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THEY SHOUT "VIETNAM" AND MEAN EUROPE

Moscow is organizing a campaign against  
the renewal of the NATO Treaty

The camouflaged Agitprop organizations are preparing for the coming months a large-scale propaganda offensive in the West. This campaign has already started and will reach its first peaks in March with the noisy "Easter Marches". It is concentrated this time on --  
the destruction of NATO.

The NATO Treaty expires in April 1969. Moscow wants to destroy this basis of the Western defense system in order to thereby push America out of Europe. This is regarded as the precondition for the realization of Soviet world domination. This is why Moscow's entire Fifth Column has been inflated into a propaganda assault. The attack in Europe will be directed first of all against the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as against the southernmost corner-stone of the Western defense system, Greece, and -- although it does not belong to NATO -- against Spain.

While on the one hand "liberalization of Communism" and the possibilities for a "relaxation of tensions" in Europe are being propagated, the Communists put forward, on the other hand, stiffer and stiffer demands as precondition for this "relaxation". At the same time they are intensifying their subversion and psychological warfare.

The propaganda slogans can be summarized in the call: "Get out of NATO!" By this slogan, first of all the trust of the masses in the Governments of the U.S.A. and the Federal Republic of Germany is to be shaken. In addition, the real character of the unpopular war in Vietnam is being distorted and then, in that form, exploited for propaganda. The implementation of the Vietnam campaign was entrusted in the first place to the "World Federation of Democratic Youth" (WFDY). This organization, with its seat in Budapest, has already drafted its program of activities in connection with this in January, and will, at an extraordinary meeting of its Executive Committee in March in Paris, issue the necessary instructions to its member organizations. The mere fact that this meeting will not take place, as usual, in an Eastern State but in France already shows in which direction the campaign will be developed. They shout "Vietnam" and mean Europe.

Conferences on the conveyor belt

A much more complicated offensive on a "higher level" is being started by the "World Council of Peace" (WCP). By this, mainly intellectuals are to be baited and won over to support the Soviet policy concerning Europe. A large number of seminars and meetings, camouflaged as pacifist, are envisaged

about so-called "European Security" and the Vietnam War. Through these events, the political atmosphere is to be made ripe for a "European Security Conference" for which Moscow is striving, on Government or parliamentary level. The "International Institute for Peace", behind which the Vienna Secretariat of the WCP is hiding, has laid on for this purpose a secret conference for March, in order to find ways for the formation of an "above-party" Preparatory Committee. An important role in this campaign is allotted to the so-called "All-Christian Peace Assembly" which is to begin at the end of March in Prague. This "Assembly" is organized by the so-called "Christian Peace Conference" which is closely connected with the "World Council of Peace" (WCP). The "Assembly"'s aim is to infiltrate the Christian Churches and to draw them more strongly into the Red "Action Front". Somewhat later, in April, an "International Conference of Scientists" will take place in Vienna, serving similar aims, which will be organized by the camouflaged Communist "World Federation of Scientific Workers" (WFSW). These are only a few of the many projects of this world-wide offensive, apart from the noisy Easter marches.

Greece - just in time

Mid-February an extremely successful so-called "4th West-European Conference on Spain" was held in Paris, inspired by Communists behind the scenes in the framework of this same offensive. It decided organizationally to expand the anti-Spain campaign by the formation of a permanent committee. This has now induced Moscow's Agitprop agents to prepare a similar international conference against Greece. Should the Governments of these Mediterranean countries be overthrown by old COMINTERN methods, the Communist seizure of power there would be merely a question of time. However, the NATO would lose thereby its most important bastions in the South and its disintegration could no longer be prevented.

This shows how the links in the chain are joined in this offensive. And the following directive, issued from Moscow, is being carried out: "The support of the Communist policy by non-Communists, above all by intellectuals, is today as a rule more important than the winning over of new Party members."

TIME

28 June 1968

## COMMUNISTS

## Russia Wooing

Who was that gentleman talking so much like a Super-European? Jean Monnet? Paul Henri-Spaak? Not at all. It was none other than the foreign editor of Pravda, the official organ of Russia's Communist Party—a man whose words and ideas could reasonably be expected to reflect the latest thinking and policy ambitions of the Kremlin. Last week, vacationing in The Netherlands, Yuri Zhukov spoke to the Dutch political weekly *Haagse Post* about what Russia has in mind when it comes to Europe, East or West. His obvious message: After soft-pedaling for the sake of *détente* their desire to replace U.S. influence in Europe with their own, the Russians are once again busily out to woo the Europeans.

Zhukov, 60, assured Europeans that they need not be scared by the "dire predictions" of French Journalist Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber that U.S. business may one day dominate the Continent's economy. "If all Europeans, that is you and we, pull together," he said, "we can soon be boss in our own house." Then he cracked: "The Americans, with their strange habit of liquidating their leaders, should turn to

their own neighbors, Canada and Mexico, for cooperation."

Dismissing NATO as "a completely useless affair," Zhukov admitted sportingly that the same might be said of the Warsaw Pact. "We must dissolve the two blocs and organize a system of European cooperation, economically, scientifically, culturally and even politically." For a start, Zhukov backs a Belgian project calling for a "Pan-European orientation conference," at which parliamentarians from all European countries would voice their plans for collaboration.

**Fleas & Elephant.** A united Europe is bound to emerge as the world's leading power, predicted Zhukov, making it clear that Russia ought to be included in the family. Even before the birth of the U.S., he said, "Dutch merchants traveled to St. Petersburg and Peter the Great came to Holland to learn a trade." This type of cooperation, he feels, continues today in such enterprises as the French Renault and Italian Fiat auto plants in the Soviet Union.

Charles de Gaulle's vision, in which the Continent is also divorced from the U.S., calls for a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Zhukov's view does not stop at the Urals: "Russians are Europeans, no matter what side of the

Urals they live on." Yet Russia obviously considers De Gaulle an ally in its European policy, so much so that even his recent fulminations against Communism in France do not bother Zhukov in the slightest. "That's election talk," he says. Nor does he think much of the student radicals who have lately upset De Gaulle. Comparing Rebel Leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit with Leftist Guru Herbert Marcuse of the University of California, Zhukov said: "Cohn-Bendit is a flea and Marcuse an elephant, although I strongly criticize his ideas too."

**Little Hope.** The Russians, who two years ago proposed an all-European security conference to disband the Continent's military pacts, are looking next door again with renewed interest. While the Viet Nam war persists, they foresee little hope for enlarged trade or other accords with the U.S. Instead, they seem ready to make new overtures to Western Europe, with its increasingly sophisticated technology. Moreover, with the U.S. preoccupied elsewhere, and with some Europeans wary of U.S. influence in their countries, Moscow may now feel that it has an outside chance to impose its own political formulas on the Continent.

INTERPLAY

May 1968

## NATO Muddles Through

JOHN NEWHOUSE

None of the key governments paid much attention to NATO's recent self-examination during the year it was carried on. Each was—and is—absorbed by larger, if not wholly unrelated, considerations. Still, the organization is a tougher instrument now than at any time since General de Gaulle withdrew his forces from it in the spring of 1966. That is of some importance, because considerable pressure, much of it arising from the diverse preoccupations of Washington, London, Bonn and Paris, has gathered against the somewhat battered and weathered NATO structure. The immediate question is whether the modest gains of 1967 can be consolidated, or whether the alliance will merely continue to drift further from the center of events.

Out of the review known as the Harmel exercise a brief but unanimous report was produced. It said nothing new or daring, but it did restate some of the old orthodoxy, and everyone, including the General, signed. Second, the joint military strategy was at last aligned with Washington's preference for a non-nuclear option and tighter crisis management at every stage of hostility.

Belgian civil servants inspired the Harmel report, hop-

ing to reassure political circles about the possibly troublesome institution whose presence it had fallen to Belgium to accept. The special beneficiaries of the exercise, besides Belgium, would be such countries as Denmark, Norway and Canada, whose NATO involvement must be justified to public opinion, much of it hostile.

The governments of these countries were served by a report which argued, if perhaps not very forcefully, "that the pursuit of *détente* must not be allowed to split the alliance," and which noted "the importance of the role the alliance is called upon to play during the coming years in the promotion of *détente* and the strengthening of peace." Such language tends to fortify the orthodox argument that *détente* is a product of the West's cohesive strength, and serves to oppose the tempting French argument that *détente* will be promoted through a loosening of the military blocs.

*A Concession and a Surprise*

French acceptance of even such diluted language was an undoubted concession and a mild surprise. For a time it appeared that France would not approve the more explicit passages; the others were prepared in the end to go ahead without her, although the Germans and Canadians were acutely anxious to avoid embarrassing Paris. De Gaulle's

John Newhouse, the author of *Collision in Brussels: the Common Market Crisis*, is currently working on a new book, tentatively entitled *De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons*.

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acquiescence was largely dictated by his reluctance to quarrel with his Common Market partners on a lesser matter one week before he would have to quarrel with them about something major—his rejection of Britain's second try to join the European Economic Community.

The Harmel report favors certain activities, most of which would have been carried on in any case. The French will be part of whatever alliance projects interest de Gaulle, and will leave to the Fourteen those he finds unacceptable or politically confining. For example, a study on East-West balanced mutual force reductions is just starting in the Council. France will almost certainly take part in this vastly complicated exercise of clouded prospect. On the other hand, she plans to ignore a study of Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean, noted cryptically in the Harmel report, on the stated grounds that the area of greatest concern, the Middle East, is outside NATO's competence.

The mutual-force-reductions study, incidentally, points up a growing but belated recognition that alliance-force goals and arms control are sides of a single coin, and should therefore be related, not so much in spite of their antagonism as because of it. The German problem lies close to the center of both alliance politics and the politics of arms control. The consequences of stressing the one at the expense of the other are predictably vexing. That is certainly among the lessons of the troubled history of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which for some time was pushed with little regard to the interests of Bonn and other non-nuclear capitals.

#### *Something in It for Everyone*

The Harmel saga coincided with much of the decisive period of the Non-Proliferation Treaty negotiations, and, at another level, was nearly as episodic. The point was to reaffirm what every government already knows but often ignores: that the Atlantic Alliance remains the best means of coping with the security requirements of its members. From a European point of view, it allows the US to make the weight in Western Europe against the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. From an American point of view, NATO offers a stable instrument for guaranteeing the security of the exposed places on its perimeter—notably West Germany and the southeastern flank, Turkey and Greece. The alliance provides the essential cover for German military strength; in return, it gives Germans the larger setting that is dictated by their political requirements. These are considerations to be borne in mind by those who suggest that the purposes of the alliance would be as well served if Washington replaced it with a system of bilateral security agreements. Germany aside, the difficulties of maintaining such agreements with, say, Greece and Turkey are easily imagined. In short, whatever the stresses of the harem, this arrangement suits Washington far better than a series of liaisons.

France is an equal beneficiary, in the sense that the stabilizing influence of the alliance—of the American presence—gives de Gaulle diplomatic running-room in Central and Eastern Europe (as, indeed, it gives East European governments as well). Needless to say, he need not be a

member of the alliance to exploit this advantage; but once he quits it altogether, his value to Moscow—his ability, for instance, to influence joint activities like the Harmel exercise—will be much diminished. His current position is such that France is neither really in nor really out. Although the seat on the Council is filled, France is divorced from most of the programing and planning; these are functions of new instruments created since de Gaulle's withdrawal from the military structure. The new strategy MC 14/1 was adopted in the Defense Planning Committee, which sits as fourteen without France. It is really an updated version of the well-known MC 100/1, which was accepted in the spring of 1963 by the Military Committee and then vetoed in the Standing Group (now defunct) by the French representative.

#### *Will de Gaulle Stay in the Game?*

Nobody can predict whether de Gaulle will withdraw altogether from the alliance; any objective assessment suggests that he will remain and take part in whatever political activities affect French interests. Yet de Gaulle is concerned with making the thrust of his policy irreversible, and must assume that with France altogether out and pursuing a neutralist course domestic politics would make it all but impossible for a successor government to return. But the seat on the Council risks becoming a bridge back into the forbidden, American-dominated structure for some successor. Since there is at least an even chance that eventually de Gaulle will leave the alliance, some people were against diluting parts of the Harmel report just to obtain French acceptance. They were wrong. Much of the value of the report lies in its unanimity; in terms of alliance politics, much the best course is to keep open whatever channels develop for French participation. Logic and fashion conspire to focus thinking on *après-Gaullisme*, however distant the day may be.

The switch to MC 14/1 is more a change in emphasis than in basic strategy, since the US controls strategic decisions anyway. It mostly means that NATO units which were formerly available only for nuclear contingencies can now be committed by SACEUR to less fanciful roles. Obviously, all this serves to concentrate still greater authority in Washington, hardly a cause for rejoicing in Europe, especially Bonn. Still, the greater stress on non-nuclear options tends—marginally, at least—to strengthen the American commitment to maintain sizeable forces in Europe; also, Europeans are starting to learn more about nuclear strategy and control, thanks to the most useful of the alliance's new instruments, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).

Like the strategy change, the NPG has its roots in the early 1960s. After a long period on the shelf, it was revived by Mr. McNamara about two years ago; Britain, Germany, Italy and the US are permanent members, joined by three smaller countries holding rotating memberships over an 18-month cycle. The utility of the group depends quite literally on what the US is prepared to disclose in the way of data and the insights arising from its long experience in the nuclear strategy business. It amounts to separating the essential from the peripheral.

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After years of lecturing his European colleagues on the realities of nuclear strategy and control, Mr. McNamara had a device that enabled him to explain the criteria and procedures that underlie nuclear planning—a device which has, of course, been inherited by his successor, Mr. Clifford. It is not an easy function, and means breaking down the inherent resistance to this sort of disclosure in various parts of Washington. For the first time, SACEUR's planning is being revealed to European defense ministers. Useful studies on the control and planning for tactical nuclear weapons have been carried on. The French, who of course do not participate, frankly admire the work of the group.

It has always been clear that if the alliance were to continue some arrangement would be needed to permit this kind of joint war-gaming. Nuclear planning requires that political direction is assured before, during and *after* the outbreak of hostilities, in whatever form. But allied governments must understand why and how. That is beginning to happen, although admittedly at a time when security is a lesser concern.

If the alliance is more coherent than it was two years ago, it lacks the political dynamic which must at some stage emerge. It is a comforting assumption that with the balance of power still centered in Europe the NATO governments will be unwilling to run down their defense capabilities and to fold up the alliance. Still, the alliance, like any system, has built-in tolerances; the combination of time and pressure from diverse sources could overcome these and empty the organization of useful purpose.

#### *America's and Europe's Diverging Courses*

These pressures arise chiefly from the growing differences between Europe and America—or better, perhaps, from the apparently diminishing identity of interest between them. The US is absorbed by Asian security, by the Soviet dossier and by internal questions. Europe is chafed by its organizational troubles and by the lamentably small figure it cuts in the direction of its own most important affairs.

An American attitude increasingly in vogue suggests that Europe's relevance to the national interest is declining steadily. This attitude gives reduced importance to Europe's continued position as the point of confrontation between the US and the USSR. It is an understandable attitude—the action, after all, is elsewhere—but it ignores, or rejects, the likelihood that as American concern with Europe and the German problem declines, Soviet concern with widening its identity of interest with the US will also decline. In short, a reduction by the US of its involvement with Western Europe will not be matched by Moscow, and is likely to sharpen the latter's temptation to pursue a more adventurous European policy; it is not a question of military conquest, if in the nuclear age it ever was, but rather an expansion of influence.

Viewed from Moscow, the alliance supports a distinct and vastly successful Western system, with each European member, France included, emulating much that is basic to the purely American system. What's more, with the European movement, they seek to expand their influence to the outer reaches of

power center in the West, a lesser power, no doubt, than the US, but in the Soviet view not very different and most undesirable, however much a united Western Europe might appear to abet the Soviet interest in freezing the division of Germany.

Like Washington, the principal West European capitals are currently preoccupied by national concerns and bilateral relationships. This is likely to be the pattern for the immediate future—a shifting, perhaps cross-cutting pattern of bilateral arrangements coexisting uneasily with NATO and the European Community, as both institutions continue to perform essential though restricted functions. Although security may not weigh heavily, the future of both institutions will be considerably influenced by the shifting defense policies of London, Paris and Bonn.

The British government, for all its declaratory Europeanism, is a spent force, certainly for the moment. Devaluation has been followed by searing internal conflict over arms sales to South Africa and the most recent decisions on reducing defense expenditures. Although some uncritically accept the argument that these decisions fortify Britain's European bona fides, it can be argued with as much force that Wilson is abandoning positions and resources that are potentially European because they are British. Britain's special role beyond the Mediterranean might one day have been subsumed in a European formation seeking to reestablish a world position. Yet it was decided to accelerate the withdrawal both from Singapore and the tumultuous Persian Gulf, instead of stretching it out to 1975. The sums to be saved are negligible and clearly out of proportion to the significance of the decision, which, among other things, can only deepen Washington's disenchantment with Europe.

The cancellation of the order for 50 F-111K strike-and-reconnaissance aircraft means that once again Britain has forsaken the hardware, while paying a heavy price, arising in this case from the cancellation charges and the predictable loss of a good part of the access to the burgeoning American aero-space market guaranteed by the F-111 offset arrangements. In fact, the F-111 decision was taken on political rather than budgetary grounds.

Admittedly London ordered the F-111 for use east of Suez. Yet its NATO/European vocation was there. The current generation of long-range strike-and-reconnaissance aircraft assigned to SACEUR is nearly obsolete. Moreover, France's withdrawal from NATO might eventually create a substantially enlarged belt of neutral air space, a problem that would point up the long-run requirement for a versatile, long-range modern airplane. The collapse of the Anglo-French swing-wing aircraft project could mean that Europe is unlikely to have such a weapon system, at least not in the 1970s. France's Dassault has tested a prototype, but it will not be produced, and the French government doesn't intend to consider the question of a swing-wing airplane until 1971 or 1972 at the earliest.

#### *Britain Trims, France Girds for War*

The asymmetry in British and French defense policy is all but complete. The one is trimming, the other apparently poised for a quantum jump to the outer reaches of

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strategic weaponry. Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030026-8  
 still Western Europe's only thermonuclear power, intends to replace its Polaris submarines as they become obsolete. In order to remain an even moderately serious member of the nuclear club, Britain might eventually have to replace the Polaris missiles with the Poseidon (assuming its availability), as the Americans are doing, and/or build a fifth nuclear submarine in order to have two boats in continuous operation. The present signs are that Britain is unlikely to do either.

Nor is any clearer that France can provide strategic forces of the quality and quantity envisaged by de Gaulle and the late General Ailleret—not, at least, in any normal time sequence. The latter's recent article calling for a defense capability directed toward *tous azimuts* (all points of the compass) found favor with de Gaulle. But it does not find favor with most deputies, or with numerous high ranking civil servants concerned with defense, or, indeed, with some prominent figures in the government.

French defense policy is the issue, in fact, of a growing debate, or the equivalent thereof in a constitutional monarchy. A program that was designed primarily to impress the Germans is to become the earnest of France's inviolability and global vocation. The chairman of the Parliamentary Defense Committee, a Gaullist deputy named Le Theule, has obliged the government to submit a report due in April explaining the distortion in the second five-year military program; or, more precisely, to justify the shifting substantial funds to the nuclear program at the expense of the *forces classiques*, all of which are lagging well behind the stated goals.

Le Theule and numerous colleagues are known to be even more alarmed by the planning for the third five-year program; it starts in 1970, but the decisions on force goals and budget must be taken this year, probably in the summer. The understandable concern is that these decisions will be virtual *faits accomplis* when sent for approval to the Palais Bourbon in December 1969.

#### *Options in the Air and under the Sea*

The government is considering a range of options; these amount to choosing between a dramatic expansion of the nascent nuclear submarine program—a jump from five to 10 or 12 (the stated goal is now four)—or replacing the submarines as they become obsolete with a substantial force of ICBMs. The latter would demand still greater qualitative strides from French technology. The third option would mean creating a mixed force of submarines and ICBMs. Leaving aside technological hurdles, it is doubtful that France could build and deploy any of the forces envisaged by the foregoing before the weapon systems themselves were obsolete except by sacrificing quite a lot of social infrastructure along the way. The reaction in both political and administrative circles mingles skepticism with concern for the economy. The current strategic program is at the point where expensive support systems must also be undertaken; for this and other reasons, the cost curve is expected to rise sharply.

Here again, logic and fashion focus discussion on *après-Gaullisme*. Nobody, including the Prime Minister, will be

able to moderate defense policy, nor any other policy for that matter, so long as the General is at the helm. But afterwards . . . It is here that the "European" argument surfaces, if somewhat mistily. Some who have worked closely with the General and others who still do speak openly about establishing an *entente nucléaire* based on British membership in the European Community; the non-Communist opposition is also picking up this line. Many who are involved in the nuclear program feel they are creating European, as distinct from French, strategic options.

Whether this outward-looking French attitude could actually promote strategic nuclear cooperation is hardly clear. The notion offends orthodox thinking by putting the strategic cart before the political horse. Even after de Gaulle, the possibilities for Franco-British nuclear collaboration may well be restricted largely to arrangements for joint targeting and limited data exchanges. British warhead and nuclear-submarine technology could be profitably linked to France's growing ballistic-missile capability. But the political obstacles are self-evident. Britain presumably remains subject to the restraints imposed by her contractual arrangements for nuclear cooperation with the United States. Without some considerable re-orientation of French foreign policy, Washington would be unlikely to approve much that was meaningful in this area.

The pity is that the nuclear question so fascinates Continental political and defense circles as to discourage systematic examination of what in the way of joint non-nuclear defense arrangements might be created at the European level. This is perhaps understandable, since for the moment nothing can be done at either level—nuclear or non-nuclear; the political interests of Bonn, London and Paris tend to cancel out each other, and thus stabilize the status quo.

Meanwhile, the two great powers are extending the distance between their strategic capabilities and the possibilities of France and Britain to deploy and maintain modern nuclear forces. Anti-ballistic missile systems, multiple individually-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV), an expanding penetration technology, the prospect of marine deep-submergence ICBMs—all this feeds the anxiety of those who favor a united and self-sufficient European Community.

Their cause would be better served if the framework of some agreement could be established that would put Europe's own considerable assets at the service of a European defense organization when the political climate improves. This would make both political and financial sense. The cost of weapons systems is rising at an alarming rate; the ability of European NATO governments to maintain adequate force levels in the 1970s is likely to decline, unless there emerges some combination of more rational procurement procedures and a new political dynamic within the Western Alliance.

#### *A Possible, if Imperfect, Solution*

Given an infusion of political will, the existing alliance machinery could be used to rationalize military spending;

the revised strategy is already linked with an agreement to put force planning and programming on a rolling five-year schedule. But NATO in its present form is unlikely to inspire this renewal of political will; on either side of the Atlantic, weariness and impatience with America's anomalous role in European affairs is growing. The solution, however imperfect, may be a new European Defense Community linked to the US within NATO; in time, the latter could presumably be subsumed in a sort of two-pillar arrangement. This is hardly a new idea, and has been under study for some time in Whitehall; useful work by the Institute for Strategic Studies has endowed it with some precision.

A European defense organization would presumably be linked with other Brussels-based communities; it, too, would be run by a commission whose supra-national authority would grow with time and would doubtless incorporate ministries of defense and supply. It would be a non-nuclear enterprise, certainly in the early stages, without precluding a nuclear option if and as the unifying process developed sufficiently.

In the long term, such a Community would perhaps encourage each of its nuclear power centers, Britain and France, to avoid trying to duplicate the strategic panoply of the great powers, and rather to leapfrog various stages in order one day, perhaps, to achieve comparable modernity, if on a smaller scale. In the meantime, the Defense Community would exploit European excellence in the less costly tactical-weapon systems. France, for example, can develop combat aircraft of a quality equal to America's and with a much smaller capital investment. Together, Britain and France have either parity or superiority vis-à-vis the US with regard to vertical take-off vehicles, hovercraft, various tactical missiles and other systems.

Opinion is growing within NATO and elsewhere that procurement can be rationalized only through specialization. Politically it is far from an ideal solution since it tends to collide with the principle of *juste retour*, as well as with national tradition. In any case, specialization is unlikely to go very far in the existing NATO framework. Who, for example, would decide whether Country A or Country B should satisfy the requirement for vertical takeoff vehicles? Would Belgium be willing to give up its Navy, the Netherlands its Air Force, on a NATO recommendation? Almost certainly not.

#### *An EDC Could Work like the EEC*

A European Defense Community, on the other hand, might in time be capable of imposing such decisions, as the EEC has in other areas, such as agriculture. The Franco-British swing-wing project collapsed less because of conflicting requirements than because France's De Gaulle managed to pre-empt the funds that would have supported French participation for his own F-1, which will replace the Mirage III. It seems that in the end the technological and defense questions are closely linked with Europe's political development; defense arrangements will require a strong central institution which would manage Europe's military spending within the framework of a general policy agreed to by governments.

Now is not the time to push such a proposition for the obvious reason that France—and hence Germany as well—is unwilling to contemplate British participation in any Community activity as important as defense. But now is surely the time to focus thinking on such a prospect within the NATO capitals, especially Bonn.

A persistent rumor suggests that General de Gaulle will focus thinking on the subject this year by offering the Five a defense community fashioned to his view of a French-led Continental formation. Although it seems unlikely, he has in the past toyed with the idea of securing a kind of subsidy from his partners, notably Bonn, for France's non-nuclear forces, thus liberating resources for his strategic program. However, he has never pushed the notion very far. To do so now would not suit the Five very well, but would further complicate the European—and Atlantic—political scene.

In the absence of a real defense community, the European governments will doubtless continue to prefer to coordinate their defense arrangements with Washington and to buy their exotic hardware from the American shelf. NATO in its present form will remain the most "cost-effective" device—in both political and military terms—for meeting minimal security requirements. But that is unlikely to be enough in the long run to maintain its plausibility. The recent gains are useful, but they do nothing to rebalance the NATO structure.

# THE WARSAW PACT

by a well-informed student of East European relations

The East European treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance, known as the Warsaw Pact, was signed on May 14, 1955. It was the first formal military alliance between the Soviet Union and the Communist States of Eastern Europe - Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania. Though Albania has never officially ceased to be a member of the Pact she has not played any practical part in its activities since 1960, when she allied herself with China in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

The Signing of the Warsaw Pact followed the ratification, nine days earlier, of the Paris Agreements which admitted the Federal Republic of Germany to membership of the Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

The Pact, concluded by the Soviet Union with governments which it had itself imposed on Eastern Europe, was initially intended as a soviet propaganda answer to the Paris Agreements rather than a serious attempt at integrating the military power of the Communist States.

The Soviet Union already had bilateral military arrangements with the Pact countries; it had signed 20-year treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance with Czechoslovakia in 1943 (renewed in 1963), with Poland in 1945 (renewed in 1965), and with Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria in 1948.

The Warsaw Pact provides primarily for a military system designed to place the armed forces of the East European countries under Soviet command. The Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Command of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces is Marshal Grechko, Soviet Vice-Minister of Defence. Under him, as deputies, are the Defence Ministers of the other member countries. The head of the "Unified Secre-

tariat" is another Soviet officer, General Kazakov, who is subordinate to Marshal Grechko.

The Political Consultative Committee comprises the Foreign Ministers of the member countries; the chairmanship is the prerogative of the Soviet Union. This committee has held only about ten meetings since 1956 and seems, at least until recently, to have been less a policy-making body than a forum for the presentation of the Soviet policy line.

The Warsaw Pact justifies the stationing of Soviet armed forces in Poland (28,000 men) and East Germany (350,000 men), and allows the Soviet Union to elude the provisions of the Hungarian peace treaty which called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from that country (where it now has some 50,000 men) after the signing of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955, and to maintain in power the régime which it installed by its armed intervention in November, 1956.

## Changed Soviet attitude

Though the Warsaw Pact came into being primarily as a propaganda counter-move to the Paris Agreements, the Soviet attitude to the Warsaw Pact changed in the late 1950s and early 1960s; the result was increased importance for the Pact.

In October, 1961, the first Warsaw Pact manoeuvres were held; Soviet, East German, Polish and Czechoslovak forces took part. Since then there have been at least nine other joint exercises, involving also the other East European countries in varying combinations, the two latest being the manoeuvres in East Germany in October, 1965 and in Czechoslovakia in September, 1966.

In the early 1960s, too, a programme was started to re-equip and standardise the arms of the East European armies and to give them a greater rôle in overall Soviet defence planning. By the time



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Khrushchev fell in 1964 substantial changes had taken place not only in Soviet policy towards the Warsaw Pact but in the capacity of the armed forces of the East European members.

A number of factors contributed to the change in the Soviet attitude. One was the change in the military policy of the Soviet Union itself. Launched by Khrushchev in 1960, this policy aimed at reducing the rôle of the large Soviet conventional forces and relied more on nuclear weapons. This meant increasing the rôle of the other Warsaw Pact members, re-equipping their forces and integrating them more closely with those of the Soviet Union.

There was also the need on the part of the Soviet Union for some organisational means to try to maintain political unity in Eastern Europe, especially after Rumanian defiance had doomed Soviet hopes for CMEA. The Soviet Union saw in the Warsaw Pact a useful instrument for this purpose.

#### Soviet dominance opposed

Khrushchev's successors, while modifying many of his schemes, have followed his Warsaw Pact policy and have continued to stress the need for greater integration of East European forces with those of the Soviet Union. But there are signs that this policy, which was intended to improve the unity of the Pact members, may be having the opposite effect of encouraging opposition to Soviet dominance.

In the last few years Warsaw Pact States have shown reluctance to accept the burdens which their membership entails. Rumania, in particular, has worked to achieve greater independence within the Pact - notably since November, 1964, when she reduced the period of military service from two years to 16 months, apparently without consulting her Pact allies.

In January, 1965, there was an unusual lack of unanimity at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw, called to discuss the German question. A vague communiqué at the end of the session proposed no real measures and was, in fact, the first Pact communiqué which failed to affirm a unanimous opinion. The East German leader, Ulbricht, later said that the East German

assessment of the situation and of the threat presented by West Germany was shared at the conference by the delegations from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland "and others".

The Northern members - the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany, appear to constitute an informal group within the Pact as being the members most immediately affected by the German question. Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary have no direct quarrel with West Germany or a common frontier with her. Without wishing to create two distinct levels of interest in the Pact, the Soviet Union probably regards the Southern States as the weak point in the alliance. In the exceptional circumstances of 1964, when the true wishes of her neighbour were temporarily found expression, Rumania had shown her desire to withdraw from the Pact; more recently, the Communist government of Rumania has made clear its reservations. Its discontent with the Pact came to a head in April and May, 1966.

#### "Abolish military blocs"

A joint communiqué issued after Rumanian-Yugoslav talks in April, 1966, asserted that "the two sides consider that it is in the interest of the strengthening of peace and the elimination of all forms of interference in other nations' internal affairs to abolish military bases and to withdraw troops from other countries' territories. The two sides also maintain that the division of the world into military blocs does not suit a positive development of international relations in the world today".

Shortly afterwards, on May 7, the Rumanian Party leader, Nicolae Ceausescu, spoke in favour of the "abolition of military blocs, the dismantling of foreign bases and the withdrawal of troops from the territory of other countries". The existence of such blocs, he said, was "an anachronism incompatible with the national independence and sovereignty of our Peoples".

Subsequent report from Eastern Europe spoke of a memorandum sent by Rumania to all East European members of the Warsaw Pact calling for a greater say in the use and deployment of nuclear

weapons, challenging the Soviet monopoly of the post of Supreme Commander, questioning the need for greater-financial contributions to the Pact and proposing that the Soviet Union should pay for its own troops in another country.

These reports were denied on May 18, but, in making their denial, the Rumanians gave the impression that they were opposed to any reorganisation of the Warsaw Pact which would extend their own commitments and which would effect a more thorough military integration with the Soviet Union.

#### Brezhnev replies

The Soviet Party leader, Brezhnev, replied to the Rumanians when he spoke at the opening of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Congress in Prague on May 31. Pleading for unity of action and for closer political and military co-operation, he said that the Soviet Union favoured the replacement of military blocs by peaceful co-operation but would defend Warsaw Pact interests as long as NATO existed.

The Rumanian Communists echoed these sentiments. Speaking at Pitesti on June 10, Ceausescu stated that it was "time to abolish the NATO aggressive pact and as a consequence also the Warsaw treaty". In other words, the dissolution of NATO must come first; while NATO remained in being Rumania would, "like the other members of the Warsaw Pact, increase its defence capacity".

This theme was developed at the Pact meeting in Bucharest in July. A 5,000-word declaration on July 8, at the end of the meeting, proposed the simultaneous

dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and called for an all-European conference on security; questions of organisation were shelved.

Simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact has been proposed on a number of occasions by the Soviet Union, though this was the first time that the Warsaw Pact Powers as a whole had made the proposal.

#### Consequences of dissolution

Simultaneous dissolution would have great strategic advantages for the Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact is irrelevant to the disposition of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe; its dissolution would not affect the bilateral treaties the Soviet Union already has with the East European States.

Dissolution of NATO, on the other hand, would mean the withdrawal of United States forces from Europe; their re-entry in the event of an emergency would be incomparably more difficult than similar re-entry of Soviet forces (even if the latter withdrew from Eastern Europe). NATO members would also lose their extensive political organisation (which does not exist within the Warsaw Pact) for which bilateral agreements would provide no effective substitute. So long as NATO exists as an effective military and political organisation its disruption and dissolution will remain a major aim of Soviet foreign policy. But the equation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact is unrealistic and unacceptable.

July-August 1968

# STUDENTS AND YOUNG POLITICAL LEADERS DISCUSS NATO

Surely it can now be said that never before has the opinion of the younger generation had more influence on world events than at the present time. Students in practically all NATO countries have made known their way of thinking in no uncertain terms. They have not hesitated to criticize or even condemn certain aspects of the existing political and social systems. In the light of all this, it is interesting and necessary to know what the young think of NATO. That is why we are publishing below two reports by the NATO Letter staff on recent youth meetings which dealt with the Atlantic Alliance. Elise Nouël analyses the discussions and resolutions of the 5th General Assembly of the Atlantic Association of Young Political Leaders (23 Abbey House, 8 Victoria Street, London SW 1, Great Britain) held in Luxembourg, while Peter Jenner describes what happened at the travelling seminar in Holland organized by the Dutch Student Movement for International Relations (S.I.B., Postbus 287, Groningen, Netherlands). Naturally, those who participated in these meetings are solely responsible for the views they expressed.

THE EDITOR.

## Fifth Atlantic Conference of Young Political Leaders "AN ALTERNATIVE POLICY FOR THE WEST"

When the 5th Atlantic Conference of Young Political Leaders opened in Luxembourg on May 26 last, events of unforeseeable scope and suddenness were shaking the ancient structures of Europe's universities, and reaching out to affect young managerial personnel as well as workmen and farmers. In Paris, the Latin Quarter was in a state of siege, the order to strike had been issued at Berlin University, the red flag flew over Brussels Free University, tension was mounting at the Universities of Milan, Venice and Rome, and the barricades were going up at the Universities of Columbia and of the State of California. Throughout the Western World the old system was tottering. This explosion left its mark on the three days during which the Young Political Leaders discussed the theme of the of the Conference: "An Alternative Policy of the West".

At the opening session the speakers who greeted the 80-odd representatives from 12 NATO countries (Greece, Turkey and Belgium did not attend) stressed the positive role of the student movement as a genuine catalyst for the radical transformation of society by reforming its political structures both at university level and in the major sectors of the

economy. The theme of the Conference lent itself ideally to such a programme and it was, quite apparently in the minds of all the delegates, the connecting link which ran through their discussions and conclusions. The Young Political Leaders, it should be added, represent a wide range of political labels — Conservatives, Liberals, Democrats, Radicals, Republicans, Socialists, Christian Democrats and even Monarchists.

At the outset, Mr. Peter Corterier (Germany), then President of the Atlantic Association of Young Political Leaders (AAYPL), opened the debates with a speech stressing the fact that NATO, while remaining indispensable until security is finally assured, needs "new ideas", purely military objectives being out-dated. However, its undisputable principles needed to be maintained and it was essential to prevent extremist parties from instilling the contrary in the minds of youth. Mr. Lucien Emringer, President of the Luxembourg Political Youth Circle (who has succeeded Mr. Otto Pick as Secretary General of the AAYPL) stressed that the anxiety of the young and the present revolutionary situation resulted from "hundreds of millions of over-nourished people faced by hundreds of millions who are hungry. Democracy is desired by all men

of goodwill and the participants in this conference, who are the statesmen of tomorrow, must work for innovation".

### Illusion or Reality ?

Mr. Pierre Werner, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, praised NATO and condemned those detractors who equate it with servitude because the free peoples of the Atlantic are in the vanguard of democratic liberty. "But obviously political changes sometimes make it difficult for young people to understand the Alliance... Illusion or reality? they ask themselves. The reality is that the Alliance has, by balancing the power blocs, maintained peace and freedom for twenty years. Now it is up to the young to set new aims for the Pact and establish new stabilising elements".

Mr. Fausto Bachetti, head of the Private Office of NATO's Secretary General, described the present state of East-West relationships. He stressed the improved relations in economic, cultural and technical fields, the political evolution of the Soviet bloc, and NATO's desire to pursue the detente, without however under-estimating the problems which still separate the two sides and with respect to which NATO must remain vigilant "since military security and the policy of detente are complementary not contradictory". He went on to stress the need above all to preserve the liberty of the individual, and added, "You are the political leaders of the youth in various countries and you are following different ideals and have only in common the respect and the cult of freedom and democracy. This variety of ideals, this respect for other opinions are the privilege of our Western civilisation and of our civilisation only... The preservation of freedom is not the obstinate resistance to new ideas, but the possibility of keeping pace with changes, which in our times are so rapid. Could a generation have a more extensive and inspiring task?"

### Revolutionary Generosity.

Concluding the opening session, Mr. Pierre Mahias, Secretary General of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) made an intensive survey of "the great movement of ideas which is sweeping Europe". This movement, he said, contests first and foremost Europe's universities, then its social structures and finally much of its ethical teaching. Young people, anguished by the future, demand to be heard and to share in decisions regarding their own destiny. Several positive aspects have already emerged. The most important is that "for the first time in fifty years a movement inspired by revolutionary generosity has been born outside the communist party, has developed without it and been condemned by it. The split goes deep. The orthodox communist parties run the risk of appearing out-distanced, or worse still out-moded". Young poli-

tical leaders must be receptive to this movement, since their duty is precisely to change and improve, rather than attempt to defend a world that in some aspects can no longer be defended. Since they entered the world of politics precisely because they want to change the world, they must call upon their imagination ("Imagination has assumed power" read the slogan outside the Sorbonne) and attempt to find practical forms for democracy. But it should not be forgotten that this vast movement has the impact it does on the intelligentsia and on leadership because it has the seal of freedom. Its very success demands the maintenance of a free system by the Western World.

The preliminary aims of the conference having been thus defined, the Young Political Leaders separated into four committees which spent three days studying the different aspects of Western policy, and in particular what might be the new mission of the Atlantic Alliance. Committee No. 1 (Chairman Mr. Tom Van Sickle, Republican, United States; rapporteur Mr. John Austin-Walker, Socialist, Great Britain) had as its theme "An Atlantic Foreign Policy — Reality or Illusion?". Committee No. 2 (Chairman Dr. Warnke, CDU/CSU, Germany; rapporteur Mr. Patrick Dutertre, *Centre Démocrate*, France) dealt with the question "Detente, a policy for the West?". Committee No. 3 (Chairman Mr. Julian Critchley, Conservative, Great Britain, and new President of the AAYPL; rapporteur Mr. Albert Hubert, Liberal, Netherlands) studied the problem "An Atlantic Free Trade Area — A Valid Alternative?". Finally, Committee No. 4 (Chairman Dr. Cuocolo, Christian Democrat, Italy; rapporteur Mr. Michel Theriault, Liberal, Canada) examined another topical subject, "The Developing Countries — A Collective Responsibility for the West".

### Resolutions Adopted.

The results of the work of each committee are reflected in the resolutions adopted. Committee No. 1 concentrated on the continuance of the Atlantic Alliance in its specifically military aspect, given the persisting Soviet threat and the infiltration of Soviet naval forces into the Mediterranean and the Middle East. While recognizing the primary military vocation of NATO, this committee hoped a place could be reserved for economic and social problems. Furthermore, the member nations of NATO should work together to resolve the problems of developing countries, not only as a matter of conscience but because poverty, hunger and oppression favour the growth of communism. To this end, closer co-operation should be established between the United States and Europe in the field of industrialisation. Finally, in its conclusions, Com-

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mittee No. 1 called for NATO to create a form of association for nations not wishing to participate in the military side of the Alliance but interested in its political, economic and social aspects.

Participants in Committee No. 2 noted that a certain détente has existed for several years between East and West, as a result of the bilateral development of economic, commercial and technical relations. They would like to see the West build upon these beginnings a common attitude towards the countries of the East, and in particular their economic organisation COMECON. This could be done by means of long-term credits, which would of course have to be guaranteed by the governments of the lending bodies or by the World Bank. Encouragement for such a policy is furnished by developments in Czechoslovakia, a country already very active in its commercial relations with West Germany and which has called on the United States for the advanced technological assistance the Russians are not in a position to give it. If this tendency were to become general it would undeniably bring about the liberalisation of the countries of the East. It would therefore seem that participation by international organizations in this policy is becoming imperative. In the longer term, the committee called for military disengagement without once more endangering the security of the countries of the Alliance, whose success is conditioned by progress in the political field.

Committee No. 3 appeared, after three days of discussion, to have reached negative conclusions. Having started by advocating a new Atlantic Free Trade Zone "to exclude members of the present Free Trade Zone and of the Common Market", the committee finally rejected this principle which "would increase the economic differences already existing in Europe and in the Atlantic world, while wider European unity is desirable".

Starting from the principle that assistance to developing countries is a moral duty for rich nations. Committee No. 4 considered that economic and social aid should be guided by technical advancement and that it is essential to follow the progress achieved by peoples who receive such aid. But the committee very judiciously called for an active search for a new system to co-ordinate the efforts of the rich countries. This could be done through a central organization including representatives of governments and of private interests in the countries of the Alliance. Moreover, countries asking for assistance should, with the help of qualified experts, submit their development plans in advance. The adoption of these two recommendations would put an end to the scattered efforts which at present give somewhat disappointing results in terms of Third

World progress. To conclude, the committee noted that "the countries of the Alliance are not fulfilling their responsibility towards the developing countries to the extent of their capacity".

### Key to EEC's Prosperity.

In plenary session, Mr. Marcel Mart, of the EEC's Information Service, summarized the present situation in the Community. He started by recalling the four crises which had nearly destroyed the Common Market. The latter, he said, "emerged strengthened from these growing pains and we are now witnessing the dissolution of the Free Trade Area whose members would like to join the EEC". Why? The EEC constitutes the world's primary importing and exporting bloc, with a trading figure of thirty thousand million dollars. Its area is one-fifth of that of the United States and one-eighth of that of the USSR, with 440,000,000 inhabitants. In reality it is a bloc of poor countries which, apart from coal, have few raw materials. It imports its minerals, oil, uranium and, in general, all its energy needs. The key to its future prosperity would therefore seem to lie in its becoming, through its imports, the world's primary processing unit.

One of the first measures if Europe is to keep up with the world technological revolution would be greater co-operation between each member of the EEC and the United States. Mr. Mart illustrated this need by the following example: "In Europe, twelve EEC firms struggle in order to produce a total quantity of 1,000 megawatts while in the United States four factories obtain a production capacity of 50,000 megawatts. It is obvious that in such circumstances the European countries have every interest in giving up their internal competition and following the example of America". Then, it was considered urgently necessary for the EEC seriously to consider the creation of a fiscal union and the suppression of national protective legislation. The speaker used another example to explain that French steel going to Luxembourg is subject to a 3 % tax applied by that country to finished products, while Luxembourg steel processed in France and re-exported is hit by the 25 % TVA tax. This creates an absolute imbalance of 22 % to the prejudice of the EEC. The same difficulty arises for other products between other EEC countries.

So far as the problem of research is concerned, Mr. Mart stressed that, while Europe is the greatest importer of raw materials, she is the greatest exporter of "grey matter". This is because of the restricted scale of Europe's enterprises, which prevents them from making the effort needed for key research.

There are, for example, Europe which combined add up to a single American company. It is therefore impossible for them to undertake production of advanced items. As for the employment problem, this is particularly acute, since at this moment ten sectors of the European economy are in a state of crisis with an employment loss of 50 %. These industries are, notably, ship-building, wood, clothing, textiles and coal. These once rich sectors have laid off personnel as new procedures have made possible a reduction in manpower. In agriculture, where 22 % of the active population of the EEC countries were once employed, today 15 % achieve increased output. In addition there is the problem of surpluses. What should be done with them? In the United States only 5 % of the population works in agriculture and she has enormous surpluses since 0.8 % of her agricultural manpower produces 60 % of her

Faced with this serious situation, it is high time to consider revolutionizing structures — and with the same determination that the students are attacking the question of university structures. The EEC, therefore, must seek new formulae, its member countries must abandon their nationalism and dreams of independence. There is another reason for wanting to build a new Europe — so that, in creating new systems of financial co-operation, we can achieve an end to poverty in Europe itself. Mr. Mart concludes with the words of Voltaire. "If you want me to venerate your gods, make them bigger, otherwise it is not worth venerating them".

**A Dual Partnership.**

After the working sessions each delegation published its own resolutions. In general they all

to devote themselves to encouraging the evolution of democracy in conformity with the North Atlantic Treaty, in order to preserve world peace. The French Delegation carried the argument a step further in calling for the Atlantic Community to seek a true balance among its members, in the form of a dual political and economic partnership. On the one hand, Europe should remain the military and political partner of the United States; on the other, European economic unity is the only way gradually to close the technological gap separating Europe and America. Finally, following the achievement of the Alliance in "preventing the expansion of totalitarian communism, and thus making possible a first stage of détente between East and West, it would appear that Western Europe could open the way towards a fresh détente which would gradually develop into increased co-operation in specific fields".

After the closing session at Luxembourg, the Young Political Leaders left for SHAPE, near Mons, where they attended a briefing session and, a few hours later, a reception at NATO Headquarters in Brussels where they heard a description of the present problems of the Alliance by Mr. Jaenicke, Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs. In conclusion, it may be mentioned that Malta, which since her independence has become a member of the Atlantic Treaty Association and which still plays a role in the defence of the Western world, has now been admitted to membership in the Atlantic Association of Young Political Leaders. The Maltese Delegation invited the Conference to meet in Malta next year.

ELISE NOUEL.

# International Students' Travelling Seminar in Holland

## "ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP TODAY AND TOMORROW"

Student opinion, expressed in particularly strident and persistent tones, is much in the news just now as it strives to make itself heard on a number of issues effecting both Eastern and Western Europe. When, therefore, sixty students from 13 European countries set themselves the task of examining aspects of the Atlantic partnership, it is of interest to find out what general attitudes emerge and, particularly, how NATO stands up to such a study.

At the start of a hot, sunny week in April, the students converged on Amersfoort, a picturesque little town in central Holland. But this was not the end of their journey for it had been decided that the seminar should combine travel with debate. After three days at Amersfoort, the students piled into a coach and went off to Tilburg, staying long enough to hear a lecture by Professor F.A.M. Alting von Geusau, of Tilburg University, on proposals for disarmament and non-proliferation. Then off they

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 went again to finish the five-day seminar at Groningen, a university town in the North/East of Holland.

The general pattern of the seminar was for the students to listen to a lecture on some aspect of the Alliance and then form small discussion groups to decide on questions to be put later to the speaker. Such a system, of course, made it easier to discover the views of the lecturers than of the students themselves, though the questions provided an indication of the way they were thinking. It seems fair to say that the great majority came to gather information rather than attempt to impose an already formulated point of view. And, like most students, they also came to see something of another part of Europe and to chat with people from other countries about less weighty subjects.

During the informal discussions in the evenings, it seemed that two aspects of the Alliance caused the most anxiety: the role of the United States, and the attitude NATO was taking to détente. And, fortunately, the two lecturers who had been invited by the student organisers to speak specifically on NATO, touched on both of these. Mr. Pieter Dankert, International Secretary of the Dutch Socialist Party, and a member of his party's NATO Committee, spoke on plans for the reform of NATO, and Mr. Harold Kaplan, Public Affairs Counsellor with the US Mission to NATO, spoke on American and European security.

#### A Dutch viewpoint.

"I want to concentrate on the political side", said Mr. Dankert, "because that is the side in which so much still has to be done." He went on: "It is very important to improve consultation in NATO and not only that but to lay down general aims for the policies of NATO as far as relations with Eastern Europe are concerned." He pointed out that this proposal was not new. "In 1956 we had the Committee of the Three Wise Men — three foreign ministers of NATO countries — who came to the conclusion that an improvement in consultation was very much necessary but notwithstanding the fact that they made quite a good report, not much came out of it."

He said it had become clear, for instance, that it would have been wise of the United States to have consulted with its European Allies before starting its talks with the Soviet Union on the non-proliferation treaty. "The same accounts for the decision by McNamara and the American Administration to start an anti-ballistic missile programme. This has had a considerable influence on policies in Germany and in the Alliance as such, and consultation on this point was really important from the point of view of the survival of the Alliance."

The period of détente which set in after Cuba, he said, made it necessary to concentrate on the search for a common political line so that détente

could be taken further. "One of the main tasks of NATO in this field is to take its part in the preparation of a conference on European security." He went on, "of course, it is not easy to bring this about; it cannot be done rapidly; quite a lot of things have to be prepared beforehand but NATO has a vital role in the preparation of such a conference." He also thought it necessary that NATO should co-ordinate policies towards Eastern Europe. "And that doesn't only account for Germany but I think also that some of the smaller Western European countries could fulfil a useful function in this."

He said that the main tasks in the improvement of East/West relations, as far as NATO was concerned, were matters relating to security aspects. And that was why, in a report prepared by his party, strong emphasis had been put on the questions of arms control and disarmament. "When you consider the actual set-up of NATO," he went on, "far too little emphasis is given to the importance of disarmament and arms control, which is also an aspect of the whole problem of security. And, in our view, it would be necessary to increase the political staff of NATO, or do it in some other way, and bring about a kind of NATO disarmament and arms control agency." He thought that "this would balance on one side the military, strategic influence on the NATO Council by a disarmament and arms control influence."

"We are of the opinion," concluded Mr. Dankert, "that if we want to go on in the way of détente, to achieve a better understanding and, let's say, a real community in Europe, and in the whole East/West context, for the moment it is absolutely necessary to maintain NATO. But if we do not change NATO, it has, perhaps, the tendency to become an entity in itself. I would say, in our view, NATO is not more than a means to an end of the real European security and a real European community."

#### An American viewpoint.

Mr. Kaplan, in his lecture, said the basic problem of NATO was to deploy forces in Europe which would, firstly, deter the Soviet Union from moving against the West and, secondly, prevent the Russians and their allies from exerting, by virtue of an overwhelming proximity and power, an undesirable influence on the political evolution of the western European countries.

"This is what NATO has done for the past twenty years; and this is what NATO continues to do," he said. "Its work must be seen in conjunction with that of the other instruments of Western co-operation — and particularly the O.E.C.D. and the E.E.C., which help to strengthen and develop the Community which NATO so boldly assumed. One measure of its success, a dangerous one, to be sure, is that many Europeans... are surprised to learn that it still exists. An ironic effect of security, as military people are prone to point out, is that it

tends to subvert itself. If tension abates, the strain of maintaining ready forces begins to seem intolerable, and the temptation to relax our efforts becomes very great."

He said that while NATO, in the words of the American Permanent Representative Harlan Cleveland, "has achieved a rough parity with the Soviet and other Communist forces in Europe", the Alliance has been moving deliberately to make the North Atlantic Council (and he again quoted Ambassador Cleveland) "a political clearing-house and centre of initiative for future European arrangements, including settlement of the German question, and for the next steps (beyond the nuclear non-proliferation treaty) in arms control and disarmament."

Mr. Kaplan said the revival and renewal of the Alliance, the improved procedures for force planning, the development of the Nuclear Planning Group, the official adoption of a new strategy, the establishment of NATO and SHAPE in new headquarters in Belgium and the adoption at the Ministerial Session of 1967 of the new political work programme — all this had occurred precisely at a time when the very relevance of NATO had been placed in question.

He went on, "What has placed NATO in question in a manner which I consider interesting, disquieting, yet potentially creative — provided always, of course, that we prove equal to this challenge — is simply the attitude of European youth on both sides of the Iron Curtain : of European youth and of those Europeans who are youthful enough in spirit to feel that Europe, after its long period of impotence and convalescence, is ready to return to its vocation of responsibility and leadership in the world : of European youth and of those Europeans who are wise enough to realise... that it is precisely the organization and stabilization of Western Europe through NATO and the other instruments of international co-operation which have ma-

de it possible for Europeans to stand firmly on their blocs and yet look beyond them; from a reliable defence system towards balanced East-West force reductions and other disarmament measures; from a resolute refusal of Soviet blackmail towards détente and "bridge-building", from the Atlantic Community towards the reconciliation of Europe and the reunification of Germany."

#### Europe's Evolution.

Turning to the American attitude to the new situation in Europe, Mr. Kaplan said his task was made easier "because our government, despite our preoccupation with difficult problems at home, and despite the enormous responsibilities which we have been obliged to assume in other parts of the world, has remained deeply sensitive and attentive to Europe's evolution and to the changing moods of the Europeans. It is with hope — and impatience — that we watch this evolution and these moods, for reasons which have been excellently stated early this year, by our Under Secretary of State, Mr. Katzenbach". Mr. Kaplan concluded with the following quotation from Mr. Katzenbach's Chicago speech : "If we are to come out of the next two decades as successfully as we did the last two, both Europe and America must accommodate to the changing times. Europe must be prepared to assume a greater share of the responsibilities and costs of world leadership. America must be willing to accept a less dominant role within the Alliance."

The travelling seminar was the second venture of this kind to be organized by the Dutch Studentenvereniging voor Internationale Betrekkingen (SIB) or, in English, the Student Movement for International Relations. The SIB has about 1,000 members in most Dutch university cities and arranges conferences and lectures on a number of aspects of international affairs.

PETER JENNER.