

Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030013-2

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November 1968

NEO-STALINISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

"... the serious violations by Stalin of Lenin's precepts, abuse of power, mass repression against honorable Soviet people, and other activities in the period of the personality cult make it impossible to leave the bier with his body in the mausoleum of V.I. Lenin."

N.S. Khrushchev at Twenty-second Party Congress,
October 1961

* * * * *

Double or triple the guard
beside his grave,
So that he will not rise again,
and with him -- the past...
We carried him away --
threw him out of the mausoleum,
But how shall we remove Stalin
from within Stalin's heirs?...
True, there are those who hurl abuse
at Stalin from the platform,
Who secretly at night
ponder their former glory...
They were the former pillars:
with no liking for empty slave camps,
Or halls jammed with people
where poets recite their verses...
As long as the heirs of Stalin
remain on this earth,
I shall feel Stalin is still there
in the mausoleum.

From "Stalin's Heirs," by Yevgeny Yevtushenko.

The term "Stalinism" has come to signify many things -- the arbitrary rule of a nation by a despot, the rigid control of a nation's economy, the collectivization of agriculture, the massive displacements of minority groups, the purge trials, forced labor camps, manic secretiveness, a massive secret police system, and, pervading everything, a reign of terror. The word can legitimately be stretched to fit the entire gamut of developments in the Soviet Union from the late 20's until Stalin's death in 1953, during most of which time Stalin literally was responsible for every major action.

Stalin made a mockery of legality and justice. He stifled the entire intelligentsia of the country, insisting that all artistic work conform to the principles of "socialist realism." Internationally, he demanded, and obtained, total, blind obedience from Communist parties throughout the world. His conduct of diplomatic relations was marked by a mania for espionage and subversion which was in turn only a reflection of a basic paranoia. All these features nurtured in the Soviet leadership, perhaps as a permanent ineradicable legacy, a frame of mind we can call Stalinism -- an orthodoxy ever inclined to preserve those features of the past that proved successful (whatever its failures) in preserving the Party's unchallenged strangle hold on political power, a frame of mind that shies away from experimentation with new forms.

The total cost of Stalinism can never be reckoned. In terms of human lives, Soviet scientist Andrei D. Sakharov estimates that 10 to 15 million people perished from hardship, torture and execution. Robert Conquest, in his recent, definitive book, The Great Terror, estimates that Stalin's death toll may be as high as 20 million.

Stalin's death in 1953, after 29 years of rule, left his successor, Georgi Malenkov faced with the necessity of consolidating his hold on the reins of power and the need to set a new direction for the nation's economic and political life which would be devoid of the worst of Stalin's excesses. Gradually, a decompression process began. Beria, head of the secret police, was defeated in his bid for power and executed. The secret police forces were purged. Huge numbers of prisoners were released from Stalin's labor camps (leaving millions in the camps, however). The Malenkov leadership gradually developed an economic program designed to sharply increase the availability of food, clothing and housing. This program came to be known as the "New Course."

Early in 1955 Khrushchev came to power, deposing Malenkov and one year later made the "secret speech" that radically changed the entire political life of the nation. In this lengthy speech to the 20th Congress of the CPSU, February 1956, Khrushchev vehemently attacked the entire "cult of Stalin's personality" -- his person, his mistakes, and his misdeeds, particularly the wholesale Party purges. Then, having exposed some of Stalin's greater crimes (although Khrushchev came far from telling the entire truth, which would have implicated the whole Soviet leadership, himself included, in the crimes), Khrushchev was committed "rectifying the errors" of Stalin's time.

Under Khrushchev, de-Stalinization had its ups and downs. Its rapid growth early in 1956 was almost entirely reversed by the end of the year as a consequence of the riots in Poland and the Revolution which exploded in Hungary. Nevertheless, insofar as the person of Stalin was concerned there was no letup and Stalin became an unperson almost overnight. Although Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign was more an attack on his political foes than an effort to right the wrongs which still persisted in the Soviet Union, many first steps were taken under Khrushchev to remove the stain left by Stalin. One of Khrushchev's most dramatic steps

was the large-scale of freeing hundreds of thousands of political prisoners. Those disposed of earlier could only be rehabilitated posthumously: in 1936-39, according to Sakharov, more than 1,200,000 Communist Party members, or half of the total membership, were arrested, and of those only 50,000 regained freedom.

Other steps toward de-Stalinization were carried out in each major sector of Soviet society. In the cultural sphere, significant books and articles began to appear in the liberal press, particularly in the monthly Novy Mir (New World). These included Vladimir Dudintsev's novel Not by Bread Alone (1956), a number of Ilya Ehrenburg's thought-provoking essays (1957 through 1964), and Alexander Solzhenitsyn's politically momentous novel about Stalin's camps, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich (1962).

In the economy, Khrushchev attempted to decentralize management in order to break the bureaucracy's strangle hold on initiative. He abolished most of the old-line industrial ministries in 1957, and transferred many of their functions to regional economic councils. He also broke with Stalin's self-defeating chauvinism when he strongly encouraged Soviet engineers to study foreign techniques, especially American, and apply them in their own work.

In military policy, Khrushchev downgraded conventional arms in favor of missiles and nuclear weapons. (This policy also enabled Khrushchev to release military men from service at a time when the USSR was suffering labor shortages.)

Khrushchev ordered that the laws of the USSR be exhaustively studied, set up a commission to draft a new constitution to take the place of the unimplemented Stalin Constitution of 1936, and extended feelers to the outside world. Not only did Khrushchev and his leading associates travel widely throughout the world, but so did relatively large numbers of technical and cultural representatives of the USSR. Exchange programs were encouraged. Tourists became almost commonplace in major Soviet cities. Moreover, jamming of foreign radio broadcasts was almost completely halted.

In the political sphere Khrushchev scored some notable successes. He removed from the party's top ruling body most of the dead dictator's oldest accomplices; he exposed himself and his views to millions of Soviet citizens in his travels throughout the country (notably to farm areas); his frequent speeches were published; Central Committee meetings were publicized and the populace began to feel that their opinions were being considered by the country's leadership. Khrushchev was unsuccessful, however, in his move in November 1962 to divide the bulk of Communist Party functionaries into two groups, those concerned with industry and those concerned with agriculture, a move which antagonized and alarmed Party officials who had become set in the bureaucratic ways of Stalinism.

The changes of the de-Stalinization period, however, were superficial for Khrushchev, himself, remained a dictator and made use of the same

machinery built by Stalin. (The secret police was curbed primarily by agreement among the leadership that no one single leader should ever again be able to use the weapon to terrorize the Party as Stalin had done. The police remained just as vigilant, and potentially just as arbitrary and brutal, toward the ordinary citizen.) And unceasing resistance to de-Stalinization by entrenched officials was effective in restricting the actual scope of changes. Moreover, Khrushchev, who had himself served Stalin and was not free of the Stalinist taint, did not consistently press for changes. Thus, many aspects of de-Stalinization are remembered more as proposals, partly formed ideas, or attitudes than as accomplished acts. Nevertheless, the USSR of October 1964, when Khrushchev was overthrown, was a far different country from the USSR of March 1953, when Stalin died.

Khrushchev's ouster resulted in part from the Stalinists' resistance to change. After all, the key party, government and military leaders of 1964 were almost all appointed and advanced by Stalin in the 15 years between the Great Purges and his death. They had shown the aptitude and ability to survive the Stalinist system, and many feared that they would lose status in any other system. There were undoubtedly other reasons for ousting Khrushchev: he impulsively launched substantial programs without thoroughly airing them with his fellow Presidium members; he spoke intemperately and crudely, embarrassing many Soviet leaders; he posed a threat to the security of top military leaders; Soviet foreign relations had been a series of failures, such as the disastrous Cuban missile affair, the ever-worsening conflict with Communist Chinese leaders, and the weakening solidarity of the world Communist movement. Of immediate alarm to his opponents, he had made tentative plans to seek a detente with Bonn.

The new Kremlin leaders had united in opposing Khrushchev. There is little evidence, however, that they have subsequently been able to agree consistently on much else. Neither party boss Leonid Brezhnev, nor any of the other leaders has been able to establish his clear-cut primacy. One result of this situation has been top-level indecision in the USSR, an unusual circumstance for a Party boasting a monolithic structure.

In this circumstance, it is hardly surprising that the developments of the four years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime have been marked by increasing reversions to Stalinist mentality and practices. This pattern became evident soon after the new regime took over, and has been accentuated as the years have gone by. Criticism of Stalin's person and his mistakes virtually stopped within five months after Brezhnev and Kosygin displaced Khrushchev. Rehabilitations of Stalin's victims dwindled and, contrary to earlier practice, no longer mentioned Stalin's guilt or the euphemistic "period of the cult of the individual" when they exonerated "victims of false accusations" who had been "illegally repressed" or whose lives had been "tragically broken off."

The measure of the political climate in Moscow is perhaps most frequently taken from the state of affairs among the intelligentsia; this is

due to a number of factors, among them the relative volubility of this group, its access to westerners, and its quick reflection in the press, theater, and artistic styles. Therefore the infamous trial of the two Soviet writers Sinyavsky and Daniel in February 1966 was correctly viewed at the time as the harbinger of much more stringent controls over society. The pressure on Soviet citizens to toe the line gradually built up thereafter. Fewer and fewer truly creative works were published in the press, art shows of anything not conforming to the worst "socialist realism" were halted, travel to and cultural exchanges with foreign countries were gradually curtailed, Soviet tourists ceased traveling, etc.

By April 1968, not only had the de-Stalinization campaign come to a complete end, but a new period -- which can perhaps best be described as "Neo-Stalinism" -- began. The occasion was the plenum meeting of the Central Committee on 9-10 April at the end of which a communique was issued which warned of a "sharp aggravation of the ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism." The committee also warned against contact with foreigners -- even foreign Communists -- since any of them might be agents of capitalist subversion. This typically Stalinist xenophobia did not pass unnoticed. Brezhnev personally addressed the meeting, but his speech has never been released. Following the plenum meeting, Brezhnev -- who seemed to have taken charge of the new campaign against "foreign ideological subversion" -- and other top party leaders traveled throughout the country addressing party groups. It was evident from the speeches and statements during that period that the Soviet leadership was deeply concerned over widespread dissent within the Soviet Union and throughout the Soviet bloc. In the face of this mounting problem, however, their reaction, significantly, was to retreat into the cocoon of the safe, Stalinist practices of the past, however discredited, rather than to move ahead with new, progressive solutions to their problems.

A leading Swiss journalist has described Neo-Stalinism in the following terms:

"Neo-Stalinism is an attempt to restore the guidelines and methods of Stalinist rule which were condemned or modified after 1953 and to make them once again the foundation of Soviet policy. The neo-Stalinist turn signifies a return beyond the 20th Party Congress and a rejection of developments since then, including reform communism, recognition of the "individual road," and West-East coexistence. The opinion seems to prevail in present-day Soviet leadership that post-Stalinist policies did not produce the hoped-for successes and that reforms and coexistence only undermined the Soviet power base, while in Stalin's time there was "quiet and order" in the satellite empire and the Soviet government inspired fear and respect in the outside world."*

*"Czechoslovak Reforms Squashed by Soviet Neo-Stalinism," by Kux, Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 25 September 1968. The complete text of this outstanding article is attached.

The nature of the neo-Stalinist reaction which has set in is to be found in both major and minor incidents. Obviously the overwhelming evidence was given in the decision to invade Czechoslovakia. As Kux points out, this was actually a step not to correct a deviation, a counter-revolution that had already broken out, but rather a step to eliminate the possibility that something might happen. This act was based on the same reasoning employed by Stalin when he purged potential enemies of the Party -- before they had become such.

Among the major events in the re-emergence of Stalinism has been the lengthy series of political trials, some well known, but others totally unknown. The first and most sensational was the trial of Daniel and Sinyavsky in February 1966. Another, involving Alexander Ginzberg and three of his friends, took place in January 1968. The most recent case is that of Pavel Litvinov, Mme. Yuli Daniel and three others, which is mentioned below. However the publicity attending these trials should not be allowed to obscure the fact that literally dozens of other political trials have been held in what has been a growing wave of deliberate terrorism during the past three years. Occasional glimpses of the nature and extent of these trials are afforded by documents smuggled to the free world, as was the case in the Chornovil papers -- a series of documents by an imprisoned Ukrainian lawyer which have revealed a major wave of repression which swept across the Ukraine, beginning in 1965.

Pavel Litvinov, Mme. Daniel and their colleagues, most of whom had joined in earlier protests against the denial of freedom, demonstrated on 25 August in Red Square for a free and independent Czechoslovakia, for Czech-Soviet friendship, and against the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. They were beaten (one had four front teeth knocked out and looked so bad he was not included among those later tried semi-publicly) and locked up by plainclothesmen said to be KGB personnel. At the trial the courtroom was packed with spectators loudly hostile to the accused, while only a small number of close relatives of the accused were allowed in. The accused were peremptorily found guilty of disturbing public order, and even their closing statements were interrupted and disputed by the judge. Their sentences were up to three years at hard labor (for the poet Vadim Delone) and 5 years exile to an as yet unannounced location for Litvinov and Mme. Daniel. The manner in which this trial was conducted indicates that its basic purpose was to serve notice on Soviet citizens that no form of overt protest will be permitted. The semi-secrecy of the trial was designed to limit, to the extent possible, foreign repercussions.

One measure of the extent of re-Stalinization was provided by Mme. Daniel who described the reticence of those who hold divergent views but do not express them. She appeared to be criticizing those who play important roles in Soviet society and have made names for themselves, but fail to use the weight this gives them to state their dissent.

Dozens of less dramatic incidents may be cited exemplify the turn toward Stalinism, among them:

-- Soviet historiographers are sharply split in attempting to describe and explain events which occurred during Stalin's reign, such as the collectivization of agriculture. Typically, a book published in 1966 which denounced Stalin's mistakes in the collectivization was violently criticized in Questions of CPSU History No. 6 (June 1968). The attack implicitly absolves Stalin of all blame and even goes so far as to assert that collectivization "developed on a sound basis with observance of the principle of voluntariness."

-- In much the same sense, a recent book by General Shtemenko, The General Staff During the War, whitewashes the Soviet war record and in the process refurbishes Stalin's reputation as a wartime leader. It maintains that his military prowess and personal courage were exemplary and it attempts to minimize the culpability of Stalin and his coterie for the disasters that befell the Red Army in 1941.

-- The Red Army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda recently attacked the popular Taganka Theater and Theater magazine for their modernist view of the arts and recommended that the Taganka Theater produce more works by Mikhail Sholokhov, Alexander Fadeyev, Alexander Korneichuk and other pillars of Stalinist thought.

-- The invasion of Czechoslovakia was accompanied by a resumption of the jamming of BBC and Voice of America broadcasts, which had ceased five years earlier.

-- Sovetskaya Rossiya, of 4 October, devoted three columns to attacking Russian drama critic V. Kadrin for a book in which he had been "too favorable toward the contemporary theater, while dismissing works of the Stalin period.... There is no room for such views in Soviet art," the paper said.

-- The president of the Soviet Academy of Art, Nikolai V. Tomskey, wrote an article for Pravda, published 24 September, in which he severely criticized nonconformist artists who do not create in the school of "socialist realism." Even more significantly, he attacked persons who are members of exhibition committees who determine what is to be shown and who thus have life and death control over all Soviet art.

-- Work is underway on a new epic film about World War II in which Stalin is depicted as a "kindly, wise and trusted leader." This is the first major film portrayal of Stalin since "The Fall of Berlin," a hero-worship spectacular made shortly before Stalin's death in 1953.

Other examples will be found in the attached materials. While these examples appear to be relatively minor froth on the surface, they are in truth only surface manifestations of very major conflicts going on behind the locked doors of the Kremlin.

* * * * *

And where do the ordinary Soviet citizens stand on these issues? Again, one can only judge from the few instances of dissidence that come into view, such as the protests by a limited number of intellectuals in Red Square against the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It is hard to imagine that the peasant or the worker welcomes any return to Stalinism -- it was they who paid by far the highest toll for his despotism. One cannot help but think of the roughly parallel case of Czechoslovakia which only a short time ago was considered to be the most Stalinist of the satellites. However, when a real possibility of change came, the people unanimously stepped forward to hail the leaders who promised a total renunciation of the past.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

22 October 1968

Neo-Stalinism gains in Soviet Union

By Paul Wohl

Written for The Christian Science Monitor

A new political style now appears to hold sway in the Soviet Union — neo-Stalinism.

Behind it is a hard-line philosophy concerned with the greatness of the Soviet state and with the mission of its ruling party.

Neo-Stalinism has a modern, efficiency-conscious, flexible approach to policy formation and considers many of Stalin's methods archaic. But, by restoring Stalin to his historic role as a great leader and architect of the Soviet communism, neo-Stalinism pays tribute to the continuity of the Soviet state and sets up a barrier against criticism of the Communist Party.

The neo-Stalinists are believed to be dominant in the politbureau. Their spokesman is second party secretary Mikhail A. Suslov, he is seconded by trade-union chief Alexandr N. Shelpin, the politbureau's youngest member.

The politbureau's so-called Jkranian faction (Pyotr Y. Shelest, Nikolai V. Podgorny, Dmitri S. Polyansky) also is neo-Stalinist inclined. General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev is close to this group.

New line spelled out

The latest move of the neo-Stalinists on the domestic scene was the exoneration of Stalin of what was believed to have been his greatest blunder: his trust in Hitler and his neglect of Soviet defenses on the eve of the war.

The new line was spelled out in No. 12 of *Kommunist*, the leading political and theoretical journal of the party's central committee. There the history of the years from 1938 to 1941 was authoritatively rewritten by two historians of the neo-Stalinist school, V. Khvostov and A. Grilev. Dr. Vladimir M. Khvostov is the director of the institute of the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of the Academy of Sciences.

The thesis of the two authors is that the Soviets were not taken by surprise in June, 1941, that they never trusted the Nazis, and that they had used the time gained through the Stalin-Hitler pact for intensive war preparations. Consequently, the authors conclude, although numerically inferior to the Nazis, the Soviets entered the war under more favorable conditions than would have been the case at an earlier date.

Soviet war preparations, the authors recall, started at an early date. In 1930-1931 the war industry turned out 860 planes and 740 tanks. The corresponding figures in 1938 were 5,469 planes and 2,270 tanks.

Role of protector

Between 1939 and 1941 the Soviet war industry produced 17,000 planes and 7,600 tanks.

The Kremlin was ready to fight before Hitler attacked.

At the time of the Czechoslovak crisis in 1938, we are told, Moscow twice offered to go to war for Czechoslovakia—even if France would not fulfill her treaty obligations toward Prague. The first time, the authors say, was on April 26 in a speech by then President Mikhail I. Kalinin; the second was at the time of Munich when apparently Stalin informed Czechoslovak President Edward Beneš through the Czech Communist Party leader Klement Gottwald of the Soviet Union's readiness to fight on Czechoslovakia's side.

The authors omit to mention that at the time of Munich Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union had no common border; and that the 40 divisions and three tank corps which Moscow allegedly held in readiness would have had to cross Romanian territory in order to reach a remote and mountainous part of Czechoslovakia.

Western historians question the seriousness of Moscow's offer to fight. But the story of the offer has been revived of late in order to place the Soviet Union in the role of the providential protector of Czechoslovakia.

In elaborating this episode, the authors tend a bouquet to Stalin and accuse Mr. Beneš of having betrayed his people by refusing to fight.

Nonaggression pact explained

British and French offers to negotiate with the Soviet Union about a common defense against Hitler are pictured as deceptive. The alleged purpose of the offers was to involve the Soviet Union prematurely in a war with the Nazis without offering adequate guarantee of Western aid.

Only after reports of secret deals between London and Berlin had reached Moscow was the Soviet-Nazi Nonaggression Pact of August, 1939, concluded. Stalin, the authors assert, had no illusions about the pact:

"The Soviet Government never believed in the loyalty of the Nazis concerning the fulfillment of their [treaty] obligations," they write.

The entry of Soviet forces into Poland the following September is described as a "liberating move."

The period from then until June, 1941, is described as a time of "intensive Soviet war preparations to ward off imperialist aggression." Allocations for military needs were increased from 25.6 percent of the total budget in 1939 to 43.4 percent in 1941. In the first six months of 1941 the output of armaments rose by 15 percent.

The Army was overhauled, antiaircraft

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defenses reorganized. In June, 1941, the military schools had five times as many students as in 1937.

Quoting from the archives of the defense department the authors claim that large-scale mobilization started in the beginning of 1941. Part of the forces stationed in Siberia, in the Far East, and in the Urals were then transferred to the western border, and nearly 800,000 reservists called up.

According to the authors, the Soviets were well informed of Hitler's intentions—they did not need Churchill's warning—but they tried to the very end to delay the attack through diplomatic maneuvers in order to gain time.

Two mistakes admitted

Only two Soviet mistakes are admitted: the assumption that the armies could be placed on war footing within a few hours and belated transmission of the Kremlin's telephoned order to fight.

In this context the authors mention, in

passing, the "negative effects of the cult of personality and of unfounded repressions of the military and political cadres of the armed forces."

Although the odds were staked against them, the Soviets did not give in. "The party [meaning Stalin] took energetic measures to weld together the efforts of the front and of the rear to defeat the enemy. A State Defence Committee was formed under the chairmanship of I. V. Stalin."

This new reading of history is diametrically opposed to the carefully documented findings of Prof. Alexander M. Nekrich in his book "June 21, 1941." At the height of the Khrushchev era this book pinned the blame for the lack of preparations squarely on Stalin.

After Mr. Khrushchev's fall from power the neo-Stalinists counterattacked. In 1967 Professor Nekrich was expelled from the party, but for awhile his views still continued to gain recognition.

THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS

Izvestia Stands Foursquare for Socialist Realism in Art

Rejoinder: LIGHT AND SHADOWS. (By B. Shcherbakov, artist. *Izvestia*, Sept. 20, p. 4. Complete text:) The Art Publishing House has issued V. Antonova's "The State Tretyakov Gallery" in a large edition in the "Cities and Museums of the World" series. The book provides information about the famous art gallery, its history and social significance. It tells how the collection grew during Soviet years as works of Soviet art were added. The book is richly illustrated. All this promises the reader an interesting acquaintance with the genuine masterpieces of this national treasure-house. But as he gets deeper into the book, a sense of puzzlement and disillusionment grows in connection with the treatment of the work of individual artists and the tendentious selection of the illustrations.

One would expect the gallery's most important works of art to be chosen for illustrations. But the book does not contain reproductions of works of Soviet art that have become classics, such as Ioganson's "At an Old Urals Factory" and "Interrogation of Communists," the Kukryniksy canvas "The End," Nesterov's "Portrait of Academician I. G. Pavlov," the paintings of Grekov and Brodsky or sculptures by Mukhina, Shadr, Kononov, Vuchetich and Tomsky. On the other hand, insignificant works, remote from realism, are reproduced. The writer tries to give a vivid presentation of works of the modernist trend. For example, Kandinsky's canvas "Vagueness" is reproduced in color, whereas many splendid works of classical Russian art and Soviet art appear in black and white.

The principle by which the works of prominent artists were chosen also seems strange. Out of the whole rich heritage of M. V. Nesterov, why was his pastebcard "The Birth of Christ," painted in 1891, reproduced, but not a single work of the Soviet period of his activity? The selection of works of the wonderful artist Konchalovsky also causes chagrin. Our contemporaries know very well that most of his paintings were produced in Soviet times. But his work is represented among the illustrations by the far from best still life "Dry Paint," produced in 1913!

It is utterly incomprehensible why such masterpieces by Valentin Serov as "Girl With Peaches" or "Portrait of Mika Morozov" were ignored, whereas his copies of ikons were presented.

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One of the important distinctive features of Soviet art is its multinational character. Yet the book reproduces paintings only of Russian Republic artists. An exception has been made only for the Azerbaidzhanian Salakhov. Where are the artists of other republics—Saryan, Nikoladze, Azgur, Mikenas, Shovkunenko, Salkalns, Tansykbayev, Dzhaparidze, Yablon-skaya, and many others?

It is hard to agree with the interpretation of individual movements in art. It is widely known, for instance, that Kazimir Malevich rejected the representational principle in art and was a follower of abstractionism. But the writer of the book says, not without sympathy, that Malevich "sought to convey in art empty space, endlessness, trajectories inhabited by visible but weightless substance" and emphasized Malevich's great popularity among adherents of abstract art.

The legitimate question arises: What guided the publishing house in issuing such a book?

Our Thoughts and Disputes: LIFE IS THE SOURCE OF CREATIVITY. (By U.S.S.R. People's Artist Yu. Vuchetich. *Izvestia*, Sept. 21, p. 2. Complete text:) One morning I gathered a bouquet of peonies in the garden. The white flowers with the soft pink spots gave off the most subtle fragrance. I placed the bouquet in a vase before the mirror. It was an early morning in summer. The sun penetrated the room through the green crowns of tall trees. The sunlight seemed to take on the fresh colors of the outdoors. The peonies, reflected twice, in the mirror and in the sunlit window pane, suddenly glowed with such color that I forgot everything as I stood looking at them.

At that moment one of my artist friends came to visit me. I showed him the peonies and he, like myself, froze in delight.

We stood in worshipful silence before this beauty. Finally I asked him to take canvas and paint this bouquet in the whole gamut of colors created by the light and the reflections in mirror and window pane.

But my friend was silent and hung his head. What was wrong? Had I offended him somehow? Then he said:

"I can't. I can't convey all this beauty. I have forgotten how. If I were to try, the peonies would fade while I searched for the right combination of colors."

I believed him. A fine painter, talented, yet he had lost the ability. What had happened?

Let us not hide the fact that the demands on the artist's mastery have declined; we have begun to regard hack work with tolerance.

But this is not all.

Some artists' searches have drowned in floods of short-lived "fashionable" trends, have dissolved in them and acquired an overall grey and inexpressive tone. Shallowness of theme swallowed up other artists; it broke down, mixed up and confused the criteria we set for art. Man with his individual diversity and beauty began to disappear from their paintings, and even the background, the "architectural structure" and so on, entered the paintings only as an external indication of the times. For the image of man, left undisclosed, did not show the signs of the times, not to mention expressive social class signs.

The impatient desire of some to "criticize," "to expose," began to spread. Artistry became secondary to satire on canvas.

A noisy pseudo-artistic milieu reveled in portrayals of everyday scenes; genre superficiality was presented as a discovery, as the birth of the art of "the little man." The insignificant personality was counterposed to the purposeful, heroic personality. And for this purpose they invented conflicts between "the little man" and "the huge, cold world," in which individuality allegedly is suppressed by the collective.

In a related art, the art of the cinema, neorealism, a much talked of trend, one that evidently had some progressive significance in the conditions of Italy, became popular in this period. To spy upon "real life" with the eye of the movie camera and record the picture with photographic preciseness became the goal of such cinematographers. Not to mention those who, with amazing persistence, kept dragging us into

applicable to such a concept as realism. Incidentally, why "neorealism"? Why is it new? Had the old realism of L. Tolstoy and Balzac exhausted itself? Or, for example, had the realism of Repin and Surikov somehow sinned against art? And was the conflict of "the little man" with society new to art? Let us be more precise: with capitalist society! No, there was nothing new in this conflict. The Italians in the cinema were following a long and well explored path, the path of showing what bourgeois society and the crazy world of fear and desperation does to man and his feelings and aspirations. But some people were overjoyed at this "discovery" of the neorealists and in our country too dashed off in search of the conflict of the "common man," the "little man," with society. With which society? With the society of this same person who was described as "common" and "little." There never were "common" and "little" people, only people; each person constitutes a huge world of feelings and thoughts, for "man is the greatest of the marvels he has created."

For some reason at our artists' meetings we began to talk little of the heroic nature of Soviet man, of creating his image in art. It is by no means a matter of mechanically borrowing the Italian "neorealists'" method. If it were only that! Philistinism overwhelmed some artists, and ugliness in all its unexpected varieties took the place of the beauty of the world around us.

But the best artists of socialist art did indeed create masterpieces that amazed the world with the majesty of the accomplishments and wealth of spirit of the new man.

Their work opened up a new era in the artistic development of mankind, they portrayed deeply and truthfully the birth, development and victory of the socialist social system. In images of enormous ideological and emotional power, images that educated the broad masses, Soviet artists affirmed the communist ideal. I shall not mention the names of the best of our artists—there are many of them.

Soviet artists created a highly artistic gallery, vast in scope, of typical images of Soviet people, a chronicle of their heroic deeds. And when we speak now of those who are falling into hack work and shallowness of theme or unthinkingly chasing after each latest zigzag of the silly Western art fashions, we have in mind, of course, only a few carriers of unhealthy trends in our artistic milieu.

Genuinely progressive art, capable of retaining its significance for centuries, was always lofty in mastery and deeply human in content, filled with thoughts and aspirations of mankind and concern for man.

Great writers and artists have always understood that art never left man's side, always corresponded to his needs and his ideal, always helped him in pursuit of this ideal—was born with man and developed along with his historical life.

Who of us does not remember "Chapayev," the famous film made by the Vasilyevs? These directors created an image of a hero that even our ill-wishers applauded. Or in art: "Lenin the Leader," "Lenin on the Platform" "At an Old Urals Factory," "Transportation Being Set in Order," "Interrogation of Communists," "The Sentry," "Worker and Collective Farm Woman"—there is enough in these canvases to show the face of our artistic culture, which is counterposed to modern decadent bourgeois art.

But let us return to the discussion of so-called "new" trends, whatever names they bear. Do we see in them the humanistic ideals of the era, its heroic content? Has time been merciful toward the "inspired" discoveries in the style of the "new trends" that were at first greeted with extraordinary fuss, with tremendous pretensions and with chagrin at nonrecognition? What has remained of them in the memory of the people?

With amazing wastefulness and with the bitterness of petty nihilists, people who called themselves artists trampled on beauty and rejected even what ancient Hellas had left them as a heritage. They even hastened to replace the beauty of man's body, its plasticity and perfection, with angular features, putting outrageous images on shameless display and thereby opening the gates to bad taste. Some lost themselves in the flood of short-lived trends or simply became confused by the diversity of the world around them. The very colors on these

trophied disproportions that even artists of the stone age were ashamed of.

In the age of thermonuclear reactions, supersonic speeds and the conquest of outer space, some artists suddenly turned out to be on the periphery of society's life.

It seems to me that this is because, in the pursuit of supposed innovation and cheap success, they somehow forgot about the chief function of art: to look into the soul of its contemporary, the fighter and builder of the new life; to look deep, as deep as our times demand.

In a half century man has matured by a century, yet we still cannot portray this suitably. How will we render account to posterity? It is generally recognized that the flourishing of the personality is judged not from formless lumps but from lofty artistic images that disclose the concepts of beauty and harmony.

Who is he, the hero of our Soviet times? The worker, whose hands create the material benefits of socialist society! The collective farmer, growing the grain for our daily bread! The Soviet soldier, who cleansed the world of fascism! The scientist splitting the atomic nucleus, the surgeon operating on the human heart! Apparently no one would object to calling them heroes. But how are they to be portrayed? After all, they are utterly incompatible with shallowness of theme. What is more, the heroic is difficult! For worthy portrayal of our contemporary one needs far-from-exhausted potentialities of art, one needs all the richness and diversity of color. But not only this. One must also be able to rise to the level of the hero, to penetrate his spirit, to be able to read and reflect his huge and complicated inner world. "Neo" does not help here. No comma shapes, not even a comma of wild color superimposed on a chaotic intersection of lines and spots, can substitute for the image of our contemporary; it cannot substitute for the depth of his thought, his courage and, finally, his beauty!

Raphael's "Sistine Madonna" has been attracting pilgrims for several centuries. This painting has only (only!) beauty. The beauty of maternal love, maternal tenderness, eternal femininity, disclosed with an amazing palette and virtuosity in handling this palette.

Leonardo da Vinci loved to tell his pupils the story of the razor. A ray of light once struck the razor, and the latter saw its reflection in a mirror. It was delighted with how it looked and complained at having to shave men's coarse beards. The razor was offended that its brilliant blade had to be sharpened on a rough whetstone, strapped and honed. It decided to hide. Time passed, and eventually the razor managed to see its reflection again. But the blade no longer shone, it was eroded with coarse rust and had become as rough-edged as a saw.

It was no accident that this story sprang from the artist's imagination. As long as art serves a lofty idea and its noble purpose of helping people to make our life beautiful, it does not lose its shine and it glistens as the sun. This is exactly how the art of socialist realism is.

Oct. 6, 1968 THE WASHINGTON POST

Soviets Intensify Crackdown On Own Cultural 'Heretics'

By Anatole Shub

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Oct. 5—Soviet Communist critics, seeking to restore the "monolithic" political and cultural unity of the early 1950s, have been lashing out at heretics in Russia itself as well as in Czechoslovakia and the world Communist movement.

The "vigilance" campaign begun in April and temporarily slowed during the summer

holidays, has resumed with vigor. In addition to China, Yugoslavia and long-favored targets in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet press is probing deeper in exposing unacceptable "deviations."

Today's Pravda contained a long attack on Ernest Fischer, the Austrian Communist theoretician and Marxist philosopher.

"Among the ranks of Communist Party members anywhere," Pravda said, "a person

who stood so close to the crudest inventions of imperialist propaganda concerning the 'occupation' of Czechoslovakia."

For Krasnaya Zvezda, the army paper, the targets were the lively Taganka Theater and Theater magazine.

"Art and politics, the truth of life and Communist Party-mindedness—these aspects of socialist esthetics are indissolubly bound together," the paper declared. It recommended that the Taganka Theater produce more works

by Mikhail Sholokhov, Alexander Fadeyev, Alexander Korneichuk and other stalwarts of the Stalin period.

The foreign affairs weekly *Za Rubezhom* takes after the Czechoslovak press, in addition to Yugoslav and Western publications. The Soviet weekly attacks the satirical magazine *Rogac* and *Dikobraz*, the Bratislava dailies *Pravda* and *Smena*, the Kosice daily *Vychodoslovenske Noviny*, the Moravian paper *Nova Svobodna*, as well as Czechoslovak theaters and publishing houses.

Friday's *Sovietskaya Rossiya* devoted three columns to a Russian drama critic, V. Kad-

rin, for a book "The Dignity of Art." Kadrin had been too favorable toward the *Savremennik* (contemporary) theater and other cultural phenomena, while dismissing works of the Stalin period.

"There is no room for such views in Soviet art," the newspaper said—urging greater attention to Vsevolod Kochetov, Anatoly Sofronov, Korneichuk and other Stalinist and neo-Stalinist authors.

For the party theoretical monthly *Kommunist*, the targets were two philosophers, Y. A. Milner-Irinin and P. M. Egides, whose contributions to a recent symposium on ethics

were found to be permeated with "anarchist idealism" and Kantian views. *Kommunist* was extremely critical of the Department of Ethics at Tbilisi University, which sponsored the symposium and "permitted the publication of theoretically erroneous materials."

A long quotation from Milner-Irinin provides a hint of the views underlying all these objectionable heresies.

"Ethics," he writes, "is far from being the science of what is, has been and will be . . . It is the only science which concerns what, in the moral consciousness of mankind, should be."

THE WASHINGTON POST

Friday, Oct. 18, 1968

Yugoslav Reds Fear Soviet Period of Neo-Stalinism

By Anatole Shub

Washington Post Foreign Service

BELGRADE, Oct. 17—Yugoslav Communists fear the Soviet Union has entered what may be a long period of neo-Stalinism which will permit neither Czechoslovak reformers nor other independent-minded forces in Eastern Europe much room for maneuver.

Despite Moscow's promise eventually to remove most of its occupation army from Czechoslovakia, qualified sources here believe the Soviet aim is to reduce that country to the status of East Germany, Poland and Bulgaria—without even the degree of cultural freedom and economic reform achieved by Hungary in recent years.

The Soviet aim, it is said here, is to make Czechoslovakia an object lesson for other Communist parties and peoples in Eastern Europe who might contemplate embarking on political or economic experimentation without full Kremlin clearance. The lesson, directed primarily now at independence-minded Rumania and internally moderate Hungary, is that states which rebel can expect harsher treatment than those which remain 100 per cent loyal to Moscow.

With the signing yesterday in Prague of a treaty legitimizing the "temporary" stationing of Soviet troops, the Kremlin has already achieved one of its initial goals in Czechoslovakia. The next step is to obtain a statement from Czechoslovak authorities that there was a danger of "counterrevolution" in August which justified the Soviet intervention.

Observers here believe that continuous Soviet pressure on Prague will produce such a statement in a matter of weeks or, at most, a few months.

These formalities are needed by Moscow in order to bring back into line the West European Communist parties which condemned the invasion. The Kremlin still hopes to stage a world summit conference of loyal parties to consolidate pro-Soviet ranks. Some 65 parties had originally agreed to hold such a conference in Moscow on Nov. 25, but Western Communist protests over the occupation of Czechoslovakia forced a postponement.

While pressing Prague for justification of the invasion, the Soviet Party has also

key Western parties whose ranks are split over the Czechoslovak events.

In the French, Italian and Finnish parties, an estimated 20 to 30 per cent of the leadership disagreed originally with their parties' condemnation of the invasion. The Soviet Party has made clear its readiness to split these parties if need be, and is reported also to have withheld funds on which these parties are in large measure dependent.

The Italian Party, in a Central Committee plenary meeting this week, is discussing for the first time whether it should make the break for genuine independence of Moscow. The outcome of the discussion is uncertain, but compromise and delay are in the Italian tradition.

However the Italians decide, it is now considered likely that the next international Communist preparatory meeting, to be held in Budapest on Nov. 17, will agree in principle to a conference early next year, without setting a precise date.

Such a conference would deal with "common tasks in the struggle against imperialism" and would not discuss Czechoslovakia. It

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Chinese and Yugoslav heretics, reaffirm the hard Soviet line on the German and Mideast questions, and proclaim collectively the Kremlin thesis that "sharpening" of the struggle against the West requires strengthening of supranational control both in the East European bloc and in the International Communist movement.

By the time such a conference is held next spring, the Soviet Union expects to have the Czechoslovak Party well in hand. Already, such collaborators as Alois Indra and Vasil Bilak—ostracized for weeks by the Czechoslovak progressives—are sitting in on meetings of the Czechoslovak leadership. Old Stalinists like Anton Kapek and Karel Mestek have organized a hard-line pressure group on the outside.

At the same time, the process of undermining the unity of the original reformers is expected to continue, as occupied Czechoslovakia tends to be abandoned by the outside world and especially by the foreign Communist parties.

Czechoslovakia's popular National Assembly President, Josef Smrkovsky, is high on the Soviet purge list and his resignation or dismissal is considered merely a matter of time. Party leader Alexander Dubcek has been placed in an impossible position. If he resigns,

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

13 June 1968

Soviet trend?

Stalin again praised

By Paul Wohl

Written for *The Christian Science Monitor*

Once again, Stalin is being honored in the Soviet Union, albeit cautiously.

Although no one talks of the Stalin cult of personality any longer there are indications that it is being revived.

An otherwise undistinguished young poet, Feliks Chuyev, who published a poem glorifying Stalin and publicly demanded: "Put Stalin back on his pedestal," received a medal for distinguished work on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the revolution. He is also said to have been expelled from the mission to travel abroad.

Moscow is spared the trouble of contriving his dismissal. If he stays and executes Moscow's harsh terms, he loses popularity among the Czechs and Slovaks—and can then more easily be discarded later, as one source here puts it, "like a squeezed lemon."

Despite the surface unity displayed in Prague thus far, differences in view have already emerged among the reformers, and there are fears that with continued Soviet pressure Prime Minister Oldrich Cernik and possibly President Ludvik Svoboda may yet be induced to collaborate with a new Soviet-controlled Party leadership of the Indra-Bilak type.

As for differences within the Soviet leadership concerning Czechoslovakia, sources here maintain that these were not disagreements over principle but only over timing and tactic. Premier Kosygin, ideologist Mikhail Suslov, trade union chief Alexander Shelepin, Deputy Premier Dmitry Polyansky and Party Secretary Boris Ponomarev argued against the invasion of Aug. 20. None of them did so, however, out of sympathy for the Czechoslovak experiment or belief in the independence of small nations. (Yugoslav leaders are now recalling for the first time in years the fate of the Baltic republics incorporated by Russia in 1940).

Instead, the reputed Kremlin doves either cited the difficult repercussions which might be expected in the West and in the Communist movement—or argued that further attempts should be made to halt the Czechoslovak democratization by political pressures "short of war" before turning to the last resort of the Red Army.

Yugoslav observers believe the present Soviet Central Committee to be dominated by long-entrenched Stalinist and neo-Stalinist bureaucrats governed largely by fear for their own positions.

These stalwarts of the Party apparatus, the army and the political police fear that even the slightest attempt at internal democratization, economic reform or relaxation of tensions with the West would open a Pandora's box and jeopardize their entire system.

Under such conditions, little hope is seen here of meaningful East-West dialogue in the near future. Contrary to some Western diplomatic assessments, qualified Yugoslavs believe that Russia is not at all interested in an early settlement of the Middle East problem, but would prefer to keep the pot boiling for five or six years—time enough to establish a solid Soviet military and economic presence in Mediterranean Sea.

Grigory Svirsky, a well-known novelist, was excluded from the Communist Party because of a speech he made before a Moscow writers meeting on Jan. 16, in which he attacked censorship and complained, "Everything that seeks to overcome the fatal consequences of the cult of personality is burned out with a red-hot iron. One sometimes is not even allowed to mention that the cult of personality existed."

Party expulsion hinted

The critic and essayist Lev Kopelev, who in December, in the Austrian Communist journal *Tagebuch* attacked those Soviet writers who glorify Stalin, also is said to have been expelled from the

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party.

The rehabilitation of Stalin has spread to military writings. In February, even *Kommunist*, magazine of the Central Committee, gave credit to Stalin for having "taken part in organizing the struggle against white guardists" and for having had a big stake in winning World War II.

Far more serious than such indications of the party leadership's attempt to restore Stalin to a distinguished place in history is the reaction of much of the people at large.

When Defense Minister Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, in a speech on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Red Army on Feb. 23, mentioned Stalin's role as chairman of the State Defense Committee, he was interrupted by loud applause. When reminiscing about the war, many older people often raise toasts to Stalin, not only in the late dictator's native Georgia but all over the Soviet Union.

Secret police glorified

Hand in hand with a renewed Stalin cult goes the glorification of the state security services, formerly called the secret police. A theater play by Sergei Mikhalkov, which was favorably reviewed by *Pravda* and *Red Star*, the daily of the armed forces, referred to secret police agents or Chekists as "those admirable people, courageous, intrepid, heroic, true knights without fear and reproach."

No wonder that the Soviets are disturbed about Czechoslovakian periodicals implicating Stalin's friend, former Soviet President Mikoyan, in the Czech trials of the early fifties and the honoring of Stalin's victims.

Mr. Svirsky, in his speech before the Moscow writers, singled out a novel by V. Zakhrutin among the works rehabilitating Stalin. It appeared last year in the conservative journal *Oktyabr*.

"Do not tackle [the] Stalin [problem]," says Mr. Zakhrutin's positive hero. "We know why Stalin got stuck in your throat. . . . Because he defended the ideas of Lenin and cut short all attempts to betray him."

'Loyal and dedicated'

"Who knows, perhaps prison, exile, the solitude of the taiga (Siberian forest), the cold and hunger which he endured, hardened his soul, made his brusque and rude, but he was loyal and dedicated to Lenin like a soldier. With all his strength and will power he defended Lenin's teachings against the rabble of the opposition and watched over the purity and discipline of the party."

Another example of Stalin idolatry are the verses of the well-known writer Sergei Smirnov, in the journal *Moskva* of last October. "It was Stalin who, in the years of trial, did not leave his command post. And we, legitimately, honored in him our own strength. . . ."

All this, complained Mr. Svirsky, goes on "with the approval of Glavlit [the censorship office]. . . . Anyone who praises Stalin is encouraged. . . . Critics of the survival of the [Stalinist] past are told 'One must not stir up the past, one must not open up old wounds etc.'"

CZECHOSLOVAK REFORMS SQUASHED BY SOVIET NEO-STALINISM

[Article by Kx; Zurich, *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, German, 25 September 1968, pp 1, 2]

The intervention in Czechoslovakia has clearly brought out a fundamental reorientation in the Soviet "general line." Against the background of the invasion of Prague, we can now detect the most profound changes in Soviet policies since Stalin's death. Czechoslovakia wanted to catch up with the "de-Stalinization" ushered in by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 at a very late date because it had missed this opportunity in 1956; on the other hand, the exact opposite development in the Soviet Union has brought a return to the formerly criticized totalitarian methods of rule and Stalin's ideological dogmas. The irreconcilability of these two development tendencies -- away from "Stalinism" in Prague, back to "Stalinism" in Moscow -- constituted the basis for the tensions between the Czechoslovak and the Soviet leaderships and inescapably led to an attempt to resolve the situation by force. There was quite obviously much more at stake here for the Soviet leadership than the new forward-strategy of the Warsaw Pact and quarantine measures against the revisionist source of infection, that is to say, the fundamental decision on the future "general line" of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030013-2

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of world communism, and a qualitative change in the European balance of power, but it also signified the first phase of an upheaval in Soviet policy with as yet unforeseeable consequences.

Counter-Reform Movement

Since Khrushchev's overthrow in October 1964, there has been a silent "de-Khrushchevization movement" parallel to the beginning of a "re-Stalinization." These tendencies of course were not expressed in any fundamental and comprehensively political and theoretical manner, such as the dramatic turn away from the Stalin era in Khrushchev's secret speech and in the resolutions of the 20th Party Congress, something which was done under the aegis of neo-Leninism. The changes since 1964 were sneaked in through the back door in that a veil of complete oblivion was spread over Khrushchev and his era, while a more positive evaluation of the Stalin era was undertaken and while the list of sins of 1956 was increasingly ignored. This creeping re-Stalinization burst into open neo-Stalinism after the 9 and 10 April 1968 CC Plenum, when hitherto rejected theories of Stalin were once again upgraded. This involved not only a better evaluation of the Stalin era, a rehabilitation of Stalin and other problems of coping with the past, but it also involved the development of new ideological perspectives and of the future political line.

Neo-Stalinism is an attempt to restore the guidelines and methods of Stalinist rule which were condemned or modified after 1953 and to make them once again the foundation of Soviet policy. The neo-Stalinist turn signifies a return beyond the 20th Party Congress and a rejection of developments since then, along with reform communism, recognition of the "individual road" and West-East coexistence. The opinion seems to prevail in present-day Soviet leadership that post-Stalinist policies did not produce the hoped-for successes and that reforms and coexistence only undermined the Soviet power base, while at Stalin's time there was "quiet and order" in the satellite empire and the Soviet government inspired fear and respect in the outside world.

This attitude so far has not produced any actual restoration of Stalin's "old regime" with permanent purges, secret police terror, and slave labor camps. In addition to the jingoistic and anti-Semitic relics which have been swept forward again, neo-Stalinism -- like most counter-reform movements -- also contains modernistic and dynamic features. By falling back on tried methods, the Moscow neo-Stalinists want to extricate the country from the stagnations of reforms, from the decay of the economy and society, and from the corruption of constant compromises; they want to alter the status quo and they want once again to restore "order" at home and power and hegemony abroad. For this purpose, they have upgraded the decisive ideological, political, and military dogmas from Stalin's textbook more in spirit than in the letter and they have combined these dogmas into a new "general line" which is by no means identical with Stalin's line. His methods and teachings are today being applied more roughly, more brutally, and more uninhibited than the sly and coolly calculating Stalin himself used to do or the way he would have done it now in similar situations. The neo-Stalinist renegades obviously are also lacking in stature and capability so that they cannot step into Stalin's shoes without creating a danger to themselves and to the rest of the world.

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The most visible outward sign of this Stalinist reaction is the increased secrecy and concealment of Soviet policy, such as it was customary prior to 1953. There is no more Giuseppe Boffa to recount the internal secrets of the Kremlin and the CIA likewise does not so far seem to have succeeded in getting its hands on the texts of Brezhnev's secret speeches to the April and July Plenums. Once again one must read between the lines, one must sift through ideological tracts, and one must listen for indirect signals.

Just how severe the current about-face is and just how radical the revocation of the 20th Party Congress really is can be seen from a contribution in the Party journal Komunist, No 12, on the outbreak of World War II. In the past, Hitler's attack on Russia and Stalin's behavior in 1941 were a debated key topic of "de-Stalinization" and only recently did Soviet historian Nekrich in his heavily attacked book The 22nd of June 1941 document and criticize the mistakes on the basis of sources. This historical dispute has always constituted a concealment of present-day clashes. The interpretation of Stalin's failure in 1941, which so far has been accepted even in official histories, has now been turned upside down in Komunist by key Party historian V. Khvostov and his associate A. Grilav.

They now assert that the Party and the Soviet leadership (they mention Stalin by name only twice) from the very beginning did not trust in the pact with Hitler and used the time between 1939 and 1941 as a breather, for the expansion of Soviet armament. Stalin supposedly was right when he avoided the danger of a two-front war in Europe and in the Far East through his pact with Hitler. The Soviet Union supposedly strictly carried out this agreement and tried to stop the attack with diplomatic means until the very last. The Soviet leadership allegedly was informed on Hitler's attack preparations -- something that has so far been doubted and challenged by Soviet historians, military men, and writers -- and did take the necessary precautions. The blame for the outbreak of World War II is placed entirely on the Western governments. With the conclusion that the Soviet leadership 30 years ago foresaw the "imperialist attack" and took the correct countermeasures, the authors are now concentrating on current matters through a revision of the image of Stalin. By the way, this essay draws a parallel between the antecedents of World War II and present-day developments. Although the article went to print on 12 August, it reads as if it were an announcement and justification of the capture of Prague.

Preventive Purge

More frightening than the threadbare justification of Soviet intervention in Prague is the reappearance of the Stalinist concept of preventive punishment used in this connection. It was not a "counter-revolution" that had already broken out -- as it was alleged in Hungary in 1956 -- but rather the danger of a threatening "counterrevolution," in other words, a possible and not a real deviation, that was to be liquidated. This is exactly the same argumentation that was used for Stalin's purges which were directed against all possible and potential "enemies of the Party." The thought scheme of total suspicion, which determined the charges and the explanation of the sentences handed down during the Moscow trials, returned with dangerous threat in the a

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 tured as "right-wing revisionist traitors" and accomplices of Mao and of the Western imperialists.

With the allegation of a counterrevolutionary danger in Czechoslovakia, there has now been wiped out as inapplicable a thesis set up by Khrushchev according to which the East Bloc countries have already progressed so far on the road to communism that a relapse into capitalism has become impossible. This ideological justification of a "Communist commonwealth" of Communist countries with equal rights, moving along "their own road," has now been replaced with the old Comintern formula of Stalin according to which all parties must take the CPSU as a model and prove their loyalty to the line by giving Moscow unconditional support. This demand is already being waved in front of all parties that dare criticize the capture of Prague. Not even in theory does Moscow want any more "sister nations" and equal partners in world communism; instead, it wants powerless tools and satellites, as in Stalin's time.

Revival of Class Struggle

This new "Stalinism without Stalin" is in the process of replacing the reformist theory of "the Party and the state of the entire people" in the 1961 Party Program with the outdated thesis of the "class struggle in socialist society," as this has already been done by Party Secretary Demichev in Komunist (No 10, 10 July). Stalin and Molotov were blamed for this class struggle theory on the occasion of the rehabilitation of their victims in 1956. The reappearance of this thesis as to the continuing class struggle is a signal for a domestic-policy hardening and challenges all of the past reform endeavors. Here we also find one of the decisive causes of the Czechoslovak crisis: while the Czechoslovak CP with its action program and statute draft was tying in with Khrushchev's 1961 and 1962 Party reforms and while it wanted to develop these reforms radically, the CPSU revoked these reforms and is now once again trying to reintroduce the old-style strict Party order. In this connection, the dispute between the Soviet reformers and the neo-Stalinists was continued via the polemic with Prague.

Although neo-Stalinist theory and practice have not yet been canonized by a Party Congress and although it is still disputed among the leadership and in the Party, it nevertheless increasingly influences the Soviet scene and promises little that is good for the future. The reimposed formulas of "class struggle" and "counterrevolution" alone would rather seem to point to convulsions and tensions, certainly not to a restoration of "calm and order." Another thing that sounds ominous is the repeated hint at a ban on the formation of fractions and on a return to Party discipline, something which Stalin used to keep bringing up during the power struggles and purges.

This theoretical and practical development of neo-Stalinism is undoubtedly backed up by forces that want to push their power aspirations through. The last consequence of neo-Stalinism would actually be a return to one-man rule. The present "collective leadership" under Brezhnev and Kosygin did grow up under Stalin and was molded by the Stalin era, but it is on the other hand closely tied in with the Khrushchev era and the reform endeavors. The real protagonists of neo-Stalinism would appear to be found in the "Ukrainian Mafia," the "young Turks," and the ambitious military leaders who do not necess-

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arily constitute a compact fraction and who need not necessarily pursue identical objectives. But in the history of the Bolshevik Party a sudden upheaval, such as it now seems to emerge with the neo-Stalinist about-face, was always connected with personnel changes at the top.

Confrontation Instead of Coexistence

Anyone who today continually reads the Soviet press and theoretical treatises on foreign policy will feel as if he were back in the Cold War during the late 40's. Corresponding to the revived thesis of the continuing class struggles within the Communist countries we now have the assumption of growing international tensions between the two camps. This fatal dialectic has already been used against the Czechoslovak "counterrevolution," when an alleged cooperation between "class enemies" in Czechoslovakia and foreign "imperialists" was construed. Since the Resolutions of the April Plenum demanded increased defense against "subversive imperialist propaganda," we find that a "continuing contrast between the socialist and the imperialist camp" is being emphasized increasingly clearly in the Soviet Union. Very quietly and hardly noticed, there has been a return to the theory of the "two camps" which was set up by Zhdanov, in 1947 and the image of "imperialist encirclement" was recalled through the tie-in between the Vietnam War, the Israeli campaign, "West German revenge-mongering" and the allegedly "aggressive NATO plans."

The Stalinist conflict theory has been expanded and aggravated inasmuch as there is now not only talk of a threat of force from the outside; in addition, the real threat is considered to reside in the internal softening which has been promoted by peaceful means, in other words, in the form of Johnson's "bridge building" and Bonn's Eastern policy. Conjuring up a "foreign enemy" to justify internal suppression is now turning into a much more offensive effort, in combination with expressions of the arrogance of power and the expansion drive. The neo-Stalinists in the Kremlin seem to have less inhibitions and a greater readiness to take risks than their re-awakened model Stalin.

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