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Principal Developments in World Communist Affairs
(17 January to 14 February 1968)

1. In what may have been the first step in a major new Soviet-directed ideological campaign, an authoritative lead editorial in the February edition of the Polish Party's monthly theoretical organ, NOWE DROGI, asserts (as reported by Radio Moscow 6 February -- full text not yet available) that "nationalism is the main danger today threatening the unity, the fighting capability, and the ideological content of the Communist movement. Therefore, struggle against nationalism ... is a necessary condition for the unity of the WCM and the cohesion of the international forces of socialism." In previous Communist polemics, the controversy has been whether the "main danger" was "revisionism" or "dogmatism and sectarianism." If the article in NOWE DROGI remains not an isolated trial balloon but ushers in a new, major ideological campaign, it remains to be seen whether this is actually an attempt to "contain" nationalism (today a dynamic force in large parts of the world, including a majority of the Communist countries) -- or primarily a maneuver to abandon the "revisionism-dogmatism" antithesis which proved rather unfortunate for Moscow's ideological efforts.

2. With the Budapest consultative meeting only two weeks away (26 February), Hungarian Party daily NEPSZABADSAG (11 February) frankly acknowledged that a number of significant parties will not attend. It disclosed that invitations were extended to 74 of the parties which had attended the 1960 81-party Moscow meeting, but that six were not delivered: the Chinese and Albanian parties refused to accept theirs, and "insurmountable obstacles" prevented delivery to the Indonesian, Thai, Burmese and Malaysian parties (all based in Peking). The Cuban, Dutch and Swedish parties have announced that they will not attend. The article stated that certain parties which approve the meeting cannot send representatives for "reasons beyond their control," and it added that some other parties which had not participated in 1960 have asked to be included in the work of preparing the international conference. It dropped the earlier "overwhelming majority" phrase and claimed only that "a majority" regard the Budapest meeting as "suitable" for dealing with preparations for an international conference. On the basis of information available thus far, one can speculate that:

a. Attendance might be the poorest yet for any comparable effort to rally the Communist world, with only 8 of the 14 ruling parties, and perhaps no more than half of the others which had participated in the 1960 Moscow 81-party conference, present. Of the ruling parties, the Albanian, Chinese, Cuban and Yugoslav have already confirmed their boycott, and they will probably be joined by the North Koreans and North Vietnamese. Since the Japanese party has announced it will not attend, it seems probable that there will be no major party from the Far East (except for the Soviet-dependent and China-fearing Mongolian

Party). Moreover, the Norwegian delegates, and perhaps some others, will limit their role to observers (according to a 26 January TANYUG report from Budapest).

b. Even with such limited formal representation, it appears that the Soviet leaders may have more difficulty in reaching any agreement than in any of their past efforts. Although there has not yet been any announcement of the Rumanian Party's intent, close observers are convinced that it will send a delegation instructed to defend Rumania's independence line and to oppose any Soviet attempts to impose hegemony on the meeting -- and it would not be surprising if the Rumanians published a statement to this effect before the meeting opens. It is also likely that such a stance would meet with sympathetic response from a number of the more important participants, including especially the Italian Communist Party.

3. The very limited press coverage indicates that the 22-23 January Yugoslav-Italian Communist-sponsored Rome meeting of Communist and left-wing political parties of the Mediterranean area suffered from the same ailments as the Budapest meeting -- limited participation and inability to reach agreement on plans for the future. Apparently 14 parties from 11 countries (including left-socialist parties as well as the Communist parties from France, Italy and Morocco) were represented, seven of them Communist parties. There were apparently no Communist representatives from Algeria, Syria, or the UAR, although the Syrian CP has been prominent as an organizer-member of the 1960 Moscow Communist Conference, the 1965 Moscow "consultative meeting," and the February 1968 Budapest Conference. The communique issued at the close of the Rome meeting claimed in very general terms that the participants had agreed on holding a general conference of Mediterranean "anti-imperialists," but did not specify a time or place.

4. In bilateral relations:

a. The Soviet Party's prestige suffered another set-back in full view of the Communist world when Politburo member Suslov led a ten-man CPSU delegation, the most powerful ever to visit Japan, through 8 days of strenuous efforts to persuade the Japanese Communist Party to go to the Budapest Conference. Suslov did restore party-to-party contacts, but Secretary General Miyamoto publicly announced, immediately after the Soviet departure on 7 February, that his party would not participate in the Budapest Conference or at any subsequent international conference planned by the Budapest meeting.

b. The Cubans sharply escalated their defiance of the Soviet leadership when the Cuban Party expelled nine senior members and a "revolutionary tribunal" tried and heavily sentenced them and 26 other members of a so-called anti-party "microfaction" which was accused of being in contact with Soviet diplomats and intelligence

agents and opposing the Castro leadership. It is likely that this event was related to the cancellation "on medical grounds" of a planned February visit to Cuba by Bulgarian Party-State boss Todor Zhivkov.

c. Rumania, in addition to its opposition to Soviet hegemony at Budapest, has been unable to come to terms with the USSR, Bulgaria and Hungary on new friendship treaties. The old 20-year Soviet-Rumanian treaty expired in February, but is automatically renewed for five years unless denounced by the signatories or replaced by a new version. The old treaty was frequently ignored by both the Soviets and Rumanians. Rumania also took a position in opposition to the Soviet-U.S. drafted treaty limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.

d. The Bulgarian and Yugoslav Foreign Ministries and press have renewed old feuding over the status of a Macedonian minority claimed by both.

e. Yugoslavia resumed diplomatic relations with West Germany, just a year after Rumania had broken ranks with the other East European states to make this move.

f. New Czechoslovakian Party First Secretary Dubcek flew to Moscow alone for two days of talks with Soviet leadership; afterwards a "full accord of views" was claimed.

5. The press has reported further internal unrest or conflict in Communist countries:

a. In the USSR, relatives of sentenced intellectuals continued to challenge the regime's violations of "socialist legality" by threatening to bring suit against "libelous" accusations in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. The Soviet Foreign Ministry officially warned foreign correspondents in Moscow that any contacts with Soviet citizens for news purposes must be arranged through the Ministry's Press Department. Further evidence of repression and ferment in the Ukraine, with strong nationalist overtones, has appeared in the western press.

b. In Warsaw, the police arrested 50 students in breaking up a demonstration of 200 against the closing of a play by famous 19th century poet, Mickiewicz, which protested Tsarist rule over a partitioned Poland.

c. And in China, where disorder and violence continue throughout the country, Peking announced the setting up of two more provincial "revolutionary committees" in February, bringing the total claimed thus far to 14 (in 29 provinces); but reports indicate that confusion and conflict have grown rapidly in the very provinces which the Maoists claim to control.

6. Miscellany: Published as an insert in the October issue of RIVOLUZIONE PROLETARIA (Milan), organ of the "Federation of Marxist-Leninist Communists of Italy," is a copy of the Federation's Constitution which defines as its objective "the construction -- in the unity of all Marxist-Leninist militants -- of the 'Partito Comunista Marxista-Leninista' of the Italian proletariat." The platform is thoroughly Maoist.

March 1968

Excerpts from Minister of Defense A.A. Grechko's report on new Military Service Law which appeared in Pravda, October 13, 1967.

Demands for ensuring the security of the Soviet state and preparing the country's entire population for armed defense of the socialist homeland have increased further in present-day conditions ... the strengthening of the country's security is an indispensable condition for successful implementation of the tasks of communism....

Sincere champions of peace, Marxist-Leninists have never been pacifists. They have always supported just wars, on the premise that it is necessary to use all resoluteness and all available means to defend from imperialist aggression the achievements of the Revolution and the homeland's freedom and independence....

The soldiers of the Soviet Army and Navy are persistently acquiring combat skill and readiness ... at the same time, it has become increasingly important to prepare the country's entire population to repulse the aggressors. This presupposes further improvement in the work of military-patriotic upbringing.... It also presupposes perfecting the entire matter of training young people for military service in the army and navy....

The draft on Universal Military Service will introduce a number of fundamentally new provisions into the system whereby USSR citizens fulfill their honorable obligations. These provisions include such important questions as reducing the term of active military service for soldiers and sailors, establishing a single conscription age for all citizens; conducting two conscription periods a year instead of one; cutting down on deferments for citizens of conscription age; introducing elementary military training for young people, and other measures....

The draft law also provides for military service by women with medical or other specialized training. In peacetime they can be registered for military service, taken for training sessions and accepted as volunteers for active military service between the ages of 19 and 40....

Conscription age. ... The possibility of reducing the conscription age from 19 to 18 is corroborated by the practice followed in admitting young men to military academies.... On the basis of this data and taking into account the improvement in the health of conscripted young people, the draft law provides that conscription age should be 18....

On training young people for service in the USSR Armed Forces.
... Introductory, pre-conscription military training of young people in secondary and equivalent schools beginning with the fifth grade, which was established by the 1939 law, was abolished after the Great Patriotic War. At the same time the increased demands made on soldiers and the

reduction in the terms of military service make it necessary to train young people for service in the armed forces even before conscription. Therefore the draft law provides for establishing a system of introductory military training for young people. This training must be conducted in a compulsory, planned basis for all young men of pre-conscription and conscription age.... Introductory military training of young students is to be conducted by regular military instructors at general education secondary schools beginning with the ninth grade, and also at vocational-technical schools.

On military service deferments for continuation of education. ... Draft law envisages deferments for only daytime students ... Deferment for graduating from secondary schools will be granted to age 20.... Boys entering specialized schools after graduation from general education schools are not eligible for deferment....

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
13 October 1967

Russia eases conscripts' burden

By VICTOR ZORZA

THE term of military service in the Soviet Union is to be cut to bring it into line with modern conditions.

Sailors, who have to give up four years of their lives to the Navy, will now be kept in for only three years. The same reduction applies to frontier troops, while national service for soldiers and airmen is cut from three to two years.

Marshal Grechko, the Defence Minister, explained to the Supreme Soviet yesterday that the cuts were made possible by the "tremendous changes" in the capabilities of the armed forces and military equipment in recent years. The striking force of the strategic rocket troops and anti-air defences had grown to "colossal" dimensions. The Government, he said, was taking all the necessary steps to strengthen the country's defence potential.

These assurances, combined with the 15 per cent increase in the military budget, are presumably intended to make it clear that the cuts will not affect the combat capabilities of Soviet forces. These depend nowadays to a much greater extent on the quality of equipment than on sheer numbers of men under arms. It is the equipment, too, that takes up the bulk of the defence budget, especially in Russia, where the pay of the servicemen is extremely low compared with Western rates.

Some years ago the Soviet Union decided to put more money into the forces and the results of this are now becoming increasingly apparent in the new equipment which is coming into service. The changes announced by Marshal Grechko are thus part of the process of streamlining and modernising the Soviet armed forces.

'Just wars'

In case anyone should misunderstand the announcement, Marshal Grechko stressed that "Marxists-Leninists have never been pacifists." They had always supported "just wars." The United States, he said, was stepping up its military preparations against the Soviet Union behind the screen of talk about peace and cooperation. This was presumably a reference to Mr McNamara's ABM announcement, which had been linked with an invitation to Russia to cooperate in slowing down the arms race.

Marshal Grechko's refusal to refer directly to the US decision, or indeed to any ABM system, in his first policy speech since the American announcement, suggests that the Russians have at last learned their lesson. It was the incessant Soviet boasting about the power and accuracy of Russia's own ABM defences that was one of the factors which led to the US decision.

The US, the Marshal said, was creating hotbeds of war in various parts of the world. The "imperialists" did not hesitate to use any "provocation" in their attempt to contain "the mighty current of the liberation movement." Although imperialism had become weaker, "its aggressive essence has not changed."

To compensate for the shorter term of military service, Soviet youths will now undergo paramilitary training for the last two years at school or at work before being called up at 18. This will lead to the introduction into school life of a military element which has often been at odds in recent years with the liberal inclinations of the intelligentsia.

Politicians associated with the conservative wing of the party leadership, and military spokesmen, have repeatedly stressed the need for the "military-patriotic" education of the young people. A letter in the party magazine "Kommunist," signed by Marshal Rokossovsky and several other high-ranking officers, complains that the schools do not give sufficient attention to "patriotic" education.

No complacency

They suggest that the schools should inculcate in their charges certain habits which will be "required by the future defenders of the fatherland." The introduction of military

officers into schools is one of their proposals. They add: "To rear (in young people) love for the fatherland is inseparable from inculcating in them hatred towards the enemy, from exposing the bestial, anti-human essence of imperialism. There must be no complacency and self-satisfaction in the hearts of the Soviet people."

DISCUSSION OF THE LAW

DISCUSSION OF REPORT ON U.S.S.R. DRAFT LAW ON UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE. [Joint Session of Council of the Union and Council of Nationalities of U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet]. (Izvestia, Oct. 13 [supplementary issue], pp. 7-8.

Speech by Deputy M. A. Prokofyev (Ostashkov E.D., Kalinin Province). — ... Introductory military training is being established in the upper grades of schools. Students will be taught basic military knowledge and some data on civil defense. This measure is timely and necessary.

The implementation of the law will create a rational system of introductory military training for young people. Practical realization of the law requires much work and energy. With the planned implementation of introductory military training, the post of military instructor will have to be introduced in 36,000 secondary schools. These should be knowledgeable people, capable of making the boys interested, intelligent pedagogues. The necessary material and technical base must be created in these 36,000 secondary schools. We count on constant assistance in this matter from the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Defense, its local organizations and the public. ...

Speech by Deputy B. N. Pastukhov (Deinau E.D., Turkmenian Republic). — ... The all-Union marches of Young Communists and young people to places of the Soviet people's revolutionary, combat and labor glory are widely known. They have become a mass achievement; millions of Soviet boys and girls took part in them.

Allow me, in the name of 25,000,000 Young Communists, to express cordial thanks to the veterans of our party, celebrated fighting men and our most important military commanders, who led the young pathfinders along the paths of exploits.

In discussing the draft Law on Universal Military Service, we consider it our task to intensify the work of Young Communist League organizations in rearing young people in the revolutionary, labor and combat traditions of the Party and the people and, jointly with the organizations of DOSAAF [Volunteer Society for Cooperation With the Armed Forces], more actively conduct the military training of young people.

Boys have a great propensity for military romanticism and a desire to emulate heroes in all their actions. This is graphically obvious from the great growth of diverse military, patriotic and sports associations. Detachments of young friends of the Soviet Army and Navy and young friends of the border guards and the militia, which number hundreds of thousands of children, have become a unique school for bringing the heroic traditions of the Soviet Army and Navy to Young Pioneers and schoolchildren. Here they become physically steered and acquainted with combat equipment and technology. In conducting the all-Union military game "Summer Lightning," in which more than 5,000,000 boys took part, we once again became convinced of the great propensity of boys for military subjects.

In our opinion, the formation of Youth, a unified defense and sports society for schoolchildren and adolescents, would make it possible to improve greatly the physical and character train-

ing of the rising generation and to unite the efforts and resources of such organizations as the Ministries of Education and Public Health, the Central Council of Trade Unions, the Y.C.L. Central Committee, DOSAAF and the Union of Sports Societies and Organizations.

The military-patriotic schools for young pilots, cosmonauts, tank troops, rocket troops, signalmen and sailors that are being organized in military schools, academies and subunits of civil aviation, the merchant marine and inland shipping fleet are an attractive form of inculcating in teen-agers respect for military service and the profession of the Soviet officer.

The Y.C.L. organizations consider it their task to strengthen and expand our joint work with the defense society, first and foremost in training young boys and girls in military-technical specialties. ...

Speech by Deputy A. L. Getman (Kaushany E.D., Moldavian Republic). — ... It is necessary to organize introductory military training for all young people of preconscription and conscription age, expand and improve substantially the training of technical specialists in DOSAAF clubs and organize military training of students in senior grades of general-education schools, pupils at vocational-technical schools and students at specialized secondary educational institutions. A substantial share of responsibility for fulfilling these tasks falls on DOSAAF. The DOSAAF Central Committee and republic, territory, and province committees are already adopting measures for expanding the network of the society's educational organizations so that in the new conditions they can fully ensure the armed forces' need for trained specialists. The interests of maintaining the combat readiness of the armed forces at a high level require that upon entering the army, the club graduates master more rapidly and better the complex subject of warfare. This calls for raising the organizational and methodological level of the instruction process in the clubs, expanding and perfecting the material and technical base and improving political upbringing work among young people.

Since existing clubs possessing their own establishments cannot provide introductory military training for all draftees, the law provides for creating a wide network of military training centers directly at enterprises, on collective and state farms and in institutions providing military service training for the young people who do not study in the defense society's clubs.

To train the young generation to defend the homeland, it is very important to improve mass defense work among young students, especially in the general-education schools. The establishment of introductory military training in the senior grades will substantially facilitate the solution of this important task. The DOSAAF organizations have set themselves the task of actively assisting the public education agencies in this matter. In our opinion, the time has come to settle the question of setting up everywhere military and sports summer camps for young people of preconscription and conscription age. We have experience in setting up such camps, and they have proved themselves to be good. ...

NEW YORK TIMES
4 February 1968
**BULGARIAN CLAIM
VEXES YUGOSLAYS**

**They Suspect Soviet Effort
for Pressure on Belgrade**

By RICHARD EDER

Special to The New York Times

BELGRADE, Yugoslavia, Feb. 3—An old issue—claims by Bulgaria to parts of what is now Yugoslavia—has flared up, bitterly in recent weeks, leading to suspicion that Moscow is once more seeking to put pressure on Belgrade.

The immediate reason for suspicion is that Bulgaria, which of the European nations, is the most politically dependent on the Soviet Union, has been particularly so in foreign policy.

"The Bulgarians don't say 'ah' unless the Russians tell them to," one Yugoslav said, referring to the numerous times that Soviet displeasure has been indicated by the worsening of Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations.

The Yugoslav Government is taking seriously the recent publication of articles in Bulgaria praising the treaty of San Stefano. This treaty, signed after the Russian-Turkish War of 1877, gave Bulgaria what is now the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and parts of Serbia. These gains were annulled.

Bulgarian Envoy Called In

Mise Pavicevic, the acting Foreign Minister, told the Federal Assembly today that he called in the Bulgarian Ambassador and informed him that the re-aring of the San Stefano claims could harm relations between the two countries.

Claims by Bulgarian scholars and writers that the Macedonians—whose language is similar to Bulgarian—were really Bulgarians have precipitated other crises. As recently as 1966, Todor Zhivkov had to come here and talk with President Tito before matters could be smoothed over.

In some respects, however, the present dispute presents more serious aspects. For one thing, the San Stefano matter is being aired, not by scholarly and literary journals, but by *Rabotnichesko Delo*, the publication of the Bulgarian Communist party.

Internal Difficulties Seen

Some diplomatic observers here suggest the Bulgarian articles seek primarily to distract attention from pressing internal difficulties.

Most Yugoslav and foreign observers, however, suspect that the new flexing of muscle by the Soviet Union and its close allies is designed to test Yugoslav independence and to discourage excessive pro-Western tendencies.

Yugoslavia has done a number of things recently to irk the Soviet leaders. A decision not to go to the forthcoming meeting of Communist parties in Budapest, and criticisms of the parley, were offensive to Moscow.

The recent visit of the Yugoslav Premier to Italy and the resumption of relations with West Germany were two major victories by pro-Western members of the Yugoslav leadership.

Some diplomatic observers see a direct relationship between the current playing up of relations with Italy and West Germany and the resurgence of Bulgarian-Yugoslav tensions.

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March 1968

The Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity
Organization on the Skids

Hampered for years by the repercussions of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) split into two parts on 17 March 1967 in the aftermath of the eighth session of the AAPSO Council (Nicosia, 13-16 February 1967). On that date the Chinese Communists issued a statement formally withdrawing from the organization and denouncing the Cairo-based AAPSO as a Soviet-dominated front. This marked the denouement of a struggle for control of AAPSO between Chinese and Soviet forces which had started in 1961. The larger of the two remaining groups, and for all intents and purposes the successor organization, is Soviet-dominated. The Chinese-oriented splinter group has but few adherents.

At the first AAPSO meeting held in Cairo (26 December 1957-1 January 1958), the organizers sought to create the impression that it was a successor to the 1955 Bandung Conference. But it soon became clear that the non-governmental AAPSO had only the faintest relationship to the Bandung meeting. Under mixed Soviet, Chinese and Egyptian domination from the outset, AAPSO fell victim to Communist exploitation and dissension.

At the Nicosia Council meeting in February 1967 the Soviet-oriented majority had succeeded in transferring the meeting site for the 5th AAPSO Conference from Peking, as previously agreed, to Algiers. In withdrawing from AAPSO the Chinese declared the move to Algiers "illegal" and announced that the Conference would take place in Peking in June 1967 as originally scheduled. As it turned out, however, neither the Algiers nor the Peking Conference took place. It was later thought that the meeting might be held in Cairo on 27 December in conjunction with the AAPSO celebration of its tenth anniversary, but this did not happen either.

The anniversary celebrations were kept in low key with little publicity and, indeed, the event went almost unnoticed. Not only was the occasion not used simultaneously to hold the Fifth AAPSO Conference, but even more significantly, no announcement was made during the anniversary meeting about the overdue conference. There is reason to believe that a Conference in Algiers in 1968 is still on the planning board but it could conceivably be held somewhere else in Africa. The Chinese, for their part, probably will not abandon proselytizing AAPSO members and encouraging them to attend "the" Fifth Conference to be held in Peking during 1968; so far there is little evidence that they are making progress toward this end, even though a few pro-Chicom groups remain in AAPSO.

In the meantime, there are several vacancies in the AAPSO secretariat (normally held by China, Indonesia, Japan and Ghana) and there have been protracted disagreements on how to fill them. AAPSO's strength has also

been sapped by the establishment in Havana in January 1966 of the Afro-Asian Latin American Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO). Under the leadership of Castro's Cuba this group has pursued a more militant "liberation policy" which is more akin to Chicom than to Soviet policy. A Second AALAPSO Conference was reportedly scheduled to be held in Cairo in January 1968, but did not take place; it may, however, be held later in the year.

AAPSO's position is that the larger, tri-continental AALAPSO is an off-shoot of AAPSO and should be subordinate to it. In practice, however, AAPSO has been unable to exert control over the "subordinate" group. Soviet manipulations of AAPSO have obviously been calculated to preserve the Cairo-based organization as an entity separate from AALAPSO because it still functions as a Soviet front in the African, Near East and South-east Asian areas and because the AAPSO national committees of the Soviet Union and of the Eastern European countries function as instruments for bilateral contact with African and Asian countries.

With AAPSO's own strength and cohesion waning -- but with its propaganda capability not reduced to the same extent -- Soviet resolve to keep it above water is further demonstrated by increased liaison between the Soviet-controlled World Council of Peace (WCP) and AAPSO. A WCP delegation, headed by its Secretary General, Romesh Chandra of India, held talks with AAPSO's Secretary General, Yusuf as Sibai of the UAR, on the occasion of the anniversary celebration in Cairo. Their joint communique highlighted the importance in the future of increasing and developing solidarity and unity among all revolutionary and anti-imperialist forces. The WCP had supported the establishment of AAPSO in 1957 but there has been less cooperation between the two organizations over the years than is indicated for the period ahead. The trend which has always existed toward such cooperation had been stymied heretofore by the Chinese presence in AAPSO who resisted AAPSO collaboration with the Soviet-controlled international fronts, such as the WCP.

MIZAN

Jan/Feb 1967

Vol. 9, No 1

THE PEOPLES' SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT: EVOLUTION AND CONTINUITY

by PAUL F. POWER

The peoples' solidarity movement is a product of the confluence of Sino-Soviet opportunism and Afro-Asian ideology on the ground of anti-imperialism. The focal point of the movement is the Organization for Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity (AAPSO), based in Cairo, which represents 73 affiliates in as many Afro-Asian nations. Claiming to pursue the ideals of the governmental Asian-African Conference at Bandung in 1955 that did not yield a permanent bureaucracy, AAPSO began its life under Soviet and Chinese sponsorship in early 1958. Since then the nominally unofficial organization has contributed to a variety of opinion-making activities in the developing world. Dedicated to the proliferation of its understanding of the struggle against imperialism and its heirs, AAPSO lent cover to efforts which produced the Tri-Continental Conference in Havana at the beginning of 1966, and a new entity, the Organization of Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity (LAAAPSO). Over time AAPSO has experienced ideological and structural changes. Persisting despite these changes are the interests of the two Communist states and the articulations of militant Afro-Asian ideologists.

Origins AAPSO's formal beginning came from a meeting in Cairo of representatives of African and Asian "peoples" in late December 1957—the First Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference. Yet AAPSO's founding, ideology and subsequent programme had roots in prior decisions and meetings. A main source was the Asian Conference for the Relaxation of International Tensions, held in April 1955 at New Delhi immediately before the meeting of Asian and African states at Bandung. Behind the New Delhi meeting roots led to the All-India Peace Council, the World Conference for the Relaxation of International Tensions in November 1954, held in Stockholm, and the World Peace Council (WPC), established in November 1950 under Soviet tutelage. An Egyptian representative attended the New Delhi meeting, together with delegates from Burma, Ceylon, People's China, India, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, Pakistan, Syria and the USSR. Through the meeting the Soviet Union gained a place as a legitimate Asian entity in a conference of Asian peoples—a precedent for Soviet participation in AAPSO, and helpful for later arguments with China as to the Asian character of the Soviet Union. From the New Delhi meeting emerged the Asian Solidarity Committee and associated national committees, all of them dedicated to Asian friendship, anti-imperialism and peace. Based on its unquestioned Asian character and benefiting from Chou En-lai's irenic role at the Bandung Conference and its active part in the New Delhi meeting, People's China employed the Asian Solidarity Committee to extend its influence among the developing nations. Its first head was Anup Singh, a Congress member of the Indian Parliament who had entered the WPC-led peace movement and remained with it after Jawaharlal Nehru had persuaded other Congress members to remain apart.

In late 1956 or early 1957 the Asian Solidarity Committee changed its name to the Asian-African Solidarity Committee and in 1957 began to publish the *Asian-African Review*, essentially the predecessor of the

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broadening of Communist fronts from non-Communist Asia, where by this time Russia and People's China had improved their positions, to the Middle East and Africa where gains from unstable nationalism were especially promising. In early 1957 Anup Singh, accompanied by Chinese, Japanese and Russian colleagues from the Asian-African Solidarity Committee, called on President Nasir of Egypt, the centre of world attention in the 1956 Middle Eastern crises and since 1955 a recipient of Eastern bloc military and diplomatic assistance.¹ This contact led directly to the First Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference in Cairo at the end of 1957 and the establishment of the AAPSO. The reasons for Nasir's willingness to have an Afro-Asian meeting in Egypt and to locate a permanent headquarters in Cairo include his ideological and leadership ambitions in Afro-Asia, which had been enhanced by his participation in the Bandung Conference. Soviet influence was not absent. A leading figure in the discussions with the Anup Singh mission was Anwar as-Sadat, an early member of the Free Officers Movement and from 1960 Speaker of the National Assembly. Later Sadat said that he had suggested that the visitors extend their interests to Africa.² Probably they had already decided to do so, as reflected in the name of the Asian-African Solidarity Committee, and they were searching for a suitable and available centre in Africa. Revolutionary Egypt was qualified and interested.

The founders of AAPSO lost no time in preparing its first meeting. A preparatory group with participants from 22 countries met in Cairo in October 1957. Important in the preparations was Félix-Roland Moumié, leader of the exiled faction of the *Union des Populations du Camérout* (UPC) which had found a haven in Egypt to prosecute its unsuccessful underground campaign against the Ahidjo government, a target of subsequent AAPSO propaganda. The planning accomplished, the First Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference opened at the University of Cairo on 26th December 1957, and lasted until 1st January 1958. Approximately 500 delegates came from about 45 countries. As presiding officer, As-Sadat welcomed them in the name of the Egyptian people. Delegates invited from Cambodia, Liberia, Malaya, Morocco, Pakistan and the Philippines did not appear. No effort was made to secure representatives from Israel or South Africa, though subsequently the African National Congress became and remains affiliated with AAPSO. The bulk of the units sending delegations were previously established solidarity groups linked with the Asian-African Solidarity Committee or similar groups newly created for the Cairo meeting. Also present were delegates of liberation movements in Algeria, Oman and Somaliland. Represented by the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), Algeria had a prominent place on the agenda.

The unofficial nature of the delegates permitted them to treat political, economic and social issues without serious inhibitions. The Egyptian delegation had the responsibility for writing a conference report on imperialism. It left no doubt as to its criticisms of traditional European imperialism, but also of the collective security efforts of the United States.³ The Soviet delegation, which based its qualifications on the Soviet Asian and Transcaucasian Republics, was headed by Sh. R. Rashidov, Deputy Chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and Chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR. Reportedly Russia offered to finance a proposed secretariat and headquarters building in Cairo, but the Egyptian Government demurred for fear of overcommitment to the Eastern bloc.⁴ Indicative of caution, Nasir did not address the meeting.

Ideology The aspirations proclaimed by the Cairo meeting in its final Declaration were repeated in increasingly militant ways at subsequent AAPSO Conferences at Conakry in Guinea in April 1960, at Moshi in

Tanganyika in February 1963, and at Winneba in Ghana in May 1965. The main objectives are the eradication of Western imperialism; the full recognition in world politics of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, but especially of the developing nations; the elimination of racial and economic discrimination in international affairs; the banning of the production, testing and use of nuclear weapons as a preface to general disarmament; the reduction of world tensions by the increased use of pacific methods to resolve interstate disputes; and the development of the common interests and mutual concerns of the Afro-Asian peoples.⁵

Except for the imperialism and arms questions, all of these points are found or implied in the Ten Principles of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung in 1955. The Cairo Declaration took special notice of and reaffirmed the Ten Principles. The famous Sixth Principle recognizes the right of individual or collective self-defence, provided that collective defence should not serve the private ends of any great power and that there should be no pressure on countries to join defence pacts. At Cairo, however, major addresses and accepted delegation reports implicitly denied Principle Six and criticized Western defence pacts and those Afro-Asian states which had joined them. The dualism of affirming Principle Six and rejecting Western efforts at collective security reappeared at the Conakry Conference in 1960. Yet a trend was clear, for the second AAPSO meeting officially stated that true independence precludes membership in pacts with colonial powers, and denounced by name the US-Japanese and Anglo-Cypriot security arrangements.⁶ The Declaration of the Moshi Conference in 1963 dropped the practice of spelling out the Bandung Principles in favour of a passing word on their behalf. The Winneba Conference in 1965 produced no mention of the Ten Principles or the Bandung Conference in its Declaration, its General Political Resolution or its resolution welcoming the projected second Afro-Asian conference.

Despite the phasing out of formal references to the Ten Principles of Bandung, at its start and for a few years thereafter AAPSO identified itself with the 1955 meeting of Asian and African states. There is no substantial affinity between the two. AAPSO may claim with some reason that the "spirit of Bandung" influenced its founding, if by that expression is meant the rising tide of Afro-Asia in world politics. Overbalancing this notion are the contributions of the WPC to AAPSO's conception and birth; its unofficial nature; and the scepticism or disbelief about AAPSO's independent character in non-Communist African and Asian circles, especially after signs of AAPSO's Leftward turn in 1961. A more plausible analogy for AAPSO's ideological position is the international orientation of the Casablanca bloc of Arab-African states during its apogee, 1961-3; but even here there is a difficulty. For the "positive neutralism" stressed in the pronouncements of the Casablanca bloc states has received next to no formal recognition from AAPSO. Although the governments of several countries whose people are said to be represented in AAPSO are firm advocates of some kind of neutralism, the solidarity movement shows little inclination to recommend non-alignment as a major strategy to realize its goal.*

*Sensitive about the underplay of neutralism in AAPSO statements on world problems, in 1959 its Secretariat issued an anonymous, undated pamphlet, *Positive Neutralism*, which expounds on the "independent personality" of Afro-Asian countries subscribing to "positive neutralism" and denies that they are aligned with the Soviet Union. The pamphlet is atypical of AAPSO publications. AAPSO did officially endorse the holding of the 1961 and 1964 non-aligned summit meetings, praising their contributions to easing world tensions and continuing the struggle for peace.

Because of the Soviet stake in the concept, "peaceful coexistence" has received more attention from AAPSO than "neutrality". The Conference's endorsement of the Ten Principles of Bandung amounted to approval of conditions under which states live in peaceful coexistence, although that term was not adopted by the Bandung meeting and only later came to be applied to them by Soviet and other participants in AAPSO. With the decline of attention to the Bandung Principles came a net increase in the demand for preconditions to make living together in peace feasible. Thus the 1960 Conference paid heed to peaceful coexistence as a goal to be achieved only after the liquidation of colonialism and all forms of imperialist domination. The next year AAPSO intensified the struggle to realize the termination of these ills which block ideal objectives and expanded on the nature of the interim difficulties, particularly neo-colonialism. The United States, West Germany, Israel, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, South Africa and France were cited as the main perpetrators of neo-colonialism to which collective security pacts, Balkanization of former colonial areas and the Peace Corps were linked.⁷ Peaceful coexistence out of dread of nuclear war received the approval of the 1963 Conference which underscored the many impediments to its realization, although not without hope of overcoming them. The 1965 Conference resolved to treat peaceful coexistence as "meaningless" unless imperialists ceased their intervention in developing areas.⁸ Related to the growth of this pattern is a mounting AAPSO call since 1960 for armed intervention or internal revolution against sovereign states, for example, the Congo (L), Malaysia, Morocco, Niger, South Vietnam, Thailand and Venezuela, as well as traditional colonial areas.

The highly qualified adherence of AAPSO to peaceful coexistence adds up to a position not far removed from that of People's China. This view was expressed in December 1957 at AAPSO's First Conference by Kuo Mo-jo, then head of the Chinese section of the WPC, who said that the struggle for national independence against imperialism must be placed before living in peace. This speech foreshadowed the difference that appeared in autumn 1959 between Moscow and Peking on the relative importance of national liberation. An explanation for AAPSO's neo-Chinese line on peaceful coexistence is that the Soviet Union, especially between 1960 and 1964, had to compete with Peking in the developing world, producing a high tolerance for liberation polemics and a downgrading of the thesis that in a nuclear age Communism should avoid major risks. Ideologically, Russia has scored against Communist China on atomic disarmament, obtaining an AAPSO demand at the Winneba Conference in 1965 for the immediate destruction of nuclear weapons and for states "to dismantle and abandon all means of producing nuclear weapons, above all, the use of such weapons by any power".¹⁰ But the main power of the Soviet Union in AAPSO is organizational, leaving AAPSO's unsophisticated ideological statements on the conditions of peaceful coexistence to be moulded by competition with China and the exaggerations of Afro-Asian propagandists.

AAPSO offers little evidence of trying to unite ex-colonial peoples against industrialized societies as did Mir Sayid Sultan Oglu (Sultan Galiyev), Stalin's lieutenant from Kazan who offered a theory of revolution for Eastern peoples before he disappeared in the purges of the 1930s.¹¹ One bond does exist between AAPSO ideology and Sultan Galiyev: the thesis that there is no need for class struggle within the East because it has suffered too much from the West and has experienced too little industrial stratification. Consequently, the "solidarity" preached by AAPSO and Galiyev's thought share the justification of national fronts within former colonial peoples. AAPSO's endorsement of national fronts is in agreement with African and Arab socialism which generally rejects class struggle. Yet there is no evidence of Sultan

Galiyev's main idea—the urging of a counter-struggle by non-Western peoples against the oppressive advanced societies—an anti-Soviet line that AAPSO has not adopted and is unlikely to adopt in the light of Soviet controls in the organization.

Bureaucracy and operations AAPSO's ideological objectives found a structure to mobilize efforts to realize them when the Cairo Conference established the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Council and Secretariat, bringing AAPSO into formal existence. Of different authority and organization, these organs were formed to carry out the meeting's resolutions, to promote the solidarity movement in Afro-Asia, and to act as liaison between the new centre and its constituents. The Council represents the national solidarity committees and those liberation movements and opposition parties recognized by the AAPSO as members. The Council's powers and organization were vague until the Second AAPSO Conference in April 1960 adopted the AAPSO Constitution.¹² It specifies that the Council consists of the heads of delegations to Conferences and constitutes the steering organ during their sessions. The Council elects the AAPSO Executive Committee, created in 1960. The Council is responsible for establishing Conference agendas, appointing special commissions, and examining financial reports and budgetary proposals. It selects a President and four Vice-Presidents for each biennial Conference. They lead the Council, which meets during Conferences and once between them for a regular session. Although the Conference has legislative authority and the Executive Committee is the most powerful AAPSO organ, the regular Council meetings can be influential since they are free to adopt their own Declarations and Resolutions which elaborate past and affect future Conference pronouncements.

If the Council gives a forum to all AAPSO members, the Secretariat performs their bureaucratic work. The Cairo Conference stipulated that initially the AAPSO headquarters should be in the UAR and that the Secretary-General should be nominated by the UAR. Although the AAPSO charter permits other arrangements, these decisions have been reaffirmed by AAPSO's Executive Committee to which the Secretariat is collectively responsible. As a result Egypt has an important place in and some influence over AAPSO. The Board of Secretaries operating the Secretariat was first limited to one Secretary-General and Secretaries from 11 specified countries.¹³ Including the Secretary-General, the Board's size rose to 14 at the Third Conference at Moshi in 1963 and to 15 at the Fourth Conference at Winneba in 1965. The present membership has a distribution of six Asians, six Africans and three Arabs.¹⁴ Reflecting their political interests and financial contributions, Russia and Communist China have been represented in the Secretariat at all times.

The Secretariat is located in a comfortable but unpretentious two-storey building in the Manial district of Cairo. Internally the work of the Secretariat is broken down into sections for finance, publication, documents and research, technical service, liaison, and women and youth activities. The last two named inspire or plan meetings of relevant groups. Afro-Asian Journalists, Afro-Asian Jurists, Afro-Asian Writers and Afro-Asian Seminars are other groups with ties to AAPSO, though only the women and youth groups have working sections in the Secretariat. None of them are embedded in the AAPSO Constitution. The Secretariat's operations have reflected differences among AAPSO's members, particularly the Sino-Soviet dispute. A crisis appeared in the spring of 1960 when People's China tried to discharge the Secretary-General, Yusuf as-Siba'i, a product of the WPC and Egyptian nationalism. Peking also tried to move the headquarters out of Cairo, perhaps to Jakarta. A compromise was found which restricted the Secretariat's use of AAPSO funds, giving Communist China some

quarters staff under Egyptian direction. Later disputes among the Secretaries revolved around Chinese versus Soviet influence in the editorial direction of the AAPSO journal *Afro-Asian Bulletin*, causing it to suspend publication at the end of 1963. The Chinese bloc in the Secretariat between 1963 and 1965 consisted of the secretaries representing People's China, Indonesia, Japan and either North or South Vietnam. Faced with the slowly increasing size of the Secretariat, Peking has not been able to improve its position which is now about four votes to eleven out of the total of the 15 secretaries authorized in May 1965.

It is the Executive Committee which has the commanding position in the AAPSO structure. In addition to deciding every two years on the national composition of the Board of Secretaries, it is authorized to act on and interpret Conference decisions and to judge how to apply Conference resolutions through the work of the Secretariat and AAPSO affiliates. The Executive Committee decides on the maximum size of delegations to AAPSO Conferences and their time and place of meeting. It prepares AAPSO's annual budget, controls the accounts of the organization and decides on members' dues. The budget is reviewable by the AAPSO Council and approved by the Conference. Since 1963 after every Conference the Executive Committee elects from its members a Control Commission to audit the Secretariat's accounts. Some members contribute substantially more than an expected minimum to compensate for non-payment and underpayment. The major financial supporters are the governmental committees or parties in Algeria, Communist China, Guinea, the USSR and the UAR. A second category of supporters includes affiliates in Kuwait and Tunisia; and a third, those in Japan, India, Mongolia, Morocco and the two Vietnams. The least responsive category includes many affiliates in Sub-Saharan Africa. There is no charter provision to suspend voting rights or to take other disciplinary action for non-payment or underpayment of dues. Recognizing the economic plight of liberation groups affiliated with AAPSO, the AAPSO Council meeting in 1964 at Algiers discharged them of any financial obligations.

The Executive Committee is responsible to and a product of the AAPSO Council which every two years elects the executive body from its members. The Executive Committee had 27 members until the 1963 Conference increased the size to 30. It meets twice yearly under its own elected President for each session. The Executive Committee maintained essentially the same national membership from its founding in 1960 until the 1965 Conference. AAPSO affiliates claiming to speak for the peoples of these countries have been continuously represented: Algeria, People's China, the Congo (L), Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, North Korea, North Vietnam, Pakistan, Russia, South West Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, the UAR, Yemen and Zimbabwe. Elected for the first time in 1965 were Basutoland, Mozambique, Palestine, Portuguese Guinea, South Vietnam and Zambia. They had become eligible two years earlier for election to the Executive Committee because of their membership in the AAPSO Council, i.e., membership in AAPSO. The new members replaced Ceylon, Cameroon, Iran, Liberia, Somalia, and Uganda, though none of these save Cameroon lost its official standing in AAPSO. The changes reflected AAPSO's increased attention to the remainder of colonial Africa, and to South Vietnam and Palestine.

Based on the character of the national affiliates involved, Russia's influence has been greater than Communist China's in the Executive Committee. From 1960 until 1965 People's China could depend only on Japan (the Communist Party of Japan), probably on the two Vietnams and Indonesia and possibly on Pakistan. The 1965 upheaval in Indonesia is likely to reverse the usually pro-Peking conduct of its affiliate in

AAPSO. The pro-Peking orientation of the Japanese, North Korean and Vietnamese affiliates is now uncertain in view of their shifting away from Peking, revealed in 1966. In agitprop terms which are so crucial to AAPSO, some militant Left-neutralist members, for example Guinea and Mali, may find no difficulty in joining the Peking group. Yet there is little doubt it is a minority.

Soviet influence also outweighs that of China in AAPSO's Solidarity Fund. A product of the 1960 crisis when Peking sought to shape the organization more to its liking, the Solidarity Fund was formed to satisfy People's China and AAPSO militants who were anxious to give material help to liberation movements in Africa. In keeping with a Conakry Conference resolution adopted the previous April, the Fund got a formal start in a meeting of the Executive Committee in November 1960. The Solidarity Fund is composed of seven members elected every two years after each Conference by the Executive Committee from its members. The Solidarity Fund began with Executive Committee members representing Cameroon, Communist China, Guinea, Indonesia, Morocco, the Soviet Union and the UAR. The membership has remained constant, except that Tanganyika replaced Cameroon in 1963. Why Algeria and one or both of the Vietnams have not become Solidarity Fund members to add their expertise is an intriguing question. The Fund elects a chairman, first vice-chairman and second vice-chairman, who to date have come from Guinea, Morocco and Communist China respectively.

The Solidarity Fund's mission became clearer in February 1961 at Conakry when a secretariat was established under Guinean direction to solicit financial and material aid to meet the "urgent needs" of national liberators—communications equipment, educational materials, scholarships for "technicians", medical care, foodstuffs, clothing and legal defence. The appeal went to national solidarity committees and to other anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist organizations and "all persons who support and approve the objectives of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Fund."¹⁵ Since 1961 financial problems have troubled the Fund, reducing its importance as a supply centre for insurgency groups. Competing agencies of AAPSO and the Organization of African Unity have also been present. In January 1961 the AAPSO Council created the International Committee for Aid to Algeria and the Congo to secure diplomatic, financial and medical assistance for the FLN and the Stanleyville régime. For African liberation problems the Solidarity Fund has a governmental competitor in the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, established by the African states in May 1963 at the founding of the OAU. Additionally, some governments involved in AAPSO have their own conduits, revealed in the Congo crisis of 1963-64 when Algerian, Chinese, Egyptian and Russian supplies and arms flowed to Eastern Congo insurgents through the Nile valley and East Africa. To date the most likely use of the Solidarity Fund as an insurgency supply or training centre concerns the Portuguese African colonies.¹⁶

Prospects Four leading and interrelated issues face the solidarity movement—the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the emergence of membership questions the relation of AAPSO to the tri-continental LAAAPSO, and the outlook of Afro-Asian constituents. The impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict has ideological and bureaucratic aspects. The growth of AAPSO's neo-Chinese ideas on coexistence and liberation questions suggests the likelihood of continuing militancy.¹⁷ A qualifying characteristic is that AAPSO resolutions usually mention "armed" struggle only after some historical evidence of formal insurgency. Thus a 1965 Conference resolution on the "internal colony" of the Afro-American population in the United States says that it "must no longer be isolated from African and Asian struggles for national liberation" and pledges AAPSO support for the "militant Afro-Americans in their

either Soviet or Chinese ideology will leave their mark on the solidarity movement. When structural questions appear, Russia is apt to retain its hegemony, illustrated in the entrance of observers from WPC groups and Eastern European socialist countries into AAPSO Conferences over the objections of the Chinese faction. The Soviet bloc won its point on WPC observers at the Moshi Conference in 1963 and on socialist states in 1965 at Winneba. The resulting division of labour may provide a stabilizing factor in the solidarity movement, provided Russia and China are satisfied with their respective advantages. A different aspect of the Sino-Soviet dispute is how it is assessed by Afro-Asian governments now supporting or tolerating AAPSO. Conceivably these governments will grow weary of the Sino-Soviet dispute and try to establish their own unofficial, Pan-organization, a step threatened by Algeria's Muhammad Yazid in AAPSO's hierarchy after the Sino-Soviet feuding in the March 1964 AAPSO Council meeting.* Because of their interests in Afro-Asia apart from the solidarity movement, the two Communist powers are unlikely to permit it to be reconstituted without them.

Membership questions have become important for the solidarity movement. Until the AAPSO Conference of 1965 membership matters were not especially controversial. Previously the list of the original solidarity committees in Communist and neutralist countries, plus some exile groups, had expanded to include similar groups. Acceptance into AAPSO is through Conferences by majority vote, with the understanding that the Executive Committee and the AAPSO Council screen all applicants. At the 1965 Conference it became clear that three kinds of membership problems had arisen: the question of how to treat competing segments within a recognized affiliate; the challenge of one or more national rivals to the existing affiliate; and controversial applications from countries new to AAPSO.¹⁹ These problems often involve the instabilities natural to the solidarity or liberation groups in AAPSO's purview. Membership questions have carried over from AAPSO into LAAAPSO.

The evolution of the solidarity movement from an organization for two continents, AAPSO, to the creation in Havana of an organization for three continents, LAAAPSO, stems from ambitions revealed as early as the AAPSO Council meeting at Bandung in April 1961. Soviet, Chinese and Cuban manoeuvring delayed the preparations for a tri-continental meeting under AAPSO and Cuban-Soviet sponsorship. Held in January 1966 distinct from the sessions of AAPSO organs, the Havana meeting of some 600 delegates from 82 nations created a new solidarity institution, located in the Cuban capital.²⁰ Yet the action did not end AAPSO, raising relationship issues for the two organizations. Based on a decision at the 1965 Winneba Conference, AAPSO's 1967 Conference is scheduled to be held in Peking, an unlikely event in view of China's internal crisis and its isolation in world politics.²¹ Wherever the next Conference is held in 1967, it may yield answers on how AAPSO relates to LAAAPSO which is to have its second Conference the following year in Cairo. Meanwhile, LAAAPSO proceeds on the AAPSO pattern with a Secretariat, a Cuban Secretary-General (Osmani Cienfuegos), a national liberation committee and a specialized body to aid insurgents in South Vietnam. Complicating organizational relations, a Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) came into existence immediately after

*To illustrate the three types of problems, the 1965 Conference gave competing factions of Cameroon's affiliate, the UPC, six months to mend differences; affirmed the *Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola* (MPLA) as the sole representative of Angola, despite the challenge of the *Uniao das Populacoes de Angola* (UPA); and took under advisement applications from groups claiming to represent the Comoro Islands, Chad and the Ivory Coast. The Conference admitted the Thailand Liberation Front, centred in Peking.

the end of the Havana meeting. No less important for the future of the solidarity movement are the ideological questions raised at Havana. Essentially they refer to a continuation of the neo-Chinese views on coexistence and liberation at the expense of conventional Soviet notions which have been at a disadvantage in AAPSO.

One new factor suggested by the appearance of the solidarity movement in Latin America is the possibility of independent Cuban influence on its bureaucracy and ideology without regard to Soviet preferences. Castro's removal of Che Guevara in 1965 and the decline in Sino-Cuban relations in 1966 suggest that Russian guidance of Cuba will persist. Another new matter concerns the relation of the solidarity movement to the West. Although AAPSO has not declared an ambition to expand into the West to include members in agreement with its ideology, its attempts to take advantage of difficulties in American race relations and LAAAPSO's support of Puerto Rican nationalism are to be noted. Also of interest is the Havana meeting's appeal to the working class and popular movements in Europe and North America to tighten bonds with the peoples of the South in the common struggle for its liberation from imperialism, thereby aiding the "emancipation of the oppressed classes in capitalist countries".²² However weak its logic a solidarity movement that has organizational lines into the West is not beyond comprehension.

The future of the solidarity movement will also be influenced by the response of the solidarity movement's constituents to its services. Liberation groups are apt to find more benefits than drawbacks from association. Non-Communist governments which sponsor affiliates or tolerate them may have to weigh the impact of association on their international power and national integrity. These governments are in a position to realize many of the goals found in the Ten Principles of Bandung and in AAPSO's Cairo Declaration of 1958 through the slow but demonstrable progress stemming from acculturation, inter-state relations and self-development. Fear of Soviet political or economic retaliation and their own ideological orthodoxy may deter them from phasing out ties to the solidarity movement. Probably AAPSO or LAAAPSO will exist as long as international Communism believes that it can benefit from the weakness of the developing nations or until they decide that their national interests can be advanced without the help of the solidarity movement.

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March 1968

The Ninth World Youth Festival

The Ninth World Youth Festival (WYF) is now scheduled to take place in Sofia, Bulgaria, from 28 July through 6 August 1968. The event was originally planned for Algeria in 1965, but was postponed after the overthrow of Ben Bella; it was rescheduled for Ghana the following year, but the coup d'etat against N'Krumah once again forced postponement.

The Youth Festivals are the largest and most expensive of the Soviet front events. This Festival will be the first since 1962, when the Soviets staged the event in Helsinki, Finland. It will be the first to be held inside the Soviet Bloc since the WYF held in Moscow in 1957. The location should reduce, but will probably not eliminate, the dissension which has given the two Festivals held outside the Bloc (Vienna, 1959; and Helsinki, 1962) something less than an image of complete "peace and friendship" -- the theme of the Festivals.

According to the organizers, approximately 20,000 participants are expected at Sofia. Despite the sponsor's exaggerated claims in the past, this expected attendance figure does not appear implausible. For the first time, several West European Social Democratic Parties (those of West Germany, Italy, Finland and probably other Sandinavian countries) will apparently permit their youth sections to send delegations.

While the war in Vietnam will be the major propaganda theme of the Festival, the Middle East is expected to be a significant secondary theme throughout the affair. Another propaganda subject, and one which may receive greater attention if more non-Communist West Europeans attend, is "NATO and European Security."

The Festivals are nominally sponsored by a seemingly representative International Preparatory Committee (IPC). Although the IPC is composed of a long list of organizations and individuals purporting to represent a number of countries, ideologies, races and languages, it is in fact only a front for two Soviet financed and controlled international organizations: the Prague-based International Union of Students (IUS) and the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), headquartered in Budapest.

Generally, delegates to the WYF are grouped into "national" delegations which are organized by National Preparatory Committees (NPC's) accredited to and by the IPC. Occasionally this pattern is altered to accept as "representatives" of a given country students or exiles who live closer to the site, who are ideologically more reliable, or who represent a more fruitful target to the Soviets. For the Soviets, the success of the event is keyed to the degree of control which can be firmly but subtly maintained, and the extent to which Soviet positions on a variety of issues can be impressed upon the participants. In most countries, the NPC is the key to the type of representation which will appear at the WYF. In the past, the Festival organizers have done everything possible to have the NPC appear representative of a variety of tendencies and groups, and yet remain firmly under Communist control of influence.

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March 1968

The Viet Cong Tet Holiday Offensive
in South Vietnam

Although documents captured from the guerrilla forces had long indicated that some major offensive by the North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong (NVA/VC) forces was planned -- presumably for the winter-spring of 1968 -- the exact nature and timing of the attack was not known. A major attack was not expected during the Tet holiday truce (even though numerous minor violations of the truce were expected of the Communists). Consequently late January found South Vietnam's people in a festive mood for the celebration of the happiest and holiest holiday of the Vietnamese year. On the night of 29 January Vietnamese soldiers, a great percentage of them on leave because of the truce and the holiday, made special efforts to join their families, emptying barracks and leaving guard ranks thin. It was after the holiday celebrants had retired that night that 50-60,000 North Vietnamese and VC soldiers struck with a fierceness and bloodiness unusual even in Vietnam. The Communists hit a hundred places across the land -- 36 out of 44 provincial capitals and some 60 district towns, airfields, military bases, South Vietnamese government buildings and other politically important targets, including the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. The toll of lives on all sides was heavy; allied forces suffered their heaviest casualties of the war, with the South Vietnamese Army sustaining the greatest losses on the allied side.

Heavy Communist losses

It was the attackers, however, whose losses were staggering. Many of the NVA/VC attacks were avowedly suicidal, such as the one against the U.S. Embassy, and the recklessness of these attacks cost the Communists some of their best men. In most cases the attackers were highly trained guerrilla forces, including specialists such as demolition experts. The accuracy of the allied count of enemy dead has been controversial; in the heat of battle accuracy may be sacrificed to expediency and exaggerated counts have undoubtedly been turned in by units too eager to please the authorities. But, there is no question that Communist losses were tremendous and the claim that the loss ratio runs from eleven or twelve to one in the allies' favor appears reasonable.

Estimates of enemy losses up to midnight 3 February were close to 15,000 NVA/VC killed; General Westmoreland gave the estimate as of midnight 5 February as 21,000 enemy dead. When the U.S. Command announced on 10 February that it was discontinuing its daily casualty reports for the Tet offensive, the total of estimated enemy dead as of midnight 9 February had risen to 27,000. The U.S. Command's final count was over 30,000 enemy dead. Added to this toll were several thousand captured. Reducing these figures by 10 or even 20% to compensate for possible error would still leave at least one third of the attackers killed or captured. The toll

of civilian casualties resulting from the Communist attack is difficult to estimate but what has been reported already is shocking and the hospitals in Saigon and in the provinces are overflowing with wounded. President Thieu, at a joint session of the Assembly on 9 February, said that since the 30th of January 3,000 civilians had been reported killed and 8,000 reported wounded. He added, in making an appeal for special executive powers to cope with the situation, that 196,000 South Vietnamese citizens have been made homeless. This brings the total number of refugees, some of whom have twice been made homeless, to an estimated 345,000.

Communist Failure to Spark a Popular Uprising

Hanoi's avowed intention was to arouse the people, to bring about a popular uprising in conjunction with the attack. A captured document released to the press on 10 February and addressed to personnel of the so-called Liberation Army provided a clear statement of Communist intent:

"The ... National Liberation Front has decided to launch a full-scale attack to defeat the enemy and return the Government to the people. All military forces of the Liberation Army and militant political forces are ordered to collaborate closely with different patriotic forces and the entire population to simultaneously dash forward to ... wipe out a good deal of enemy potential ... disrupt the puppet army, overthrow all levels of the stooge government and drastically punish all high echelon traitors and ... establish the people's revolutionary government at all levels."

Interrogations of prisoners have shown that the Communist cadres were thoroughly indoctrinated in this belief. Wild claims were made on the Communist "Radio Liberation" that "patriotic forces, including men in the South Vietnamese Army, the armed organizations of the people, and patriotic youth are rising up to oppose the U.S. forces and the Saigon Government and to seize control of the city."

It has been reported by defectors that they had received orders to go from door to door in Saigon summoning the people to join the attacking forces and observers of some of the street battles reported hearing Communist exhortations to the people over megaphones. The Communists also called for a general strike in South Vietnam and asked for demonstrations abroad in support of their offensive. According to Hanoi's broadcasts and newspapers, scores of organizations supporting the Communists sprang up spontaneously throughout South Vietnam. But the truth is that the people did not join in the attack, there was no general strike, no demonstrations, no organizations spontaneously bursting forth. It quickly became clear that the "popular support" claimed by the Communists in Vietnam is a myth which the Communists leadership is vainly attempting to perpetuate. In this connection it is important to distinguish between "popular support" and acquiescence to Communist demands. It is true that the guerrillas

were able to hide among the people in the cities and towns before striking out. In some instances this was no doubt due to sympathy for the Viet Cong; but in most cases it was due to simple fear of the consequences of refusal. The important point is that when the Communists came into the open the people did not join them; in fact they fled at the earliest opportunity. (See attachments 1 and 2 for more details.)

Viet Cong Alienation of the Population

Far from stirring up the popular support Hanoi had led them to believe was bubbling just under the surface, the Communist attacks brought on a vastly different response. By choosing to attack during the traditional, almost sacred, family New Year celebration, the NVA/VC undoubtedly alienated major portions of the population. By firing bullets and bombs at the heart of heavily populated areas they caused the indiscriminate slaughter of civilians, rendered thousands of city dwellers homeless and terrorized those already in refugee status who had fled to the cities for safety. Nor should it be forgotten that all this occurred during the Tet truce which the Communists themselves had proposed first.

The Communist offensive against the lives and sensibilities of the South Vietnamese people were not confined entirely to the violation of the Tet truce or the Tet holiday celebration. The NVA/VC forces attacked hospitals as well as military installations, they used churches, pagodas and schools as defense posts, and forced captured civilians (most frequently women) to be human shields. In the area south of Hue they brutally executed 300 civilians and buried them in a mass grave; they marched off to some unknown destination 125-150 Catholic prisoners and have reportedly started holding "trials" of captured city officials. In the highland town of Ban Me Thuot, the VC killed six American missionaries in a sweep through a leprosarium operated by the Christian and Missionary Alliance. After killing the missionaries, they wired their bodies with booby traps. In Saigon a score of VC paraded through the streets singing songs, waving flags and shouting: "This is the Liberation Force come to liberate the city! Be compatriots! Help us liberate the city!" Two and three-man teams with the same message went from door to door, like census takers, asking for the names and addresses of local police, government officials, and army personnel. Those they found, they killed on the spot. In Danang a VC guerrilla rose in a Buddhist Tet service with a pistol in one hand and a megaphone in the other; interrupting the service, he appealed to the assembly over the megaphone to "support the uprising." The Buddhists seized him and his two comrades and turned them over to the South Vietnamese police. (See attachments 4-6 for additional details.)

Viet Cong Betrayal of its Own Fighting Forces

The losses caused by the Communist Tet offensive were not confined to the South Vietnamese armed forces and civilians. The Communist leadership

showed the same callous disregard for the lives of -- and the same readiness to betray -- its own fighting forces as it did the enemy's. There is no question that Hanoi has perpetrated an incredible betrayal against its own troops. They were asked to sacrifice for a "popular uprising" which never developed; they were told that their wounded would be housed, hidden and healed by collaborators in the urban areas, but the collaborators never appeared; they were told resupply would be forthcoming within 12-24 hours, but in fact provisions had never been made to this end; they were promised reinforcements, but the reinforcements were not sent. Suicide squads were sent on missions without the slightest hope of survival; the squad sent into the U.S. Embassy compound, for instance, was abandoned as soon as it had entered the grounds; 19 VC commandos attacked the compound and six hours later 19 VC commandos lay dead. In at least one province, Chau Doc, the Communist units were told by their leaders that they were to celebrate the New Year with the townspeople who were waiting to welcome them with open arms. In fact they were greeted with gunfire. (The only exception to the almost total lack of genuine cooperation the VC received from the South Vietnamese people may have occurred in Hue where the continuing battle still obscures what is going on there as of this writing.) It remains a stark fact that Hanoi made a cold-blooded decision to sacrifice thousands of its best soldiers' lives in a risky bid for a short-lived psychological/political advantage. This, of course, is traditional Communist military doctrine. (See attachments 7 and 8.)

Heartening Performance of the South Vietnamese Government and Military

Although the morale of the Communist forces must be under considerable stress, the morale and subsequent response of the ARVN officers and men, after the initial surprise had worn off, has been praiseworthy. Not only did they quickly return from their holiday leave and fight well against the attacking forces, they have also assisted the civil authorities in attempting to restore order and get food and medical supplies flowing and utilities operating and public services functioning once more. Civilian officials have set up centers in the Saigon area to help care for displaced persons and Ministry of Health teams are furnishing these centers potable water, rice and other food as well as supplying immunizations against cholera and plague. One third of Saigon's garbage truck fleet of 70 was operating normally by 10 February and more than 500 tons of rice had been delivered to Saigon sales points by the same date. More than 2500 tons of rice were discharged from ships or brought in from outlying warehouses between 8-10 February and it appears the flow will continue. The fresh vegetable supply to the city showed considerable improvement nine days after the attack and Saigon's water and power supplies are functioning -- below normal, but at adequate levels. Provincial officials have responded well to the emergency and committees have been organized to deal with the refugee problem; schools, churches and public buildings have been converted to refugee use and food is being supplied in increasing quantities. Two thirds of the civil servants were reported back on

the job in Phu Khuong Province and all 63 hospitals in the 44 provinces are in operation.

Responsibility for the overall effort of rehabilitation has been vested in a joint South Vietnamese/American task force. It generally appears that the people are behind the government's efforts to restore order and there have been signs of across-the-board participation which are not usual in a society as divided among partisan interests as Vietnam has traditionally been. However, the Communist-made crisis may have ignited a spark of unity which will be the eventual means of reversing tradition. Time and the performance of both the government and the people will tell. (See attachments 9 and 10.)

LOS ANGELES TIMES

(1)

3 February 1968

Reds Claim Victory in Viet Drive Is Assured

But Observers Believe Part of Effort Is to Soften U.S. Stand on Peace Conditions

BY ROBERT S. ELEGANT

Times Staff Writer

HONG KONG — The Communists declared Friday that they now are striking for total victory in South Vietnam and claimed victory is assured.

Among a spate of statements, the official Hanoi daily *Nhan Dan* (the People) hailed the present generalized offensive of the Viet Cong as a comprehensive uprising which will bring the Communists to power.

But specialists in Hong Kong believed the Communists are seeking a political objective as much as a purely military victory. They think the Communists are seeking to soften American public opinion for a new peace offensive.

As the picture was unfolded by their publicists, it appeared more and more that the Communists might be staking everything on one throw of the dice. An undertone of desperation was evident in a strategy that could leave them defeated and facing the task of rebuilding their striking power from a dispirited and vanquished cadre.

Red Gamble

The Communists were gambling on a great popular response—the mass insurrection they have so long sought — to carry them to victory. In practical, tactical terms, they have staked their success on a total revolt of the South Vietnamese people. That revolt is vital to the strategy they are following while negotiating.

Hanoi claimed that "millions of patriotic" South Vietnamese had joined the Communist-led insurgents in the total assault on the power of the Saigon government, which is directed at 40 key towns and cities. According to the broadcasts and newspapers of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, scores of organizations like the National Democratic Alliance of the old capital of Hue have sprung up all over the country.

The Communists are deliberately giving the impression that the offensive, which began Jan. 30, is a total commitment of their manpower and arms to crushing American and South Vietnamese resistance.

Political Objectives

Despite the heavy commitment of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regular troops to the assault, highly qualified specialists in Hong Kong believe the offensive seeks political and diplomatic objectives at least as much as military objectives. They think the target of the Communists is as much American and world public opinion as it is real estate the guerrillas cannot hold.

The assault was obviously well coordinated with the enigmatic peace feelers Hanoi has been spinning for the past month and a half. These analysts believe that Hanoi might quite soon offer negotiations on terms which would appear a little less obdurate than their previous conditions. The final objective, however, would remain

the same: the creation of a government in South Vietnam which, whatever its name or formal composition would be wholly responsive to Communist wishes.

The political offensive is also directed squarely at the South Vietnamese people. Throughout the Communist statements runs the theme that the masses of South Vietnam are joining the guerrillas, even soldiers and officials of the present regime deserting their posts to "enter the revolutionary ranks."

If the Communists can convince the South Vietnamese people that further resistance is hopeless, they will be well along toward the victory they claim. They have in pursuit of that objective set up organizations—fictitious of real — like the Alliance for National and Peace Forces in Saigon, which they claim "has been welcomed by many prominent personalities."

Seen as Bait

That alliance, carefully distinguished from the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Viet Cong, has issued an "urgent National Salvation Manifesto" demanding "the U.S. and its satellites withdraw their troops from South Vietnam so as to end the war." The alliance, its composition undisclosed, has also undertaken "to negotiate with the South Vietnam National Liberation Front on measures to restore peace . . ."

The Communists obviously hope to use their newly created organizations as bait to draw all the disaffected and the war-weary in South Vietnam to their side.

It would be unwise to understate the impact of the offensive on the South Vietnamese people. None may have wrongly assessed the psychology of

the South Vietnamese as they appear to have wrongly assessed the American reaction.

Accept Consequences

The South Vietnamese have always assumed the Viet Cong could make an effort like the present one if they are willing to accept the consequent losses. While the offensive will certainly not enhance popular support for the Saigon government, it is not likely to turn a shocked populace to the Communists.

The impact on the United States is likely to be greater. Nonetheless, psychological warfare specialists pointed out that the Communists may have miscalculated.

The Communist offensive does not, after all, vitiate the previous American assessment that the anti-Communist forces were making slow progress. It has always been axiomatic among specialists that the Viet Cong could hit any place in South Vietnam at any time they were prepared to take the losses.

Although specialists are surprised by the scope of the attacks, their surprise derives from Communist strategy rather than Communist capability.

Failing Impact

"If the Communists fail to have the impact they expect on the United States," one specialist asks, "if they make the American people angry instead of cowing them, what will they have gained by their lavish expenditure of lives and materiel? They cannot possibly hold the towns they have taken. If they fail to win big now, they will have squandered their resources without effect."

It appeared that the Communists might have been impelled to their go-for-broke strategy by tensions among both the Viet Cong and the harassed population of North Vietnam. Such a mass offensive by units that are not linked on the ground is against all the basic tenets of guerrilla warfare—particularly when it is staged in the face of total enemy domination of the air.

Communist call for all-out offensive

By VICTOR ZORZA

Communist radio stations in Vietnam have announced the impending formation of an alternate Government. The call has gone out for the final, mighty push towards victory. A new political organisation has been set up which is being represented as a coalition of all anti-Saigon forces, and which is evidently acting as a non-Communist front for the NLF and the Vietcong.

The NLF's "Liberation Radio" has announced that the "long awaited general offensive" had now been launched. The headquarters of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, which introduced itself as "directing the general offensive to overthrow the regime," has announced: "We are going to set up a Government which will be entirely ours." It appealed to all citizens to join its forces in attacking the US troops and their South Vietnamese "henchmen."

The new political organisation has introduced itself under the name of "The Alliance of National and Peace Forces." It has issued a "national salvation declaration," and claims to have held a meeting to explain its policy. In Saigon, it claims, many intellectuals, industrialists, and representatives of non-Communist political parties and religions have responded to the alliance's appeal. The alliance demands an American withdrawal from Vietnam, and calls for "negotiations with the NLF" in order to discuss measures to restore peace and bring independence and sovereignty to the country.

Identical policy

In policy, therefore, it is identical with that of the NLF. If it has any real existence—other than in the broadcasts of the NLF's "Liberation Radio"—the alliance seems to have been set up in order to represent the new offensive as the concern not only of the NLF, but of elements which have previously kept clear of it. Hence, presumably, the

claim that political parties and religious organisations, so far unidentified, have joined the alliance.

The headquarters of the "Revolutionary Armed Forces," which claims to be directing the general offensive, would appear to be distinct from the Vietcong, which goes under the name of the "Liberation Armed Forces." The new headquarters is described by the "Liberation Radio" as the commanding organ of the various patriotic South Vietnamese "armed" forces. The "Revolutionary Forces" headquarters therefore appears to stand in the same relation to the alliance as the Vietcong stands to the NLF.

The "Liberation Radio" claims that "the revolutionary Administration has been set up" in Saigon and in other areas where the "Revolutionary Armed Forces" have taken "complete control of many important centres." The revolutionary Administration, which claims to enjoy the "enthusiastic support" of the people, has set itself a number of military and political tasks which are quite distinct from previous NLF-Vietcong policy, and suggest that this is seen by the Communists as the final stage of the war.

The Revolutionary Administration has immediately taken up the task of

- 1 Directing the completion of the armed uprising;
- 2 Reorganising the militia units and;
- 2 Setting up revolutionary political parties."

But the armed struggle is primary. In Hue, where the National Alliance claims to have seized control, it issued a local appeal to all patriotic forces, in much the same terms as a national declaration, calling for an immediate armed uprising. The political import of the NLF move may be seen in a statement issued by the NLF representation in Hanoi, which says that in Saigon and Hue "many organisations opposing the USA and the Thieu-Ky clique have been set up to coordinate action with the NLF."

The Communists variously claim to have held between forty and fifty towns, and they have not so far admitted abandoning any of them. The Hanoi party paper "Nhan Dan" claimed yesterday that the events of the past few days showed that the enemy could be beaten not only in the countryside, but also in towns, "thus quickly reversing the tide in key political, economic and military centres." The offensive was not over, it added, but was gaining momentum.

This is closely reminiscent of the Vietnamese Communist textbook formula for the final victory of the revolution. The Vietnamese Communists have always claimed that they have evolved their own revolutionary road, to suit the conditions of their own country, and quite distinct from those of China and of Russia.

In Russia, the revolution had begun in the cities and had spread to the countryside. In China, it began in the country and gradually engulfed the cities. The Vietnamese formula, however, requires a period of armed struggle in the countryside and of political preparation in the cities, with the two finally merging in a great explosion of nationwide political and military struggle in the cities as well as in the country.

Struggle

This is the "General Uprising" which is supposed to crown the revolutionary struggle—but it is noeworthy that while the Communist reporting of the events of the last few days fits the formula of the General Uprising, the term itself is not being used. This may be due to doctrinal differences in the Communist leadership which have usually attended major shifts in strategy. There was one such debate, centring on the concept of the general uprising, and particularly on the question whether political or military struggle was primary, in 1964.

On the question of an uprising in the cities, there were clear differences in the leadership more than a year ago, when one faction was pressing for armed urban struggles, while the other argued that the city population was not yet ready for it. "Liberation Radio" broadcasts explained at the time that the conditions for "a direct revolutionary struggle in the cities are not yet adequate," because there were still nothing like the necessary number, of organised Vietcong groups in the urban areas

LONDON TIMES
9 February 1968

(3)

British girl's ordeal in Hué

FROM DAVID BONAVIA
SAIGON, FEB. 8

A British girl described today how she spent last week hiding under a bed with a Vietnamese family in Hué, as mortars and rockets fell all around and the Vietcong sniped at American helicopters from the house next door.

Miss Helen Bowen, aged 25, who is third secretary for information at the British Embassy in Saigon, was visiting a Vietnamese family in the old northern imperial capital over the Tet (lunar new year) festival. In the small hours of January 31 "there was a terrific pandemonium of mortars, rockets, and everything else", Miss Bowen said. "I was fast asleep, then gradually realized that this was a bit more than Tet firecrackers."

Miss Bowen, whose parents live at Sherwood Park Road, Mitcham, Surrey, said the eldest girl of the family rushed into her bedroom and took her next door, where she hid under the bed until morning. The parents, 12 children, and three servants had taken refuge in the same room.

"In the morning we crawled out and sat around in the house with the noise continuing", she said. For the next six days they ate boiled rice, with marrows from the garden as the fighting went on all around. They listened to the B.B.C. twice a day and Miss Bowen, who is fluent in Vietnamese, translated for the head of the family, a civil servant. At one point a North Vietnamese voice on the radio announced that Hué had been taken.

Sometimes shells fell so close that plaster fell from the ceilings. Every night the family returned to sleep under the beds. "When there was a lull we used to open the shutters and peep out. We knew there must be Vietcong just behind the house. There was rifle fire at helicopters from the house next door." One night they heard the Vietcong passing just behind the wall.

Miss Bowen wanted to leave, but her host told her: "On no account must you go out, because if you are seen by the Vietcong they will shoot you and all of the family." She passed the time in reading Svetlana Stalin's *20 Letters to a Friend* and a Vietnamese book called *The Night which Lasts a Lifetime*.

She had her British passport and red diplomatic card with her—"the things I really clung to"—and believed she would have been reasonably treated if North Vietnam troops entered the house and did

not shoot before she had time to speak, but by the seventh night she was very depressed and feared she would never escape.

A Vietnamese who lived across the street slipped in and offered to guide her to the American military compound later. He went out again, and the next thing they heard was that he had been shot.

Miss Bowen said the family she stayed with were "absolutely fantastic", in their concern for her safety and insisted on giving her the best morsels of food, to her embarrassment. She saw no sign of popular support for the attack.

Last Monday they saw at last heavily armed United States Marines coming down the street. They pushed in the door and started to inspect the house. They were astonished to see Miss Bowen, but moved on, leaving her there. Soon afterwards two Marines returned and told her to leave at once, because they might have to call for an air strike on a concentration of 1,000 Vietcong just behind the house. The Marines had her and the family taken to a refugee centre where they spent the next night.

The refugees were not hostile, and kept offering to let "the American girl" share their mats on the floor. There were bodies in the refugee centre and fresh mounds where others had been buried.

The next day the United States Navy put her on a landing craft to take her down the river to Da Nang. Before they left, a mortar shell fell near the landing craft and showered fragments on the deck. As they sailed down the river she could see the Vietcong flag still floating over the citadel of Hué. The battle is continuing.

Pat Healey writes:—

Before Miss Bowen went to Hué she wrote to her married elder sister, Janette, to say that she hoped to go but that the American intelligence services were predicting a Vietcong attack. "I may finish up being captured by the Vietcong", she wrote. Her mother, Mrs. Caroline Bowen, said at her Mitcham home yesterday: "She did not really mean it when she wrote the letter, but it is significant considering how close she came to being captured."

For five days Mr. and Mrs. Bowen waited anxiously for news knowing their daughter was in Hué and that the Foreign Office had no news of her. Then the Foreign Office rang to say that their daughter had been evacuated to Da Nang. "I asked them what was the point of taking her to Da Nang when it was under fire too", said Mrs. Bowen. "They told me she would be flown to Saigon."

Miss Bowen's posting to Vietnam, on a three-year engagement, is her second overseas posting since entering the Diplomatic Service five years ago.

5 February 1968

Raids Add 175,000 To Refugee Rolls

Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, Feb. 4 —The injury to South Vietnam's people and its cities from the coordinated series of enemy attacks is just beginning to be assessed.

The number of civilian casualties is not known, or even guessed at. Only seven provinces and five cities, including Saigon, have reported how many new refugees resulted from the urban fighting and their total estimate is 175,000.

Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky was named chairman of a

central relief committee to coordinate efforts to help pick up the pieces. Premier Nguyen Van Loc was named vice chairman and Maj. Gen. Nguyen Duc Thang was named secretary general in an announcement today.

[Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Tran Van Do issued an appeal to foreign friends of South Vietnam to come quickly to the aid of civilian victims of the Communist onslaught, the Associated Press reported.]

Ambassador Robert W. Komer will coordinate American efforts to help with the massive relief project.

In Saigon, there are an estimated 20,000 new refugees. Whole blocks of buildings were destroyed by bombs, rockets and fire during the fighting in the city. Volunteer agencies have set up three refugee centers. Vietnamese student leaders have established several aid stations and the government has 22 centers in the Sai-

gon area.

In the heavily populated Mekong Delta, an estimated 125,000 refugees were driven from their homes in the cities of Cantho and Mytho and the provinces of Baxuyen and Chaudoc. There are 14 other provinces in the Delta which have not yet sent in estimates.

Giadinh and Bienhoa Provinces, plus Vungtau, one of the few important cities where little fighting occurred, report about 20,000 new refugees.

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EXCERPTS FROM THE VIETNAMESE PRESS REGARDING VIET CONG TET TRUCE OFFENSIVE

CPYRGHT

Vietnamese Intellectuals Condemn Viet Cong

The 9 February French edition of the Vietnam press carried a report that a group of Vietnamese intellectuals had issued a statement strongly condemning the Viet Cong. The following is an unofficial translation of the Vietnamese press report:

"93 people - men of letters, artists, scholars and professors - adopted a motion yesterday severely condemning the treachery and inhuman action of the Viet Cong, who have dissipated all hope of peace in the people.

"This motion calls on all religious and political groups, all cultural and charitable organizations, to participate in the work of aiding the victims of the Viet Cong attacks in the provinces and in Saigon.

"The motion asks all circles of the population to be vigilant and to be clearly aware of the deceitful nature of the Viet Cong who employ all means, even the most barbarous, with the view to weaken and annihilate the state.

"Further, this motion expresses gratitude to the Vietnamese and allied soldiers, whose efforts and sacrifices have entirely frustrated all of the communists' attempts, for defending the territory and the people of South Vietnam."

Saigon University Faculty Condemns Viet Cong

Following is a translation of the French edition of the Vietnam press which consists of a summary of a 6 February declaration issued by the teaching staff of Saigon University:

"The faculty of the University of Saigon issued a declaration today in which it severely condemned the violation of the Tet truce by the Viet Cong. The declaration scored the Viet Cong for sowing sorrow and desolation among the people during the first few days of the New Year. The faculty of the University of Saigon declared its total support for the Government in the re-establishing of security and order."

Buddhist Institute Denunciation of Viet Cong

Following is the complete text of a communique dated 2 February and signed by the Venerable Thich Thien Tuong, President of the Buddhist Institute for the Propagandon of the Faith:

"To the dignitaries of the Buddhist Association and to the Buddhists of the nation:

"Starting the night before Tet, the enemy, taking advantage of the truce, infiltrated the cities to massacre the inhabitants and destroy their possessions. As a result of this spectacle, the Institute has taken the following decisions:

- "A) The Buddhist Association denounces the inhuman and barbaric actions of the Viet Cong;
- "B) Requests the representative committees of the Buddhist Association, and Buddhists, to keep calm and alert in order to assist the Governmental authorities to re-establish order and security and alleviate the injuries caused during the course of the attacks;
- "C) Pray that our country and the world will soon be liberated from the communist yoke and that the people will be less miserable;
- "D) Request the people to actively participate in the blood donation campaign to save the victims and the soldiers injured in the attacks."

CPYRGHT

WASHINGTON POST
12 February 1968

(6)

Reds Said To Execute 300 in Hue

HUE, South Vietnam, Feb. 11 (AP)—Communist troops in Hue executed 300 civilians and buried them in a mass grave south of the city, the province chief said today.

Lt. Col. Phan Van Khoa, province chief, mayor of Hue and military overseer of the Hue district, said those exe-

cuted were province officials, technicians, policemen and others who had been long marked for death by the Communists.

He said the executions took place Friday when the Communists were being pushed from the south side of the city by U.S. Marines.

Khoa said the mass grave was several miles southeast of the city, an area not yet reached by allied forces. He said, however, that his reports of the executions were precise and unquestionable.

At the same time, a Vietnamese civilian reported

seeing from 125 to 150 Catholics being led from the city as captives Saturday.

Where the captives were being taken was unknown to the civilian, who witnessed the scene from a hiding place near Hue's southern boundary.

Viet Cong Sacrificing Lives for Propaganda

No Realistic Chance for Success Seen in Widespread Use of Small Suicide Squads

BY JOHN RANDOLPH

Times Staff Writer

SAIGON—The first victim in any sudden and painful explosion of violence can be a proper sense of proportion.

The sensational Viet Cong offensive now going on in so many parts of South Vietnam is a case in point. It is a subject that lends itself to a great deal of exaggeration and confusion. If ever a sense of proportion was called for, it is now.

To exaggerate what the Viet Cong have actually accomplished by their offensive can make it seem more important than it is. But to misunderstand or to minimize the offensive's real point is to give the enemy a clear shot at his true goal.

Only Answer

For both the United States and the Republic of Vietnam, it is of the highest importance to recognize this spectacular Viet Cong offensive quickly and correctly for what it now clearly seems to be: a cold-blooded decision to trade a certain number of their best soldiers' lives for a certain number of lively headlines and vivid impressions. There is no other reasonable conclusion.

Militarily, the offensive is nonsense. There are only three military objectives that could justify the cost to the Viet Cong. These three would be:

1—Seizure and permanent occupation of some large or small part of South Vietnamese territo-

ry to give the Viet Cong a de facto right to call itself a functioning government.

Will to Fight

2—The infliction of some grave Dien Bien Phu-type defeat on the allies that would break their will to fight.

3—Creation of a major diversion that could expose the allies to a more dangerous blow from another quarter.

Neither of the first two seems to have any realistic chance of success. For success, the offensive would have had to have been concentrated at one place. As it is, the Viet Cong attacks are spread out over approximately 40 major areas.

As for the third objective, the allied command has not been diverted from its attention to a number of possibly dangerous sectors where even greater action can be expected. One such is the area around Khe Sanh where a major Communist offensive has been expected for weeks.

On the formal political side, there are many things the Viet Cong would like to do. But this offensive, energetic as it is, seems much too weak to achieve the major Communist hopes, which would include:

1—Breakup or overthrow of the new constitutional government created last year, or creation of a split in the unity of the armed forces leadership that still underwrites it.

2—Generating a popular uprising or large-scale defection from the government in favor of the Viet Cong, or the creation of some third force in Vietnam resulting in a three-cornered civil war for the ultimate profit of the Communists.

3—Stimulation of a peace-at-any-price mood that could paralyze the government or force it into a coalition with the Viet Cong.

These objectives also seem too grandiose to realize as long as the Vietnamese government, its armed forces and the U.S. armed forces in Vietnam maintain any organization and vigor.

If these possible objectives are eliminated, the only one remaining that makes any sense is the propaganda objective.

For this, unlike the others, there are strong and realistic arguments.

The offensive seems perfectly adapted to produce the maximum amount of effect with the least amount of effort. A very large number of relatively small units have attacked almost simultaneously in every major subdivision of the country. Some of these attacks

have been made with as few as 12 men. Some have been directed against such prominent and newsworthy targets as the U.S. Embassy and the presidential palace in Saigon.

More importantly, the offensive seems to have been directed as closely as the Viet Cong can aim it at two targets: the American voter in an election year and the war-weary Vietnamese citizen.

Brooding on Viet Setback Ignores Fearful Cost to Enemy

IN ANY WAR, when one side hazards a high proportion of long-hoarded, near-irreplaceable resources, and suffers fearful losses as the main reward, the result must be accounted a serious defeat.

That rather basic rule of warfare needs to be recalled at present, simply because so many normally sensible people appear to have forgotten it. They have forgotten it, in turn, because they have formed the habit of focusing exclusively on our own problems in Vietnam, which are very painful indeed, without paying any attention to the enemy's problems, which are much more painful.

Yet the only way to make a balanced assessment of the enormously important recent developments in Vietnam is, rather obviously, to look at both sides of the balance sheet. And enough solid facts are at last in hand to permit a tentative assessment.

Since the damage done in the cities has received all the emphasis to date, it is best to begin the assessment with the other side of the coin. What, then, was the aim of this ambitiously planned attack on South Vietnam's cities and towns? What did it cost? And what did it achieve?

As to its aim, the captured documents and prisoner interrogations leave little room for doubt that a "general uprising" was confidently counted upon, at any rate in a considerable area or areas of South Vietnam. In all cases, the enemy troop units were sent into the towns and cities with no plans whatever to cover the contingency of severe setbacks.

In at least one province, Chaudoc, the units engaged were simply told that they were to celebrate the new year with the townspeople, who were waiting to welcome them. The need to fight was a rude surprise.

IN ALMOST ALL cases, again, the enemy units sent into the towns and cities had only a few days of supplies. And in some cases, they had almost no supplies at all, being promised instead that they would get all they needed from VC sympathizers in the urban populations.

In a considerable measure, of course, morale problems necessitated this deception of the VC troop units. Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap can hardly have hoped for a countrywide "general uprising."

Instead, Giap's aim seems to have been to establish full VC control in one or more large areas—the Delta and parts of I Corps being the most likely candidates. If that had happened, the turmoil in the rest of the country would have fatally hampered any roll-back effort. It was not a foolish aim, but it was not attained.

To attain this aim, meanwhile, a cost was incurred that is still hard to calculate exactly. It was certainly an enormous cost, however. Except in the most northerly provinces, very few North Vietnamese troops were used. The great bulk of the attacking troops were true VC in the old sense—local units composed of southerners, that will lose most of their effectiveness if they are later reconstituted with northern replacements.

Because of the sharp drop-off in recruiting in the South, manpower of local origin is the VC's most precious single resource. This resource was expended with a lavish hand, as can be seen from the current estimate that enemy losses in dead and prisoners of war will reach 20,000 men.

Worse still were the losses in men of highest quality and strongest motivation. The sapper units, used for blowing bridges, mortaring airfields and the like, have always been a special elite within the VC. The great majority of the sapper units

have now been expended to the last man. And again, although dragooned young boys were used as infantry fillers, the spearhead outfits in the ordinary infantry were necessarily composed of the flower of the VC.

TO THESE RATHER dire sacrifices, one must add two other items to complete the account. The VC used and lost just about all members of the underground network which has always been their principal hidden asset in the towns. And they also surfaced and expended their clandestinely acquired assets in the South Vietnamese army, which proved to be very trifling indeed.

Such then were the aim and the cost. As to what the VC achieved, that is pretty obvious. Pacification has been sharply set back. Great destruction has been wrought in some cities. Confidence has been shaken.

Much now depends, therefore, on three things: Whether the South Vietnamese government moves successfully to restore services and confidence; whether the remaining urban pockets of VC resistance are quickly liquidated and whether a second wave of urban attacks is successfully thrown back, if it materializes as some fear.

Reasonable success on these three vital fronts is now predicted. If that is the outcome, the final balance sheet will be most unfavorable to Gen. Giap. But that leaves the question why on earth Gen. Giap ordered this vast and costly general assault on the cities and towns.

Saigon's Authority Believed to Be at a Crucial Point

By BERNARD WEINRAUB

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Feb. 10—There is a growing feeling in this tense city that the South Vietnamese Government must react swiftly to cope with the confusion and disappointment that have swept the country since the Vietcong staged daring raids on Saigon, Hue and other major cities.

"There is an opportunity here to be seized or lost," an American official said today. "If the Government moves with decision, they'll wind up in a strong position. If not, they're in trouble."

"The Government now has a chance to move into a vacuum," said another official.

"The people are frightened and they want some kind of leadership—maybe the word is protection," said another official, "and this is the time for the Government to act and show what they can do."

Two Leaders at Odds

Since the presidential elections Sept. 3, the Government has moved slowly on reforms urged by the United States. American officials said privately several weeks ago that Washington had been disappointed in the performance and concerned at the bickering between President Nguyen Van Thieu, and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky.

United States officials now insist that the Saigon Government take immediate steps to counter what they term a shrinking confidence in the regime.

"The confidence in the Government's ability to protect the cities has certainly been shaken," one official remarked.

Among the reforms that the United States has pressed over the last few months, and which the Saigon Government has resisted, are tax increases aimed at the middle class and the wealthy, the ouster of corrupt army officials, land reform, a tougher mobilization policy that would wipe out draft-dodging, a lowering of the draft age from 20 to 18, refugee camps and a decentralization of government that would reduce the powers of military corps commanders and province officials, who are, in many cases, corrupt.

American officials say that in the present crisis mood President Thieu would have no difficulty pressing one or more of these measures in the Legislature.

"It's sort of like Johnson's relationship with Congress shortly after Kennedy's assassination," one American official said.

Martial Law Imposed

—Since the start of the Vietcong offensive, President Thieu has imposed martial law and appointed Vice President Ky to head a special task force that will handle the recovery program.

Yesterday President Thieu said he was prepared to step up mobilization and start drafting 18-year-olds by July. He also asked the legislature to give him authority to rule by decree for the next year on economic and financial matters.

Although American officials indicate that martial law is necessary, there appears to be growing uneasiness among South Vietnamese politicians, intellectuals and students that the constitutional process may suffer as a result.

Some South Vietnamese say that press censorship has been too severe and that the government could easily maintain decree powers even after the crisis cases.

Military Retain Power

The powers of the corps commanders have been stiffened so that each commanding general remains an independent force.

"It seems to be a long way toward the subordination of the military to civil authority," said one knowledgeable South Vietnamese.

Informed South Vietnamese and American sources say that the 44 provinces will continue to be headed by military officers. Reforms in corrupt practices and in nepotism will probably not be pressed because the emphasis over the next few months will be on the military clean-up of the Vietcong.

Politicians and intellectuals fear that the legislature will grow impotent. It has been pointed out, for example, that the imposition of martial law has not been questioned although the Constitution stipulates that the National Assembly must decide within a 12-day period whether to accept emer-

gency special measures.

The impact of the Vietcong's urban campaign on the pacification program in the countryside remains cloudy. The program seeks to wrest control of hamlets and villages from the Vietcong.

"Nobody really knows what happened yet in the countryside," said one high American official. "Nobody can tell how we stand in the villages."

"What we think they did was sneak right through and not touch the hamlets," the official added. "What they did on the way out, when they exfiltrated, we just don't know and we won't know for another week."

American officials contend that, in striking the cities, the Vietcong sought vainly to spark an uprising against the Saigon Government.

"None of those units had plans to withdraw," one official said. "That's not the VC style at all. They thought they would stay and knock the Government of Vietnam out of business."

or American and South Vietnamese officials, the impact of the Vietcong attack in Saigon had a significant, perhaps irrevocable, influence on the dwellers in the capital.

"With the attacks," said one South Vietnamese journalist, "the discouraging gap between the city and the countryside was substantially narrowed, something that can only be beneficial to the Government if it knows how to exploit it."

"Now, with the war brutally and unexpectedly brought to their doorsteps, most city people are forced to think over their traditional indifference and make a choice between the Government and the Vietcong."

"If a choice has to be made," he went on, "the city people are more likely to opt for the Government because they know their lives would be much more miserable under Communist rule."

NEW YORK TIMES

(10)

10 February 1968

Thieu Outlines His Steps to Mobilize 65,000 More Vietnamese

HE INDICATES NEED FOR HIGHER TAXES

President Asks Authority to Rule by Decree on Economic Matters

By JOSEPH B. TREASTER

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Feb. 9—Declaring that South Vietnam "must" carry out its flagging national mobilization at an accelerated pace, President Nguyen Van Thieu outlined today steps that would bolster the armed forces by 65,000 men more rapidly than had been planned. The president also said that

higher personal taxation might become necessary as the war became intensified and asked the National Assembly to give him authority to rule by decree for the next year on matters of finance and economics.

A spokesman for the Ministry of Defense estimated that the mobilization could be carried out in about six months, bringing the number of South Vietnamese in uniform to about 765,000.

Addresses Joint Session

In an hour-long speech before a joint session of the assembly President Thieu reflected the shock that has swept through the nation as a result of the Vietcong's widespread assaults on the cities. "The Communist attacks have enabled us to realize even more clearly," he said, "the urgent problems that must be resolved."

He reiterated his agreement to negotiate with the North Vietnamese Government "any

time," but said that the Communists would seek peace only when they were convinced that they could not win.

"The recent attacks show that Hanoi still thinks that it can win," the President added. "A poll of legislators indicate that they would support the President in his request."

Essentially, the mobilization action that President Thieu called for would amount to an implementation and telescoping of the law that he enacted by decree last October, shortly before being sworn into his elected office.

Act Brings Protests

The mobilization act touched off a storm of public protest before the Vietcong launched its lunar new year offensive. In a political retreat, President Thieu had gradually diluted the plan and, in fact, had put nothing of it into effect.

In his proposals today, President Thieu said that military cutbacks should be curtailed and that the drafting of

18 and 19-year-olds should begin quickly.

He also called for the abolition of military discharges except for medical reasons and the recall of veterans with less than five years of service.

In addition, the President said that all Government officials under the age of 45 would be given military training and armed. He added that students, who were 17 years of age or older would also receive military training in school.

NEW YORK TIMES

(11)

12 February 1968

U.S. Aide Thinks That Gen. Giap May Be Trying to Win by Spring

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Feb. 12 — According to an American expert on the Vietcong and North Vietnam, Defense Minister to Nguyen Giap of North Vietnam may be trying to win the war by spring.

Douglas Pike, author of "The Vietcong," published late in 1966 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said today that General Giap probably based much of his planning for the recent Lunar New Year, or Tet, offensive on a belief that the South Vietnamese Army would disintegrate under the attacks.

Mr. Pike's evaluation of enemy intentions and planning is one of dozens making the rounds in Saigon, many of them sharply conflicting.

Mr. Pike's evaluation is based on a study of the Communist press and radio, on prisoner interrogations and captured enemy battle plans and orders.

Was in Saigon for 6 Years

Mr. Pike is a studious employe of the United States Information Agency who spent six years in Saigon before his book was published, concentrating on studies of the enemy. He is now assigned to Hong Kong, but was brought back to Saigon a week ago to make the new study.

Mr. Pike said in an interview that his first impression was that the enemy had not had "very large ambitious goals" in the recent offensive and had primarily hoped to inflict a psychological black eye.

Choosing now between the "black eye" theory and the "we

for broke" theory, Mr. Pike said, he believes that the enemy planned and hoped for large military and political success.

Mr. Pike firmly believes the Lunar New Year offensive was directed by General Giap, the victor over the French colonial forces at Dienbienphu in 1954. Mr. Pike said that the recent attacks showed General Giap's "handiwork."

With a scholar's respect for his subject, Mr. Pike called General Giap "one of the great master tacticians" of the 20th century and a "genius at surprise and diversion."

However, Mr. Pike said he believed that the Giap plan was "a failure for the time being" apparently because some of General Giap's assumptions had been false.

Probably the most important of these, Mr. Pike said, was a belief that the South Vietnamese Army would disintegrate. Mr. Pike said he surmised that General Giap believed that South Vietnam had

The evidence he has studied, Mr. Pike said, is that General Giap believed that the South Vietnamese Army could be rendered ineffective by the end of the enemy's "winter-spring offensive," which began last fall.

Mr. Pike pointed out that in this situation the Americans would have no indigenous ally, and that General Giap appeared to doubt that the Americans could win by themselves.

Mr. Pike said he believed that General Giap had sought a fairly quick victory because of a measure of disagreement within the North Vietnamese Communist party leadership.

It is Mr. Pike's belief that some younger members disagreed with the view of General Giap, President Ho Chi Minh and Premier Pham Van Dong that Vietnam can be reunited by a stubborn, unrelenting war. Defense Minister Giap may have tried to speed up the war because of this "grumbling."

Mr. Pike said the North Vietnamese were prepared to exploit, politically, the possibility of a "general uprising" by the civilian population, Mr. Pike said. The enemy must have believed there was a chance of such an uprising, he said, because of the manpower resources allocated to the promotion of the idea.

Wrote Book During Leave

Mr. Pike, who is 43 years old, wrote "The Vietcong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam" while at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Center for International Studies in 1964 and 1965 on a leave from the United States Information Agency.

A native of Cass Lake, Minn., Mr. Pike was news editor of the Army's Far East radio network in Tokyo before joining the information agency about eight years ago. Previously, he had been a reporter and radio

newsman in Korea, Okinawa and Japan. He holds a bachelor's degree from the University of California and a master of arts from American University in Washington.

His book on the Vietcong was described by Eliot Fremont-Smith in a review in The New York Times on Dec. 23, 1966, as "a remarkably extensive study."

"Vietcong" is a model of impartiality, though Mr. Pike does not like what he sees," the review commented. "In a foreword and in a conclusion he supports our continued efforts against the Vietcong in South Vietnam. Because of the excellence of his study — it is a 'must' for anyone who wants to be minimally informed about the war — his carefully muted plea that we not abandon the South Vietnamese carries more weight than most."

WASHINGTON POST (12)
2 February 1968

Red Raids on Cities Are Sign Of Weakness, Not Strength

WE ARE ALREADY engulfed in another spate of warnings that all is hopeless in Vietnam, because of the attack on the U.S. Embassy and the other VC efforts in Saigon and other cities.

In reality, however, this flurry of VC activities in urban centers will almost certainly prove to have just the opposite meaning in the end. The nearest parallel is probably the fruitless Japanese use of Kamikaze pilots in the Second World War's final phase.

Beginning at the beginning with Hanoi's basic doctrine, the war has always been supposed to culminate in a "general uprising," engulfing towns as well as countryside in South Vietnam. In prudent preparation for this "general uprising," the enemy's high command long ago began to accumulate hidden assets, in the form of men and weapons, within or on the fringes of

the various urban centers where their writ has never run.

Everyone has known that such hidden assets existed. Occasionally, this or that bit of the VC network in Saigon or some other town has been discovered and removed. Most of the network has always remained in place, largely inactive and therefore difficult to locate, but ready for use on the word of command from Hanoi.

That word was evidently given some weeks or months ago. The numerous attacks in Saigon, in Hue, in Danang and at other points were obviously long-planned and most carefully coordinated. The execution, in most cases, was quite admirable, showing very careful coordination as well as great daring.

There are still serious trouble spots waiting to be cleared up. Important elements

of VC strength in the countryside have been committed to give striking power to the people of the urban network.

But in the upshot all these immense assets are just about sure to have been wastefully expended, without producing anything dimly resembling the general uprising Hanoi has always dreamed of. It is as though a college boy, who had been saving up for a new sports car, suddenly put all his savings into a useless rattletrap. The question is, why?

QUITE CERTAINLY, therefore, the decision was consciously taken to settle for the rattletrap instead of the longed-for sports car. Equally certainly, there were two aims behind this decision. One was the obvious propagandistic aim—to weaken American and South Vietnamese resolution by causing people to write

and talk the kind of guff that one is currently hearing here.

The other aim was military. Everything indicates that the big show in Vietnam this winter is to be the battle at Khesanh. The North Vietnamese preparations strongly suggest, by their mere unprecedented scale, that this battle is intended to be climactic. And it will obviously help the enemy at Khesanh if there is acute worry about security throughout the rest of Vietnam.

But from all this, a single, central point rather emerges. What has happened in the cities, what is happening at Khesanh, cannot possibly be made to fit into Hanoi's familiar and classic blueprint for "protracted war."

The sudden expenditure of the hidden urban assets, like the preparations at Khesanh, in truth make no sense at all unless the Hanoi leaders are instead basing

all their current hopes on a short, convulsive, final or semi-final effort. Their adoption of the system of win-lose-or-draw is the only rational reading of the facts, including the fact that many recent captured documents show the Hanoi leaders promising their troops in the field peace-by-coalition "in 1968."

THAT MEANS, on the one/hand, that the stakes at Khesanh are almost unbearably high. But that means, on the other hand, that the Hanoi war-planners have been driven to conclude that "protracted war" is not a safe strategy to adopt.

This should surprise no one. Quite aside from the heavy pressure of the bombing of the North, countless captured documents reveal that "fear of protracted war" is the central "weakness"—the word is regularly used—of the North Vietnamese troops and VC cadres and

troops in South Vietnam.

There is considerable evidence, indeed, that at some time last summer the Hanoi leaders seriously contemplated retreat into the patient strategy of classical "protracted war," only to rebound into the patient strategy of a climactic effort. And the chances are that the reason for the rebound was the effect on the troops and cadres in the South of the calls from Hanoi for "protracted war . . . up to 20 years."

God knows, none can predict exactly what Hanoi will do if the preparations at Khesanh fail, DV (Deo Volente), to produce the result that Hanoi hopes for. But it is certainly idiotic to go on talking about a war "with no end in sight," as so many do in this country, when the other side so obviously thinks (or fears) that a rather early end is in sight.

Non-governmental Vietnamese Organizations
in Saigon, Republic of Vietnam

Vietnamese Confederation of Labor 14 Le Van Duget	Goodwill Woman's Association
Young Christian Workers Movement	General Confederation of Craft and Industry
Vanh Hanh Buddhist University	World Buddhist Church
National Voluntary Service 28 Phung-Khac-Khoan St	Father Tho's Sacred Heart Association
Association of Jurists	Buddhist Quang Duc Center
University of Saigon	Vietnamese Buddhist Welfare
Council of Social Service	Architectural College Students
Gio Khoi Association (Youth Group)	Student Marian General Associa- tion, 43 Nguyen-Thong St
National Youth Council 37 Hong Thap Tu	Vietnamese Buddhist Laymen's Group
World University Service/Vietnam	Vietnamese Scouts Association
Voluntary Youth Association	Technical Student's Welfare World Association
Saigon Chamber of Commerce	Student Volunteer Movement
Junior Chamber of Commerce	Nhan Lanh Welfare and Chari- table Association
Lions	Nyn Mutual Aid Association
Rotarians	Virtuous Youth Group
Boy Scouts, Saigon Prefecture 268 Tran-Hung-Dao St	Terres des Hommes
American University Alumni Association	Vietnamese Vanguard Youth Group
Chinese Lions Club	Vietnam Boy Scouts 18 Bui Chi St
Chinese Chamber of Commerce	Young Men's Christian Associa- tion of VN Gmac-Dinh-Chi St
Vietnamese Japanese Friendship Asso- ciation	
Saigon Student Union	
Vietnamese Red Cross	

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March 1968

Extremism Grows in Indian Communist Movement

Never have the competing aims and conflicting conceptions of the role of the Communists in Indian political life been so clearly manifest as during the past year, following the general elections of February 1967 in which the ruling Congress Party lost its twenty-year monopoly of government at both the national and state levels.

The resulting instability and ineffectiveness of most non-Congress Party state governments, headed by coalitions of parties ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left, heightened the differences among Communist factions, historically passionately divided by ideological questions and personal rivalries for leadership. These inter- and intra-party dissensions have been intensified by the general dissatisfaction and disagreements growing out of the coalition experience. Of India's 17 states, five are now ruled by opposition parties, three are controlled by the Central government under "President's Rule," which was proclaimed when their coalition governments fell apart. (Haryana last November; West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh in late February 1968.)

Although the CPI/R and the CPI/L seem able to agree on opposition to the Congress Party, that agreement has not extended to a mutual accord for Communist unity and united front tactics, as urged by the CPI/R and pressed by the CPSU as recently as late January when Premier Kosygin counselled CPI/R leaders to work for Communist unity in India and to cultivate CPI/L moderates such as E.M.S. Namboodiripad and Jyoti Basu, and at the Eighth Congress of the CPI/R which convened 9 February.*

Rifts in the CPI/L

In fact, the CPI/L is now undergoing yet another violent inner convulsion of ideology which indicates a seriously widening rift within the

*The Communist Party of India formally split in October 1964 into the pro-Soviet party (CPI/R) and the pro-Chinese party (CPI/L or CPI/Marxist) over the burning question at that time: the degree of support for the Government of India which national loyalty demanded from Communists during the Chinese invasion of India's borders in September 1962.

The activities of the pro-Chinese Communists in India are well documented in a Statement by Minister of Home Affairs Nanda to Parliament 18 February 1965, and published by the Government of India under the title "Anti-National Activities of Pro-Peking Communists and Their Preparations for Subversion and Violence." It was prepared as an explanation and justification for the arrest of some 900 pro-Chinese Communists in December 1964, under the Defense of India Rules.

CPI/L and points to the emergence of a third Communist Party in India formed by the CPI/L extremists, to whom Chinese propaganda has lent support and inspiration. The Chinese support includes promises of arms and equipment for the underground guerrilla forces among the peasants which the Chinese are encouraging the extremists to build according to the best Maoist doctrine of encirclement of the cities.

In early November, a large rally was organized in Calcutta by pro-Naxalbari elements at which portraits of Mao, Lenin, Stalin, Ho Chi-Minh and Jangal Santhal, a Naxalbari peasant leader, were exhibited and participants shouted pro-Chinese slogans. A few days later posters appeared in Kerala quoting from The Thoughts of Mao.

Basically, the dissensions within the CPI/L center around the issues of whether or not peaceful transition to socialism is really possible, and whether or not Communists should participate in coalition governments (parliamentary Communism), especially in Kerala and West Bengal where extremist elements resented compromises which the CPI/L accepted in order to control the United Front leadership. The CPI/L moderates, on the other hand, are concerned over the possibility that the Government of India, affronted by the Kerala and West Bengal pro-Chinese demonstrations, might ban the CPI/L. On 14 February, however, Home Minister Chavan said it would be extremely "unwise" to think of banning either Communist Party. In his reply in Parliament to a suggestion that both parties be banned in the interest of the integrity of the country, he stated "the problem should be considered as a political challenge and met on a political level. If they tend to go beyond limits, there are other ways of dealing with them."

Because of the increasing sentiment among dissidents within the party and the Naxalbari group against the "Madurai Theses," the ideological draft proposed by the Central Committee at Madurai in August 1967, the CPI/L All-India Plenum was postponed from late January to March 1968, and there is some doubt that it will take place even then.

The "Moderates"

Recent developments in the three strongholds of the CPI/L -- Kerala, Andhra and West Bengal -- suggest that a common pattern of factionalism is evolving throughout the party. At most levels and in most areas the CPI/L is now divided by three distinct ideological currents. One group, the "moderates" of the CPI/L, supports the Madurai Theses, which means that in the international field it conceives of the CPI/L as an independent party in a polycentric International Communist Movement, and opposes attempts by either the Chinese or the Soviets to dictate on matters of ideology. In the domestic area it supports the CPI/L policy of participating in united front governments in which the CPI/L is dominant, as in Kerala (and as formerly in West Bengal where the central government turned out a United Front regime, attempted unsuccessfully to install a new

anti-communist coalition, and subsequently established President's Rule on 20 February 1968). This group sees the CPI/L's main task as increasing its support among the masses rather than organizing for subversion and terror, and opposes the call for violent revolution at this time.

The "In-Betweeners"

A second faction of the CPI/L takes a position somewhere in between the "moderates" and the left extremists. As in other parties under stress from the coalition experience, this group includes loyal party members who, while staying within the party lines, are discontented because of the compromises forced on the CPI/L by its participation, along with non-Communist parties, in united front governments, and by the CPI/L leadership's refusal to embark on a truly revolutionary program of agitation and violence. Internationally, this dissident group does not accept the right of Radio Peking to vilify CPI/L leaders, but generally feels that the measure of a good Communist is loyalty to the Chinese Party. In a November session of the CPI/L Central Committee, as announced by P. Sundarayya, General Secretary of the party and a member of this faction, it was decided to make sweeping changes to eliminate "revisionism" and to make the party more effective, proletarian and mass-based, making parliamentary politics subsidiary to party organization and mass struggle.

In Kerala this faction showed unexpected strength at the State Plenum meeting 2-7 January 1968, which maintained a neutral position between China and the Soviet Union. The State party had been divided for six months between the moderates supporting Kerala's Chief Minister Namboodiripad and the Maoist extremists led by Deputy A.K. Gopalan, head of the Indian peasant Communist movement. During the debate, the moderates accused Peking of unfriendly interference in the affairs of the Indian Communist movement and of compromising aid to the Communist movement in Vietnam by refusing unity of action with the Soviet Union. However, Maoist strength was great enough to eliminate from the final resolution criticism of China.

During the last six months, Chinese Communist propaganda has intensified its attacks on Namboodiripad, whom it accuses of cooperating with reactionary Indian elements. Now only the peasants of Naxalbari, who rose up against the West Bengal authorities in early 1967, meet with Peking's approval. That outbreak, so far the only one in the sub-continent where Peking's efforts to stir up full scale violence seem to have had any great effect, coincided with the formation last March of the United Front Government in West Bengal. Having achieved a dominant role in the coalition with its leader, Jyoti Basu, as Deputy Chief Minister, the CPI/L voiced its disapproval of the peasants' action and by the end of June was in turn being denounced by the Chinese as a betrayer of the developing popular armed struggle. The CPI/L retaliated by accusing Peking of "violating every Marxist-Leninist tenet" in its assessment of the situation in West Bengal, and by expelling the militants.

The "Extremists"

The third group, called "extremists" or "ultras," is outspokenly pro-Chinese and reflects the extremism of the Maoists. In domestic affairs it supports the Naxalbari movement as a Maoist model for the Indian revolution, to be implemented wherever possible and as quickly as possible. This group includes members of the CPI/L, individuals expelled from the CPI/L, and others who left the party of their own accord. One element of this group believes that true revolutionaries should have nothing to do with the official CPI/L, while another faction favors working from within to change party policies. The activities of the extremists were, until recently, loosely coordinated by the All-India Naxalbari Krishak Sangram Samiti, based in Calcutta.

The idea of a third Communist party took on some reality at a mid-November 1967 meeting of the "extremists" which decided to launch a new party on Maoist lines, after an initial propaganda campaign, to achieve a "people's democratic revolution through building militant rural bases and extending them to encircle the cities." State level extremist Co-ordinating Committees, functioning independently of the local CPI/L state committees, exist in West Bengal, the extremist movement's real center of strength, and in Uttar Pradesh. (In late October 1967 the CPI/L for the first time expelled two of its members, Maoist extremists who had gone underground and formed a peasant militia in northeast Uttar Pradesh against the wishes of the higher echelons of the party. Last summer the CPI/L disavowed local militants who supported the peasant revolt at Naxalbari.) Other smaller groups are in Kerala, Tamilnad and Bihar, and are all represented on the All-India Coordinating Committee.

The extremist movement now publishes in Calcutta its English language monthly Liberation plus a number of low-circulation weeklies and other irregularly produced publications in English and the vernaculars. These are highly praised by Peking and reproduce quantities of material from Chinese sources. Their editorials tout the Naxalbari movement and condemn the Madurai Theses for their support of the Soviet call for unity of action on Vietnam, their failure to take an uncompromising stand on such issues as the inevitability of war and the peaceful transition to socialism, and their reluctance to agree that India is at an advanced stage of the Marxist revolutionary process requiring immediate violent action on the part of "genuine" Communists. However, while the extremists spout revolution, they appear at this point to pose a threat to law and order in West Bengal alone, but one which the Government of India could control, although not without some difficulty.

There have been recent reports of "volunteer corps," "Red Guards" or underground guerrilla organizations established by the extremist elements, principally in Kerala where they are said to have organized their own armed militia of some 3,000 men to "protect the rights of the working class." (The CPI/R, while denying that the "volunteer corps" of the CPI/L poses a threat to them, have begun organizing their own volunteer corps!) Chinese propaganda strongly supports the "armed peasants" and is trying to incite further uprisings along the Naxalbari pattern.

BLITZ

4 November 1967

New Red Party to seize power by armed revolt

By BLITZ Calcutta Bureau

CALCUTTA: Communists, some of them veterans in the movement, met at a secret conference in Calcutta last week and decided to form a new Communist Party whose main task will be "agrarian revolution for armed seizure of power by peasant guerillas with support from armed working class contingents in towns and cities".

Most of those who attended the meeting were members of the CPI(M) and they included a few from some other States, notably, Uttar Pradesh. The consensus that emerged from the meeting was that the CPI(M), because of its essentially petty bourgeois leadership, had betrayed the cause of the revolution.

UNDERGROUND

It also took note of "the fact that India is fast heading towards fascism which is inevitable in the current epoch when the Communist Party is too weak to provide leadership to the people ready for armed struggle." The task today was, therefore, to build armed units among the peasantry and to prepare them politically for the forthcoming struggle against counter-revolution.

The new Communist Party will have two distinct organisational wings, each manned by entirely separate sets of people. The underground wing and on technical

training, consistent with the objective of armed seizure of power.

The meeting hailed the leadership of the Naxalbari movement, which was described as having outlined correctly the future pattern of developments in the rural areas all over India. It denounced the CPI(M)'s West Bengal unit for having expelled from the party the most revolutionary elements.

Those representing West Bengal at the meeting claimed that nearly 50 per cent of the party's membership in the State owed allegiance to the Naxalbari group. Two senior leaders, Mr. Shiv Kumar Misra, secretary, and Mr. Kriharain Tewari, member, Uttar Pradesh State Committee of the CPI(M), reported in detail the prospects of the new Communist Party. They held that 90 per cent of the party's membership of more than 10,000 was against the present leadership in the Central Committee and Politbureau.

REVOLUTIONARIES

While Mr. Tewari has resigned from the party, Mr. Misra has issued a circular saying that it was necessary for the revolutionaries inside the party and outside to come forward to defend Naxalbari. The CPI(M) politbureau has charged Mr. Misra with "openly and wilfully defying the decisions of the Central Council", of which he is a member.

Aged 77 and in the Communist Party since 1931, Mr. Tewari in an exclusive interview to BLITZ said that the CPI(M) ceased to be a Marxist party. It had turned into a "running dog" of the "big bourgeois-landlord Government" at the Centre, to please which the CPI(M) leadership in West Bengal went so far as to unleash fascist attacks on peasantry, killing pregnant women.

ARMED SEIZURE

According to him, the party had suffered one deviation after another since its inception — right deviation till 1948 with Mr. P. C. Joshi as secretary; left sectarian dogmatism under Mr. B. T. Ranadive's leadership, and Centrist Opportunism when Mr. Ajoy Ghosh became the party secretary. These deviations were inevitable because of the petty bourgeois character of the leadership of the Indian Communist movement.

"The new Party which is in formation will be a party of revolutionaries hardened in struggle and trained in the correct Marxist perspective," Mr. Tewari said. It would not be interested in struggles for people's economic demands, either in rural or urban areas. Armed seizure of power would be the only objective.

THE STATESMAN
17 November 1967

'Third Force' Communists To Use Mao's Sickle

"Nov. 16--A decision to form a third Communist Party strictly on Maoist lines was taken at a conference which ended in Calcutta today after a week's deliberations. The task of the new party, which will be formed after an initial phase of propaganda, will be to achieve a 'people's democratic revolution through building militant rural bases and extending them to encircle the cities'.

"Those who attended the conference included the recently expelled members of the CPI(M) and some who still belong to the CPI(M) but feel that the party has become 'neo-revisionist'. Prominent among the participants are Mr. Charu Mazumdar, known as the Naxalbari theoretician, Mr. Shiv Kumar Misra, recently expelled from the CPI (M)'s Central Committee, Mr. S. Tiwari, formerly a member of the party's U.P. Committee, and Mr. Satyanarain Sinha from Bihar.

"The starting point was that the Naxalbari movement which had been 'betrayed' by the CPI(M) should guide all revolutionary action to rural areas. Another point of 'common conviction' was that the CPI(M)'s Central Committee was a 'collaborator and friend of American imperialism, Soviet revisionism and the reactionary Government of India'.

"The conference was sponsored ostensibly by an organization called the All-India Naxalbari Krishak Sangram Sahayak Samiti. It began with a discussion of the CPI(M)'s Madurai resolutions. Mr. Charu Mazumdar produced a thesis elaborating the factors which demanded 'immediate preparations for building the new revolutionary party'.

"In his class analysis, which, in a Communist document must precede the statement on tasks, Mr. Mazumdar said India was a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, and hence revolution must be based on peasants' anti-feudal struggle: the country's 'liberation' could come only through an agrarian revolt.

"The CPI(M)'s Central Committee, Mr. Mazumdar said, was not only silent on the need for an agrarian uprising but determined to oppose peasants' revolutionary struggles. According to him, this was clear in 'the Central Committee's pronouncements on the

Naxalbari movement and its glee over the military success of the reactionary United Front Government's repressive policies'.

"The conference, however, agreed that the new party could not be formed immediately because of the lack of 'subjective preparation among most Communists in the country' despite the 'objective' revolutionary situation. It was felt that there were many revolutionary workers in the CPI(M) but considerable confusion still persisted because of the party's prolonged practice of revisionist politics and acceptance of bourgeois methodology.

"The immediate task was defined as 'intense propaganda and actions to expand revolutionary politics'. It was through struggles in villages that the new party would be born. The aim would be to raise a 'people's liberation army by forging peasant guerilla units'.

"Mr. Mishra said in an interview that the propaganda would aim at spreading Mao Tse-tung's thoughts and actions to create 'more Naxalbaris.' To start with the organizational tasks of the new party would be conducted from Calcutta. A new monthly journal, Liberation, dealing with theoretical aspects of Maoism and its applicability to India, has been started. The propaganda scheme also includes publication of a Hindi edition of 'Deshabrati', the Bengali weekly, brought out by the Communists recently expelled from the CPI(M)'s West Bengal unit."

THE HINDUSTAN TIMES
25 November 1967

Govt. not to ban Left CPI, Shiv Sena now

New Delhi, Nov. 24 (PTI, UNI)
—Jan Sangh and PSP members asked in the Lok Sabha today why the Government had not taken stern action against the Left Communist Party. They accused the party of indulging in violence and anti-national and pro-Chinese activities.

Mr Kanwar Lal Gupta (JS) asked whether the Government was considering banning the Left Communist Party.

The Minister of State for Home Affairs, Mr V. C. Shukla, said the Government was not considering at present banning the Left Communist Party. However, the Government was keeping a strict watch on the activities of the members of this party and would use the Preventive Detention Act or other laws against them when there was an occasion to do so.

He described as "serious" the shouting of pro-Chinese slogans in Calcutta and the appearance of some Chinese posters in Trivandrum recently.

Mr Gupta said the West Bengal Government had been dismissed. He alleged that the Kerala Government was not supplying correct information to the Centre. He wanted to know whether the Centre would dismiss that Government also.

Mao footsteps

Mr Shukla replied it was a "matter of shame" that certain elements in the country shouted pro-Chinese slogans. The Kerala Government had informed the Centre that some posters containing the preachings of Mao were seen in Trivandrum on Nov.

20. The Centre was making further enquiries and on receipt of more information, the Government would consider what action should be taken.

Earlier, replying to Mr H. C. Kachwal, Mr Shukla disclosed that under the present laws, the Government could not take action against those who indulged in shouting anti-national and unpatriotic slogans. This was the opinion of the Law Ministry.

Mr Kachwal also had asked why the Government had not taken stern action against the Left Communists. He wanted to know whether some members of Parliament were "getting money from China."

There was no reply to the latter part of the question.

Mr Nath Pal (PSP) said the posters which appeared in Trivandrum had been reproduced in an English daily. The posters had called upon the people of West Bengal and Kerala to follow the footsteps of Mao Tse-tung. This was "a call for treason" and an attempt to undermine the loyalty of the Indian people. The country was under an emergency and the Government could easily take action.

Mr Shukla said so far as the incidents in Calcutta were concerned, the Government wanted to take some action and had referred the matter to the Law Ministry, but that Ministry advised that under the existing laws no action could be taken against those who indulged in anti-national slogans. So far as Kerala was concerned, the Government were awaiting further reports and if it was possible to take any action under the laws.

Pre-Peking Reds to launch intense struggle in villages, before formally organising a third Communist Party in India

NEW DELHI: The Home Ministry here is perturbed at the possible formation of a third Communist party in India on "Maoist lines".

Reports reaching here from Calcutta indicate that a decision to form such a Communist party was taken at a recently held meeting of the expelled members of the Left Communist Party. They included MR. S. TIWARI, MR. SHIV KUMAR MISRA, MR. CHARU MAZUMDAR and MR. SATYANARAIN SINHA.

Before formally organising themselves into a "third Communist organisation" in this country, these Peking-inspired Reds have decided to launch a struggle in villages and "intense propaganda and actions to expand revolutionary politics". Only then, they believe, a truly Maoist Communist Party will be able to take shape in India.

These Reds have also taken upon themselves the task to propagate Mao Tse-tung's thoughts in India and to organise revolutionary struggle on the Naxalbari pattern. According to these Reds, the Naxalbari movement would have succeeded but for the "betrayal" of the Left Communist Party. And therefore the need for another Communist organisation.

The declared aim of the new Communist Party is to bring about a "people's democratic revolution through building militant rural bases and extending them to encircle the cities." In other words, the emphasis of the third Communist Party would be on peasants instead of industrial workers and on agrarian revolt.

Calcutta has been chosen to be the first headquarters of the new party which will also publish a monthly journal named LIBERATION.

It is interesting to note that these expelled Left Communists have described the CP(M) as "a collaborator and friend of U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism and the reactionary Government in India."

THE HINDUSTAN TIMES
21 November 1967

Mao posters in Trivandrum

H.T. Correspondent
Trivandrum, Nov. 20—Wall posters listing Mao's thoughts and praising the Naxalbari "revolution" were seen at several prominent places in the city today.

They criticized Marxist leaders like Mr. Ranadeva and Mr. Konar. These posters, written in Malayalam and English, are believed to be the handiwork of extremists among Marxist Communists here, who are known as "Naxalbaries." The group, fed up with the present Marxist-dominated administration of Kerala, is gaining strength in the State.

In Trivandrum, "Naxalbaries" are very active.

They are behind the present agitation by the NMR workers of the Electricity Board.

A wing of the Students Federation is with them. In a showdown two days ago this wing had gained an edge over the official group.

HINDUSTAN TIMES
29 December 1967

This is it!

By Sudhir Dar



"Like to hear some Punjabi thoughts on Mao....?"

HINDUSTAN TIMES
3 January 1968

Mao photographs at CP (M) meet

Cochin, Jan. 2 (PTI)—The proceedings of the week-long Kerala State plenum of the Marxist Communist Party began here today with the hoisting of the party's flag by Mr. P. Ramamoorthy, MP.

After flag hoisting all the delegates, members of the Politburo and Marxist members of the State Cabinet went round a martyrs' memorial column showering flowering petals at its foot.

Photographs of Mao Tse-tung, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, flanked by the party's symbol hammer and sickle and a portrait of P. Krishna Pillai, martyr in the Vylar—Punnappa Communist uprising, formed the backdrop to the date.

Kerala Govt. Launches Anti-Centre Move

By Our Trivandrum Correspondent

KERALA is on the way to become the base of operations by the pro-Chinese Marxist hordes against the Central Government now that they have lost their Government-sheltered base in West Bengal following the dismissal of Ajoy Mukherji's cabinet.

Chief Minister Mr. E.M.S. Namboodiripad is reported to have told some of his comrades that Kerala had to be looked upon as "the only bastion of democratic forces" in the country, and that everything should be done to keep the present Government intact at any cost!

For this purpose he prevailed upon his partymen in the United Front coordination committee to soft-pedal programmes of direct action against the Centre which might provoke New Delhi to "take any desperate step to pull down the Ministry".

This, according to informed sources, explains the decision of Kerala United Front to take on a campaigning job, rather than launch any mass agitation to protest against the Centre's action in West Bengal. The decision, it is believed, would give a longer span of life for the Marxists' continuance in power as it does not involve a direct clash with the Centre.

Party Finance

Marxist leaders know that once the party quits power, all sources of making money for financial survival and its

programmes would be shut out. The sources are already closed in West Bengal. Now the party has to depend more on Kerala, where Mr. Namboodiripad and his comrades could still extend official patronage to the Party's efforts. "Pay some money to the Party, and anything could be get done, except making a man a woman and vice versa", this has become the popular saying.

Meanwhile there are rumours afloat that the all-India leadership of the Marxist Party has a programme to collect "several crores of Rupees" to finance their proposed "mass struggle" which would be nothing but a civil war.

At the instance of the Marxists, Kerala is already preparing at official level for a tug-of-war with the "Congress rulers in Delhi". The Marxist-administered Public Relations Department of the Government has launched a new offensive against the Centre at Government cost.

The State Government launched a scheme of purchasing newspaper space to attack the Centre on several issues. It has started with the rice problem. It is estimated that this could cost the Government a huge amount, as the advertisements on large space is published in all newspapers in the State. (There are over 40 dailies, big and small)

Most of the papers carried the first paid advertisement prominently. It raised the poser: "Is the food problem

against Keralites?". Cleverly enough, the advertisement makes no assertions, but asks questions like "Do you know?" Then facts and figures are given (which are true, of course) about the quantity of rice supplied to Kerala. The figures clearly reveal that Centre has not been caring for the interests of Keralites.

People in various departments are working overtime to provide material for this kind of advertisements, as the Marxists have their own men in key positions.

Marxist infiltration and control over the police force is on the increase. This is known to be part of the approved plan of the Party. Political observers think, the Marxists could easily use those infiltrators to subvert the successor-Government if the Marxists are forced to quit. Until then, the police could be used as an instrument of the Party. (Police portfolio is handled by the Chief Minister Mr. E.M.S. Namboodiripad)

Alongside what the Marxist leaders connected with the Government do, the partymen outside the Government are engaged in creating widespread disrespect for the Judiciary, Constitution, and existing laws. Even some of the Ministers like Mr. E.K. Imbichi Bawa (extreme Marxist) make speeches preaching revolution as the only way to cure the "ills of the society". Mr. Namboodiripad himself, once a moderate, is now openly preaching his party line of whipping up hatred towards the Centre and all those sections of the people the Marxists consider hostile.

Clever Way

While Mr. Imbichi Bawa openly defended the display of Maoist posters in Trivandrum recently, Mr. Namboodiripad in his own clever way declared that while he had his own differences with Mao Tse-Tung, "the hysteria shown by some people to run down Mao should be condemned." He exhorted,

everyone should study the thoughts of Mao Tse-Tung, "the great theoretician and man of action who was able to upturn a whole society".

Undoubtedly it appears, the Kerala Government would tolerate large-scale display of Mao posters and Chinese literature, unless other partners in the Front particularly the Right Communists, SSP, and KTP (The Muslim League's attitude is doubtful) stood firm and restrained the Marxists Ministers. As things stand at present, the non-Marxist partners are only interested in continuing in office as long as possible.

The Opposition parties, Congress, and the Kerala Congress, are yet to launch a programme jointly to expose the menace to democracy that is posed by the Marxists. The strange picture is that although these two parties, Jan Sangh and Swatantra, are opposed to the Marxist and Communist parties they are not prepared to unite and put up a strong united democratic front against the "moves to subvert democracy through democratic processes." It is the feeling of superiority and self-

importance of the leaders that prevents a united course of action in the interests of democracy and freedom.

Meanwhile, observers pose the question, whether the SSP and Muslim League stand for Communist totalitarianism, or for parliamentary democracy. It is felt that the all-India leaders alone could give clarity and direction to their men in Kerala.

The signs of the times are rather bad. Those who love freedom and democracy want New Delhi to keep constant vigil over every word and every move of the Marxist-dominated United Front's leaders.

A veteran Congress leader who suffered a lot for freedom, who is now out of active politics, had this to say: "New Delhi will have to stop thinking in terms of what Moscow, Peking, or Washington would think if the Government took some stern action in the interests of the country. The leaders of the nation today are governed by their fears, desire for approval, than by what is right for the nation and the people."

HINDUSTAN TIMES
29 December 1967

Peking radio attacks EMS

New Delhi, Dec. 28 (PTI)—Kerala's Communist Chief Minister E. M. S. Namboodiripad, was today the target of a renewed attack by Radio Peking.

The attack came in a criticism on the decision of the Kerala unit of the Communist Party (M) to set up a volunteer corps.

The Radio said Mr Namboodi-

ripad who was 'clinging' to such "official position as Chief Minister" had decided to form, along with "other revisionists" a volunteer corps.

Such a corps, according to Peking, was reactionary and was aimed at putting down people's revolutionary struggle in co-operation with the State police.

The broadcast said: "As early as last September the Indian revisionists set up camps in Calcutta, district and other places and trained 130 officers—many of them ex-servicemen for the proposed corps."

HINDUSTAN TIME
29 December 1967

Left Communists plan machinery for armed revolt

Special to the Hindustan Times

New Delhi, Dec. 28—The Left Communist Party is setting up alternative secret party machinery at the provincial committees level as part of a plan to seize power by armed insurrection.

According to secret documents in circulation among the Left Communist cadre—some of these are with the Government—the armed struggle will be on the Vietnam pattern and will be intensified in areas bordering on China and Pakistan.

The documents show that the party will soon make a special effort to infiltrate into the Army and the police. This, according to party planners, will serve two purposes: the party could "rely" on disaffection by sections of the Army and the police at crucial moments and establish a clandestine source of arms.

A prominent Left Communist leader in U.P. promised at a secret meeting recently that arms will flow from the Chinese in Tibet as soon as the party is able to establish its militant machinery.

Similar assurances were given by two West Bengal Left Communist leaders, now underground, at a secret meeting. "There would be no dearth of arms when needed," they said. "The party should concentrate on broadening the base of its mass organization for future struggle," they added.

Sensitive border

Exhorting party members to concentrate on the insurrectionary machinery in border areas, the documents speak of the experi-

ence of Telengana which failed because of "the absence of continuity with a socialist State." The situation had now changed in the party's favour with the establishment of a "socialist State" in Tibet under Chinese control. Another favourable factor was the "current friendship" between China and Pakistan so that party militants could always seek sanctuary in Tibet and Pakistan.

The border areas where the movement is to be intensified, according to these secret documents and the speeches by party leaders at secret meetings, include West Bengal, especially the districts of Jalpaiguri, West Dinajpur, Malda and Murshidabad, and U.P.'s Baharaich district situated on the border of Nepal with dense jun-

gle admirably suited to guerilla activity. Other areas listed for intensifying party activity, aimed at armed insurrection, include Mizo Hills, Nagaland, Assam, Manipur, Tripura, and Kashmir.

The secret committees will have no written list of party members nor will the identity of the members be disclosed. Underground shelters, underground printing presses, safe houses and secret communication channels will be established to cover the machinery. An extensive "Tech Apparatus" will be set up to cover remote villages so that papers and circulars can be properly circulated without any loss of time. Each secret cell will consist of not more than nine members and each member will be screened.

The documents give a new political line for party work among border tribes and minority communities, especially Muslims. The new line agrees with the Chinese stand that Mizos, Nagas and other tribes should be encouraged to agitate for autonomy short of secession from the Indian

should be for a protectorate. Among the minorities, the Muslims are to be made aware of what is characterized as the unfair treatment by the Government during and after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict."

Link with Pak Reds

West Bengal Left Communists have set up an Indo-Pakistan co-ordination committee with the East Pakistan Communist Party which is wholly pro-Chinese.

The party advocates self-determination for Kashmir in line with the Chinese advocacy and holds that India has no locus standi in Kashmir.

One of these documents, captioned Five Banners of Struggle and Unity, explained how revolution could not be achieved by

constitutional means and how the ballot box and how an insurrectionary struggle alone would enable the party to seize power. Another document, titled Path of Resistance, explained the mechanics of promoting "revolutionary activity" among the peasantry and the building of peasant-worker unity.

The document on party line on the border tribes called Advance in the Path shown by Nagas and Mizos was first circulated towards the end of last year. It characterized the Naga and Mizo uprisings as manifestations of "the liberation struggle in these two regions" and promised support to this struggle. A prominent Left Communist leader of Tripura has since been put in charge of organizing party cells among the eastern hill tribes.

HINDUSTAN TIMES
5 January 1968

CPI(M) report criticizes Chinese propaganda

Cochin, Jan. 4 (UNI)— Mr Basav Punniiah, poli'bureau member of the Marxist Communist Party, yesterday strongly criticized the Peking Radio, the Peoples' Daily and the New China News Agency for their propaganda against the Indian Communist Party (Marxist) and said it was not only a gross violation of the Marxist-Leninist principles of fraternal relations between the brother parties but also a totally wrong estimation of the real situation now prevailing in the country.

Mr Punniiah, in his report to the State Marxist plenum on the ideological draft of the Central Committee, further warned party men that if anybody in the party was carried away by this propaganda, it would be harmful to the party and the people's movement and would inflict irreparable damage.

He stressed the determination of the Central Committee "to apply the Marxist-Leninist principles to our concrete conditions here and experiences from the Russian revolution and Mao's application of Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese revolution to evolve and pursue our own correct strategy and tactics, to develop our own revolutionary movement to establish a people's democracy.

Unity bid

Mr Punniiah said the Chinese party's rejection of Soviet call for talks between them to forge united action against United

States aggression in Vietnam was against one of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism of "unity in action" even with forces having antagonistic positions, on specific issue or issues, at specific time.

Rejection of this principle would mean for the Indian party, isolation in all mass fronts from all other democratic forces and would, instead of strengthening and developing the democratic movement and forces, result in tremendous weakening and to great disaster. Vietnam President Ho Chi-minh, had openly disagreed with all the revisionist position taken by the Soviet leadership in international, ideological and political positions, but warmly welcomed all the aid and support from the Soviet Union.

Mr Punniiah repudiated the concept and theory that were being propagated by certain sections in the party in Kerala and the Chinese party abroad that the Soviet Union and its leadership had become an agent of the United States imperialism.

The socialist system built and consolidated in the Soviet Union could not be wished away and substituted by capitalism, he said.

He declared that to consider the Soviet Union, its Government and its leaders as allies of imperialism was denying the existence of world socialist system.

On the second day yesterday, the plenum adopted three resolutions, one of which dealt extensively with the developments in West Bengal.

The plenum protested against the "undemocratic, unconstitutional and illegal" dismissal of the United Front Ministry and said that this, along with the installation of the minority ministry "of Mr P. C. Ghosh, was the first step of the Congress and capitalists to wipe out the democratic system in the country and to establish autocracy."

Another resolution wanted the Kerala Government to abolish the detention system in high schools and colleges and a third demanded that education be made free up to the SSLC.

LINK

14 January 1968

Kerala Ultras Routed

The Left Communist Party is not prepared for political adventures—at least for the time being. The determined manner in which the top leadership of the party came down on the extremist group at the six-day plenum of its Kerala State unit held last week at Cochin illustrates this. In fact, the leadership went whole hog to support the "realist" section of the party led by Chief Minister E. M. S. Namboodiripad against the onslaught of the extremists.

Gain For EMS: The plenum was a signal gain for Namboodiripad. It has reestablished his position as the most decisive Left Communist leader in Kerala and enhanced his prestige in the all-India leadership, a section of which was sharply critical of him till recently. The election of A. K. Gopalan, who is said to enjoy the confidence of the extremist section, as Secretary of the reconstituted Kerala State Committee is not likely to create serious problems for Namboodiripad, for all the sections in the party, who want the Kerala United Front Ministry to remain in power know that Namboodiripad cannot be substituted.

The district-level plenums that preceded the State plenum were the scenes of a bitter fight for supremacy between the extremists and the so-called official group. These differences had existed in the Kerala party even before the elections. But after the general election the clash came into the open. The failure of the Ministry to effectively tackle the food question and other issues aggravated the inner-party conflict. The extremists, who were taught to consider anything from China as gospel truth, hailed Radio Peking's tirade against Namboodiripad and glorified the Naxalbari episode as a "new path". The Central leadership of the party also contributed to this situation. In the guise of explaining the Madurai ideological—political resolutions of the party, General Secretary P. Sundarayya launched an offensive against the other parties in the United Front like the CPI and the SSP. This encouraged the extremists, who by wildcat strikes and other adventurist actions, tried their utmost to "expose" the Ministry.

During the elections to the district party committees, held prior to the State plenum, the extremists captured the leadership of four districts, namely, Cannanore, Kottayam, Quilon and Trivandrum. In Trichur and Alleppey the rival groups were evenly balanced. In the remaining three districts—Cali-

cut, Palghat and Ernakulam—the official group is said to be in firm control. The seizure of the Cannanore district committee by the extremists can become a serious headache to the leadership, for it is the biggest unit of the party in Kerala, with the largest number of experienced cadres.

Plenum-eve developments pointed to a showdown at Cochin, where the extremists claimed that Gopalan was with them. The role that Gopalan played in strengthening the extremist position is still a point of debate. He has not openly supported the ideological line taken by the extremists. But his frequent criticism of the Namboodiripad Ministry can be construed as a political attack on the official group.

The onslaught of the Centre against the United Front Government of Bengal and subsequent events in the State had a sobering effect on the all-India leadership of the Left Communist. The need for party unity and also unity of the Left forces became urgent tasks. At the Politburo meeting, which took place in New Delhi towards the end of November, the question of the Kerala extremists was discussed in the light of the Bengal developments. The other members of the PB agreed with Namboodiripad that the extremists had to be curbed. Top leaders, Sundarayya, Basavanuniah and Ramamurthi attended the Kerala plenum.

First Shot: Party general secretary Sundarayya fired the first shot against the extremists. In a marathon speech which lasted over seven hours, he announced that the Left deviation was the main danger facing the party at present. He appealed to the delegates to root out this danger. Sundarayya claimed that with the "removal of the Dangeites" in 1964 and the adoption of a new party programme, a major step in the fight against revisionism was achieved. Now the party had to face the challenge of Left adventurism.

Basavanuniah who presented the ideological resolution carried the attack against the extremists a step further. Though he praised Mao Tse-tung for leading the struggle against "revisionism in the world Communist movement", he flatly rejected the demand made by some district party plenums to brand the Soviet Union as an ally of US imperialism. He also reiterated the party's stand taken at Madurai, that the Chinese stand of no joint action with the Soviet Union on the question of support to Vietnam was wrong.

A few hardliners like Pattiam Gopalan MP tried to put up a defence for the pro-Peking stand. But a good sec-

tion of those who had taken extreme positions at lower-level conference veered to the official stand. It is said that the disarray among the extremists was complete when A. K. Gopalan, instead of supporting them endorsed the official stand. The ultras complained that he had let them down. An amendment to the ideological resolution describing the Soviet Union as an ally of US imperialism got only 86 votes against 196. Another amendment rejecting joint action with the Soviet Union in support of Vietnam, secured just 46 votes. When the resolution as a whole was finally put to vote there were only 25 to oppose it as against 235 who supported it.

Consensus On Committee: The Central leadership saw to it that a showdown during the organizational elections was avoided. The size of the State Committee has now been almost halved and the party secretariat abolished. Long before the poll, the Central leadership had informally made it known that they wanted A. K. Gopalan to take up the post of secretaryship. This helped to cool tempers. The final list of the State Committee members was prepared by the members of the Politburo including Namboodiripad and Gopalan. It was presented as a Central panel and approved as such.

There are some conspicuous omissions in this list. K. P. R. Gopalan who is reputed to be one of the top leaders of the extremists and Raghavan, the new district committee secretary of Cannanore (who is also a prominent extremist) are not in the new committee. Food Minister Gouri Thomas, credited with extremist sympathies, is also out. Whether she had been excluded because of her political leanings or because of her failure as Food Minister is not clear. Among Namboodiripad's strong supporters, party daily "Desabhimani" editor P. Govinda Pillai M.L.A. has been excluded, as also veterans like Gangadharan of Cochin, Achuthanandan of Alleppey and Kunjiraman Master of Palghat. Obviously Namboodiripad also had to pay a price for unanimity.

The extremists claim that they have a slight edge over the E.M.S. group in the committee. Six among the 21 members of the new committee are known extremists. Another five who are also alleged to be extremists can at best be described as waverers.

NYTIMES
21 February 1968

INDIA TAKES OVER 2D STATE REGIME

Bengal's Left Communists
Balked Local Coalition

By JOSEPH LELYVELD

Special to The New York Times

NEW DELHI, Feb. 20 — The Government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ended a year of political turbulence in West Bengal today by dissolving the state's assembly and assuming responsibility for its administration.

Home Minister Y. B. Chavan told Parliament that the move had been forced by the flouting of democratic principles by the Left Communists, the stronger and more extreme of India's two Communist parties.

Ignoring cries of outrage from the Left Communist benches, he said the party had been working for "a complete collapse of the rule of law" as part of "a broader design to paralyze democracy."

The Left Communists were the strongest of 14 parties making up a united front that governed the state for nearly nine months until it was ousted Nov. 21 by the Governor, Dharma Vira.

They Obstructed Regime

The Left Communists denounced the Governor's action as unconstitutional and committed themselves to obstructing a new government led by a defector from the front, Dr. Prafulla Chandra Ghosh.

They were supported by the assembly speaker, who refused to permit a vote of confidence in Dr. Ghosh's regime.

The Left Communists said they were seeking "President's rule" — the term given to central government administration pending a fresh election.

That was something New Delhi wanted to avoid because of a fear that it would lead to further Left Communist gains in a strategic state in which most of India's heavy industry is concentrated.

Thus Mrs. Gandhi and her colleagues supported a move by the Congress party to enter a coalition with Dr. Ghosh to bolster his shaky administration. They then prepared a strategy for removing the speaker so that the regime could prove its majority in the assembly.

The strategy backfired as a result of defections. This left no alternative to the action taken today — the one the Left Communists had been seeking all along and the New Delhi Government had been trying to avoid.

The first step in the complicated process was the resignation of Dr. Ghosh. This was quickly followed by the signing of a decree dissolving the assembly.

Normally the new election would have to be held within six months. But official sources here said it would probably be delayed till November or December.

Some observers believe the Government will be tempted to outlaw the Left Communists if developments in the coming months indicate that they might do well enough in the election to form a government in West Bengal.

West Bengal is the second state under President's rule. Haryana became the first, Nov. 21. Of the remaining 14 states, at least four seem unstable enough at present to become likely candidates before long for the same extreme remedy.

March 1968

Examples of Chinese Communist Propaganda Support of CPI/L Extremists

INDIAN COMMUNISTS, PEASANTS CONTINUE STRUGGLE

Peking NCNA International Service in English 2 Nov 67 B

"Peking, 1 November -- despite the very cruel suppression of the peasant's armed struggle in Naxalbari by the reactionary Indian Government, which is plying its counterrevolutionary two-faced tactics in collusion with the Indian revisionists, the revolutionaries of the Indian Communist Party who are leading the movement and the revolutionary peasants in Naxalbari are still persisting in their militant struggle in order to prepare the way for a new revolutionary storm...

"... The revisionists of the Indian Communist Party, cooperating with the reactionaries, persecuted party members who supported the peasant's struggle in Naxalbari, and expelled from the party two-thirds of the party members in Darjeeling district. Harekrishan Konar, P., a revisionist of the Indian Communist Party, closely cooperation with the police authorities, went to the jail to persuade the peasant movement leaders to submit to the government.

"An article written by a STATESMAN reporter from Naxalbari said that revolutionaries of the Indian Communist Party are 'still on the warpath in Naxalbari.'

"... A chieftain of the Congress Party also disclosed after going to Naxalbari that 'the underground movement was being organized again' there by revolutionary peasants who 'continued to raise Maoist slogans.'

"... The Indian press also disclosed that the revolutionaries of the Indian Communist party are expanding the revolutionary forces in various parts of the Darjeeling district, in the whole of West Bengal State, and even in Uttar Pradesh under the inspiration of the Naxalbari movement.

'PEACEFUL TRANSITION' FAILS IN WEST BENGAL

Peking NCNA International Service in English 23 Nov 67 B

"Peking, 22 November -- India's Congress-controlled reactionary central government yesterday evening ordered the dissolution of the West Bengal State government, according to a New Delhi report.

"The West Bengal State government came into being after the 'fourth election' held in India in February this year. Joyti Basu, a revisionist in the Indian Communist Party, was its deputy chief minister. Among the other officials of the state government were members of the renegade Dange clique. The revisionists in the Indian Communist Party vainly attempted to make use of it to show that it was 'feasible' to achieve 'peaceful transition'

through elections and that the 'parliamentary road' was 'correct.' They advertised such a state government as an 'instrument of struggle in the hands of our people' and claimed that it could be used to 'protect the interests of the people.' In fact, they used such propaganda to coverup their sinister scheme of betrayal of the Indian revolution.

"In the northern part of this state, the revolutionary people are carrying on their armed struggle under the leadership of the revolutionaries in the Indian Communist Party. Under the beacon light of Mao Tse-tung's thought, they have spurned the 'parliamentary road' advocated by the revisionists in the Indian Communist Party and are waging a heroic struggle to blaze the correct trail for the Indian revolution.

INDIA'S COMMUNIST REBELS BUSY IN RURAL AREAS

Peking NCNA International Service in English 23 Nov 67 B

"Peking, 22 November -- The revolutionaries in the Communist Party of India (CPI) ... have gone to the rural areas to mobilize and organize the peasants for struggles against the landlords...

"The Indian paper STATESMAN reported on 16 November that the 'All-India Committee To Support the Naxalbari Peasant Struggle,' an organization of the CPI revolutionaries, recently held a meeting in Calcutta. ... They held that it is necessary to go to the rural areas to disseminate Mao Tse-tung's thought among the peasants and to take action to create more Naxalbaris.

"... The CPI revolutionaries who went to the rural areas have organized the peasants to set up 'people's committees' to resist the landlords and police. Peasant struggles against the landlords have broken out in places remote from state capitals in West Bengal, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh. The peasants of Darjeeling district under the leadership of the CPI revolutionaries have recently launched a struggle to seize land from the jotedars.

"According to INDIAN EXPRESS, the CPI revolutionaries have recently organized guerrilla-warfare training centers in Darjeeling and some other districts...

"... A struggle of the 'Naxalbari type' also broke out in Punjab State. The CPI revolutionaries recently led the peasants in wresting back land in Naiwala and Nagri villages in Patiala district.

"... Chairman Mao said: 'In semicolonial China the establishment and expansion of the Red Army, the guerrilla forces, and the red areas, is the highest form of peasant struggle under the leadership of the proletariat, the inevitable outcome of the growth of the semicolonial peasant struggle, and undoubtedly the most important factor in accelerating the revolutionary high tide throughout the country.'

"The CPI revolutionaries are striving to apply these teachings of Chairman Mao's to the revolutionary practice in India. They have gone to the rural areas to lead the peasants in revolutionary struggle...

INDIAN REBELS PUBLISH JOURNAL: LIBERATION

Peking NCNA International Service in English 18 Dec 67 B

"Peking -- Determined to fight modern revisionism, the Indian revolutionaries have, ... recently published their own journal, LIBERATION, which enthusiastically propagates the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung and actively promote India's national-democratic revolution...

"The first issue of LIBERATION is prefaced by the following notes: 'In India, an unprecedented revolutionary situation is fast developing. The brave peasants of Naxalbari, armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought, have raised the banner of revolt against feudal oppression, against the rule of the reactionary classes.' Naxalbari marks the beginning of a new era in India's history ...

"It also carries in full and editorial of the Chinese paper PEOPLE'S DAILY of 5 July 1967 entitled 'Spring Thunder Over India' hailing the armed struggle waged by the peasants of Darjeeling district under the leadership of the revolutionaries of the Indian Communist Party.

INDIAN REVOLT SURGES UNDER MAO'S THOUGHT

Peking NCNA International Service in English 25 Dec 67 W

"Peking -- NCNA Correspondent -- This year marks a turning point in the history of the Indian revolution. Under the guidance of the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung, the Indian people have finally embarked on the only correct road for the Indian revolution -- the victorious road along which Chairman Mao led the Chinese people to seize political power by armed force. The revolutionary line upheld by the revolutionaries in the Indian Communist Party is winning one victory after another, while the line of 'peaceful transition' pursued by the Indian revisionists is steadily going bankrupt...

"Now, the revolutionary people of India led by the revolutionaries in the Indian Communist Party are determined to take the road of the Chinese revolution, to oppose armed counterrevolution with armed revolution...

"The struggle between two lines and two roads has always existed in the Indian Communist Party for a long time. The struggle has been intensified in the past few years. The revolutionaries in the Indian Communist Party, under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung's thought, have firmly opposed the parliamentary road of 'peaceful transition' pursued by the renegade Dange clique which has usurped the party leadership and by the small handful of revisionist chieftains represented by Namboodiripad and Jyoti Basu.

"... Abiding by Chairman Mao's brilliant teaching that 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,' the revolutionaries in the Indian Communist Party explicitly pointed out that in India 'the only correct path of the people's democratic revolution is: to build up revolutionary bases in the rural areas through an agrarian revolutionary under proletarian leadership, and subsequently to encircle the urban centers by expanding these revolutionary bases; to organize people's liberation forces from among the peasants' guerrilla forces and to lead the revolution to victory by capturing the cities.'

"The revolutionaries in the Indian Communist Party have gone to the rural areas like Darjeeling district, where feudal exploitation is especially heavy and the revolutionary forces are comparatively strong, to propagate Mao Tse-tung's thought among the peasants, to rally them, organize them, arm them, and prepare for the peasants' armed uprising.

"At the beginning of this year, ... the revolutionary peasants in Naxalbari area of Darjeeling district and other places, rallied by the revolutionaries in the Indian Communist Party, lit the flames of armed struggle.

"The revolutionaries led the landless or land-hungry peasants in Darjeeling ... in launching tempestuous attacks on the landlords, the plantation owners, and the reactionary government; they took back the land and wrested arms and grain from them. They organized small armed groups and set up 'people's courts' to punish those local tyrants and evil gentry who put up stubborn resistance. ...Between March and June of this year the peasants engaged in 220 armed actions...

"The Indian revolutionaries set up committees in various places in support of the Naxalbari peasants' struggle, and rallied the people to support the armed revolution. They translated and published large quantities of Chairman Mao's writings, widely propagating Mao Tse-tung's thought. They published many periodicals and books, and printed leaflets to spread the truth about the seizure of political power by armed force and to expose the small handful of revisionists within the party who sabotaged armed struggle. Following the example of the revolutionaries in the Indian Communist Party in Darjeeling district, many revolutionaries went to the villages 'to develop struggles, especially Naxalbari-type movements' and to create 'more Naxalbaris.'...

"This year is also a year during which the 'parliamentary road' followed by the Indian revisionists represented by Namboodiripad and Jyoti Basu has been fully exposed and has gone completely bankrupt.

"This 'parliamentary road' is a mixture of the fallacy of 'peaceful transition' advocated by old-line revisionists Bernstein and Kautsky and the 'doctrine of nonviolence' advocated by Gandhi. The Soviet revisionist renegade clique ... made great efforts to support and propagate this 'parliamentary road,' the so-called 'Indian road,' in an attempt to prevent

the Indian people and other oppressed nations and people from taking the victorious road of the Chinese revolution....

"The big exposure of the reactionary nature of the so-called 'non-Congress governments' in Kerala and West Bengal had educated the Indian people. They have seen that the 'parliamentary road' advocated by the Indian revisionists is a road which betrays the Indian revolution, and that this road will never lead to the overthrow of the rule of the reactionary classes and to the liberation of the people....

"The present main tasks for the Indian revolution put forward by the revolutionaries in the Indian Communist Party are: to spread among the people Mao Tse-tung's thought, the acme of Marxism-Leninism in the present era; to carry further the struggle against the old and new types of revisionism; to make a specific analysis of India's objective conditions in accordance with the brilliant thought of Mao Tse-tung, and formulate the program and tactics for the Indian revolution on this basis; to give impetus to the peasant revolutionary struggle and develop the Naxalbari-type movements....

INDIAN REVISIONISTS BUILD 'VOLUNTEER CORPS'

Peking NCNA International Service in English 26 Dec 67 W

"Peking -- E.M.S. Namboodiripad and other revisionists in the Communist Party of India who have climbed to such official positions as chief minister of Kerala State Government are now building a counterrevolutionary 'volunteer corps' in an attempt to cooperate with the police in putting down the Indian people's revolutionary struggle according to a report from New Delhi.

"According to the Indian bourgeois newspaper, STATESMAN, a 'massive volunteer corps' is being organized by the revisionists in the Communist Party of India. 'The volunteers,' those revisionists have indicated, 'might be used to supplement the duties of the state police.' As early as last September the Indian revisionists set up camps in Cannonore and Calicut districts and trained 130 officers (many of whom were exservice-men from the reactionary Indian Army) for the proposed 'volunteer corps.' A thousand or more such 'volunteers' had first appeared at a rally in Calicut district in late October....

PEOPLE'S DAILY CITES INDIAN PEASANT STRUGGLE

Peking NCNA International Service in English 16 Jan 68

"Peking -- 'Mao Tse-tung's thought lights up the way to victory for the Indian revolution' is the title of an article carried in PEOPLE'S DAILY here today.

"The article, ... notes that the Indian people are rising in rebellion inspired by the great thought of Mao Tse-tung and led by the revolutionaries in the Indian Communist Party. ... The revolutionaries there have broken the fetters of modern revisionism and kindled a spark that has started a prairie fire in the vast land of India against imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. The rising revolutionary armed struggle of the Indian peasants represents their country's hope and future....

"It was in the spring of last year, ... that the revolutionary peasants in Naxalbari, ... aroused by the revolutionaries in the Indian Communist Party, lit up the torch of armed struggle. ... The S.A. Dange renegade group and the handful of revisionist leaders of the Indian Communist Party violently attacked this splendid revolutionary uprising. The 'non-Congress government' of West Bengal then openly joined the Indian reactionaries in fiercely suppressing the Darjeeling peasants.

"Though styling himself a 'communist,' the chief Minister of Kerala, E.M.S. Namboodiripad, promptly ordered the police to crack down on the peasants' struggles of the Naxalbari type as soon as they had broken out in his state. This shocking record fully proves that the revisionists of the Indian Communist Party are a bunch of dyed-in-the-wool renegades who act as accomplices of the Indian reactionaries....

"Guided by the radiance of the great thought of Mao Tse-tung, the revolutionary forces of the Indian Communist Party and the revolutionary Indian people have seen through the counterrevolutionary features of the Soviet revisionist ruling clique, the Dange renegade group, Namboodiripad, and other revisionists in India and have resolutely rebelled against them....

"Chairman Mao has pointed out: 'As a rule, revolution starts, grows, and triumphs first in those places in which the counterrevolutionary forces are comparatively weak.' The vast Indian rural areas are the weakest link in the reactionary rule. The present vigorous revolutionary armed struggle of the peasants has irrefutably proved that in India, the peasants are the natural, most reliable, and biggest ally of the proletariat and the main contingent of the revolutionary forces.

"The revolutionaries of the Indian Communist Party and the revolutionary people in India are persisting along the road pointed out by the great leader of the people of the world, Chairman Mao. This is a decisive factor for the victory of the Indian revolution. Chairman Mao's road is one of arousing the masses of peasants in the countryside, under the leadership of a proletarian political party, to carry out guerrilla warfare and agrarian revolution, build rural base areas, encircle the cities from the countryside, and finally seize them. This is the only correct road for the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples to overthrow the rule of imperialism and its lackeys and achieve complete liberation....

"Chairman Mao has pointed out: 'Without a people's army the people have nothing.' This is an incontrovertible Marxist-Leninist truth. In their struggle against the reactionaries 20 years ago, the people of Telengana, India, did set up their own armed forces composed of a guerrilla force of 2,000 and militia units of 10,000 strong, establish guerrilla zones with a total population of 10 million, and distribute nearly 1 million acres of land.

"But they were completely deprived of the fruits of the revolution when, in 1951, the renegade Dange and his like betrayed them. The peasants' revolutionary armed struggles that are aflame in Darjeeling and other areas at present have prepared the groundwork for the establishment of a people's army. The revolutionaries of the Indian Communist Party will undoubtedly end the reactionary rule and win nationwide victory so long as they set up and develop, step by step, a people's army of a new type in accordance with Chairman Mao's thinking....

"The excellent revolutionary situation in India has inspired the Indian people and the revolutionary peoples of various countries, and has dealt a heavy blow at imperialism, the Soviet revisionist ruling clique, and the Indian reactionaries..."

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March 1968

Panama Elections and the Canal Treaties

The two chief contenders for election to the Presidency of Panama in the 12 May 1968 elections are President Robles' Finance Minister David Samudio and Dr. Arnulfo Arias, twice President before. Thus far the Canal treaties have been a relatively minor issue in their election campaigns.

Dr Arias has gone on record with the cautious statement that the inauguration of his administration on 1 October will "provide a most propitious and timely occasion to give the world an example of justice, nobleness and honor on the part of Washington, and of true and frank understanding on the part of Panama" to harmoniously resolve the canal problem. For the past two decades, Arias has been consistently pro-United States in his statements, except for a short period following his defeat in the last presidential election. At that time he indirectly blamed the United States for his upset and accused it of lack of courtesy for not arranging a dialogue with him. However, during and after the riots of January 1964 he was accused of being the only "pro-Yankee" candidate for the presidency. During his present campaign, Arias has assiduously tried to give the impression that he will have the backing of the United States if elected. At a political rally on 3 February he stated his views on the importance of the Canal problem as a campaign issue (see Attachment A): "It is not the most important issue. It is one of the most important. There are many other problems which we must analyze and study. For example, we have problems of education, economy, and production. We are not going to breathe only through the Canal. We want to increase the trust of the U.S. and European investors.... We are willing to help the United States and the world, but first we must help ourselves so that we can make progress."

Arias' chances for election to the presidency of Panama have been greatly enhanced by the addition to his ranks of four of the eight parties forming the Robles government coalition. These four parties -- opposed to Samudio because of his reputation as a liberal reformist -- have joined forces with Arias' Panamenista Party to form the powerful National Union, which claims to represent 75 per cent of the voters. Further, Samudio's aspirations have been under attack -- although there is no sign yet that these attacks have had much effect -- as a result of the recent publicity given to alleged irregularities in the Electoral Tribunal's cedula issuance offices. Administration supporters are accused of pressuring those offices to weigh the scales in favor of Samudio by issuing duplicate and falsified cedula (identity cards required for voting) to his followers, delaying issuance of cedula to opposition voters, and perforating (and thus invalidating) the cedula of peasants. However, if Samudio can control the election machinery, backed by the National Guard under General Bolivar Vallarino, he has a good chance of repeating the political maneuvering that put Robles into office over Arias in 1964. Thus far Vallarino has remained neutral, but he has little liking for Arias and could risk much by going against the present administration. There is no evidence

to show that one candidate is more pro-United States than the other on the Panama Canal treaties issue.

The Canal Problem

In 1903 the newly independent nation of Panama granted the United States a treaty to build and maintain the Panama Canal. The American Government paid \$10 million for the right. After more than ten years of labor the Panama Canal was officially opened on 15 August 1914. As President Johnson stated, when he announced in December 1964 (the full text is attached) the readiness of the United States to begin negotiations for a new canal treaty:

For 50 years the Panama Canal has carried ships of all nations in peaceful trade between the two great oceans -- on terms of entire equality, and at no profit to this country. The canal has also served the cause of peace and freedom in two world wars. It has brought great economic contributions to Panama. For the rest of its life the canal will continue to serve trade, and peace, and the people of Panama.

But that life is now limited. The canal is growing old, and so are the treaties for its management, which go back to 1903. The Panama Canal, with its limiting locks and channels, will soon be inadequate to the needs of world commerce.

Diplomatic relations with Panama, severed after the flag riots of January 1964, had been resumed in April of that year. In September 1965 a joint statement was issued by President Johnson and Panamanian President Marco A. Robles announcing that certain general areas of agreement had been reached in negotiations for a new treaty. In the main it was agreed that the 1903 Treaty would be replaced by one recognizing Panamanian sovereignty and providing for its own termination upon completion of a sea-level canal. However, it was not until after two and a half more years of discussions, that the United States and Panama announced in June 1967 that final agreement on a treaty had been reached between the two governments.

In place of the 1903 Treaty, which gave the United States exclusive and perpetual rights to control the present Canal, the negotiators have formulated three treaties: one provides for Panamanian participation in the running of the present lock canal, although on a minority basis, and vastly increases her direct income from it; another provides for continued United States defense of this canal or any future canal through military bases; and the third gives the United States an option to build a new sea-level canal. Both canals would revert to Panama after a certain number of years.

The Robles government proposed bringing the draft treaties before the Panamanian National Assembly for ratification on 1 October 1967. However, influenced by critical blasts from the opposition press, Robles decided to postpone action on the treaties until after the May 1968 presidential elections. Prospects for ratification soon after the elections appear slim since Robles will not be likely to call a special assembly session during his lame-duck period from May to October 1968. Both principal contenders for the presidency, Arias and Samudio, have carefully refrained from issuing clear-cut policy statements on the Canal issue.

Opposition to the New Treaties in Panama

Much of the opposition to the "three-in-one" treaty package has had an emotional basis -- transferred from the strong popular sentiment against the Treaty of 1903. Panama has long had a problem of identity and self-assertion. In the 19th century she was part of Colombia and struggled against her. When the United States helped her gain independence in 1903, she fell within the United States' sphere and lost control of 600 square miles of territory around the Canal. Although the legal tender in Panama is the balboa, the only paper money in circulation are United States bills. Panama City's water is supplied from the Canal Zone and her telephone and electric services are under American financial control. One of the largest single sources of employment in Panama City and Colon is the Panama Canal Company. In the countryside one of Panama's major exports, bananas, is in the hands of the United Fruit Company, a United States concern. Panamanians have naturally become hyper-sensitive on the subject of Panamanian sovereignty and the new treaties have been attacked for either infringing on Panamanian sovereignty or contravening Panama's constitution.

Criticism of the treaties has come from both the extreme left and the extreme right. The Communist Party of Panama (PDP-Partido del Pueblo) has been active among student and youth groups in planning opposition to the treaties in the event that they come up for ratification in their present form. Communist-inspired student rioting in Colon in June 1966 brought out sharply the power of students as a pressure group in Panama -- the student movement has been a prime target of the Communists since the 1930's.

On the other hand, while still refraining from issuing a clear cut policy statement on the Canal treaties, Robles has expressed the position that the treaty package needs to be "enlarged, complemented and reformed." His candidate for the presidency, David Samudio, has adhered to this line also. The Government's efforts to launch a campaign to promote public support for the treaties was frustrated almost from its inception by rivalries among the elite, who control most of Panama's news media, and by attacks from the Arias family newspapers, which have taken the stand that Robles won the 1964 election through fraud and that therefore his government is illegal and cannot negotiate binding treaties with anybody. In the main, however, there has been little adverse reaction to the treaties

from Arias himself who, as one of the two primary candidates for the presidency, has no wish at this time to alienate the United States. The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) has been highly critical of the United States on the Canal issue, maintaining that complete renegotiation is called for; however, the PDC presidential candidate, Antonio Gonzalez Revilla, is given no chance of victory.

Growing Opposition to the Treaties in the United States

Meantime, as the Panamanian Government quibbles over the terms of the new treaties, opposition is increasing in the United States itself. A number of influential American citizens, including Congressmen and high-ranking military men, have formed an organization called the American Emergency Committee on the Panama Canal, which takes the line that return of the Canal Zone to Panamanian sovereignty could lead to a world war. Its spokesmen claim that the treaties jeopardize the security of the United States and represent a giant giveaway of American resources.

PARA INFORMACION SOLAMENTE

Marzo 1968

Elecciones en Panama y los Tratados del Canal

Los dos principales contrincantes en la contienda electoral por la presidencia de la República en Panamá el 12 de mayo de 1968 son David Samudio, ministro de Finanzas en el Gabinete del Presidente Robles, y el doctor Arnulfo Arias, quien fuera presidente dos veces. Hasta la fecha los tratados con respecto al Canal han sido materia relativamente menor en la campaña electoral.

El doctor Arias se ha pronunciado en forma cautelosa al declarar que su inauguración el primero de octubre "ofrecerá una muy propicia y oportuna ocasión para dar al mundo un ejemplo de justicia, nobleza y pundonor por parte de Washington, y de verdadera y franca comprensión por parte de Panamá" para resolver en armonía el problema del Canal. Durante los dos últimos decenios el doctor Arias ha sido permanentemente favorable a los Estados Unidos en sus manifestaciones, excepto por un corto tiempo a raíz de su derrota en los últimos comicios presidenciales. En aquella ocasión culpó indirectamente a los EE.UU. por su fracaso y los acusó de falta de cortesía por no haber entablado un diálogo con él. No obstante, durante y después de los motines de enero de 1964 fue acusado de ser el único candidato presidencial "proyanqui." En su campaña actual el doctor Arias ha procurado asiduamente dar la impresión de que contrará con el respaldo de los EE.UU. en caso de resultar electo. En una concentración política el 3 de febrero expuso su criterio sobre la importancia del problema del Canal como tema de la campaña electoral (ver Anexo A): "No es la cuestión de mayor importancia. Es una de las más importantes. Por ejemplo, tenemos problemas de escolaridad, economía y producción. No vamos a respirar sólo por el Canal. Queremos ensanchar la confianza de los inversores norteamericanos y europeos.... Estamos dispuestos a ayudar a los EE.UU. y al mundo, pero primero tenemos que ayudarnos a nosotros mismos de modo que podamos progresar."

La posibilidad de Arias de ser electo presidente ha sido acrecida grandemente con la incorporación a sus filas de cuatro de los ocho partidos que constituyen la coalición de gobierno del Presidente Robles. Los cuatro partidos --opositores de Samudio por su reputación como reformista liberal -- se han unido al Partido Panameñista de Arias para formar una poderosa Unión Nacional que dice representar un 75 por ciento del electorado. Además las aspiraciones de Samudio han sido combatidas -- aunque hasta la fecha no hay indicio de que los ataques hayan hecho mucha mella -- como resultado de las noticias recientes sobre supuestas irregularidades en las oficinas de cedulaación del Tribunal Electoral. Se acusa a los partidarios del régimen de presionar a dichas oficinas para que inclinen la balanza en favor de Samudio mediante la expedición a sus partidarios de cédulas en duplicado o falsas, los retrasos en la expedición de cédulas a los electores de oposición y la perforación (y consiguiente cancelación) de las cédulas de campesinos. Sin embargo, si Samudio consigue hacerse cargo de la maquinaria electoral, con el respaldo de la Guardia Nacional comandada por el general Bolívar Vallarino, tiene posibilidades de repetir las maniobras políticas que dieron la presidencia a Robles derrotando a Arias en 1964. Hasta la fecha Vallarino se ha mantenido neutral, pero tiene poca simpatía por Arias y tendría mucho que perder yéndose contra el régimen actual. No existe indicio de que un candidato sea más favorable a los EE.UU. que el otro en materia de los tratados sobre el Canal.

El Problema del Canal

En 1903 la nueva Nación independiente de Panamá concedió a los Estados Unidos un tratado para construir y mantener el Canal de Panamá. El Gobierno de los EE.UU. pagó por dicho derecho la suma de diez millones de dólares. Luego de más de un decenio de trabajo el Canal de Panamá fue inaugurado oficialmente el 15 de agosto de 1914. Como declarara el Presidente Johnson al anunciar en diciembre de 1964 (véase texto completo anexo) la disposición de los EE.UU. a comenzar a negociar un nuevo tratado sobre el canal:

Durante 50 años el Canal de Panamá ha llevado buques de todas las Naciones en comercio pacífico entre los dos grandes Océanos -- en condiciones de entera igualdad y sin provecho para este país. El Canal también ha servido a la causa de la paz y la libertad en dos guerras mundiales. Ha traído a Panamá grandes aportes económicos. Por el resto de su vida el Canal continuará sirviendo al comercio, la paz y el pueblo de Panamá.

Pero esa vida está actualmente limitada. El Canal envejece, y así también los tratados para la gestión del mismo, que datan de 1903. El Canal de Panamá, con sus canales y esclusas restrictivos, pronto será inadecuado a las necesidades del comercio mundial.

Las relaciones diplomáticas con Panamá, rotas a raíz de los motines de banderas de enero de 1964, habían sido restablecidas en abril de aquel año. En septiembre de 1965 fue suscrita una declaración por el Presidente Johnson y el Presidente Marco A. Robles dando a conocer que se había llegado a ciertas zonas de acuerdo en las negociaciones para un nuevo tratado. En lo principal se acordó que el tratado de 1903 sería sustituido por uno que reconociera la soberanía de Panamá y disponiendo su propia caducidad al completarse un canal a nivel del mar. Pasaron sin embargo dos años y medio más de conversaciones antes que EE.UU. y Panamá anunciaran en junio de 1967 que entre ambos Gobiernos se había llegado a un acuerdo definitivo sobre un tratado.

En lugar del tratado de 1903, que concedía a los EE.UU. derecho exclusivo y en perpetuidad al control del Canal actual, los negociadores han formulado tres tratados: uno dispone la participación de Panamá en la operación del actual canal de esclusas, aunque con carácter minoritario, y aumenta enormemente sus ingresos directos del mismo; otro dispone que los EE.UU. mantendrán la defensa de este o de cualquier futuro canal por medio de bases militares; el tercero concede a los EE.UU. la opción de fabricar un nuevo canal a nivel del mar. Ambos canales pasarían a poder de Panamá al cabo de cierto número de años.

El Gobierno de Robles propuso someter los proyectos de tratado a la aprobación de la Asamblea Nacional de Panamá el primero de octubre de 1967. Sin embargo, influenciado por fuertes críticas de la prensa de oposición, Robles resolvió postergar la acción sobre los tratados hasta pasadas las elecciones de mayo de 1968. La perspectiva de ratificación poco después de las elecciones parece ser escasa ya que Robles probablemente no convocará la Asamblea Nacional a reunión especial durante los meses finales entre mayo y octubre de 1968. Ambos contendientes principales en la contienda electoral, Arias y Samudio, se han abstenido de hacer declaraciones específicas sobre la cuestión del Canal.

Oposición en Panamá a los Nuevos Tratados

Gran parte de la oposición al acuerdo "tres en uno" ha tenido base emocional -- traspaso del fuerte sentimiento popular contrario al Tratado de 1903. Panamá por mucho tiempo ha tenido un problema de identidad y auto-imposición. Durante el siglo 19 formaba parte de Colombia y luchaba contra ésta. Cuando los EE.UU. la ayudaron a conseguir su independencia en 1903, cayó dentro de la órbita de los EE.UU. y perdió su hegemonía sobre 600 millas cuadradas de territorio en derredor del Canal. La moneda legal de Panamá es el balboa, pero el único papel moneda circulante son billetes de los EE.UU. El servicio de acueducto de la Ciudad de Panamá proviene de la Zona del Canal y sus servicios de teléfonos y electricidad están bajo control financiero norteamericano. Una de las fuentes más grandes de empleo en las ciudades de Panamá y Colón es la Panama Canal Company. En el campo, uno de los principales artículos de exportación de Panamá, la producción bananera, está en manos de la United Fruit, empresa norteamericana. Los panameños naturalmente se han puesto hipersensibles con respecto a la soberanía de Panamá y los nuevos tratados han sido combatidos por infracción de la soberanía panameña o por contravención a su Constitución.

Tanto la extrema izquierda como la extrema derecha han hecho críticas. El partido comunista (PDP, Partido del Pueblo) ha trabajado activamente entre los grupos estudiantiles y juveniles planificando la oposición a los tratados para el caso en que sean sometidos a la ratificación en su forma actual. Los desórdenes estudiantiles de inspiración comunista ocurridos en Colón en junio de 1966 pusieron de agudo relieve el poder de los estudiantes para presionar en Panamá -- el movimiento estudiantil ha sido blanco principal del comunismo desde los años del '30.

Por otra parte, aunque absteniéndose de formular una declaración de política concreta con respecto a los tratados del Canal, Robles ha expresado el criterio de que el conjunto de tratados tiene que ser "ensanchado, complementado y reformado." Su candidato a la presidencia, David Samudio, se ha adherido a esta línea. Los esfuerzos del Gobierno por lanzar una campaña para promover apoyo popular por los tratados fueron frustrados casi desde su inicio por rivalidades entre la élite, en cuyo poder están la mayoría de los órganos noticieros, y por ataques de los periódicos de la familia Arias, que han adoptado la posición de que Robles ganó la elección de 1964 mediante el fraude y que por lo tanto su régimen es ilegal y no apto para negociar tratados comprometedores con nadie. Pero por lo general no ha habido gran reacción contraria a los tratados por parte de Arias mismo, el cual, como uno de los dos candidatos principales a la presidencia, no se interesa por ahora en enemistar a los EE.UU. El Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC) ha criticado fuertemente a los EE.UU. en cuanto al Canal, sosteniendo que se hace necesaria una nueva negociación completa. Sin embargo, al candidato del PDC a la presidencia, Antonio González Revilla, no se le atribuye perspectiva de triunfo.

Creciente Oposición a los Tratados en EE.UU.

Entretanto, mientras el Gobierno panameño busca faltas a los términos de los nuevos tratados, en los Estados Unidos crece la oposición a ellos. Cierta número de influyentes ciudadanos, incluso parlamentarios y militares de alto grado, han formado lo que llaman el Comité Americano de Emergencia Sobre el Canal de Panama, que propugna la idea de que la devolución de la Zona del Canal a la soberanía panameña podría conducir a la guerra mundial. Sus portavoces aducen que los tratados hacen peligrar la seguridad de los EE.UU. y representan un dispendioso reparto gratuito de los recursos norteamericanos.

Panama
6 February 1968

(A)

CANAL, REFORM ARE ISSUES AT POLITICAL RALLY

Panama City Radio Aeropuerto Network in Spanish 2315 GMT 3 Feb 68 P

[Live relay of a National Union Political Rally in Concepcion, Chiriqui Province, on 3 February]

[Summary] Gilberto Arias: "The outcome of the 12 May elections was determined three months ago when the Panamenista Party, Democratic Action, National Patriotic Coalition, Republican Party, and Third Nationalist Party, and other independent groups such as the Opposition Alliance, National Front, and Independent Liberals, which represent 75 percent of the voters, formed the powerful National Union."

The National Union is an example of personal and partisan unselfishness seeking the nation's best interests. We must consolidate and organize the people's will to obtain an overwhelming majority at the polls and to give our support to candidate Arias, Arango, and Bazanso so that in the next four years they can cleanse the nation of bad government. There have been attempts at abuses and fraud but these have been denounced in time. If they try anything on 12 May they will be crushed. The people will not tolerate fraud at the polls.

In regard to the Canal, we must repeat that Panamanians want a canal operated and owned exclusively by Panamanians. "This is our final goal; to it we will give our time, and with the help of God we will get it. About a year ago the Foreign Ministry advised the government to sign three draft treaties with the United States. Reports from Washington gave July 1967 as the date for signing them. There are people in the government who wish to see those draft treaties signed. You know what the public thinks. It is opposed to it and the National Union also says no to the draft treaties. Panama's Bar Association has said that according to the treaties recommended by the government, Panama is obliged to surrender additional territory and waters when the United States says this is necessary for operation and defense of the Canal. The National Union will not permit this. In the opinion of the Bar, the treaties submitted to the Panamanian Government give the United States an option to build a sea-level canal without knowing beforehand what Panama's compensation will be if the canal is built through Panama. The National Union will never allow this, fellow citizens. The Bar Association has said that the draft treaties submitted by the Foreign Ministry to the Panamanian Government allow the U.S. Armed Forces to enter Panamanian territory in case of any threat of aggression, armed conflict, or any other emergency. What could this other emergency be? For instance, 9 January? But the National Union will never allow this." The National Union needs the support of all Panamanians to rebuild the nation on permanent, solid, and just foundations.

Jose D. Bazan: Panamanians, as I was coming here I could feel the great admiration that the people of this province have for Dr Arnulfo Arias. This feeling is justified, inasmuch as Dr Arnulfo Arias has been living in this province for over 20 years and carries in his heart the desire for progress and welfare for this province and for the whole nation. Dr Arias is fully aware of the problems he must face as president. He is overwhelmed by your enthusiasm, but he also needs for you to keep it up during his administration so that he can carry out the task of governing the country. The parties who are members of the National Union are fully aware of the responsibility the nation is facing in its progress, reorganization, and international relations. We know there are opposing viewpoints but we will respect all ideas in order to find solutions in the nation's best interests.

Raul Arango Navarro: I want to express my gratitude for the demonstration of sympathy shown by the people of this province. The National Union is supporting the presidential ticket headed by a great citizen, Dr Arnulfo Arias Madrid. Our crusade is the product of fervor and hope. We are pursuing a patriotic mission full of faith and optimism toward the great task which will benefit our country. "Because we are an overwhelming majority, we can make effective the promise of unity without hatred among the Panamanian family and with social justice for the entire nation. In our program to save the nation there is no place for throwing the rich against the poor, the aristocrats against the humble classes, of those who believe they know it all against the lack of knowledge of some people. We do not believe in the class struggle. We prefer the integration of classes in the daily task of developing the nation. We cannot face future problems if we are not united in one will and organize our efforts better to serve the Panamanian Nation. "We are going to eliminate ill-obtained privileges, which is a chronic evil in our land. Dr Arnulfo Arias has promised with brilliant sincerity a regime of national reconstruction, which will be the greatest guarantee for internal peace and institutional orders, and which will obtain the abrogation of the deplorable 1903 treaty. We are supported by men from all levels. Only with such support can we go before the world as representatives of a nation which is demanding justice in our relations with the United States."

Our civic duty is to serve the majority and not group or personal interests. The people will give us the authority to carry out our task of national progress. Since the majority of people are supporting us, I can assert that public forces will have to listen to their demand for a clean electoral process, without restrictions, threats, or impositions.

Dr Arnulfo Arias: Dear Friends, I am deeply moved, not just by the amount of people I see here, but because I see in your radiant faces a genuine faith in our cause. We are grateful for the trust shown us to continue ahead in our long struggle to make something of this country. I have friends who have given me their support over many years during which we had nothing to offer to show our deep appreciation. Our adversaries thought that we had failed because we were not active in politics by participating in elections. However, they failed to comprehend that Panamenista was alive as a moving force based on love for our land and our traditions. "The National Union is not a temporary coalition of parties, it is not a group that got together for electoral ambitions, much less is it a group pursuing particular interests. The National Union is a step forward in the formation of our nationality in a march toward progress."

The National Union has been received with joy and pleasure by the man in the country, the man in the city, the merchant, professionals, teachers, and the people in general, rich and poor. "During a political rally we asked the people what other party or parties other than the National Union could form a government with creative power? Now we are asking you: What party or parties other than the National Union could form a government to face the problem of rising unemployment? What other party or parties other than the National Union could form a government to provide roofs and adequate facilities for the people in the city and in the rural areas? What other party or parties other than the National Union could form a government to give children, adolescents, and youth an adequate education to meet the practical needs of our environment? What political group other than the National Union could form a government to face with honor and dignity the problems of the Panama Canal?"

Recently I was interviewed by the National Broadcasting Company, and the first question I was asked was: "Do you consider that the Panama Canal problem is the most important issue in this electoral campaign?" My answer was 'no.' It is not the most important issue. It is one of the most important. There are many other problems which we must analyze and study. For example, we have problems of education, economy, and production. We are not going to breathe only through the Canal. We want to increase the trust of U.S. and European investors. This country cannot depend exclusively on

what is produced in one region, or to dedicate its effort to one activity, or to depend on the advantage of our geographic position. We must stop living on hope. We must set our feet on the ground and give up all illusions of wealth through the lottery."

We are willing to help the United States and the world, but first we must help ourselves so that we can make progress. Public employees, from the president to the lowest in rank in the administration, should be at their posts to serve the people. They are paid for it. We are in favor of an efficient civil service. My fellowmen, learn to love your country and put all your effort into the progress of the nation.

I am inviting all Panamanians to join us in this important task of success, not just the electoral success which we already have assured. I mean, to form part of a successful government which I plan to make.

WASHINGTON POST
19 December 1964

(B)

President's Statement on Panama Canal

Associated Press

Following is the text of a formal statement by President Johnson on the Panama Canal situation:

This Government has completed an intensive review of policy toward the present and future of the Panama Canal. On the basis of this review I have reached two decisions.

First, I have decided that the United States should press forward, with Panama and other interested governments, in plans and preparations for a sea level canal in this area.

Second, I have decided to propose to the Government of Panama the negotiation of an entirely new treaty on the existing Panama Canal.

These decisions reflect the unanimous judgment of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They are based on the recommendations of Ambassador Robert Anderson, Secretary Stephen Alles, Secretary Thomas Mann, and Ambassador Jack Vaughn. They have the full support of Mr. Truman and Gen. Eisenhower. They have been reported to — and sympathetically received by — the leadership of the Congress. These two steps are needed now — for the protection and promotion of peaceful trade — for the welfare of the hemisphere — in the true interest of the United States — and in fairness and justice to all.

For 50 years the Panama Canal has carried ships of all nations in peaceful trade between the two great

oceans — on terms of entire equality, and at no profit to this country. The canal has also served the cause of peace and freedom in two world wars. It has brought great economic contributions to Panama. For the rest of its life the canal will continue to serve trade, and peace, and the people of Panama.

But that life is now limited. The canal is growing old, and so are the treaties for its management, which go back to 1903.

The Panama Canal, with its limiting locks and channels, will soon be inadequate to the needs of world commerce. Already more than 300 ships built or building are too big to go through with full loads. Many of them — like our own most modern aircraft carriers — cannot go through them at all.

So it is time to plan in earnest for a sea level canal. Such a canal will be more modern, more economical, and far easier to defend. It will be free of complex, costly, vulnerable locks and seaways. It will serve the future as the Panama Canal we know has served the past and the present.

4 Possible Routes

The Congress has already authorized \$17 million for studies of possible sites and other practical problems of a sea level canal. There seem to be four possible routes — two in Panama, one in Colombia, and one which goes through Nicaragua and possibly Costa Rica as well.

I have asked the Secretary of State to begin discussions with all the govern-

ments concerned with these possible new routes. In these discussions we will be prepared to work on the terms and conditions of building and operating a new canal, and if preliminary agreements can be reached, we will be ready to go ahead with selected site surveys.

Last January there was violence in Panama. As I said then, "violence is never justified and is never a basis for talks."

But while the people of the United States have never made concession to force, they have always supported fair play and full respect for the rights of others. So from the first day I made it clear that we were ready to sit down and seek answers that would be just and fair and right — without precondition or precommitment on either side.

New Treaty Proposed

On that basis, relations between our two countries were resumed in April, and on that basis I chose Mr. Robert Anderson, who had been President Eisenhower's Secretary of the Treasury, to be my special ambassador on this problem. Since then Ambassador Anderson has been working with Ambassador Vaughn, with Secretary Alles, and with Secretary Mann. They have recommended that we should propose a new treaty for the existing canal. After careful review with my senior advisers, I have accepted this recommendation.

Today we have informed the Government of Panama that we are ready to negotiate a new treaty. In such a treaty, we must retain the

rights which are necessary for the effective operation and protection of the canal, and the administration of the areas necessary for these purposes. Such a treaty would replace the treaty of 1903 and its amendments. It should recognize the sovereignty of Panama. It should provide for its own termination when a sea level canal comes into operation. It should provide for effective discharge of our common responsibilities for hemispheric defense. Until a new agreement is reached, of course, the present treaties will remain in effect.

In these new proposals, we will take every possible step to deal fairly and helpfully with the citizens of both Panama and of the United States who have served so faithfully through the years in operating and maintaining the Panama Canal.

These changes are necessary not because of failure but because of success; not because of backwardness but because of progress. The age before us is an age of larger, faster ships. It is an age of friendly partnership among the nations concerned with the traffic between the oceans. This new age requires new arrangements.

The strength of our American system is that we have always tried to understand and meet the needs of the future. We have been at our best when we have been both bold and prudent in moving forward. The planning of a new canal, and the negotiation of a new treaty, are just such bold and prudent steps. Let us take them together.

SECRET

68/3-6

KGB ANNIVERSARY STATEMENTS CONFLICT WITH
REALITIES OF SOVIET JUSTICE

1. In directing propaganda against the KGB as an external intelligence service we mustn't overlook its role of internal secret police in the Soviet Union. The Fiftieth Anniversary of the KGB, which was recently celebrated, particularly emphasized this internal role, the Soviet leadership being reluctant to stress publicly its secret activities abroad.

2. One very vulnerable point for attacking the KGB as an internal police force is in its disregard for the laws of the Soviet Union (reduced to parody by the arrest in December 1965 of poet-mathematician Alexander Yesenin-Volpin for parading in Red Square with a sign proclaiming "Uphold the Constitution!"). This issue has been seized by the Soviet intellectuals who have attempted to protect themselves by protesting the illegality of the procedures taken against them. Several examples of the problem are given in the unclassified attachment. Others appear in the press fairly regularly and are reprinted in *Press Comment*.

3. Dissension in the Ukraine, though not new, has recently broken into the news. The particular case of Vyacheslav Chornovil is mentioned in the attached backgrounder, and is but one of many examples of the KGB's nefarious role in that land. We expect that Ukrainian dissidence will receive more publicity in the future and this will provide pegs for assets to use in future media coverage of this topic.

4. Treatment of intensified KGB activities at home and abroad should stress the recrudescence of arbitrary police power, a major symptom of the current trend toward "re-Stalinization" in the Soviet Union.

5. Targets for propaganda play include:

a. Soviets abroad, many of whom have indicated a particular sensitivity to, and irritation with, persecution of the intellectuals and miscarriage of justice at home.

b. Communist party intellectuals and their fellow travelers; they have frequently themselves protested against Soviet handling of this problem (see attached article from *L'Unita*)!

c. Western intellectuals, who have taken a heartening interest in the plight of Soviet intellectuals and whose interest should be further stimulated.

d. Lawyers and others associated with the legal profession who ought to protest this perversion of justice.

SECRET

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

March 1968

KGB ANNIVERSARY STATEMENTS CONFLICT WITH REALITIES
OF SOVIET JUSTICE

Two recent events in the USSR have once again brought the issue of Soviet justice into sharp focus. The first, a pledge to uphold "socialist legality" in a major speech by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov, and the second, a rigged trial of several young Moscow intellectuals, give diametrically opposed impressions. A look at events involving the KGB over a longer span suggests that justice needs more than pious pledges by its secret police if it is to become a reality in the USSR.

Andropov Speech on KGB Anniversary

On 20 December 1967 Andropov, the Chairman of the USSR's Committee for State Security (KGB), addressed the country's top Communist Party, government, military, and intelligence leaders who had gathered to celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet state security agencies (these are the KGB, previously known as the Cheka, OGPU, NKVD, MVD, and MGB and the military's Chief Intelligence Directorate, or GRU). Andropov, as was to be expected, lauded the historical role of the Cheka and discussed the state security agencies' current task of contributing to the fulfillment of Soviet foreign policy as set forth by Communist Party Secretary General Brezhnev on the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet Revolution. (The speech appeared in the central Soviet press of 21 December 1967.)

The most remarkable part of Andropov's speech dealt briefly with the indelible blot of the terror of the past which, he pledged, would never return:

"In addressing ourselves to the history of Soviet security agencies, we see distinctly that their successes were always linked first and foremost to the strictest observance of Leninist principles. Only on this basis and only under the Party's guidance is it possible to fulfill the tasks of protecting the interests of the socialist state.

"We also have no right to forget the time when political adventurers who turned up in the leadership of the N.K.V.D. attempted to remove the state security agencies from the Party's control and to isolate them from the people and committed lawless acts, which seriously harmed the interests of our state, of the Soviet people and of the security agencies themselves.

"In recent years our party has done an enormous amount of work to strengthen socialist legality. Distortions have been liquidated in the work of Chekist agencies themselves; daily Party and state control has been established over their activities; and reliable political and legal guarantees of socialist law and order have been created.

"Thus our party has shown clearly that there is and can be no reversion to any violations of socialist legality whatever. The state security agencies stand and will stand on guard over the interests of the Soviet state, on guard over the interests of Soviet people."

Andropov claimed there can be no reversion to the evil ways of the past because a Chekist is:

"... the image of a passionate revolutionary, a man of pure honesty and enormous personal courage, implacable in the struggle against enemies, stern in the name of duty, humane, and prepared to sacrifice himself for the sake of the people's cause, to which he has dedicated his life."

Andropov also stressed this legality aspect in other remarks, including:

"... active, purposeful communist humanism and each Chekist's awareness of his job as a position aimed at protecting Soviet people, their peaceful labor, their tranquility and security, were and remain the stable foundation of the activities of the state security agencies."

"... Consistent implementation of Leninist principles, rigid fulfillment of the directives and instructions of the Communist Party, strict observance of the laws of the socialist state, and constant and extremely close ties with the masses of working people constitute a pledge of the successful work of the state security agencies and a reliable guarantee of the correct approach to fulfilling the tasks entrusted to them."

Andropov also emphasized the subservience of the KGB to the Communist Party:

"... it would never have been possible to build the Cheka-OGPU ... had Dzerzhinsky, for all his qualities as a Communist organizer, not been a great man of the Party, obedient to the law and modest, a man for whom a Party directive was everything."
(a quote of Menzhinsky)

and

"The Chekists, ... who are boundlessly devoted to the Communist Party, our great homeland and the Soviet people, will steadfastly implement the general line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union..."

KGB Acts Against Dissidents

On 8 January 1968, less than 3 weeks after Andropov's speech, the widely publicized trial of Aleksandr Ginzburg, Yuri Galanskov, Aleksei Dobrovolsky and Vera Lashkova began in Moscow. At this trial, the letter and spirit of "Soviet legality" were violated in numerous ways:

a. Prior to the trial the four defendants had been held by the KGB, incommunicado and without access to legal counsel, for 11½ months; but, Article 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedures of the RSFSR stipulates even for "exceptional" cases, that a maximum of 9 months can elapse between arrest and trial (see attached text of the Article).

b. Attendance at the trial was by invitation only, effectively barring sympathizers of the defendants until they protested to loudly that a few close relatives were admitted. It was reported that the audience consisted of KGB officials and volunteer militia who laughed at and insulted the accused and the witnesses, and howled at a witness who attempted to testify for the defense.

c. Press coverage was virtually non-existent until 16 January, after the trial had been over for 5 days. In fact, only 3 major articles on the trial appeared in the central Soviet press during the whole month of January.

d. Press coverage, even on such a minimum scale, was, according to Ginzburg's mother, inaccurate and libelous. She wrote the publishers of Komsomolskaya Pravda, the Communist youth paper, that she would bring legal proceedings against the author and the newspaper if they did not either prove or retract their statements that her son was a "paid agent" of an anti-Soviet emigre organization and that espionage equipment and subversive literature were found in his apartment.

e. The trial was run, according to assembled reports, in accordance with a scenario already prepared by the KGB investigation. Witnesses for the defense were stopped when they attempted to make statements which departed from the "rehearsed spectacle."

f. Witnesses were denied their obligation, under Article 283 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to remain in court after giving evidence. One witness, L. Katz, was not allowed back into the courtroom after a recess, but was told by the "commandant of the court," KGB Colonel Tsirkunenko, that "If you had given other evidence, you could have stayed."

Soviet intellectuals summed up their opinion of the atmosphere created by this trial in one word: Stalinism. The trial itself was termed "no better than the celebrated trials of the nineteen-thirties." It conjured up for the intellectuals an unfolding picture of the activities of Nikolai Yezhov, one of Stalin's most blood-drenched lieutenants, who headed the NKVD, a forerunner of the KGB, during the infamous purges in the mid-thirties.

Soviet "Legality"

Soviet justice is inhibited by the absence of meaningful legal protection for the individual. The legal code emphasizes the duties and responsibilities owed to the state by its citizens, rather than the justice and rights of individuals (typical articles from the Criminal Code of the RSFSR are attached). Furthermore, Soviet laws are frequently so vaguely worded as to provide no real protection for individuals. The Stalinist Constitution of 1936 has, for all practical purposes, been ignored. As the eminent British authority on the Soviet system, Robert Conquest, has noted*, the Constitution has value in terms of propaganda, both external and internal, stemming from the impression it gives of "a settled order, consistent government, and inalienable civil rights." During the Khrushchev era the Soviets recognized the inadequacy of the Constitution and in 1959 started talking about drawing up a new one. Khrushchev headed a Constitutional Commission from 1962 to 1964, and Brezhnev has headed it since. However, no draft constitution has been produced, nor have there even been any recent reports to indicate the Commission is active.

Arbitrary acts by the KGB are thus not effectively barred by legal or constitutional restraints. A flagrant example of such acts was the reported interrogation of Pavel Litvinov by a KGB official, Gostev, on 26 September 1967. Not only did Gostev threaten Litvinov with punishment, but he revealed how the Soviet court and press had run roughshod over the legal rights of Vladimir Bukovsky. (See attached articles.)

The rights of Soviet citizens have been even more badly trampled in other parts of the USSR, where the light of publicity seldom reaches. For example, in August 1966 six Baptist leaders in Rostov-on-Don were imprisoned for organizing a street procession and public baptism of about 40 young people; they were charged with causing a disturbance, circulating anti-Soviet literature and conducting Sunday schools. Two others who conducted similar religious activities in Kirgizia were sentenced to 5 years under the very ambiguous Article 227 (copy of which is attached).

One of the most comprehensive condemnations of Soviet justice is an 80-page manuscript by a 29-year-old Ukrainian journalist, Vyacheslav Chornovil, who was sentenced in Lvov to three years in a labor camp in November 1967. Chornovil's manuscript outlines his charges against the "illegalities" being perpetrated by the courts and the KGB. Chornovil has also written a book in which he describes the miscarriages of justice which occurred in the trials of 20 "criminals" which took place -- unnoticed -- in the Ukraine at about the same time that the world was being thrown into an uproar by the Sinyavsky-Daniel arrest and trial in Moscow. One can only surmise how many other trials have passed unnoticed.

*See Robert Conquest: The Soviet Political System, Bodley Head; London, 1968.

Text of Appeal Denouncing Trial of Four Russians

MOSCOW, Jan. 12 (Reuters)
—Following is a translation of the text of an appeal issued today by Pavel M. Litvinov, grandson of the late Soviet Foreign Minister, Maxim M. Litvinov, and Mrs. Larisa Daniel, wife of Yuli M. Daniel, the imprisoned writer, on the trial in Moscow of four young Russians:

To World Public Opinion:

The judicial trial of [Yuri] Galanskov, [Aleksandr] Ginzburg, [Aleksei] Dobrovolsky and [Yera] Lashkova, which is taking place at present in the Moscow City Court, is being carried out in violation of the most important principles of Soviet law. The judge and the prosecutor, with the participation of a special kind of audience, have turned the trial into a wild mockery of three of the accused — Galanskov, Ginzburg and Lashkova—and of the witnesses—unthinkable in the 20th century.

The case took on the character of the well-known "witch trials" on its second day, when Galanskov and Ginzburg—despite a year of preliminary incarceration, in spite of pressure from the court—refused to accept the groundless accusations made against them by Dobrovolsky and sought to prove their own innocence. Evidence by witnesses in favor of Galanskov and Ginzburg infuriated the court even more.

Unfair Procedure Charged

The judge and the prosecutor throughout the trial have been helping Dobrovolsky to introduce false evidence against Galanskov and Ginzburg. The defense lawyers are constantly forbidden to ask questions, and the witnesses are not being allowed to give evidence that unmasks the provocative role of Dobrovolsky in this case.

Judge [Lev M.] Mironov has not once stopped the prosecutor. But he is allowing people who represent the defense to say only that which fits in with the program already prepared by the K. G. B. (state secret police) investigation. Whenever any participant in the trial departs from the rehearsed spectacle, the judge cries, "Your question is out of order," "This has no relation to the case," "I will not allow you to speak." These exclamations

directed at the accused (apart from Dobrovolsky), to their lawyers and to the witnesses.

The witnesses leave the court after their examination, or rather they are pushed out of the court, in a depressed state almost in hysterics.

Statement Forbidden

Witness Yelena Basilova was not allowed to make a statement to the court—she wanted to record how the K.G.B. had prosecuted her mentally sick husband, whose evidence given during the investigation when he was in a certifiable state, plays an important role in the prosecution case. Basilova was driven out of the court while the judge shouted and the audience howled, drowing her words.

P. Grigorenko (former Maj. Gen. Pyotr Grigorenko of the Soviet Army) submitted a request asking that he be examined as a witness because he could explain the origin of the money found on Dobrovolsky, Galanskov gave him this money. Grigorenko's request was turned down on the pretext that he is allegedly mentally ill. This is not true.

Witnesses Aida Topeshkina was not allowed to make a statement to the court in which she wanted to give facts showing the falsity of Dobrovolsky's evidence. Topeshkina, an expectant mother, was physically ejected from the courtroom, while the audience howled at her.

The "commandant of the court," K.G.B. Colonel Tsirkunenko, did not allow witness L. Katz back into the court after a recess, and told her, "If you had given other evidence, you could have stayed."

None of the witnesses have been allowed to stay in the court after giving evidence, although they are obliged to stay under Soviet law. Appeals by the witnesses on the basis of Article 283 of the Code of Criminal Procedure [the relevant article] went unheeded, and the judge said sharply to witness V. Vinogradova, "You can just leave the court under Article 283."

Appeal to World

The courtroom is filled with specially-selected people—officials of the K.G.B. and volunteer militia—who give the appearance of an open

make a noise, laugh, and insult the accused and the witnesses. Judge Mironov had made no attempt to prevent these violations of order. Not one of the blatant offenders has been ejected from the hall.

In this tense atmosphere, there can be no pretense that the trial is objective, that there is any justice or legality about it. The sentence was decided from the very start.

We appeal to world public opinion, and in the first place to the Soviet public opinion. We appeal to everyone in whom conscience is alive and who have sufficient courage:

Demand public condemnation of this shameful trial and the punishment of those guilty of perpetrating it!

Demand the release of the accused from arrest!

Demand a new trial with the observance of all legal norms and with the presence of international observers!

Citizens of our country! This trial is a stain on the honor of our state and on the conscience of everyone of us. You yourselves elected this court and these judges—demand that they be deprived of the posts which they have abused. Today it is not only the fate of the three accused which is in danger—their trial is no better than the celebrated trials of the nineteen-thirties, which involved us in so much shame and so much blood that we have still not recovered from them.

We pass this appeal to the Western progressive press, and ask for it to be published and broadcast by radio as soon as possible. We are not sending this request to Soviet newspapers because that is hopeless.

(signed)

LARISA BOGORAZ-
DANIEL

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After the Moscow Trial of Aleksandr Ginzburg
and Jurij Galanskov

Literature and Politics in the Soviet Union

The recent Moscow trial of four Soviet citizens, including the principal figures, Aleksandr Ginzburg and Jurij Galanskov, provoked strong and varied reactions in the West also. For the bourgeois press, it was an especially diverting change from the news of revelations of ever more prevalent scandalous corruption in our national leadership. The international imperialistic front is wrought up over an important issue. Yet, if it had been a matter only of a propaganda expedient, all that would have been needed would have been a polemic retort to remind the vestals of freedom of their own daily crimes against freedom. Actually, the situation is more serious. If the bourgeois press exploits for its own ends an opportunity that is liberally presented to it, the basic fact nevertheless remains; that is, the Moscow trial, as a part of a vaster state of affairs, is an event that preoccupies anyone who may see in Socialism a solution for present-day world problems.

The Stalin Era and the XXth Congress

I should like to say definitely that, I, personally, do not at all approve of that trial, and, still less, the manner in which it was conducted, nor its outcome. Nevertheless, while I feel that it is my duty to express my strong personal disagreement with the official Soviet position, the important thing is to understand what is happening among the intellectuals in the USSR.

Even if one follows with sympathy the efforts and the aspirations for revival of intellectuality in the Soviet Union, he is impelled to judge its abstractness with severity. He would like to derive from it the solace of political ideas, or at least of definite attitudes consonant with those of the West European Left. He is disappointed when he hears from the "innovators" more talk of literature than of politics. How many times, then, does the local intellectual shake his head and accuse his Soviet colleagues of "Social Democracy," of being guilty of thinking more of limiting censorship than of revolutionizing the world? He who searches the specific nature of Russian history for the reasons for Soviet political-cultural deficiencies also does not find a satisfactory answer. Aside from the fact that a definition of this nature is almost always unreasonable, one forgets that, politically speaking, the same problems are repeated in more "Western" countries, as, for example, Czechoslovakia.

Every reader will have his own idea of what the Stalinist period did for the Soviet Union, or, more specifically, for its culture. Whatever the judgment concerning that period is (and the matter will have to be worked over by the historian), most people will agree that its end constituted a real, true liberation: liberation of men who had been unjustly

imprisoned and banished, a liberation of energy and of ideas, a liberation from a state of oppression that in the final Stalinist years reached incredible heights. The XXth Congress of the CPSU was the vital moment for that liberation. A "thawing" began to take place in literature and culture -- a difficult "thawing," also because literature took on a burden that it would have been better to share with political discussion, historiographic work, and sociological research. But it was not possible. One would have to not know what the Stalinist era was to be astonished. Thus burdened, literature moved as far away as possible from the premise of "polished" literature, which Soviet society judged as "good" or "better," and set out to search for the truth. Solzhenitsyn is the symbolic frontier of this period, which began with Ehrenburg, Nekrasov, and Dudintsev and toward which they were pushing. But, in the midst of all of this, Doctor Zhivago appeared, with all that it signified. For the first time, the clamorous matter of censorship, because awareness of it as a problem came later.

What was the outcome of this period that we can also term the "Khrushchev" period (among other things, it was Khrushchev's intervention that removed the last remaining obstacles to the publication of A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, by Solzhenitsyn)? From a general point of view, which is what is of interest to us, the importance of the "thawing" or "Khrushchev" period, is, first of all, a real, true re-animation of literature and a steady re-acquisition of values, political as well as literary, which had been missing. And that is not insignificant. The other result is to be seen in the contrast between literary importance and political importance. This statement might seem paradoxical. In reality, one must abandon the idea of a tender, rosy, peaceful union between politics and literature with respect to institutions. Such a union sprouts from indifference or from the extinction of literature as a specific form of spiritual activity. A literature that is not politically committed is the hand maiden of institutionalized politics. The "Khrushchev" period showed Soviet literature how to commit itself, and thus the way to political struggle -- obviously, a struggle within a society, to realize common ideals, but not necessarily always in agreement. Was it not this very creative tension that Stalin had stifled, by prosecuting each dissent and all research? The contrast between literature and politics really disappears from literature and politics when political awareness ceases to coagulate and remain gangrenous and, instead, resumes its pulsating course through the veins of society. The "thawing" period has left a legacy of many unresolved problems to the new period, but there are at least two important results.

The case of Daniel and Sinjavskiy occurred between two periods. It burst forth in the new, but had ripened in the old. The criminal proceeding unjustly replaced a public trial that should have taken the responsibility of checking not only the behavior of the two authors, but, first of all, the problems that they contortedly treated. Nevertheless, the consequences of the Daniel and Sinjavskiy case are part of the new

period in the development of Soviet culture; in fact, they inaugurate it. For the first time, large segments of intellectuals, better informed than the other citizens, explicitly expressed to the political leaders their disagreement with respect to the sentence. Solzhenitsyn also explicitly explained, in a wonderful open letter (one that was full of anguish) to the Fourth Congress of Soviet Writers, not so much his personal problem of a writer who could not publish, but a general state which pertained not even just to intellectuals as such, even though they feel it more acutely, but to society in general: the evil of censorship. The young men who were recently condemned in Moscow had protested the sentencing of Sinjavskiy and Daniel, appealing to the Soviet Constitution. They had published articles of great interest in their typewritten newspaper, and in no case were they averse to Socialism.

Socialist Democracy and Cultural Freedom

We are living in a time when an anti-imperialistic struggle is becoming strategically complex, in that it imposes firm, encompassing choices of great responsibility. In addition, we know how intricate relations are within the Socialist world and how delicate political situations are sometimes created in individual Socialist countries. And yet, it would be a serious error to underestimate the importance of the matter of intellectual and political freedom in Socialist countries. These problems find their solution in the prospect of an international revolutionary transformation and in the accomplishment of this task. But, during the whole period of transition, they persist and require diligent attention, a series of "temporary" and approximate solutions, but nonetheless important and effective ones. The need for a more suitable solution, while it may be manifested through the initiative of intellectuals, in reality answers a need that is latent in the entire Soviet society. In fact, this need for a more suitable and flexible political structure of the society that emerged half a century ago as a result of the October revolution comes, from all evidence, from the acquirement of political consciousness and does not pertain merely to sectional or selfish group interests. On the contrary, it is what is needed for the attainment of a broader, more varied, and active Socialist political consciousness.

That is why Soviet intellectuals, far from carrying out a "Social-democratic" activity, are clearly presenting a problem of universal value for Socialism, even if the way in which they express it and, even more, the way they will resolve it, cannot help but be qualified and limited by history. From the movement promoted by the XXth Congress to the also important problems of the "autonomies" and of the "decentralizations," the need has been widely established for taking a stand on great political questions. There is an increasingly clear need for a public, collective quest for politics that will allow rational discussion of every activity and concept. Socialist culture has a vital responsibility in connection with this extremely difficult, and extremely necessary, activity, during the course of which the "educated" and the "educators" will be re-educated.

Vittorio Strada

Dopo il processo di Mosca a Aleksandr Ginzburg e Jurij Galanskov

Letteratura e politica nell'Unione Sovietica

Il processo svoltosi recentemente a Mosca contro 4 giovani cittadini sovietici, tra i quali le figure principali sono quelle di Aleksandr Ginzburg e Jurij Galanskov, ha suscitato varie e vaste reazioni anche in Occidente. Per la stampa borghese è stato un diversivo particolarmente prezioso in un momento in cui la classe dirigente nostrana si rivela sempre più piena di scandolose magagne e il fronte internazionale dell'imperialismo si squarcia in un settore assai importante. Tuttavia, se si trattasse soltanto di un espediente propagandistico, basterebbe una ritorsione polemica che ricordasse alle vestali della libertà i loro propri quotidiani criminali di lesa libertà. In realtà la situazione è più seria. Se la stampa borghese sfrutta al suo fine un'occasione che lo è generosamente offerta, resta peraltro indubbio che il fatto di base, cioè il processo di Mosca come parte di uno stato di cose più vasto, è un avvenimento che preoccupa chiunque veda nel socialismo la soluzione degli attuali problemi del mondo.

L'età staliniana e il XX Congresso

Preciso che, personalmente, non approvo affatto quel processo e, ancor meno, il modo in cui si è svolto e il risultato cui è pervenuto. Tuttavia, se mi pare doveroso manifestare un personale fermo dissenso dalle posizioni ufficiali sovietiche, il problema autentico è quello di capire ciò che sta succedendo tra gli intellettuali dell'URSS.

Anche chi segue con simpatia gli sforzi e le aspirazioni di rinnovamento dell'intellettualità dell'Unione Sovietica, è portato a giudicare severamente l'«astrattismo»: vorrebbe ricevere da essa il conforto di idee politiche, o almeno di espliciti atteggiamenti, consonanti con quelli della sinistra europea-occidentale, e resta deluso quando dagli «innovatori» sente parlare di letteratura più che di politica. Quante volte, poi, il nostro intellettuale di sinistra scuote il capo e tace di «socialdemocrazia». I suoi colleghi sovietici, rei di pensare più a limitare la censura che a rivoluzionare il mondo? Insoddisfante è anche la posizione di chi cerca nel particolare carattere della storia russa le ragioni delle deficienze politico-culturali sovietiche: a parte il fatto che la definizione di tale carattere è quasi sempre cervelotica, si dimentica che, nella sostanza politica, gli stessi problemi si ripetono in paesi più «occidentali», come la Cecoslovacchia, ad esempio.

fatto della censura poiché il sentirlo come problema fu un risultato posteriore.

Quale fu il risultato di questo periodo che possiamo denominare anche «kruscioviano» (tra l'altro, fu proprio l'intervento di Krusciov ad abbattere gli ultimi ostacoli alla pubblicazione di *Una giornata di Ivan Denisovic di Solzhenitsyn*)? Da un punto di vista generale, che è quello che qui ci interessa, l'importanza del periodo del «disgelo», o «kruscioviano», sta, prima di tutto, in una vera e propria rianimazione della letteratura e in una costante riacquisizione di valori, politici non meno che letterari, che lo erano stati sottratti. E questo non è poco. L'altro risultato è da vedere nel contrasto tra momento letterario e momento politico. Questa affermazione può parere paradossale. In realtà bisogna abbandonare l'idea di un'unione tenera, rosea, pacifica tra la politica e la letteratura in quanto istituti. Un'unione cosiffatta nasce dall'indifferenza reciproca o dall'estinzione della letteratura come specifica forma di attività spirituale. La letteratura politicamente meno impegnata è quella che si fa ancella della politica istituzionalizzata. Il periodo «kruscioviano» riaddestrò la letteratura sovietica all'impegno e quindi alla lotta politica. Evidentemente, lotta all'interno di una stessa società per realizzare i comuni ideali, non sempre, del resto, identicamente intesi. Non era proprio questa tensione creativa che Stalin aveva spinto, incriminando ogni dissenso e ogni ricerca? Il contrasto tra letteratura e politica passa, in realtà, attraverso la stessa letteratura e la stessa politica in un'epoca di transizione.

tutto il periodo di transizione essi permangono e chiedono una preoccupazione assidua, una serie di soluzioni «provvisorie» e approssimate, ma non per questo meno importanti e fattive. L'esigenza di una loro soluzione più congrua, se si manifesta per iniziativa degli intellettuali, risponde in realtà a un bisogno latente di tutta la società sovietica. Infatti questa esigenza di una più adeguata e flessibile struttura politica della società nata mezzo secolo fa dalla rivoluzione d'ottobre proviene, con ogni evidenza, da una presa di coscienza politica e non risponde a interessi meramente settoriali, egoistici, di gruppo. D'altro lato, essa è la condizione della possibilità di una più vasta, differenziata e attiva coscienza politica socialista.

Ecco perché gli intellettuali sovietici, lungi dallo svolgere un'azione «socialdemocratica», rendono esplicito un problema di universale valore per il socialismo, anche se il modo in cui lo esprimono e, ancor più, il modo in cui lo risolveranno non può non essere storicamente condizionato e limitato. Dal movimento promosso dal XX congresso, al di là dei problemi pur rilevanti delle «autonomie» e del «decentramento», si è largamente affermato il bisogno di prender posizione sulle grandi questioni politiche, si fa sempre più viva nella società l'esigenza di una ricerca politica pubblica e collettiva che discuta razionalmente ogni attività e concetto. In questa azione estremamente difficile e estremamente necessaria, nel corso della quale si riederanno «educati» e «educatori», la cultura socialista ha una responsabilità capitale.

e il XX Congresso

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Ogni lettore avrà una sua idea di quello che è stato per l'Unione Sovietica o, in particolare, per la sua cultura il periodo staliniano. Qualunque sia il giudizio su quel periodo (e il terreno spetta ancora di essere dis-

sodato dallo storico), i più converranno che la sua fine costituì una vera e propria liberazione: liberazione di uomini, ingiustamente incarcerati e deportati, liberazione di energie e di idee, liberazione da uno stato di oppressione che proprio negli ultimi anni staliniani aveva toccato punte incredibili. Il XX congresso del PCUS fu il momento capitale di quella liberazione. Per la letteratura e per la cultura cominciò il « disgelo ». « Disgelo » difficile anche perché la letteratura si caricò di quasi tutto un fardello che sarebbe stato meglio dividere equamente con la discussione politica, il lavoro storiografico, la ricerca sociologica. Ma non era possibile: bisogna non sapere che cosa era stata l'età staliniana per meravigliarsene. Così caricata, la letteratura si allontanò il più possibile dalla vecchia tesi della letteratura « verniciata » per cui nella società sovietica l'unica contraddizione è quella tra il « bene » e il « meglio » e si avviò alla ricerca della verità. Questo periodo, che era cominciato con Ehrenburg, Nekrasov, Dudintsev, ha la sua simbolica frontiera nell'esordio di Solzhenitsyn. Ma nel suo mezzo ci fu il caso del Dottor Zhivago con tutto quello che significò: per la prima volta si poneva clamorosamente il problema della censura, anzi il viano « riaddestrò la letteratura sovietica all'impegno e quindi alla lotta politica. Evidentemente, lotta all'interno di una stessa società per realizzare i comuni ideali, non sempre, del resto, identicamente intesi. Non era proprio questa tensione creativa che Stalin aveva sovrano, incriminando ogni dissenso e ogni ricerca? Il contrasto tra letteratura e politica passa, in realtà, attraverso la stessa letteratura e la stessa politica in

quanto il momento politico cessa di coagularsi, incancrendo, in un punto e riprende a pulsare per le vene della società. Il periodo del « disgelo », ha lasciato in eredità al nuovo periodo molti problemi irrisolti, ma almeno questi due rilevanti risultati.

Il caso di Daniel e Sinjavskij fu al limite tra questi due periodi: scoppiò nel nuovo, ma maturò nel vecchio. Il procedimento penale venne a sostituire, ingiustamente, una pubblica azione critica che investisse non solo il comportamento dei due letterati, ma, prima ancora, i problemi che in essi contortamente si esprimevano. Le conseguenze del caso Daniel e Sinjavskij rientrano tuttavia nel nuovo periodo di sviluppo della cultura sovietica, anzi lo inaugurano. Per la prima volta, larghi strati dell'intellettualità, meglio informati degli altri cittadini, hanno espresso esplicitamente al potere politico il loro disaccordo per la condanna. Sempre esplicitamente Solzhenitsyn ha manifestato, in una splendida quanto angosciante lettera aperta al quarto congresso degli scrittori sovietici, non tanto il suo problema personale di scrittore che non può pubblicare, quanto uno stato generale che non è neppure degli intellettuali, anche se da essi più acutamente sentito, ma della società: il male della censura. I giovani di recente condannati a Mosca avevano protestato per la condanna di Sinjavskij e di Daniel appellandosi alla costituzione sovietica e avevano fatto conoscere, nel loro giornale dattiloscritto, articoli di notevole interesse e in nessun caso avversi al socialismo.

Democrazia socialista e libertà culturale

Viviamo in un momento in cui la lotta antimperialista si fa strategicamente complessa in quanto impone decise scelte generali di grande responsabilità. Sappiamo inoltre quanto siano intricati i rapporti all'interno del mondo socialista e quali situazioni politiche delicate si creino a volte in singoli paesi socialisti. Eppure, sarebbe un grave errore sottovalutare l'attualità del problema della democrazia socialista e della libertà intellettuale e politica nei paesi socialisti. Questi problemi trovano la loro soluzione nella prospettiva di una trasformazione rivoluzionaria internazionale e nell'opera di realizzazione di questo compito. Ma in del « decentramento », si è largamente affermato il bisogno di prender posizione sulle grandi questioni politiche, si fa sempre più viva nella società l'esigenza di una ricerca politica pubblica e collettiva che discuta razionalmente ogni attività e concetto. In questa azione estremamente difficile e estremamente necessaria, nel corso della quale si rieducheranno « educati » e « educatori », la cultura socialista ha una responsabilità capitale.

Vittorio Strada

Excerpts From Letter by Russian Dissident and From Plea During Soviet Trial

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 26—Following are excerpts, translated from the Russian text, of a letter from Pavel M. Litvinov to four Soviet newspapers, the French Communist party newspaper *L'Humanité* and the Italian Communist party newspaper *L'Unità* and from the text of a plea by Vladimir I. Bukovsky before a Soviet court on Sept. 1, 1967. The text of the plea was attached to the Litvinov letter, both of which were sent to the West. Neither text has been published in the Soviet Union.

Litvinov Letter

I regard it as my duty to make public the following:

On Sept. 26, 1967, I was summoned by the Committee of State Security [K-G-B] to appear before Gostev, an official of the K.G.B. Another officer of the K.G.B., who did not give his name, was present during our conversation.

After this talk was over, I wrote it down immediately and as fully as I could remember. I vouch for the accuracy of the substance of what was said between the representative of the K.G.B. and me.

Gostev: Pavel Mikhailovich, have knowledge that you together with a group of other people intend to reproduce and distribute the minutes of the recent criminal trial of Bukovsky and others. We warn you that if you do that, you will be held criminally responsible.

I: Irrespective of my intentions, I cannot understand what the criminal responsibility for such an action might be.

Gostev: The court will decide that, and we wish only to warn you that if such a record should be spread through Moscow or other cities or appears abroad, you will be held responsible for this.

'Know the Laws Well'

I: I know the laws well and I cannot imagine what particular law would be transgressed by the composition of such a document.

Gostev: There is such an article, 190-1. Take the criminal code and read it.

I: I know this article very well and can recite it from memory. It deals with slanderous fabrications which would discredit the Soviet social system and regime. What kind of slander could there be in recording the hearing of a case before a Soviet court?

Gostev: Well, your notes will be a biased distortion of facts and a slander of the court's actions, and that would be proved by the agency competent to handle such cases.

I: How can you possibly know this? Instead of starting a new case, you yourself should publish the record of this criminal trial and in this way kill the rumors circulating in Moscow.

Gostev: And why do we need to publish it? It is an ordinary criminal case of disturbance of the peace.

I: If so, it is all the more important to give information about it, to let all the people see that it is really an ordinary case.

Newspaper Cited

Gostev: *Vechernyaya Moskva* [a Moscow newspaper] of Sept. 4, 1967, gives all the information about the case. All that has to be known about that trial is in there.

I: In the first place, there is too little information: The reader who had heard nothing previously about this case simply would not understand what it is all about. In the second place, it is false and slanderous. Rather, the editor of *Vechernaya Moskva* or the person who gave such information should be charged with slander.

Gostev: Pavel Mikhailovich, the news report is absolutely correct. Remember that.

I: It says there that Bukovsky pleaded guilty. Yet I, who was interested in this case, know perfectly well that he did not plead guilty.

Gostev: What does it matter whether he pleaded guilty or not? The court found him guilty. Consequently, he is guilty.

I: I am not talking now about the court's decision; nor did the newspaper have it in mind. And confession of guilt by the defendant represents a completely independent

judicial concept. In general, it would be a good idea to tell more about Bukovsky; for example, how he was arrested while reciting poetry on Mayakovsky Square, brought to the police station and beaten up.

Beating Is Denied

Gostev: This is not true. It could not be.

I: His mother said so.

Gostev: Who cares what she said?

I: She did not tell it to me—I do not know her—but to the court, and nobody interrupted her or accused her of slander.

Gostev: She should rather have told you how she was summoned and warned about the conduct of her son. We can summon your parents, too. And in general, Pavel Mikhailovich, have in mind: *Vechernyaya Moskva* has printed all that the Soviet people should know about this case and this information is completely true and we warn you that if not only you, but your friends or anybody makes this record, you specifically will be held responsible for it. You understand very well that such a record can be used by our ideological enemies, especially on the eve of the 50th anniversary of Soviet power.

I: But I do not know of any law that would prohibit the dissemination of a non-secret document only because it might be misused by somebody. Much critical material from Soviet newspapers might also be misused by somebody.

Warning Is Given

Gostev: It should be clear to you what we are talking about. We are only warning you, and the court will prove the guilt.

I: It will prove it, I have no doubt. The trial of Bukovsky makes that clear. And how about my friend Aleksandr Ginzburg? Is he imprisoned for the same kind of actions that you are warning me about?

Gostev: Well, you will learn what he did when he is put on trial. He will be acquitted if he is innocent. Could you possibly think that now, in the 50th year of Soviet power, a Soviet court would make a wrong decision?

I: Then why was Bukovsky's trial closed to the public?

Gostev: It was not.

I: Yet it was impossible to get in.

Gostev: Those who had to get in got in. There were representatives of the public and all seats in the hall were taken. We did not intend to rent a club [auditorium] because of this case.

I: In other words, the public nature of legal proceedings was violated.

Gostev: Pavel Mikhailovich, we have no intention of arguing with you. We simply warn you. Just imagine if people would learn that the grandson of the great diplomat Litvinov [Maxim M. Litvinov, former Foreign minister] is busy with such doings, this would be a blot on his memory.

I: Well, I do not think he would blame me. Can I go?

Gostev: Please. The best thing for you to do now would be to go home and destroy all that you've collected.

I know that a similar kind of conversation was conducted with Aleksandr Ginzburg two months before his arrest.

I am asking you to publish this letter so that in case of my arrest the public would be informed about the circumstances which preceded it.

P. M. LITVINOV.

Assistant in the Faculty of Physics in Moscow, Institute of Precision Chemical Technology

Oct. 3, 1967
Moscow, 8 Alexei Tolstoy Street, Apt. 78.

Bukovsky Plea

In preparation for this trial, I anticipated that the proceedings would completely reveal all the motives for the actions charged, and would deal with the legal analysis of the case. The court has done nothing of the kind. It engaged in character defamation—whether we are good or bad is irrelevant to the case.

I expected the prosecution to present a detailed analysis of the "disturbance" which we made on the square: who hit whom, who stepped on who's foot. And this did not follow either. The prosecutor says: "As I see

it, the danger of lies in its insolence."

But I have here before me the text of the Soviet Constitution: "In accordance with the interests of the workers and with the aim of strengthening the Socialist system, the citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed by law . . . the right of street processions and demonstrations." Why is such an article included? For May Day and October [revolution anniversary] demonstrations? But it is not necessary to include such an article for demonstrations that the Government organizes—it is clear that no one will disperse these demonstrations.

Right to Protest

We do not need freedom "pro" if there is no freedom "anti." We know that protest demonstrations are powerful weapons in the hands of the workers; this is an inalienable right in all democratic states. Where is this right denied? In Madrid, there was a trial of the participants of a May Day demonstration. They were tried under a new law recently passed in Spain shall read the full text of Clause 125:

"In accordance with the workers' interests and with the aim of strengthening the Socialist system, the citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed by law: A. Freedom of speech; B. Freedom of the press; C. Freedom of gatherings and meetings; D. Freedom of processions and demonstrations on the street. These rights of the citizens are secured by making available to workers and their organizations printing facilities, supplies of paper, public buildings, streets. . . ."

Yes, streets, citizen prosecutor!

" . . . means of communication and other material conditions, necessary for their realization."

Need for Revision

Now, about Article 70. We demanded its revision because it is subject to too wide an interpretation. Here is its text:

"Agitation and propaganda conducted with the aim of subverting or weakening Soviet authority or with the aim of committing particularly dangerous crimes, dissemination with the same aim of slanderous statements, discrediting the Soviet state and social system as well as dissemination or preparation and

aim, of literature of the same character, will be punished by imprisonment for a period of six months to seven years or by deportation for a period of two to five years."

Article 70 refers to such different things as agitation and propaganda aimed at particularly dangerous state crimes, and, on the other hand, slanderous statements against the Soviet system.

Judge: Defendant Bukovsky, we are lawyers here, and all those present in the courtroom have also been through grammar school. We realize that you have recently become exposed to problems of the law and have become interested in them. We applaud this interest, but it is unnecessary to discuss them at such length here. We must decide the question of your guilt or innocence, decide your fate. Possibly you will enter Moscow University as a student of law. There, at the seminars, you shall discuss these questions on a higher level.

Bukovsky: No, I won't enter it. I object to the prosecutor accusing us of legal illiteracy and lack of seriousness. I do know the laws, and speak of them seriously. If, however, what I'm speaking about is so well known, it is even more incomprehensible why the prosecutor sees criticism of the law as a crime.

Freedom of speech and of the press is, first of all, freedom for criticism. Nobody has ever forbidden praise of the Government. If in the Constitution there are articles about freedom of speech and of the press, then have the patience to listen to criticism. In what kinds of countries is it forbidden to criticize the Government and protest against its actions? Perhaps in capitalist countries? No, we know that in bourgeois countries Communist parties exist whose purpose it is to that provides imprisonment from one and a half to three years for participation in demonstrations. I see a disturbing identity between fascist Spanish and Soviet legislation.

Judge: Defendant, you are comparing things that cannot be compared: the actions of the rulers of Spain and those of the Soviet state. In court, the comparison of Soviet policy with the politics of foreign bourgeois states is intolerable. Stay closer to the

I object to the abusiveness of your words.

Bukovsky: You do not have the right to interrupt me. I have not departed from the essence of my case.

In our country, the organs of state security play a police role. What democracy can there be to speak of when we are being watched? Let them catch spies! Why are we being questioned about our acquaintances, about what we were doing two or three years ago and such things? I recognize the important role of the organs of the K.G.B. in the fight for state security. But what is their business in this case? There were no external enemies involved here. Perhaps they had internal ones in mind. There were no grounds for the interference of the state security organs. Now, let's take a look at how our case was conducted. Why did they have to drag it out for a period of seven months? I see one explanation: to trump up some means of covering the traces of this unseemly business. When stalling finally became impossible, the proceedings about us were made so secret that nobody would be able to penetrate and convince oneself of their illegality. Although the investigation of our case had been started by the prosecutor's office, the decree on my arrest was signed by the K.G.B. Captain Smelov. By the fourth month, our case had been transmitted from the prosecutor's office to the K.G.B. This is a violation of proceedings.

Judge: Defendant Bukovsky, this is of no interest to us—keep closer to the indictment. What significance does everything you are saying essentially have to do with the resolution of your case?

Bukovsky: I have already said that you have no right to interrupt me. The significance is quite simple: There have been breaches of the law in the conduct of the investigation, and it is my duty to speak out about them, so now I am speaking out.

We demonstrated in the defense of legality. It is incomprehensible why the office whose responsibility it is to safeguard the citizens' rights sanctions such actions by the Druzhinniki [civilian auxiliary police] and the K.G.B. We did not come out against laws. We protested against an unconstitutional decree. Was this really an anti-Soviet demand? Not we

Approval. A group of representatives of the intelligentsia have presented a similar demand to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

Isn't the Constitution the basic law of our country? I

Article 1. The purposes of the Criminal Code RSFSR.

It is the purpose of the Criminal Code RSFSR to protect the Soviet social and governmental system, socialist property, the person and rights of citizens and of the entire socialist legal order against criminal encroachments.

With a view to achieving this purpose, the Criminal Code RSFSR specifies what socially dangerous acts are criminal, and prescribes the penalties to be applied to persons who have committed crimes.

Article 8. The premeditated commission of a crime.

A crime is considered to have been premeditated if the person who committed it was aware of the socially dangerous character of his action or inaction, foresaw its socially dangerous consequences, and desired or consciously permitted the occurrence of those consequences.

8) persons sentenced to deprivation of freedom for a period of more than ten years, provided that in the course of eight hours from the time the sentence was served (both the basic and the extra penalty) they have not committed another crime, and provided, further, that the court shall have established the fact that the convicted person has reformed himself and that there is no necessity for considering him to have had a conviction.

Article 69. Wrecking

An act of commission or omission aimed at undermining industry, transportation, agriculture, the monetary system, trade, or other branches of the national economy, or the activity of state organs or social organizations for the purpose of weakening the Soviet state, provided such act was committed by means of utilizing state or public institutions, enterprises, or organizations, or by means of obstructing their normal functioning --

shall be punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period of from eight to 15 years, with confiscation of property.

Article 70. Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda

Agitation or propaganda carried on with the purpose of undermining or weakening the Soviet state, or the commission of individual crimes against the state which are especially dangerous, or the dissemination of libelous fabrications defaming the Soviet governmental and social system, or the dissemination or production or keeping of literature of similar content for the same purposes --

shall be punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period of from six months to seven years, or exile for a period of from two to five years.

The same acts committed by a person previously convicted of especially dangerous crimes against the state, or committed during time of war --

shall be punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period of from three to ten years.

Article 71. The propagandizing of war

The propagandizing of war, irrespective of the form in which it is carried on --

shall be punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period of from three to eight years.

Article 78. Smuggling

Smuggling; that is, the illegal transportation of goods or other things of value across the state boundary of the USSR with concealment of the objects in special containers, or with the fraudulent use of customs and other documents, or in large amounts, or by a group of persons organized for the purpose of engaging in smuggling, or by an official making use of his official position, and in like manner the smuggling of explosives, narcotics, strong and poisonous substances, weapons, and military equipment --

shall be punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period of from three to ten years, with confiscation of property.

Article 89. The appropriation of state or public property by means of theft

The concealed appropriation of state or public property (theft) -- shall be punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period not to exceed three years, or by corrective labor for a period not to exceed one year.

Theft when committed as a second offense, or in accordance with prearranged agreement by a group of persons, or when technical means are employed --

shall be punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period not to exceed six years.

Theft when committed by an especially dangerous recidivist, or in large amounts --

shall be punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period of from five to 15 years, with or without confiscation of property.

Note. A second offense in the meaning of articles 89, 90, 92, and 93 is a crime committed by a person who has previously committed any of the crimes specified in these articles, or in articles 77, 91, or 144-147 of the present Code.

Article 154. Speculation

Speculation; that is, the buying up and resale of commodities or other objects for the purpose of making profits --

shall be punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period not to exceed two years, with or without confiscation of property, or by corrective labor for a period not to exceed one year, or by a fine not to exceed 3,000 rubles.

Speculation in the form of a business, or on a large scale -- shall be punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period of from two to seven years, with confiscation of property.

Small-scale speculation committed as a second offense -- shall be punishable by corrective labor for a period not to exceed one year, or by a fine not to exceed 2,000 rubles, with confiscation of the objects of speculation.

Article 191. Resisting a representative of established government or of society who is performing his duty to keep public order

Offering resistance to a representative of established government who is performing duties imposed upon him by law, or resisting a representative of society who is carrying out his duty to keep public order, or coercing them into the performance of clearly illegal acts, when committed with violence or with a threat of violence --

shall be punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period not to exceed three years, or by corrective labor for a period not to exceed one year, or by a fine not to exceed 600 rubles.

Article 206. Hooliganism

Hooliganism; that is, wilful acts grossly violating public order and manifesting an evident lack of respect for society --

shall be punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period not to exceed one year, or by corrective labor for the same period, or by a fine not to exceed 500 rubles, or by public censure.

Article 227. The organization of a group causing damage to the health of citizens

The organization of a group whose activity, carried on under the pretext of propagating religious doctrines, is accompanied by moral debauchery, and in like manner the dissemination of such a group or inducing the participation of minors therein

shall be punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period not to exceed three years, with or without confiscation of property.