


50X1-HUM

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

SECRET

World-wide Perspectives



KEY DATES

3 September - South Vietnamese elections

19 September - UN General Assembly convenes

7 November - 50th Anniversary of Bolshevik Revolution

50X1-HUM

SECRET

50X1-HUM

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

Principal Developments in World Communist Affairs
(to 16 August 1967)

1. The month was marked by numerous clashes -- physical and verbal, explicit and implicit -- between Communist parties and regimes around the world, including:

a. ChiCom-Soviet, reaching a new peak of hostility in the Chinese Red Guard attacks on the Soviet ship SVIRSK detained in Dairen and its crew, Kosygin's personal note threatening rupture of trade relations and Chinese compliance, new Peking mob demonstrations and attacks against the Soviet Embassy, and a 3-page PRAVDA denunciation of Maoist policies and actions.

b.. ChiCom-Mongolian, with new Peking demonstrations against the Mongolian Embassy.

c. ChiCom-N. Vietnamese-Soviet. Observers saw new evidence of "serious political differences" (AFP) in a 20 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the arrival of a NV economic delegation in Peking: the USSR jumped in with a 24 July note to Hanoi pledging more political and military aid.

d. Soviet-Rumanian. As the 24 July Rumanian National Assembly session opened, PRAVDA issued a thinly veiled, conciliatory appeal to Rumania to get back into line with the Warsaw Pact. GenSecy Ceausescu reaffirmed Rumanian adherence to the WP in his keynote speech, even while he reiterated R's refusal to take sides with the others against Israel. Next day Premier Maurer strongly attacked interference and pressure in relations between Communist countries, leaving little doubt that he meant the USSR. Seemingly waving a big stick, Radio Moscow on 28 July carries a Rumanian-language commentary by Soviet hero of "the liberation of Bucharest" Ivan Lakonugov, who, inter alia, relates how the "Soviet Russian territory of Bessarabia" was "illegally attached to the Rumanian kingdom in January 1918" and "how festively the Bessarabian people received the Red Army" when "Bessarabia reunited with the motherland" in June 1940. Similarly, the Soviet monthly VOPROSY ISTORII (Questions of History) featured in its June issue an article by L.G. Beskrovny entitled "The Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Liberation Struggle of the Balkan Peoples," which seemed to some observers as designed especially to show that Rumania has historically been an unreliable ally of Russia's and to imply that the current Russian leaders have merely resurrected the old "bourgeois" Rumanian foreign policy line.

e. Cuban-Soviet. The story of the Havana LASO meeting is one long account of the hassle between Castro and his sympathizers on one hand and the Soviet-line Communists on the other, with public recriminations between Castro and Moscow: see separate item.

2. Reporting out of China indicates that the chaos of the Cultural revolution has degenerated into bloody strife in widespread areas, with large-scale loss of life, especially in the major city of Canton.

(Cont.)

3. Serious confusion and ferment within the Polish Party and regime is reported, resulting from general disapproval of Gomulka's hard line toward Israel and its sympathizers.

4. Increasing Soviet concern over adverse developments threatening to "spoil" the propaganda impact of the 50th anniversary is reflected in the strange maneuvers of agent Victor Louis to spread a Soviet version of the Svetlana Alliluyeva memoirs in advance of authorized publication, also in media commentary. The Soviets have made numerous private approaches to Westerners whom they consider influential and sympathetic in efforts to discourage non-Communist comment (especially U.S.) which might reflect discredit on the Soviet state, political and economic systems, and foreign policy on the eve of the anniversary.

5. The Soviet-urged project for a world CP meeting is "kept alive" via endorsements in a 22 July Bulgarian-Mongolian communique signed by party-state delegations in Ulan Bator and in a 28 July speech by Hungarian Party leader Kadar.

50X1-HUM

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

September 1967

Latin American Solidarity Conference

At the first conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization -- LASO (Havana, Cuba, 31 July-10 August 1967), held under the slogan "The Duty of Every Revolutionary Is To Make Revolution," Cuba demonstrated that it has pretensions to revolutionary leadership. Castro and his fidelista supporters insisted that "armed struggle" is the only viable course toward achieving national liberation in Latin America. Castro wants to be the final judge of Communist theory and practice within Latin America." There are theses which are 40 years old," Castro said. "Marxism has acquired certain characteristics of a church, and those characteristics must be overcome ... We consider ours a Communist Party; it is not a problem of words, it is a problem of deeds." As expected, dissension and rivalries between Castro's extremist groups and the orthodox Latin American Communist Parties over the proper course to national liberation arose early in the conference which condemned the "Socialist" countries' aid and trade policies with Latin American dictatorships and oligarchies.* Significantly, however, this resolution was not published; presumably the fidelistas did not dare openly condemn "Socialist" trade and aid while Cuba still depends on Soviet assistance (see accompanying article). In many respects, the conference and particularly Castro's 3-hour-and-40-minute closing speech (see condensed version) were a two-pronged attack: directly and vehemently on the United States and indirectly on conventional Communists, leaving the question open whether the Cuban-led LASO will seek to coordinate and give impetus to the struggle against "U.S. imperialism and other oppressive forces in Latin America."

The conventional Communist Parties probably expected to be outnumbered at the Conference but they were also clearly outmaneuvered through voting manipulations. Castro himself launched a bitter attack on the absent Venezuelan Communist Party (VCP), which he labeled "the enemy of revolution" as well as "a tool of imperialism." The VCP has for over five months been involved in an ideological dispute with Cuba over such issues as the "Socialist" countries' aid and trade with Latin American governments and the question of armed revolution. Venezuela was represented at the Conference by members of the Castro-oriented guerrilla forces (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional) which are locked in a dispute with the VCP. This portion of Castro's speech was possibly an answer to a plea presumably made by Soviet Premier Kosygin that Cuba "de-escalate" its support for revolutionary movements in the hemisphere in favor of supporting less risky approaches. Castro said "we are true revolutionaries; no true Communist in the hemisphere will ever allow himself to be dragged into an alliance with imperialism."

*The Soviet Union and several East European countries began to increase economic support activities to Latin American countries in 1966. In a speech in March 1967, Castro also condemned the aid and trade activities of the European Communist Bloc countries in Latin America.

(cont.)

Castro also said that while there are other forms of struggle, it is imperative that revolutionaries never lose sight of the fact that it would be deceiving the masses to think that revolutionaries can come to power peacefully. In the end, most of the non-Castroite Communists present appeared convinced that armed struggle may well be needed to achieve political power but a few did not applaud Castro's speech.

On the eve of the Conference, on 30 July, PRAVDA published a demand of the Secretary General of the Chilean Communist Party, Luis Corvalan, (see full text) that Castro stop meddling in the revolutionary affairs of other Latin American nations. In a bid against Castro, Corvalan's article said that efforts to impose views on other ranks of the anti-imperialist forces do not help the achievement of unity. Corvalan said:

"In this national struggle, the revolutionaries of every country determine in all its aspects the direction and concrete tasks which emerge on the path to their own revolution. They know better than anyone else the reality and the conditions in which they fight and have the greatest opportunity for correctly determining the goals of the struggle and the methods of achieving them. They may err, but they are the least likely to err..."

Corvalan accused Castro of seeking to destroy other Communist parties and thus provide "a gift to imperialism." He disagreed with Castro's analysis that some Latin American Communist Parties are weak because they rely on "bourgeois elements." On 1 August, in a broadcast to Latin America on the LASO conference Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress argued that the most consistent policy promoting the unity of the widest strata of the anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchical forces is pursued by the Communist Parties of the Latin American countries.

China was not represented. At the meeting of the Afro-Asian Latin American Peoples Organization (AALAPSO) in Havana in January 1966, at which LASO was set up, the Chinese delegation was the most vociferous. The hard line taken at the present conference on the revolutionary struggle is consistent with Chinese views whereas the Soviet Union, which was represented by observers, propagates achieving the same ends primarily by coexistence. The LASO line was also consistent with the views of the theoretician of the Cuban revolution, Major Che Guevara, whose shadowy figure officially presided over the conference as honorary chairman "in absentia." The Viet Cong, represented by observers, were credited with having initiated successful "armed revolution" against the United States and most delegates paid tribute to the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese, some of the more militant demanding "two ... several Vietnams." Black power advocate Stokely Carmichael, an honorary guest, delivered a bitter speech, describing the situation of U.S. Negroes as that of a colonized and exploited people with more in common with Asians, Africans and Latin Americans than with their white fellow citizens. A resolution declares support of the "liberation struggle" of American

negroes and declares 18 August, the anniversary of the 1965 Watts riots a "Day of Solidarity with American Negroes." The conference took the position that from the exploited and oppressed Negro sector will emerge the revolutionary movement of the United States and American Negroes were exhorted to action. A number of recently captured "North American agents" were put on display as proof of U.S. subversive activity against Cuba.

The conference, attended by 162 delegates from 27 countries, and by observers from Communist and some Afro-Asian countries and from the Communist international front organizations, passed somewhat repetitive general resolutions which declared (in summary) that:

a. (Work Committee No. 1) -- armed struggle is the primary path and that unarmed forms of action must help and not hinder insurrectional struggle; that it is necessary to unify political and military leadership in the revolutionary war and that the most important task for the majority of the countries of America is to organize, initiate, and carry out revolutionary war; that the task of the revolutionary movement in the hemisphere must be that of reaching the highest forms of class struggle and through these forms to achieve liberation; that the historic task imposed on some countries is the need to give impetus to the revolutionary war already initiated, in others the task is firm, determined help to those who struggle; that the primary forms of struggle are armed violence and the preparation of the revolutionary movement in each country; and that in countries where the guerrillas are fighting, unification of political and military command becomes a need of the revolutionary movement;

b. (The general resolution drafted by Work Committee No. 2 determines the position and common action against the politico-military intervention and economic and ideological penetration by imperialism in Latin America. After describing the imperialist exploitation, the resolution declared) the only alternative that will free Latin American countries is anti-imperialist revolution which must also be a profound social revolution; that the creation of a common political strategy of struggle by Latin American peoples is based on the premise that the main enemy is North American imperialism; in all Latin American countries conditions are ripe for beginning an armed struggle of such a type that it will insure the defeat of the imperialists and the seizure of power by the people;

c. (Work Committee No. 3) -- armed struggle in each country is the most effective means of exercising solidarity. Solidarity is part of the common struggle of the peoples opposed to the continental repressive strategy of Yankee imperialism; impetus to the armed struggle is sought through firm determined support expressed by the presence of revolutionary fighters from any country in each of the places where these struggles develop; and points at the example of solidarity offered by the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the aggression by U.S. imperialism, the main enemy of the people of the world.

d. (Work Committee No. 4) -- Havana is the permanent site for LASO.

The purpose of LASO is to participate in and give impetus to the unity of revolutionary movements and anti-imperialist organizations within each of the Latin American countries. The supreme organs of the organization will meet every two years with the national committees of the member countries. After pointing out that the main functions of the permanent LASO committee will be to give impetus to effective solidarity with the peoples struggling for national liberation, the draft by-laws declare that in countries where there is armed struggle, those movements which participate in it or support it effectively will be considered as anti-imperialist.

A Resolution (see full text) harshly condemned the servility of the Organization of American States (OAS) to U.S. imperialism and called on all revolutionary fighters to oppose the maneuvers of that organization.

A final Declaration was read summarizing principles emerging from the Conference

STAT

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

September 1967

PRAVDA, 30 July 1967

Article by Luis Corvalan, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chilean Communist Party, "The Alliance of Revolutionary and Anti-Imperialist Forces in Latin America."

The October Socialist Revolution which this year will celebrate its 50th anniversary marked the beginning of the end of capitalist rule over the world. It opened the era of socialism, the epoch of the liberation of the workers class and the peoples, oppressed by imperialism.

At present socialism is being built on American soil in Cuba. Social conflicts are shaking our continent, which has become an important front of the world-wide struggle against imperialism, for democracy, peace, and socialism.

In view of the fact that imperialism, in complicity with the local oligarchies, disregards the principle of noninterference, encroaches upon the sovereignty of Latin American countries, and does not respect geographical borders but is guided by the doctrine of ideological borders, revolutionaries are called upon to raise their solidarity to a new peak. This presupposes, specifically, the direct participation in the liberation struggle of fraternal peoples -- naturally on those occasions when it is required by the revolutionary movement of these peoples and on condition that such participation serves the resolution of their tasks and is implemented under their leadership.

The basic contribution of revolutionaries to the cause of the universal liberation of peoples and the victory of the workers class on the international scale, however, consists primarily in the struggle for this cause in their own country and the manifestation on this basis of the utmost moral and material solidarity with the revolutionary struggle of other countries. As early as the "Communist Manifesto" Marx and Engels, the creators of Marxism and the founders of proletarian internationalism, stressed that "the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle, in form if not in content. The proletariat of each country naturally must first finish with its own bourgeoisie."

In this national struggle the revolutionaries of every country determine in all its aspects the direction and concrete tasks which emerge on the path to their own revolution. They know better than anyone else the reality and the conditions in which they fight and have the greatest opportunity for correctly determining the goals of the struggle and the methods of achieving them. They may err, but they are the least likely to err. In any case, the revolutionaries of every country can work out a correct line by assuming the responsibility, by studying above all their own experience, their own successes and failures.

(cont.)

Naturally this does not exclude the exchange of opinion and, in certain cases, fraternal advice.

The Cuban revolution constitutes obvious proof of how life breaks up all schemes and serves as an additional reminder that we must not deal with the generalization of peculiar, specific features of this or that experience. It would be wrong, however, to deny on this basis that the specific features of one revolution -- in the given case of the Cuban revolution -- could repeat themselves in another place (even though not in a completely analogous form).

It is naturally not very easy to determine the place and the exact moment to begin partisan operations or some other form of the armed struggle which may serve as a starting point for winning power. Lenin warned against the danger of adventures which, as a rule, lead to the useless loss of valuable lives of revolutionaries and to a retreat of that movement. Leninism, however, always excelled by its creative daring, by its striving to advance the revolutionary process. Therefore, one must neither condemn outright nor accept blindly any form of the struggle. The main thing is to embark resolutely upon the path of the struggle, striving to assess the situation as well as possible, to feel for the most correct path, to continuously correct tactics by relating them to practical experience. It is necessary always to be ready for attack as well as retreat and to search diligently for the favorable situation which would make it possible to open the path of the revolution.

The liberation struggle of Latin America included representatives of the most diverse trends: men, women, and youths of different political directions and social extraction. It is important for the cause of the revolution to expand and not to contract the anti-imperialist front.

Any attempt by the communists to force their viewpoint upon the other detachments of the anti-imperialist forces as well as attempts of the latter to force their views upon others do not promote the achievement of the necessary unity of action and fail to lend the struggle against the common enemy an extensive character. For this very reason the tasks which unite, and not those which divide, must be put to the fore. This means concrete tasks on whose necessary implementation we have all agreed.

In this connection we think that the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) and the corresponding national committees of every country must concentrate their activities on the development and coordination of international solidarity and on achieving unity of action in the struggle for resolving joint tasks. We ardently desire that all revolutionaries, all anti-imperialists, all people's movements in Latin America, should arrive at a joint mode of

revolutionary thinking. This, however, can only be achieved as a result of a certain developmental process. We can accelerate this process, but we cannot regard it as already finished.

It is no secret that among Latin American revolutionaries there exist different approaches to several problems of the revolution. These trends emerged and manifested themselves with greatest force after considerable masses of new fighters joined the ranks of the Latin American revolutionary movement, fighters coming from the politically most backward strata of the proletariat and also from the petty bourgeoisie, while in the international arena divergencies emerged in the ranks of the revolutionary forces, divergencies which hamper the cause of the struggle being waged in all parts of the world.

Thus, what matters here are problems of growth which cannot be overcome within a few days. It is, however, also an objective fact that imperialism tries to profit and actually does profit from the divergencies between the revolutionary forces, and mainly between the communist parties.

From this follows the duty to act in such a manner that the divergencies under no circumstances obstruct the attainment of action unity in the struggle against the common enemy, since in the opposite case it would only promote the implementation of his plans. The divergencies between communist parties are not insurmountable obstacles for their mutual understanding. Similarly, the divergencies between them and other revolutionary forces must not hinder their joint struggle against imperialism.

Experience shows that open polemics lead only to unnecessary name-calling and arbitrary evaluations. The main result of such polemics is an aggravation and not an overcoming of difficulties. Sometimes, under certain conditions the parties may be forced to publicly express their views on this or that question. We are not against that. But we are confident that the best means for achieving mutual understanding are direct contacts, bilateral and multilateral meetings, a fraternal dialogue without slander, and, chiefly, the continuous development of joint actions.

The driving forces of the revolution in Latin America are the workers class, the peasantry (most of whom are Indians in many countries) the students, the middle strata, and some groups of the national bourgeoisie. Though contradictions exist between these forces, the common interests of the struggle against North American imperialism and oligarchy constitute a predominant factor. Hence real possibilities of uniting them exist.

While pursuing a policy of unity of action of the broadest possible anti-imperialist and antioligarchic forces, we communists always proceed

from the fact that an alliance of the workers class with the peasantry, an alliance of the proletariat with the nonproletarian strata of the people, is the best guarantee of the creation of a solid and militant united front. Mutual understanding between proletarian and petty bourgeois revolutionaries is the main factor for advancement in this direction.

The proletariat constitutes the most powerful social class on our continent, a class which is in a process of stormy development. Communist parties exist in all countries of the continent. The progressive part of the workers class and the finest representatives of the Latin American intelligentsia are in the ranks of the communist parties. All communist parties are the offspring of the proletariat of their countries and of the October revolution, the fruit of the victory of Leninism, and of the victory of the revolutionaries over reformism. The creation and strengthening of the Latin American communist parties is a valuable gain of the revolutionary proletariat.

The opportunities for the development of the communist parties and for the transformation of small parties into big ones are being implemented to the extent to which the parties take their place in the vanguard of social battles. The proletarian masses are accumulating all-round experience. Finally they unite around the communist parties.

But we are also confronted with another objective phenomenon which must be given constant consideration, and this is precisely the fact that not only the conscious proletariat but also a considerable portion of the petty bourgeoisie is switching to revolutionary positions, is selflessly struggling for the liberation of the Latin American countries, and is advancing the building of socialism as its goal. This has become manifest with particular force in Latin America since the victory of the socialist revolution in Cuba.

Objectively, the phenomenon represents success and progress, and hence it must not only be regarded from the viewpoint of the erroneous positions of petty bourgeois revolutionaries or of the acts of desperation which they sometimes commit.

The revolutionary possibilities of the broad strata of the rural and town petty bourgeoisie must not be underrated. Whereas the Latin American bourgeoisie obviously is no longer capable of heading revolutionary processes (although some of its groups may participate in them), the petty bourgeoisie on the contrary possess ample possibilities of acting as a revolutionary force and even of playing a leading role in those countries where the proletariat is relatively weak either numerically or politically.

One of the lessons of history consists of the fact that the petty bourgeoisie possesses revolutionary reserves of heroism in the struggle

for national liberation and socialism. Ties of unity and struggle exist between the revolutionary currents developing among the proletariat on the one hand and among the petty bourgeoisie on the other hand. Many things unite them, but there also are quite a few things separating them. The revolutionary current which emerges on a petty bourgeois basis usually underrates the proletariat and the communist parties, is more disposed toward nationalism, adventurism, and terrorism, and sometimes permits anticommunist and anti-Soviet attitudes. It also is more prone to slip into desperation and subjectivism. Nevertheless, it is a revolutionary current with respect to which the proletariat must adopt a position of unity rather than a position of struggle.

A struggle for the leadership of the movement -- which is to a certain extent an ideological struggle -- is taking place between these two trends. But any attempt to exacerbate this struggle and to turn it into a "struggle for the annihilation" of one or another revolutionary trend is nothing else but a present to imperialism. Proof of this is the fact that imperialism and its agents strive precisely to exacerbate this struggle and to carry it to a rupture.

The so-called national bourgeoisie on its own part, in order to preserve or expand its class positions also strives to make the revolutionary currents of the petty bourgeoisie and of the proletariat move increasingly away from each other.

The mutual understanding, collaboration, and joint actions of the revolutionary proletariat and of the revolutionary circles of the petty bourgeoisie are now the main problem and the primary duty in Latin America. The revolutionaries of all Latin American countries are now confronted with the task of searching for ways toward a mutual understanding between the revolutionary currents among the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. It is absolutely clear that the revolutionaries of each country themselves are selecting these ways and that at the same time this places great emphasis on the need for the broadest possible dissemination of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and a genuine education of the masses in the spirit of proletarian ideology. It can be confirmed that the question in most Latin American countries concerns not only the need for joint actions of the communist parties and other revolutionary forces, but also the need for the implementation of this collaboration of the level of a joint leadership of the liberation-struggle for each people by the revolutionary forces which in a certain sense are sharing in the vanguard function.

A vanguard cannot be created arbitrarily or artificially around a leader or around people who individually adopt most radical -- in any case this is what they think -- positions and are preparing some type or other of revolutionary actions. Exceptions from this rule do not disprove it. The vanguard emerges as a result of the merger of Marxism and the workers movement, of the forming of revolutionary ideas

(primarily in the ranks of the proletariat) and of the application of Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of each country, that is, as a result of a purposeful activity and not of a spontaneous process. On the other hand, as Lenin said, it is sufficient to term oneself a vanguard and foremost detachment; it also is necessary to act in such a manner that the other detachments realize and cannot ignore that we are advancing.

The communist parties in Latin America emerged at different times; they are operating in different social and political conditions. Some parties are trying to shift from the popularization of the ideas of scientific socialism to the stage of strengthening their contacts with the masses, and to the period of organizing and leading a massive struggle and of intense social and political work among the people, a feature which will permit them to open the road toward the conquest of power. At the same time this represents the road toward a rapid development of all Latin American communist powers and toward their transformation into a leading force in the revolutionary movement.

But the communist are far from considering this prospect the only one possible. On behalf of the interests of the proletariat and on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism they are ready to raise the collaboration and unity with the other revolutionary forces to the highest possible level.

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

September 1967

FINAL PROCLAMATION

We, representatives of the peoples of our America, conscious of the conditions which exist on the continent, knowing of the existence of a common counterrevolutionary strategy directed by Yankee imperialism, proclaim:

- 1--That it is the right and duty of the peoples of Latin America to make revolution;
- 2--That revolution in Latin America has its deepest historic roots in the liberation movement against European colonialism of the 19th Century and against the imperialism of this century. The epic of the peoples of America and the great class battles against imperialism waged by our peoples in previous decades are the sources of historic inspiration for the Latin American revolutionary movement;
- 3--That the essential meaning of the revolution in Latin America is given by its confrontation of imperialism, the oligarchies, and bourgeois landowners. Consequently, the character of the revolution is that of a struggle for national independence, emancipation from oligarchies, and the socialist path for complete economic and social development;
- 4--That the principles of Marxism-Leninism guide the revolutionary movement of Latin America;
- 5--That the armed revolutionary struggle is the primary path of the revolution in Latin America;
- 6--That all the other forms of struggle must serve and not hinder the progress of the primary line which is armed struggle;
- 7--That for the majority of the countries of the continent the problem of organizing, initiating, developing, and culminating armed struggle is today the immediate and primary task of the revolutionary movement;
- 8--That those countries in which this task is not being considered as an immediate task should at any rate consider it as an inevitable prospect in the development of the revolutionary struggle in their country.
- 9--That the people of each country and their revolutionary vanguards will have the historic responsibility for advancing the revolution in each of them.
- 10--That the guerrillas, as the embryo of the armies of liberation, are the most effective means for initiating and developing revolutionary struggle in the majority of our countries;
- 11--That the leadership of the revolution demands, as an organizational

(cont.)

principle, the existence of a unified political and military command as a guarantee for its success;

12---That the most effective solidarity that revolutionary movements can give each other is the development and culmination of their own struggle in each country;

13---That solidarity with Cuba and collaboration and cooperation with the revolutionary movement in arms are unavoidable duties of an international type for all anti-imperialist organizations of the continent;

14---That the Cuban revolution as a symbol of the victory of the armed revolutionary movement is the vanguard of the Latin American anti-imperialist movement. As the people who carry out armed struggle advance along that path, they also place themselves in the vanguard;

15---That the people directly colonized by the European mother countries or subjected to direct colonial domination by the United States, while on their way to liberation, have as their immediate and primary objective the fight for independence and the maintenance of links to the general struggle of the continent as the only manner of avoiding being absorbed by North American neocolonialism;

16---That the Second Declaration of Havana, which contains the beautiful and glorious revolutionary tradition of the last 150 years of American history, is a programmatic document of the Latin American revolution which the peoples of this continent have confirmed, deepened, enriched, and radicalized during the past five years;

17---That the peoples of Latin America have no antagonisms with any other people of the world and they extend a fraternal hand to the people of the United States themselves whom they urge to fight against the repressive policy of the imperialist monopolies;

18---That the struggle in Latin America strengthens its bonds of solidarity with the peoples of Asia and Africa, the socialist countries, and with the workers of the capitalist countries, particularly with the Negro population of the United States who simultaneously suffer class exploitation, poverty, unemployment, racial discrimination, and denial of the most elementary human rights and who are an important force to be considered in the context of revolutionary struggle;

19---That the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people gives all the peoples who fight imperialism an inestimable help and is an inspiring example for the peoples of Latin America;

20---That we have approved the statutes and created the permanent committee with headquarters in Havana of the Latin American Solidarity Organization which is the genuine representation of the peoples of America.

We, revolutionaries of our America, the America south of the Rio Bravo, successors of the men who gave us our first independence, armed with unbreakable will to fight and with revolutionary and scientific orientation, and without anything to lose but the chains that oppress us, declare that our struggle is a decisive contribution to humanity's historic struggle to liberate itself from slavery and exploitation. The duty of every revolutionary is to make revolution!

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

September 1967

FIDEL CASTRO'S SPEECH TO LASO

At the closing ceremony of the First LASO conference Fidel Castro gave a 3 3/4-hour speech. He began by saying that the conference had been an ideological victory but it was not won without ideological struggles, and although the declaration of the conference was unanimously supported, it did not represent unanimous viewpoints. Noting the attention given to the LASO conference by the international press, Castro said the news reports "undoubtedly revealed a certain lack of discretion on the part of the conference delegates...and almost everything discussed is more or less known." He claimed the conference had produced ideological and political agreements which were clear and final.

Castro repeated at length Cuban charges that alleged CIA agents in Cuba were plotting to overthrow his regime and to assassinate him. Castro implicated the OAS in these charges and attacked the OAS Foreign Ministers meeting, asserting that, with the exception of Mexico, "none of the governments of this continent...has the slightest right to invoke any law, invoke any principle against the actions that Cuba carries out in support of the revolutionary movement."

He denied that Cuba is "a nation of adventurers, of provokers, or irresponsible people, as some have tried to picture us," and charged that the people who are willing to accept the imperialist order are not only to be found among the counterrevolutionaries -- "you will also find them among those who even invoke Marxism-Leninism as a theory and who will say that this is what has to be done: submit to the imperialist draconian order."

Before returning to disagreements with fellow-Communists, Castro took up the subject of racial disorders in the United States. He praised Stokely Carmichael's presence at the LASO Conference and what he termed a "rapprochement between a revolutionary movement in Latin America and the revolutionary movement within the United States." He brushed aside charges that Carmichael is a racist, said it is not true that the U.S. negro movement is acting without a program, and declared:

"...from the negro segment will surge the revolutionary vanguard within the United States -- around this revolutionary movement -- which does not emerge as a result of race problems, but from social problems...the revolutionary movement will emerge -- vanguard of a struggle called someday to liberate all of U.S. society." Castro called on revolutionaries throughout the world to support Stokely Carmichael -- "a great example of militant internationalism" -- adding: "There is no doubt that we sympathize with this kind of revolutionaries much more than with the supertheorizers who are revolutionary only in word and bourgeois in deed."

Castro then returned to the main business of the LASO conference and to ideological dissensions among communist groups. Excerpts follow.

(cont.)

Revolutionary Action Is to Precede Majority Support:

"...the LASO conference has been a victory for revolutionary ideas, [but not a victory devoid of struggle. A latent ideological struggle has been reflected in the LASO conference....We believe that it is necessary for revolutionary ideas to prevail....the fulfilling of a requirement is necessary -- namely, the triumph of the revolutionary ideas among the masses -- not among all the masses, but among a sufficiently ample segment. This does not mean that action should await the triumph of ideas. This is one of the essential points of the matter....anyone who wants to wait for ideas first to triumph among the masses, in a majority fashion, before revolutionary action is initiated, will never become a revolutionary."

The Only Path to Victory:

"There is a series of principles -- do not think they will be accepted without discussion -- but they are essential truths approved by a majority, with reservations from some...regarding the means of struggle, the peaceful or non-peaceful armed or without arms....Different words have been used as to whether there is a single path or not, whether it excludes anyone or not and the LASO conference has been very clear in this regard. It does not say that there is only one path, although it could be said. It says there is a basic path and the rest of the means of struggle should be subordinated to it. In the long run it is the only path....Let no one dream that he will achieve power peacefully in any nation of this continent....This does not mean that one should take a gun tomorrow in any place and begin to fight....Everything depends on whether or not the necessary conditions to take weapons exist or not."

On Empty Marxist Phrases:

"We no longer accept any type of evident truth. The evident truths belong to the bourgeois philosophy. They constitute a series of old clichés that should be abolished. The very Marxist literature, the very revolutionary political literature should be rejuvenated, because by dint of repeating clichés, small phrases, and small words, that have been repeated for 35 years, nothing is conquered, nothing is won. These are the times when political documents that are considered Marxist give the impression that one can go to an archive and ask for a model -- for example, model number 14, model number 13, model number 12 -- all of them alike with the same words that make up a language incapable of expressing real situations. Many times such documents are divorced from life, and many people are told that this is Marxism, that it differs from a catechism, that it also differs from a litany and a rosary. He who feels that he is a Marxist, of a sort, almost feels obliged to go look for a model containing this or that manifesto. If 25 manifestos of 25 different organizations are read, they will be found to be all alike. Taken as models, they convince no one and nothing is farther

from the thought and style of the founder of Marxism than empty words, the forced straight jacket to express ideas, because Marx was undoubtedly the greatest and most brilliant prose writer of all times....However, worse than words are the ideas that many times are contained in phrasesthose that are 40 years old. For example to mention one of them, the famous thesis about the role of the national bourgeoisie. How much effort has it cost to become convinced of the absurdity of this thesis in regard to the conditions prevailing on this continent."

On a Convent Spirit in Communism:

"I am not going to say that the revolutionary movement and, in general, the communist movement has ceased to play a role, even an important role, in the history of the revolutionary process and of revolutionary ideas in Latin America. It has acquired a method, a style, and, in certain things, not a few characteristics of a church. We sincerely believe that this character must be overcome. It is clear that in the eyes of some of our illustrious revolutionary thinkers we are nothing more than little bourgeois adventurers without revolutionary maturity. Fortunately, the revolution came before maturity because, finally, those who are mature have matured so little that they have decayed. But we consider ourselves a Marxist-Leninist party. We consider ourselves a communist party....we feel great satisfaction with the final resolution of this conference which proclaims that revolutionary movement in Latin America is guided by Marxist-Leninist ideas.

"This means that the narrow parochial spirit, the convent spirit must be overcome...As a Marxist-Leninist party we belong not to a group within revolutionary thought...but to an organization which includes all real revolutionaries and we shall not look with prejudice on any revolutionary. In other words, there is a much broader movement on this continent than the movement composed simply of the communist parties in Latin America."

On Dividing the Political and Military Commands:

"...experience acquired in guerrilla warfare on this continent has taught us many things, among them, the terrible mistake, the absurd conception that a guerrilla movement can be directed from a city.... It is also our conviction that it is not only stupid but a crime to want to direct a guerrilla movement from the city....for this reason we consider the resolution of the conference of great importance.

"A guerrilla movement is called upon to be the fundamental nucleus of a revolutionary movement...We do not deny the role of a directing organization. We do not deny the role of a political organization. The guerrillas are organized by a political movement, by a political organization. What we believe to be incompatible with the correct

conception of guerrilla warfare is the pretension of directing the guerrilla movement from the city."

On Peaceful Transition -- Legal and Illegal Methods of Gaining Power:

"As for those who really believe that peaceful transition is possible, in some country of this continent, we do not understand what kind of peaceful transition they are talking about other than a peaceful transition in agreement with imperialism....The first thing a revolutionary must understand is that the ruling classes have organized the state in such a way as to be able to maintain it by all means, and they use not only arms. They use all possible instruments to influence, to deceive, to confuse, and those who believe that they are going to defeat the imperialists in any elections are simply naive. Those who believe that, even if they do win in elections, they will be allowed to take office, are super-naive....This does not imply the negation of other means of struggle...[of the one who] writes a manifesto...goes to a demonstration ...preaches an idea, or uses the famous so-called legal means. Here we must end this distinction between legal or illegal means and call them revolutionary means or non-revolutionary means....

"We are speaking of the conditions of Latin America. We do not wish to meddle in other...revolutionary organizations...as in Europe... but they are trying to encourage the errors of those who are mistaken on this continent. A certain so-called revolutionary press has therefore attacked Cuba because of our revolutionary position in Latin America. A fine thing! They have not known how to be revolutionaries there and they want to teach us how to be revolutionaries here. We are in no hurry to launch polemics....Nevertheless, we shall not pass over these direct or indirect, veiled or open, attacks from some neo-social democrats of Europe."

"The revolutionary movement should be ready to take advantage, and even support, all manifestations of struggle that arise which could turn into or which might strengthen the position of the revolutionaries. What is not admissible is that there are those who call themselves revolutionaries who wait for a military post to rise up in arms to make a revolution.../who/ dream of making revolution through the rebellion of troops."

The Venezulean Guerrillas:

"The most painful case was that of Venezuela. In Venezuela, the revolutionary movement was being developed, and has had to pay for the results of the absurd concept of wanting to lead the guerrilla movement from the city, of wanting to use the guerrilla movement as a tool for politicking....Of course, the Venezuelan guerrilla movement is far from being crushed, in spite of treason.../but/ in Venezuela a group of people who headed a party with all these vices of concepts was almost able to accomplish what imperialism or the regime's repressive forces

were not able to do. The party, or better still the rightist leadership of the Venezuelan party, has succeeded in practically becoming the enemy of the revolutionaries and an instrument of imperialism and oligarchy -- and I do not say this just to have something to say.... We have problems pending with that group of traitors."

On the Background of the Venezuelan Dispute:

"They started talking about a strange thing/in Venezuela/... about democratic peace, and we asked ourselves what the devil this democratic peace meant because if it was not odd, it was strange. They told us that, no, this was a revolutionary slogan to widen the front, to merge forces, to open a wide front....At the end of a few months they started talking about tactical retreats....A tactical retreat, never...there are no tactical retreats in a guerrilla movement because a guerrilla group that retreats is like a plane whose propellor has stopped in mid-air....They were taking off their masks little by little until one day it came off altogether. Then they said let us join the elections and declared themselves believers in elections. However, shortly before they did so, they perpetrated some of the most infamous deeds that can be committed by a revolutionary party. They began to behave like informers and public accusers against the guerrillasaccusing openly and publicly the guerrilla movement and to shove it practically into the den of the repressive beast of the regime.... the so-called party, that is, the rightist leadership of a party that had already seized the command, that held it, took it upon itself to arm morally and politically the repressive forces that pursued the guerrillas....How could we, a revolutionary party, condone, in the name of any argument or any secret agreement, whatsoever, the actions of a party which was trying to morally strengthen the repressive forces which were persecuting the guerrillas.

"It was then that they started telling us that we were creating fractionalism....[but] this was a matter concerning a group of guerrillas with many years in the mountains, of fighters who had been abandoned -- forgotten....Naturally, we condemned them, after a series of statements by those rightist leaders against our party. We condemned the treacherous way in which they used the Iribarren incident to slander and attack the revolutionaries. Of course, this caused rage and irate protest from that rightist leadership which made us the object of a series of diatribes...They charged that we were narrowminded, that we were attacking a clandestine party, that we were fighting the most heroic, the fightingest, anti-imperialist organization....It is necessary to bring this reply here because this document became an argument of a Mafia, a real mafia of slanderers and defamers of the Cuban Revolution. This incident served as the beginning of a real international conspiracy against the Cuban Revolution....

"If you will excuse me, I would like to read this reply which was made public, the so-called answer of the Communist Party of Venezuela to Fidel Castro."

(Castro read the letter from the Venezuelan CP. Excerpts follow:)

"Fidel Castro...taking advantage of his position has attacked the Communist Party of Venezuela, a clandestine party, with hundreds of its militants in jail, with scores of them killed....Even as Fidel Castro was speaking, the party was learning of new victims....Fidel Castro has issued a negative judgment on the murder of Iribarren Borges, even claiming his right to express an opinion on this matter. Yet with surprising impudence he tries to deny the PCV the same right.... According to his peculiar viewpoint: we speak out and we play the government's game; he speaks out and claims to be the voice of an intangible revolutionary oracle.

"...with regard to the incident itself, the PCV said exactly the same thing as Fidel Castro, neither more nor less. On the other hand, we declare that what does play the game of the reaction and imperialism are speeches such as those of Fidel Castro.

"...the PCV demands the right to choose its own policy....we do not accept the tutelage of anyone, however great their revolutionary merits may be....Fidel Castro has launched all the weight of his prestige against the PCV in a desperate attempt to help the anarchist-adventurous group which he has sponsored and encouraged to destroy the PCV."

"We categorically reject his claim to being alone the person who is to decide what is and what is not revolutionary in Latin America."

"[Castro] should ask himself what North Vietnam would say if Cuba were to trade with South Vietnam. We also want to ask him if he thinks about what the Spanish people say about his trade with Franco and with the Spanish oligarchy, or what the black peoples of Zimbabwe and Rhodesia and the patriots of Aden might say about his trade with imperialist England."

Castro Answers:

Having finished reading the letter from the Politbureau of the Venezuelan CP, Castro says it is full of lies and slander and furthermore represents "a part of the conspiracy of the consolidation in which these elements, though dissimilar from imperialism, join imperialism to create for the revolution serious difficulties with the countries in the socialist camp."

Castro then replied to the charge by the PCV concerning his trade policies, dwelling at length on the economic blockade of Cuba and Cuba's

need for trade. "We do trade with the socialist camp -- a trade that is practically barter -- with so-called 'agreement money,' which is only valuable in the country with which the agreement exists. If any of the items needed, for example, like medicines of a certain kind, are necessary to the life of our people and the trade agencies of any of the socialist states cannot supply them, we always have to obtain them from other markets and pay in their money. This is another way in which imperialism tries to apply more pressure. If we bought medicines from capitalist nations in the past, it was because we could not buy them or a similar product from a socialist country to save the lives of sick persons and children...."

"Really, in substance, this [the conflict with the Venezuelan CP] is a plot by reactionary mafia elements within the revolutionary movement and by Yankee imperialism. It is a plot whose aim is to create an international conflict between our revolution and the states of the socialist camp because they have already said what they want, demand, claim, and urge is that the socialist camp join in the imperialist blockade against Cuba."

Castro then ridicules the distinction that has been made between Latin American "communists" and "anarcho-adventurous" followers of Fidel. Referring to the Venezuelan communists who are going to participate in the Venezuelan national elections he says: "no one can tell our people this is Communist. No one. Because...Marx always said that the communists should support the most militant and progressive sectors of the bourgeoisie. These so-called communists are joining the little politicians of the bourgeoisie to fight the heroic guerrilla fighters."

The rest of Castro's speech goes over the preceding points, stressing ideological conflicts and the need for revolution.

50X1-HUM

Page Denied

Next 7 Page(s) In Document Denied

Who Is to Rule the Middle East?

After the death of Stalin a new attitude toward the emergent states, and toward the Middle East in particular, became evident in Soviet foreign policy. This change in attitude in the Soviet Union occurred at the same time that Egypt, Syria, and later Iraq, began to reject ties with the Western world, with the result that Soviet influence in the Middle East rose suddenly beginning in the mid-1950's. The result was a series of economic, technical and military agreements with the Soviet Union on which the Arab States grew increasingly dependent, while at the same time trying to resist political pressure by the Soviet Union.

In its attempts to reduce Western influence in the Middle East, the Soviets exploited two main sources of Arab friction with the West: the desire for revenge on Israel, which is common in varying degrees to all Arabs and the desire to eliminate the Western political, military and economic positions, which is particularly characteristic of the revolutionary Arab states. Since the Syrian-Egyptian union of 1958, the Soviet Union, in its attempts to cultivate the revolutionaries, has found that the revolutionaries main objective of hegemony over the Arab world has not only threatened the progress of the Communist movement in the area, but has fragmented the Arab world and prevented concerted Arab action against the West.

In May 1967 the Soviets attempted to reunify the Arabs against the West by again aggravating the Israel issue, but they almost certainly did not anticipate the armed conflict and the massive Arab losses. President Nasser, however, made hostilities virtually inevitable when he closed the Strait of Tiran to Israel, apparently without the foreknowledge of either the Soviets or the Syrians.

In the wake of the Middle East crisis, after a good deal of soul-searching on the part of the Soviet Union, various Soviet news articles have discussed the possibilities of a future role for the Communist Parties in the Middle East as long as "objective conditions pertain for the development of the socialist trend." A recent Pravda article emphasized that the release of political prisoners in Egypt would enable the "cooperation of all genuinely progressive forces...which undoubtedly has broadened the revolution's social base," suggesting that the Soviet Union anticipates a more important role for Egyptian Communists. At the same time it seems clear now that, after what must have been initially surprise, dismay and anger over Nasser's miscalculation of the pre-hostilities situation, the Soviets have decided that Nasser is still their best hope as one tool through which to achieve Soviet aims in the area. In an earlier article, Pravda attributed Egyptian military failures to the bourgeois, non-revolutionary officer corps, with the implication that the fault did not lie with President Nasser himself. This position was underscored by Soviet praise of the UAR on its 15th Anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution.*

*Moscow News, July 29-August 5, 1967.

Soviet media are now going beyond their general criticisms of Egypt's Arab Socialist Union (ASU) and Syria's Baath Party for lack of organization of the masses and especially, in the case of the ASU, for poor indoctrination of youth. Za Rubezhom on 21 July took the ASU to task for not being a real political party, for having too many members from the urban middle class, rich peasantry, and position-conscious bureaucracy, particularly in its higher posts; for a lack of decision-making in the middle ranks; and for failure to monitor the activities of the government, press and local administrations. However, Za Rubezhom took some satisfaction in the formation of a small political activist cell in the ASU operating "secretly" and presumably ultimately controlling the ASU. Several members of this new ASU organ, it was emphasized, "are known for their Marxist views."

Criticism of the Syrian Baath Party was if anything, more scathing. Za Rubezhom accused it of not being in sufficiently close touch with the masses, and not fully representing the Syrian leftists. The presence of one Communist in the Syrian cabinet was noted, but it was implied that there needed to be more.

Soviet efforts to forge a grouping of "progressive forces" in the Arab world also include persuading Iraq to identify more formally with the proposed grouping. A sign of this was Moscow's description of the recent meeting between Nasser, Boumedienne of Algeria, Atasi of Syria and Aref of Iraq as an event which demonstrated Arab determination to "strengthen the unity of the anti-imperialist Arab forces." Further, a Moscow broadcast of 13 July stated that the new government in Iraq was "expected to help the efforts of Iraq and the other Arab States to bring about unity of action." However, Moscow pointed out that in other Arab countries "real patriots and revolutionaries" were working together -- "regardless of their political or ideological differences." In other words, Iraq should emulate the example of its fellow "progressive" Arab countries and show a more permissive attitude toward Communist and fellow travellers and include a suitable proportion of such elements in its government. (In the late 1950's the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) was one of the country's most potent political forces; it fell abruptly from its influential position in 1959; it was refused a license in 1960 and many of its leaders were arrested or fled. When the Baathists took over in 1963 anti-Communist measures were intensified. The Higher Command for the Defense of the Iraqi People -- the ICP in exile based in Eastern Europe -- then came into being, as did the clandestine Voice of the Iraqi People, which broadcasts from East Europe with Moscow's blessing. The ICP is alone in having a station at its disposal for transmissions to the Arab world -- a measure of the importance which Moscow attaches to Iraq.)

As in the case of Syria, where the Communist Party is also banned, Moscow has been prepared to overlook the Iraqi regime's anti-Communist policy and to cooperate with a government which has shown anti-imperialist interests, no doubt hoping that a more favorable climate for Communist activity will eventually evolve.

Early in 1965, ostensibly at Soviet urging, the Egyptian Communist Party decided to dissolve itself and join the Arab Socialist Union. The party, banned since 1953, issued a statement saying that the Arab Socialist Union was the only political party capable of coping with political action in Egypt and of carrying on the revolution in all patriotic, nationalist, economic, social, and cultural spheres. Representatives of this group then tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade other Arab Communists of the wisdom of their decision, notably during one meeting which took place in Salzburg in October 1965. Two years before the dissolution of the Egyptian CP, the Algerian CP was dissolved (1963) and its members joined the FLN on a voluntary basis. Militants of the FLN were repressed following Boumedienne's rise to power and later formed the FLN-ORP. This, the front for the communist party, is now called the Parti d'Avant-Garde, and is once again in good graces with the government.

Since the coup in Syria (February 1966) the outlook has changed for the Middle East Communist parties. The isolation of left-wing Arab nationalism slowly declined. Khalid Bakdasn, the leading Arab Communist, was allowed to return to Syria, and has since tried to disassociate his party from charges of being potentially subversive by laying claim to an authentic place in the Syrian socio-political structure.

During the recent defeat of the Arab states in their war with Israel, Arab nationalism suffered a severe crisis and its political force is at least temporarily weakened in face of the current call for Arab unity. It seems likely that the Communist parties will have an easier time in some countries convincing both the leaders and the masses that they represent a positive alternative and not just a redundant substitute for left-wing Arab groups. The adoption of nationalist and popular front tactics along the lines which developed in West Europe is impractical for Communist parties in the Middle East. The opportunities for effective cooperation with a wide spectrum of left-wing groups are simply not available in the essentially one-party Arab states. However, the absence of non-Communist left-wing restraint upon the Communists, the frustration of the Arab states over the outcome of the war, and the now seemingly unavoidable dependence of the UAR and Syria on the Soviet Union all indicate that the ground is ripe for initiatives by local Communist parties. It seems likely that some of the recent policy debate in the Soviet Union has dealt with the problems posed for the Arab parties by Soviet support for the Middle East governments. The parties, representing potentially more stable organs than the nationalist (radical) regimes will probably be given a firmer Soviet hand than they have had in the past.

In this context, among the thousands of post mortems on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the current stand-still in efforts to bring a settlement to the area, several recent articles in the Soviet and UAR press are most significant and revealing. A series of six articles in Pravda by I. Belyayev and Y. Primakov, running from 29 July to 9 August, give

the official Soviet critique of the background and results of the Arab-Israeli hostilities and the need for strengthening Arab unity. (Pertinent excerpts accompany this paper.)

After stating the "official line" regarding the history of events leading up to and immediately following the armed conflict, the Pravda articles call the signals for future developments, as suggested by the following quotes:

-- "It is absolutely clear not only to the Egyptians but to very many Arabs that political means now must become the most important struggle for the expulsion of the Israeli occupiers from the Arab lands temporarily seized by them. Another thing is no less obvious ... this struggle can and must become a uniting factor in the Arab world."

-- "The far-reaching social transformations carried out in the UAR have greatly affected the minds of all Arabs. The successes of the Arab national liberation revolutions are eliciting sincere and ardent sympathies for the UAR, Syria and Algeria throughout the whole Near East."

-- "After 5 June a sharp delimitation of class forces took place in the UAR Workers, fellahs, patriot-intellectuals, and officers, sincerely believing that the lost battle for Sinai was above all the result of the existence of numerous holdovers of the past in the UAR -- backwardness, inadequate training of army cadres, and the activities of reactionary elements alien to the revolution in the officers corps and among the Egyptian bourgeoisie -- supported the existing regime and advocated the continuation of decisive reforms."

-- "The latest events have once more shown to the Arab leaders where the line lies between the genuine friends and allies of the national liberation movement and its enemies. The Marxist-Leninists, including those working under the difficult conditions of the capitalist countries, always have been and will be on the side of the national liberation forces."

-- "'The Soviet Union is our most reliable friend,' M.H. Haykal, the editor in chief of the newspaper Al-Ahram, told us. 'The Soviet Union has done and still is doing everything that depends on it effectively to help the UAR people to overcome the consequences of the Israeli aggression.'"

Two of the weekly articles by Muhammad Husayn Haykal, traditionally regarded as the personal propagandist of Nasser, in the Cairo daily Al-Ahram (3 and 10 August) also bear careful study. Discussing the Arab Socialist Union, "which constitutes the framework of the alliance of the people's working forces as well as the center of their political and social action," Haykal states:

"The theory on which the ASU is based -- that it is an alliance of the people's working forces, a broader front of the masses run by a political organization committed to state policy -- is in my opinion theoretically correct but had not been given a full opportunity to succeed in practice. There are several reasons for this:

"1. Many times the ASU has become a center or centers of authority. Consequently, at times the ASU seemed as if it were trying to become a government above the government, or a government adjacent to the government. This is wrong. The ASU should remain under the government, which is in fact its progressive executive instrument....

"2. By becoming a center or centers of authority the ASU was bogged down in ideologies which expressed the thought of individuals rather than collective thought which could serve as the basis for political action for the masses....

"3. Organizational formalities have preoccupied some members from the real provision of the organization. There were more meetings than subjects to be discussed.

"4. A number of ASU leaders did not try to learn from work among the masses. The new role which [President] Nasser has assumed in the ASU has prepared the ground for an essential change in the ASU's method of work and the daily exercise of its role among the masses.*"

Continuing, Haykal says:

"Many of our revolutionary achievements have been made through what we may call democratic action. Because of their close contact with the feelings and attitude of the people, our leaders have made decisions which later were completely approved by the masses...

But now that the decision is one of life or death, victory or defeat, we need what we call democracy by cooperation. In other words, the masses should participate in evolving a measure before a decision is made. This calls for discussions with greater public participation... which need not be held in public if the circumstances so demand."

*On 23 July, Nasser announced: "I have taken over responsibility for the General Secretariat of the Arab Socialist Union. I understand that the political organization of the people will play a decisive role in the battle..."

In discussing other recommendations for consolidating the position and authority of the ASU, Haykal also states:

"Egyptian patriotism is the history of this entire people. There is no need for new teachers.... The socialist revolution has had its biggest successes without anyone's guardianship.... This and other fields of action on the domestic front will undoubtedly be the subject of full discussion during the process of reorganizing the ASU Central Committee.... Therefore, the strengthening of the domestic front's defenses, the bridging of gaps in this front, the mobilization of the entire people's forces, and their alertness in their positions are necessary to frustrate US attempts preparatory to our seizing the initiative and passing from defense to offense backed by a consolidated and a solid base."

Several of the Haykal statements, such as those quoted directly above and his comment that the ASU should "remain under the government," show first an attempt to remain independent from Soviet (or any other) direction, and second a complete reversal of accepted Communist theory that the Party is above the government. These two attitudes -- if they continue to obtain -- will be of major importance in the evolution of the ASU and the relations between the ASU and the CPSU, and the UAR government and the USSR government.

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

September 1967

Excerpts from the Belyayev-Primakov PRAVDA Series --

"Report From Cairo"

(Part Four, "When the Dust Settled," dated 3 August 1967)

In the present conflict with Israel, Arab peoples are defending their vital rights and their territorial integrity. As a whole they are struggling for the opportunity to continue pursuing a policy of independence, progressive reforms, and national dignity.

We, of course, would be denying the truth if we did not mention the stream of chauvinistic nationalism which, while not determining the official position, does exist in the Arab world. Several Arab figures who are not related to the governments of Arab countries, greatly harmed the Arab peoples by their rash speeches and "plans" to annihilate the state of Israel. Recently in the Cairo newspaper AL-AHRAM an article was published by the well-known Cairo journalist Lutfi al-Khuli, whom the Israeli attack had forced to remain in Europe for several days. He wrote about the benefits which imperialist propagandists in the West derived for themselves from citing the irresponsible chatter of several Arab ultra-nationalists. Mohammed H. Haykal in one of his weekly summary articles published in the same AL-AHRAM stressed that: "We are defending a just cause and we can obtain support on the part of the peoples of the world, but the Arabs also can turn the world against themselves if they express their struggle as an intention to cause 'a bloody bath.'"

Meanwhile the official point of view in Cairo -- and this is a fact which the imperialist press and radio try to hide at any expense -- has nothing in common with the hysterical appeals of shouters. The President of the UAR said that in the event of an attack on the Arab world, Israel would bring its own existence into question. But this statement was misrepresented in the West and presented to the public as if the UAR had made the annihilation of Israel the primary aim of its foreign policy. Imperialist propaganda has had recourse and continues today to have recourse to such devices.

(Part Five, "From Tripoli to Khartoum," dated 6 August 1967)

Now when a part of the territory of the UAR, Syria, and Jordan has been temporarily seized by Israel, a special situation has become established in the Arab world, we were told in Cairo. It is thus necessary to exploit exhaustively all political means for the struggle against the consequences of the Israeli aggression and imperialism. It is absolutely clear not only to the Egyptians but to very many Arabs that political means now must become the most important instrument in the struggle for the expulsion of the Israeli occupiers from the Arab

(cont.)

lands temporarily seized by them. Another thing is no less obvious -- this struggle can and must become a uniting factor in the Arab world.

The strength of the progressive regimes in the Arab world became manifest during the Near East crisis. The peoples' masses rose not only in the struggle against the treacherous Israeli aggression but also in defense of the revolutionary governments of the UAR, Syria and Algeria.

The far-reaching social transformations carried out in the UAR have greatly affected the minds of all Arabs. The successes of the Arab national liberation revolutions are eliciting sincere and ardent sympathies for the UAR, Syria and Algeria throughout the whole Near East. This once more emphasizes an indisputable fact: Never before has anti-imperialism and the aspiration of the Arabs to strengthen their independence and territorial integrity been as strong as now.

In an environment where the earliest possible elimination of the dangerous consequences of the Israeli aggression has become the prime task of all Arab countries, anti-imperialism becomes a genuine basis for the struggle for Arab unity. At the same time, any slackening in the Arabs' efforts aimed at resisting the treacherous policy of Israel and its imperialist patrons can be beneficial only to the aggressor.

(Part Six, "Our Friend -- the Soviet Union," dated 9 August 1967)

The Soviet Union is on the Arab side! The Soviet Union demands that the aggressor be condemned in the Security Council and that the shooting be halted. The Soviet Union has resolutely warned Israel that it is responsible for all the crimes committed by it. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries which signed the Moscow declaration and participated in the Budapest meeting fully support the Arab countries struggling against the Israeli aggression and demand the immediate withdrawal of the troops of the occupiers from the Arab territories temporarily seized by them.

The above sentiments not only express the meaning of the headlines of the Cairo newspapers and the reports broadcast by Cairo Radio after 5 June; they also reflect the specific actions of the Soviet Union and other socialist states in support of the Arab peoples and against the aggression undertaken after Israel's attack against the UAR, Syria, and Jordan. They register the effective steps taken by the CPSU and the Soviet Government on behalf of the restoration of peace in the Near East even in the first few hours after the Israeli "blitzkrieg."

The June plenum of the CPSU Central Committee stressed that the Israeli aggression was the result of a conspiracy of the most reactionary forces of international imperialism, primarily of the United States, and that it was aimed at one of the detachments of the

national liberation movement -- the progressive Arab states, which had embarked upon a road of progressive socioeconomic transformations in the interests of the working people and which had pursued an anti-imperialist policy.

"The events in the Near East have once more demonstrated," said L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 5 July in a speech at a Kremlin reception in honor of the military academy graduates, "how cunning imperialism is and how important it is to defend effectively the gains achieved during the national liberation struggle. The cause of national and social liberation is a just cause and for its sake it is necessary to strengthen in every possible way the states which have liberated themselves and their defense capability and unity, and it is necessary to be ready to repulse the aggressive intrigues of imperialism."

The just position of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and their swift and resolute joint actions in support of the struggle of the Arab peoples against imperialism and neocolonialism have played an important role in the discontinuance of the military actions in the Near East.

The efforts of the Soviet Union in the Security Council to stop the Israeli aggression, and its initiative concerning the convocation of an extraordinary special session of the UN General Assembly were duly appreciated in Cairo.

The demands that all consequences of the aggression be eliminated, that the Israeli troops be immediately and unconditionally withdrawn from the occupied Arab territory to behind the 1940* armistice line, and that reparation be made for the damage inflicted upon the UAR, Syria and Jordan -- advanced by chief of the Soviet delegation A.N. Kosygin at the special extraordinary session of the UN General Assembly -- now have become a program for the specific action of all peace-loving states at restoring peace in the Near East.

The defeat in Sinai has created a difficult situation in the UAR. Local reaction immediately tried to exploit the emerging pessimism and dejection openly speculating on the military failures of the Arabs. As always happens in such an environment, people began to look for a scapegoat on whom the whole burden of responsibility for events could be placed. Little by little they asserted that the cause of all this was the choice of socialism by the UAR and its progressive domestic and foreign policy.

Why must our country maintain close relations with the Soviet Union? Why has it become antagonistic to the West? -- this was asked by those who as a result of nationalization had lost their fortunes and influence. "Fragments" of the bourgeoisie which had been "smashed

* (sic)

to smithereens" began to knock together a "pro-American lobby" which widely spread a most active political campaign for the reestablishment of the diplomatic relations between the UAR and the United States, which was interrupted in the first few days of the war.

After 5 June a sharp delimitation of class forces took place in the UAR. Workers, fellahs, patriot-intellectuals, and officers, sincerely believing that the lost battle of Sinai was above all the result of the existence of numerous holdovers of the past in the UAR -- backwardness, inadequate training of army cadres, and the activities of reactionary elements alien to the revolution in the officers corps and among the Egyptian bourgeoisie -- supported the existing regime and advocated the continuation of decisive reforms.

Under these conditions the reaction had feverishly to search for some legal excuses to justify its antinational position. As repeatedly happened in the past, the Egyptian reaction joined imperialism and went against the people. But it was not the government or President Nasir directly who became targets of direct attacks. The Thermidorians here do not possess enough strength or courage for this. "Those to blame for everything", the representatives of the reaction who disguised themselves as "decent patriots," stated in a vague manner, "are those who spoke too much about socialism and who adopted an 'alien' ideology."

The Arab Socialist Union conducted vast propaganda work among the country's working people. Articles were published in the pages of all Cairo newspapers pointing out that the Soviet Union was the most solid and most dependable friend of the Arabs.

But the reaction in the UAR does not admit defeat. The "pro-American lobby" in Cairo is now trying to intimidate people by saying that without the West -- more accurately, without the United States -- the UAR will, allegedly, not succeed in overcoming the economic difficulties connected with the closing of the Suez Canal and other consequences of the war against Israel. The partisans of this "lobby" even blabber about the need to return to what they term the "old democracy" so that the bourgeois state-owning clique which still has retained influence in some places may take advantage of this democracy. The most violent antisocialist elements are causing the Egyptians, primarily the intelligentsia, to worry that the UAR will all but lose its independence if the present government continues to maintain close contacts with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

But these contacts are developing even more, despite the subversive activity of the Egyptian reaction, which has shown in the days of the Israeli aggression what its "patriotism" is worth. "The Soviet Union is our most reliable friend," M.H. Haykal, the editor in chief of the newspaper AL-AHRAM, told us. "The Soviet Union has done and still is doing for everything that depends on it effectively to help the UAR people to overcome the consequences of the Israeli aggression."

Such a conclusion is incontestable. It reflects the profound conviction of the Egyptian patriots who daily, nay every hour, feel the support of the friends from the socialist countries. The Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and the communist and workers parties throughout the whole world have rendered and still are rendering firm support to the Arab people.

The latest events have once more shown to the Arab leaders where the line lies between the genuine friends and allies of the national liberation movement and its enemies. The Marxist-Leninists, including those working under the difficult conditions of the capitalist countries, always have been and will be on the side of the national liberation forces.

publication of the charter in 1962.

"Thus, the lifting of censorship then did not bring about much change for the important reason that generations of journalists had already become so used to it that they could not imagine themselves capable of deviating from the old line. I used to tell the generation of journalists that succeeded us: The old situation was worse than censorship. Having a censor in our offices whom we could oppose would have been better than having a censor hidden in our own heads, whom we unconsciously followed."

"Journalism itself has developed tremendously. At the turn of the century journalistic writing was confined to translation; in the 20's to enthusiastic demands for the evacuation of the occupation forces; in the 30's and 40's, when Egyptian society was dominated by a small aristocracy, to gossip in salons. However, the 50's and 60's brought new issues which could not be handled by the old methods of translation, enthusiasm, or gossip. Journalistic writing demanded harmony between scientific treatment and journalistic method; it became a new science. The new challenge facing our profession."

"I now return to discussion of the Egyptian domestic front and how we can improve it to confront the mad American bull which is charging us. The question now posed is: what can we do on the Egyptian domestic front?"

"First, the important thing we must do now is "to move." I can rightly say that a long time has already passed without our taking any adequate action on the domestic front. The period I have in mind here is the 40-odd days between President Jamal Abd an-Nasir's speeches on 9 June and 23 July. This period seemed to have been a period of quiet on the home front! The reasons were:

1--The domestic front looked as if it had been stunned by the storm.

2--Then came the days when the front began to absorb the shock caused by the setback.

3--Then began the attempt to surmount the setback psychologically. This led to the important question: It happened, so what? What are we going to do next?

4--Then we began to search for the answer to this question. President Jamal Abd an-Nasir provided the answer in his 23 July speech. He spoke from a position of absolute confidence in his revolutionary leadership and from a profound feeling of the enormous responsibility entrusted to him by the masses.

"Although this period was one of quiet on the domestic front it was by no means a period of complete inactivity or paralysis. It was marked by

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

September 1967

Excerpts from Editorials by Muhammad Haykal, Al-Ahram, 3 and 10 August 1967.

"Since we have already established that US aims, according to the role the United States played in the Middle East crisis--and it was a major role, if not actually the leading one--were: 1) to strike at the Arab revolutionary regime, the foremost of which is the Egyptian regime; 2) to strike at the idea of Arab nationalism, considering it the greatest danger to US bids to dominate the area; and 3) to strike at and harm Arab-Soviet relations."

"Our discussion of the first US aim--to strike at the Arab revolutionary regimes, the foremost of which is the Egyptian regime--is bound to lead us to a lengthy discussion of the Egyptian domestic front for two reasons: First, this front was the enemy's original target because it is the biggest Arab front and the one most capable of taking action and exerting influence. Second, I, more than anyone else, am in a good position to speak about this front."

"Although I have repeated this remark on several occasions in the past, I find it necessary to stress the point again in the present circumstances. This is that in all I write I express my personal opinion or at most AL-AHRAM'S opinion, since I help in formulating its policy. Neither I nor AL-AHRAM can go beyond that. Undoubtedly we adhere to the general line which marks the course of the political and social revolution, but our expression of this line is a private endeavor."

"What distinguishes the Egyptian revolutionary regime from others is that it does not restrict freedom of thought and expression, not only in the press, but also in literature, art, and culture in general. The regime has not dictated any particular school of thought or any formula. This has always been a source of pride for us--we who assume responsibility for expressing the regime's general line."

"There will be no Pasternak in Egypt. No story like 'Dr. Zhivago' will be published outside our country if it was written here, because our experiences differ from others. I used to say to the new generation of journalists that the real restriction on our freedom exists within ourselves and that was the real challenge to our mission today. During the past 30 years Egyptian society has lived under abnormal conditions."

"Take myself. I began my journalistic career in 1942, when World War II was still raging. Martial law was in force by order of the British occupation forces, censorship was imposed, and the darkness was complete. After the war the darkness was not completely dissipated. The restrictions which had existed since September 1939 continued until the outbreak of the revolution in July 1952. Even after the revolution martial law continued in force for several years because of the revolutionary battles on the political and social fronts. Restrictions were removed only after discussion and actual

(cont.)

various attempts to seek reality. On the Arab level, the searching process took the form of talks in Egypt and several Arab states. This process culminated in the summit meetings in Cairo attended by Boumedienne, Arif, Al-Atasi, Al-Azhari, and Abd an-Nasir. This was in addition to the Arab foreign ministers' meetings in Kuwait and New York."

"On the level of Soviet-Arab relations, the searching process took the form of extremely important talks between Egypt and the USSR. These talks culminated in the visit of Soviet President Podgorny and Chief of Staff Zakharov to Cairo. On the international level, the process took the form of the activities of the Security Council and the General Assembly, both in the meeting halls and in the lobbies."

"All this shows that the quiet period was not actually one of complete inactivity and paralysis. Nevertheless, it should be followed by actions, and by action I do not mean hurried action. The action now required on the domestic front must stem from full awareness of reality and an accurate and faithful analysis of all circumstances. Reflex action cannot be considered action but nervous twitching."

"Second, the first step to take in our action--and this is unavoidable--is to again place the Egyptian armed forces in a state of readiness. I would like to say that nothing short of a miracle can prevent a return to the battlefield, and I do not think that we are living in an age of miracles. Even if a miracle were to bring about a solution that did not require such preparation, the preparation would be the first factor that would help bring about such a miracle."

"The first thing we must be aware of is that the enemy cannot intimidate us, that we are capable at all costs of making his life on our Arab territory impossible. All this can only take place by again placing the Egyptian Armed Forces in a state of readiness. It is fair to immediately add that action in this direction was given top priority even when the home front was still engaged in the process of absorbing the shock caused by the setback."

"Third, the popular forces are the real backbone of armed resistance and the real support behind the frontline. This leads us to the role of an important and vital process--the process of unleashing the masses' forces and of reorganizing them to serve the objectives of the battle and the aftermath of the battle. The masses--and this has been proved by experience--unreservedly give all that they have when the position is clear to them, when they themselves are part of the situation, when their role in the battle is defined, and when they have a clear picture of the aftermath of the battle, even if it is a general outline."

"We cannot say that war is waged for the sake of war, but for the sake of life. This is the only justification accepted by people for declaring war and going through the sufferings and torture which result from it.

Life means people, masses of people. This leads us to discussing the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), which constitutes the framework of the alliance of the people's working forces as well as the center of their political and social action."

"The theory on which the ASU is based--that it is an alliance of the people's working forces, a broader front of the masses run by a political organization committed to state policy--is in my opinion theoretically a correct formula for political action in the developing world and its complicated circumstances. But this formula, which is theoretically correct, has not been given a full opportunity to succeed in practice." There are several reasons for this:

1--Many times the ASU has become a center or centers of authority. Consequently, at times the ASU seemed as if it were trying to become a government above the government, or a government adjacent to the government. This is wrong. The ASU should remain under the government, which is in fact its progressive executive instrument.

2--By becoming a center or centers of authority the ASU was bogged down in ideologies which expressed the thoughts of individuals rather than collective thought which could serve as the basis for political action for the masses.

3--Organizational formalities have preoccupied some members from the real provision of the organization. There were more meetings than subjects to be discussed; there were more people employed in political action than there were volunteers; there were more reports than studies on problems and how to solve them; and the publications which were pasted on the walls lacked correct ideas that could move the masses. All this was wrong.

4--A number of ASU leaders did not try to learn from work among the masses, but from books or from others. This was wrong, particularly with regard to those leaders who were not in the first place ready for popular action. Furthermore, their previous experience was not close to the masses' pulsating hearts. Perhaps Abd an-Nasir's firm link with the masses results from his not once having tried to expound an ideology before the masses. He has always spoken what was in his heart and always reached the hearts of others. Thus, the new role which Abd an-Nasir has assumed in the ASU has prepared the ground for an essential change in the ASU's method of work and the daily exercise of its role among the masses.

"However, we have to be fair by saying that the ASU has succeeded in certain fields. It is now clear that the ASU's popular political action under the effective and direct leadership of Jamal Abd an-Nasir, to whom on 9 and 10 June the masses gave authorization for change, consists of two stages: an urgent stage calling for mobilization for the battle and a later stage calling for a program for the period after the battle so that a

clear view of the future will help strengthen present decisive efforts."

"How can we mobilize the masses for the urgent stage, and how can we mobilize them for the latter stage? Jamal Abd an-Nasir has already answered when he said: "The only course is democratic action." I cannot say, that the great achievements of the 23 July revolution were not made through real mobilization, or rather without true democratic action. To say that would be to commit a horrible crime against the epic of the modern Egyptian revolutionary struggle. But there are various kinds of democracy. Many of our revolutionary achievements have been made through what we may call democratic action. Because of their close contact with the feelings and attitude of the people, our leaders have made decisions which later were completely approved by the masses. Examples are the decision to nationalize the Suez Canal disregarding the danger, the decision to build the High Dam no matter what the sacrifices, and the socialist decisions which liquidated the 0.5 percent of the population that dominated Egyptian society. But now that the decision is one of life or death, victory or defeat, we need what we call democracy by cooperation. In other words, the masses should participate in evolving a measure before a decision is made. This calls for discussions with greater public participation--which need not be held in public if the circumstances so demand."

"To achieve this it is necessary to eliminate all the elements of fear, including fear of fear. In this connection I spoke previously of the need for guarantees regarding arrest, custody, and dismissal. I also touched on the question of consolidation of the institutions of independent thinking which are committed to the objectives of political and social struggle. These include the universities and the press. I then stressed that law should be the determining factor so that it "will be above all positions of power and above the will of individuals," as President Abd an-Nasir said in his speech in November 1966 when he opened the National Assembly session. I am not saying that after this it should not be permissible to arrest anyone, but that there should be predefinition of when such a measure is necessary. I do not mean by what I said about the question of custody that great wealth should be given back to the half of one percent; the question of wealth has been settled and resolved. But what remains unsettled is the question of the individual members of this class as human beings who have the right to live in dignity in society and to work, if they can, under society's new laws, without continuing to be ghosts lost in Egyptian society like disturbed, unsettled souls."

"Further, I am not saying that the penalty of dismissal should disappear from Egyptian society, but that dismissal should not be carried out without prior study, indictment, and defense. The rule of law does not mean that the right of legislation should stop now; it means that we can today, tomorrow, or at some time in the future issue any number of laws in accordance with the requirements of our circumstances."

"Socialist legality does not separate the spirit of the law from the

spirit of the revolution, but combines the two spirits. Hardly anyone raises an innocent voice when people accuse him of saying things he did not say. So then they appoint themselves as prosecutors, sentence him, and carry out the sentence. Egyptian patriotism is the history of this entire people. There is no need for new teachers. Egypt's history did not begin with the 23 July revolution. The value of the 23 July revolution is that it is a link in a long chain, but it is right to say that it is the strongest link. The socialist revolution has had its biggest successes without anyone's guardianship. Those who use terror are not men of principle no matter what they say."

"Fourth, work is now playing and will play an increasingly influential role on the conduct of the battle. This puts before us the problem of production and consumption. During the battle, complete mobilization is essential within every production unit no matter what the circumstances. The task of enlightened political action in such circumstances is not to oppose the administration (of production--ed.) but to support it and see that it has men capable of understanding the technological revolution, which is the strongest motivating force in our world. With regard to consumption, the masses have given, and are ready to give everything. All the masses want to know is that what they give is being used for the purpose for which it is given and no other purpose."

"Fifth, the various information media should light the way before the masses' movement. Any attempt to hide the facts will be wrong in a world whose frontiers have disappeared thanks to the advanced means of communications. Truth always finds its way to the one who wants it. The danger is that it often reaches him fraught with hostile intentions. Moreover, the attempt to arouse enthusiasm and excitement and to consider it as a form of mobilization has proved worthless. It has proved that it is incapable of supplying stamina in a war, whose battles demand stamina. Information media do not make news, but convey it. They may add their viewpoint whenever that is necessary. If news media resort to secrecy and to making news, then what reaches the masses most of the time is vague and incomprehensible verbiage, which hardly quenches the masses' thirst or helps mobilize them for action."

"This and other fields of action on the domestic front will undoubtedly be the subject of full discussion during the process of reorganizing the ASU Central Committee. The committee also knows that the US plan was and still is aimed at the Egyptian domestic front, at overthrowing the revolutionary regime. If the masses' movement of 9 and 10 June has blocked the way for any attempt to capitalize on the military setback by laying a siege around the entire domestic political situation, other kinds of attempts still continue. Therefore, the strengthening of the domestic front's defenses, the bridging of gaps in this front, the mobilization of the entire people's forces, and their alertness in their positions are necessary to frustrate US attempts preparatory to our seizing the initiative and passing from defense to offense backed by a consolidated and a solid base.

The Soviets, the puppet

Translated from LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, Paris

Why did the Soviet Union unleash U.A.R. dictator Nasser's army to confront the Israelis on the Sinai frontier? Who made the blockade decision? Who was behind the demand for withdrawal of U.N. peace-keeping forces? This report is attributed to a high Soviet *fonctionnaire* and was obtained in Moscow by a reporter for the leftist French journal, *Le Nouvel Observateur*.

OUR INTELLIGENCE was disturbed by the Israeli plan to make a raid into Syria to destroy the nests of the Palestinian commandos and eventually push onward to Damascus to overthrow the Syrian Government. It was with our approval that Nasser massed his troops on the Sinai frontier to demonstrate to the Israelis that if they launched an offensive against Syria, that country would not fight alone. Nasser believed this would discourage Israel from initiating the attack.

On the other hand, Nasser made the grave decisions of demanding the withdrawal of the U.N. "blue helmets" from the Suez Canal zone and blockading the Gulf of Aqaba on his own and then informed us about them. We told him that by playing these two cards at this time he was running the risk of unpredictable reactions. But he seemed confident, and U Thant's decision to withdraw the U.N. forces, which came sooner than expected, appeared to justify this confidence. At that point we advised Nasser that we were only committed to neutralizing the United States—that is, we would respond with an escalation equal to any escalation Washington might undertake—and that our support would not go beyond that.

When it appeared that the Israelis considered the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba as a *casus belli* and that the situation had become grave, the hot line between Washington and Moscow began operating. Kosygin and Johnson agreed to work on their allies—the one on Egypt and Syria, the other on Israel—in order to prevent them from resorting to arms. They also decided to keep military forces out of the theater of operations, to take the measures necessary to avoid contact between these forces and to immediately get in touch should an incident occur so that it would not degenerate into a serious conflict. (This is why Washington promptly notified us when planes took off from the Sixth Fleet after an American vessel had been attacked through an error by the Israelis.)

Nasser, knowing our reservations, promised he would not be the first to attack, but he committed the error of believing that the agreement between the two big powers allowed him all the time he needed for diplomatic maneuvers. In fact, he was partially a victim of his own propaganda which claimed that the Tel Aviv Government was merely Washington's pawn. He did not want to believe that this pawn might act on its own. Furthermore, he made a major mistake in neglecting the military side of the crisis. It did not even occur to him to put his airfields in a state of alert. This lack of foresight (or sabotage by some top officers hostile to Nasser) caused the destruction of the excellent military material we had given Egypt. The truth is we had overrated the ability of the commanding staff and logistics of the Egyptian military apparatus. Since 1956, the Egyptian Army units up to battalion level had made great progress in terms of courage and maneuverability, but the shortcomings above this level turned out to be shocking.

The second exchange on the hot line between Johnson and Kosygin dealt with an American proposal for a general settlement of the Middle East problem. Wanting to protect their oil interests on the Arab peninsula and the political positions in Jordan, the Americans proposed to settle the question of freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba by a compromise between the Israeli and Arab viewpoints. The Israelis would be compensated by substantial economic and financial aid from the United States, and a large-scale plan of economic aid similar to that which had been projected for the "Alliance for Progress" in Latin America would be launched for the benefit of all the Arab countries, including Egypt and Syria. The Soviet Union was invited to make a parallel effort. Kosygin replied that he needed more facts, but that *a priori* he was not opposed to this project.

In order to test the reactions of the Egyptians to the plan, Johnson invited one of the men closest to Nasser, Zakaria Mohieddin, to come to Washington. On our advice, Mohieddin accepted the invitation which only strengthened Nasser's convictions that hostilities would not erupt. In addition, the Israelis skillfully hoodwinked him. At the very moment when Dayan was making the final preparations for his lightning offensive, he stated at a press conference that his country would not attack first. But in fact the Israelis had decided to act and confront the world with the *fait accompli* of their military victory.

The drama unfolded at dawn on Monday, June 5. Almost all of the Jordanian and Syrian air forces and two-thirds of the Egyptian air force

were destroyed on the ground. Dramatic conversations took place in Cairo between Nasser and our ambassador and in Moscow between the Egyptian Ambassador and the top members of the Soviet collective leadership which had been called into an emergency meeting. The Egyptians demanded that we, the Soviets, immediately replace their destroyed airforce. But where were the new craft to be landed? All the Egyptian airfields were under fire by Israeli planes except Luxor and Aswan in Upper Egypt, and these fields were poorly equipped to handle such attacks. The Egyptians suggested sending the planes to the Sudan, to Iraq or to Libya; we refused because the two or three airfields in the Sudan and Iraq are small and inadequate. As for sending Soviet planes into Libya, a few miles from the American base, Wheelus Field, Washington would regard it as a provocation—and we did not want war with the United States.

The dialogues between the Egyptians and us grew strained. They accused us of abandoning them in the hour of need. We replied that we had committed ourselves to supporting them against American action but not against Israel, whose power they had underestimated. After the success of the Israeli offensive we decided, without consulting the Egyptians, that we could accept an immediate cease-fire in the Security Council because the Arab positions on the ground were still not catastrophic. De Gaulle, who was in communication with Kosygin, shared our view.

The Egyptians mistakenly believed they could take the first punch thrown by the Israelis in ground fighting. Once that danger had passed, they would begin a long war which they could win due to the large area and numerical superiority of the Arab world. We told them they were substituting their wishes for realities since their tanks would be beaten without air cover. Nasser did not want to believe us and launched his counter-offensive, which failed. He closed the door on the only reasonable solution: to pay the price in ground fighting under the least disadvantageous conditions possible and gain precious time during which he would be able to quietly rebuild his air force.

As Nasser continued his desperate struggle, we became aware that the Arab world and a large part of the Third World, not to mention the Chinese, disapproved of the inadequacy of our support to Egypt. Suddenly, some of our leaders began thinking of taking the risk of limited military action on behalf of Egypt within the framework of a "prudent challenge" to the United States. However, this solution was finally rejected. (As elsewhere, the pressure of Jewish opinion made its weight felt in the U.S.S.R. right up to the leading circles.)

The latest events prove the imperialism of Israeli policy and our attitude toward Tel Aviv is going to get even tougher. The Israelis are now the mad dogs of the Middle East. You don't kill a mad dog because he has a right to live, but you do have to punish him. We now firmly believe this punishment is required to bring Israel to its senses and that undoubtedly it will take place some day. The Israelis have pointed out the road the Arabs must take to launch a surprise air attack one day on the vulnerable territory of tiny Israel.

The political and diplomatic struggle we are going to wage alongside the Arabs, especially the Syrians and Nasser, will be difficult. As for the Americans, we shall exploit to the utmost the blackmailing of their oil interests and navigation through the Suez Canal.

We shall fight at all the conference tables to force the Israelis to evacuate the territories they conquered. And we shall wage an incessant propaganda war, particularly among the young Arab generation, against all the cowards, opportunists and elements linked to the Anglo-Americans who show any readiness to cooperate with Israel—as long as Israel does not agree to the concessions that we shall demand of her.

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN

12 August 1967

Struggle for Cairo leadership is brought into open

By VICTOR ZORZA

The struggle in the Egyptian leadership, which has been boiling up under the surface of public life since the end of the war, came out into the open yesterday with an article in "Al Ahram," which accused the Arab Socialist Union of trying to take over the government of the country.

Mr Haykal, the editor of "Al Ahram," strongly counter-attacked the extremists who had earlier accused him of being a "defeatist" who wanted "reconciliation with Israel."

There ought indeed to be action, he said, "but I do not mean hurried action—if our inaction is far better." Any new action had to stem from reality and from a full analysis of the situation. "Reflex action cannot be considered action—it is merely nervous twitching." What he wanted was "a calculated pause," during which the military forces should be brought to a state of readiness.

The miracle

And then what? "I would like to say that nothing short of a miracle can prevent a return to the battlefield—and I do not believe that we are living in an age of miracles." Does this mean, then, that a resumption of the war is inevitable? Not quite—and this is presumably why "Al Gomhouria" denounced him and those in whose name he speaks as "defeatist."

He explained: "Even if a miracle were to bring about a solution that did not require such (military) preparations, these would be a primary factor in bringing about such a miracle." So the miracle in which he did not believe in the preceding sentence becomes a practical proposition, capable of bringing about a solution that might otherwise not require military preparations—that is, a settlement without war.

Of course, any such proposition has to be wrapped up in Egypt today in a thick fog of words—and Mr Haykal is a past-master at this game. He is, no doubt, addressing himself as much to the Israelis as to Egypt's own "hawks." He wants political concessions from Israel that

will make it possible for Egyptian "doves" to divert from thoughts of revenge those forces in Egypt that can think of nothing but the ultimate solution.

The argument here is evidently between those who want a resumption of hostilities, if only by way of guerrilla warfare and infiltration, and those who believe that any thought of war should be abandoned—certainly for the time being and possibly for good.

Mr Haykal's main stress, on the need for a programme of domestic development, presumably reflects the views of those Egyptian leaders who have had enough military adventures. Hence the criticism of him as a "defeatist" in "Al Gomhouria," the official organ of the Arab Socialist Union, which also took him to task for advocating the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States.

Mr Haykal dismisses all these charges with contemptuous silence, which shows the strength of his position, and of those who are backing him. He does concede that his articles express his own view, or "at the most" those of his paper, "But nothing more"—which, coming from a man who has been for many years the recognised mouthpiece of President Nasser, must be taken with a pinch of salt.

Not academic

President Nasser is the head of both the Government and of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), and the distinction which Mr Haykal makes between the two may therefore seem academic. It is not so to him. At times, he said, it seemed as if the ASU had tried to put itself "above the Government." This was wrong. It should remain "under the

Government." In trying to "compete" with the Government, the ASU was creating a "duality of authority and a confusion of responsibility."

The whole trend of his argument showed that he was attacking the ASU as an alien Left-wing force which was trying to challenge Nasser. The ASU, he said, was bogged down in ideology, and was expressing the thought of particular individuals. Its leaders got their ideas "from books," not from the masses. Nasser, on the other hand, had firm links with the masses, because he had never tried to expound an ideology to them, but had always spoken from the heart.

His own programme of action reads almost like a charter of rights for those sections of Egypt's society which had suffered from the excesses of "socialisation." He was not asking for the restoration of property to the class which had been deprived of it, he said. But individual members of this class, he said, should be treated as human beings, who had the right to live in dignity, and who should be allowed to work. They ought not, in his view, remain as "ghosts lost in Egyptian society, like disturbed, unsettled souls."

It was necessary to ensure, in his view, that men capable of understanding the technological revolution should have posts of responsibility—which means that members of the middle classes and the intellectuals thrown aside by the "revolution" should be rehabilitated. Indeed, he believes that there ought to be no dismissals without prior investigation and without providing an opportunity for the person concerned to defend himself against his detractors.

Under the system of "democratic action" prevalent in the past, Mr Haykal said, the leadership took the major political decisions and then the masses approved them. But what was necessary now was "cooperative democracy," whereby "the masses should participate in evolving a policy before a decision is made." This called for public discussion, which in turn required guarantees against arrest and dismissal and "the consolidation of institutions of independent thinking," such as the press and the universities.

He pleaded for the rule of law which, he said, should be the determining factor—and he recalled a speech in which Nasser said that the law should be "above all positions of power, and above the will of individuals."

He spoke of "ideological terror," and he deplored the situation produced by it. "Hardly anyone raises an innocent voice when people accuse him of saying things he did not say. So

then they appoint themselves as prosecutors, they sentence him, and then the same people carry out the sentence."

Unprincipled

Was he replying to those who had levelled unfair accusations against him through the pages of "Al Gomhouria," or was he raising broader issues? "Those who use terror," he declared, "are not men of principle. I will not say more than that."

But he did. He went on to speak of the need for an honest and truthful press—and he drew on the lessons of the war to drive his point home. Any attempt to conceal the facts from the public was wrong, for truth always found a way through the frontiers, thanks to modern media of communication.

The attempt to arouse enthusiasm by words alone had proved incapable of providing strength in time of war. The information media did not make news, they conveyed it. If they had "recourse to secrecy and to making news, then what reaches the masses most of the time is vague and incomprehensible verbiage."

Mr Haykal's insistence that he is speaking in his own name, or at the most in the name of his paper, only begs the question, for in Egypt only those are allowed to use the press to express their "own" views who happen to share the views of the authorities.

Both "Al Gomhouria," which attacked Mr Haykal, and his own article in "Al Ahran" yesterday invoke by implication the authority of President Nasser. They cannot both be right. They are merely obeying the rules of the totalitarian game, as do the contending factions in China, all of which invoke the authority of Mao—although some are clearly less for Mao than others.

On past form and on the internal evidence of the Cairo press debate, Mr Haykal is likely to be closer to President Nasser than "Al Gomhouria." Therefore "Al Gomhouria's" attack on Mr Haykal as a defeatist who wanted reconciliation with Israel must have been aimed at that part of Nasser's entourage—and at that half of Nasser's own mind—which would prefer a realistic long-term settlement with Israel.

From COMMUNIST SOURCES

MOSCOW NEWS

July 29-August 5 1967

15th Anniversary of
the Egyptian Revolution

CORRECT PATH

THE 15th anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, July 23, will be marked in a complex situation. In June some of the territories of the UAR and other Arab states were seized as a result of Israeli aggression. The Egyptian people passed with flying colours the test of loyalty to their revolution. Moreover, the latest events show that they are resolved as never before to fight actively against any who attempt to encroach on their freedom and independence or divert them from their course of building a new life.

The revolution of July 23, 1952, stemmed from the people's deep dissatisfaction with the pro-imperialistic monarchy. They suffered under double oppression—from domestic and outside exploiters. Formally Egypt was independent but in fact the British did what they liked in the country. Using the enslaving 1936 agreement, Britain occupied Egypt, preserved her military bases on its territory and controlled both home and foreign policies. The bourgeois governments carried out a policy of compromise with the British. The dissipated King Farouk was in debt and absolutely indifferent to the lot of his people who suffered from hopeless poverty, ignorance and inhuman privations.

The years preceding the 1952 revolution were years of incessant unrest among the people. Under the pressure brought to bear by the masses the Government of Egypt was obliged to annul the 1936 treaty on October 15, 1951. Britain threw a heavy expeditionary force into Egypt. Tension mounted. A spontaneous guerrilla war broke out against the British occupation troops in the Suez Canal zone. A revolutionary situation took shape in the country. On July 23, 1952, a group of officers staged a coup and took power into their hands. But the "Officers' Committee" which organised the coup was made up of representatives of various political trends and was not united. Lieut.-Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser was the leader of the more active adherents to an anti-imperialist course. They compelled King Farouk to abdicate and to leave the country. In June 1953 Egypt became a republic, with Nasser as its President. He proclaimed a new course for Egypt which later brought the country to the non-capitalist way of development.

President Nasser was a nationalist-patriot. In 1953 he published a book, *Philosophy of Revolution*, in which he declared that the aim of the revolution was to win complete political and economic independence and create a "just society". But the very logic of the struggle to put into effect these aims prompted him and other leaders to assume more and more a left outlook both in home and foreign policies—for example, to im-

plement an agrarian reform and adopt the broad masses feel tangibly measures against the arbitrary rule of the fruits of the new revolutionary foreign capitalists. policy—a policy of deep socio-economic transformations. Therein lies the secret

President Nasser chose to cooperate closely with the socialist countries. In 1955 in Cairo he reached agreement with them on the delivery to the UAR of the arms it needed for its defence. The arms were supplied without conditions. Egypt concluded a number of equal agreements with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries on economic, scientific, engineering and cultural cooperation.

The imperialist states showed strong hostility towards Egypt when Nasser decided to nationalise the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956. Though Egypt was legally entitled to do this, the West gave this measure a hostile reception and eventually began armed intervention against the revolutionary regime in Egypt. The Suez crisis played a decisive role in the further fate of Egypt. In answer to the aggression, the Egyptian Government began still greater cooperation with the socialist states, and, above all, with the Soviet Union, which had offered Egypt its firm support in time of need

In the subsequent years, to strengthen the economy Nasser's Government developed the state sector in industry and carried out the second stage of the agrarian reform. Continuing to struggle against the comprador bourgeoisie, which was closely connected with foreign monopolies, Nasser's Government is nationalising big internal capital. The power of the feudal landowners in the countryside is being curtailed. The Government is acting more and more vigorously in defence of the rights and interests of the fellahs.

A new temporary constitution was proclaimed on March 23, 1964. It stated that the basis of the Egyptian society was a "social system, which excludes exploitation".

The UAR's new course is bringing it considerable success in socio-economic development. In 1961-1965 annual growth rates in industrial output in the UAR were over 7 per cent, as against 5.5 per cent in the industrially-developed capitalist countries. The age-old dream of the Egyptian people to harness the Nile is being realised. The second part of the Aswan High Dam is going up with Soviet technical assistance. Eight hundred new industrial enterprises have been built in the UAR since 1957. Unemployment has been drastically reduced. Nasser's Government has established a minimum wage for the workers. It is introducing social security measures to pay sickness benefits, old-age and disability pensions. Workers' children have the right to free education. In short,

the Middle East crisis showed the Egyptian people who is their real friend. The UAR press is giving the highest appraisal to the stand taken by the USSR, which was and remains a loyal friend and ally of the Arab peoples in their just struggle for freedom, independence and socio-economic progress. "This friendship," as Gamal Abdel Nasser said in one of his speeches, "is the cornerstone of freedom for the Arabs. It and will continue to be the most durable foundation for the independent course pursued by the United Arab Republic and its progress towards the implementation of the noble aims of the July 23, 1952 revolution."

RAJK ARUTYUNOV

Militancy or Moderation: 3 Assessments

Which Way the Arab Camp?

Russia

By Anatole Shub

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Aug. 8—Soviet policy in the Mideast has been proceeding along two tracks:

- Russian diplomats have been keeping options open while waiting for the Arab states to sort out their own policies.

- Soviet propagandists have been reshaping the history of the Mideast crisis in an effort to turn military and political defeat into eventual propaganda victory.

Limited Maneuvering

Although it has been clear since Premier Kosygin went to the United States to meet with President Johnson that Russia wants a settlement rather than renewed war in the Mideast, diplomatic maneuvering is limited by two hard facts: Russia cannot and will not force the Arabs to accept terms they consider humiliating, and only the United States—certainly not the Soviet Union—can prevail on Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab territories.

Thus Soviet diplomacy has been seeking to influence Egyptian President Nasser, primarily, toward a bargaining position which Moscow thinks Washington would consider reasonable enough to press for Israeli withdrawals. A mutually acceptable arrangement would call for the Israelis to withdraw in return for some sort of Arab declaration of nonbelligerence.

This sort of deal, if it can be struck, appears to Moscow greatly preferable to the guerrilla-type war being demanded by some Arab extremists, or to prolonged stalemate leading ultimately

to separate peace between Israel and moderate Arab states like Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon.

Unity Ranked First

In the Soviet view, Arab unity behind Nasser is essential to impress Washington when Nasser's willingness to proclaim nonbelligerence (and open the Suez Canal and Tiran Strait to Israeli shipping) falls short of Tel Aviv's demands for a formal peace settlement.

The diplomatic maneuvering, however, will consume months, with major decisions by Soviet policymakers probably unnecessary until well into the autumn.

In the meantime, though, the propagandists are having their day in the campaign to get Israel to withdraw from occupied territories in Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

If and when the Israelis do withdraw—even as a result of American diplomacy and Arab concessions—it will be another great victory for the Socialist "forces of peace," according to the propagandists' strategy.

Early last month the Soviet Union and its Arab friends were insisting at the United Nations that censure of Israel and her unconditional withdrawal from occupied lands were preconditions to a Middle East settlement. But there have been reports in the past weeks that the Kremlin has adopted a softer line, and that it has persuaded Egypt and some other Arab nations to follow along.

Some reports date the shift to a purported secret understanding between President Johnson and Soviet Premier Kosygin at their Glassboro summit.

Those who see the Soviet Union exercising a moderate influence point to these events:

• On July 21, as the special session of the U.N. General Assembly moved to adjournment, the Soviet Union tentatively accepted a compromise resolution that linked withdrawal of Israeli forces with recognition that all states have a right to exist. (Opposition, led by Algeria and Syria, blocked General Assembly acceptance.)

• The Syrian Communist Party last week urged the Arab nations to abandon their vituperation against Israel and work toward productive ends.

• Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, editor of the authoritative Cairo newspaper Al Ahram and a confidant of Egyptian President Nasser, wrote last week that diplomatic relations between Egypt and the United States—broken by Cairo—were essential.

• At the recent Arab foreign ministers' conference in Khartoum, Sudan, Egypt reportedly asked its allies to give serious consideration to the U.S.-Soviet plan they had helped sabotage at the United Nations.

The three accompanying articles assess these apparent shifts from intransigence to flexibility.

Egypt

By Victor Zorza
Manchester Guardian

LONDON, Aug. 8—Strong evidence of a struggle between militants and moderates in the Egyptian leadership was provided today in a Cairo journal's attack on Mohammed Heikal, the editor of Al Ahram who has long been regarded as President Nasser's closet political confidant and spokesman.

Al Gomhouria, the official organ of the Arab Socialist Union, attacked Heikal as a "defeatist" who wanted reconciliation with Israel.

Last week Heikal advocated the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States, on the ground that Egypt could not afford a head-on clash with it. Even the Soviet Union, he wrote, sought to avoid such a clash.

This, it is now clear, was only part of a much broader argument about the future direction of Egyptian policy.

Today's Al Gomhouria told its readers that "what the chief editor of a certain Egyptian newspaper writes expresses no more than his own view." This will certainly be a surprise to them, for Cairo has always sought to foster the impression that what Nasser thought today,

Heikal wrote tomorrow—or even yesterday.

The question now is whether Heikal really did represent President Nasser's view in last Friday's article, or whether he had gone over to the "opposition."

Whatever the explanation, the original article and today's attack on it reveal the existence of men in the Egyptian leadership who want to forget about the confrontation with Israel, and those who still have dreams of revenge.

The chief editor who called for the liquidation of our battle," Al Gomhouria wrote, was a "defeatist." His views meant that "we have no alternative to submission," which was contrary to Nasser's own call for a continuing struggle.

On the face of it, Al Gomhouria's argument represents the left-wing view, which identifies progress to socialism with extreme anti-Israel policies. But while progress to its own type of socialism is something the Soviet Union would welcome, the Kremlin certainly does not wish to see a resumption of the war with Israel.



PRESIDENT NASSER

PREMIER KOSYGIN

... has flexibility replaced intransigence in Mideast?

Israel

By Alfred Friendly

Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, Aug. 8—

Foreign policy officials here discount recently reported Egyptian proposals for a settlement of the Middle East crisis as not being seriously intended and in any event utterly unacceptable to Israel.

The compromise that Egypt reportedly is now willing to accept would involve withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories in exchange for an end to the Arab belligerency against Israel and some kind of recognition of its right to exist.

Israeli officials are certain that Egypt does not seriously contemplate giving Israel what would be the immediate corollary of a state of "nonbelligerence"—free passage in the Suez Canal to Israeli ships and cargo.

What Does It Mean

Yet, the Israeli officials argue, what else would "non-belligerency" mean if it did not mean a state of peace in which that right was acknowledged. Israel would obviously not withdraw troops unless it was acknowledged.

Israeli foreign affairs officials are fairly certain that the Soviet Union has not yet set its future policy in the Middle East and accordingly has not yet called on its allies and clients in the Arab world to make the concessions necessary to obtain a settlement with Israel.

These officials minimize the significance of recent Soviet recommendations to the Arabs that they abandon their vituperation against Israel. They say that the suggestion was only a tactical one, and not indicative of basic policy. They feel that the Russians merely implied that the continued Arab call for Israel's extinction was hysterical and unrealistic, and not likely to win sympathy for the Arab causes.

"Russia is not trying to defuse the Middle East," one Israeli policymaker declared. "It is simply trying to defuse the United States."

Soviet's Interest

It is in the Soviets' interest to lull the United States in order to gain time and rebuild its position, Israel feels.

That the United States might be lulled has been a constant Israeli fear since the six-day war with the Arabs ended.

Israel was infinitely relieved that the American-Soviet resolution in the United Nations proved unacceptable. Israel saw a resolution leading to joint East-West pressure for concessions — principally the withdrawal of its troops—as fatal to what it considers its defense necessities.

Neither "nonbelligerence" nor international guarantees are acceptable to Israel. Peace, in its view, can derive only from direct negotiations and a settlement between the immediate parties—Israel and the Arabs.

50X1-HUM

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

September 1967

RE-WRITE OF SOVIET PARTY HISTORY STALLED
On Eve of 50th Anniversary, Even Lenin's Role Distorted

A Communist historian -- like all historians living under autocratic regimes -- must cope with the distortions and falsehoods flowing out of a monopoly on all sources of information. Worse yet: because of the vital importance of "historical material" as the foundation on which "scientific" Marxism-Leninism bases its claim to authority, the top Party leadership is most directly concerned with the work of historians. The Communist historian is obliged to celebrate the true faith. He is repeatedly instructed that history "cannot be a cataloging of events, cannot amount to a mere description of facts": quite the contrary, it must demonstrate clearly that truths of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine (as interpreted by the current Party line), by combining "profoundly scientific argumentation with popular and easy-to-grasp presentation." (Pravda, 22-24 June 1962; see below.) But his greatest frustration (and danger) lurks in the all-too-frequent changes in those "truths" which history must demonstrate -- resulting from changes in the Party leadership, or sometimes even abrupt changes in line under the same leadership. And -- in view of the bitter, bloody infighting which has characterized most of its history, especially its 50 years of power -- it should not be surprising that historians of the CPSU face the toughest and most dangerous tasks of all.

Soviet re-writing of history has often been exposed in the past. The subject has unusual interest at this juncture, however, because: (a) current Soviet efforts to re-write histories of both the Party and the nation for this 50th anniversary year have been embarrassingly frustrated by internal CPSU dissent on a number of vital issues, most important of which is the treatment of Stalin and Stalinism; and (b) we now have a remarkably informative, apparently genuine, detailed "inside" account which delineates the nature of the problems and the conflicts that have snarled work on the delayed new 6-volume re-write of the CPSU's own history.

This "inside" document is a summary of a discussion of the draft 3rd volume of the new CPSU history at Moscow's Institute of Marxism-Leninism (IML) by a large group of "Old Bolsheviks" (Party members active at the time of the Revolution) with members of the editorial board and representatives of the ideological section of the Party CC, 250 persons in all. Attached is a reproduction of a shortened version of Soviet and East European studies. (The original account was carried in the underground Moscow Russian-language journal Phoenix 66. The publisher of the illegal journal, young poet Yuri Galanskov, has reportedly been under arrest since early 1967.) The meeting is said to have taken place in the summer of 1966, and the seriousness of the conflicts may be seen in the fact that the 3rd volume has still not been published, despite the urgency of the task.

(Cont.)

Prior to the CC decree on the 6-volume history, the CPSU had published 7 earlier 1-volume versions of its history. None remained valid more than a few years, except for Stalin's own personal version, the famous "Short Course", which, during the 15 years from its first appearance in 1938 to the dictator's death, became one of the world's all-time best sellers -- 60 million copies in almost 100 languages. Although the "Short Course" disappeared from Soviet bookstores and libraries soon after his demise, Stalin's heirs were apparently too involved in the succession struggle to attempt to re-write during the next 5 years. Khrushchev finally secured his hold on the top in 1957-58, and a new, Khrushchevian 1-volume history appeared in 1959.

One year later, the CPSU/CC (in a decree dated 22 June 1960) directed its Institute of Marxism-Leninism (IML) to begin preparation of this unprecedented new 6-volume Party history (about 600 pages per volume), to be completed by 1965. There was little further mention of the project until June 1962, when Pravda publicly set forth the detailed tasks of the new history in a massive article spread over its issues of the 22nd and 24th. Without explaining the implied 2-year delay, Pravda now stated that the new history was to be completed by 1967, the 50th anniversary year. Pravda's specific instructions to the authors provided a remarkably detailed picture of the Communist view of the role of history and historians in demonstrating the "truths" of the Party line: e.g., "it was no accident, but a logical development, that Russia became the birthplace of Leninism."

A top-priority task of the new version is "to insure the total elimination of the Stalin cult in the field of Party history." It was to illuminate Stalin's errors and vacillations in the philosophical discussions of 1908-09, during the crucial events of 1917 and the Civil War, and must "sharply censure" his "grave offenses against Lenin's behests," his abuses of power, his political and military mistakes before and during WWII, his responsibility for repressive measures against the Party, government and military cadres, his mismanagement of agriculture, etc.

An Izvestiya editorial a few weeks later covered much the same ground, adding that the first volume of the new work was scheduled for publication in 1963. A year behind that amended schedule, Pravda on 21 September 1964 announced that the first volume "is to appear shortly" and reprinted the full text of its lengthy Introduction: this introduction was a typically Khrushchevian polemic, which sharply condemned the Stalin cult, declared that 1953 was "a most important turning point" in the history of Party and country, and denounced Chinese policies and "schismatic, adventurist activity" explicitly, as well as implicitly under the cover of Trotskyite "Left Communism." Not surprisingly, Khrushchev's name appears 5 times, including references to him as "the true Leninist" and to his "glorious 70th birthday." Less than a month later, Khrushchev was ousted and the Party immediately launched measures to make him an "unperson." It is not known how much of the 250,000-copy

first printing of this ill-fated volume had been distributed by the time that the Party watchdogs caught up with it, but the New York Times reported from Moscow on 12 January 1965 that it had been "withdrawn for changes." When the second printing finally appeared later in 1965 (with a small-type printer's note acknowledging that it contained certain "refinements, changes and additions" over the first), Khrushchev's name was missing from the Introduction, and references to Stalinism and the Chinese were toned down.

Beyond that ill-conceived Introduction, Volume 1 covered the earliest history of the CPSU, up through the split of the Bolsheviks from the Mensheviks in 1903: presumably there was little or no difficulty in recounting history which is so ancient and on which the Party line is so hardened. The same was probably true of most of the material in the 2nd volume, which appeared in 1966 and carried on from 1904 to the outbreak of the February Revolution in 1917. But the momentous events of 1917 are obviously remembered vividly by many of the "inside" participants who are still alive -- and their memories differ sharply from the version which the editors were trying to pass on to posterity, as we see in this record of the comments of the "Old Bolsheviks." What seems to be particularly significant is that, on a subject so near and dear to them, these individually powerless oldsters mustered the courage to band together in sharply critical opposition to this draft, even though it bore the stamp of the Party's prestigious IML and had already been reviewed and commented on by other powerful figures. (In his opening comment, in a passage omitted by the Survey editor, Pospelov expanded on this theme, naming Army political chief Yepishev among others who contributed.) Perhaps even more noteworthy is Brezhnev's support of their right to register their criticisms, and the Institute's reluctance or inability to push its version through in the face of these unofficial objections -- despite what must be extreme pressure to get this story of the events of 1917 published before the 50th anniversary.

The highlights of the attached summary can be outlined as follows:

a. Perhaps most significant are the direct charges (supported by strong evidence) that the authors of this massive falsification are just as guilty of conscious, deliberate distortion as any falsifiers of the past. Moreover, a number of young historians who wanted to attend the session were sent home before it started, in an obvious measure to hide the extent of the falsification from them. Zorin puts it bluntly:

"Why are we afraid of the truth? It is shameful that yesterday the young historians were not allowed in. If you sit by yourselves on top of enormous material, so much the worse for the material. Who will write history after you? To sit on top of historical material like a cur on a stack of hay, to keep Lenin's documents under lock and key -- these are crimes indeed...."

(We note several other references to the existence of a number of Lenin documents which are still being suppressed, although the IML is now engaged in publication of a new 55-volume "complete" edition of his collected works.)

b. The comments of these Old Bolsheviks are characterized by their complaint that the authors (and implicitly the IML) are still haunted by the ghost of Stalin. They harshly criticize Stalin, Stalin's "Short Course" version of the Party's history (in which he "overshadowed the Party, the people, and Lenin"), and the authors of the new draft for accepting the Stalinist distortions of the "Short Course." In addition to building his "cult," Stalin is accused in passing of having been erroneously in opposition to Lenin on a number of issues and tactics during those crucial events of 1917, of having suppressed Lenin's letters to the Party from exile before the latter's return, of having advocated (during the period when Lenin was forced into hiding after the "July days" uprising was put down) a court appearance by Lenin which (Romanovsky alleges) would have seen him "physically liquidated", etc. The "Short Course," which the draft praises as having played a useful role in propagandizing Leninism (according to comments of Volfson, Rashal and others), is denounced by the Old Bolsheviks as "the result of the torture of Leninism revolutionaries in Stalin's prisons" (Snegov) which "played a major role in the distortion of the Party's history" (Fofonova), etc. And condemnation of the authors of the draft for accepting a Stalinist version of history reaches the level of derision: "Let tender mamas protect baby Stalin by all means" (Snegov).

c. At least one of the OB's (Dinitas) frankly acknowledges: "Stalin was not the only guilty one. Much should be disclosed...."

d. Particularly noteworthy is the cynical pessimism expressed by the son of Vladimir Antonov-Ovseyenko, one of the more prominent OB participants in 1917 (whose own account was published in Moscow in 1957 under the title V Revolyutsii (In the Revolution) -- and especially his sardonic recommendation that the new draft 3rd volume be replaced by John Reed's Ten Days That Shook The World! That glowing account of the revolution written by a Harvard-educated American eye witness (buried in the Kremlin wall) was "unreservedly recommended" by Lenin as "a truthful and most vivid exposition of the events" in his 1917 "Foreword" for the book, yet Stalin slighted and practically suppressed it -- understandably, because his name is barely mentioned in this action picture of those crucial events.

e. Only one of the participants speaks out in fulsome praise of Stalin -- Shagaev (or Shagayev), who admits that he has always been a junior grade apparatchik and that his speech "may be at a low level"; although he was reportedly shouted down vigorously, it may be assumed that the Stalinist defense he so simplistically recited strikes a responsive chord among a significant element of Soviet society.

Other current Soviet "re-write" problems: In 1963, while the IML was still struggling to get the first volume of the 6-volume CPSU history ready for the press, the Party issued the first edition of a greatly condensed version of its history in a modest little 340-page volume in pocketbook format under the title KPSS Spravochnik (CPSU Handbook). Although its style was comparatively terse and factual, with no flowery adulation, this was clearly Khrushchev's Party history: policies and developments were described from his subjective point of view; his criticisms of Stalin, the "anti-Party group", and Zhukov are there; and K's name appears 26 times in the last 45 pages, almost the only name mentioned positively in the post-WWII period. A year after K's ouster, it was replaced by a 2nd edition obviously re-written to purge the record of the Khrushchev cult: he is not made an "unperson," but his name is mentioned only 5 times in connection with specific events; some of the policies he had promoted are criticized; -- and his criticism of Stalin is toned down.

Even more interesting is Soviet handling of a 2-volume Short History of the USSR (Kratskaya Istoriya SSSR) prepared by the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the second volume of which (covering the period following Lenin's return from exile) was signed to the press 1 June 1964. Like the 1st edition of the Spravochnik, it is heavily Khrushchevian in flavor. This version of history was "de-Khrushchevized" in the English "translation" of the same 1st edition, published in 1965 by "Progress Publishers," Moscow: this purported translation was actually edited in much the same manner as the 2nd edition of the Spravochnik, as described above. The editing extends to the choice of illustrations: whereas the Russian original's photograph of the 20th CPSU Congress clearly shows K. giving his keynote report, the English version uses a photo of the entire hall in which no one is recognizable! (We have no record of the appearance of a Russian 2nd edition of this work: perhaps it has been held up while work proceeds on the 12-volume version described below.)

In 1966 the History Institute of the Academy of Sciences began publication of a 12-volume History of the USSR, the first 6 volumes to cover the period up to the February Revolution. Two volumes of the first part appeared in 1966 and one in 1967. It is reported that Volume 7, covering the period 1917 through 1920 has just appeared: reportedly it conveys a "balanced" view of Stalin's role similar to the revised English "translation" of the Short History. It seems likely that this "balanced" view of Stalin's role would be similar to that in the draft 3rd volume of the Party history to which the Old Bolsheviks objected so strenuously.

* * *

The "dirty linen" of Soviet historiography shows most embarrassingly in the situations described above, but the same pattern of distortion and falsification can be discerned across the board in the work of Soviet historians. Following are references to three books containing broad

analyses of the work of Soviet historians:

CONTEMPORARY HISTORY IN THE SOVIET MIRROR, ed. by John Keep. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964. This is a collection of selected papers and summaries of discussions at a conference on the subject held in July 1961 at the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etude Internationales, Geneva, under the auspices of the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Participants include some of the world's top specialists on Soviet affairs.

REWRITING RUSSIAN HISTORY, ed. by Cyril E. Black. New York: Revised second edition (paperback) by Vintage Books, 1962. (First ed. 1956) This symposium by a number of specialists was intended "to illustrate the main trends in Soviet historical writing in the field of Russian history." Except for the first chapter, which was rewritten for the 2nd edition, the essays refer primarily to the Stalin period.

RUSSIAN HISTORIANS AND THE SOVIET STATE, by Konstantin F. Shteppa. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1962. An in-depth study by a former Soviet Professor of History at Kiev University and Senior Associate of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences who "went West" during WWII.

SURVEY, London
April 1967

THE PERSONALITY CULT

We reproduce below two recent documents reflecting the continuous struggle about Stalin's role in Soviet history. One of them is a shortened version of a discussion on the proposed text of the third volume of the new History of the CPSU. It took place at a closed meeting held at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism between some old Bolsheviks and Party historians. The other document is a verbatim report of a similar discussion held there about the book by the historian A. M. Nekrich, 22 June 1941, published in the spring of 1965, of which the relevant passages are also reproduced below to give the background of the discussion.

It is clear that the question of the historical interpretation of Stalin remains a most sensitive one both in the Sino-Soviet dispute and inside the Soviet Union. Although the suggestion that the twenty-third party congress would produce a partial rehabilitation of Stalin was not borne out, references to Stalin in the Soviet press have since become more favourable. The reappraisal is limited to his role in the war; other aspects are played down. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the German attack on the Soviet Union, Marshal Grechko wrote in New Times that Stalin had ignored warnings of the impending German attack and had been wrong in his assessment of the political-military situation. But the anniversary of the defence of Moscow provided an opportunity to mention Stalin favourably. Marshal Zhukov in Sovetskaya Moldaviya (20 October 1966) said that he 'did a colossal job in organising the necessary strategic reserves and . . . achieved, one might say, the near-impossible'. Marshal Rokossovsky in Moskovskaya Pravda (18 October 1966) paid a tribute to Stalin as an inspiring leader who was able to encourage military commanders in a difficult situation 'with a few words'. Marshal Budenny (Izvestiya, 6 November 1966), described the 7 November 1941 military parade in Red Square before Stalin as a 'turning point in the psychological attitude of the masses'.

Other favourable comments appeared in Pravda (5 November 1966), Komsomolskaya Pravda (6 November 1966), and Economic Gazette (no. 44). Brezhnev in his speech at Tbilisi on 1 November 1966 named Stalin among Georgian 'ardent revolutionaries' and this, according to Pravda, received prolonged applause.

Such remarks, although relatively mild as rehabilitation, stand in striking contrast with the tone of the book by Nekrich and of the two discussions reproduced below.

Discussion of the draft third volume of The History of the CPSU

Present: 250.

Presidium of the conference: Academician P. N. Pospelov, member of CPSU since 1896; F. N. Petrov; Academician I. I. Mints; D. M. Kukin, vice-chairman of IML editorial board; Glebov and others, representing the ideological section of the CC of the party.

Pospelov (IML): More than 1,000 comrades have taken part in the discussion of the manuscript and draft of the third volume. The authors were guided by the documents of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and by material already published and in the archives. There were many difficulties, as layers of subjectivist judgments which had been included in earlier decades, including the last few years, had to be stripped off. We must tell the truth about this . . .

Fofanova, M. B. . . . From the middle 30s onwards the influence of Stalin's cult of personality made itself felt, particularly in 1938.

The *Short Course* played a major role in the distortion of party history. In the *Short Course* Stalin overshadowed the party, the people, and Lenin. His influence was felt in many books on the history of the party, making them unreadable. In the third volume of the present *History* I am mentioned. I am supposed to have said that Lenin arrived in Petersburg at the end of September. I said nothing of the kind. There are documents proving that Lenin returned before the CC decision. Here are two shorthand records of mine and comrade Rakhya's examination on the eve of 1934 (reads). Here are N. K. Krupskaya's memoirs (reads). Why is this material not used by the editors? I and comrade Rakhya were questioned for the party history, but on 1 December 1934 Sergei Mironovich Kirov was killed, and you know what became of the history of the party and of the party itself . . .

Borisov (old Bolshevik): Comrades! The editors avoid the awkward question of Stalin's and Kamenev's position during the preparations for October. Together with Bolshevik delegates I visited Stalin after the February revolution. We asked: 'Why is the question of the Soviets' seizing power not being considered?' Stalin replied: 'The Provisional Government is not all that weak; it is about the same as the Soviets'. That was his statement.

At the time we did not know Lenin's position. We missed Lenin, we missed his letters in which he talked about the party's tasks. The party was not told about Lenin's letters. That was the fault of Kamenev and Stalin. They were in charge of the All-Russian March conference. We did not hear a word from them about Lenin's letters and his position, although they knew. And later, Stalin had the impertinence to say that he and the party both made a mistake. Lenin characterised Stalin's desire for unification as treason to socialism. How is it possible not to write about this? . . .

Romanovsky (old Bolshevik): NEP should be defined as Lenin defined it at the tenth party congress. It must be noted that the sixth congress rejected Stalin's proposal, when the current situation was being discussed, that Lenin should appear before the court. It should be shown that Stalin spoke at the congress in favour of Lenin's appearance before the court on condition that the Provisional Government gave a safe conduct. And at that time they would have offered every kind of guarantee, but Lenin would have been physically liquidated. . . .

Chairman: Comrades: As there is a meeting of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences today, to confirm the appointment of corresponding members of the Academy, comrades Pospelov and Mints have gone there. They will take part in our meeting tomorrow.

Oslikovskaya (old Bolshevik): . . . The more I study the question of collectivisation, the more I am convinced that Stalin put Trotsky's ideas into practice. He became more of a Trotskyite than Lev Davydovich himself.

Comrade Pospelov named organisations and people from whom he received comments on the third volume of the *History*, but he did not say to what extent these comments were used. What will happen about our statements here? Are our observations and suggestions made merely for later editions and not for this one? Why is our criticism not heeded?

Dinitas (old Bolshevik): We are all interested in making the *History* objective. The fourth and fifth chapters are not bad. One cannot say the same about the earlier chapters. The editors write that the party was faced with difficult tasks after it emerged from underground, but they do not say what these tasks were. Documents can be read in different ways. Borisov's speech was very good. It is necessary to consider his remarks on the March conference and on Stalin's position. The fact that Stalin did not publish Lenin's letters must not be passed over in silence. He only published one, and that belatedly. It is necessary to say this. Future generations will learn from our *History*. Stalin is not the only guilty one. Much should be disclosed. . . . References should be made to sources. . . . The distribution of forces

on the eve of October is wrongly presented. It should be shown who were the *mezhratontsy*—Manuilsky, Uritsky, Lozovsky. Trotsky was at the head of them. They left their mark on the revolution. This must be mentioned.

Milonov (old Bolshevik): . . . About Stalin's speech on Lenin's fiftieth birthday: Stalin said that he had corrected his mistakes. But look at the original source. Stalin said one thing, while during the personality cult period his speech on Lenin's anniversary looked different.

About the date of the rising: there are some lapses into Stalinism: the 24th is too early, the 26th is too late. This is not Lenin's point of view, but Trotsky's, which Stalin shared. (Voices from the hall 'Exactly', 'That's right.') This unfortunately also crept into Khrushchev's speech, slipped in by some adviser who was ignorant of the facts. It also got into the letter about differences with the Chinese Communist Party.

On 6 November 1918 Stalin published an article in *Pravda* maintaining that Trotsky, Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, participated directly in all the work connected with the leadership of the rising. Stalin maintained that the party owed its victory in October first and foremost to Trotsky. Strange as it is, this article was reprinted in the collection *October Revolution*, published in 1932. . . .

Volfson (old Bolshevik): . . . Lenin said that the listeners should be told the whole truth. We sinned in teaching party history from the *Short Course*. How is it possible to maintain now that it was useful? The authors write that Stalin was the head of the Revolutionary Military Council (RVS) of the southern front. They maintain that the RVS put a quick end to the actions of traitors. But we know that Lenin sharply criticised Stalin and Voroshilov for their erroneous attitude towards military experts. At the eighth party congress, Stalin's position is presented as correct. This is wrong, Stalin objected to the criticism of the Tenth Army command. That means he was practically in agreement with the military opposition. Together he and Voroshilov liquidated many military experts loyal to the Soviet regime. It was for this that Lenin criticised them at the eighth congress. Why should Stalin be whitewashed? This gives rise to Stalinism and it is very difficult to fight with this weapon against our ideological opponents. It is not our weapon.

On page 218 the mistaken position of Bukharin and Pyatakov on the nationalities question and on the right of workers to self-determination is mentioned. However, only Pyatakov is criticised. If Bukharin was wrong, he should be criticised too. But there is silence on this. Why? Because at the eighth congress Bukharin stated that on the question of workers' self-determination he was following Stalin's statement to the Third Soviet Congress.

This is an anti-Leninist assertion, since Stalin's mistakes should not be covered over; his anti-Leninist assertions, his anti-Leninist position, must be mentioned.

I have taught in universities for a long time. Stalin and his nearest comrades-in-arms Mekhlis and Ezhov did everything possible in order that our party should be portrayed in history as a party of 'spies' and 'enemies of the people'. Young people often ask me: 'How could Lenin find himself surrounded with "enemies" and "traitors"? Who supported him and why?' The twentieth and twenty-second party congresses rehabilitated many names.

Stalin made Lenin's nearest comrades-in-arms into so-called spies and saboteurs.

The authors of the draft have no single point of view, they swing from side to side. They follow the methods of the *Short Course*. The editors print portraits of outstanding party activists, leaders of the Central Committee (Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Rykov), while in the text they only talk about their mistakes, and nothing is

said about their positive rôle.

This must end, so that history can become truly scientific.

Rashal (old Bolshevik): Principles have not been sufficiently clarified in this work. We must remember that it is to appear for the fiftieth anniversary of October. We expect a precise and truthful description. Views about the past are still influenced by temporary factors. This can also be seen in the six-volume *History*. How is it possible to praise the *Short Course* in a new textbook? Overcoming the consequences of the personality cult is a directive of the party, but how is this directive embodied in the draft? Peter Nikolaevich Pospelov trusted the authors, while they treated history from the position of the *Short Course*. They maintain that the *Short Course* played a huge part in propaganda, the propaganda of Leninism. This is a mockery of Lenin's words! I went specially to see Sergei Pavlovich Trapeznikov about this. On 14 April last, the head of the science department of the Central Committee saw me and stated that he does not share the assessment of the *Short Course* made by the editors of the volume and promised to give relevant instructions. . . .

(The meeting lasted from 10 to 18.30 hours with an hour's break.)

Second Day

Same members of the Presidium (with the exception of Academician Mints).

Sedugina (old Bolshevik): Party history must be written vividly and convincingly. This is not yet the case. There is no vivid interesting material. The writer must be convinced of his rightness if he is to be able to convey it to the people. Stalin's cult was very harmful for the party and its history. Many facts and events were distorted. None of the congresses suffered such distortion as the sixth. There is no stenographic record, while as regards minutes the same questions are interpreted in different ways. How are they being used? Persistent attempts are made to show that Stalin led the congress. That even after the sixth congress Stalin alone prepared the revolution. Thirty years of Stalin's dictatorship, and later of its consequences, could not pass without a trace. This found its reflection in the *Short Course* which is again being popularised by the present authors. When I looked at the composition of the sixth congress, I found that of 28 members 17 had been subject to repression and the activity of these comrades was distorted in the *History*. The activity of such Bolsheviks as Bukharin and Bubnov was effaced and distorted. Repressions with regard to them cannot be justified. Slandering them in the six-volume edition does not add to its prestige. . . .

Look what is written in the draft—that at the sixth congress a Central Committee was elected—a general staff to lead the insurrection. It is said that it was a militant and united general staff. Now look through the minutes of the congress, see who were the members of this general staff. In Stalin's time almost all of them were numbered among spies and traitors. How did these spies and traitors manage to lead the Great October Socialist Revolution? How could they lead a country which stood up to the whole capitalist world? To write of seventeen people as spies and traitors means defaming the Communist Party.

The congress Manifesto was written by Bukharin. It has a number of virtues, why keep silent about it? . . .

Zorin (old Bolshevik): The draft shows only too clearly the birthmarks of the *Short Course*. The authors themselves do not deny this. They write a paragraph to the effect that the *Short Course* played a big part in the propaganda of party studies. Its removal is not a cosmetic operation. . . . Is the third volume a scientific work or a compilation? The conceptions of the *Short Course* slip in not only in the introduction. And then we will write that our history is being falsified abroad, while we do the same. Where are our articles against our own falsifiers? Why are we afraid of the truth?

It is shameful that yesterday young historians were not allowed in. If you sit by yourselves on top of enormous material, so much the worse for the material. Who will write history after you? To sit on top of historical material like a cur on a stack of hay, to keep Lenin's documents under lock and key—these are crimes indeed. Not one of Lenin's documents can be published without your permission, nothing can be written about Lenin. What does the approval of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism mean? We can neither write nor publish, while bourgeois falsifiers attack.

The draft should show the Leninist norms of party life and how they were distorted by Stalin. This would be both scientific and right, while you keep to a straight line saying that internal party discipline existed all the time. But what then did the twentieth and twenty-second congresses say? We must return to retrieve what was lost.

Your conception is that of the Chinese leaders. You are on the same side as the bourgeois falsifiers. Party history should not justify distortions. You write that Trotsky tried to substitute Trotskyism for Leninism, while you remain silent on Stalin's substitution of Stalinism for Leninism. Do you think young people will believe you? Can young people believe a lie? . . .

Snegov (old Bolshevik): Comrades! First of all I should like to thank the CC in the name of the old Bolsheviks. After the letter of the 34 Old Bolsheviks to the four secretaries of the CC and to Comrade Brezhnev, a meeting with the participation of Old Bolsheviks to discuss the third volume of the party *History* has finally come about. . . . The conception of the third volume is such that it willy-nilly breeds scepticism in young people. Young people are not sceptical because they have not been told the truth, they are sceptical because they have not been told all the truth.

It is said that one man cannot change as much as a whole army can. Stalin proved that it is possible to destroy more than a whole army, he destroyed millions. . . .

Let tender mamas protect baby Stalin by all means. Why, he certainly did not commit any mistakes in October. The 'boy' himself confessed in 1925 that he made mistakes. Confessed! But how? He maintained that he shared these mistakes with the majority of the party. Does this mean that the majority of the party was with Stalin and not with Lenin?

Lenin said that listeners should be told all the truth. He taught us that party history should be approached in a particularly truthful spirit. Lenin raised the question of expelling Zinoviev and Kamenev from the party before October. But three years later Lenin, as a historian, appraised their position and wrote that Kamenev and Zinoviev erred because they feared isolation. Stalin said definitely that a union with Mensheviks was necessary. Lenin said that he would rather remain alone than join the Mensheviks. However, the careful 'mama' continues to keep silent on this position of Stalin.

Chairman: Your time is up. (Voices, 'extend it', 'let him speak'.)

Snegov: I need another forty minutes.

Chairman: Everybody else had twenty minutes and you want forty more?

(Voices, 'give him forty minutes', 'extend it'.)

Chairman: I put it to the vote. Who is for giving another forty minutes? A majority. Who is against? Two.

Snegov: When Steklov exposed the Provisional Government during the March Conference, Kamenev and Skrypnik declared that there was no question of supporting the Provisional Government. While Stalin declared that he did not agree with them on this. Stalin showed his typical subjectivism. Lenin finished his speech at the Finland railway station with the appeal: 'Long live the Socialist Revolution.' But *Pravda* did not print this.

There are three volumes of party history by Shlyapnikov. He wrote that Stalin, Kamenev, and Muranov, returning from Siberia, welcomed

Lvov and the others. . . .

On the question of the Brest peace. The authors of the draft maintain that the Trotskyite-Bukharinite group spoke against it. Is this the case? Were not Frunze, Dzerzhinsky, and Kuibyshev also against the Brest peace? What was Stalin's position? The authors of the draft write that the Trotskyites and Bukharinites tried to wreck the signing of the Brest peace. Lenin told them, if we do not sign it, we will sign the death warrant of the Soviet regime within three weeks. Is this the case? Let us look at the CC minutes. Here it is written: 'Stalin is wrong when he says that it is possible not to sign. If we do not sign, we shall sign a death warrant for the Soviet regime in the course of three weeks.' This is Lenin speaking. How can one falsify documents to such an extent? . . .

The fact is that some people expected the twenty-third congress to rehabilitate Stalin. Nothing has come of it and nothing will! History will not forgive the torture of revolutionaries, of Leninists, which took place in Stalin's prisons. The *Short Course* is the result of these tortures.

The twenty-third congress again confirmed the line of the twentieth and twenty-second congresses. There is no return to Stalin's times. (Prolonged applause.)

Shagaev: I have always worked in the party in a junior job. My speech may be at a low level and perhaps this may cause some anxiety. The aim of the draft is to give an objective assessment of party history. However, this has not been done. Everything was concentrated on Stalin's personality cult, the total condemnation of Stalin. This was done by many who spoke here. You slandered Stalin maliciously (indignant outcries 'toady', 'scoundrel', 'get down', 'he guarded Stalin and he's still a swine'. The Chairman pacifies the meeting and reminds them that they must give everybody a chance to speak for twenty minutes). Stalin led the country properly. Lenin was in favour of Stalin becoming General Secretary. (Indignation throughout the hall. Shouts of 'lies!', 'slander!' The Chairman restores quiet with difficulty.) Here is what I wrote when Khrushchev was in power: 'Stalin was the most firm and consistent Marxist. You, Khrushchev, have wrongly called him an apostate. You would probably call Lenin's letter to the congress a testament, a political testament. Collective leadership was impossible with Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, and other Trotskyites and Bukharinites. Bukharin dragged us towards capitalism, crying "Enrich yourselves".' (Explosion of indignation in the hall. Cries: 'Lenin carried out collective leadership with them!' 'Stalin got rich by stealing all the credit due to the party and to Lenin!' The Chairman again calls for quiet in the hall.) Stalin managed by skilful manoeuvres to get rid of Trotskyites and Bukharinites. That was right. It was they who, by their anti-party activity, made Stalin even more angry, and he destroyed many innocent men. You cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs. There is nothing strange about this; we only gained from it. Stalin was an inflexible Marxist. . . . He guarded Lenin, but it turned out the other way round. (Indignation throughout the hall. Cries: 'Madman, come to your senses!' 'Scoundrel'. The Chairman again restores quiet in the hall.) Stalin was faithful to Marxism to the end of his life. Stalin was a remarkable genius. He carried out collectivisation, industrialisation, the defence potential of the country was brought to a high level. (Indignation continues in the hall.)

Chairman: Shagaev, your time is up.

(Shagaev asks for an extension. A vote is taken. Unanimous vote that the right to speak be withdrawn.)

One hour's break

In the interval the son of Antonov-Ovseyenko appears—Anton Vladimirovich Antonov-Ovseyenko. Old Bolsheviks approach him. Anton Vladimirovich says: 'You're wasting your time; nothing will be altered in the third volume, unless it is for the worse. I haven't the strength left to fight. I would like to suggest that the third volume of the History be replaced by a new edition of John Reed's *Ten days that shook the World*.' A lively debate is carried on in the corridor. Old Bolsheviks are indignant because young historians were not admitted to the meeting. One of them says: 'To send back the son of Ion Emmanuilovich Yakir! He is a historian; how can they act like this? Put sentries on guard! From whom do they want to hide the truth? From the children of those who gave their lives for the happiness of the people, who went into battle under Lenin's banner!'

After the break the suggestion is made that the conference be finished that day. The procedure is changed, reducing the twenty minutes for each speaker to ten. . . .

Shutskeper (old Bolshevik): Shagaev's speech fills me with indignation. It does not correspond to the line of the twentieth and twenty-second congresses. After Stalin's letter to the editors of *Proletarskaya Revoliutsiya* and his destruction of party scientific personnel, conditions for the writing of a truthful history were absent. How is it possible to write that the *Short Course* had a positive influence! One lyrical 'detail'. In 1937, on 21 January, the anniversary of Lenin's death, my twelve-year-old son asked a question at school: 'Did Lenin have any comrades-in-arms besides Stalin?' For this I was expelled from the party. The six-volume edition should be a step forward. It should not propagate the ideas of the *Short Course*. . . .

Rusakov (old Bolshevik): When shall we abandon the description 'and others'? How is it possible to write about the 26 Baku Commissars and name only ten, and then write 'and others'? I ask the editors kindly to name all 26 Baku Commissars. . . .

Petrovsky (a young historian): I have spoken to old Bolsheviks several times and said, your ranks are getting thin, you are leaving us while all you say remains within four walls, and the protocols of your conferences will not become the property of historians for a long time. You say that the history of the party will be written by young communists when you are gone. I would like to say that they already write it and write it well. I started with this subject as I should like to relate a disgraceful fact which happened yesterday when many of my comrades—young historians—were sent home. They were not allowed in here. I was not allowed either, in spite of the requests of old Bolsheviks. With great difficulty I obtained official permission to attend the present conference. And what's more, when permission was obtained, the representative of the editors said to the person who gave the official permission: 'Mind, you'll answer for all the consequences!'

Pospelov (Chairman of the editorial board): Who could have said that? It is impossible that it could have been a representative of the editors!

Petrovsky: The comrade who said that and who did not allow me and other young historians into the building is sitting in the hall.

Pospelov: Give the name.

Petrovsky: There is the comrade (pointing). Her name is, I think, Gorbunova. She can confirm that that is what happened. (Gorbunova rises blushing: 'Yes, that is how it was') . . .

Bugaev (leader of the commission): We tried to polish the history of the CPSU from the ideological-theoretical aspect. The team of authors shares the anxiety of the old Bolsheviks. We are morally and politically responsible to the party for the contents of the volume. A series of commissions of the editors-in-chief and of the CC worked

on the draft. The reproaches to the editors by comrades Roshal, Fofanova, Snegov, and Zorin and their accusations, that we describe the history of the party from the cult position, are wrong. We have been accused of distorting events. That is incorrect. We accept concrete comments. We shall try to correct all faults. We have received 120 comments from scientific collectives and individuals. They have given their opinion as to what should be improved and altered. In fact, we spent two days discussing the problem of one person. We are not writing a multi-volume biography of Stalin. (Noise in the hall. Shouts: 'Don't blacken party history by putting him side by side with Lenin.' 'How can you talk about it?') We must follow the resolution of the CC of 30 July on the personality cult. (Noises in the hall. Shouts: 'The twenty-second congress declared him a criminal!', 'We have no right to forget that Stalin's body was taken out of the Lenin mausoleum for mass crimes!' 'The resolution of the twenty-second congress has not been repealed!') In a multi-volume history Stalin's merits and faults must both be shown. Comrade Shutskeper told of her expulsion from the party in 1937, while the *Short Course* was published in 1938. (Shutskeper, from her seat: 'What has that got to do with it? I spoke of teaching in schools and its distortions before the appearance of the *Short Course*.) All remarks must be checked.

Pospelov: The general evaluation of our work has been positive. Every discussion will, no doubt, be of help in putting the finishing touches to the third volume. The remarks made must be checked and compared with documents. . . . Fundamentally, Stalin defended Leninist positions during the October period. It was he and nobody else who retorted to Preobrazhensky that the possibility was not excluded that Russia would be the first pioneer of socialism. I can declare this officially and it will be mentioned without fail in the seventh volume of the history of the USSR. Irresponsible remarks have often been made here to which the leaders of fraternal parties took exception. Some were subjective remarks. This is a one-sided approach. Recently we were in an office where a young man said that Yaroslavsky had sold himself to Stalin cheaply. (Voice from the hall, 'He spoke the truth'.) Comrades, those who knew Yaroslavsky, can they say this about him? How can one say this about Yaroslavsky? When I started to contradict the young people, they told me: 'Comrade Pospelov, you have one advantage. You knew Yaroslavsky and we did not', and they added that consequently they can judge objectively. Yaroslavsky cannot be portrayed as a sort of lickspittle. There was an editorial commission of the CC for the *Short Course*. The book was discussed seven times at meetings of the CC. Stalin had some merits in the struggle against Trotskyism, we must mention this. Comrade Zorin's accusation that the Institute is concealing some sort of documents is wrong. Documents can be published only with the CC's permission. The diaries of Lenin's duty secretaries were also published with the permission of the CC. If we do not publish something, it means that the shorthand record has not been corrected. We must note Stalin's services, mistakes, and crimes. Permit me to thank you for taking part in the discussion of the third volume of the *History of the CPSU*.

Romal (three minutes on a point of information): I did not make the observations to the editors which Comrade Bugaev accuses me of making. I am sincerely convinced that P. N. Pospelov places too much reliance on the editorial board. I have protested and I will continue to protest against the popularisation of the *Short Course*. I do not understand why Comrade Pospelov and others favour this. But I repeat again that I had a talk with the head of the CC science department, Comrade Trapeznikov, who declared that he will give relevant instructions to the editorial board to delete the wording which praises the *Short Course*. Comrade Trapeznikov was in full agreement with this

protest. Why have no measures yet been taken to delete from the draft this shameful wording?

Shagaev (three minutes on a point of information): I have been accused of speaking against the decisions of the twentieth and twenty-second congresses (Noise in the hall. Shouts: 'Quiet', 'Stop babbling'.) All of you who speak against Stalin are in the same company as Trotskyites. I have been in the party for sixty years and I have defended Stalin and will continue to defend him. (Indignation in the hall: shouts: 'Get down'.)

Chairman: Comrade Shagaev, this is not a point of information, you are out of order.

Shagaev: I maintain that they are all Trotskyites. Whoever is against Stalin is a Trotskyite. (Noise throughout the hall.) I will finish reading my letter to Khrushchev against attacks on Stalin. (Shouts of indignation. Shagaev is not allowed to speak. The chairman asks him to leave the platform. Raising his fists Shagaev leaves the platform.)

Neizvestny (old Bolshevik): (three minutes on a point of information): Comrades, I suggest that a commission be formed to assist in writing the history of the party.

Chairman: Comrades: We are not empowered to form any kind of commissions. We shall not form any commissions.

50X1-HUM

Page Denied

Next 39 Page(s) In Document Denied

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 29, 1967

"WHY I FLED FROM COMMUNIST NORTH KOREA"

What are the Reds up to in North Korea? A rare close-up of that country emerges in this exclusive interview with Lee Su-kun, a North Korean newspaperman who recently made a dramatic escape. He was interviewed by K. M. Chrysler of the staff of "U. S. News & World Report."

AT SEOUL

Q Mr. Lee, what is life really like in North Korea?

A I have traveled throughout Eastern Europe, and I feel there is less freedom in North Korea than in any other country in the Communist bloc. It is just like Russia when it was controlled by Stalin.

As far as North Korean leaders are concerned, the Eastern European countries are no longer following Marxist doctrine. They are too enlightened, too liberal in their thinking and living. If the people of East Europe want to go into a church or see a Western movie or dance, they can. Not so in North Korea, where leaders are afraid of granting freedom of any kind.

There is no such thing as personal freedom or liberty. Everything is strictly controlled. For example, jobs are all allocated by the Government. You cannot change jobs without official approval. It is not even wise to marry without the permission of the Communist Party. You can do so if you dare, but you are penalized and condemned as a "freedom-lover."

Another example: In theory, you can travel freely within North Korea, but in actual fact you cannot. Why not? Unless your trip is officially sanctioned, you are not given any rations during your travels, and your pay is stopped. Besides, you probably couldn't afford the fare, anyway. For instance, the one-day, 200-mile trip from Pyongyang to Chongjin on the East Coast costs 50 or 60 won [\$19.46 or \$23.35]—a whole month's wage for most people.

Q What is the mood of people up there?

A Superficially, the North Koreans in their daily life appear to be supporting the regime and the party. But underneath they are unhappy and dissatisfied. Not everyone is displeased. The 1.3 million party members presumably like things the way they are. But most of the remainder of North Korea's 14 million people have little cause to applaud.

For example, the relatives of the 5 million refugees who fled from North to South after World War II do not like the artificial division of Korea created by the Communists. Now that all business is run by the Government, there is no place for private businessmen. Intellectuals and the well-educated are stifled, as are other people in a position to know how things are elsewhere in the world, such as newspapermen.

Probably the most disillusioned North Koreans of all are those who voluntarily repatriated themselves from Japan, expecting beauty and freedom. They found something quite

Q Why aren't there more defections?

A Defecting is easier said than done, because of two large obstacles: Escape is particularly difficult from a society which builds a high, strong wall between its citizens and the rest of the world. And those few in a position to get away are seldom able to free their families too, so they rarely attempt escape.

Q How is the standard of living in North Korea?

A Except for the minority of top officials who live reasonably well, the people are not very well off. Most people do not get enough to eat most of the time. Food is cheap, but scarce. There is a chronic shortage of rice, our staple food, and all food is strictly rationed.

A productive worker is allowed only 700 grams [about 1½ pounds] a day. This might be acceptable to someone who sits at a desk, but it is insufficient for a man doing hard manual work, and half the population lives on farms. Nonproductive workers such as housewives and children are limited to 400 grams [not quite one pound] per day. And 30 to 50 per cent of everybody's daily ration is not rice but beans, corn or some other grain.

Clothing is not rationed, but the gap between wages and prices efficiently cuts down on purchases. For instance, this suit I am wearing would cost 300 won [\$116.73] in North Korea, almost two months of my wages there. And I was considered well paid. A college graduate starting on a newspaper gets only 45 won [\$17.51] a month. A skilled worker earns around 60 won [\$23.35] monthly, and it is hardly enough to live on.

Q What about housing?

A As far as I know, every country in the Communist bloc has a housing problem. There isn't enough and what there is of poor quality. North Korea is no exception.

Q How is the Government economic planning working out?

A Everybody knows that North Korea's Seven-Year Plan has failed. It was supposed to end this year, but they have had to extend it to 1970.

First of all, the ideological conflict in the Communist world resulted in a cutback in aid from Russia.

Secondly, a big military build-up has been made at the expense of normal economic growth. The demands of the military forces and the civilian forces cannot coexist. A shortage of capital has been aggravated by military requirements and, as a result, many factories planned for nonmilitary goods have never been completed.

This leads to a third point: Economic development in North Korea has not been very well co-ordinated. Targets were overambitious. Plans have seldom been thought through, and controls were inadequate. The authorities have created a shell of heavy industry without paying attention to the parts needed to support it. In effect, they installed the backbone but forgot to add ribs, flesh and muscle.

Q You mentioned a military build-up. What's going on?

A It is impossible for a civilian like me to say with any accuracy. Military matters are a carefully guarded state secret. But I can make these comments:

Great efforts have been made to modernize and upgrade

quired an Air Force which it did not have in 1953. And they have Russian-made surface-to-air missiles. About five years ago I heard that one of these North Korean SAM's knocked down an American U-2 spy plane.

There are about 470,000 in North Korea's military forces, including reserve units. In addition, the entire population has undergone military training. Everyone—men, women, farmers, laborers, white-collar workers, even actors and actresses—is a member of the militia.

Finally, I should explain that the military forces are top-heavy with rank. For example, platoon leaders have been carefully trained so that, when the next war starts, they can immediately take command of a company. The military forces stand ready to expand almost instantly.

Q How much military aid are they getting from outside?

A I don't know the quantities, but airplanes, missiles, submarines and other Navy ships have been acquired—heavy weaponry North Korea cannot produce itself.

I don't think China is in a position to provide much military aid. Russian economic and military aid was resumed last year on a large scale after North Korea declared its independence from China. Even more aid is expected in the future.

Q What's behind this big military build-up?

A North Korea's main goal, politically and economically, is communization of South Korea. In order to do this, they feel they must beef up their military forces in preparation for an invasion when the time is ripe.

Q In recent months, there has been a sharp increase in incidents along the Demilitarized Zone which divides Korea. Do these tie in with North Korean ambitions to take over the South?

A There are various explanations for North Korean harassment along the Demilitarized Zone. Last autumn, for example, there was a shoot-up to protest the visit of President Johnson to Korea. In past weeks, I am convinced my defection is responsible in part for DMZ raids. The raiders are trying to kidnap a South Korean or U. S. officer in retaliation and use him for propaganda purposes.

But a more important reason for the recent harassment was the presidential election in the Republic of Korea on May 3.

The Communists were trying to show that there can be no stability in the South as long as Korea is divided. And they also are trying to emphasize that the dispatch of two Republic of Korea divisions to Vietnam has weakened South Korean defenses. They are particularly interested in preventing the dispatch of more Korean troops to Vietnam.

Q Are the Korean Communists supplying much aid to the Communists in Vietnam?

A They are positively and very aggressively supporting North Vietnam to the best of their ability, with such things as small arms and ammunition, tractors, diesel engines, small ships and chemical fertilizer.

About 100 North Korean Air Force pilots have been sent to Vietnam to gain combat experience, but no regular troops are involved. As far as I know, none have been requested by Hanoi.

Q What do the North Koreans think about the split between Russia and Red China?

A North Korean leaders were not surprised by the split and they do not consider reconciliation possible, at least not in the near future.

Moreover, from their point of view, the split has its advantages. One-nation control of the Communist bloc is no longer possible. Each Communist nation is now permitted more independence.

A new policy line announced last August was a direct repudiation of Mao Tse-tung and his "cultural revolution." In reality, it signaled more independence from China and more dependence upon Russia.

But it must be emphasized that Pyongyang leaders feel North Korea is the best example of Communism at work. They term the Chinese "leftist adventurers," and criticize the Russians for being "revisionists."

Q What have the Communists really accomplished?

A I imagine Kim Il Sung [North Korea's Prime Minister] is chiefly pleased with his development of heavy industry, creation of a strong military force, and successful brainwashing of North Korea's youth.

But he has failed miserably in the most important thing: He has been unable to improve living standards, or permit even a small ration of personal liberty.

TIME, JUNE 2, 1967

NORTH KOREA**A Case of Frustration**

Along the 151-mile Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Korea, North Korean soldiers have taken to using female dogs in making their patrols. Reason: they hope that the bitches, when in heat, will lure South Korea's male patrol dogs away from their handlers—thus winning canine defections to the North. This petty bit of harassment shows just how far the Communist North Koreans are willing to go to stir up trouble on the border. They have increased their subversion and infiltration attempts by 40% this year, and in recent weeks have continued to step up the pace.

In the first five months of 1967, North Korea committed 59 border violations, half of which resulted in clashes between patrols. Seven weeks ago, 60 North Korean and 40 Republic of Korea soldiers clashed and, for the first time since the armistice agreement in 1953, the R.O.K. forces had to use artillery fire to throw back the North Koreans. The North Koreans have also been infiltrating subversives and saboteurs into South Korea, about half of them by sea. They now have fast (40 knots), 60-ft. to 70-ft. boats, designed to look like fishing craft, that regularly land agents along the Southern coast. Others infiltrate across the DMZ.

Nasty & Vicious. In just such a manner last week, North Koreans struck twice at U.S. and South Korean positions in and near the DMZ. Just before dawn, a North Korean band slipped into a barbed-wire compound of the U.S. 2nd Division just south of the DMZ and planted bombs under two Quonset barracks; the resulting explosion killed two Americans and injured 16 others, along with two South Korean soldiers. A few days later, North Koreans who were attempting to infiltrate a guard post

in the same area exchanged fire with U.S. and South Korean troops, wounding an American and a South Korean. As a fitting finish to the week, Communist shore batteries also opened up for 20 minutes on a fleet of South Korean naval vessels just south of the DMZ.

Though part of the harassment is an effort to distract U.S. attention from South Viet Nam, the bigger reason for North Korea's provocations is to divert its own people's thoughts from their deepening economic troubles. "The Communist actions," says General Charles Bonesteel III, the United Nations and U.S. Eighth Army commander in Korea, "are nasty and vicious, but they amount largely to frustrated impotency."

The man behind the actions is North Korea's shrewd Premier Kim Il Sung, 55, Korea's World War II resistance hero against the Japanese. Kim took full party power in 1955 and, through intrigue, murder, imprisonment and character assassination, managed to wipe out every shred of political opposition. A ruthless strategist and master manipulator, he holds onto power by the old Stalinist tactic of periodic purges. The most recent came last October when he shuffled the Central Committee, sacking three key officials and longtime associates.

Kim has been far less successful in manipulating the economy. In 1961, he launched a seven-year plan as part of the broader "Chullima" development program—named after the legendary Korean flying horse that could cover 300 miles in a single bound. Kim has been forced to admit that his flying horse has acted more like an old grey mare, has therefore extended the deadline for the plan's vaunted goals to 1970. To get the investment he needs for development, he has quietly shifted his allegiance from Red China to Russia, which is far more able to afford North Korea's aid requirements. Along the

way, his government is going deeper and deeper into hock to Russia; without Russian fuel, all North Korean jets would be grounded and a complete cut-off in aid would probably cripple the country. Kim has also made a bitter enemy of Peking; wall posters have denounced him as "a traitor to the worker class and a disciple of Khrushchev"—a Communist leader that Kim could never abide.

Warning of War. The biggest reason for Chullima's failure is the strain of North Korea's war machine on a non-viable economy. To support its 370,000-man army (plus an aid program to North Viet Nam that is so far limited to supplying small arms, medicines, tractors, diesel engines, psywar personnel, military advisers and 50 MIG instructors), North Korean military spending will run to a hefty \$465 million this year, or 30.2% of the total national budget. To justify it, Kim tells his country that war is imminent with the U.S.-backed "imperialistic dictatorship" to the south.

The result is steadily mounting tension above the 38th parallel. Air-raid shelters are being built in the cities, and antiaircraft batteries are reportedly going up in the countryside. To be certain the people keep the faith, Kim's government stages regular political-indoctrination classes at factories, offices, schools and neighborhood meeting halls; militia groups practice bayoneting replicas of Uncle Sam. Kim is also careful that his people hear nothing of the economic and political progress of the South or of the great upheaval of the cultural revolution in Red China, which might send ripples through his own country. It is a measure of the success of Kim's censorship that most North Koreans genuinely believe that the South Koreans, who recently held free elections at a time of rising national prosperity, are living in worse conditions than animals.

WASHINGTON POST

7 July 1967

Well-Armed Teams Sent In**N. Koreans Infiltrating South
To Test for Guerrilla War**

By Richard Halloran

Washington Post Foreign Service

SEOUL—Communist North Korea has begun an intensive probe of South Korea to see whether Vietnam-style guerrilla war can be successfully waged to "liberate" South Korea, according to internal security authorities in the Seoul government.

These authorities agreed that South Korea could become the next test case to see whether the anti-guerrilla doctrine of coordinated political, economic and military action can be applied soon enough and effectively enough to cut off the Communist attempt before it develops into a protracted struggle.

Since early June, North Korea has infiltrated at least 47, and possibly twice as many, guerrillas into South Korea by sea. While small in number, they are specially trained and are considered by Seoul as the vanguard of a major guerrilla movement that Pyongyang intends to build up in the next couple years.

South Korean authorities claim to have killed 24 guerrillas and captured four.

[South Korean army patrols reportedly killed six North Korean infiltrators Wednesday in two gunfights just south of the demilitarized zone, according to the Associated Press.]

The North Korean guerrillas are almost all officers organized into seven-to-ten-man teams, heavily armed with sub-machine guns and hand grenades. From captives and captured documents, South Korean sources said they learned that all the guerrillas have been highly indoctrinated and some teams even included Communist Party officials.

The guerrilla teams' missions are to test the general situation for the possibility of guerrilla warfare, to gather intelligence, and to look for possible guerrilla bases. All the teams have been ordered to return to north Korea no later

than October, before the bitter Korean winter sets in.

Recruiting Peasants

Political officers are attempting to recruit agents from among the peasants, a switch from previous tactics. In the past, the Communists usually looked for sympathizers, smuggled them to North Korea for training, and then returned them to their homes for espionage and subversion. Now they are recruiting, training, and leaving people in place.

So far, North Koreans have committed little terror. They are under instructions not to fire unless fired on. Teams came in with only ten days rations and are testing their ability to live off the land. Many sightings by South Koreans have occurred during thefts of chickens and other food.

The best estimates here say that if the North Koreans are successful this summer, they will return next summer in larger force and eventually try to establish strongpoints where they will remain.

Teams have been coming down both coasts in high-speed boats that swing well out to sea, then dash straight in to the coast. On the east, they have been coming in around Amchok and immediately moving into rugged highlands. On the west, they are concentrating in Cholla Pukto Province.

Several reasons for North Korean guerrilla activity now can be readily seen in recent propaganda dispatches from Pyongyang. They have revived the theme that Korea, still divided by a 151-mile-long demilitarized zone, must be reunified "in this generation" of North Korean leaders.

Further, efforts to subvert South Korea have failed because South Koreans have been able to develop considerable economic progress, though they lag behind the North in per capita income and industrialization.

Guerrilla operations may be designed to upset economic progress and to discourage foreign investment.

South Korea's political progress during six years of President Park Chung Hee's rule has also been marked, though it has taken a setback in recent weeks with protest demonstrations in aftermath of fraudulent practices in the June 8 National Assembly elections.

North Korean guerrilla probes are directly connected with the Vietnam war.

Support for Hanoi

The North Koreans have given strong moral and minimal tangible support to North Vietnam but look on harassment of South Korea as a diversionary move to distract the United States and to prevent Seoul, which has 45,000 troops in Vietnam, from sending more.

North Korean propaganda in recent months has also daily warned North Koreans that America is threatening to "ignite a new war" against North Korea. Pyongyang, according to sources here, is genuinely concerned that the Vietnam war will escalate and spread into the Korean Peninsula.

Since the Korean war ended in 1953, North Korea has sent a steady flow of low-level espionage and political subversive agents into the south. About a year ago, American and Korean military authorities noticed an increase in the number and upgrading in quality of the infiltrators, most of whom attempted to come through the DMZ.

In October, a Central Committee meeting was held in Pyongyang during which two major decisions were made.

One decision was to begin hitting the Americans here. On the last day of President Johnson's November visit here, six Americans and one Korean soldier died in an early morning ambush south of the DMZ. Since then, three more have been killed, two by an explosive charge that blew

up a barracks and one on patrol, and 21 have been wounded.

In addition, general harassment of the U.S. 2d Division, which sets astride the invasion route from Kaesong to Seoul, has notably increased, with North Koreans taking potshots at guard posts and occasionally lobbing in hand grenades. The incidents were punched in the American sector until several weeks ago, when they started spreading. In all, there have been 200 incidents along the DMZ this year.

The second decision to come out of the October meeting in Pyongyang was to probe the possibilities of guerrilla war and to expand the already existing espionage and subversive action. North Koreans have begun recruiting South Korean hoodlums and prostitutes to stir up trouble and to gather information.

To combat all of this, South Korea has extensive security forces. However, they are hampered by the lack of fast boats to patrol the coast and lack of helicopters for spotting any quick movement against North Korean teams.

Comparison Made

Compared with Vietnam, South Korea has several advantages. Terrain here does not have the dense jungle cover of Vietnam, making it easier to spot guerrillas. But forests in remote mountain regions provide some refuge.

Seoul security authorities say that South Koreans can be counted on to give full support to their government.

While this is probably true in the cities, which took the worst beating during the Korean War, North Korean guerrillas are starting to operate in farm areas that were not so affected by war and where people are not so emotionally anti-Communist.

WASHINGTON POST

JUNE 17, 1967

Covert War Increases South Korea's Problems

By Richard Halloran

Washington Post Foreign Service

TOKYO, June 17.—The announcement by South Korea that North Korean Army troops are operating as guerrillas in the southeast part of the country comes at a time when the Seoul government is going through its worst political crisis in two years.

It also occurs at a time when the United States, South Korea's major ally and protector, is preoccupied with the Middle East and Vietnam.

Pusan Riots

Just why the announcement was made at this time, when the guerrillas have reportedly been in South Korea since early this month, is not clear. It may be a move to divert the attention of South Koreans, from their own internal politi-

cal difficulties and to unify them against a Communist threat.

(The Associated Press reported that several policemen and students were injured today during riots in Pusan which grew out of demonstrations against alleged rigging of the June 8 parliamentary elections. There were no demonstrations in Seoul for the first time in six days.

(President Chung Hee Park, admitting some rigging was done, has expelled six members of his ruling Democratic Republican Party.)

The government disclosure about the North Korean guerrilla offensive said about 30 men armed with rocket launchers and machine guns had been infiltrated early this month.

Since the North Korean Communists held their central committee meeting in Pyongyang last October, they have consistently and steadily prepared the army and people for the opening of paramilitary activities in the south. And recently Communist propaganda has mentioned Korea as the third front against "American imperialists."

Protracted War

The movement of regulars trained in guerrilla warfare into the southern part of the peninsula is part of the North Korean doctrine, recently unfolded, of a protracted war designed to disrupt and eventually to subvert and overthrow the South Korean government. The North Koreans apparently believe

they do not have the strength to beat the South Korean forces, backed by the United States, in conventional battle.

Whether the North Koreans intend to build guerrilla bases, or to infiltrate and conduct raids and sabotage, and then pull out by sea and return home is not yet clear. With the strong anti-Communist sentiments of most South Koreans, the Communists are not likely to get the logistic support from the population that guerrilla operations usually require.

Communist Premier Kim Il Sung's regime appears to have shifted to guerrilla tactics because peaceful moves toward reunification of Korea have had no success and because of the economic progress in South Korea.

TIME MAGAZINE
AUGUST 19, 1966

NORTH KOREA

Declaration of Independence

"There can be no superior party or inferior party nor a party that gives guidance and a party that receives guidance. No one country or party can serve as the center of the world revolution or the leading party."

With that forthright declaration of independence, North Korea's Communist Party last week followed the lead of its brother parties in Rumania and Japan, and announced that it was going its own ideological way. In an editorial appearing in Rodong Shinmoon, the country's official Communist newspaper, the party claimed that it—and not Peking or Moscow—was the best judge of how Communist doctrine should be applied to North Korea's problems. "When one loses the faculty of thinking and judging for himself," the editorial said, "he cannot distinguish right from wrong. Such people commit revisionism if others commit revisionism, and if others commit dogmatism, they also commit dogmatism."

The Korean declaration came after a long, gradual drift toward *jooche* (national identity), and seemed directed less at Moscow than at Peking. As such, the break represented one