drama of Russian Religion

The Church in the old Russia of feared Tsars, false Dimitris and Romanovs as well as in the now fifty-years-young Soviet State can produce a long list of somber events. The prognostics, however, have changed. After the Turks had taken Constantinople, the second Rome of that time, in 1453, the title of the third Rome went to the next heir: Moscow. For more than two centuries after that the state was wholly subordinated to the church, until finally Tsar Peter the Great, after the schism of the 17th century - when the followers of the Byzantine and of the Russian tradition faced each other irreconcilably - again subordinated the church to the state, i.e., himself. A wave of persecutions, desperate suicides and condemnations followed. We experience this tragic conflict and its causes, deeply rooted in the tradition of the Russian people,

- 14 -

in Mussorgky's unfortunately little-known opera "Khovantchina."

The chapter of extended troubles, currents and movements between church and state seemed finally come to an end on January 23, 1918, when Lenin signed the law of separation between church and state as well as between church and school, in the first Constitution of the Soviet state. But the wheel continued turning inexorable, flattened, crushed, rejected ideas, principles - and men. The fear of church persecution during and after the revolution as well as the horrors under Stalin were followed after his death by a brief period of general relaxation. But the relief was brief - just a breath in the chronology of history. Already in the middle of his term of office, Khrushchev began the fight against religion, closed many churches and, through his many arrests, reawakened the shadows of the all-too-close past.

The schism within the Baptist church falls within this period of renewed repression and fear. It is hardly known that in this country imbued with "scientific atheism" religious groups other than the Russian Orthodox Church may exist; even less is known of their circumstances.

State Pressure

The Church of the Evangelical-Christian Baptists is represented in the Soviet Union by the All-Union Council of Evangelical-Christian Baptists and is, aside from the Russian Orthodox, the only one which may function legally and institutionally on an All-Union basis. It is particularly this dependence on the state which is said to cause protests from its own ranks.

In 1960, the All-Union Council of the Evangelical-Christian Baptists decreed new statutes as well as directives in the form of a "letter of directions" to all high dignitaries of the Baptist Church. Its contents were confusing and contradicted the Baptists' basic tenets. It was suggested, among others, that it was at present not the Church Elder's main task to admit new members; he should rather get certain "unhealthy trends toward missionary activities" among Baptists under his control, not emphasize the sermon and not increase the number of his parishioners, in order to effect a reduction in baptisms. Children should as a rule not be taken to services.

Resistance

The contents as well as the fashion in which these new instructions were so undemocratically imposed on the faithful were sufficient to cause a protest movement. A.F. Prokofiev and G.K. Lriutchkov were the initiators of a counter-movement in 1961, which called itself "initsiativniki." In their "first message" they asked for the immediate convocation of a congress of all the Baptists, in order to endeavor, by means of democratic election methods, i.e. by the vote of all participating Baptists, a reorganization of the All-Union Council in whose procedures they saw a compulsion by the state. One of the main points on the Congress agenda should be the election of a new All-Union Council, whose members had so far consisted of a carefully chosen nucleus. The seriousness of the effort to close the gap can be seen by the reaction to the protest: the congress was called together, the highest leaders of the Council newly elected and one and the other unimportant concession granted.

- 15 -

At first the Soviet press remained silent about these events; it also remained silent about the arrests which began in the course of the following year. The reason for that may be the small number of Baptists in the Soviet Union. According to official tabulation they number half a million; "unofficially" this number increases to three millions - to whom important positions in society had been closed by long-practiced pressure. Only in 1966, when a parallel situation arose within the Russian Orthodox Church, a press campaign began.

Spring of 1966 at first brought some drastic events: a group of Initsiativnikis stormed a subway in Kiev and sang songs from the gospel to the accompaniment of guitars and balalaikas; another group held an hour of prayers on the steps of the parliament building in Moscow and had to be led off by force after the police had tried in vain to disperse it. Other Initsiativnikis organized Sunday schools, which flagrantly violates Soviet laws. Finally the Initsiativnikis' underground paper, BROTHERS MESSENGER, was initiated, printed and circulated.

"Contagion" of the Orthodox

The parallel movement within the Russian Orthodox Church began at the end of 1965, when the Moscow priests N. Eshiliman and G. Jakunin addressed an "open letter" to Patriarch Alexei. Their reproaches were mainly the same as those made against their own leadership by the Initsiativnikis: lack of freedom in the Church's administrative work by interference of the government organ for church questions and all-too-willing collaboration of the highest Church Leaders with the Government. Orthodox Christians, unlike the Baptists, find themselves admitted to all groups of society, so that for that reason the movement cannot be pushed aside negligently. The second factor is the great number of Orthodox Christians, in spite of persecution and bitter years. However, the later beginning public attacks in the press were directed not against them, but only against the Baptists, i.e. the Initsiativnikis.

Government reacted sharply and as a countermeasure; pointing particularly at the Initsiativnikis, decreed two new laws (3.18.66); also, art. 142 of the penal code RSFSR was modified (9.22.66). This covered restrictions for the faithful regarding worship, religious instruction of children, and meetings outside of the provided churches, and demonstrations of any kind were declared illegal as of that date.

Press Campaign and Punishments

PRAVDA of Feb. 19, 1966 began the press campaign against the Initsiativnikis, followed by IZVESTIA of June 6 and August 31, 1966. The third voice of the prosecution was the atheist monthly NAUKA I RELIGIJA (Science and Religion, July/Sept. 1966). The article published by it in September was reprinted in the Ukrainian monthly LJUDINA I SVIT (Man and World, Oct./Nov. 1966), and the PRAVDA VOSTOKA (Truth of the East) printed a further echo of these events (October 22, 1966). The gamut of accusations went from "extreme anti-Sovietism" to the alleged murder of a child. Several Initsiativnikis were arrested in Rostov on the Don in the course of those months; five others were tried in Kiev and a three-year prison sentence imposed on three women of the group. The proceedings against the Initsiativnikis were published in

- 16 -

the Russian press. The Communist paper AGITATOR in July severely criticized the Baptists, Muslims and "wandering priests" who had disturbed atheist meetings and had asked "provocative questions."

The All-Union Council held a further meeting with the Initsiativnikis in Moscow between Oct. 4 and 8, and again made some more unimportant concessions. More detailed reports on that may still be expected from the (only) official Baptist publication BROTHERS MESSENGER. The Initsiativnikis continue in their endeavors to solve their Church questions on a "collective level," i.e., in collaboration with all the Baptists in the Soviet Union, and not to leave the entire complex in the hands of the All-Union Council which they accuse of excessive dependence on the state.

Die Baptisten in der Sowjetunion

CPYRGHT

Ein neues Kapitel des russischen Glaubensdramas

Die Kirche im alten Rußland der gefürchteten Zaren, falschen Dimitris und Romanows sowie im nun fünfzig Jahre jungen Sowjetstaat hat ein langes Register düsterer Ereignisse aufzuweisen. Die Vorzeichen allerdings haben sich geändert. Nachdem die Türken 1453 Konstantinopel, das damalige Zweite Rom, eingenommen hatten, ging der Titel des Dritten Rom an den nächsten Erben: Moskau. Mehr als zwei Jahrhunderte lang war nun der Staat völlig der Kirche unterstellt, bis schließlich zur Peter der Große nach der Kirchenspaltung Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts — als sich die Anhänger der byzantinischen und der russischen Tradition unversöhnlich gegenüberstanden — die Kirche wiederum dem Staat, das heißt sich selbst, unterstellte. Es setzte eine Welle von Verfolgungen, verzweifelten Selbstmorden und Verurteilungen ein. Wir erleben diesen tragischen Konflikt der Kirchenspaltung und seine tief in der Tradition des russischen Volkes wurzelnden Beweggründe in Musorgskys leider wenig bekannten Oper «Chowantschina».

Das Kapitel langer Wirren, Strömungen und Bewegungen zwischen Kirche und Staat schien schließlich seinen Abschluß zu finden, als Lenin am 23. Januar 1918 in der ersten Konstitution des Sowjetstaates das Gesetz zur Trennung von Kirche und Staat sowie von Kirche und Schule unterzeichnete. Das Rad drehte sich jedoch unerbitlich weiter, überrollte, zermalnte, verwarf Ideen, Grundsätze — und Menschen. Den Schrecken der Kirchenverfolgung während und nach der Revolution sowie den Greneln unter Stalin folgte nach dessen Tod eine kurze Epoche allgemeiner Entspannung. Das Aufatmen aber war kurz — ein Atemzug in der Zeitrechnung der Geschichte. Bereits in der Mitte seiner Amtszeit begann Chruschtschew den Kampf gegen die Religion, ließ zahlreiche Kirchen schließen und erweckte durch seine Verhaltungsmaßnahmen erneut die Schatten der noch allzu nahen Vergangenheit.

In diese Zeit erneuter Unterdrückung und Angst fällt die Spaltung innerhalb der Baptistenkirche. Daß in dem vom «wissenschaftlichen Atheismus» durchtränkten Land außer der russisch-orthodoxen Kirche noch andere Religionsgruppen existieren, das heißt geduldet werden, ist kaum bekannt, noch weniger ihre Situation.

Druck des Staates

Die Kirche der evangelisch-christlichen Baptisten wird durch den Allunionsrat der evangelisch-christlichen Baptisten in der Sowjetunion vertreten und ist neben der russisch-orthodoxen Kirche die einzige, die rechtlich institutionell auf Allunionsbasis wirken darf. Es ist gerade diese Abhängigkeit vom Staat, die Protest aus den eigenen Reihen auslösen sollte.

Im Jahre 1960 erließ der Allunionsrat der evangelisch-christlichen Baptisten neue Statuten sowie Direktiven in Form eines «Anleitungsbriefs» an alle hohen Würdenträger der Baptistenkirche. Der Inhalt war verwirrend und widersprach der Grundhaltung der Baptisten. Es wurde unter anderem suggeriert, daß es gegenwärtig nicht die Hauptaufgabe des Kirchenältesten sei, neue Mitglieder aufzunehmen; er solle vielmehr gewisse «ungesunde Tendenzen zur Missionstätigkeit» unter den Baptisten in seine Kontrolle bekommen, die Predigt nicht in den Vordergrund stellen und die Zahl der Gemeindeglieder nicht weiter ausdehnen, um somit einen Rückgang der Taufen zu erwirken. Kinder sollten grundsätzlich nicht in den Gottesdienst mitgenommen werden.

Widerstand

Der Inhalt sowie die Art, die neuen Instruktionen den Gläubigen auf so undemokratische Weise aufzuerlegen, genügten, eine Protestbewegung auszulösen. A. F. Prokofjew und G. K. Krjuščkow waren 1961 die Initiatoren einer Gegenbewegung, die sich «*Initsiativniki*» nannte. In ihrer «*L. Botschaft*» verlangten sie die sofortige Einberufung eines Kongresses aller Baptisten, um auf dem Wege demokratischer Abstimmungsverfahren, das heißt durch das Votum aller teilnehmenden Baptisten, eine Neuordnung des Allunionsrates zu erzielen, in dessen Handlungsweise sie ein Diktat des Staates sahen. Eines der Haupttraktanden des Kongresses sollte die Neuwahl des Allunionsrates sein, dessen Mitglieder bisher aus einem sorgfältig ausgewählten Gremium bestanden. Wie sehr man bestrebt war, den Riß wieder gutzumachen, ist aus der Reaktion auf den Protest ersichtlich: der Kongreß wurde einberufen, die oberste Führung des Rates neu gewählt und diese und jene wenig bedeutende Konzession gemacht.

Zunächst schwieg die sowjetische Presse zu diesen Ereignissen, schwieg auch zu den Verhaftungen, die im Laufe der nächsten Jahre einsetzten. Den Grund dafür kann man wohl in der für die Sowjetunion geringfügigen Zahl der Baptisten sehen. Laut offizieller Registrierung sind es eine halbe Million; doch steigt die Zahl «*inoffiziell*» bis zu drei Millionen an — denen ohnehin durch lang ausgeübten Druck jegliche bedeutende Stellung in der Gesellschaft verschlossen war. Erst 1966, als eine *Parallelsituation innerhalb der russisch-orthodoxen Kirche* eintrat, setzte eine Pressekampagne ein.

Zunächst brachte das Frühjahr 1966 einige drastische Ereignisse: In Kiew stürmte eine Gruppe von *Initsiativniki* eine U-Bahn und sang zu Gitarren- und Balalaikabegleitung Lieder aus dem Evangelium; in Moskau hielt eine weitere Gruppe Gebetsstunden auf den Stufen des Parlamentsgebäudes ab und mußte, nachdem Polizisten vergeblich versucht hatten, sie zu zerstreuen, gewaltsam abgeführt werden. Andere *Initsiativniki* organisierten Sonntagsschulen, was in schwerstem Maße gegen das Sowjetrecht verstößt. Schließlich wurde die Untergrundzeitung der *Initsiativniki*, das «*Blatt der Brüder*», ins Leben gerufen, gedruckt und in Umlauf gesetzt.

«Ansteckung» der Orthodoxen

Die Parallelbewegung innerhalb der russisch-orthodoxen Kirche begann Ende 1965, als die Moskauer Priester N. Eschliman und G. Jakumin einen «*Offenen Brief*» an Patriarch Alexei richteten. Ihre Vorwürfe waren in der Hauptsache die gleichen, wie sie die *Initsiativniki* gegen ihre eigene Führung vorgebracht hatten: Unfreiheit in der administrativen Arbeit der Kirche durch *Einmischung des Regierungsorgans für Kirchenfragen* und allzu bereits Zusammenarbeit der obersten Kirchenleitung mit der Regierung. Im Gegensatz zu den Baptisten steht den orthodoxen Gläubigen

der Zugang in alle Gesellschaftsgruppen offen, so daß schon darum diese Bewegung nicht unbeachtet beiseite geschoben werden konnte. Der zweite Faktor ist die trotz Verfolgung und bitteren Jahren große Zahl der orthodoxen Gläubigen. Objekt der später einsetzenden öffentlichen Attacken in der Presse waren jedoch nicht die letzteren, sondern allein die Baptisten, das heißt die *Initsiativniki*.

Die Regierung reagierte scharf und erließ als Gegenmaßnahme, mit deutlichem Hinweis auf die *Initsiativniki*, *zwei neue Gesetze* (18. 3. 66); ebenso wurde Art. 142 des Strafkodexes der RSFSR abgeändert (22. 9. 66). Dies betraf Restriktionen für die Gläubigen in bezug auf Gottesdienst, Religionsunterricht der Kinder und Zusammenkünfte außerhalb der dafür vorgesehenen Gotteshäuser, wobei von nun an überhaupt Demonstrationen jeder Art als gesetzeswidrig erklärt wurden.

Pressefeldzug und Strafen

Den Feldzug der Presse gegen die *Initsiativniki* begann die «*Prawda*» (19. 2. 66), gefolgt von der «*Iswestija*» (5. 6. 66, 31. 8. 66). Die dritte Stimme der Anklage bildete die atheistische Monatschrift «*Nauka i Religija*» («*Wissenschaft und Religion*», Juli/September 66). Den im September erschienenen Artikel veröffentlichte die ukrainische Monatschrift «*Ljudina i Swit*» («*Mensch und Welt*», Oktober/November 66), und die «*Prawda Wostoka*» («*Wahrheit des Ostens*») brachte ein weiteres Echo auf diese Ereignisse (22. 10. 66). Die Skala der Anklagen reichte von «*extremem Antisowjetismus*» bis zu angeblichem Mord an einem Kind. Im Verlaufe jener Monate erfolgten in Rostow am Don die Verhaftung mehrerer *Initsiativniki*, die Verurteilung von weiteren fünf in Kiew sowie eine Gefängnisstrafe von 3 Jahren für drei Frauen dieser Gruppe. Die Maßnahmen gegen die *Initsiativniki* wurden in der sowjetischen Presse bekanntgegeben. Die kommunistische Zeitschrift «*Agitator*» übte im Juli scharfe Kritik an Baptisten, Moslems und «*Wanderpriestern*», die atheistische Zusammenkünfte gestört und «*provokative Fragen gestellt*» hätten.

Der Allunionsrat hielt vom 4. bis 8. Oktober in Moskau eine weitere Zusammenkunft mit Vertretern der *Initsiativniki* ab und machte aufs neue einige, wenn auch wiederum unbedeutende Konzessionen. Genauere Berichte hierüber dürfen von der (einzigen) offiziellen Zeitschrift der Baptisten, dem «*Boten der Brüder*», noch erwartet werden. Die *Initsiativniki* bleiben bestrebt, ihre Kirchenfragen auf einer «*kollektiven*» Ebene, das heißt im *Zusammenwirken mit allen Baptisten* in der Sowjetunion, zu lösen und nicht den gesamten Komplex in den Händen des Unionsrates zu belassen, dem sie eine zu starke staatliche Gebundenheit vorwerfen.

Silvia Stücker

might be pushed into that position."

He might have added that the U.S. is just as reluctant to find itself in the same position; for that reason, some people within the Government believe this country will be better off if China doesn't decide to block Soviet shipments to Hanoi or if a collapse of China's rail system doesn't lead to a shutoff.

There's no question that the Soviet Union is the primary supplier of war goods to North Vietnam, even though rival China loudly disputes that fact. U.S. intelligence experts estimate that the Russians have supplied North Vietnam with more than \$600 million in military aid, including \$500 million in arms alone, since 1953; of that total, 85% has been sent since August 1964, when North Vietnamese ships attacked U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin and the Vietnam war began heating up rapidly. Since 1953 the Chinese have given Hanoi only \$150 million in military aid, 85% of that since August 1964.

The Soviet arms aid, according to U.S. estimates, has flowed like this: Before 1964, \$50 million; in 1964, \$25 million; in 1965, \$200 million to \$225 million; in 1966, about \$200 million. Analysts figure Chinese military aid in 1965 was about \$35 million and rose to \$50 million or \$60 million last year, most of it in small arms such as rifles and mortars that play a major role in the war in the South.

Until 1964 the Soviet arms shipped to North Vietnam consisted mainly of artillery, armored vehicles, some 75 airplanes of all types, 20 naval patrol boats and small arms, mostly rifles. From then until mid-1966, the Soviets supplied 20 to 25 battalions of SAMs, each with six missile launchers, radar equipment to operate them and several thousand light and medium antiaircraft artillery pieces, many of them radar-controlled. Since mid-1966, most of the equipment sent has been radar, antiaircraft guns, trucks and other vehicles.

Hugo Russian Helicopters

In addition, North Vietnam has been slowly building up its air force, primarily with Russian-supplied planes, until it now has a total of about 220 aircraft. Included are about 115 jet fighters, 15 to 20 of them late-model MIG-21s and the rest Korean War-vintage MIG-15s and MIG-17s. Hanoi also has 8 light jet bombers, 50 light transports, 30 trainers and 20 helicopters.

The helicopters include 4 or 5 of the biggest choppers in the world, the Russian MI-6, which can carry from 75 to 120 passengers. The planes were shipped to North Vietnam in crates by rail or flown in from China, but the helicopters, being too big for rail hauling, were transported by ship; it was this event that brought the howl from Congressman Rivers.

Back in 1955, the Chinese and the Soviets promised North Vietnam \$1 billion in economic aid, but up through 1964 they had delivered only \$600 million to \$750 million, it's estimated. Of this total, some \$250 million to \$300 million came from the Russians, \$300 million to \$400 million from the Chinese, the remaining small portion from the Communist East European bloc. Since 1964, there's been \$400 million in \$200 million more in economic aid delivered, 75% or more from the Soviets.

machine tools, generators, road-building equipment and complete small factories to make plastics and textiles. But since 1964, the Soviet assistance has concentrated on products useful for war as well as peace: Tractors and trucks, wire, all kinds of spare parts, steel rails to repair bombed railroad lines, medicine, blood plasma and, of course, oil and gasoline. Some medicine and machine tools, the latter described as good quality but not highly sophisticated equipment, have come from East Europe. Most Chinese economic aid in the same period has been rice; China is the biggest supplier of food to North Vietnam.

Last October Russia promised an additional \$800 million in material and money, with \$200 million more to come from its East European allies. But so far as U.S. officials can determine, there's no time limit on that aid and based on past experience it could take years for the full amount to be delivered, if it ever is.

Slowdown in Aid Seen

U.S. authorities are divided in their forecasts of the size of aid the Soviets will supply North Vietnam this year, and they throw up their hands when asked to predict the scope of Chinese help. But most agree that there won't be a continuation of the big buildup of the past two years. It's said the North Vietnamese will see either a slowing-down of the rate of increase or an actual decline.

The reasons lie partly in international Communist politics and partly in North Vietnam's own capabilities for using additional help.

"Aid can't help but slacken off in 1967 or it will sink North Vietnam," says one expert only half-jokingly, noting as an example the thousands (estimates range from 4,000 to over 7,000) of antiaircraft weapons the country has received in the past two years.

Another analyst asks: "How much more equipment can North Vietnam take without also taking thousands of guys in sports shirts?" He is referring to Soviet technicians, who favor that garb in tropical climates.

By all indications, the North Vietnamese are trying to maintain a balance in their dependence upon both Peking and Moscow, hoping to get aid from both while angering neither and becoming neither's satellite. Thus, it appears, if Hanoi accepts the bulk of its military materiel from the Soviet Union, it is willing to take only a few Soviet technicians.

Soviet Technicians Decline

In 1965 there were some 2,500 to 3,000 Russian technicians in North Vietnam, primarily to install and teach operation of the SAMs and radar equipment, but the number probably has declined to 1,500 or fewer now as the training has been completed.

By contrast, there are 35,000 to 50,000 Chinese in North Vietnam. Most are labor troops used to repair bombed roads and bridges, though some are widening the gauge of North Vietnamese railroads to match China's. A few of the Chinese man antiaircraft guns defending the rail line that runs from Hanoi northeast to Nanning in China. Since North Vietnam is getting relatively little military materiel from the Chinese, it apparently feels safe in accepting relatively large aid from Peking in the form of manpower. While apparently reluctant to accept the aid

WALL STREET JOURNAL

FEBRUARY 14, 1967

Soviets May Ship Hanoi Arms by Sea, Perhaps Provoking U.S. Action

China Turmoil Impedes Land Shipments; Ocean Traffic Now Is Mainly Nonmilitary

Missiles, MIGs and Medicine

By FREDERICK TAYLOR

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON -- Red China's growing rift with Russia, along with China's own internal strife, is impeding shipment of war goods to North Vietnam.

Moscow itself has charged that Chinese interference with Russian embassy operations in Peking has hindered the flow of Soviet military aid delivered via China; the Kremlin has hinted that it must seek other routes.

And U.S. officials report that disruption of China's transportation system has delayed some war shipments to Hanoi, either of Soviet or Chinese goods, or both. No details are given, but indications are that Mao's rampaging Red Guards may have held up movement of trains, perhaps at the point where they're shifted from Soviet to Chinese tracks; the two systems have different gauges.

While officials doubt that the delays encountered so far are cutting seriously into North Vietnam's war potential, such a possibility is plainly arising. Nonetheless, this turn of events may not be nearly as comforting for Americans as it may sound.

For the question beginning to plague the strategists here is how the Soviet Union would react to anything approaching a complete shut-off of supplies shipped to North Vietnam through China—whether that came about by decision of Peking's rulers or through unplanned breakdowns of Chinese transport. The answer that some authorities foresee points toward the peril of a direct military clash between this country and the USSR. This sobering prospect arises out of this combination of fact and figuring:

The great bulk of war supplies for North Vietnam comes from Russia rather than from closer-by China. Much of this materiel moves by sea past U.S. warships into Haiphong harbor. But the Russians, apparently wishing to avoid a Cuba-type confrontation, have been careful to limit the goods sent this way to items that can be used for peaceful as well as military purposes. Included are oil, trucks, medicines, pontoon bridges, structural steel and machine tools. (Diligent aerial reconnaissance and other intelligence operations have convinced U.S. officials that Russia is applying this restraint.) And the U.S. has not tried to interfere.

War Materiel via China

Soviet equipment whose war use is unmistakable, including antiaircraft guns, aircraft, radar sets and the surface-to-air missiles known as SAMs, is routed by rail through China.

What happens if the Chinese can't or won't continue forwarding Soviet military equipment to Hanoi, or can't keep up their own shipments of small arms, ammunition and rice to North Vietnam? U.S. officials have no doubt that the Russians would want to maintain their assistance to Hanoi and would be willing to make up any loss of Chinese aid as a way to bring North Vietnam more closely into their camp; the problem would be in delivering the goods.

In theory, supply by air might be an alternative. But the Chinese have insisted on approving in advance each Soviet flight over their territory to North Vietnam and they might well refuse to give further approval. In that case, the Russians could try flying around China to Hanoi, but such flights would be long and risky. In any event, planes could hardly carry the bulky, heavy military equipment that Russia has been sending by rail to North Vietnam. So a shift of these shipments to sea transport looks like a logical Soviet move.

Will Russia Take Risks?

Some American authorities reason that, rather than risk a confrontation with the U.S. at sea, the Russians would throttle back their deliveries and thus de-escalate the war. But others fear the Soviets would feel impelled not to let down the fighting member of the Communist world and so would take the risk of sending their ships loaded with missiles and MIGs past the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Tonkin Gulf or the South China Sea.

If that occurs, what will be the U.S. response? A blockade? The mining of Haiphong harbor, as military men already have urged?

Some U.S. officials, recalling what happened in the Cuba missile crisis of 1962, theorize that if the Russians confined their shipments to defensive equipment, such as SAMs and MIGs which are intended basically for air defense, the U.S. would look the other way. Or, even if it happened that offensive weapons were included, there could be a top-level effort to hush up the news in order to avert a U.S.-Soviet clash.

But it might be impossible to keep such big news under cover; certain military men or civilian officials might feel impelled to leak the word to their friends in Congress. And if the news did come out, some strategists believe that public reaction, particularly as reflected in Congress, would be so violent that some effort to halt the traffic would have to be considered. The sort of pressure that might then arise has already been glimpsed; last year when a Soviet ship carrying big helicopters was approaching Haiphong, the hawkish chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Mendel Rivers of South Carolina, urged military action to stop it. If such a U.S.-Soviet confrontation should come about, no one knows what might happen.

"The Russians are quite content to see this war continue along at its present pace," says a high U.S. official, "since it costs them relatively little and they are not particularly reluctant to get involved to the point where

ditional Soviet technicians who might accompany big new deliveries of military hardware, the North Vietnamese do seem to feel they can accept (without straining their own pool of trained manpower) a simple replacement of equipment being used up in the war. And that's what they appear to be doing.

Early in 1965 the Russians began supplying North Vietnam with SAMs and by mid-1966 had sent 20 to 25 missile battalions, each with six missile launchers, complete with the radar warning, tracking, control and guidance equipment. But at that point the SAM buildup apparently stopped; presumably only replacements have followed since.

Stepup in Missiles

But the Russians appear to be supplying far more than the four missiles per launcher that they have given to other Communist allies; U.S. intelligence sources estimate the Soviets originally furnished 10 missiles for every launcher, and have supplied more since. As a result, these weapons are being fired more often than they were earlier in the air war, with some 1,000 launched in the past five months. The SAMs, being most effective at higher altitudes, force U.S. planes down to relatively low levels of 3,000 to 5,000 feet. There the planes are subjected to murderous fire from antiaircraft guns. The combination is "the best air defense system that ever existed," one Air Force officer says.

Intelligence experts suspect that fighter aircraft could offer another example of only replacing, rather than increasing, Soviet-supplied equipment. Counting the planes in the North Vietnamese air force is tricky because they're shuttled back and forth across the border to nearby Chinese airstrips for maintenance and repair; at any given time, as many as 40 North Vietnamese fighters may be in China.

But it is known that the Russians, and the Chinese to a small extent, have supplied North Vietnam with a force of fighters composed mainly of MIG-15s and MIG-17s (roughly equivalent to U.S. F86s of Korean War vintage) and a handful, probably 15 to 20 of late-model MIG-21s, building up to a total of 115 in December. Then, in one outstandingly successful mission in early January, U.S. fliers trapped and knocked down seven MIG-21s and later the same week shot down two more. The Russians now have replaced these losses, but U.S. experts lean toward the belief that North Vietnam's fighter force will stay at about its present size.

"North Vietnam has a reasonable number of planes for its air defense in terms of men available to fly and maintain them, with about two pilots per plane," one U.S. official says. But he figures that some of the 50-odd North Korean pilots now in the country may begin flying combat missions since "there seem to be too many of them for training purposes alone."

Though the number of ships calling at North Vietnamese ports dropped sharply last year to 380 from 550 in 1965, the amount of tonnage unloaded increased as the Soviet Union sent larger vessels, many of them oil tankers. The number of Soviet ships arriving at Haiphong and smaller North Vietnamese ports rose to 122 last year from 74 in 1965, according to U.S. estimates, while the number of Chinese vessels held steady at 138 and East European bloc ships declined slightly to 40 from 46.

The overall decline resulted from a sharp dropoff in the number of so-called Free World merchantmen trading with North Vietnam. The Dutch, the Japanese and the Greeks, for instance, have pulled out of this trade. Most of the Free World ships still calling at Haiphong fly the British flag, but that's about the only thing British about them. They're registered in Hong Kong, which entitles them to fly the Union Jack, but either are owned outright by companies there which are Red Chinese fronts or else are under long-term charters to Chinese fronts.