

Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030015-0  
 8 May 1968

# Vietnam peace unit seen as peril to Saigon rule

By Beverly Deepe  
 Special correspondent of  
 The Christian Science Monitor

## Saigon

Announcement of 10 national-level committee members of a new peace group is considered here as a significant step towards an all-out Communist drive to topple the government of President Thieu.

Reliable Vietnamese sources here believe the announcement of the peace group's leadership marks a crucial turning point for the United States-backed anti-Communist here.

It is not considered a clear-cut political defeat for the Thieu government, but it does represent an acceleration in the erosion of political strength in the government-controlled areas.

Observers say formation of the 10-member alliance publicly stresses the continued state of crisis and the unsolved problems of President Thieu's elected government.

## Use of name indicated

The announcement of the leadership for the alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces also is considered likely here to offer the pretext for the Communists to use the name of the movement to perpetuate their so-called "general uprising" in the cities and towns.

They also are expected to simultaneously launch a concerted diplomatic offensive to win over leftists in America and the world while Washington-Hanoi peace talks preliminaries are getting underway.

"The Communists are interested in the substance rather than in the semantics of words like front and alliance," one Vietnamese political source explained.

"During the French Indochina war, the Viet Minh was technically known as an alliance, while today the Viet Cong are called a front. During the Indochina war, Ho Chi Minh organized a front within a front; Now the Viet Cong have organized the new alliance as an appendage of the National Liberation Front, or a satellite to it.

"In general, the Communists want bigger and bigger concepts to attract an ever widening base of mass support. If the American government wants to negotiate with the new alliance to dump the Thieu government, fine — but Washington rejected that

idea, so now they'll try to destroy the Thieu government by themselves."

Just what methods the Communists will use in their attempts to overthrow the Thieu government are still unknown here. Some believe their political offensive will be made in conjunction with either ground assaults and/or rocket attacks on the cities and towns. Saigon is currently in a high state of tension and uneasiness as developments of this kind have been predicted by both the Vietnamese and American military commands here.

Other sources believe the Communists will turn more and more toward political agitation, subversion, attracting urban dissidents, propaganda, and terroristic activities as the spearhead to destroy the Thieu government, with military forces playing a distinctly supporting role.

## Significance outlined

The short-range, immediate significance of announcing the national-level committee members of the alliance is considered by Vietnamese political sources to be:

1. This is the first known migration of as many as 10 persons of what amounts to the upper-crust, snob-set Vietnamese to the pro-Communist side since 1960, when the National Liberation Front was established.

This is not considered an outright defection of pro-American, anti-Communists to the pro-Communist camp. The important members of the announced alliance are not known here as anti-Communists; several have histories of pro-French leanings or pro-socialist and proletarian peace leanings or activities in the past.

Yet, these committee members are not specifically known to Saigoneses as Communists either, nor is there immediate, specific evidence of Communist backgrounds, informed sources report.

While numerically insignificant in political terms, these 10 personages—intellectuals rather than politicians—are nevertheless considered as psychologically important in softening the attitudes of other urbanites toward the Communists. Communist radio broadcasts indicate more than the 10 have been officially named to the committee. But other names have not been released.

## Ploy called clever

Since 1964, allied counterinsurgency experts here have predicted with trepidation this specific moment when, as one said at the time, "the Communists will eventually attract very respectable non-Communists to front for them, but behind the scenes the Communists will hold power. This will be a very clever ploy by the Communists—and a very difficult one for the allies to coun-

Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030015-0

2. In terms of guerrilla geopolitics, the Communists Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030015-0  
 heads into the cities at a time when militarily they are attempting to encircle some urban centers from the outskirts and when economically they are trying to strangle these populated centers from the agricultural produce of the countryside.

The Communist radio broadcasts during the Tet offensive in late January first mentioned the Alliance for National, Democratic, and Peace Forces, under a variety of names, as representing a return of the "government to the people" in Hue. Later the committee members were named for the chapter in Hue and the two northernmost provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien.

Le Van Hao, a professor of ethnology at the Universities of Saigon and Hue was named chairman. He was the son-in-law of a businessman closely identified with managing the economic interests of Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu, the sister-in-law of the late President Diem; the businessman also was a relative by marriage to the Diem family.

Named deputy chairman was a woman, Mrs. Tuong Vy, a former director of an important girl's school in Hue and the mother-in-law of a Vietnamese general, currently head of the political warfare department, as well as the mother-in-law of a rich pharmacist who is currently acting as an assistant to President Thieu.

### Buddhist monk named

Also named deputy chairman was a Buddhist monk, the Venerable Thich Don Hau; his student leader protégé, Hoang Phu Ngoc Tuong, was named secretary-general. The Venerable Thich Don Hau a Buddhist spiritual leader who was heir apparent to Thich Tri Quang in Hue, also is listed on the newly announced committee list for Saigon. Some Buddhist sources believe he was captured by the Communists during the battle of Hue and his name was involuntarily entered on the committee roster.

Also during the Tet offensive, Communist radio broadcasts said a Saigon chapter had been established, but no names were listed. Last weekend, both Liberation radio and Hanoi radio mentioned that the Saigon committee—expanded to mean the national-level committee—had met on April 20-21, outside Saigon.

Numbers of unnamed persons reportedly drew up the alliance's program and selected the 10 leaders. The program is described here as a carbon copy of the 14-point National Liberation Front program, issued last September, in the terms of the main objectives of fighting the common enemies of the Thieu-Ky government and the Americans.

The tone is less strident and the words are less biased: "The Americans" replaces the Communist language of "the American imperialists," for example.

### Mixture represented

The 10 members listed as heading the

national level alliance seemed to contain a mixture of the three regional divisions of Vietnam—northern, central and southern—of various religious groupings, and of various professions. It is heavily weighted toward lawyers, doctors, professors, and students which are considered the best-educated layer of Vietnamese society.

The chairman was listed as Trinh Dinh Thao, a semiretired Saigon lawyer. He was born in North Vietnam, but moved to the South at middle age. His law degree was earned from his studies in France. His son, also a lawyer, is married to the daughter of one of the richest jewelers in Saigon.

Mr. Thao was considered years ago by informed Saigonese to be close to Nguyen Huu Tho, head of the National Liberation Front; the two lawyers reportedly worked together in peace movements at the end of the French Indochina war.

Vice-chairman Lam Van Tet is a southern-born Cao-Daist, a religious sect. Tet was prominent in Saigon as the chairman of the All-Religions Citizens Front established in 1964 with the Rev. Hoang Quynh representing the Catholics, and others representing the Hoa Hao and Buddhists and Cao-Daists.

He is reportedly rather elderly. While listed as an engineer, a more accurate translation would be a land surveyor. He also is a large landowner, which Viet Cong and Hanoi radio broadcasts conveniently failed to mention. He unsuccessfully ran for the upper house of the Legislature that is now in session.

### Reported in hiding

A second vice-chairman is the Buddhist monk Thich Don Hau, who is also vice-chairman of the chapter for Hue. He, like the chairman of the Hue grouping, is thought to be in hiding outside of Hue, where heavy fighting has taken place in the past few days between U.S. Army 1st Air Cavalry 101st airborne troops and North Vietnamese Army units.

Secretary-General Duong Ky was arrested for his anti-government actions in 1965. He was one of three peace advocates sent over the Ben Hai Bridge to North Vietnam in that year. He went to Paris and returned to Saigon in 1967, informed sources report. Active in the past Buddhist-inspired crises and demonstrations against a succession of governments following the fall of Ngo Dinh Diem, he was for a time a professor at Saigon and Hue Universities.

Listed as assistant secretary-general is a rather well-known, wealthy woman doctor in Saigon, Duong Quynh Hoa. She received her doctor's degree in France, and reliable sources said she was once engaged to a Frenchman who was a member of the Communist Party. He passed on before they were married and she never wed anyone else.

She was bitter for sometime, these sources say, because her brother, a lawyer in the

resort city of Dalat, was murdered and robbed. Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030015-0

A second assistant secretary-general was listed as Le Hieu Dang, who was well known as deputy chairman of the Saigon student union, with headquarters on the main street of Saigon, in 1966 and 1967. He was known to have participated in the American-aided summer student programs which helped rebuild and clean up some of Saigon's slum districts.

A third assistant secretary-general, Thanh Nghi, is known as the author of a French-Vietnamese dictionary. He holds the equivalent of a master of arts degree from France.

Three others are listed as standing committee members. Educated in France, Nguyen Van Kiet has held government positions dealing with primary and middle-level education, as well as good teaching jobs in the Mekong Delta and at the University of Saigon.

Tran Trieu Luat was graduated from the University of Saigon in 1967, was vice-chairman of the Saigon Student Union, participated in antigovernment demonstrations, and then became a professor at the University of Saigon.

Little information is available, even from official sources, about Huynh Van Nghi, who was not further identified by the Communists.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
29 August 1968

## Front for a front


Whatever the Communists or their agents do in Vietnam these days is manifestly connected with both the talks in Paris and the presidential election campaign in the United States. Hanoi has things impressively organized — even if it occasionally fails or misreads the signs. And so it is presumably no coincidence that there have come together in recent days both a brief resumption of the rocketing of Saigon — as well as stepped-up military activity elsewhere — and a resumption of political activity by one of the newest and most significant Communist-front organizations in the South, the Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces (VANDPF).

The VANDPF is in fact a front for a front — for the National Liberation Front (NLF) which has had some non-Communist components all along but is now exposed as on a tight rein to Hanoi. Even Hanoi at last recognizes apparently that it is asking too much of the other side to accept the NLF as the sole legitimate spokesman for the South and to insist on the NLF's program as the only one acceptable for a resolution of the country's long agony. So the VANDPF has been set up in Viet Cong-held territory in South Vietnam, with possibly only one known Communist on its 10-man central committee. (That one, paradoxically, is a woman who may either have been a member in her youth of the French Communist Party or was once betrothed to a member of it.)

Hanoi's intention would seem to be to get the VANDPF recognized as the non-Communist component in an eventual coalition government in Saigon. And to achieve this, it has first to bring about an undermining of the legality of and confidence in the present government in South Vietnam — the Thieu-Huong tandem which the United States supports. In effect, then, the plan is first to substitute a VANDPF team for the Thieu-Huong team, to be immediately followed by the VANDPF's seeking a coalition with the NLF. To discredit these efforts, the Thieu-Huong tandem has recently pronounced capital sentences in abstentia on the 10 members of the VANDPF's central committee.

A good case can be made that this central committee — while playing Hanoi's game — is less pro-Communist than neutralist, anti-American and more at ease with French than any other outside culture. Among intellectual and some religious and business circles in Saigon, there are signs of a patchy growth of these trends — perhaps an incipient hedging of bets against an imagined American sell-out or walkout.

It would be naïve not to see the VANDPF for what it is. Yet at this stage in the game, could it not be short-sighted to make its non-Communist central committee members martyrs, albeit in abstentia? Could not these people under certain circumstances be used against as much as by the Communists?



Principal Developments World Communist Affairs  
(20 August-19 September 1968)

1. World Communist Conference

In the light of the deep divisions in the Communist world which the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has caused, questions have been raised in many quarters in and outside the Communist world whether the Soviets could effectively proceed with the World Communist Conference, a convocation planned to demonstrate the unity and harmony binding the world Communist movement together (it is scheduled for 25 November 1968). As we go to press all indications are that they do indeed plan to go ahead with it. Pravda on 13 September published an article by the war horse of Stalinist Communism, Jacques Duclos, former head of the French Communist Party, urging the importance of the Conference. The desperation of the Soviets to find a prestigious figure to call for proceeding with the Conference is illustrated by the fact that this call was actually originally published by Duclos in France on 15 May (!), long before the invasion. Since the invasion, it is doubtful the Soviets would be able to find any major Communist leader in the free world willing to support such a move. In fact, Italian Communist leader Luigi Longo wrote in the Party journal Rinascita in mid-September that it would be "neither useful nor opportune, nor perhaps even possible" to go ahead with the Conference unless the Soviets withdraw their troops from Czechoslovakia in the interim -- an unlikely development. (Correspondent Alvin Shuster's article in the New York Times, datelined Budapest 17 September, says that another preparatory meeting for the Conference will convene in Budapest during the week of 23 September, but that no official announcement has been made. The last such preparatory meeting was held last June.)

2. Polycentrism Revived?

Even if the Soviets succeed in ramming through their demand for a meeting of many Communist parties next November, it is doubtful they could gain assent for formalizing world Communist unity in some sort of organization or in the unanimous underwriting of some bold new Manifesto.

Much more hope of success could be expected from an idea that is hinted at by Maurice Duverger, a leftist French professor of political science writing in Le Monde on 5 September 1968, that is, "A Western Communism" ("Un Communisme Occidental") (See attachment). He points out that the invasion merely highlights the inapplicability of the Soviet model of Communism for Western Europe, and argues that it can only become viable by seeking its own path. In this vein, the veteran Austrian Communist ideologist Ernst Fischer asserted that all European Communists

have the moral duty of severing relations with the CPSU as a result of the invasion, and it is but a step beyond this to suggest that West European Communist parties should get together -- without the Soviets -- to discuss the development of a more relevant form of Communism (an application of deceased Italian CP leader Togliatti's "polycentric Communism").

### 3. The Soviet Dread of Freedom

On the night of 20-21 August 1968, the Soviet Union by invading Czechoslovakia with four Bloc partners: East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, again demonstrated its disregard of solemn agreements, in this case those reached with the Czechs at Cierna nad Tisou and Bratislava a scant three weeks earlier, and of its solemnly and oft repeated "principle" of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state. The desperate proliferation of excuses for the intervention proffered afterwards in Bloc propaganda betrays the lack not only of a reason that is acceptable to the world at large, but even of one that would be convincing to anyone in the Bloc itself. The main justification offered -- that "counterrevolutionaries" were on the verge of toppling the Czechoslovak regime -- is patently absurd, and it seems impossible for the Soviets to have believed it true.

The true reason was and remains the Soviet fear that its system of Communism, wherever practiced, cannot survive free and critical self-examination such as that which Czech intellectuals were conducting and airing in public information media and which the Czech leadership refused to suppress. This Soviet fear may well be justified, and it is a telling commentary on the ideological poverty of Soviet Communism that it cannot exist under conditions where even some of the basic human freedoms are permitted to flourish.

There was some early hope among both friends and enemies of the Soviet Union that the invasion would be recognized as a mistake with an accompanying disposition to make amends, but that hope is fading in the light of the single-minded and persistent determination of the occupiers to require complete fulfillment of their demands, which they choose to call "normalization." It is still not clear how far these demands will extend, but there is reason to believe that a liberalized, or even humanized, Czech Communism will not be permitted, and that the Czech leadership will not be permitted to run the country without direct Soviet supervision (for example, via a system of Soviet "advisors" in all key sectors).

### 4. Highlights of Events in Czechoslovakia

The occupation of Czechoslovakia was achieved smoothly and efficiently, in its military aspects, as if it had been planned far in advance. It seems most likely that it was the execution of a contingency

plan made long before, though it is less certain when the decision was taken to put such a contingency plan into effect. Presumably it was some time after the agreements reached at Cierna and Bratislava, at which the Czech leaders believed they had received assurances that they would be permitted to meet minimum Soviet requirements in their own way.

The invaders were received by the Czech people with uniform hostility though with little violence (this latter at the behest of the Czech leadership). While the main Czech leaders, with the exception of President Ludvik Svoboda, were seized and held incommunicado, the Soviets were surprised at not being able to find enough Czech Quislings to set up an amenable yet viable government. Hence they had to resort to the unexpected alternative of re-installing the original key leaders: Party Chief Alexander Dubcek, Premier Oldrich Cernik, and National Assembly head Josef Smrkovsky, after dictating to them the conditions that would have to be met. These conditions are known as the "Moscow Agreement," reached between 23-27 August. While the authorities have not revealed the content of the agreement, a version acquired by the New York Times (attached) is probably a fair approximation. Judging by this and by events following the Moscow meeting, the most important provisions are clear: (a) restoration of the formal, organized censorship of news and information, especially to prevent criticism of the Soviet Union, its allies, or Communism (b) elimination of any kind of political or quasi-political grouping not sanctioned by the occupying authority (c) removal from office of certain officials repugnant to the Soviet Union. The first two provisions have been fulfilled, though full conformity of the Czech news media with Soviet requirements has not yet been achieved and the Soviet regularly note this fact in their propaganda. Full conformity is probably simply a matter of time. Some Czech liberal leaders long under personal attack in Soviet and Bloc media have been purged, others will undoubtedly be removed in due time. Among the more prominent liberal figures relieved of their main responsibilities (some have taken less sensitive jobs) are Central Committee Secretary Cestmir Cisar, National Front head Frantisek Kriegel, Minister of Interior Josef Pavel, and Deputy Premier Ota Sik, prime architect of Czechoslovakia's new economic model. Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek resigned on 19 September. A number of well known Communist conservatives also resigned their posts.

Another provision of the agreement is that the Soviets will decide when the situation is "normalized" sufficiently to warrant the withdrawal of troops. Most observers believe this will be a long time coming, and that even when most troops are withdrawn some units will remain along the Czech-German border.

Lesser provisions seem to include the requirement that the Czech leadership make public its disapproval or take a public stand on certain issues such as, disavowing the anti-Soviet deposition made by Foreign Minister Hajek in the United Nations and declaring null and void the clandestine 14th Party Congress which was held just after the invasion and which elected an overwhelmingly liberal Central Committee (the regular

Party Congress scheduled for 9 September has not yet been rescheduled). Whether the Czechs will indeed be forced to discard all elements of Sik's economic program, as Soviet propaganda suggests, is not yet certain.

There is some reason to believe that Dubcek's days as Party Chief may be numbered. He was the only one of the present top leaders named in a Pravda editorial of 22 August (hence the day after the invasion and before he joined the talks in Moscow) as a "right-wing opportunist." He was also said to be one of a minority at the Cierna meetings that refused to abide by the Bratislava agreement. However, that has been the only adverse mention of Dubcek in Soviet media. A straw in the wind may be that an "independent" Polish newspaper, Zycie Warszawy ("Warsaw Life"), on 4 September printed him as gullible, moral, and sincere, but expressing "certain reservations as to his political acumen and ability to engage in resolute action when necessary."

##### 5. Communist Reaction

The ultimate impact of the Soviet invasion of the World Communist Movement (WCM) still remains to be seen. The reaction of certain key Communist parties is still evolving. The Communist governments behaved for the most part as was to be expected. The four Bloc partners, of course, defended it. Rumania and Yugoslavia denounced the invasion immediately, unequivocally, and vehemently. In succeeding days, the Rumanians softened their tones, whether under pressure by the Soviets, or voluntarily in order not to add gratuitously to the disruption of the Communist world, is not clear. The Chinese Communists and Albanians denounced the invasion in vitriolic terms ("a monstrous crime," "utterly shameless"). Among Chinese objectives in condemning the invasion may well be the hope of sabotaging the World Communist Conference. And of more than passing interest is the fact that the North Vietnamese chose clearly to support the Soviet position even though it flatly contradicted the Chinese Communist line. The Cubans approved it as "necessary" while simultaneously asserting that of course it was illegal.

All the legal European Communist parties condemned the Soviet invasion, some more vigorously than others. Among the strongest condemnations was that of the Austrian Communist Party. Central Committee member Ernst Fischer personally proposed that Communist parties cut all ties to the CPSU and form another leftist movement. The powerful Italian and French parties condemned the invasion, but not going so far as to suggest a break with the Soviet Party.

Parties of countries in the Near and Middle East receiving Bloc military and economic aid supported the Soviets; perhaps for analogous reasons, so did most Latin American parties. In the rest of the free world, condemnation of the Soviet action by Communist parties was virtually unanimous.



LE MONDE, Paris  
5 September 1968

Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030015-0

### A Western Communism?

by Maurice Duverger

The action of the USSR in Czechoslovakia raises the problem of a third pole in the development of communism. It has not brought together the two which already exist, the Russian and the Chinese. That Mr. Dubcek might be more "revisionist" than Mssrs. Brehnev and Kosygin, that the latter might employ Stalinist methods to eliminate them, these do not suffice to give them grace in the eyes of Mao Tse-tung. He has understood perfectly well one of the essential meanings of the Soviet decision: the affirmation by one of the two great powers of its freedom of action within its zone of influence, which obliges it to accord the same prerogatives to the other. The new coup de Prague could justify a new coup de Santo Domingo. It strengthens the imperialism of the United States in Latin America. Nothing is more removed from the Chinese concept of world revolution.

The two present forms of communism still correspond to fundamentally different situations. That of Peking embodies the hope of the poor, of the under developed, of those who have nothing to lose and everything to gain in employing violence. That of Moscow relates to the more advanced countries, which naturally tend toward prudence and realism. But, since 21 August 1968, it has shown itself incapable of embodying the future of the more modern industrial nations. To tell the truth, it never truly embodied it. As early as 1917, Lenin hoped that the revolution in Germany and in the rest of Western Europe would relay the Russian revolution and take the lead in the movement. Since then, the progress of the communist parties in France, in Italy and in the other countries having a pluralist democracy has always been held back by certain aspects of Soviet practice.

This phenomenon remained a secondary one as long as these parties were far removed from power. Moreover, the evolution of the USSR and of the popular democracies, in recent years, gave reason to think that the gap between the structure of their communism and the technical, political, and cultural needs of the western nations was going to be progressively filled in. Thus one could think that the liberalization of Eastern Europe would develop more rapidly -- or as rapidly -- as would the possibility of the communists accede to the government in Paris or in Rome, so that they would not have been too weakened by the sequels of Stalinism.

Hereafter one can no longer believe that. The military occupation of Czechoslovakia shows that the USSR is absolutely determined to prevent a profound liberalization. Although it remains less brutal than in Hungary, because popular resistance has taken different forms, the action of the Soviet tanks is more grave for the future of communism. Twelve years ago it aimed above all to prevent the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact; Imre Nagy had been imprudent in this respect. Today its essential aim is to paralyze the internal democracy of a country otherwise determined to remain faithful to the socialism camp and to the Russian alliance. It is motivated by fear of the contagion of liberty more than by the necessity of protecting outward appearances.

Let us not deceive ourselves on the other hand. The conflict which last month was able to divide the Soviet leaders did not really pit the liberals against the "hard liners." Rather it pitted the advocates of military intervention against those of political pressure, to reach the same goal: to conserve the monolith. There are no real liberals in the apparatus of the Soviet party and state. As always in Russia, liberty remains above all the idea of the intelligentsia. The formidable weight of the traditions of an authoritarian empire is added to that of a dictatorship of the proletariat to brake evolution towards socialism, pushed moreover by

Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030015-0

Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030015-0  
economic and technological developments. Yesterday the example of the popular democracies, and particularly that of Prague, acted in the opposite sense; it is now suppressed.

Certainly, as in Hungary after 1956, liberalization will undoubtedly begin again, little by little, in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere. But so slowly and so weakly that it will remain for a very long time (if not forever) short of the degree of liberty necessary to render communism assimilatable by the nations of the West. The gap becomes more serious as the communist parties are no longer totally beyond the hope of coming to power. The communists have participated in the government of Finland since 1966; their participation in France is no longer entirely unimaginable; even in Italy they have moved a little towards it. Facing a Social Democratic movement that is more and more bureaucratic, could not a liberal communism restore its chances for achieving socialism in the advanced countries? But Moscow now appears as incapable of resolving these parties' problems as those of the under developed countries. Its responsibilities as a great atomic power, its (valid) efforts to establish a modus vivendi with the United States, its economic growth, the remoteness of revolutionary methods: these lend justification to Chinese communism. Its rejection of an authentic liberalization, its attachment to dictatorial control over information, its allergy to political democracy, its estrangement from the needs of industrial nations: these would justify the birth and development of an original western communism.

Soviet communism remains very important. Without the revolution of 1917, the development of socialism in the world would be less important. Without the present strength of the USSR, which confronts that of the United States, capitalism would be more widespread and more dominant. In misunderstanding this aspect of the problem, and in considering the Russians as enemies, the Chinese are probably wrong in relation to their own revolutionary objectives. In refusing to break completely with Moscow, the communist parties of the West show themselves more realistic. But they would not be so, on the other hand, if they content themselves with protesting the military occupation of Czechoslovakia in the name of the right of each country to determine its own road to socialism.

Stalin transformed the USSR from a power which exports ideas into a simple conservator of a system. It became a place of security, a citadel, and nothing more. It is even less able to spread its doctrine in the industrialized countries than in the under developed countries: It still has something to teach to the Chinese communists. It has nothing to teach to the western communist, since it refuses the liberalization which alone would permit the Soviet model to correspond to the level of technological and political evolution of Western Europe. On the contrary, the latter could teach it a lot in defining a model of liberal communism which would raise Eastern Europe from the stagnation in which it is progressively engulfed.

In saying "no" Moscow over the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the communist parties of the West have opened the way for such an evolution. They do not seem determined to go further in this direction after this enormous first step. However, on their ability to do so depends not only their own future, but perhaps that of international communism. There is no reason to think that the under developed countries will be the prime movers of history in the coming decades; without doubt this role will belong for a long time yet to the most technically advanced countries, as Marx thought moreover, and except at the end of his life, Lenin. The future of socialism in the latter countries depends less on Moscow now than on the capacity of the Italian CP and, to a lesser degree, the French CP to take the leadership of a western communism.

LE MONDE, Paris  
5 September 1968

Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030015-0

# UN COMMUNISME OCCIDENTAL ?

Par MAURICE DUVERGER

L'action de l'U.R.S.S. en Tchécoslovaquie pose le problème d'un troisième pôle de développement du communisme. Elle n'a pas rapproché les deux qui existent déjà, le russe et le chinois. Que M. Dubcek soit plus « révisionniste » que MM. Brejnev et Kossyguine, que ceux-ci emploient des méthodes staliniennes pour l'écraser, cela ne suffit pas à leur faire trouver grâce aux yeux de Mao Tse-toung. Il a partiellement compris une des significations essentielles de la décision soviétique : l'affirmation par l'un des deux Grands de sa liberté d'action à l'intérieur de sa zone d'influence, qui l'oblige à reconnaître les mêmes prérogatives à l'autre. Le nouveau coup de Prague justifierait un nouveau coup de Saint-Domingue. Il renforce l'impérialisme des Etats-Unis en Amérique latine. Rien n'est plus éloigné du concept chinois de la révolution mondiale.

Les deux communismes actuels correspondent toujours à des situations fondamentalement différentes. Celui de Pékin incarne l'espoir des pauvres, des sous-développés, de ceux qui n'ont rien à perdre et tout à gagner en employant la violence. Celui de Moscou correspond à des pays plus avancés, qui tendent naturellement vers la prudence et le réformisme. Mais, depuis le 21 août 1968, il s'avère incapable d'incarner l'avant-garde des nations industrielles les plus modernes. A vrai dire, il ne l'a jamais incarné vraiment. Dès 1917, Lénine espérait que la révolution en Allemagne et dans le reste de l'Europe occidentale viendrait relayer la révolution russe et prendre la tête du mouvement. Depuis lors, la progression des partis communistes en France, en Italie et dans les autres pays de démocratie pluraliste a toujours été freinée par certains aspects du stalinisme.

Le phénomène restait secondaire tant que ces partis demeuraient très éloignés du pouvoir. D'autre part, l'évolution de l'U.R.S.S. et des démocraties populaires, ces dernières années, faisait penser que l'écart allait être progressivement comblé entre la structure de leur communisme et les besoins techniques, politiques et culturels des nations occidentales. On pouvait croire ainsi que la libéralisation de l'Europe orientale se développerait plus rapidement — ou aussi rapidement — que les possibilités de voir les communistes accéder au gouvernement à Paris ou à Rome, de sorte qu'elles n'auraient pas été trop affaiblies par les séquelles du stalinisme.

On ne peut plus le croire désormais. L'occupation militaire de la Tchécoslovaquie montre que l'U.R.S.S.

est absolument décidée à empêcher une libéralisation profonde. Bien qu'elle reste moins brutale qu'en Hongrie, parce que la résistance populaire a pris d'autres formes, l'action des chars soviétiques est plus grave pour l'avenir du communisme. Il y a douze ans, elle tendait surtout à empêcher la dissolution du pacte de Varsovie : Imre Nagy avait été imprudent à cet égard. Aujourd'hui, elle a pour but essentiel de paralyser la démocratisation intérieure d'un pays décidé par ailleurs à rester fidèle au camp socialiste et à l'alliance russe. Elle est motivée par la peur d'une contagion de la liberté plutôt que par la nécessité de protéger le glacis.

Qu'on ne s'y trompe pas d'autre part. Le conflit qui a pu diviser le mois dernier les dirigeants soviétiques n'opposait pas réellement des libéraux à des « durs ». Il opposait plutôt les partisans d'une intervention militaire et ceux d'une pression politique, pour atteindre le même but : conserver le monolithisme. Il n'y a pas de véritables libéraux dans l'appareil du parti et de l'Etat soviétiques. Comme toujours en Russie la liberté reste surtout une idée de l'intelligentsia. Le poids formidable des traditions d'un empire autoritaire s'y ajoute à celui de la dictature du prolétariat pour freiner l'évolution vers le socialisme, poussée pourtant par le développement économique et technique. Hier, l'exemple des démocraties populaires, et singulièrement de Prague, agissait en sens contraire : il est maintenant supprimé.

Certes, comme en Hongrie après 1956, la libéralisation reprendra sans doute peu à peu en Tchécoslovaquie et ailleurs. Mais si lentement et si faiblement qu'elle restera très longtemps (si non toujours) en deçà du degré de liberté nécessaire pour rendre le communisme assimilable aux nations d'Occident. Le décalage devient d'autant plus grave que les partis communistes n'y sont plus absolument écartés de l'espérance du pouvoir. Les communistes participent au gouvernement de la Finlande depuis 1966 ; leur participation en France n'est plus tout à fait imaginable ; en Italie même, ils s'en rapprochent un peu. En face d'une social-démocratie de plus en plus

gestionnaire, un communisme libéral ne pourrait-il restituer ses chances au socialisme dans les pays avancés ? Mais Moscou paraît maintenant aussi incapable de résoudre leurs problèmes que ceux des pays sous-développés. Ses responsabilités de grande

puissance atomique, ses efforts (viables) pour établir un *modus vivendi* avec les Etats-Unis, sa croissance économique, l'éloignement des méthodes révolutionnaires : ils apportent des justifications au communisme chinois. Son refus d'une libéralisation authentique, son attachement à la dictature de l'information, son allégeance à la démocratie politique, l'éloignent des besoins des nations industrielles : ils justifient la naissance et la progression d'un communisme occidental original.

Le communisme soviétique conserve une grande importance. Sans la révolution de 1917, le développement du socialisme dans le monde serait beaucoup moins grand. Sans la puissance actuelle de l'U.R.S.S., le capitalisme serait plus répandu et plus dominateur. En méconnaissant cet aspect du problème et en considérant les Russes comme des ennemis, les Chinois ont probablement tort par rapport à leurs propres objectifs révolutionnaires. En refusant de rompre totalement avec Moscou, les partis communistes de l'Ouest se montrent plus réalistes. Mais ils ne le seraient pas, d'un autre côté, s'ils se contentaient de protester contre l'occupation militaire de la Tchécoslovaquie au nom du droit de chaque pays à déterminer sa propre voie vers le socialisme.

Staline a transformé l'U.R.S.S. de puissance exportatrice d'idées en une simple conservatrice d'un système. Elle devient une place de sûreté, une citadelle, et rien de plus. Elle peut encore moins répandre la doctrine dans les pays industrialisés que dans les pays sous-développés. Elle a quelque chose encore à apprendre aux communistes chinois. Elle n'a plus rien à apprendre aux communistes occidentaux, puisqu'elle refuse la libéralisation qui permettrait seule au modèle soviétique de correspondre au niveau d'évolution technique et politique de l'Europe de l'Ouest. Au contraire, ils pourraient lui apprendre beaucoup en définissant un modèle de communisme libéral qui tirerait l'Europe de l'Est de la stagnation où elle s'enlise progressivement.

En disant « non » à Moscou lors de l'invasion de la Tchécoslovaquie, les partis communistes d'Occident ont ouvert la voie d'une telle évolution. Ils ne semblent pas décidés à s'y engager plus avant, après cet énorme premier pas. De leur

capacité à le faire dépend copondant, non seulement leur propre avenir, mais peut-être celui du communisme international. Rien ne permet de penser que les pays sous-développés seront le moteur principal de l'histoire dans les prochaines décades : ce rôle appartiendra longtemps encore sans doute aux pays les plus avancés techniquement, et, sauf à la fin de sa vie, Lénine. Le sort du socialisme dans ceux-là dépend moins de Moscou, maintenant, que de la capacité du P.C. italien et, dans une moindre mesure, du P.C. français à prendre la tête d'un communisme occidental.

Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030015-0

NEW YORK Times  
8 September 1968

# MOSCOW'S ENVOY AND DUBCEK TALK ON CZECH COURSE

## Kuznetsov Sees Party Chief in an Effort to Reconcile Conflicting Viewpoints

### DEMANDS MADE KNOWN

#### Text of 14 Points Suggests Prague Has Been Balking at Some Conditions

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

PRAGUE, Sept. 7—Vasily V. Kuznetsov, the Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, conferred today with Alexander Dubcek, the Czechoslovak party leader, in his second day of negotiations aimed at resolving conflicting interpretations of a Soviet-Czechoslovak accord reached in Moscow two weeks ago.

The agreement, concluded Aug. 26, contained Soviet conditions for the withdrawal of the 600,000 troops of the Soviet Union and four of its Warsaw Pact allies that invaded Czechoslovakia on the night of Aug. 20-21.

A list of 14 points of the Moscow agreement, which has now become available here, suggests that while the Czechoslovak leadership has fulfilled some of the conditions demanded by the Soviet Union, others have been met only partly and still others not at all.

The conditions were presented earlier this week at closed briefings of regional and district party leaders throughout Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Kuznetsov, who arrived here yesterday with what appears to be full negotiating powers, conferred later in the day with President Ludvik Svoboda.

ment by the Prague radio seemed to indicate that the Soviet and Czechoslovak officials remained at odds.

Last night, the talk with Mr. Svoboda was described as an "open and comradely" exchange. On the meeting today with Mr. Dubcek, the Prague radio said that the two men "informed each other and presented opinions about current questions concerning relations between the two countries and parties."

A comparison between the 14 points and the present situation shows that, for example, Czechoslovakia has not yet issued a required statement that her border with West Germany was not properly prepared for defense and must, therefore, be secured by Warsaw Pact forces.

It has been reported that at least two divisions are to be stationed on the West German border after withdrawal of the other occupation forces.

The Prague government has removed Deputy Premier Ota Shik, the chief economic planner, and Interior Minister Josef Pavel as demanded, in the 7th and points, but it has not "released from his functions," as requested, Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek. In fact, Mr. Hajek returned to Czechoslovakia today despite an attack on him in the Soviet press in recent days.

While Point 2 demanded a declaration that the 14th congress of the Czechoslovak Community party, which met clandestinely in a Prague industrial plant while Mr. Dubcek and his associates were in Soviet interment, was illegal, no such statement has yet been made.

According to the Czechoslovak party briefings insist that such a declaration be delayed until the withdrawal has been completed.

Press censorship has been formally instituted, as the third point of the Moscow agreement specified, but the Russians are known to be unhappy over its laxity.

#### A Pointed U.N. Report

Czechoslovak methods of handling their press in the face of restrictions were evident in the prominent front-page display this morning in the Communist party's official organ, Rude Pravo, of a report from New York on the meeting of the United Nations Security Council on the Middle East.

limited interest in the Middle East, reported that the Soviet delegate, Yakov A. Malik, had said that "the responsibility for the tense situation in the Middle East lies with those who occupy the Arab lands."

"With the occupation of Arab territory, Israel brought on itself the hate and bitterness of the local people," Rude Pravo quoted Mr. Malik as having said. "The occupation has called to life a fight for freedom that cannot be suppressed by the Security Council or anyone else."

Czechoslovakia broke diplomatic relations with Israel following the 1967 war — before Mr. Dubcek's advent to power — but the Czechoslovak press has not occupied itself with attacks on Israel.

Despite the wide use of such double entendre, Soviet troops evacuated last night all but one of the newspaper offices they had been occupying since the invasion. Still under guard was the youth newspaper Mlada Fronta, but the People's party's daily Lidova Demokracie appeared today and the Socialist newspaper Svobodne Slovo is expected to come out tomorrow.

However, the showing of a newsreel on the first days of the occupation was stopped earlier this week, apparently on orders from the Soviet command.

Mr. Kuznetsov called on Mr. Dubcek early this afternoon at the latter's offices at the Central Committee of the Communist party. He was accompanied by Ambassador Stepan V. Chervonenko and one unidentified person.

Authoritative informants indicated later in the day that Mr. Kuznetsov might remain in Prague indefinitely. The view in foreign Communist quarters was that his presence was "a positive event" that might lead to a settlement.

East European diplomats also believe that Mr. Kuznetsov's talks may be followed late next week by another visit to Moscow by a delegation headed by Mr. Dubcek.

Yesterday, the Presidium of the Czechoslovak party called for "open and direct negotiations" to remove obstacles "from any side" to the fulfillment of the Moscow agreement.

This was taken to mean that the Czechoslovak leadership was preparing for a new round of negotiations on the highest level to clarify the terms and the implications of the agreement.

Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030015-0

to include economic discussions on a whole range of problems ranging from long-range trade questions covering the period beyond 1970 to immediate economic aid to Czechoslovakia and to compensation for damages caused by the invading armies.

Under the circumstances, sources here said, the planned meeting in Dresden, East Germany, between the Czechoslovak leadership and the leaders of the five Warsaw Pact countries to negotiate a gradual withdrawal of the occupation forces is certain to be postponed pending the outcome of the expected new round of conversations in Moscow.

The Dresden conference had been tentatively scheduled for Sept. 10 or 11.

There was no visible warmth between the Soviet and Czechoslovak officials as Mr. Kuznetsov made his rounds, but the relationships were coolly correct even though Soviet tanks still sat in Prague's streets and parks and armor and artillery forces ringed this capital.

A new note in the Soviet occupation was the appearance of Soviet marine detachments in red berets, sailor blouses and khaki uniforms guarding the embassies of the five War-

saw Pact occupiers.

According to Rude Pravo, three East German deputy defense ministers, including an admiral, visited last week their country's occupation units in Czechoslovakia. It was believed that they met with liaison staff and the token units that remain in northwestern Czechoslovakia after most of the East German forces were evacuated for political reasons a week after the invasion.

Meanwhile the afternoon newspaper Vecerni Praha reported this evening the return to Prague of Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek who came under attack by the Soviet press earlier this week.

There appeared to be no immediate disposition on Prague's part to dismiss Mr. Hajek, one of those on the Soviet black list.

The new Interior Minister Jan Pelnar — a little known moderate who last week replaced Gen. Josef Pavel, an outspoken liberal — has taken personal control of the security forces, including the secret police, and has offered public assurances that Czechoslovak laws would be respected.

Mr. Pelnar also turned over to the Justice Ministry the disposition of rehabilitations involving former political prisoners in a step that had been planned before the invasion.

#### New Soviet Phase Seen

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Sept. 7—The visit of Vasily V. Kuznetsov to Prague was viewed by East European observers today as a possible opening step in a new phase of Soviet policy toward Czechoslovakia.

Although nothing has become known of Mr. Kuznetsov's conversations today with Alexander Dubcek, the Czechoslovak party leader, and yesterday with President Ludvik Svoboda, the observers feel that such a visit at this time is of more than routine importance.

In the light of public Soviet statements since the Moscow agreement of Aug. 26, the observers feel that a new phase of Soviet policy would be marked by a more draconic attitude toward the occupied country.

NEW YORK TIMES,

8 September 1968

## Czechoslovak Party Briefing on Moscow Accord

Special to The New York Times

PRAGUE, Sept. 7—Following, in unofficial translation, are stenographic notes taken by Czechoslovak Communists who were briefed at closed meetings earlier this week on the 14 points of the Aug. 26 Moscow agreement between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

Information for the workers of the regional and district party committees on the basic 14 points of the Moscow agreement:

1. The characteristics of the political development here. It was agreed that the course will be changed in accordance with the Soviet type of socialism.

2. The declarations of the 14th party congress are not valid.

3. The strengthening of socialism through press censorship.

4. The Soviet side requested our side to declare that there was a counterrevolution. As the result of our protest, the

revolution" was left out and it was not repeated again in the declaration [published Aug. 27 at the end of the Soviet-Czechoslovak talks.]

5. The mass communications media may not speak or write against the allies.

6. We submitted a request that together with the withdrawal of the troops, the Soviet security organs also be removed. The Soviet Union did agree and changed the declaration so that together with the withdrawal of troops the other groups will also be removed.

7. The Minister of Interior, Gen. Josef Pavel, asked to be relieved from his functions because he was not ready to cooperate with the Soviet security organs.

8. Our request for reparations for damages caused by the invasion was finally couched in such a way that a commission will probably be formed consisting of representatives of the five states and us to decide what can be approved as repara-

9. The international situation must be adjusted in accordance with the agreement in Bratislava.

10. The issuing of a declaration that our government did not request the United Nations and will not request the United Nations to discuss our subject.

11. The questions of ministers. The release from their functions of Ota Sik and of Prof. Jiri Hajek.

12. A declaration that our border with West Germany is not prepared for defense and must, therefore, be secured by the allies.

13. The results of the Moscow negotiations are strictly secret and will not be published.

14. The further strengthening of friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union and with the states of the socialist camp.

The following additional points were discussed:

(A) The Soviet Union requested a declaration that the persons who worked for the Soviet Union [in connection with Paragraph 4] will not be persecuted.

(B) Our side requested an extra provision in the declaration that the statement that the 14th congress is not valid will be made when the foreign troops have left the country.