


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December 1968

IS A SPLIT DEVELOPING BETWEEN PEKING AND HANOI?

Observers of the Far East scene are concluding with increasing assurance that Hanoi and Peking are having their differences and that the differences are even more deep-seated than those that would arise naturally from their long term donor-dependent relationship. There is considerable direct evidence of serious quarrels, such as their openly opposed stands on certain major issues and the increasingly polemical turn of their public references to one another. There is other evidence which can most logically be explained in terms of a quarrel between the two countries, such as the withdrawal of Chinese technicians and military personnel from North Vietnam, and the prolonged absences of North Vietnam's diplomatic personnel from Peking.

Divided Views Over Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia

The most significant recent example of serious differences between Hanoi and Peking occurred when the two nations took diametrically opposite views on the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Hanoi leapt in immediately to give unqualified support to the USSR, even going so far as to repeat verbatim the lengthy TASS justification of the invasion. This move gave Hanoi a black eye not just in the free world, but also in the view of leftist organizations which ordinarily support Hanoi in the Vietnam war. Moreover, Hanoi's support for Moscow has estranged her from the great majority of the fraternal Communist parties which strongly condemned the USSR. Hanoi's endorsement of the Soviet action may be an indication that she has decided to follow Soviet rather than Chinese leadership of the world Communist movement; it could be that Moscow had extracted from Hanoi a promise of support for an action the USSR knew would bring down world censure; it could be that Hanoi hoped the invasion would put a crimp in any possible U.S.-USSR detente, or that Czechoslovakia's fate would bring Moscow's Eastern European satellites into line on other issues, including more help to Hanoi. It is possible that Hanoi's decision was primarily based on ideological grounds since the Lao Dong, as one of the most conservative ruling Communist parties in the world, would rejoice to see the stamping out of what it undoubtedly viewed as dangerous revisionist tendencies on the part of Czechoslovakia.

As for China's view of the attack on Czechoslovakia, CHOU En-lai and a number of China's leaders used North Vietnamese National Day celebrations to criticize Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and to flail Hanoi for her defense of the Soviet move. Peking was not by any means defending the down-trodden, out-powered Czechs; she was merely taking another opportunity to excoriate her erstwhile ally, Moscow, and to charge that the invasion is evidence of a Soviet-U.S. bargain on "spheres of influence" giving Moscow a free hand in Eastern Europe in return for a U.S. free hand in Southeast Asia. Whatever the reasons for Hanoi's and Peking's respective defense and attack on Moscow, the drama of Czechoslovakia revealed a definite schism between these formerly closeknit allies.

Paris Peace Talks

China's brief appearance as a critic of aggression and invasion in Europe would have been more impressive had it not been for her attitude in April and May of 1968 when North Vietnam agreed to meet U.S. representatives in Paris for peace negotiations. Chinese leaders roundly and openly criticized the North Vietnamese for agreeing to participate in the talks. Reports came out of the Chinese mainland in mid-June that Red Guards had demonstrated outside the three North Vietnamese consulates in China -- at Canton, Nanning and Kunming. The demonstrations were ostensibly in support of the continued Vietnamese "struggle," but seasoned observers viewed them as a further condemnation by China of the Paris talks on Vietnam. On 29 June, the International Herald Tribune (Paris) reported that "public demonstrations against local North Vietnamese diplomatic officials" in China had supported demands that "these officials repudiate the Paris talks," and an Indian press agency report from New Delhi on 22 June said "it is presumed that they (Red Guards) were demonstrating against North Vietnam's talks with the United States."

Two days after Foreign Minister CHEN Yi attacked the announcement that peace negotiations were to begin in Paris, Ngo Minh Loan, the North Vietnamese Ambassador to China, abruptly departed from Peking. On 8 July, the deputy chief of the National Liberation Front mission in Peking, Nguyen Minh Phuong, was recalled and has not returned to China.

Evidence of split or the inevitable results of problems confronting allies?... It doesn't actually matter into which category the foregoing evidence falls. However these factors may be categorized, they seem to indicate a deterioration of the close relations which existed between Hanoi and Peking a year ago.

Other Indications of Possible Rift

Newspaper men in Hanoi have expressed the opinion that the Chinese are withdrawing their troops from North Vietnam as a result of Hanoi's conviction that the bombing will not be resumed. Rumors have also been circulating in Paris that the Chinese have withdrawn 40% of their technical and paramilitary personnel from North Vietnam, including bridge builders, railroad engineers and anti-aircraft units. (Chinese manpower in North Vietnam in the past has been estimated by military observers as between 30,000 and 50,000.) The withdrawal of these Chinese may be by mutual agreement between Hanoi and Peking. On the other hand there may be another explanation. Numerous stories are circulating in Hanoi, in fact, that the Chinese were evacuated at North Vietnam's insistence because of Chinese insistence on distributing Mao badges and propaganda material including the "Little Red Book of Quotations." The Hong Kong South China Morning Post, of 2 May reported that the North Vietnamese had barred Mao badges and books and that Chinese seamen had been warned not to wear their badges ashore. Despite these warnings, there have been reports that Chinese sailors have been seeking to create incidents among the crews of other shipping at Haiphong. A few months ago, when the

Chinese offered to repair the Paul Doumer Bridge in Hanoi again, the North Vietnamese refused the offer, recalling the last repair job on the bridge carried out by the Chinese in December 1967 when the Chinese workmen put up a flagrant display of Mao posters for all of Hanoi to see. It has been recalled -- in the general context of withdrawal of technicians and advisors -- that the first sign of the Sino-Soviet split was the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China in 1960, heralding the eventual cut-off of Soviet economic aid to China.

Arrangements for negotiating economic aid from China to North Vietnam were markedly changed this year when Le Thanh Nghi's economic delegation (which in past years went first to China) signed its first agreement in Hungary, after which it went to Bulgaria, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and the USSR. The Peking-Hanoi agreement on further economic and technical aid to North Vietnam was eventually signed in an atmosphere of mutual misgivings, primarily caused by the continued hold-up in China of supplies for Vietnam. Fifteen convoys of Soviet aid and military equipment were reportedly bogged down in Chinese territory at the very time the economic protocols were being signed. Small wonder that the North Vietnamese tried other nations before falling back on an ally whose internal chaos makes cross country rail transportation so uncertain. The 15 Soviet convoys were believed to be caught on the southern border of Kwangsi province, which was then riven by factional disorders finally brought under control by the Red Army. But can the Red Army maintain order, manufacture the goods Peking has just promised Hanoi, keep the railroads running to deliver the goods Eastern Europe countries have promised Hanoi and serve the real functions of an Army? For that matter, how can China claim to be in the protective, guiding hands of Communism when all that keeps order in the country and maintains the Party in power is the Army?

Hanoi's unflattering views on her Chinese ally have been indicated directly or obliquely in her public statements, in her news media coverage of Chinese affairs, in the statements of her diplomats and consular officials, and sometimes in her very failure to comment on such vital factors as the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese scene.

China has revealed her own unflattering views on Hanoi in similar fashion: in the recent protests in Yunnan and Kwangsi provinces against the shipping of scarce goods such as rice and medical supplies to North Vietnam, and in her open resentment over the growing warmth of the Hanoi-Moscow relationship and over Hanoi's apparent ingratitude for what Peking has done for her.

The objective viewer could say "small wonder" in either situation, considering the polemics and the extremist behavior indulged in by both Hanoi and Peking. Peking's resentment against such an inconstant ally is comprehensible, as is Hanoi's concern over what the war is costing in North Vietnamese lives -- an entire generation, which can never be replaced.

Hanoi is also certainly worried about what China plans to extract from North Vietnam in ultimate payment for her assistance during this long war. And while Hanoi worries over paying her mounting debts to China, she will have to consider that the further she moves towards Moscow, the further in debt she will be there. She is already, in fact, mortgaging her future to two nations, the USSR and China, both of which have repeatedly demonstrated that they will exploit to the hilt any obligations owed them. Whether the quarrels between Hanoi and her giant Chinese neighbor and "benefactor" eventually lead to serious rifts or not, she is in a position few countries in Asia or Europe would envy. She has only to look to Czechoslovakia to see a vivid example of the price the small debtor must pay to a Communist-style friend.

PHILIPPINE HERALD
4 October 1968

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North Vietnam Is Talking with U.S. in Paris Against Communist China's Advice

PARIS (UPI) — Diplomatic sources in Paris have backed up chief U.S. delegate W. Averell Harriman's contention that North Vietnam is talking with the United States against the wishes of the Chinese Communist.

"They (the North Vietnamese) are in Paris with the support of the Soviet government and against the advice and pressure of Peking," Harriman told

the Mainichi newspaper of Tokyo in an interview recorded last week and released this week.

The sources said that Peking made it clear in May when the conversations began in Paris that they were unhappy that Hanoi had agreed to talk. At that time the Chinese recalled their press representatives in Paris and have ignored the talks ever since.

The sources said that

talk-fight policy of the Vietnamese, which they used so successfully against the French, is not in agreement with the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung on the fighting of wars of national liberation.

The Chinese want the Vietnamese to keep fighting and to win on the battlefield, thus proving again that Mao is right, the sources said.

The same sources said

that the Soviet Union, following its policy of detente with the United States urged the North Vietnamese to negotiate an end to the Vietnam war with the U.S.

The North Vietnamese probably are allowing themselves to be influenced by the Soviet Union as a means of decreasing Chinese influence and pressure on North Vietnam, the sources speculated.

WASHINGTON POST
1 October 1968

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Concern Over Moscow Rises

Peking Celebration Downgrades Hanoi

By Stanley Karnow
Washington Post Foreign Service

HONG KONG, Oct. 1 — The Chinese communists have significantly downgraded their expressions of support for North Vietnam and the Vietcong while displaying increased concern at the possibility of a clash with the Soviet Union.

This was apparent today in major statements delivered by both Premier Chou En-lai and Lin Piao, China's Defense Minister, at Peking celebrations marking the Chinese Communist regime's 19th year in power.

The two Chinese leaders also indicated domestic policies pointing to the further decline of Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution and the rise of moderate military and civilian authority in China.

Held in Peking's Tien-an Men Square—the Plaza of Celestial Peace—today's cele-

bration featured Mao and his wife Chiang Ching, and other luminaries.

Notably missing for the second straight year was Liu Shao-chi, the head of state, who has been repeatedly denounced as "China's Khrushchev" for allegedly having favored such Soviet-style "revisionist" reforms as material rewards for workers and peasants. But the presence or absence of key figures, though usually a revealing clue to the status of Communist hierarchies, appeared to analysts here to be less important today than the style of the anniversary demonstration and the substance of its oratory.

The most important aspect of the celebration, in the view of these analysts, was the shift in focus by the Chinese away from the Vietnam war to the potential danger of collision with the Soviet Union.

This switch is thought to reflect increasingly strained relations between Peking and Hanoi and, at the same time, mirror growing Chinese fears that the Russians may violate their northern and western borders just as they invaded Czechoslovakia.

Peking's attitudes towards Hanoi and Moscow are linked, moreover, since the Vietnamese Communists backed Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia while the Chinese bitterly excoriated the Russians for their action.

The new change in their outlook, some experts here suggest, may also mean that the Chinese are now less worried by the threat of war with the United States than they were earlier this year, when American aircraft were bombing close to their southern borders.

Speaking at this morning's rally in Peking, Lin Piao pointedly omitted any reference to the Vietnam conflict, and instead called on Chinese troops to "remain vigilant" and strengthen their country's "frontier defenses."

At last year's celebration, in contrast, Lin urged China to give "resolute support to the Vietnamese people in their great war against U.S. aggres-

sion and for national salvation."

That appeal, in fact, ranked as a slogan during last year's anniversary demonstrations. None of the slogans in the current celebration has mentioned Vietnam, however.

Similarly, speaking at reception in Peking last night, Chou En-lai referred to Vietnam perfunctorily, placing Chinese support for the "heroic Vietnamese" after Peking's devotion to the "fraternal Albanian people."

Last year, Chou not only matched Lin Piao's promise of "resolute support" for Hanoi and the Vietcong but also stressed that China would "not flinch" from making "maximum national sacrifices" in its determination to aid them.

In another speech yesterday, Chou voiced Peking's apprehension at the possibility of Russian attack, accusing Moscow of encircling China by "stationing massive troops along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders" and "even more frequently sending planes to violate China's airspace."

On Sept. 16, in their first exchange of protests on the subject, the Chinese complained to Moscow against 29 intrusions over their territory by Soviet aircraft.

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The diminished Chinese emphasis on Vietnam was also evident last night in the order of prominence accorded the "distinguished foreign guests" who attended the National Day reception given by Chou in Peking.

As listed in an official New China News Agency dispatch received here, the two North Vietnamese vice-ministers and a Vietcong Central Committee member present at the reception were outranked by half a dozen Albanians, four members of a Pakistan delegation, a Burmese and an Indonesian Communist, and a Communist from Auckland, New Zealand.

At last year's celebration, the Hanoi and Vietcong representatives were second only, to the Albanians.

Meanwhile today, the government press made it clear that the drive to curb the Cultural Revolution and stifle Red Guard activities will continue.

The official editorial said that "the working class must exercise leadership in everything", insisting that workers and peasants mobilized into so-called "Mao Tse-tung's Thought Propaganda Teams" would play a predominant role in schools, offices, factories and other enterprises.

These teams, essentially disciplinary platoons organized to crack down on unruly Red Guards and other agitators, are instruments of the army, which now rules the country through Revolutionary Committees set up in all of China's 29 provinces and special municipalities.

The editorial indicated that attention may soon be turned towards constructing a new Communist Party apparatus. "New blood" in the apparatus would be "primarily advanced elements among the industrial workers," the newspapers said.

It is unlikely that the moderate military and civilian leaders now in the ascendency will call a party congress to make such a change until they are able to reinforce their control down to the country's lowest levels.

This appears to be their objective in their program to establish Revolutionary Committees in every town, county, school, factory, office and other enterprise in the country.

Judging from the subdued tone of the National Day celebration, they are evidently approaching this challenge with a sobriety starkly different from the demonstrations of two years ago, when Mao encouraged disorder and violence.

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WASHINGTON POST
22 October 1968

Hanoi-VC Split Seen on Reply

CPYRGH

By Stanley Karnow

Washington Post Foreign Service

HONG KONG, Oct. 22—

North Vietnamese and Vietcong leaders appear to Western analysts here to be divided in their efforts to shape a response to President Johnson reported package plan to break the deadlock in the Paris peace negotiations.

In the opinion of these analysts, the Communists are united in their determination to "talk and fight," which means they have no intention of either quitting Paris or stopping military operations in South Vietnam.

They are apparently split, however, on the key question of how much emphasis to place on diplomatic action as a way to achieve their objectives.

This crucial question, which will largely decide whether the Communists accept or reject the Johnson Administration's reported offer, is complicated by the fact that Communist factions in North and South Vietnam evidently advocate different tactics to attain different goals.

Divergent Views

These differences have been brought to the fore by the White House proposal, which the factions view either as a hazard or an opportunity, depending on their particular hopes, fears or dogmas.

The Communist group most sensitive to the negotiations is the National Liberation Front, the official arm of the Vietcong, which seems to fear that its interests may be forgotten by the North Vietnamese as they seek a settlement favorable to themselves.

In contrast to Hanoi, whose basic aim is eventual unification of Vietnam, the Front puts its focus on gaining political power in the South.

Front's Apprehension

Hence the Southern Communists appear apprehensive that Hanoi may strike bargain with the United States that relegates the Front to a relatively minor position in a Saigon coalition.

Such a possibility, the Front's leaders realize, would demoralize their followers, who would have lit-

tle to show for years of sacrifice.

This apprehension has been reflected, for example, in Front propaganda attacking figures like Gen. Duong Van Minh, a former South Vietnamese Premier now in Saigon, whom Hanoi spokesmen publicly treat with respect and privately concede to be a potential member of an acceptable coalition.

A sharper sign of nervousness was mirrored today in a statement by the Front that jumped the gun on Hanoi in seemingly rejecting Mr. Johnson's offer.

Apparently striving to undercut any deal between Washington and Hanoi to include the Saigon regime in peace talks, the Front asserted that the "puppet administration . . . does not represent anybody."

Three Hanoi Factions

In the estimation of Douglas Pike, a foremost American authority here on Vietnam, there are roughly three factions in Hanoi that have long been pressing to impose their strategies.

All, Pike has pointed out, fundamentally agree that "revolutionary violence" is the proper approach against internal and foreign ene-

mies. But they differ over methods.

One Faction's View

One faction, according to Pike, is headed by the Politburo member Truong Chinh, who has argued for "protracted warfare" on the grounds that time is on the side of the Communists.

Chinh has stressed the necessity to "shift to the defensive to gain time, dishearten the enemy and build up our forces for a new offensive."

This line apparently has brought Chinh close to the Front, which also favors slow, small-scale tactics, and it has earned him the reputation of being pro-Chinese, since "protracted warfare" is a pet theory of Mao Tse-tung.

Over the past year, however, the Chinh approach has been overshadowed by that of Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, the North Vietnamese Defense Minister, who in Pike's view is the predominant Communist strategist in Hanoi.

Giap's Contention

Presumably backed by President Ho Chi Minh and Premier Pham Van Dong, Giap contended that the

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ford a patient "protracted war" in the face of overwhelming American might. Thus he launched the devastating Tet offensive in hopes of a decisive victory in the shortest possible time, regardless of casualties.

That offensive seems to have had a far greater political and psychological impact in the United States and elsewhere than it had militarily.

That impact evidently led to a third Hanoi faction headed by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, seeking to increase North Vietnam's options by pushing for a diplomatic offensive.

Dual Approach

Since spring, the North Vietnamese have been promoting a dual approach, combining Giap's battlefield thrust with Trinh's diplomatic drive, the two being related in the sense that progress at the conference table would reflect military progress.

But the statement in Paris has been matched by a statement in Vietnam, and Hanoi is now facing the problem of contriving a new doctrine. It can, as Truong Chinh advises, phase back to guerrilla war and fight forever—or it can dilute its demands and make concessions to Washington in an attempt to turn a political settlement in its favor.

These are the alternatives the North Vietnamese and Vietcong have undoubtedly been debating. Their choice remains to be seen.

CPYRGT

SAIGON POST
15 August 1968

Memo To Hanoi On Economics, Bombing, Troops, Advisers

CPYRGT

BY VICENTE VILLAMIN

THAT AMERICA is willing to help North Vietnam economically is set forth in the joint communique between Presidents Johnson and Thieu of South Vietnam, dated in Honolulu July 21, 1968, as follows: «The US wants to help the people of Southeast Asia—including the people of North Vietnam—develop their rich region in conditions of peace». Let this be talked about more and more in Paris and it will produce good results for both sides, leading to peace.

Hanoi is so insistent in having the bombing of North Vietnam stopped completely. What is the extent of that bombing? The joint communique says that President Johnson's order of last March 31st to suspend the bombing partially "freed 90% of the people of North Vietnam and 78% of its territory from attack." The words in quotation may be misleading because the bombing is not directed against the people but against military targets which have to do with the movement of troops and the production and shipment of supplies to South Vietnam, their destruction by the enemy being approved by the laws of war.

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The armed forces of South Vietnam are described in the joint communique as follows:

«President Thieu reported that the increase in volunteers, the extension of the draft to 18 and 19-year olds, and the calling back to service of veterans and reserve officers have brought the armed forces of South Vietnam to a level of 765,000 men in June—some 48,000 more than the original goal for this date. With the mobilization law enacted at the end of May; it is expected that the total will exceed 800,000 men by the end of 1968—the equivalent in population ratio of some 15 million men in the US. It is also anticipated that an additional 200,000 men will be made available by the end of 1968 in auxiliary and paramilitary forces, such as the police and self-defense purposes.» That is one million

Americans (and about 80,000 other allies, or a grand total of 1,610,000 men at year's end, with possible additional American and foreign allied troops. That is what Hanoi has to fight.

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On the arming of the South Vietnamese troops, the joint communique says: «President Johnson... reviewed the joint program under way to equip South Vietnamese armed forces with improved weapons, accelerated technical training programs and financial assistance. M-16 automatic rifles have already been provided to all regular South Vietnamese infantry, airborne, marine and ranger Battalions. The supplying of these weapons to paramilitary troops down to the hamlet level is proceeding on a high priority basis. Increased production of the M-16

should make it possible to get the weapon into the hands of South Vietnamese forces during 1969».

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Relevant is a UPI press dispatch from London, dated July 22, saying in part as follows: «Peking (Communist China) has renewed its call on Hanoi to fight to the end as apparent price for further Communist Chinese aid. But Hanoi has deftly avoided any commitment to Mao Tse-tung to change its present Vietnam strategy. The Hanoi mission headed by Deputy Premier Le Thanh Nghi flew to Peking earlier this month to seek to Peking earlier this month to seek move Chinese aid. It also reportedly went to secure unobstructed passage of Russian arms supplies through Red Chinese territory... The Peking leader, Vice Premier

Li Hsien - Nien, warned the Hanoi mission of the plot staged by the US and Russia in the Paris negotiations in an attempt to gain at the conference table what America cannot get from the battlefield.»

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It would be a good move for Hanoi to have fair, competent and courageous non-Communist advisers on America. Hanoi's actions in South Vietnam, her utterances in Paris, her declarations in Hanoi and her understanding of the American problems show that she is often grossly misinformed on the subjects. And that is why her actions are often inaccurate, illogical, ridiculous, disastrous, ineffective and unnecessarily mean and inequitable. In having such advisers, she would simply be doing what other experienced nations do. Over-friendly and fawning persons do not make good advisers.

JAPAN TIMES

24 October 1968

Over the Horizon

By SHINROKU NOZAKI

Peking Breaks Long Silence

No sooner had there appeared a strong possibility that the U.S. might halt its bombing of North Vietnam than Peking's New China News Agency broke its long silence on the Paris peace talks.

This news agency had withdrawn its Paris correspondents immediately before the opening of the talks and had not reported any news about the peace negotiations for the last five months. Why should it break its silence at this juncture?

Communist China, which regards the Vietnam war as an anti-American colonial struggle, has consistently opposed any move toward peace in Vietnam and called for a fight to the finish against the United States.

Ever since the start of the Paris talks, Peking has lost no opportunity in repeating this stand. For instance, at a Peking reception held Sept. 2 to commemorate the 23rd anniversary of Hanoi's declaration of independence, Premier Chou En-lai warned Hanoi that after the Czechoslovak affair, the U.S. "imperialists" could be expected to stiffen their terms in negotiating a Vietnam peace.

Again, on Sept. 31, on the eve of the national day celebration in Peking, Chou called for a thorough prosecution of the Vietnam war, reiterating his nation's resolute support for the "great struggle of the heroic Vietnamese people" in their fight to the

finish against the United States.

But in inverse proportion to the escalation of Peking's opposition to Vietnam peace overtures, its aid to Hanoi has become increasingly unreliable due to the effect of the cultural revolution. This spring, it was frequently reported, both officially and unofficially, that the transportation of aid materials to North Vietnam had been held up by armed struggles in the Kwangsi Autonomous Region. The goods did not start to flow again until August when the railway workers in this region formed a revolutionary committee.

It is this failure of Peking to back up its call for a fight to the finish with the provision of necessary military supplies that seems to have caused Hanoi to switch over to the Russian viewpoint at the Paris talks.

Seemingly corroborating this surmise was the news received from Hongkong earlier this month that North Vietnam had partially suspended its transactions with the Bank of China in that city.

The reported withdrawal of some of the Red Chinese technicians from North Vietnam at the beginning of this month is regarded by some observers as another sign of deterioration in Hanoi-Peking relations.

If Communist China persists in calling for a fight to the finish without improving its relations with North Vietnam, it will run the risk of being excluded from any Vietnam peace arrangement. It is this consideration that seems to have prompted Peking to take a sudden interest in the Paris talks.



July 1968

China's View of Hanoi's Agreement to Go to Paris

Prime Minister Chou En-lai's speech at a Peking reception for President Nyerere of Tanzania on June 18, confirmed China's disapproval of the Paris talks. He said:

"The 31,000,000 heroic Vietnamese people have dealt heavy blows at the U.S. aggressors in their war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation. While intensifying the war of aggression, U.S. imperialism is busy carrying out peace-talk schemes in a vain attempt to gain at the conference table what it cannot get in the battlefield. This is what the Vietnamese people cannot permit. Responding to the call of its great leader, President Ho Chi Minh, the entire Vietnamese people are getting united still more closely, persevering in the protracted war and valiantly fighting for the great goal of thoroughly defeating the U.S. aggressors and liberating the whole of Vietnam."

Several recent official speeches by Chinese Ministers have failed to praise North Vietnam, whereas previously some reference had always been made to "the success of the Vietnamese struggle." Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien made no mention of Vietnam at a reception for Guinean and Malian Foreign Ministers on May 24; neither did Foreign Minister Chen Yi, at the reception for the Nepalese Deputy Prime Minister on May 26, and on the Nepalese National Day on June 11.

What comment there has been has taken a hard line. Chen Yi, at a reception for the Guinean and Malian Foreign Ministers on May 18, said:

"Ho Chi Minh has exposed the U.S. imperialist scheme of peddling the peace negotiations swindle while stepping up the war in Vietnam and once again called upon the Vietnamese army and people to 'increase the resolve to fight and to win,' 'brave all hardships and sacrifices, fight continuously and on all battlefields, in order to win still bigger victories.' We are convinced that under the leadership of President Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese people, preserving the protracted war of resistance will win final victory."

On 25 June a Peking Radio commentary on a Moscow meeting of world church leaders said:

"The communique [of the meeting] and its appeal for so-called 'peace' ... is especially useful to the U.S. imperialists' plot aimed at bringing about peace talks on the Vietnamese question."

Other

The Hong Kong Times on 4 July gave an unconfirmed traveler's report of an incident in Nanning. A visitor to Kwangsi claimed to have seen the sacking of the North Vietnamese Consulate in Nanning by Red Guards, who "stormed into the grounds, ransacked the premises and tore the clothes off officials after overpowering the Vietnamese guards." The Red Guards were reportedly demonstrating against Hanoi's participation in the Paris peace talks. According to leaflets circulating in Nanning, the Red Guards had acted on Madame Mao's instructions. Other reports from China state that the Vietnamese consulate in Nanning has moved to new quarters outside the town.

September 1968

Statements of Chinese Communist Leaders Reflecting Hanoi-Peking Differences

1. The bulk of a speech by Chou En-lai, given at an anniversary (NVN's 23rd anniversary of independence) reception on September 2, was devoted to a condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. He said:

"The Soviet revisionist renegade clique getting together four countries which follow it, has in the past ten days occupied a so-called 'allied country' with a population of only 14 million.... To describe this barbarous fascist aggression as Marxist-Leninist and proletarian internationalist aid is nothing but a flagrant betrayal of Marxism-Leninism. It will forever be condemned by history. While saying one thing, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique is actually doing another. This clique of renegades are, to quote Lenin, 'socialists in words and imperialists in deeds.'"

2. Wu Teh, Vice-Chairman of the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee, at a meeting held on August 31 to celebrate the anniversary, said:

"The Soviet revisionist leading clique has always played the role of number one accomplice of U.S. imperialism in its war of aggression against Vietnam. Facts showed that this clique was a very dangerous enemy of the Vietnamese people who were fighting to resist U.S. aggression and save the country."

3. A message from Chairman Mao Tse-tung, Defense Minister Lin Piao and Premier Chou En-lai sent to Ho Chi-minh on September 1, again attacked the Soviet leaders:

"U.S. imperialism plus Soviet revisionism still cannot save the U.S. aggressor from his fate of inevitable failure in Vietnam. Their arrogant and rabid attempt to redivide the world through mutual collaboration is meeting stronger and stronger resistance from the people of all countries. The more U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism gang up with each other, the more clearly the people of the world will see through them as jackals of the same liar."

4. In July, Cheng Shih-ching, Chairman of the Kiangsi Provincial Revolutionary Committee, gave a speech on Vietnam, reported in a Red Guard newspaper Tzu-liao Chuan-chi, in which he confirmed that China wanted the Vietnam war to continue in order to weaken the United States, if necessary at the expense of the North Vietnamese. He said:

"This war will go on fiercely. With the enlargement of the war, the U.S. troops in Vietnam have increased continuously. The United States now spends the sum of more than \$30 billion a year in the war of aggression in Vietnam. This is a spectacular sum of money."

5. The Chinese leaders' message to Ho Chi-minh on September 1 again condemned the Paris peace-talks. It said:

"The U.S. imperialist ambition to forcibly occupy the southern part of Vietnam and divide ... the Vietnamese nation will never change. To achieve this purpose U.S. imperialism is carrying out its peace talks scheme in a big way while expanding its war of aggression."

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December 1968

THE CPSU AND WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS:
HOW STRONG ARE THE TIES?

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia took West European Communist parties by surprise. Several party leaders were on vacation when the Soviet Union marched into Czechoslovakia with four of her allies. The bitterness of the initial CP reactions has been widely reported. However, many initial statements, the products of skeleton staffs in the various CP headquarters were found later to be not quite representative of party unanimity. Moreover, differences began to develop between the leaders (better aware of the consequences of Moscow's aggression) and parts of the rank-and-file, particularly oldsters, still hypnotized by the myth of Soviet infallibility. Those factions in discord with the anti-Soviet positions of the larger European parties are not very substantial, and in any case their objections are mostly of little practical consequence since these factions are firmly anchored to their parties and to the party organizations. With the exception of widow Thorez-Vermeersch in the French CP, there have been few top level changes within parties, much less defections.

Immediate party reactions of stark condemnation have been modified in most cases to demands for a return to "normal" by the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. In some cases, parties have indicated a willingness to settle for a "loyal fulfillment" of the Moscow "agreement," which sanctioned the stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. Anti-Soviet expressions have also been muted, partly as the result of Soviet accusations that western parties had fallen prey to the "anti-socialist propaganda of capitalist warmongers." The most recent party declarations have taken on an almost defensive tone as the leaders attempt to refute the Soviet claims that they are trying to torpedo socialism and Soviet plans to hold a world communist summit. A degree of face-saving was permitted the West Europeans by the reluctant Soviet acknowledgement that stands taken on Czechoslovakia could not be retracted. However this was coupled with a fervent Soviet demand for a halt to further polemics. The demand spotlights the Soviets' morbid fear of anything that smacks of "participatory democracy."

Even though the West European CP's have avoided a rupture with Moscow and have joined in making plans for the CP summit conference next spring, the seeds of alienation are still there. The truly faithful are restricted to tiny hard-line groups in Portugal, Luxembourg, West Germany, and West Berlin and to the second-echelon and essentially Stalinist-factions in the larger parties of Italy, France, Austria, Sweden, Belgium, and Finland. From the larger parties, and partly as a result of splits within them, has emerged a small group of outspoken Communists who are calling either openly or by implication for a rededication and reorganization of the entire International Communist Movement. The motives, influence, and vulnerability to Soviet pressure differ in each case and certainly differ with each country.

ITALY: The Italian Communist Party (PCI) is Europe's largest and has been probably the most united in its condemnations. Party Chief Luigi Longo, who had tried to dissuade Moscow from interfering in Czechoslovakia, flatly declared at the 16-18 October PCI Central Committee meeting that the Communist movement no longer had "central direction." While Longo's speech in general is open to interpretation as an attempt to reconcile criticism of Soviet intervention with a recognition of the Soviets' major role in the communist camp, he did call for a new action program. Longo proposed an apertura a destra -- an opening to the right -- in which the Italian Communists would join with other dissident groups in Italy to form a sort of united protest front.

Essentially the PCI evaluated "Czechoslovakia" as an act consistent with current Soviet policy and symptomatic of the harder line being taken by the Soviet leaders. The precarious state of Luigi Longo's health (at this writing he is still recovering from a stroke suffered in early November) opens the question of how firm will be the PCI line taken by his successor (or successors). At the two extremes are Giorgio Amendola and Enrico Berlinguer. Amendola, often referred to as an "old Bolshevik" (although the Cubans dubbed him a "conservative social democrat"!), in an attempt to muffle Longo's criticism of the Soviet invasion, has been playing down Czechoslovakia and emphasizing domestic issues instead. While perhaps his attitude is based on considerations of where voter interest lies, it nevertheless coincides with a pro-Soviet approach. It should be noted that the PCI scored substantial gains in the mid-November local elections.

Berlinguer has supported Longo on all issues, especially on the matter of Czechoslovakia. He has authored strongly-worded articles in Rinascita questioning the future of the Communist movement under its current Soviet leadership. Berlinguer was appointed to head the Italian delegation that went to Moscow on 11 November in a last ditch attempt to get all Soviet troops out of Czechoslovakia before the PCI would acquiesce to a world Communist conference. He was unsuccessful.

As a result of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the basic question of party autonomy is on the agenda for the PCI Twelfth Party Congress to be held in January 1969. The future posture of the PCI may be clearer after the congress. At the moment it is the relationship of the PCI, as Europe's largest CP, to the other parties of Western Europe that is of particular interest. Both Longo and Berlinguer, and even Amendola, have hinted at the possibility of a caucus of West European CP's, although such a development seems stopped for the moment.

FRANCE: The French Communist Party (PCF), Western Europe's second largest CP, condemned the Soviets and split with Moscow for the first time in its history. This was presaged by the pre-invasion efforts of the party chief, Secretary General Waldeck Rochet who, apparently feeling he had made little impression on Moscow, attempted to convene a West European Communist party meeting in Prague, a meeting which the Czechs themselves refused. Following the PCF's immediate condemnation of the USSR, however, the PCF

was the first to back down as its Central Committee amended its stance to one which still gave homage to the Soviets as leaders of the Communist camp. Rochet's complete capitulation came in early November when he went to Moscow and agreed with the Soviets to relegate Czechoslovakia to the finished business of the past. As one small gesture of independence, however, Rochet and his delegation made sure they were out of Moscow by the eve of the 7 November "Great October Revolution" celebrations.

The PCF generally viewed the invasion of Czechoslovakia as a deplorable error and as inconsistent with an otherwise correct Soviet policy. The 21 October Central Committee meeting of the PCF, acknowledged as the party's first public defense of its own views against Moscow, was also the occasion to announce the resignation from the PCF Politburo and Central Committee of Jeannette Thorez-Vermeersch, the 58-year old widow of Maurice Thorez who was the party's long-time leader until his death in 1964. Expressing her stand in a long letter that managed to sound more like a widow with hurt feelings than a hard-line appatchik, Madame Vermeersch said she was resigning because she believed "the leadership should be in agreement on all points." It seems likely that she expected other leaders to follow her, but so far this has not happen.

Principal speakers at the 21 October PCF plenum were Politburo member Gaston Plissonnier and Waldeck Rochet. Plissonnier's speech was blunt in its refusal to accept the Soviet "reasons for intervention" and in its insistence that there was no "counterrevolutionary situation" in Czechoslovakia. Rochet's speech was less polemical as he concentrated on justifying PCF policy and at the same time stressed the need to reinforce PCF-CPSU solidarity.

The same Central Committee plenum passed a public censure on the outspoken utterances of Politburo member Roger Garaudy, who has been one of the more enthusiastic admirers of the "Czech experiment." In a short statement before the plenum, Garaudy said he had not changed his ideas, had not been asked to change them, and had been "justly criticized for violating party rules on expression of views." Garaudy was not dismissed from his Politburo post.

Garaudy, a former intimate of Thorez, has been a communist since 1933 and has recently become somewhat of a maverick by PCF codes of behavior. A proponent and activist in the movement to promote a Marxist and Christian-left dialogue on an international scale and a frequent participant in Church-sponsored seminars on the subject, Garaudy is seen by the PCF as more personally motivated than moved by party zeal. During the May student uprisings, Garaudy opposed PCF guidelines by actively supporting the rebellious students. Nor has Garaudy the author pleased the PCF. One book published in October 1967, The Chinese Problem (Le Probleme Chinois) was attacked by the Communist press as an affront to Soviet (and PCF) policy as Garaudy argued that the Soviet polemical approach should be replaced by a new attitude toward the Chinese. In another book published in April 1968, Can One Be a Communist Today? (Peut-on Etre Communiste Aujourd'hui?) he wrote:

"Contrary to what has become dogma in the Communist movement for a quarter of a century, in no way do the principles of Marxism imply that:

- a sole party is a condition for the construction of socialism;
- the Communist Party must be a dictator to the proletariat; or that
- the socialist revolution implies the denial of all political rights to the bourgeoisie once it is deprived of its economic privileges. It has been this way in the Soviet Union -- not for reasons of principle, but for historic reasons. To canonize these laws as necessary and universal is to substitute the thoughts of Stalin for those of Lenin."

In denouncing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia during a 26 August press conference in Prague, Garaudy closed his comments by praising the "glorious past" of the CPSU and adding "We forget none of this at a moment when behavior of the current Soviet leaders has dealt a heavy blow to the Communist and workers' movement -- especially to their own country and their own party. What is really at issue is a return to Stalinism, in theory and in practice, on the part of the leaders who wish too quickly to forget the Twentieth Congress. To these leaders, we say as Communists: to bring honor to your party and respectability to the international movement -- get out!"

AUSTRIA: The Communist Party of Austria (KPOe) under the leadership of its Chairman Franz Muhri, was in the forefront of the critics of the Soviet Union. By 10 September, as the KPOe official attitude was coming around to one of accommodation, old-time Communist and KPOe Central Committee member, 69-year old Ernst Fischer spoke out in the most telling of criticisms of the Soviets. In a Vienna television interview Fischer rejected the Soviet "intervention excuses," saying "the much quoted anti-socialist forces are sitting in the CPSU leadership." Before his TV appearance, Fischer, with 27 other Communist intellectuals, had published a resolution printed in the dissident Communist magazine Tagebuch (Diary) calling for an overthrow of the CPSU leadership. Fischer's condemnation went so far beyond that of the official KPOe position that by 12 September, in a speech before the KPOe Central Committee plenum, Muhri, perhaps reluctantly, had to disclaim party sanctioning of Fischer's statements.

In his television appearance, Fischer had endorsed the call for a Western CP conference in the hopes of exercising a moderating influence on the Soviets, but he also insisted that if the Soviets did not respond to the resolutions of such a conference, then the Western CP's should sever all ties with the CPSU. The last recorded call for such a "mini-summit" to be heard in advance of the Budapest preparatory meeting of the World Communist Conference of 18 November came from Franz Muhri when he was interviewed 11 October by Svobodne Slove: "We think an important step would be a conference of West European Communist parties to solve the basic questions of relations of Communist parties amongst themselves."

OTHER PARTIES: Two other outspoken mavericks have been Carl-Henrik Hermansson in Sweden and Santiago Carillo of the Spanish party. Judging from his silence following the whopping defeat suffered by the Swedish Left-Communist Party in the 15 September elections, what motivated Swedish CP Chairman Hermansson to be so outspoken was the hope of improving the image of the Communists in the eyes of the Swedish electorate. Hermansson's initial statements were the most violent of any Western CP leader as he demanded the resignation of the CPSU leadership and the recall of the Swedish ambassador from Moscow. He took the first post-invasion initiative in early September to rally support for a Western CP meeting. Since 15 September, that initiative has fallen to Austria.

Santiago Carillo, Secretary General of Spain's illegal Communist Party (PCE), strongly condemned the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia, though without the attendant publicity given statements from other European parties. The only previous evidence which might have indicated Santiago Carillo's probable rejection of the Soviet action comes from a footnote commentary made by Roger Garaudy in France when he described a (Neuvos Enfoques a Problemas de Hoy), as "a remarkable analysis." An emotional interchange between Suslov and the grand old dragon of Spanish communism, Dolores Ibaruri, is described in the attached article from L'Express.

L'EXPRESS, Paris
2-8 September 1968

Les orphelins du communisme

Le Dieu russe est mort, tué par les grands prêtres de son orthodoxie : il ne faut pas s'y tromper en condamnant l'intervention soviétique, la presque unanimité des communistes occidentaux — consciemment ou inconsciemment — pose le double problème des causes du crime et des raisons de la faute. Comme dit un proverbe bouddhiste cité par un marxiste célèbre : « Quand le doigt montre la Lune, l'imbécile regarde le doigt. »

En termes sans doute trop prudents, un membre du Bureau politique du Parti communiste français, M. René Piquet, donne déjà une des clefs de ce « grave désaccord ».

« L'attitude que nous avons adoptée en ces circonstances tragiques, dit-il à « L'Express », n'est pas de l'opportunisme. C'est pour nous une question de principe qui découle de la politique élaborée à nos précédents congrès : nous avons dit clairement, en particulier, que dans le cadre d'une France démocratique, le droit des minorités politiques à l'existence et à l'expansion ne saurait être remis en cause pourvu que cela se passe dans le cadre de la légalité. »

Au cœur de Rome. Où sont, en Union soviétique, en Allemagne de l'Est, en Bulgarie, ces minorités politiques, et où s'expriment-elles ? C'est une idée semblable que développe, devant nous, un des dirigeants du Parti communiste italien, M. Carlo Galuzzi, membre du Bureau politique et prototype du responsable « nouveau style ». Le visage fin, la quarantaine, le cheveu dru et grisonnant, l'élégance très péninsulaire, il nous reçoit dans cet immeuble un peu triste de la via delle Botteghe Oscure, au cœur de Rome. C'est lui, qui avec Giancarlo Pajetta, fut chargé d'aller mettre en garde les dirigeants soviétiques contre une initiative irréparable. L'expérience fut terrible...

« L'intervention des pays du Pacte de Varsovie est une erreur tragique, nous dit-il, mais il n'est pas impossible qu'à long terme cette erreur ouvre des possibilités nouvelles. Il y a, désormais, un processus qu'on ne peut arrêter et qu'il faut bien considérer. En effet, deux problèmes sont désormais posés : celui du rapport entre le Parti et l'Etat, et celui de la démocratie socialiste. Il n'y a pas de socialisme véritable sans démocratie et la question demeure, même si le conflit actuel se résout. Pour nous, la question est posée. »

trialisés et occidentaux, elle est primordiale, et nous savons que nous ne pourrions la résoudre que si nous parvenons à dépasser la politique des blocs basée sur les seuls rapports de forces. Sans quoi, vous savez, on ne sort pas de cette dialectique, la Grèce ici, la Tchécoslovaquie là-bas.

— Mais enfin, l'affaire tchèque ne pose-t-elle pas le problème même de la vitalité du communisme ?

— Nous ne le pensons pas. Et nous tenons à préciser que nous ne raisonnons pas comme Pietro Nenni, qui, lui, met en cause l'U.R.S.S. en soi en tant que pays socialiste et affirme qu'il n'y a plus d'autre issue que de s'adapter à la situation capitaliste. Car enfin, Dubcek n'est ni un social-démocrate ni un démocrate-chrétien, c'est un communiste. Ceux qui, là-bas, ont résisté et se sont battus au risque même de leur vie, ce sont des communistes. Malheureusement, ils se battent contre d'autres communistes et c'est cela qui est tragique. »

Les Marx Brothers. D'autant plus tragique que le communisme, il y a dix ans encore, était un et indivisible. Le plus étonnant n'est peut-être pas que l'on en pleure — et combien de communistes ont pleuré, le mercredi 21 août — mais que peu à peu, on se mette à en rire. « Les Marx Brothers du Kremlin viennent de nous rejouer « Soupe au canard », disait un russo-phile d'hier, et un responsable communiste français de retour de ce qui fut La Mecque de soupérer : « C'est le stalinisme sans Staline, autant dire l'U.N.R. sans de Gaulle, avec Poujade au pouvoir. »

Rire amer, d'ailleurs, nerveux, défilant. Car on le sait aujourd'hui dans toutes les directions communistes du monde : le drame du Kremlin ne tourne pas simplement autour d'un quarteron d'apparatchiks laudateurs de leur propre médiocrité, de quelques damnés du terre à terre. Ce qui s'est passé depuis avril dernier, cette sorte de révolte des demi-soldes du sous-marxisme, est grave, terriblement grave. Retour du stalinisme sans doute, mais ce n'est qu'un aspect de la réalité. Toute réédition de l'Histoire, disait Marx, est une caricature. Ce sont les anciens domestiques qui réinventent la politique du maître.

Le 29 mars dernier, M. Léonide Brejnev prononçait devant les militants de Moscou un discours historique articulé autour de ces trois idées :

— Le capitalisme traverse une crise décisive, et sans doute fatale.

— Pour sortir de ses convulsions, il a tendance à chercher une issue dans la politique d'aventure militaire.

— Stoppé dans ses velléités bellicistes, il recourt alors à la subversion idéologique à l'intérieur des pays socialistes « en tablant sur le révisionnisme et sur les hommes moralement instables ».

De cette démonstration découlent tout naturellement ces « thèses » nouvelles :

1) La démocratisation et la tolérance ne sont plus à l'ordre du jour.

2) La « discipline de fer » au sein du Parti doit se renforcer.

3) La lutte des classes en régime socialiste prend un caractère de plus en plus aigu.

4) Les valeurs morales doivent prendre le pas sur les stimulants matériels.

Autant de thèses staliniennes dénoncées par le XX^e Congrès.

Saveur de sang. On ne doit donc pas s'étonner que, le 10 août dernier, le Comité central soviétique ait adopté un long texte théorique, à propos du centième anniversaire de la naissance de Lénine, où, pour la première fois, on ne trouve aucune référence au XX^e Congrès, et aucune des allusions habituelles aux « déformations des normes léninistes dans la période du culte de la personnalité ».

En revanche, on y relève ce passage, dont chaque mot mérite d'être pesé : « Lénine enseignait qu'il fallait envisager la question de la liberté d'un point de vue concret. La liberté, pour qui, pour quoi, pour quelle classe ? Le développement ultérieur de la liberté de l'individu présume l'éducation de tous les membres de la société dans un esprit d'intransigeance envers toutes les atteintes aux normes de la vie en société socialiste. » Autrement dit, l'acquisition de la liberté ne sera possible que lorsque chaque citoyen sera prêt à en faire le sacrifice : voilà ce que dit aux militants stupéfaits de Rome, de Paris, de Helsinki le nouveau message de Moscou. L'accepter ? M. Santiago Carrillo, le secrétaire général du P.C. espagnol, qui, plus fortement encore que les autres, a stigmatisé l'intervention russe, allait-il expliquer à ses partisans pourchassés qu'il n'était pas conforme à la pureté idéologique de poser de manière générale le problème de la liberté et de la démocratie ? Cette sorte de pureté-là, elle a, depuis quelque trente ans, sur le sol de Castille, une saveur de sang. L'homme qui a eu le courage de dire qu'en Espagne « la guerre était finie » allait-il accepter que cela ne soit plus vrai à Prague ?

On vit alors, fantôme blanchi par la douleur, apparaître à Prague, au milieu des ombres résignées, surgir de son his-

toire Dolorès Ibarruri, la Pasionaria. Et elle, vieille femme voûtée par quarante ans de discipline, vivant à Moscou, se planta devant les membres du Comité central soviétique et leur lança son second refus en un demi-siècle : « Vous ne passerez pas non plus... »

Condamnée. Sans doute, ce fut une déchirure. En France, il a manqué une voix à la direction du Parti, celle de Mme Jeannette Vermeersch, la femme de Maurice Thorez, pour condamner « l'occupant ». De vieux militants dans les usines se sont sentis tout à coup orphelins à un âge où on ne se refait pas une famille. « Mais enfin, ont-ils dit, si l'U.R.S.S. a pris un tel risque, si elle a accepté d'être ainsi condamnée, calomniée, isolée, c'est vraiment qu'elle devait avoir de bonnes raisons. » Ils l'ont dit au cours de réunions fédérales et ils ont été sifflés. Ils ne reconnaissaient pas non plus leurs enfants. A Vienne, il a fallu une nuit de débat à la direction du P.C. autrichien pour choisir le refus : six de ses membres ont voté contre.

Le chef du Parti suisse du travail, M. Edgar Woog, un vieil homme aux cheveux blancs qui marche en s'appuyant sur une canne, a eu cette réflexion : « Depuis vingt ans, l'essentiel de notre travail consiste à tenter de limiter les dégâts causés à notre Parti par les actions des pays socialistes. Nous sommes vraiment fatigués de cette lutte. »

En Finlande, nous dit notre correspondant à Helsinki, le P.C., qui représente 22 % des suffrages et dispose de 42 sièges sur 200 à la Chambre, se préparait à fêter son anniversaire sur le thème « Le jour de la démocratie ». Il a préféré annuler les festivités et renvoyer chez eux les délégués russes, qui étaient déjà arrivés. Pour lui, seul parti européen à participer à un gouvernement de coalition, condamner Moscou avait une double signification : sauver cette expérience unique en collant aux autres formations de gauche et renouer avec le sentiment national d'une petite nation limitrophe de la Russie, qui, en d'autres temps, ne fut pas à l'abri des incursions « stratégiques ».

La III^e Internationale a définitivement vécu. Un empire idéologique, un des plus impressionnants que le monde ait connus, se désagrège. Il n'y aura pas de conférence au sommet des Partis communistes à Moscou.

Sur une mappemonde. Mais s'agit-il de constater une faillite ou une erreur ? Beaucoup, aujourd'hui, se souviennent de l'avertissement que, en 1956, M. Nikita Krouchtchev venait

de révéler que Staline était un fou, un criminel, un mégalomane qui, pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, faisait de la stratégie sur une mappemonde d'écolier : « Attention, déclara Togliatti, cette manière de déstaliniser est stalinienne. Il s'agit moins de savoir si Staline était fou que d'étudier et de rechercher les défauts d'un système qui a pu conduire à de telles monstruosités. »

Le problème est de nouveau posé. Les communistes français, par exemple, croient qu'il est possible de définir un modèle de socialisme propre aux sociétés européennes occidentales, sans soumettre à une critique de fond le modèle « déformé » de socialisme qui a cours en Union soviétique. Pas d'imixtion ! Mais la Russie est une trop grande puissance pour qu'il soit réaliste de la mettre entre parenthèses, et la crédibilité du socialisme, non plus, n'est pas isolable d'un ensemble.

Pétard littéraire. M. Roger Garaudy, philosophe communiste, membre du Bureau politique du P.C., a lancé aux responsables du Parti soviétique : « Allez-vous-en ! » Il a été blâmé pour avoir dit tout haut ce que d'aucuns pensent tout bas. En nous recevant dans sa maison de Chennevières, non loin de la Marne, où il mitonne quelque nouveau pétard littéraire, il nous a déclaré : « Je préfère ne pas relancer la polémique. »

Mais il a accepté de définir ce qui, à ses yeux, représentait, pour le nouveau socialisme, la formule tchèque : « Nous nous trouvons, dit-il, devant une contradiction entre les exigences du développement propre à la Tchécoslovaquie et une organisation économique acquise sur un pays qui avait dû passer d'un capitalisme arriéré au socialisme. Les formes centralisées et bureaucratiques de la direction politique du pays comme de la gestion économique avaient provoqué de graves déformations de l'appareil d'Etat et le recours à des « méthodes seigneuriales » au sein du Parti. « Le mérite principal de Dubcek est d'avoir compris que ne pas entreprendre les corrections indispensables, c'était discréditer le socialisme, en donner une image caricaturale et le vouer au mépris ou à l'indifférence des masses populaires, en Tchécoslovaquie ou ailleurs. Il s'agissait donc de créer les conditions d'une participation active des masses dans tous les secteurs de la vie du pays sans que le Parti se substitue à la classe ouvrière. Cela ne constitue nullement un retour à une démocratie bourgeoise formelle et, en cela, les Tchèques nous

rendu au socialisme son visage humain. »

Au Père-Lachaise. En est-ce fini de cet espoir ? La force de la Russie en tant qu'Etat-guide était d'exister. Le socialisme cessait d'être un mythe enterré au Père-Lachaise au pied du Mur des Fédérés. Il devenait concret

Le socialisme démocratique, lui, n'oxlate pas. Ni à Cuba, ni en Chine, ni en Roumanie. Seule, d'ailleurs, à l'Est, la Tchécoslovaquie avait les moyens matériels de construire cette forme de socialisme « libertaire » adaptée à l'époque de la révolution technologique. Plus encore que l'idée abstraite de liberté, c'était cela qui était important pour le « modèle occidental », c'est-à-dire pour la socialisation de la société dite de consommation.

C'est à Prague, d'ailleurs, qu'un sociologue marxiste nommé Rodovan Richta a tenté pour la première fois de dégager ce que pourrait être la forme « humaine » et « socialiste » de la révolution technologique. « Stade où le développement de l'homme lui-même devient le moyen le plus efficace de faire croître les forces productives. » « Le but d'un tel projet, écrit-il, est non pas de cultiver un homme d'un type déterminé, mais d'éduquer en chaque homme un éducateur de soi-même, ce qui suppose une entière liberté de mouvement et d'information. »

Ces propos, aujourd'hui, prennent une signification bien amère.

Logique infernale. Avant le coup de Prague, on pouvait expérimenter une voie nouvelle. Désormais, il faut totalement la réinventer et les communistes ne peuvent espérer y parvenir seuls. « D'ailleurs, disait l'un d'eux — dirigeant important — nous sommes peut-être parvenus à un stade où nous devons dépasser le communisme tel que nous l'avons conçu. Comme il y a cinquante ans, le communisme a dépassé l'héritage social-démocrate. »

C'est ce que pense également un homme comme M. Ricardo Lombardi, leader de la gauche du Parti socialiste unifié italien, que nous avons interrogé à Rome : « A notre avis, ajoutet-il, le drame tchèque ne dément pas la possibilité d'une démocratie socialiste, mais il montre qu'il existe une situation internationale qui l'empêche de se développer. Pour l'instant, chez nous, les partisans du renforcement du Pacte atlantique tirent argument de cette tragédie. Mais c'est une logique infernale. On s'apercevra vite, au

la politique des blocs et la constitution d'une Europe émancipée des entreprises russes et américaines offrent une issue, et que le progrès est à ce prix. Il serait également urgent de régler le problème allemand qui — on le voit — devient l'alibi de tous les conservatismes. »

Pour des hommes comme MM. Waldeck Rochet, Luigi Longo, Nicolas Ceaucescu, l'Union soviétique était sacrée. Ils l'ont désacralisée. Les schismes naissent toujours d'un blasphème. **JEAN-FRANÇOIS KAHN ■**

CZECH EXPERIENCE CRUCIAL TO FUTURE OF COMMUNISM

[Article signed J.-F.K.; Paris, L'Express, French, 28 October-3 November 1968, pp 16-17]

Why Do the Young Choose Che Guevara?

"If you want socialism to offer an attractive image to young people again, you must denounce the leaders who govern the Kremlin today, who have 'failed'."

Failed: the word was used by Mr. Roger Garaudy at the last session of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party. And no one whistled, booed or stamped his feet. In two months, what was blasphemy has become commonplace. Today in Rome, Helsinki and Vienna, as in Paris, the question asked is no longer: "How far do we go with the Russians?" but rather this one: "Why socialism?"

A new Moscow agreement has been signed. The Soviet soldiers will remain in Czechoslovakia and Mr. Alexandre Dubcek will have a reprieve only on condition that he be his own jailer. "The hope of an immediate triumph for an attractive and democratic socialism has evaporated," we are told, with infinite sadness by Ernst Fischer, one of the best known Marxist philosophers in the world, former Secretary of State for Culture in Vienna, and a member of the Central Committee of the Austrian Communist Party, the "local Garaudy."

"What did the news of the Russian intervention in Prague mean for you?"

"At the time I was writing a book in a little Styrian valley, in complete peace. At 7 in the morning on 21 August my wife entered my room, her face distraught and her hands trembling with emotion. She was carrying a transistor radio. "Am I losing my mind?" she cried. "You listen, then -- it isn't possible." And in fact, we then heard the news of the intervention. I was stupefied, aghast, terrified. Two days later I made the statement to the Central Committee of my Party that this was not only an error, but a crime as well.

Then, ignoring the rising protests from the ranks of their friends, the Soviets increased their pressure, week after week. On 27 September, in Budapest, the main communist parties met again, with the Soviets present, to finalize arrangements for the coming summit talks planned in Moscow. Mr. Boris Ponomarev, the Russian representative, set aside all criticisms, arguing the danger of a third world war which necessitated "strategic precautions," and to those who expressed their concern he replied: "I do not see why what is happening in Czechoslovakia should prevent us from further tightening our ranks in order to cope with the German determination for revenge, as well as the American aggression against Vietnam and in the Middle East."

In fact, behind this apparent relaxation, there is something more serious: the Russian leaders, from experience, believe in the efficacy of steady efforts behind the scenes, and they had begun an internal effort to recoup within the protesting communist parties. The Jeannette Vermeersch affair (see the section on France) is but one example. In Italy, a special propaganda effort aimed at the communist federations in Emilia is evident. In Finland, when the communist party leadership condemned the invasion, the local organization in the port of Turku approved it enthusiastically. Pravda chose to note only the stand of this particular group. Mr. Arvid Pelche, a Lett member of the Political Bureau of the Soviet Communist Party, went to Helsinki where he tried to win the support of the former leader of the Finnish party, Mr. Aimo Aaltonen, who has close links with Moscow, against the current and more independent president, Mr. Aarne Saarinen. These divisive maneuvers certainly did not increase the ranks of the Finnish Communist Party, which suffered a veritable catastrophe during the municipal elections.

Another example: while the Secretary General of the Swedish Communist Party, Mr. Carl-Henrik Hermansson, sharply condemned the Soviet undertaking, a party daily published in Lulea, the Norskens Flamman, continued to express approval of the Russian line. Immediately, Moscow pretended to regard Mr. Hermansson as the head "of a revisionist group" and the Moscow radio described him as a "vociferous hothead."

As if that were not enough, the East Berlin journal Neues Deutschland reported that "his wife inherited a fortune totalling some half a million crowns." A strange prelude to an election campaign. The Swedish communists, who hoped for a triumph, collapsed, and found themselves with three deputies instead of eight. More dramatic still: the Greek Communist Party has gone to pieces and the USSR is manipulating foreign "leadership" headed by Mr. Kostas Koliyannis, who, naturally, approved of the Prague affair. It took indignant letters from thousands of communists locked up in the Laros Prison -- including Manolis Glezos, the man who during the war tore the Nazi flag down from the Acropolis -- to make it clear that this "leadership" meant nothing.

Thus far, the major Russian maneuvers have failed. And the chance that they will prove fruitless is the greater since the problem of approval or condemnation is a thing of the past. The fact of which the West has become aware is the dramatic absence of a model of socialism in which one could simply believe in a society entering into the era of technological revolution.

"The young people," Ernst Fischer tells us further, "want to leave the old formulas behind. Neither the Catholic hierarchy nor that of Moscow, with their old ways of thinking, can exert any appeal for them. This is why they elect Che Guevara or Mao Tse-tung. Personally, I believe in communism, but not in just any old communism." Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030007-9

di MINO MONICELLI

(PCI Objects to Soviet Pressures)

ROMA. « La radice del male è in via delle Botteghe Oscure. Bisogna estirparla, anche a costo di gravi lacerazioni, prima che sia troppo tardi ». Questa frase, detta a Mosca da un esponente sovietico, ha segnato l'inizio dell'offensiva decisiva contro il PCI. L'autunno si annuncia per il partito comunista italiano gravido di incognite. Nuovi bi tempestose si addensano sul suo orizzonte. Sono nubi che arrivano, insieme a lettere e opuscoli anonimi, da Dresda, da Varsavia, da Berlino Est, dai paesi del Patto di Varsavia; una valanga di materiale progressivo dei partiti comunisti voluto da Mosca.

E' possibile che per quell'epoca il Cremlino sia riuscito definitivamente a domare l'eresia di Praga e che Bilak e Indra o un qualsiasi altro uomo di paglia abbiano sostituito Dubcek e compagni nella stanza dei bottoni. In tal caso, i dirigenti comunisti italiani si troveranno ad affrontare l'ultima offensiva dei "carristi" praticamente con le spalle al muro. Essi sanno fin d'ora che Mosca è pronta a tutto, anche all'ultimatum, alla rottura, alla scomunica, pur di spegnere il focolaio di infezione che si annida in via delle Botteghe Oscure. E che al partito non sarà lasciata che un'alternativa: o cedere ignominiosamente oppure esporsi a una lacerazione la cui entità e le cui conseguenze appaiono, in questo momento, imprevedibili.

Gli interventi al Comitato centrale di sabato 19 ottobre, rudemente esplicito quello di D'Onofrio, più sfumato ma forse più insidioso quello di Secchia, riflettono indubbiamente una situazione che essi ben conoscono e che da tempo seguono con attenzione. Forse saranno questi due uomini a far esplodere ufficialmente la crisi e a indicare che la conclamata unità del gruppo dirigente comunista italiano non esiste più.

Anche Donini aveva espresso riserve, come si è detto, al penultimo Comitato centrale. Ma Donini non è mai stato un uomo di vertice; un intellettuale, più legato al Cremlino che a via delle Botteghe Oscure, ma senza alcun seguito. Con Secchia e D'Onofrio la cosa è diversa: Secchia è stato vice segretario del partito, il numero due subito dopo Togliatti; D'Onofrio è un vecchio militante ancora influente, già membro della segreteria, per anni ha diretto l'ufficio quadri del PCI, cioè l'organo dell'inquisizione russa. L'in-

tervento di Donini è stato più che altro uno sfogo. Quello di Secchia, e soprattutto quello di D'Onofrio, hanno ben altro significato, perché dietro di essi c'è un piano politico a lungo respiro.

Edoardo D'Onofrio oggi vuole essere l'interprete dell'ondata di critiche proveniente dalla base stalinista. Bisogna dire subito che ha le carte perfettamente in regola per pretendere a questa leadership. Il suo filosovietismo non è un atteggiamento intellettuale, ma un istinto di fondo. Il suo passato di comunista, di militante che ha conosciuto il carcere e ha passato lunghi anni in esilio a Mosca è ineccepibile. D'Onofrio non ha mai nascosto, anche nei momenti più difficili (come all'epoca dell'Ungheria), la sua incrollabile fedeltà all'Unione Sovietica. Egli ha sempre detto apertamente di non condividere i dubbi e le perplessità di molti compagni della direzione del partito (anche dei più prestigiosi, come Palmiro Togliatti), ma respinge l'epiteto di carista. Tuttavia non appena seppe che la direzione del PCI aveva condannato l'intervento sovietico in Cecoslovacchia (in quel momento si trovava in Bulgaria), inviò una lettera di protesta a Longo.

OGGI D'Onofrio è convinto che sia giunto il momento per far sentire la sua voce. Sa bene che la base non condivide la posizione del gruppo dirigente del PCI nei confronti dell'URSS ed è evidente che ambisce a diventare il leader di questo dissenso. Un dissenso che per il momento è spontaneo, ma che nulla impedisce possa essere trasformato in frazione organizzata all'interno (per ora) del partito, perché D'Onofrio non è solo, ha molti amici e non gli sarà

difficile fare proseliti anche tra i gruppi dissidenti di tipo maoista, guevarista, marcusiano, e tra tutti gli scontenti che si richiamano alle origini rivoluzionarie e operaiste del partito.

Ma i sintomi della crisi imminente e gravissima che sovrasta il PCI non si limitano agli interventi di Secchia e D'Onofrio all'ultimo Comitato centrale del PCI. Abbiamo parlato dell'alluvione propagandistica di provenienza polacca, tedesco-orientale e sovietica, da cui sono sommerse le organizzazioni periferiche del partito e molti compagni. Si tratta in genere di bollettini, di lettere aperte e di opuscoli anonimi in cui si attaccano i dirigenti cecoslovacchi e, indirettamente, coloro che li appoggiano. Il flusso di tale materiale si è talmente intensificato nelle ultime settimane che recentemente "l'Unità" ha dovuto pubblicare un corsivo per mettere sull'avviso i compagni e per denunciare questi "metodi inammissibili". Particolare rilievo, in questo martellamento propagandistico, hanno avuto una serie di lettere aperte ai compagni, in cui si denuncia violentemente la politica di Longo.

A questi mezzi di pressione se n'è aggiunto, ultimamente, un altro ben più gravido di conseguenze. E' noto che il Cremlino ha già cominciato a tagliare i viveri al PCF, fino a due mesi fa considerato il più ortodosso dei partiti comunisti occidentali. Questa misura di rappresaglia per la "ripromissione" dell'intervento sovietico in Cecoslovacchia, manifestata pubblicamente dai comunisti francesi, ha messo in crisi i vari enti controllati dal PCF e che viveva-

no sugli scambi con l'Unione Sovietica (l'Interagra, per esempio specializzato nel commercio cerealicolo; o il CDLP, che aveva il monopolio delle pubblicazioni sovietiche).

A sanzione moscovita ha aggravato una situazione finanziaria già precaria, per cui il problema di Waldeck Rochet è ora di trovare un compromesso con Mosca che gli consenta di evitare il peggio, cioè la bancarotta. Un sintomo di questa incipiente disponibilità al compromesso del PCF è il contentino offerto ai sovietici con il "biasimo" inflitto a Roger Garaudy, leader della corrente filocecoslovacca del partito. Anche la soppressione, ufficialmente attribuita a motivi finanziari, della rivista "Democratie Nouvelle", simpatizzante per la causa di Praga, potrebbe rispondere al medesimo scopo. Corre voce, a questo proposito, che sarebbe minacciata l'esistenza anche di "Lettres Françaises", diretta da Aragon, che ha condannato l'intervento sovietico con estrema violenza. Comunque, a tutte queste pressioni sul piano finanziario, va ora aggiunto il ricatto politico costituito dalle dimissioni dal partito di Jeannette Vermeersch, vedova di Maurice Thorez e portabandiera della corrente dei filosovietici "incondizionali".

E' evidente che si tratta anche, nel caso francese, di sintomi più che inquietanti: e infatti non hanno mancato di allarmare profondamente i responsabili delle finanze del PCI e in particolare gli amministratori dell'organo del partito. L'eventualità che Mosca tagli i viveri anche al PCI avrebbe conseguenze gravissime, se si pensa che già qualche anno fa si parlava di sopprimere l'edizione romana dell'"Unità". Se il PCI non si piegherà a un compromesso è ormai certo che l'edizione romana verrà soppressa e ridotto il numero delle pagine del settimanale "Rinascita". Questi allarmi si possono cogliere negli interventi al Comitato centrale di Anelito Barontini e di Luciano Barca, che hanno insistito sulla necessità che il partito si mobiliti per far fronte alle esigenze economiche. L'appello al partito, in realtà, aveva anche un altro scopo, oltre a quello di mettere in favore delle finanze esauste: e cioè suscitare un certo risentimento

antisovietico tra i burocrati degli apparati, il cui personale, a causa del ricatto finanziario moscovita, è minacciato di falcidia. « Ecco, compagni, appena mostriamo un po' di indipendenza, ci vogliono piegare per fame ». Questo ricatto della fame, a dire il vero, non è stato ancora messo in atto da Mosca. Ma tutto lascia prevedere che lo sarà fatalmente dopo il 17 novembre, se il PCI non si allineerà. ← → ← →

LE MONDE, 24 October 1968

Mme Jeannette Thorez-Vermeersch

Née le 26 novembre 1910 à Lille, Lucie Marie dite Jeannette Vermeersch a douze ans lorsqu'elle entre comme tisserande dans une usine de textiles du Nord; elle a dix-huit ans lorsqu'elle adhère au parti communiste; elle en a vingt-trois lorsqu'elle rencontre, au cours d'un meeting de la jeunesse communiste, Maurice Thorez, qui est depuis trois ans secrétaire général du parti communiste. Devenue sa compagne, elle a de lui trois enfants, Jean, Paul et Pierre nés respectivement en 1935, en 1941 et en 1946, et l'épouse en 1947.

Membre du secrétariat des Jeunesses communistes du Nord (1930-1931), puis de la commission nationale des jeunes syndiqués de la C.G.T.U. (1931-1932, elle accède au bureau national des Jeunesses communistes, où elle siège de 1932 à 1934. De 1935 à 1939 elle fonde puis dirige avec Danielle Casanova et Marie-Claude Vaillant-Couturier « l'Union des jeunes filles de France ».

Au lendemain de la seconde

guerre mondiale, qu'elle passe en U.R.S.S., elle entre en 1945 au comité central du P.C.F., qui l'élit en 1950 membre du bureau politique du parti. Au sein de la direction elle adopte souvent des positions intransigeantes, notamment au moment des manifestations anti-américaines de 1952 et de nouveau après le XX^e congrès, préconisant alors une déstalinisation très lente et prudente. La maladie et l'absence du secrétaire général, dont elle est l'agent de liaison avec la direction du P.C.F. et au nom duquel elle s'exprime avec autorité, l'amène à intervenir, non sans se heurter parfois avec tel ou tel dirigeant, dans le règlement des successives « affaires » Tillon, Marty, Lecœur qui secouent entre 1950 et 1956 l'état-major du parti.

Membre des deux Assemblées constituantes (1945-1946), puis député de la Seine de 1946 à 1959, elle siège ensuite au Sénat d'avril 1959 jusqu'au 22 septembre 1968, date à laquelle elle ne sollicite pas le renouvellement de son mandat.

M. Roger Garaudy

Né à Marseille le 17 juillet 1913, M. Roger Garaudy est agrégé de philosophie et docteur ès lettres.

Après trente mois d'internement dans un camp de concentration allemand, il regagne la France. Député du Tarn aux deux Assemblées constituantes (1945-1946), il est élu membre de la première Assemblée nationale, mais ne conserve pas son mandat le 17 juin 1951. Il le retrouve en 1956 comme député de la Seine. Vice-président de l'Assemblée nationale de 1956 à 1958, il siège ensuite au Sénat d'avril 1959 à novembre 1962, date à laquelle il abandonne son mandat pour se consacrer à la philosophie, qu'il enseigne actuellement à la faculté des lettres de Poitiers. Membre du P.C.F. depuis

1933, il entre au comité central en 1945. Membre suppléant du bureau politique de 1956 à 1961 il y siège à « part entière » depuis lors.

Directeur des « Cahiers du communisme » et du Centre d'études et de recherches marxistes (C.E.R.M.), il est l'auteur de plusieurs livres parmi lesquels, l'Humanisme marxiste. De l'anathème au dialogue. Marxisme du vingtième siècle. Il a publié tout récemment Prague 1968 : la liberté en sur-sis (voir le Monde des 6-7 octobre) et vient de faire paraître. Pour un modèle français du socialisme (voir le Monde du 16 octobre).

M. Roger Garaudy est docteur ès sciences de l'Institut de philosophie de l'Académie des sciences d'U.R.S.S.

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EXCERPTS FROM
L'ESPRESSO, Rome
27 October 1968

(PCI Objects to Soviet Pressures)

by Mino Monicelli

"The roots of evil lie in via delle Botteghe Oscure [Italian Communist Party headquarters.] Even at the cost of a serious mutilation it must be eradicated before it is too late." This statement, which was made in Moscow by a Soviet leader, marked the beginning of the decisive offensive against the Italian Communist Party [PCI]. Autumn promises to be fraught with unknown factors for the PCI. Stormy clouds are gathering on the horizon. They are clouds which are moving in along with anonymous letters and pamphlets from Dresden, Warsaw, East Berlin, and the Warsaw Pact countries. They form an avalanche of propaganda against the PCI which, together with the material distributed by the Soviet and Polish Embassies in Rome and by the USSR Novosty news agency, is spilling onto the regional sections and the houses of the rank and file militants. After having practically liquidated the new Czechoslovak leadership, the Soviet Union is determined to get rid of the Italian heretics. The top PCI leaders are convinced of this. They know that November will be the month of truth; the crucial date is 17 November when the conference preparatory to the Congress of the Communist Parties called by Moscow will be held in Budapest.

It is possible that by that time the Kremlin will definitely have succeeded in controlling the Prague heresy and that Bilak and Indra or any other stray puppet will have replaced Dubcek and his comrades in the push button room. In that case, the Italian communist leaders will have to face the final offensive of the "tank drivers" [carristi] with their backs practically to the wall. They already know that Moscow is ready for anything, even an ultimatum, excommunication, or a break, as long as it can destroy the hotbed of infection which is lodged in via delle Botteghe Oscure, and that the party will only have one alternative: either to surrender shamefully or to expose itself to mutilation, the importance and consequences of which are unpredictable at this time....

The statements uttered at the Central Committee on Saturday, 19 October -- an outright explicit one by D'Onofrio, and the more toned down, but perhaps more insidious one by Secchia -- undoubtedly reflect a situation with which they are well acquainted and which they have been closely following for some time. Perhaps it will be these two men who will officially bring about the explosion of the crisis and point out that the proclaimed unity of the Italian communist governing group no longer exists.

Donini had also voiced his reservations, as it was said, at the last but one Central Committee meeting, but Donini never has been a summit man. He is an intellectual, with greater ties to the Kremlin than to via delle Botteghe Oscure, but without any following. In the case of Secchia and D'Onofrio the situation is different: Secchia has been deputy secretary of the party, the number two man immediately after Togliatti; D'Onofrio is an old, still influential militant. A former member of the secretariat, for years he directed the PCI cadres office, that is, the Russian inquisition organ, Donini's speech was a matter of letting off steam more than anything else.

The speech by Secchia, and particularly that of D'Onofrio, assume quite a different meaning because behind them lies a long-term political plan.

Edoardo D'Onofrio would now like to be the interpreter of the wave of criticism coming from the Stalinist rank and file. It must be said that his papers are in perfect order for seeking this leadership. His pro-Soviet stand is not an intellectual stance, but a basic instinct. His Communist past, as a militant who has been in jail and who has spent many years in exile in Moscow, is unimpeachable. D'Onofrio never did hide, even at the most difficult moments (such as during the Hungarian events) his unshakable loyalty to the Soviet Union. He has always openly said that he does not share the doubts and the perplexities of many of his comrades in the party leadership (even those with the greatest prestige, such as Palmiro Togliatti), but he rejects the attribute of "Tank Driver." However, as soon as he learned that the PCI leadership had condemned the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia (he was in Bulgaria at the time), he sent a protest letter to Longo.

Today D'Onofrio is convinced that the time has come to make his voice heard. He is well aware that the rank and file do not share the PCI leadership's stand with regard to the USSR, and it is obvious that he would like to become the leader of this dissenting group. It is a dissention which for the time being is spontaneous, but which nothing prevents from becoming an organized faction inside the party (for the time being) because D'Onofrio is not alone. He has many friends and it would not be difficult for him to proselytise among the Mao, Guevara, Marcuse type dissidents and among all the malcontents who recall the revolutionary and working class origins of the party....

However, the signs of the imminent and very grave crisis which threatens the PCI are not restricted to the statements read by Secchia and D'Onofrio at the latest PCI Central Committee meeting. We have referred to the flood of propaganda from Polish, East German, and Soviet sources in which the party's regional organizations and many comrades are being immersed. They are kinds of bulletins, open letters, and anonymous pamphlets in which the Czechoslovak leaders are attacked, and indirectly those who support them. The influx of such material has

in recent weeks increased to such an extent that of late L'UNITA had to issue an article warning its comrades and to denounce these "inadmissible methods." In this propaganda pounding, of particular importance was a series of open letters to the comrades violently denouncing Longo's policy.

To these forms of pressure another more fraught with consequences has been recently added. It is well known that the Kremlin has already begun to cut off its subsidies to the French Communist Party, which until two months ago was considered the most orthodox of western communist parties. This measure of reprisal for "reproaching" the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, which was publicly reported by the French communists, has created a crisis inside several enterprises controlled by the French Communist Party whose existence depended on exchanges with the Soviet Union (for example the Interagra, which specialized in the trade of grain products, or the CDLP [Centre de Diffusion du Livre et de la Press] which had a monopoly on Soviet publications.

The Moscow sanctions have aggravated an already precarious financial situation as a result of which Waldeck Rochet is now faced with the problem of reaching a compromise with Moscow which will allow him to avoid the worst, that is, bankruptcy. A sign of this incipient availability for a compromise on the part of the French Communist Party is the appeasement offered to the Soviets with the "censure" of Roger Garaudy, the leader of the party's pro-Czechoslovak faction. The suppression, officially attributed to financial motives, of the journal Democratie Nouvelle, which backs the Prague cease, might serve the same purpose. There is a rumor in this connection that the existence of Lettres Francaises, directed by Aragon, who issued an extremely violent condemnation of the Soviet intervention, is also threatened. In any case, to all these financial pressures is now added the political blackmail of the resignation from the party by Jeannette Vermeersch, Maurice Thorez' widow and the standardbearer of the "unconditional" pro-Soviet faction.

It is obvious that in the case of the French Communist Party, it is a matter of signs that are more than disquieting and, in fact, they have not failed to deeply alarm those responsible for the PCI's financial situation, particularly the administrators of the party organ. The possibility that Moscow might cut off its subsidy to the PCI would also have grave consequences, if one remembers that already several years ago there was talk of abolishing the Rome edition of L'Unita. If the PCI does not yield to a compromise, it is certain that the Rome edition will be abolished and the number of the pages in the Weekly Rinascita reduced. The alarm created by these possibilities can be seen from the Central Committee speeches Anelito Barontini and Luciano Barca who emphasized that the party must mobilize in order to meet the economic demands. Actually, the appeal to the party also had a purpose other than that of mobilizing it in favor of the exhausted funds and that was to arouse a certain anti-Soviet resentment among the bureaucrats of the apparati whose personnel are threatened by having their salaries cut as

a result of Moscow's financial blackmail. "So, comrades, no sooner had we displayed a little independence, than they want to starve us to our knees. To tell the truth, Moscow has not yet put this blackmail by starvation into practice, but there is every reason to believe that it will inevitable after 17 November, if the PCI does not fall into line...."

La relazione del compagno Natta al Comitato Centrale e alla CCC apre il dibattito sul documento preparatorio del XII Congresso

Alternativa democratica al centro-sinistra Nuova unità internazionalista

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Diamo qui di seguito un ampio resoconto del rapporto svolto dal compagno Alessandro Natta al Comitato Centrale.

In questa sessione del CC e della CCC dobbiamo decidere sulla convocazione del XII congresso del partito per il quale proponiamo la data del 26 gennaio e la sede di Bologna. La direzione ha preparato un progetto di documento politico che occorre ora discutere e definire e che dovrà quindi costituire la piattaforma del congresso.

I segni dei tempi indicano grandi e sconvolgenti avvenimenti. Una crisi, un complesso di ribellioni e di scontri — ultimo quello tragico del Messico — fanno gravare il senso di un sommovimento profondo. Le spinte sempre più imperiose alla pace, alla libertà delle nazioni, alla liberazione dell'uomo — che sollecitano la lotta di forze sempre più imponenti e nuove — si scontrano con il sistema e la politica dell'imperialismo e del capitalismo, ma le vie della loro affermazione sono faticose, complesse, e su di esse pesa innanzi tutto il condizionamento delle armi atomiche ed il rischio del loro fuoco

distruttore, e pesano anche le difficoltà dell'azione unitaria dello stesso schieramento di pace e antimperialistico. Questa consapevolezza dei dati nuovi, complessi e contraddittori della realtà del mondo e della Italia, dell'emergere di questioni nuove, deve essere alla base del nostro impegno e del nostro dibattito congressuale.

Ci rendiamo conto che vi è una forte attesa nel partito, nelle altre forze politiche, tra i lavoratori e nell'opinione pubblica democratica per il nostro congresso. Ad esso noi ci accingiamo muovendo da un ben saldo retroterra. Il terreno solido, da cui guardiamo le cose nuove per compiere passi in avanti, è quello dell'elaborazione teorica e delle lotte sulla via italiana al socialismo; il terreno è quello dei fatti che abbiamo saputo promuovere, con la direzione del compagno Longo, confermando la validità della nostra linea politica e la funzione di avanguardia del nostro partito, fatti che hanno trovato espressione il 19 maggio nel successo nostro e dello schieramento unitario delle sinistre; il terreno è quello dei fatti che, più recentemente, di fronte alla crisi di Cecoslovacchia hanno testimoniato la

coerenza tra principi e azione della nostra politica, l'autonomia e l'internazionalismo del nostro partito e la profonda unità dei gruppi dirigenti e del complesso del partito su questa linea.

Un documento aperto

Il progetto di documento non propone, tuttavia, un richiamo sistematico a tutti gli elementi della nostra elaborazione politica né un bilancio dell'attività del partito. Avremo, per l'approfondimento, un rapporto di attività del partito che sarà messo a disposizione del congresso. L'impegno che la Direzione ha inteso affrontare con il documento e che propone per il congresso è quello di misurarci in modo aperto con i dati nuovi, di verificare in modo critico e di portare avanti la nostra politica nello sviluppo delle cose. Per questo abbiamo teso ad un documento che cogliesse i fatti decisivi

e indicasse, anche in modo problematico, le tendenze di fondo, senza proporsi un'interpretazione compiuta di tutti gli aspetti e che della nostra linea politica richiamasse gli elementi essenziali, un documento, cioè, con una più accentuata impronta politica per stimolare la ricerca e la discussione.

Proponiamo, cioè, un congresso caratterizzato da un dibattito aperto su problemi aperti, che stimoli un più largo impegno di elaborazione anche — nel limite in cui è possibile — nel campo dell'impostazione teorica. Il punto è quello di unire la discussione nel partito all'iniziativa e alla battaglia politica. La saldatura d'altra parte è obbligatoria di fronte alle scadenze elettorali (turno di novembre), alle lotte operaie e contadine, agli impegni internazionali.

Ecco perché abbiamo bisogno di un dibattito aperto alla partecipazione più larga, in cui l'affermazione di una precisa linea politica e l'unità del partito su di essa comporta un confronto aperto e schietto, in cui la polemica ideale e politica ha piena cittadinanza, mentre non ne ha e non può averne il «tema» tra la «scomunica» e l'abiura.

Il quadro che abbiamo di fronte è quello, drammatico, di una realtà in sommovimento. Il processo di trasformazione è complesso e non univoco. Le fiamme della denuncia e della protesta che si accendono in parti diverse hanno alla loro origine le condizioni sempre più intollerabili per i popoli e per gli uomini, determinate dalla logica del capitalismo. A questa radice occorre ricondurre — e la denuncia è venuta dalla stessa Chiesa cattolica — lo sfruttamento e l'oppressione coloniale, lo stato di sottosviluppo, la fame, l'esistenza al limite animale di tanta parte dell'umanità, il divario nelle risorse degli Stati. A questa radice va ricondotta la politica con cui l'imperialismo e gli USA hanno teso a bloccare e svuotare il moto di indipendenza e di liberazione nazionale, ricorrendo alla violenza, all'aggressione — come nel Vietnam — alle guerre locali, agli interventi armati. Questa linea accentua, d'altra parte, all'interno del sistema imperialistico, le contraddizioni che diventano sempre più laceranti, da cui emergono poi le tendenze, che anche in un paese come l'Italia vengono in luce, alla concentrazione del potere economico e politico, all'autoritarismo, allo svuotamento degli istituti e dei diritti democratici.

All'origine della crisi dobbiamo porre il fatto nuovo che queste tendenze aggressive e autoritarie si collocano nel quadro della condi-

zione atomica, del mutamento del carattere stesso della guerra, del potere distruttivo delle armi termoneucleari per le stesse basi della civiltà. Siamo di fronte ad un potenziale distruttivo che per la sua enormità finisce per stimolare una crescente concentrazione del potere e dei meccanismi di decisione, fino al punto di ridurre, in sostanza, nelle mani di gruppi ristretti la sorte dei popoli. L'umanità avverte questo limite pauroso, terrificante che oggi è posto al moto di emancipazione e di progresso e vi è nello stesso tempo la coscienza del contrasto assurdo e stridente tra le conquiste dell'intelligenza umana, della scienza e della tecnica e l'incapacità a creare un mondo di pace, di libertà e di uguaglianza dei popoli e degli uomini.

Scienza e cultura

E vi è ancora la funzione e la collocazione nuova che la scienza e la cultura sono venute assumendo nelle società avanzate, la coscienza in strati notevoli dell'intellettualità, nei giovani studenti di un nuovo ruolo che non può e non vuole essere più quello del tessuto connettivo del sistema capitalistico. Questa funzione nuova della cultura e dell'intellettualità entra in contrasto con il sistema che l'ha evocata e stimolata e il capitalismo e i suoi regimi si trovano di fronte al maturare di nuovi antagonismi.

Alcuni di questi problemi — come quello dell'autonomia, della libertà, della funzione nuova della cultura e della scienza — investono anche le società socialiste, dove, del resto, si pongono anche esigenze di sviluppo della partecipazione delle masse nella vita economica e politica, in un quadro tuttavia che vede sorgere contraddizioni, ma non antagonistiche e che sollecitano soluzioni organiche legate al processo storico, alle diverse e concrete condizioni dei diversi paesi socialisti.

Un immediato impulso a questa carica di libertà e di progresso è venuto dalla resistenza e dalla lotta del popolo vietnamita, dal colpo che esso ha dato alla strategia aggressiva degli USA, dalla mobilitazione di solidarietà che quel moto di liberazione nazionale ha determinato nel mondo. Ma più a fondo — nella prospettiva storica — bisogna indicare il mutamento dei rapporti di forza nel mondo, che ha alla sua origine la rivoluzione d'Ottobre, la costruzione del socialismo in URSS, lo impulso che da qui è venuto

ai moti di liberazione dei lavoratori, di riscossa dal colonialismo, la costruzione di una potenza economica e militare, come quella sovietica, che ha contribuito in modo decisivo ad aprire nuove vie all'espansione dell'area e all'affermazione delle idee del socialismo. Intendiamo sottolineare — è chiaro — un dato che non riguarda solo la storia di questi cinquant'anni, ma il presente e l'avvenire; il peso oggettivo, la funzione determinante dei paesi socialisti e dell'URSS in primo luogo nello schieramento antimperialistico.

La coscienza di tale peso ci fa guardare con preoccupazione ai ritardi nell'opera di rinnovamento aperta dal XX congresso, ai contrasti e alle divisioni che segnano la vita del campo socialista e del movimento comunista — dal contrasto determinato dalle posizioni cinesi alla crisi cecoslovacca — che hanno senza dubbio indebolito anche l'unità e l'efficacia della lotta delle forze antimperialistiche e di pace. Questa consapevolezza stimola ad assumere sempre più coscienza della necessità per il nostro movimento di affrontare e risolvere i problemi che lo stesso sviluppo delle società socialiste e della nostra forza ci impone. Ciò è tanto più urgente nel momento in cui la crisi della strategia imperialistica trova un limite nel fatto che in questi anni sono stati colpiti i falsi miti del benessere, di un capitalismo capace di correggere le proprie brutture e di farsi popolare. Siamo di fronte, su scala mondiale, ad un processo che preme verso una trasformazione profonda; ma è un processo non lineare, né univoco, in cui non sono da escludere sbocchi involutivi e soluzioni reazionarie, talvolta feroci (Indonesia, Grecia), in cui il pericolo di una guerra di sterminio non è né spezzato né scongiurato. Ma tutto ciò non fa che confermare — come hanno confermato questi anni di lotte e di allargamento dell'opposizione antimperialistica — la validità delle nostre teorie economiche e sociali, dell'idea socialista dell'abolizione dello sfruttamento dell'uomo sull'uomo e della socializzazione dei mezzi di produzione, l'idea del socialismo come l'espressione più alta e compiuta della libertà e della democrazia.

L'obbiettivo della pace

La lotta per il socialismo propone alcuni grandi obiettivi. Al primo

posto noi abbiamo indicato — e lo ribadiamo — l'obiettivo della pace. Ci richiamiamo a tutta la nostra elaborazione e in particolare allo impegno che Togliatti pose nello indicare il significato e il carattere nuovo di tale obiettivo. Dobbiamo ora vedere quali ragioni abbiano determinato un'attenuazione dell'iniziativa nostra. Per assicurare e garantire la pace occorre oggi liberare il mondo dal condizionamento atomico, eliminare dalle prospettive possibili quella, oggi sempre presente, dell'urto e della catastrofe termonucleare. Di qui tutto il valore di necessità della idea e della lotta per la coesistenza pacifica. Il problema di fronte al quale ci troviamo non è quello di una qualche alternativa, perché se dovesse cadere la prospettiva della coesistenza pacifica cadrebbe tutto il resto, tutte le ipotesi di libertà dei popoli e di emancipazione dei lavoratori.

Il problema che abbiamo di fronte è quello dei contenuti attuali della lotta e delle forme di lotta contro l'aggressività USA e della battaglia ideale per distinguere ciò che la coesistenza pacifica deve essere da ciò che coesistenza pacifica non è. Il documento richiama a questo proposito una serie di tesi. A me importa ora sottolineare solo l'idea fondamentale della lotta per la coesistenza come un processo che deve investire tutti i campi — politico, ideale, economico — deve fondarsi sulla partecipazione, come protagonisti, di tutti gli stati e i movimenti di liberazione e di indipendenza nazionale; deve far leva sullo sviluppo dei processi rivoluzionari e di rinnovamento delle diverse parti del mondo.

Il punto al quale soprattutto si volge la nostra attenzione, nel momento presente, è quello del così detto «bipolarismo», la visione cioè, dei rapporti e della politica internazionale, secondo la logica dei blocchi e, in essi, delle due maggiori potenze. E qui non importa tanto respingere — come del resto abbiamo fatto — l'attacco deformante calunnioso che permane, ma ha scarsa incidenza, da parte cinese, ai fondamenti stessi della linea di coesistenza e alla politica dell'URSS, in ogni suo atto, presentata costantemente, senza preoccupazione della verità o del verosimile, come il frutto di un'intesa con l'imperialismo americano. La insidia da respingere per un giusto orientamento della lotta per la pace è soprattutto quella che viene nel nostro paese dai fautori incalliti dell'atlantismo ed oggi del suo rilancio militare, che prospettano in definitiva la politica dei blocchi, il «bipolarismo» come se si trattasse di un equilibrio salutare, il cui turbamento porterebbe ad una nuova guerra, come se questa

fosse davvero la via realistica attraverso cui dovrebbe passare la pace. Questo non è altro che il modo americano di intendere la coesistenza.

Così, mentre non possiamo non renderci conto delle esigenze di difesa dei paesi socialisti, non possiamo nemmeno tacere il nostro giudizio critico nei confronti di posizioni che oggi, nella stampa di alcuni paesi del Patto di Varsavia, sembrano voler riproporre, in seguito alla crisi cecoslovacca, concezioni sostanzialmente restrittive del campo delle forze socialiste ed antimperialistiche, ed enunciazioni di irrigidimento del blocco socialista o di limitazione dell'autonomia e sovranità di ciascuno Stato, in base a valutazioni della situazione internazionale e di quella interna del paese in questione, valutazioni delle quali non si sa chi e a quale titolo sarebbe giudice o arbitro. Sono posizioni che ci appaiono in contraddizione sia con l'esigenza, dall'URSS più volte affermata, di una lotta per la coesistenza che veda partecipi, e su basi di uguaglianza, tutti gli Stati del mondo, sia con le linee fissate dal PC d'Europa, a Karlov Vary, per il superamento dei blocchi, sia con posizioni di principio tante volte affermate nel nostro movimento.

La logica dei blocchi è stata quella della guerra fredda. Il suo superamento è dunque obiettivo essenziale della politica di coesistenza per l'autonomia e l'indipendenza delle nazioni, per la libertà delle scelte sociali e politiche e per il libero progresso di ogni paese.

Le spinte in questa direzione sono cresciute, anche nell'ambito occidentale. La realtà che ci troviamo di fronte non è più solo quella dei blocchi, ma anche quella di una serie di esperienze da parte di paesi che hanno importanza e peso nell'Europa e nel mondo, i quali sono venuti impegnandosi in una politica attiva, autonoma, restando fuori, o allentando progressivamente i loro vincoli militari e politici nel blocco in cui erano inseriti.

I governi italiani sono andati e vanno invece in una direzione opposta, anche con il centro-sinistra e la presenza dei socialisti. Nei momenti decisivi ha sempre operato il vincolo atlantico, la subordinazione alla politica aggressiva degli USA. Bisogna cambiare radicalmente tale politica perché l'Italia deve essere garantita contro il rischio di essere trascinata in guerra. E' puro pretesto affermare che

l'Italia deve restare nella NATO per ragioni di sicurezza. Nessuno minaccia, nessuno ha minacciato la nostra indipendenza. Il limite vero, pesante, alla nostra sicurezza e alla nostra indipendenza è stato ed è questa politica di asservimento. Noi ci preoccupiamo e dobbiamo preoccuparci della sorte della Italia che vogliamo sia oggi e sia nell'avvenire, anche in un regime socialista, al di fuori di ogni e qualsiasi blocco. Noi rivendichiamo per l'Italia il bene primo della pace, e ad ogni costo. Abbiamo alle spalle l'esperienza tragica di due guerre. E' un'esperienza che non deve ripetersi. L'Italia non deve essere lo scudo dell'imperialismo americano!

Centro-sinistra atlantico

L'Italia deve in ogni caso restare fuori da ogni conflitto. Ai movimenti politici e ideali, ai socialisti, ai cattolici che hanno vissuto le dure esperienze belliche del passato, resistendo per i valori della pace e della neutralità, noi rinnoviamo l'appello ad un'azione comune per salvaguardare la pace del nostro paese. E' un appello che ha per noi anche il senso di un impegno a non esitare, per quanto ci riguarda, a mobilitare le masse dei lavoratori e del popolo e a guidarle contro chiunque volesse trascinarci in una guerra.

Ma l'azione del governo italiano va nella direzione di un aggravamento della tensione come dimostrano anche le ultime iniziative per l'armamento atomico e la posizione circa la firma del trattato anti-H.

La linea della coesistenza, la lotta per una politica attiva di pace e di neutralità, alle quali sono strettamente legati il rinnovamento democratico e l'avanzata al socialismo del nostro paese, collocano chiaramente il PCI sul terreno degli interessi permanenti e fondamentali della nostra gente e lo schierano nello stesso tempo nel grande movimento mondiale di lotta per la pace e contro l'imperialismo.

Abbiamo dato — credo giustamente — grande rilievo alle novità che si sono verificate e si verificano nel movimento cattolico. La svolta di Giovanni XXIII e del Concilio ha dato il via ad un processo che spinge masse cattoliche a lottare contro l'imperialismo e il colonialismo, per la pace, e a cercare un rapporto nuovo, un dialogo con altre forze, su obiettivi pratici, al di là delle divergenze ideologiche. La sofferita coscienza re-

ligiosa — il polo apocalittico del cattolicesimo — giunge, da parte di avanguardie, fino all'appello alla lotta rivoluzionaria. Non ci sfugge certo la complessità e la contraddittorietà del processo. Vediamo i gesti di cautela, di controllo pesante, di ritorno indietro delle più alte gerarchie. Ma le manifestazioni del dissenso cattolico, la contestazione aperta di atti e posizioni dello stesso pontefice dicono anche quali potenzialità democratiche esistono nelle masse cattoliche su scala mondiale e nel nostro paese.

E' sulla base di questo giudizio che noi riaffermiamo la validità della nostra linea, volta alla ricerca di un avvicinamento, di un rapporto, di un'intesa tra movimento operaio di ispirazione marxista e movimento cattolico. Per questo noi riteniamo di grande interesse il recente documento sul dialogo del segretario per i non credenti, e il complesso delle sue affermazioni sul valore del pluralismo, sulla maturità e libertà dell'uomo, sulla verità come risultato della ricerca e, soprattutto, sulla legittimità e possibilità del dialogo per fini pratici, nel campo dell'azione sociale e politica.

La crisi della socialdemocrazia

In un ambito diverso europeo si pone il problema delle forze e dei partiti socialisti e socialdemocratici. Vediamo la crisi che investe oggi la politica della socialdemocrazia. Al nodo si trovano i miti tradizionali del riformismo e le « scelte di civiltà » che i dirigenti socialdemocratici hanno compiuto schierandosi su una linea, quella dello atlantismo, che ha diviso l'Europa e che, con l'anticomunismo assurdo, ha tolto alla classe operaia la possibilità di esercitare davvero una funzione dirigente nell'azione per la pace e per il socialismo.

La crisi delle concezioni dell'integrazione della classe operaia e della gestione del sistema capitalistico, per razionalizzarlo e umanizzarlo, la crisi dell'atlantismo di stampo socialdemocratico hanno già avuto un riflesso nei diversi paesi europei, incrinature vi sono state nel tradizionale orientamento anticomunista, tra le masse dei lavoratori, dei militanti della socialdemocrazia in Europa.

L'altro dato che occorre sottolineare è che noi muoviamo sempre dalla valutazione della consistenza e dell'influenza reale in Europa delle organizzazioni socialdemocratiche; dal fatto che l'unità fra socia-

listi e comunisti sarebbe un elemento decisivo per determinare un mutamento di rapporti di forza, per superare la politica dei blocchi e i rischi reazionari. La nostra dura polemica contro la socialdemocrazia non può quindi prescindere mai dalla paziente ricerca della unità.

La visione dell'estendersi e del diversificarsi insieme delle forze (stati, partiti, movimenti politici e ideali) che nei diversi continenti sono venuti assumendo un sempre più chiaro impegno di lotta antimperialista e per il socialismo fa sorgere il problema dei punti di iniziativa comune. Qui è già presente l'idea nostra delle vie e del metodo dell'unità, che a noi sembra opportuno riaffermare, come un fatto necessario, una condizione dello sviluppo rivoluzionario, di fronte alle dimensioni mondiali del nostro movimento, all'incontro della nostra concezione marxista e leninista con civiltà, con culture, con popoli dei diversi continenti. Questa idea, che fonda l'unità sulla diversità, sulla realtà effettuale che già indica caratteristiche assai differenziate nello sviluppo di una serie di stati socialisti — da quelli europei alla Cina, a Cuba, al Vietnam, alla Corea — pur sulla base di rivolimenti strutturali e di obiettivi comuni, e sulla autonomia dei partiti e degli stati, a noi appare sempre più un dato essenziale e irrinunciabile.

La nostra critica al monolitismo, non è critica e rifiuto dell'unità, ma critica e rifiuto di un errore perché in quel modo si fa dell'unità un fatto formale e autoritario, illusorio quindi, alla prova dei fatti. Su questa base teorica e politica già all'VIII congresso Togliatti aveva affermato che l'unità si può ottenere in due modi: come « risultato di una costrizione proveniente dall'esterno, di una trasposizione meccanica o imitazione servile di indirizzi altrui, e questo lo respingiamo. Ma può essere unità che si crei nella diversità e originalità delle singole esperienze, si alimenti del reciproco spirito critico, si rafforzi nella autonomia dei singoli partiti. Di questa seconda unità abbiamo bisogno ».

Quando parliamo di nuovo internazionalismo vogliamo sottolineare l'avanzata di forze nuove e l'estensione dello schieramento antimperialistico, e indicare una concezione dei rapporti, un modo nuovo di costruire la unità. Il nostro dissenso dagli altri partiti — quando c'è stato — è nato da uno spirito di profonda solidarietà, nel riconoscimento che

la nostra linea è fatta anche dei legami storici e vivi con l'URSS, con gli altri paesi socialisti e i partiti comunisti di tutto il mondo.

Riprendendo il tema della Cecoslovacchia il compagno Natta ha affermato le ragioni della nostra posizione di appoggio alla linea politica e all'impegno di rinnovamento e di sviluppo della democrazia socialista del PCC e del nostro dissenso e riprovazione dell'intervento militare dei cinque paesi del patto di Varsavia. Ribadiamo tali posizioni — ha detto Natta — perché tutti i fatti provano che era infondata l'ipotesi catastrofica sulla gravità e imminenza del pericolo controrivoluzionario. Restano la nostra preoccupazione e la nostra ansia per uno stato di cose in cui la presenza in Cecoslovacchia delle truppe del patto di Varsavia si riflette negativamente sulla autorità degli organismi legali, democraticamente eletti, dello Stato e del Partito e sul libero svolgimento della loro attività, e nei rapporti tra i partiti comunisti.

Il nostro partito ha sempre evitato la delineazione e la proposta di un modello astratto di socialismo. La via italiana è per noi un processo rivoluzionario che muove dall'incapacità della classi dirigenti, nel sistema del capitalismo monopolistico di Stato, di risolvere i problemi del paese — quelli storici e quelli nuovi — che fa leva sulla tensione sociale, politica ed ideale e sulla combattività delle masse, sulle idee e sull'impegno socialista di un complesso di forze politiche e ideali diverse, che nella prospettiva socialista vedono, oggi, la garanzia del progresso, del rinnovamento, della libertà e della indipendenza della nazione. La validità di questa linea emerge dal cammino che abbiamo compiuto in questi anni ed è convalidata dalla realtà attuale del nostro paese.

Improprietà del centro-sinistra

Il compagno Natta ha quindi fornito al CC e alla CCC un'ampia analisi della crisi economica sociale e politica che travaglia la nostra economia, e del fallimento del centro sinistra. L'affermazione centrale che il documento sottolinea — ha detto Natta — è quella della improprietà del centro sinistra. Su questo punto la nostra opposizione è netta e decisa. Di qui muove il nostro appello a tutte le forze democratiche e di sinistra, laiche e cattoliche, perché riflettano sullo stato di malessere, di tensione e perché cerchino, con sincerità, le vie nuove che bisogna cominciare a percorrere. Il centro si-

PLATFORM FOR 12TH PARTY CONGRESS PLANNED

[Article; "Natta's Report on Draft Theses for 12th Party Congress"; Rome, L'Unita(organ of Italian CP), Italian, 17 October 1968, pp 5-6]

"At this session of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, we must decide when to convoke the party's 12th Congress: we propose that the Congress be held on 26 January in Bologna. The Directorate (Executive Committee) has prepared a draft of the political document that must now be discussed and finalized and that will then be the platform of the congress.....

THE CRISIS OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

"The problem of the forces and the socialist and social-democratic parties is posed in a different European framework. We can see the crisis that today invests the policy of social democracy. At the center are found the traditional myths of reformism and the "choices for civilization" that the social-democratic leaders have made by aligning themselves with the line of Atlantism, which has divided Europe and, with an absurd anticommunism, has prevented the working class from availing itself of the opportunity to exercise in fact a leading role in the action for peace and socialism.

"The crisis of the conceptions concerning the integration of the working class and involving the administration of the capitalist system to rationalize and humanize it and the crisis of the Atlantism of the social democratic brand have already had a repercussion in various European states, and cracks have appeared in traditional anticommunist orientation among the masses of the workers and the militants [activists] of social democracy in Europe.

"We must also emphasize the following: we always proceed from an evaluation of the persistence and genuine influence in Europe of the social democratic organizations; we proceed from the fact that the unity between socialists and communists would be a decisive element for determining a change in the balance of forces and surmounting the policy of blocs and reactionary risks. Our hard polemic against social democracy must then always proceed with a view to a patient search for unity.

"The extension and diversification of the forces (states, parties, political and ideological movements) that in the various continents have been assuming an ever-increasingly clear commitment to the anti-imperialist struggle and for socialism give rise to the problem of a common initiative. Here we already find our idea about the ways toward and method of unity, which we feel it is time to reaffirm as a necessary fact and a condition of revolutionary development, given the worldwide dimensions of our movement and the encounter of our Marxist and Leninist conception with cultures and peoples of diverse continents. This idea, which bases unity on diversity, on an effectual reality that is already indicating very different characteristics in the development of a series of socialist states — from the European group to China, Cuba, Vietnam, and Korea —, although on the basis of structural changes and common objectives and on the autonomy of the parties and states — this idea, it seems to us, is an essential and irrenounceable fact.

"Our criticism of monolithism is not a criticism of unity and its rejection. Rather it is the criticism and the rejection of an error because, otherwise, unity becomes a formal and authoritarian fact, an illusion when put to the test. On this theoretical and political basis, Togliatti had affirmed back at the 8th Congress that unity can be attained in two ways: 'as a result of compulsion from the outside, of a mechanical transposition or servile imitation of others' directions -- and this we reject. But there can be a unity that is created in the diversity and originality of single experiences; they nourish one another with a reciprocal critical spirit. And they are strengthened in the autonomy of the single parties. We need this second unity.'

"When we speak of a new internationalism, we wish to emphasize the advancement of new forces and the extension of the anti-imperialist alignment and point out a way to conceive relations, a new way to build unity. Whenever we had a disagreement with other parties, it was born because of a spirit of profound solidarity, the acknowledgement that our strength also stems from the historical and viable ties with the USSR and the other socialist countries and communist parties in the world."

Then returning to the subject of Czechoslovakia, Comrade Natta affirmed the reasons for our position of supporting the Czechoslovak Party's political line and its commitment to renewal and the development of socialist democracy and disapproving the military intervention of the five Warsaw Pact countries, "We emphasize these positions," Natta said, "because all the facts concerning the imminent and grave danger of counterrevolution were without foundation. Our preoccupation and anxiety persist because the presence of the Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia reflects adversely on the authority of the legal, democratically elected organs of the state and party and on the uninhibited discharge of their responsibilities, on the relations between communist parties."

"Our path has always refrained from delineating and proposing an abstract model of socialism. The Italian path is for us a revolutionary process that proceeds from the inability of the leading classes in the system of state monopoly capitalism to solve the country's problems, both historical and new, that affect social, political, and ideological tensions and the combativeness of the masses, the ideas and socialist commitment of a complex of political forces and diverse ideals, which in the socialist prospect see today a guarantee of the progress, renewal, freedom, and independence of the nation. This line has been validated by the path we have traversed in recent years; it has been confirmed by the current reality of our country."

socialization of the means of production are not enough. Who in the end has the power? For an answer I am given this euphemism: the workers and the peasants. But in Czechoslovakia, the working people wanted to seize power and this undertaking was denounced as counterrevolutionary by the occupying forces. I believe that the scientific and technical revolution is one of the essential conditions of a humane socialism. And this was the great merit of Professor Radovan Richta -- to show this in Czechoslovakia. But watch out: without democracy, the technological revolution will not produce humane socialism, but a barracks communism."

This Radovan Richta to whom Fischer refers is still unknown to the public at large. And yet this man in his 50's, sick, tubercular, nervously exhausted, is in the process of splintering an ideological empire. One knows the name of Mr. Ota Sik or Mr. Dubcek. However, more than anyone else, this professor, the director of the Institute of Philosophy at the Academy of Sciences in Prague, where thousands of communist intellectuals like Roger Garaudy are being trained today, was indeed the great craftsman of the Czech experiment.

Six years ago, when it was clear that the country was headed for bankruptcy and that for a Czechoslovakia deprived of raw materials and of ports, there was only one solution, "technological reconversion," Mr. Antonin Novotny turned to Professor Richta and asked him to study what might be a "model of technical civilization" within the framework of a socialist society. Richta recruited the best sociologists, economists and psychologists the country had and set to work.

His "reports" were a series of bombshells. In January 1968 he saw his ideas triumph. The French Communist Party review Democratie nouvelle (New Democracy) had, in a special issue, set forth the essence of them, but this issue was never to see the light of day. The party saw fit to kill it. The editor in chief, Paul Noirot (communist), wrote in an introductory article: "The basic idea of this new path was that each citizen of a socialist country should, finally, have not less, nor the same, but greater freedom of speech, of expression, of assembly, of movement and of travel than the freedoms offered by the most fully developed bourgeois societies."

And here is something which may at first glance seem idealistic and literary. But Richta's strength is in saying not "it must be so because this is good," but "it must be so or we will perish." Why? Because in a certain sense socialism was conceived within the framework of a civilization which is in the process of disappearing. "That civilization was based on two conflicting components: more and more powerful and complex machines, on the one hand, and ever larger armies of unskilled manpower, on the other. Now the technological revolution is tending to invert these terms completely."

Can one still speak of "proletarian democracy" as in Moscow, when we are moving toward "the abolition of an ever

vaster scale of basic manipulative functions carried out by man," when the tertiary sector is expanding increasingly? Complete automation, says Richta, requires "40 percent skilled workers, 40 percent of the personnel with secondary education, and 20 percent of the personnel with higher education."

And in view of the future he adds: "In the course of the coming decades, it will be the work of regulation which will predominate in production (of the adjustment type). Later, this will yield to the preparatory phase, to technical management and to the drafting of plans (of the engineering type). By the end of the century, production will have ceased to be a labor process in the sense it is today."

In other words, the very frontier which separates the "workers' class" from the "intelligentsia" is tending to disappear. The most effective means of increasing the creative capacities of society is not production in itself, but investment in man, education, and also "participation." Finally, notes Richta, the "expansion of mass consumption is becoming quite as essential a condition for economic growth as the limitation of mass consumption was in the past."

Each phrase here opens up vast horizons of consequences following one after the other: the strength of this "model" is that it is not merely moral, it does not appeal merely to an abstract concept of freedom. Richta sets forth with rare scientific precision the fact that the socialism of tomorrow remains entirely to be defined. What can tanks do against that?

In a month, for thousands of communists in the west, this vague apprehension has come to the forefront. In the issue of the French Communist Party review La Nouvelle Critique (The New Criticism) which will come out next month, the following lines will appear under the byline of Andre Gisselbrecht: "The renewal of a concept of socialism saw the light of day within the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party itself, through mutual understanding between statesmen and men of science. Thus it involves something other than adding 'additional liberty' to a socialist model. It is a matter of a scientific analysis of the development of productive forces."

The discussion concerns not only communists, but contemporary men as well.

L'EXPRESS, Paris

28 October 1968

Pourquoi les jeunes choisissent Che Guevara

« Si vous voulez que le socialisme offre de nouveau à la jeunesse son visage attrayant, vous devez dénoncer les dirigeants « faillis » qui gouvernent aujourd'hui le Kremlin. »

Failli : le mot a été prononcé par M. Roger Garaudy à la dernière session du Comité central du P.c. français. Et il n'y eut personne pour siffler, protester ou taper du pied. En deux mois, ce qui était blasphème est devenu banalité. Aujourd'hui, à Rome, à Helsinki, à Vienne comme à Paris, on ne se pose déjà plus la question : « Avec les Russes jusqu'où ? » mais bien celle-ci : « Le socialisme pour quoi faire ? »

Un nouvel accord de Moscou a été signé. Les soldats soviétiques resteront en Tchécoslovaquie et M. Alexandre Dubcek n'obtiendra un sursis qu'à condition d'être son propre geôlier. « L'espoir d'une victoire immédiate d'un socialisme attractif, démocratique, s'est effondré », nous dit, avec une infinie tristesse, Ernst Fischer, un des philosophes marxistes les plus connus dans le monde, ancien secrétaire d'Etat à la Culture à Vienne et membre du Comité central du P.c. autrichien, le « Garaudy local ».

« Qu'a signifié pour vous l'annonce de l'intervention russe à Prague ? »

— J'écrivais à ce moment, en toute quiétude, un livre dans une petite vallée styrienne. Le 21 août, à 7 heures du matin, ma femme entra, le visage défiguré, mains tremblantes d'émotion, dans ma chambre. Elle portait un transistor. « Suis-je folle ? » s'écria-t-elle. Ecoute donc, ce n'est pas possible. » Et l'on entendit effectivement la nouvelle de l'intervention. J'étais stupéfait, consterné, épouvanté. Deux jours plus tard, je déclarais devant le Comité central de mon parti qu'il s'agissait non seulement d'une faute, mais aussi d'un crime. »

Grignotage. Depuis, insensibles aux protestations qui montaient des rangs de leurs amis, les Soviétiques ont, semaine après semaine, accentué leur pression. Le 27 septembre, à Budapest, les principaux partis communistes étaient de nouveau réunis en présence des Soviétiques pour mettre au point la prochaine conférence au sommet prévue à Moscou. M. Boris Ponomarev, le représentant russe, écarta toutes les critiques en arguant du danger d'une troisième guerre mondiale qui imposait des « précautions stratégiques », et il répliqua à ceux qui exprimaient leur

trouble : « Je ne vois pas pourquoi ce qui se passe en Tchécoslovaquie nous empêcherait de resserrer nos rangs afin de faire face au revanchisme allemand ainsi qu'aux agressions américaines au Vietnam et au Moyen-Orient. »

En fait, derrière cette apparente décontraction, il y a plus grave : les dirigeants russes croient par expérience à la vertu du long grignotage et ont commencé de l'intérieur un travail de récupération au sein des P.c. contestataires. L'affaire Jeannette Vermeersch (voir section France) n'en est qu'un exemple. En Italie, on assiste à un effort particulier de propagande en direction des fédérations communistes d'Emilie. En Finlande, alors que la direction du Parti communiste a réprouvé l'invasion, l'organisation locale du port de Turku l'approuva d'enthousiasme. La « Pravda » ne voulut connaître que cette prise de position particulière. M. Arvid Pelche, membre « letton » du Bureau politique du P.c. soviétique, se rendit à Helsinki où il tenta de s'appuyer sur l'ancien leader du Parti finlandais, M. Aimo Aaltonen, très lié à Moscou, contre son président actuel plus indépendant, M. Aarne Saarinen. Ces manœuvres de division n'ont certainement pas accru l'audience du P.c. finlandais, qui a subi un véritable désastre au cours des élections municipales.

Grandes manœuvres. Autre exemple : alors que le secrétaire général du P.c. suédois, M. Carl-Henrik Hermansson, condamnait vivement l'initiative soviétique, un quotidien du Parti publié à Lulea, le « Norskens Flamman », continua d'approuver la ligne russe. Aussitôt, Moscou feignit de considérer M. Hermansson comme le chef « d'un groupe révisionniste » et la radio moscovite le qualifia de « brailleur intempérant ».

Comme si cela ne suffisait pas, le journal de Berlin-Est « Neues Deutschland » écrivit que « sa femme avait hérité d'une fortune se chiffrant à un demi-million de couronnes ». Curieux prélude à la campagne électorale. Les communistes suédois, qui espéraient un succès, s'effondrent et se retrouvent avec trois députés au lieu de huit. Plus dramatique encore : le P.c. grec a éclaté et l'U.R.S.S. manipule une « direction » extérieure présidée par M. Kostas Koliyannis, qui, naturellement, a approuvé le coup de Prague. Il a fallu que des milliers de communistes emprisonnés au bagne de Laros — dont Manolis Glézos, l'homme qui arracha pendant la guerre le drapeau

nazi de l'Acropole — écrivent des lettres indignées pour faire savoir que cette « direction » ne représentait rien.

Jusqu'ici, les grandes manœuvres russes ont échoué. Et elles ont d'autant plus de chances de se révéler vaines que le problème de l'approbation ou de la réprobation est bien dépassé. Ce dont on vient de prendre conscience en Occident, c'est de l'absence dramatique d'un modèle de socialisme qui soit simplement crédible dans une société entrant dans l'ère de la révolution technologique.

Vieux schémas. « La jeunesse, nous dit encore Ernst Fischer, veut sortir des vieux schémas. Ni la hiérarchie catholique ni la hiérarchie moscovite, avec leurs vieilles manières de penser, ne peuvent exercer une attraction sur elle. C'est pourquoi elle choisit Che Guevara ou Mao Tsé-toung. Moi, je crois au communisme, mais pas à n'importe quel communisme. Le pouvoir politique et la socialisation des moyens de production, cela ne suffit pas. A qui revient ce pouvoir ? On me répond par cet euphémisme : aux ouvriers et aux paysans. Mais, en Tchécoslovaquie, le peuple des travailleurs a voulu prendre le pouvoir et cette entreprise a été taxée de contre-révolution par les occupants. Je crois que la révolution scientifique et technique est une des conditions essentielles d'un socialisme humain. Et ce fut en Tchécoslovaquie le grand mérite du Pr Radovan Richta que de le montrer. Mais attention : sans démocratie, la révolution technologique ne produira pas de socialisme humain, mais un communisme de caserne. »

Ce nom de Radovan Richta, auquel Fischer fait allusion, est encore inconnu du grand public. Et pourtant, cet homme d'une cinquantaine d'années, malade, tuberculeux, fatigué nerveusement, est en train de faire éclater un empire idéologique. On connaît M. Ota Sik ou M. Dubcek. Et pourtant, plus que quiconque, ce professeur, directeur de l'Institut de philosophie de l'Académie des sciences à Prague, dont des milliers d'intellectuels communistes, comme Roger Garaudy, se nourrissent aujourd'hui, fut bien le grand artisan de l'expérience tchèque.

Il y a six ans, quand il fut clair que le pays allait à la faillite, et que pour une Tchécoslovaquie dépourvue de matières premières et de ports il n'y avait qu'une solution, « la reconversion technologique », M. Antonin Novotny se tourna vers le Pr Richta et lui demanda d'étudier ce que pourrait être un « modèle de civilisation techni-

cienne » dans le cadre d'une société socialiste. Richta s'entoura des meilleurs sociologues, économistes, psychologues que comptait le pays et se mit au travail.

Bombes. Ses « communications » furent une suite de bombes. Janvier 1968 vit le triomphe de ses idées. La revue du P.c. français, « Démocratie nouvelle », en avait, dans un numéro spécial, dégagé l'esprit : mais ce numéro ne verra jamais le jour. Le Parti a préféré tuer la revue. Son rédacteur en chef (communiste), Paul Noirot, écrivait dans le préambule : « L'idée fondamentale de ce nouveau cours était que chaque citoyen d'un pays socialiste doit finalement disposer non pas d'une plus petite, ou de la même, mais d'une plus grande liberté de parole, d'expression, de réunion, de mouvement et de déplacements que celles qu'offre la plus épanouie des sociétés bourgeoises. »

Voilà qui peut paraître à première vue idéaliste et littéraire. Mais la force de Richta est de dire non pas : « Il faut que ce soit ainsi parce que c'est bien », mais : « Il faut que ce soit ainsi, sans quoi nous périrons. » Pourquoi ? Parce qu'une certaine forme de socialisme a été conçue dans le cadre d'une civilisation qui est en train de disparaître : « Celle qui était fondée sur ces deux composantes en opposition, des machines de plus en plus puissantes et complexes, d'une part, des armées de plus en plus grandes de main-d'œuvre humaine non qualifiée d'autre part. Or, la révolution technologique tend à renverser complètement ces termes. »

Peut-on encore parler de « démocratie prolétarienne » comme à Moscou quand on va vers « l'abolition à une échelle de plus en plus vaste des fonctions fondamentales de manipulation exercées par l'homme », quand le secteur tertiaire s'étend de plus en plus ? L'automation complète, dit Richta, exige « 40 % d'ouvriers qualifiés, 40 % de personnel ayant reçu une formation secondaire et 20 % de personnel ayant reçu une formation supérieure ».

Participation. Et il ajoute dans une vision prospective : « Au cours des prochaines décennies, c'est le travail de régulation qui dominera dans la production (type de l'ajusteur) ; plus tard, il cédera la place à la phase préparatoire, à la direction technique et à l'établissement des projets (type de l'ingénieur). A la fin du siècle, la production aura cessé d'être un processus de travail au sens d'aujourd'hui. »

Autrement dit, la frontière même qui sépare la « classe ouvrière » de l'« intelligentsia » tend à disparaître. Le moyen le plus efficace pour accroître les capacités créatrices de la société est non pas la production en soi, mais l'investissement dans l'homme, l'éducation, et aussi la « participation ». Enfin, note Richta, l'« élargissement de la consommation des masses devient tout autant une condition nécessaire de la croissance économique que l'était précédemment la limitation de la consommation des masses ».

Chaque phrase, ici, ouvre un champ infini de conséquences en chaîne : la force de ce « modèle » est qu'il n'est pas simplement moral, qu'il ne se réclame pas d'une idée abstraite de la liberté. Richta constate avec une rare rigueur scientifique que le socialisme de demain reste totalement à définir... Que peuvent les tanks contre cela ?

En un mois, pour des milliers de communistes en Occident, cette vague appréhension s'est transformée en évidence. Dans le numéro de « La Nouvelle Critique », revue du P.c. français, qui paraîtra le mois prochain, on pourra lire sous la signature d'André Gisselbrecht ces lignes : « Le renouvellement de l'idée du socialisme prit naissance dans le Comité central du P.c. tchèque lui-même, par l'entente entre hommes d'Etat et hommes de sciences. Il s'agissait donc d'autre chose que d'ajouter à un modèle socialiste un « supplément de liberté », il s'agissait d'une analyse scientifique de l'évolution des forces productives. »

Le débat concerne non seulement les communistes, mais également l'homme moderne. J.-F. K. □

RISING SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The conspicuous display of a Soviet naval-amphibious presence in the Mediterranean during and since the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967 has dramatized to the West the Soviet Union's efforts to improve the mobility of its traditionally land-based military power. As early as 1964, however, the Soviets gradually began to establish a naval presence in the Mediterranean, using regular submarine patrols and other vessels during the Cyprus crisis. It was only after Brezhnev demanded withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in April 1967, just before the Arab-Israeli conflict, that the appearance of additional Soviet naval units in the eastern Mediterranean attracted widespread attention. The presence of a number of tank and troop-landing ships in the increased force of about thirty to forty combat and auxiliary vessels drew particular notice, for the Soviets thereby created the impression they were willing to intervene by means of local landing operations. This turned out to be merely a gesture, for even at the height of the six-day war the Soviets gave no sign of wishing to become militarily involved in Arab-Israeli fighting.

Increase in Soviet Ships

During 1967, 152 Soviet naval vessels entered the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles, and all but about forty of them entered after the Arab-Israeli war in June. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sixty-two of these ships have not re-entered the Black Sea, although some have probably left the Mediterranean via the Strait of Gibraltar to join the Pacific and Baltic fleets or to join whatever Soviet naval units may be in the Indian Ocean.

Since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, important elements of the Soviet navy have entered the Mediterranean, also from the Black Sea. The addition of these ships reinforces the apparently permanent Soviet presence in the Mediterranean to a total of over fifty warships, supply vessels and other auxiliaries. These include two cruisers, at least four fast escort vessels, a nuclear submarine plus several conventional submarines, and six intelligence collecting ships. Most significant was the appearance in mid-September of the first of the Soviet Union's helicopter carriers, Moskva, a 25,000 ton vessel commissioned last year, which can carry thirty helicopters or operate V.T.O.L. aircraft. The Moskva is also equipped with guided missiles, with the launchers on the forecastle. By late October there was an estimated total of sixty Soviet ships in the Mediterranean, although there have been indications that the Soviets may have altered or duplicated the numbers on some of the vessels, in an attempt to mislead Western observers. So far the ships have been operating in small groups rather than as a fleet, and in some instances becoming mixed up with American naval units during the latter's maneuvers and snooping on American radar or counter-radar wave-lengths. (Concurrently, the Soviet press has

carried direct attacks against the U.S. Sixth Fleet, claiming that the Soviet naval buildup is in the interest of national security as it is intended to counter "foreign machinations" near USSR territory.)

There have been recent rumors that there will soon be a major rotation of the Soviet ships, with the Moskva and three missile-armed units scheduled to return to the Black Sea. If true, the rotation will reduce the force level to between thirty and forty ships, which was the average number maintained during the Arab-Israeli war. Nevertheless, all evidence points to a permanent Soviet presence and a long-term Soviet interest in the Mediterranean and North Africa. This evidence includes reports that the Soviets are building more helicopter carriers and other ships especially designed for use in the Mediterranean and African waters. Moreover, the Soviets are developing an amphibious force, similar to the U.S. Marines, with special equipment for landing operations. (See attached Time article of 23 February 1968.)

Soviets Seek Port Facilities

In addition to their fleet buildup, the Soviets are seeking special facilities in North African ports besides the repair facilities already available to them in Alexandria and Port Said, Egypt, and in Latakia, Syria. These facilities, together with the provisions and fuel carried by their own supply vessels, greatly extend their capability for long-term cruising in the Mediterranean.

In October a Soviet military delegation arrived in Algeria, probably to discuss additional military assistance. (Algeria has already received some \$235 million in military aid from the Soviet Union, and major economic agreements include Soviet assistance to the Algerian fishing industry and, over the next few years, purchase by the Soviets of five million hectoliters of Algerian wines.) It is believed that the Soviets also urged the Algerian government to agree to grant the Soviet fleet fuller use of the facilities at the former French strategic base of Mers-el-Kebir in the western Mediterranean in return for Soviet maintenance of the base and Soviet training of the Algerian navy.

Earlier, the Algerians had asked the French for assistance in reorganizing their navy, which is Soviet-equipped and trained, and in renovating Mers-el-Kebir as an Algerian naval base, but to date there has been no reply from Paris to this proposal. The French decided to quit the base last year, a decade earlier than agreed upon in 1962, and since then Algerian officials have repeatedly emphasized that no power, Soviet or otherwise, would be allowed to establish a base anywhere in Algeria.

Although units of the Soviet fleet have made a number of visits to Algeria in the past eighteen months, the use which they can currently make of Mers-el-Kebir facilities is limited, and they are not known to have used any of the available maintenance facilities in Algiers. As of mid-1968, total Communist military personnel in Algeria were estimated at between

1500 and 3000, with probably no more than 60-100 Soviet technical advisers at Mers-el-Kebir. Thus, recent European press reports that the Soviets have assumed maintenance of Mers-el-Kebir and that there are now 10,000 to 18,000 Soviet civilian and military technicians in Algeria appear exaggerated. (On 23 October Izvestia published an article by its Algerian correspondent in which he ridiculed as a "desert mirage" an article appearing in the 8 October issue of the conservative French paper Aurore reporting 18,000 Soviet "military experts" in Algeria, but such a refutation from the Soviets may have been designed to counter the growing attention of the Western press to the increased Soviet presence in the Mediterranean.)

While French officials doubt the accuracy of these press reports, at the same time they have expressed genuine concern over growing Soviet influence on the Algerian economy and the increasing military dependence of Algeria on the Soviets. Yet the costs involved, the basic political instability of Algeria and pressure from various French interest groups would appear to restrict France's ability to compete with the Soviet Union in Algeria.

The Soviets are also apparently interested in the Moroccan port of Casablanca, for they finally received permission from the Moroccan government for several ships to visit the port for the first time in mid-October. The usual routine of calls and entertainment was arranged for them, but in general their reception was only correct at best. It is rumored that at the time of the visit, the Moroccans were offered the necessary spare parts to recommission the dozen or so MIG fighter and trainer aircraft which the Soviets delivered to them in 1961, but which have not been operational since late 1965 for lack of spare parts. Apparently a number of Soviet military technicians who arrived with the fleet have remained in Morocco to survey maintenance requirements of the aircraft before servicing them.

Widespread Concern over Soviet Presence

In the meantime, there are indications of widespread growing concern in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East over the Soviet naval thrust into the Mediterranean. At a mid-October meeting in Lisbon of the Atlantic Treaty Association, an organization made up of private citizens interested in promoting understanding and support of alliance policies, General Lyman Lemnitzer, Supreme Commander, Allied Forces Europe, commented that the Soviet naval buildup was of "serious concern," but he did not endorse the alarmist view of it taken by the European press. Most recently the subject was raised before the five-day NATO meeting in Brussels, which was concerned with revising political and military plans as a consequence of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. U.S. Senator Henry M. Jackson told the meeting the Soviet Union was apparently building its forces not only in the Mediterranean, but in the Indian Ocean and Norwegian Sea as well.

The Spanish press has reflected, if not helped to create, the anxiety of Spaniards over Soviet fleet operations in the Mediterranean, including

articles on the presence of Soviet ships a few miles from the joint U.S.-Spanish base at Rota. Spanish concern is heightened, moreover, by their awareness of the smallness of their own navy and their dependence on Western forces for their defense.

Although Yugoslavia has allowed Soviet naval units to use shipyard repair facilities on its coast, it has recently been concentrating on raising the combat readiness of its navy since the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the reinforcement of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet, which could now be used to pressure either Yugoslavia or Albania for base facilities. (The Soviets lost a submarine base in Albania because of the Sino-Soviet conflict.) The Yugoslav government has also announced a supplementary defense allocation of \$32 million for 1968, citing the current world situation as the reason. This brings the Yugoslav defense budget to approximately twenty percent above the 1967 allocation.

Some observers see Moscow's next move, as part of its drive toward the Mediterranean, in using Bulgaria to pressure Yugoslavia over Macedonia. For some time Bulgarian newspapers have recalled old Bulgarian claims that much of Yugoslav territory is really Bulgarian. This press campaign has become more intense since the beginning of the Czech crisis. Last March Sofia commemorated the 90th anniversary of the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano, which aimed to create a "greater Bulgaria" in what is now Yugoslav and Greek territory. Intervention in that year by the Western powers and the resulting Berlin Treaty prevented most of Macedonia from coming under Bulgarian-Russian domination and denied to Russia an outlet on the Aegean Sea and control of the Turkish Straits, both traditional goals of its foreign policy. Thus, apprehension in Yugoslav Macedonia -- fed by the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, Arab-Israeli tension and Soviet threats to Yugoslavia since the occupation of Czechoslovakia -- has now spread to Greek Macedonia. The fear there is that any Soviet-backed Bulgarian move against Yugoslav Macedonia could develop into a serious threat to itself.

Others reported to be concerned over the increased Soviet naval strength include the Tunisian government, whose fears of subversion or aggression by Algeria or Egypt -- since its boycott of the Arab League -- have been heightened by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and Tunisia's condemnation of it; also the Iranian government, whose concern is apparently based on the possibility that one of the Soviet goals in strengthening its naval forces is to reopen the Suez Canal, by which the Soviet presence could then be easily extended into the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. In fact, it has been increasingly rumored that the Egyptians may have already agreed to a Soviet request to reopen the southern end of the Suez Canal.

Counteraction by the Western alliance

The Soviet fleet buildup in the Mediterranean has been watched closely, however, by both NATO and SHAPE, and the reports of additions to the Soviet fleet have coincided with the announcement that the Western alliance is

HAMBURGER ABENDBLATT, Hamburg
3 October 1968

Italiens Kommunisten im Osten nicht beliebt

Die „Konterrevolutionäre“ von Rom

Eigener Bericht

Rom, 3. Oktober

Aus den Zeitungständen Moskaus, Warschaus und Ost-Berlins ist die „Unità“ verschwunden. Das Organ der italienischen Kommunisten, die sich neben den Russen und Chinesen immer mehr als dritter Bruder in der uneinigen Familie herauskristallisieren, wird im Osten gehaßt und gefürchtet. Es ist in seinen Leitartikeln der dritten Seite noch „konterrevolutionärer“, als es Dubcek und Cernik jemals zu sein wagten. Fast ist es zur Fahne der unterdrückten Freiheiten des Ostens geworden, auch wenn die wenigen Exemplare, die meist eine Woche alt sind, nur heimlich von Hand zu Hand gehen.

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Die „Bruderparteien“ können dieses Blatt nicht lieben. Die Hartnäckigkeit, mit der es das Modell einer sozialistischen Perspektive der Vielzahl der Meinungen und der nationalen Eigenarten vertritt, ist ihnen ungemein lästig. Obwohl man in Moskau jede Polemik mit der Stellung der KPI vermeidet und man sie in Warschau und Ost-Berlin verdreht und zerredet, hat sich unter den Volksmassen der Ostländer die Wahrheit doch sehr schnell verbreitet.

Man spricht von Longo wie von einem Apostel der sozialistischen Freiheit. Man sagt: „Wir haben den Sozialismus, aber nicht die Freiheit; in Westeuropa hat man die Freiheit, aber nicht den Sozialismus. Die KPI hingegen hat seit Togliatti das Problem der sozialistischen Demokratie, das heißt der Freiheit aufs Tapet gebracht. Nur das kann der Wegweiser in die Zukunft sein.“

Überall weiß man auch, daß seit Januar niemand die Reformbestrebungen Dubceks mehr unterstützt hatte als die italienischen Kommunisten. Viele betrachteten die CSSR als Vorfeld des italienischen Experiments eines liberalisierten, humanistischen Kommunismus. Wer heute trotz der eingedrungenen russischen Panzer weiter an einen solchen Kommunismus glaubt, setzt allein auf die moralische Zugkraft der KPI.

Argumente, aber keine Divisionen

Fühlen sich die Führer des italienischen Kommunismus stark genug, die in sie gesetzten Hoffnungen auch nur in etwa zu erfüllen? Zweifellos haben sie zahllose gültige Argumente, aber keine Divisionen. Sie wissen sehr wohl, daß der Kompromiß von Moskau nur ein fadenscheiniger Waffenstillstand ist, hinter dem

zwischen den Prager Reformern und der roten Orthodoxie weitergeht.

Der 21. August wurde vom Gros des KPI-Parteivolks verurteilt. Es hätte auch gar nicht anders sein können, nachdem die Parteilokale jahrelang mit Schriften über einen Kommunismus überschwemmt worden waren, der offen sein wollte zur „Zusammenarbeit mit den sozialistischen und katholischen Volkskräften“. Nur von den alten Parteimitgliedern, denen Rußland als „das erste Land des Sozialismus“ noch immer im Blute liegt, kam Zustimmung zu dem russischen Überfall.

Suche nach „neuen Ufern“

Aber im KPI-Hauptquartier will man den Bruch zwischen den Generationen verhindern. Einheitslich solle die Partei „die Straße zu den neuen Ufern“ suchen. Hinter dieser poetischen Sprache verbirgt sich die Notwendigkeit, eine Doktrin und Taktik für die Länder der fortgeschrittenen Industriekultur auszuarbeiten, „die in entsetzter Abwehr dem östlichen Kommunismus gegenüberstehen“.

Viele Beobachter mögen sich fragen, ob die Kampfansage Longos an die russische Gewaltherrschaft wirklich aufrichtig oder nur taktisch ist. Wir zweifeln nicht an der Aufrichtigkeit, weil sich Longo bereits viel zu weit vorgewagt hat, als daß er noch zurückkönnte. Italiens KPI-Chef ist über Nacht für alle Trostsuchenden des Ostens zu einem Mythos geworden, und von einem solchen Mythos kann er sich nicht lösen, wenn er sich nicht selbst und seine Partei einäschern

In der letzten Nummer der KPI-Wochenzeitschrift „Rinascita“ griff der junge Parteideologe Ingrao frontal die ganze Struktur im Osten an. Was andere

die zaristischen Traditionen Rußlands nennen, nannte Ingrao die Fatalität des bürokratischen Zentralismus und der Zusammendrängung der ganzen Macht in einem engen Staatsapparat. Dagegen habe sich die CSSR zu Recht erheben wollen. Von Rom aus gesehen läge die Gefahrenquelle für den Sozialismus nicht im Prager Freiheitsstreben, sondern in den Methoden, die Moskau mit den Panzern am Leben erhalte.

Die Revolution steht auf dem Spiel

Ingrao schloß: „Wir verlangen das Ende der bürokratischen Degeneration. Wir verlangen eine Ausweitung der inneren Parteidemokratie, und deshalb unterstützen wir die Gruppe um Dubcek. Denn hier entscheidet sich die Zukunft der Revolution. Die ganze marxistisch-leninistische Tradition hat sich nicht nur auf die Zustimmung der Massen gegründet, sondern auch auf die bewußte Mobilisierung der Arbeiterklasse und die kollektive Arbeit, aus der allein die schöpferischen Energien des Sozialismus kommen können.“

Die Konsequenz solch scharf umrissener Thesen ist klar: Wenn sich der russische Block den Liberalisierungsforderungen der italienischen Kommunisten verschließt — und bis zum Augenblick tut er das hartnäckig —, dann wird die ideologische und organisatorische Trennung von ihm unvermeidlich. Darüber scheint sich Longo mit den französischen, spanischen und englischen Genossen bereits einig zu sein. Das Wort Schisma ist noch nicht gefallen, um die Parteimasse, die in ihrem Reifungsgrad zurückgeblieben ist, nicht in die völlige Verwirrung zu stürzen; aber in der praktischen Entwicklung bewegt sich die italienische Führergruppe darauf zu.

Der Weg wird lang...

Der Weg wird lang und schwierig sein. Er wird um so schneller zurückgelegt, je schärfer sich der russische Druck auf die tschechoslowakische Freiheit erweist, je mehr das Moskauer Diktat die ideologischen Motive des Marxismus-Leninismus zusammenschlägt, je stärker die Pressezensur und das Versammlungsverbot den Bankrott des kommunistischen Messianismus umschreiben. Mit Entsetzen beobachtet man im KPI-Hauptquartier die fortschreitende Prager Involution, die von den Gewaltherrn frech „Normalisierung“ genannt wird. Ein Schlag nach dem anderen kommt gegen das, was Togliatti die „Humanisierung des Sozialismus“ nannte. Die Reaktion der KPI darauf wäre noch schärfer, wenn Longo nicht Angst hätte, der Sozialdemokratisierung bezichtigt zu werden. Gut doziert setzt er deshalb neben jeden An-

griff auf Moskau einen Angriff auf den Westen.

Die Furcht vor Sprüngen ins Unge- wisse lähmt. Deshalb ist es auch noch nicht zur Einberufung einer Konferenz der kommunistischen Parteien Westeuropas gekommen, die man in Rom schon vor zwei Wochen ins Auge faßte und zu der Belgrad und Bukarest verschiedent- lich ermutigten. Bisher hat man es bei zweiseitigen Zusammentreffen bewen- den lassen.

Aber wenn Moskau die eingeschlagene Straße weitergeht, wird die KPI ihre Position in einer autonomen Konferenz der westlichen Kommunisten bestätigen müssen; denn der Punkt, an dem sie angekommen ist, würde Resignation, Verwirrung und schließlich Verfall be- deuten. Longo hat die ganze Zukunft seiner Partei auf die Waagschale ge- worfen. Nach solchem Wagemut kann er nicht mehr kapitulieren.

Dr. Fritz G ordian

HAMBURGER ABENDBLATT, Hamburg
30 October 1968

ITALIAN COMMUNISTS NOT FAVORED IN THE EAST

The "Counterrevolutionaries" of Rome

Rome, 3 October.

L'Unita has disappeared from the newsstands of Moscow, Warsaw, and East Berlin. The organ of Italy's communists, who along with the Russians and Chinese are emerging more and more like a third brother in a disunited family, is hated and feared in the East. In its editorials of the third page it is even more "counterrevolutionary" than Dubcek and Cernik in their time dared to be. It is as if it has become the flag of the suppressed freedoms of the East, even though the few copies available (which usually are a week old) are passed secretly from hand to hand.

"The fraternal parties" cannot like this paper. The persistence with which it represents the model of a socialist perspective based on a multitude of opinions and national peculiarities is uncommonly burdensome to them. Though Moscow avoids all polemics with the position of the Communist Party of Italy (PCI) and though Warsaw and East Berlin twisted and distorted its position, the truth nevertheless has quickly spread among the popular masses of the eastern countries.

Longo is spoken of as an apostle of socialist freedom. In the East, people say: "We have socialism but not freedom; in Western Europe they have freedom but not socialism. But the PCI since Togliatti has brought to the fore the problem of socialist democracy, i.e., freedom. That is the only way to the future."

It is known everywhere also that since January no one has supported Dubcek's efforts at reform more than the Italian communists. Many regarded Czechoslovakia as the testing ground for the Italian experiment of a liberalized, humanistic communism. Whoever currently, despite the intrusion of Russian tanks, can still believe in such a communism now must rely on the PCI's moral attraction alone.

Arguments but no Divisions

Do the leaders of Italian communist feel strong enough to fulfill substantially the hopes rested in them? They certainly have countless valid arguments, but no military divisions. They know very well that the Moscow compromise is only a fake armistice behind which the dramatic tug of war continues between the Prague reformers and Red orthodoxy.

The 21st of August was massively condemned by the PCI rank-and-file. It could hardly be otherwise, after the local party units for years had

been swamped with writings about a communism which claimed to be open to "cooperation with socialistic and Catholic forces." Only the old party members to whom Russia remains the "first land of socialism" could approve of the Russian invasion.

Search for "New Shores"

But the PCI headquarters wants to prevent the break between generations. With unity the party is to seek "the way to new shores." Behind this political language hides the necessity to work out the doctrine and tactics of countries with an advanced industrial culture "which stand clear of Eastern communism in defensive disengagement."

Many observers may ask whether Longo's challenge to Russian hegemony is genuine or merely tactical. We have no doubt as to its genuineness, because Longo has already ventured too far to be able to turn back. Italy's PCI chief has become overnight a mythical figure for all those in the East who are seeking solace, and he cannot destroy this myth without smashing himself and his party to smithereens.

In the last issue of the PCI weekly journal Rinascita, the young party ideologic Ingrao made a frontal attack on the whole structure in the East. What others called the Czarist tradition of Russia, Ingrao called the fatal flaw of bureaucratic centralism and the concentration of all power in a narrow state apparatus. Czechoslovakia justifiably protested against it. From Rome's point of view the real danger of socialism was not to be found in Prague's strivings for freedom but in Moscow's methods, which it tries to keep alive with the help of tanks, according to Ingrao.

The Revolution Is at Stake

Ingrao concluded "we demand the end of bureaucratic degeneration, we demand an extension of inner party democracy and therefore we support the group around Dubcek. For here the future of the revolution is being decided. The whole Marxist-Leninist tradition has based itself not only on the consent of the masses but also on the conscious mobilization of the working class and on collective work, out of which alone the creative energies of socialism can arise."

The consequence of such sharply delineated theses is clear: if the Russian bloc closes its mind to the liberalizing demands of the Italian communists -- and up to now it is doing just that and very stubbornly -- then an ideological and organizational parting of the ways will be inevitable. In this, Longo already seems to be of one mind with the French, Spanish, and English comrades. The word "schism" has not yet been mentioned because it would throw the party masses, who lag behind in their degree of maturity, into complete confusion. But in terms of practical development, the intellectual leader group is moving in this direction.

The Revolution Will be Long ...

The road will be long and difficult. But the road will be traversed so much the more quickly, the more sharply, Russian pressure is exerted on Czechoslovak freedom, the more the Moscow "diktat" smashes the ideological motive force of Marxism-Leninism, the more strongly press censorship and the ban on free assembly demonstrate the bankruptcy of communist messianism. With horror, the PCI headquarters watched the continuing Prague-involution which the power lords impudently call "normalization." One blow after another is being delivered against what Togliatti called "the humanization of socialism." The reaction of the PCI would be even sharper if Longo were not afraid of being accused of being a social democrat. With even doses, he therefore accompanies every attack on Moscow with an attack on the West.

The fear of a leap into the unknown is paralyzing. For this reason it has not yet come to the point of convoking a conference of West European communist parties, an idea which arose two weeks ago in Rome and which Belgrade and Bucharest independently encouraged. Before that, bilateral meetings were more the order of the day.

But if Moscow persists in the course it has undertaken, the PCI will have to confirm its position in an autonomous conference of Western communists; for it has come to a point where resignation, confusion, and finally failure is to be expected. Longo has thrown the whole future of his party in the balance. After such boldness he can no longer capitulate.

Dr. Fritz Gordian

nistra serve solo all'attuale gruppo dirigente della DC. Se si vuol dunque battere il prepotere dc occorre far cadere ogni tentativo, ogni velleità di ripresa o di rilancio del centro sinistra.

In verità, quello che oggi predomina nella discussione politica, è il problema del rapporto con noi comunisti e con l'opposizione di sinistra. Si parla così dell'esigenza di far cadere il principio della delimitazione della maggioranza, si afferma che sarebbero da instaurare nuovi e corretti rapporti fra maggioranza e opposizione; si dice che comunque sarebbe da riprendere quella sfida che l'onorevole Moro lanciò baldanzosamente contro di noi nel congresso di Napoli della DC e che ha fatto una fine così miseranda. Non sottovalutiamo il travaglio di molti degli uomini politici che avanzano questa ipotesi, sia nel PSU che nella DC. Essi testimoniano l'esaurimento del centro sinistra e la coscienza della direzione in cui occorre cercare una soluzione. Ma proprio per questo non possiamo in alcun modo avallare alibi o contribuire ad alimentare equivoci.

Dobbiamo denunciare il tentativo di quanti parlano di « corretti rapporti » con i comunisti o di superamento della delimitazione della maggioranza, per ridare credito alla formula fallimentare del centro sinistra, per mascherare il loro cedimento. Vaneggia chi parla di volontà di inserimento dei comunisti nel centro sinistra. Questa è una pura e semplice calunnia. Ben altro vogliamo. Per ben altro ci battiamo.

Il dibattito svoltosi in preparazione dell'imminente Congresso del partito socialista unificato ha lasciato in ombra i problemi più attuali della vita economica e sociale del Paese. Una discussione per formule, a volte astratta e incomprendibile. Escluse le posizioni del tutto nette della sinistra, tutte le altre tendevano a sfumarsi ed a lasciare aperte le più diverse ipotesi per le combinazioni di vertice dopo il Congresso. Un dibattito che per ciò non poteva interessare le grandi masse, caratterizzato da metodi clientelari ed anche peggio sul quale il giudizio, per quanto severo, è superato da quello che gli stessi dirigenti del PSU sono costretti ad esprimere.

Costruire un'alternativa

Grave e seria è la responsabilità dei delegati che si riuniranno per il I Congresso del PSU. Essi dovranno in primo luogo trarre un

bilancio sull'azione svolta in questi ultimi anni e sui guasti che la rottura a sinistra e nel movimento operaio ha determinato. Quanti mantengono vivi gli ideali del socialismo e le tradizioni del vecchio PSI dovranno riflettere su quanto sia costata l'unificazione socialdemocratica in termini di cedimento e di abbandono di posizioni di principio. In questi mesi nelle file socialiste si è levato l'allarme per l'offuscarsi del carattere socialista e classista del partito, per la politica di collaborazione subalterna e di copertura a sinistra della D.C. A noi sembra indispensabile un ripensamento sull'esperienza di questi anni, perché il PSU possa arrivare ad un cambiamento di linea e di impostazione. In questo senso, salutiamo fraternamente tutti i compagni del PSU che avvertono come la sconfitta elettorale del loro partito debba attribuirsi ad una politica profondamente sbagliata, sentono la necessità di cambiare, vogliono ricercare le strade per una nuova unità delle sinistre, lottare per l'avvenire socialista dell'Italia.

Il problema maturo, all'ordine del giorno in Italia — ha continuato Natta — è quello della costruzione di una alternativa democratica al centro sinistra. Questa emerge come necessità dai problemi della società italiana, dalle lotte dei lavoratori, dallo sviluppo del processo unitario delle forze di sinistra, laiche e cattoliche. Da quali condizioni nasce la possibilità e necessità di quest'alternativa? Come dare unità a forze politiche e sociali, a gruppi e movimenti autonomi diversi? Su quali obiettivi concentrare il movimento e la lotta?

La prima condizione è data dall'ampiezza, dalla profondità e dalle novità del movimento delle masse. Nel dibattito congressuale tutto il partito deve approfondire criticamente queste esperienze. Il quadro di movimento, di lotte, di tensione politica, ideale e sociale della società italiana non è certo casuale. Rivendichiamo anche alla politica ed all'azione del nostro partito una parte importante del merito per questo nuovo volto del nostro Paese. Esso è stato investito in questi anni da processi economici e sociali propri delle società capitalistiche cosiddette avanzate, anche se il fenomeno si intreccia con antiche contraddizioni e squilibri.

Ma tutta l'evoluzione della situazione di questi venticinque anni è caratterizzata dalla presenza e dalla lotta del movimento operaio, su una linea strategica e politica che

gli ha consentito di affermarsi come forza nazionale dirigente dalla Resistenza ad oggi. Non siamo riusciti, è vero, ad impedire la restaurazione capitalistica ed un tipo di sviluppo dominato dai monopoli, né ad imporre un diverso tipo di sviluppo basato sulle riforme di struttura, su trasformazioni democratiche e socialiste della società. Ma abbiamo realizzato conquiste assai importanti sul piano economico-sociale e politico: siamo avanzati come Partito e, soprattutto, novità del movimento delle masse. Nel dibattito congressuale tutto il partito deve approfondire criticamente queste esperienze. Il quadro di movimento, di lotte, di tensione politica, ideale e sociale della società italiana non è certo casuale. Rivendichiamo anche alla politica ed all'azione del nostro partito una parte importante del merito per questo nuovo volto del nostro Paese. Esso è stato investito in questi anni da processi economici e sociali propri delle società capitalistiche cosiddette avanzate, anche se il fenomeno si intreccia con antiche contraddizioni e squilibri.

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Siamo di fronte ad una vigorosa ripresa unitaria delle lotte operaie, le quali abbracciano tutta la condizione di fabbrica e riguardano anche il potere contrattuale dei sindacati e dei lavoratori. Si sono conseguiti notevoli risultati sul piano degli accordi aziendali.

Importanti movimenti si sviluppano inoltre sul problema delle pensioni, nelle lotte per rompere le gabbie salariali, contro le smobilizzazioni e i licenziamenti che provocano la reazione di interesse città, da Trieste a Pisa, da Palermo a Roma e a Napoli.

Malgrado i punti deboli questo movimento offre un quadro com-

piessivo di una classe operaia combattiva, che si prepara alle grandi battaglie del 1969 per il rinnovo dei contratti di lavoro. A queste lotte debbono guardare tutti coloro che ritengono necessario un cambiamento della situazione politica italiana. Senza tentativi di strumentalizzazione politica delle autonome battaglie sindacali, non può tuttavia sfuggire che la spinta operaia tende a imporre un nuovo tipo di sviluppo. Nel corso delle lotte che hanno mobilitato milioni di lavoratori è andato avanti il processo di unità sindacale: un problema che interessa tutta la democrazia italiana.

Anche nelle campagne si è allargato il movimento dei lavoratori della terra e dei contadini. Dopo le elezioni il movimento ha conosciuto uno sviluppo nuovo e impetuoso. La durezza e la difficoltà incontrate da queste lotte derivano dal fatto che sulle masse dei contadini e dei lavoratori della terra è caduto il peso maggiore del processo di trasformazione della società italiana. Ma pur in queste difficili condizioni mai è stata ammainata la bandiera della riforma agraria.

Nuove forze sono scese in campo quest'anno, a rivendicare una nuova politica agraria di riforme e trasformazioni produttive. Il movimento per l'unità del movimento contadino è senza dubbio più lento e difficile. Tuttavia, anche qui registriamo fatti nuovi e interessanti.

Si è rivelato inconsistente il tentativo scissionistico messo in piedi due anni fa dal PSU. Sintomi di crisi e difficoltà si sono avvertiti nella confederazione bonomiana. Sono senza dubbio un altro sintomo della situazione.

Il movimento studentesco

Accanto alle lotte delle organizzazioni tradizionali, operaie e contadine, il movimento registra la presenza attiva di forze non organizzate nei partiti e nei movimenti di classe, ma che tuttavia si pongono sul terreno del rinnovamento democratico e socialista del Paese: si tratta in primo luogo del movimento studentesco. La sua lotta ha conseguito importanti risultati. Ha dato un colpo ai propositi di ristrutturazione conservatrice del centro-sinistra, ha fatto emergere con forza la coscienza della crisi strutturale della nostra scuola, ha indebolito il sistema autoritario nelle

università. Soprattutto è maturata nello scontro la coscienza del rapporto organico che deve esserci tra la battaglia per il rinnovamento della scuola con la lotta generale contro il sistema capitalistico.

Noi abbiamo dato il nostro appoggio al movimento studentesco, in un rapporto non solo di comprensione e aiuto, ma di dibattito aperto, di collaborazione critica. Vogliamo lavorare ad una ripresa del movimento, ad uno sviluppo del suo carattere di massa. Far crescere il movimento studentesco e giovanile, nella sua autonomia e nella sua forza di massa, è una esigenza essenziale non solo per la scuola, ma per tutta la società italiana.

Il fenomeno va oltre il movimento studentesco. Investe lo sviluppo di circoli, di riviste, di gruppi diversi nel campo cattolico e socialista, che esprimono una tendenza generale all'estensione della partecipazione alla vita politica, che cercano la via per imporre un cambiamento della situazione italiana e un proprio ruolo autonomo nella lotta per il socialismo.

Noi esprimiamo una comprensione profonda verso questi gruppi, li consideriamo forze partecipi dell'incessante processo degli orientamenti e della lotta per avanzare verso il socialismo. Nel vastissimo panorama fin qui considerato andrebbero compresi altri importanti gruppi sociali, come quelli del ceto medio produttivo delle città, che si muovono anch'essi su un terreno antimonopolistico.

Accanto al moto delle forze sociali, guardiamo a quanto avviene nello schieramento politico, dentro e fuori del centro-sinistra per individuare le condizioni di una alternativa democratica. Il successo elettorale delle forze unitarie di sinistra ha confermato la giustezza di una scelta del PCI, del PSU e di altri gruppi volta ad operare un'inversione di tendenza per dare vita ad una base di aggregazione di forze socialiste e democratiche. Il processo è andato e può andare ancora più avanti.

Ho già detto del PSU — ha continuato Natta — delle manovre per farlo tornare all'ovile del centro-sinistra, del deterioramento subito con l'unificazione socialdemocratica. Non possiamo tuttavia dimenticare fatti importanti, come la collaborazione tuttora esistente in tante amministrazioni comunali; nei sindacati, nelle cooperative, nelle organizzazioni contadine. Non dimenticare come sia stata finora battuta, in gran parte dagli stessi compagni socialisti, l'idea del «sindacato socialista». In questa situazione riteniamo che non sarà

affatto facile a Nenni e ad altri realizzare il piano della ripresa del centro-sinistra. Noi faremo comunque il possibile perché questo non avvenga.

No a un nuovo centro-sinistra

I fenomeni che caratterizzano il processo in atto nel movimento cattolico investono anche la D.C.

L'ultimo consiglio nazionale ha dovuto registrare il fallimento della linea seguita con il centro-sinistra, riconoscere il crescere di gruppi politici e di orientamenti nuovi in gruppi come le ACLI che contestano ormai la concezione dell'interclassismo e la funzione stessa della D.C. Ha visto la sinistra svolgere un duro attacco contro le posizioni moderate e conservatrici del gruppo dirigente attuale e gli stessi personaggi dorotei formulare ipotesi che avevano, tutte, l'assillo di fare i conti con la realtà del paese e con il nostro partito. Oltre la «filosofia di luglio», la DC non è finora andata nel definire una linea, mentre sono cresciuti il disagio e la opposizione della sinistra. Quanto del resto sia aspro il cammino per la ricucitura del centro-sinistra lo dimostrano tutte le ultime vicende politico-parlamentari.

Tutto il partito deve avere chiaro il senso di una battaglia aperta: nelle prossime settimane, è possibile far saltare i calcoli e le speranze delle forze conservatrici italiane, di Rumor e di Nenni.

E' possibile imporre un cambiamento, far avviare la vita politica del Paese su una nuova strada, far crescere l'ondata del 19 maggio, contro la DC e contro il centro sinistra.

Ecco le basi per un cambiamento e la costruzione di una alternativa democratica: sviluppo e allargamento delle lotte operaie, contadine, di tutte le forze antimonopolistiche; presenza combattiva di movimenti autonomi, come quello studentesco; avanzamento del processo unitario tra forze sociali diverse in funzione antimonopolistica; collegamento oggettivo e ricerca di unità fra forze politiche di sinistra laiche e cattoliche, interne ed esterne al centro-sinistra.

Questo processo per la formazione di una nuova maggioranza e per l'unità delle sinistre, non è né breve né facile. Tuttavia può essere portato avanti con un complesso e vario sviluppo di

detto r...
Innanzitutto la riaffermazione piena del concetto leninista e gramsciano del partito come organizzazione politica che fa politica in rapporto vivo con la realtà, stimolando la partecipazione alla battaglia del complesso dei militanti, formando, per via democratica, una coscienza unitaria e una volontà collettiva del partito, agendo in modo che le grandi masse compiano la propria esperienza e su questa base misurino e si convincano della giustizia della linea e della direzione politica del partito.

Riaffermare questo carattere del partito è oggi importante. Questa concezione del partito assume infatti un significato critico di fronte ad altre esperienze. Inoltre, da una parte, è necessario respingere e battere le tendenze riaffioranti di tipo estremistico, che approdano allo spontaneismo, al primitivismo organizzativo delle formazioni settarie; dall'altra dobbiamo respingere le spinte che emergono dal sistema economico in atto contro gli istituti democratici e il sistema dei partiti.

Nel fenomeno positivo della ricerca di espressioni e forme nuove dell'impegno politico c'è tuttavia anche il riflesso dei limiti e degli impacci ad una reale e democratica partecipazione alla vita e alla battaglia politica attraverso i partiti. La polemica dei giovani — noi riteniamo centrali e decisivi in questo momento riguardano una nuova politica estera di pace, di superamento dei blocchi e di neutralità attiva, e lo sviluppo economico, il consolidamento e l'allargamento della vita democratica.

La programmazione sta « saltando »

Non intendiamo fornire un quadro della situazione economica del Paese e indicare tutto il complesso di proposte che noi avanziamo. Intendiamo sottolineare i punti sui quali è necessario premere per un cambiamento generale e complessivo e che costituiscono al tempo stesso obiettivi immediati del movimento e della pressione delle masse lavoratrici. Il primo di questi punti riguarda il naufragio del programma di sviluppo economico del governo Moro-Nenni. A parte la cifra dell'incremento del reddito, che si mantiene a stento, tutti gli altri dati del Piano Pierac-

... sono saltati. Quanto avviene nel campo delle grandi concentrazioni industriali (Fiat-Citroen, Eni-Montedison) dimostra l'inesistenza di una programmazione economica nel nostro Paese.

Altro punto controverso è il giudizio sul tipo di sviluppo economico verificatosi in Italia in questi anni, orientato sulla ricerca del massimo profitto e non nell'interesse del Paese. In questo indirizzo generale stanno le cause della marginalizzazione crescente e dell'aggravarsi dei problemi dell'agricoltura, dell'accresciuto squilibrio, fra Nord e Sud, dell'accantonamento di ogni proposta di riforma, della mancata soluzione dei problemi della scuola e dell'Università, ecc. Terzo punto, per noi centrale, riguarda l'accrescersi degli squilibri sociali a danno degli operai, di larghi strati di contadini, della povera gente. Non è possibile, a nostro parere, parlare di allargamento del mercato interno, se non si parte da questo problema, dagli intollerabili salari operai, dalla povertà del reddito contadino, dai minimi di fame delle pensioni.

Per porre fine ai mali di cui soffre il Paese, noi proponiamo una politica di riforme che affronti organicamente le cause del distorto sviluppo economico. Tale politica di riforme non significa rinviare la soluzione dei problemi in tempi lunghi. Una organica politica di riforme parte anzi dalle questioni immediate, per dar lavoro a chi non ne ha, migliorare le condizioni di vita degli operai e dei contadini, per dare sollievo ai pensionati. Ciò è anche economicamente indispensabile per l'allargamento del mercato interno. Occorre inoltre una diversa scelta sugli investimenti, spostare le risorse verso le esigenze veramente essenziali a partire dalla difesa del suolo, dalle trasformazioni fondiarie, dall'irrigazione per rendere più produttiva l'agricoltura. Questo significa programmazione democratica e antimonopolistica, intesa come una linea. Qui giungiamo anche al carattere meridionalistico che deve avere la programmazione democratica.

Tutto questo significa dare preminenza al settore pubblico della economia assicurando la sua gestione democratica, ponendosi il problema di eliminare gli sprechi e di fare le riforme, in primo luogo quella agraria e quella urbanistica.

Le questioni della democrazia sono strettamente legate a quelle dello sviluppo economico e delle riforme sociali. In questo legame sta uno dei momenti essenziali di tutta la nostra strategia.

... della partecipazione democratica non è solo una esigenza di fondo per la programmazione che noi indichiamo, ma una necessità per lo sviluppo del Paese in tutti i campi. Questo tema sottende a quello decisivo del rapporto fra democrazia e socialismo, — e lo sottolineiamo — non solo per dissipare equivoci sul carattere « pacifico » della via italiana, non solo per ribadire la visione di essa come un processo di lotte di massa, tanto più agevoli e decisive quanto più il terreno di combattimento è quello di un regime democratico. Il sistema capitalistico, nel suo sviluppo monopolistico e nella sua difesa di fronte alle lotte sociali e politiche, reagisce non solo sul terreno economico, ma su quello politico, con le tendenze autoritarie, lo svuotamento degli istituti democratici e, nei momenti più acuti, con l'attacco reazionario.

D'altro canto, non solo nella classe operaia ma in altri strati sociali, tra i giovani, matura la persuasione che le conquiste sul terreno sociale e delle riforme debbono saldarsi, per essere consistenti, ad un più ampio intervento, democratico, a possibilità di gestione e controllo da parte delle masse. Di qui il valore di esperienze che, pur nei loro limiti nel nostro Paese, ed anche nei loro insuccessi come in Francia, hanno proposto forme nuove ed originali di partecipazione e di potere democratico nelle fabbriche, nelle università. Affermiamo che non vi è contrasto tra l'obiettivo del rinnovamento degli istituti della democrazia rappresentativa e la loro funzione, e la ricerca di forme ed istituti nuovi di democrazia diretta; al contrario, le due esigenze sono inseparabili e connesse l'una con l'altra.

Su questa linea si muovono le proposte nostre, volte a far crescere la partecipazione democratica e a realizzare degli spostamenti nei rapporti di forza. Qui sono gli obiettivi della lotta per il rinnovamento e lo sviluppo della democrazia, per una riforma democratica dello Stato. E qui sono nello stesso tempo le leve per la crescita di un movimento democratico e popolare articolato, vivo e di tale ampiezza da riuscire a garantire successo alle conquiste sociali, alla lotta per le riforme e da essere in grado di far fronte alle reazioni dei gruppi dirigenti capitalistici e di batterie, quale che fosse il terreno su cui volessero avventurarsi.

I pericoli autoritari

Il pericolo del ricorso alla violenza e agli attentati antidemocratici è sempre aperto e politicamente attuale. Occorre essere pronti alla risposta. Ma la garanzia prima per evitare il rischio è lo sviluppo conseguente della lotta e delle istituzioni democratiche, dell'organizzazione politica e sindacale, della combattività e partecipazione delle larghe masse dei lavoratori e del popolo. Il valore di rottura che oggi sempre più assumono le riforme nel regime di capitalismo monopolistico di Stato, la spinta e le esperienze nuove sul terreno della partecipazione ci riconducono a quel punto nodale della nostra strategia che è il rapporto tra riforme e democrazia, tra riforme e rivoluzione. Ribadiamo che qui è la ragione di radicale differenza tra la nostra strategia rivoluzionaria e le tradizionali impostazioni del riformismo. Le vicende di questi anni ci sembra confermino un giudizio che tuttavia deve essere aperto al dibattito, ma la nostra lotta — anche sul terreno teorico — deve sempre più riuscire a sperimentare questa che è la verità della via italiana al socialismo.

A conclusione del suo rapporto il compagno Natta ha affrontato i problemi del partito, della sua organizzazione e della sua vita interna. Quello che occorre — ha detto — di convergenze unitarie e momenti di collaborazione anche su obiettivi limitati e parziali. Questo è il compito, urgente e attuale, dei comunisti. Senza di noi sarebbe impensabile e impossibile, in Italia, un processo unitario di questo tipo.

Si pongono in questo quadro anche i problemi della più ravvicinata prospettiva politica. Mi sembra perfino inutile ribadire la necessità che l'attuale governo sia spazzato via. Già gravi danni ha arrecato al Paese. La sua speranza di sopravvivenza sta nell'evitare i problemi, nel farli marcire, nel non far lavorare il Parlamento. L'Italia non può sopportare una tale politica. D'altra parte riteniamo del tutto improponibile un rilancio del centro-sinistra e pensiamo che, ove questo tentativo venisse compiuto, assai gravi potrebbero essere le conseguenze sul piano dei rapporti sociali e politici.

E allora? Come risolverò, nello immediato il problema della crisi politica aperta dal fallimento del centro sinistra e

torali del 19 maggio? Noi lavoriamo per mandare avanti il processo di unità fra tutte le forze di sinistra laiche e cattoliche, fra forze politiche e sociali diverse, gruppi e movimenti autonomi. E' chiaro che il PCI e questo schieramento hanno una funzione decisiva nelle battaglie di opposizione. Noi ci battiamo però anche sul piano parlamentare per soluzioni che non significhino alcun ritorno, comunque mascherato, al centro-sinistra, ma segnino un passo avanti per l'avvio a soluzione dei più urgenti problemi del Paese e dei lavoratori, e verso la formazione di una nuova maggioranza. Per questo siamo disposti a discutere con tutte le forze di sinistra, animati solo dalla volontà di far progredire la soluzione dei problemi della società italiana, degli operai, dei contadini, di tutti i lavoratori, pronti a sperimentare forme nuove di unità e anche soltanto di convergenze e di collaborazione, a tutti i livelli, e in tutte le assemblee elettive, dai comuni al Parlamento.

I punti programmatici che noi nonostante la grande prova di fiducia del 19 maggio — investe anche il nostro partito e coglie problemi ed esigenze reali che sarebbe grave se non valutassimo giustamente.

Siamo in verità di fronte a situazioni nuove per il rapporto fra il partito e il complesso dei movimenti, delle organizzazioni e dei gruppi politici e culturali che si collocano sul terreno della lotta democratica e socialista. Per questo è necessaria una forte azione di orientamento del partito perchè emerga con più chiarezza che tutta la nostra linea politica esige un rafforzamento della funzione dirigente del partito, esige un impegno senza eguali del partito e dei comunisti, di presenza e di iniziativa in tutta la società, in tutte le organizzazioni; un impegno di chiarezza e combattività ideologica e politica, di mobilitazione delle energie e della partecipazione popolare, di conquista del consenso. Pluralismo, autonomia dei movimenti di classe, e democratici, politica di unità, strategia delle riforme fanno contare di più il partito e il compito che deve essergli proprio di sintesi, di direzione politica, di strumento di egemonia, secondo il metodo del confronto critico, della dialettica aperta, del rapporto tra eguali con le altre forze del movimento operaio e democratico. Ma proprio per questo il partito deve mantenere e rafforzare i suoi caratteri peculiari di organizzazione politica di massa e di lotta, deve tendere sempre più a d'venire l'intellettuale collettivo di cui parlava Gramsci. Il documento propone a questo fine un

tema e un orientamento generale: quelli di un profondo, audace sviluppo democratico, della partecipazione del più grande numero possibile di militanti comunisti alle scelte e alla lotta del partito.

TIME
22 November 1968

NEW REALITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN


AS the 78,000-ton aircraft carrier U.S.S. *Forrestal* slid out of the Greek port of Salonica one grey dawn last week, a 900-ton escort ship waited for her just outside the harbor. The *Forrestal* turned southward into the Aegean Sea, and the escort dutifully took up station a mile astern, rolling gently in the huge carrier's wake. At midday, when the *Forrestal* catapulted her Phantom jets into clearing skies, the escort drew alongside to within 50 yards of the carrier. But not a signal was exchanged. The escort vessel was Russian, a super gunboat of the *Mirka* class, and the *Forrestal* had not invited her to tag along.

Invited or not, the Soviet navy has made itself at home all over the Mediterranean in sharply increasing numbers. Acting as if they had nothing to lose but their anchor chains, the Russians are everywhere now—tailing the U.S. Sixth Fleet, showing the Red Flag from the Dardanelles to Gibraltar, resorting to old-fashioned gunboat diplomacy to keep the big powers baffled and the smaller ones uneasy.

Snap of the Fingers. Black-bereted naval infantrymen, the Soviet version of Marines, stroll the streets of Damascus. Intelligence trawlers refuel at what has become the Soviets' main Mediterranean port of call, Alexandria. Soviet patrol boats tie up 1,700 miles to the west at the Algerian port of Mers-el-Kebir. Soviet subs play hide-and-seek with NATO patrols underneath the heel of Italy. Overhead, from bases in Egypt, Soviet "Badger" class planes, their red stars painted over with Egyptian markings, wing daily across the Mediterranean to shadow Allied fleets.

What are the Russians up to? NATO commanders do not know the answer, but they do know that the new Soviet presence has radically changed the Mediterranean equation. Only ten years ago, when Nasserite terrorists were trying to overthrow the government of Lebanon, its President, Camille Chamoun, could reassure a doubting Cabinet minister: "If things get too tough, I can call for the Sixth Fleet, just like this . . ." And the President snapped his fingers. Chamoun did call for help; the U.S. Sixth Fleet landed its Marines. Lebanon proceeded to settle its affairs without further outside interference. Russia's Nikita Khrushchev, who had been loudly rattling his rockets and threatening war if the U.S. intervened in Lebanon, quickly backed down in the face of the U.S. show of strength.

Impact on Israel. In those days, the Mediterranean was considered an American lake, and



begun to awaken to the potentialities of seapower. In the early '60s, the Soviets began to build up their navy all over the world (TIME cover, Feb. 23). Now the U.S. must reckon with the Soviet force in the Mediterranean—and so must the Israelis. When Soviet-made Styx missiles, fired from a torpedo boat by Egyptians, sank the Israeli destroyer *Elath* off Port Said in an incident in October 1967, the Israelis dared not retaliate directly for fear of hitting Soviet warships near by. Now the Soviets have brought a dredge into the Mediterranean; should they try to use it to pry open the Suez Canal, the Israelis would face an agonizing dilemma.

In recent weeks, the Soviets have put yet another x into the equation. To the Soviet *eskadra* (squadron) in the Mediterranean, which has numbered as many as 52 ships, including two cruisers, ten submarines and six intelligence-collecting trawlers, the Russians added an entirely new kind of vessel on the face of the oceans—a multipurpose, missile-firing helicopter carrier. The Russians so far have built no Western-style aircraft carriers because they consider them vulnerable to missile attack. Instead, into the Mediterranean glided the *Moskva*, a sleek 25,000-ton vessel that combines the features of a cruiser and a carrier. The craft has four pads marked with red and white bull's-eyes on her 100-yd. flight deck for launching up to 30 helicopters of the Hormone type used in antisubmarine warfare. The *Moskva* is the first Soviet vessel in the Mediterranean equipped with ship-to-air as well as ship-to-ship missiles, and each time a U.S. Navy P-2 patrol plane tries to take a peek, the Russians swiftly swing the missiles below decks on elevator platforms. In a crunch, the helicopters could carry troops. In the future, the *Moskva* will be able to handle

VTOL (vertical take-off, landing) planes as well as helicopters.

Altering the Balance. In the opinion of U.S. strategists, the Soviet Mediterranean force, lacking big aircraft carriers, would be no match for the Sixth Fleet, with its 50 combat ships, including two carriers and two cruisers, 200 aircraft and 25,000 men. The Russian squadron in the Mediterranean is, in fact, smaller than the Italian navy. But as U.S. Admiral Horacio Rivero, commander of NATO forces in Southern Europe, notes: "While the Soviet flotilla is a potential military threat, its greatest importance is political and psychological. The number of ships is not too important. The presence of one ship has a political impact."

A coup attempt in Egypt or Syria, a blockade thrown against Israel for Egypt, a pro-Soviet political upheaval in Albania, a Soviet power play against Yugoslavia—all are situations in which the Soviets could use their new seapower with unpredictable results. Some Western strategists worry that the friendly neighborhood presence of Russian ships may tempt the Arabs to take foolish chances soon against Israel, in the belief that the Russians would rush to their aid if Israel lashed back in force.

Nothing of the sort has yet hap-

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pened, and in fact the Russians so far tries along the Mediterranean, including Algeria and Egypt, to permit them to build a full-fledged naval base. But even without such bases, the Soviets now drop anchor all along the rim of the Mediterranean and sail binocular-to-binocular alongside the allies. The Russians muscled into the Mediterranean, says U.S. Rear Admiral Richard C. Outlaw,

"in a concerted attempt to alter the balance of power in the Mediterranean. I keep the balance even that this week Outlaw, whose name the Italians have happily translated as *Il Bandito*, takes command of Maritime Air Forces, Mediterranean (MAIRAIRMED), the special new NATO naval air arm created to coordinate the watch on the Russians watching NATO.

TIME

23 February 1968

RUSSIA

Power Play on the Oceans

The flag of the Soviet navy now proudly flies over the oceans of the world. Sooner or later, the U.S. will have to understand that it no longer has mastery of the seas.

















—Admiral Sergei Gorshkov

The author of that threatening boast walked up to a snake charmer in the Indian city of Agra last week and, while his aides looked on aghast, seized a thick, six-foot-long python in his strong hands and draped it over his shoulders. Making a ten-day tour of India, the commander of the Russian navy was acting like the traditional sailor on shore leave. He viewed the Taj Mahal by moonlight, visited the Nehru Museum and the site where Mahatma Gandhi's body was cremated, and shopped for souvenirs. But Admiral Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov's trip to India had an entirely serious purpose, as do all his trips these days. He is trying to line up a worldwide system of ports of call and bases for his navy, and he hoped to persuade India, which is about to receive at least three submarines from the Soviet Union, to reciprocate by allowing Soviet men-of-war to fuel and make repairs in Indian ports.

While the attention of the U.S. is focused on Viet Nam, the Russians are mounting at sea a new challenge that the U.S. and its allies will have to deal with long after the fighting in Southeast Asia is ended. This may come as a surprise to most laymen—but not to U.S. naval experts. While Russia's stock of intercontinental missiles and its huge land army on Europe's periphery still remain the major military threats to the West, in recent years the Russians have developed a global navy second only to the U.S. in size and weaponry. As a comparison between the two navies shows (see chart), the U.S. remains indisputably the world's greatest sea power. But, in a remarkable turnaround since World War II, Moscow has transformed a relatively insignificant coastal-defense force that seldom ventured

far from land into a real blue-water fleet.

If any one man is responsible for this change, it is Admiral Gorshkov, 57, who became the youngest admiral in Soviet history at 31 and has guided the growth of the navy as its chief for the past twelve years. He has totally reshaped the Soviet Union's once conservative naval strategy and transformed the fleet into the most effective and flexible arm of Soviet foreign policy.

U. S.		U. S. S. R.	
NAVAL STRENGTH			
 Attack carriers	15	0	
 Helicopter and support carriers	17	2	 Helicopter carriers
 Battleship and cruisers	14	19	 Cruisers
 Destroyers, frigates & destroyer escorts	330	170	 Destroyers, frigates & destroyer escorts
 Nuclear-powered submarines	75	55	 Nuclear-powered submarines
 Other submarines	80	305	 Other submarines
 Landing craft	105	100	 Landing craft
	0	560	 Torpedo and missile boats
MERCHANT FLEET			
	1,000	1,350	
	1 million d.w. tons	10 million d.w. tons	

Formidable Fleets. Since 1957, Russia has added to its navy virtually all of the ships that now make up its impressive striking power. It has a modern force of 19 cruisers, 170 destroyers, missile frigates and destroyer escorts, and 560 motor torpedo boats. Its 360 submarines, 55 of them nuclear, give Russia the world's largest

submarine fleet, far exceeding the U.S. total of 155 subs but falling short of the U.S. fleet of 75 nuclear subs.

Moreover, unlike other naval powers, the Soviet Union uses its merchant marine and other seagoing services as important arms of the navy. Russia has the world's fastest-growing merchant fleet, which will pass the lagging U.S. merchant marine in tonnage in the early 1970s. Its high-seas fishing fleet is the world's largest and most modern; many of its 4,000 craft fish for vital information along foreign coasts as well as for the creatures of the sea. The Soviet Union also has the largest oceanographic fleet, whose 200 ships plumb the earth's waters for militarily valuable data on depths, currents, bottom topography and other information of interest to its ships and submarines. Says Admiral John McCain Jr., commander in chief of U.S. naval forces in Europe: "The Russian program to develop its seapower is more advanced and fully developed today than most people realize. It encompasses the full spectrum of the uses of the sea—in its military, economic, political and commercial connotations."

The new Soviet emphasis on seapower represents a major strategic decision. With its arsenal of 720 ICBMs more than offset by a larger U.S. deterrent, with its huge land army muscle-bound and deprived of global mobility in the middle of the great Eurasian land mass, Russia has turned to the sea to break out of its own geographic confines and attempt to wield truly global power.

Using the navy as a political as well as a military force, the Kremlin hopes that its mere presence in many places will act as a deterrent to the U.S. Moreover, the Russians want to be ready to move quickly into any areas where U.S. power and prestige may recede. They not only plan to project a more tangible Russian influence in the underdeveloped world but also, by using their merchant fleet, to get a strong hold on the raw materials vital to Soviet—and often to American—industry. Ultimately, though, the Russian navy's biggest threat is a military one. Its offensive strategy not only zeroes submarine-carried nuclear missiles in on U.S. cities,

but aims to isolate North America from Europe and Asia in case of war.

Bridge of Trouble. The imperial reach of the Soviet navy has already begun to have its impact on world events. In the tense Sea of Japan, a flotilla of 16 Soviet cruisers and missile frigates has in the past few weeks shouldered its way between the coast of North Korea and the U.S. Navy task force that was sent into the area to add some muscle to U.S. diplomatic demands for the return of the *Pueblo* and its crew. Soviet destroyers have also closely shadowed the carrier *Enterprise*, which withdrew because of North Korean protests shortly before the Soviet navy's approach. The Soviet presence checkmates the U.S. pressure on North Korea and gives the Kremlin a local pressure point without having to resort to nuclear threats.

Soviet seapower sustains the two countries that are giving the U.S. the most trouble. A bridge of 150 freighters from Russian ports carries to Haiphong the SAMs, the petroleum, the rockets, the assault rifles and the ammunition that keep North Viet Nam fighting and killing U.S. soldiers. Moreover, it is the fear of hitting those Russian ships that has so far kept the U.S. from bombing Haiphong's piers or mining the harbor. And it is another bridge of Soviet ships that carries the \$1,000,000-a-day in supplies that sustains Castro's Cuba as the only Communist foothold in the Hemisphere.

Outflanking NATO. In the Mediterranean, the impact of the Soviet fleet has been particularly dramatic. Where Russia had only half a dozen ships a year ago, it now has 46 ships, almost as many as the 50-ship U.S. fleet, which for years had made the "Med" practically an American lake. Many of the Soviet ships came through the Dardanelles during the Six-Day War, and their arrival helped persuade the Israelis to accept a cease-fire. The Soviets have enhanced their new image as the protector of their Arab allies by keeping a few ships in Alexandria and Port Said so that Israeli bombers will not be tempted to blast away at the vast amount of war matériel that is flowing into those ports.

One main Soviet objective is to outflank NATO's land-based defenses—a goal that the Russian navy has partially reached by penetrating the Mediterranean. In a report to the Western European Union last November, Dutch Delegate Frans Goedhart warned: "It is no longer correct to speak of the 'danger' of the Soviet Union outflanking the NATO southern flank. This 'danger' has become a reality." To the north, the Russians have also turned the Baltic into a virtual Red Sea on which their warships now outnumber NATO forces 5 to 1.

To support its growing naval activity, Russia is searching for new bases and ports of call. Soviet diplomats are setting up an embassy in the new republic of South Yemen, where the Russians have their eye on the former British naval installation at Aden; the installation not only controls entry to the Red Sea but is an ideal base from which to expand influence into the oil-rich sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf. The Soviets may also be able to use the facilities of the big British naval base at Singapore, which Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has said he will rent to all comers after the Royal Navy pulls out in 1971. The big question in the Mediterranean is whether the Russians will move into the Algerian naval base at Mers-el-Kebir, which the French evacuated last month; it is only 315 miles east of Gibraltar. Russians have also used their influence with the Arabs to set up secret stockpiles of spare parts within trucking distance of Arab ports.

Russian Marines. Admiral Gorshkov's ships are not only wide-ranging but among the world's newest and best equipped. Unlike the U.S. and Britain, both of which emerged from World War II with large surface fleets, Russia had to start practically from scratch after the war. The result: while 60% of the U.S. fleet consists of ships 25 years old or older, the Soviet navy's surface fleet is sleek and modern. "Almost every time you go into a harbor," says U.S. Navy Captain Harry Allendorfer, an expert on Soviet seapower, "if there are no flag markings and you pick out the cleanest and best-looking ships, nine out of ten of them will be Russian."

The Soviet Union is adding to its fleet of 55 nuclear-powered submarines at the rate of five a year. Most of the Soviet nukes are hunter-killers whose mission is to destroy U.S. Polaris subs in time of war, but a growing number fire a new underwater missile that has a range of at least 1,500 miles (v. the U.S. missile's range of 2,500 miles). Since he believes that naval guns are obsolete, Admiral Gorshkov has equipped almost all Soviet surface ships, from the smallest to the largest, with ship-to-ship missiles. The Soviet missiles are so-called "cruise missiles" that fly about 700 miles an hour, steer themselves either by radar or heat-seeking systems and carry either conventional or nuclear warheads. The U.S. experimented with similar weapons in the 1950s but dropped them in favor of concentrating on the Polaris and airpower. No Western navy, in fact, has such missiles.

Soviet cruisers and the *Kresta*- and *Kynda*-class destroyers carry the SS-N-3 missile, which can hit enemy ships at a range of 200 miles. The *Krupny*- and *Kildin*-class destroyers carry the

the speedy *Osa* and *Komar* torpedo boats are armed with Styx missiles, whose effective range is 20 miles. A Styx fired by the Egyptians from a *Komar* sank the Israeli destroyer *Elath* off Port Said last October. U.S. Navy-men insist that their planes would knock out Soviet ships before they got within firing range of U.S. warships or, failing that, that U.S. anti-aircraft rockets would intercept the missiles in flight. But the U.S. Navy has now started work on ship-to-ship missiles of its own.

Admiral Gorshkov is also developing a new force that will give the Russians the ability to intervene in trouble spots, much as the U.S. did in Lebanon and the Dominican Republic. The Soviet navy has built its first carrier, a new 25,000-tonner called the *Moscow*, which is now on a training course in the Black Sea, and is readying a second, the *Leningrad*, for sea trials; some Western sea experts feel that the Russians may build many more. The Soviet carriers have landing areas only on the rear and can thus handle only helicopters or vertical-takeoff aircraft. They are similar, in fact, to the American *Iwo Jima*-type LPH (for Landing Pad Helicopter), of which the U.S. Navy has eight, two of them stationed in Viet Nam waters as offshore bases for Marines. So far, the Soviets have given no indication that they will advance to the large U.S.-style attack carriers, since they consider such carriers vulnerable to attacks by missiles.

The Russians do have, however, a force similar to the U.S. Marines. It is the so-called Naval Infantry that fought as regular ground units during World War II but was later disbanded. Reorganized in 1964 just after the construction of the carriers began, the Naval Infantry now numbers 10,000 men who wear distinctive black berets, are chosen for outstanding physical fitness and aggressiveness. The Naval Infantry are carried on special landing craft and have tanks that can "swim" from ship to shore in amphibious landings.

Collecting Lovers. The Soviet surge at sea should come as no surprise to the West. Actually, the Russians have been reaching out to the oceans since Peter the Great ascended the throne in 1689. Under the guise of Peter Mikhailov, carpenter, the young Czar traveled to The Netherlands and England to learn how to build ships. In 1714, his fleet defeated the Swedes at Hango, thus opening through the Baltic a "Window to the West" for his backward country.

Peter's successors frittered away the fleet, but when Catherine the Great came to power in 1762, she began a massive rebuilding program. To find enough officers to command her new selected foreign naval

men almost as fast as she collected lovers. Among them was the American Revolutionary War hero, John Paul Jones, who, despite his bravery and gift for quick phrasemaking, had risen no higher than captain in the U.S. Navy. In return for an admiral's rank, Jones took command of a Russian sailing fleet composed of four battleships, eight frigates and assorted smaller craft that

helped chase the Turks from the Black Sea. Unfortunately, his morals were nearly as bad as Catherine's, and rival admirals used a scandal about his deflowering a young Russian girl to chase him out.

Throughout the 19th century, Russia remained the world's third largest naval power (after Britain and France), but it was a largely untested one. The

testing came in the 1904-05 war with Japan. In the straits of Tsushima, the Japanese met a fleet of 37 Russian ships and sank or captured all but four of them. It was the last time the Russians fought a naval engagement on the high seas.

What was left of the navy became a hotbed of anti-czarist agitation. In 1917, the guns of the cruiser *Aurora*



fired a blank salvo at the Winter Palace in Petrograd and started the October Revolution. At first, sailors were the new Soviet government's most trusted fighters, but Lenin managed to alienate them. He put in charge of the navy a commissar who was, of all things, a woman, named Larisa Reisner-Raskolnikova, and refused to allow the sailors to organize their own self-ruling local governments. As a result, the Baltic Fleet suddenly mutinied in 1921. Lenin crushed the revolt, but he never forgave the navy. He demoted it to the inglorious position of "naval forces of the Red Army" and decreed a new strategy that called for only a defensive fleet whose main weaponry would be submarines.

By 1932, the U.S.S.R. had some 25 subs, but Lenin's successor, Stalin, was dissatisfied with such an invisible fleet. In the mid-1930s, he reinstated the navy as an independent service and started building a huge surface fleet. The Germans captured the partly finished hulks when they swept into Russia in 1941. Thus the mission of defending the Red Army's coastal flanks fell to the Soviet navy's ragtag fleet. Most seagoing men would have chafed at such a coastline assignment, but a young captain named Sergei Gorshkov welcomed it as an opportunity.

Youngest Admiral. Born in the Ukraine, Gorshkov joined the navy when he was 17, and graduated from Leningrad's Frunze Academy, the Russian equivalent of Annapolis, four years later. When war broke out, he was the commander of a handful of antiquated cruisers and assorted small craft in the Black Sea. As the German invaders rushed toward the oilfields of the Caucasus, Gorshkov became expert at amphibious operations, plucking trapped Soviet troops from the Crimean coasts and landing them farther eastward to fight again.

During those years, Gorshkov also formed the attachment for heavily armed small craft that is reflected today in the Soviet navy's emphasis on *Komar* and *Osa* torpedo boats. He welded the turrets from T-34 tanks to motorboats and formed a river fleet that harassed the Germans from Rostov-on-Don to Vienna on the Danube. The young admiral impressed some Red Army officers who were fighting in the area. One was a major general named Leonid Brezhnev, another a lieutenant general named Nikita Khrushchev.

Sitting Ducks. After the war, Stalin started building big warships again, but only 15 cruisers had been completed by the time he died in 1953. The new chief in the Kremlin had no sympathy for Stalin's plans. Nikita Khrushchev fired Stalin's navy chief, Admiral Kuznetsov, and brought in Gorshkov, who by then was naval chief of staff.

The assignment turned out to be a bit of one. Khrushchev believed that missiles had made surface ships "sitting ducks." He derided cruisers as "fit only for traveling on state visits," and scrapped four that were still under construction. He even passed the word to the admirals to stay away from the round of receptions and parties during the 1956 air force day celebrations. Spotting four soldiers rowing a boat on a Moscow pond, Khrushchev joked to one of his American guests: "There is our navy!" He went as far as to contemplate disbanding the navy and transferring its missile-firing submarines to a new unified missile command.

As a party member since 1942, Gorshkov knew better than to openly oppose Khrushchev. But as a skilled politician himself, he knew well how to stall. He subtly resisted the missile enthusiasts in the Kremlin, kept alive the concept of surface ships. Then Khrushchev decided to put missiles in Castro's Cuba—and the whole game changed. The humiliation of their backdown under the guns of the U.S. Navy impressed on the Soviet leaders the value of naval power. Shortly after the crisis, Khrushchev sent an order to the admiral: Create a surface fleet.

Gorshkov's own status reflects the navy's elevation to a place of importance. His fleet ranks in the top troika of Russian weaponry, alongside the ICBM command, a separate service in the Soviet setup, and the air force strategic bombers. In the chain of command, Gorshkov reports directly to the Defense Ministry. He was elected to the Central Committee in 1961, became a Hero of the Soviet Union in 1965 and was promoted last year to the exalted five-star rank of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, only the third to get that honor in the history of the Soviet navy.

As befits his rank, he is chauffeured each morning from his spacious Moscow apartment to the Defense Ministry in Arbatskaya Square. Gorshkov seldom entertains and rarely appears at diplomatic functions. Married, he often spends weekends with his wife at their government-supplied dacha near Moscow. Like most high-ranking Soviet officers, he is withdrawn even from his personal staff, spent most of the time that he was not traveling about in India alone in his bedroom.

Czarist Traditions. Peter the Great would probably feel more at home in the Soviet navy than Lenin or Trotsky. Aside from the fact that nearly all officers are party members and that each ship has a political officer who gives daily indoctrination lectures for everyone, navy life reflects the traditions of the czars more than those of the commissars. Discipline is extremely rigid, and the gap between officers and men

is far greater than in the U.S. or British navy. The officers' quarters are far more spacious, their food far tastier, their dining rooms more elegant, their uniforms much fancier. The disparity in pay between officers and men is right out of the times that drove Karl Marx to write *Das Kapital*; a first-term seaman earns \$5 a month, a lieutenant earns 100 times more, and a rear admiral 400 times that much. There is an additional discrimination that probably is due to the Soviet Union's problem with alcoholism. While officers may tinkle in moderation onshore—and those of the Black Sea Fleet may even enjoy white wine at meals—Soviet sailors are forbidden at all times to drink on either land or sea. From all indications, the order is surprisingly well obeyed.

Russia's seamen—nearly all are draftees who serve for three years—nonetheless live better than many factory workers. The food is plentiful, and the crew quarters are relatively comfortable and clean. The ships have air conditioning, well-stocked libraries, TV sets for reception in ports and coastal areas and movies twice a week. Sailors organize singing and music groups, play dominoes and chess and, at every opportunity, sunbathe on deck in what U.S. Navymen call the "Soviet uniform"—white jockey shorts.

Unlike their Western counterparts, the Soviet sailors are not allowed to let off steam in foreign ports. They go ashore only in groups escorted by a petty officer, take in local museums, points of historical interest, and window-shop. They buy few souvenirs, avoid bars and prostitutes and never tip. Usually they return to their ships by nightfall. In the ports along the Mediterranean where the Soviet fleet has displaced the Western ones, hawkers and whores are dismayed by the spartan conduct and serious demeanor of the Russian sailors.

Harassment Policy. The Soviet navy's 465,000 men are also deadly serious about their chief task: a potentially lethal game of espionage and tag. Gorshkov's fleet has expanded its activity on the seas by three hundredfold in the last ten years, and much of its effort is devoted to a determined policy of harassment, probing and provocation. Across the oceans of the world, the light-grey-hulled Soviet warships are watching, trailing and sometimes crowding the ships of the Western fleets, especially those of the U.S. Navy.

Soviet warships and electronic intelligence trawlers stalk U.S., British and other Western fleets far from the shores of the Soviet Union. Soviet subs and destroyers shadow the U.S. carriers in the Mediterranean, keeping a watch offshore when the carriers go into port and taking up the chase again when

they come out. A fleet of espionage ships keeps watch off U.S. Polaris submarine bases at such places as Holy Loch in Scotland, Rota in Spain and Charleston, S.C. Other snoopers sit off Seattle, New England, and Cape Kennedy, where the Soviets monitor the U.S. space shots.

Soviet behavior at sea is becoming increasingly cocky. From the Mediterranean to the Sea of Japan, Soviet destroyers and trawlers boldly maneuver into the midst of formations of U.S. ships. Frequently, the intruders suddenly cut across the bow of an American ship to test the skill and technique of the helmsmen. The Russians also try to ruin maneuvers between the U.S. and its allies. In the Sea of Japan last year, Soviet warships scraped the U.S. destroyer *Walker* twice in an obvious attempt to break up a joint antisub exercise between U.S. and Japanese fleets. "Seafaring nations for centuries have allowed ships to proceed peacefully on the high seas," says Vice Admiral William I. Martin, commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. "This is quite new—to barge in on a formation."

Carrier v. Bomber. Because the Russians consider the U.S.'s seaborne airpower to be a major threat in case of all-out war, one of their favorite tricks is to harass and probe U.S. carriers. Soviet destroyers and trawlers try to break a carrier's screen of protective smaller ships in order to force the flattop to change course while launching or landing aircraft and thus maybe dump a few planes into the sea. In the air, bombers of the Soviet navy's 750-plane, land-based air force continually test to see how close they can approach U.S. carriers before they are detected by radar and intercepted by the carrier's own planes. Their aim is to avoid being caught until they have got within 100 miles of the carrier. Reason: from that range, the Russians would have a good chance of scoring a hit with their air-to-ship missiles before the carrier could scramble fighters to shoot down their bombers.

The U.S. Navy has become increasingly watchful and wary of the Soviet navy. To keep track of its movements, U.S. reconnaissance planes overfly Soviet warships at sea at least once daily and sometimes more often in areas near the U.S. coasts and Viet Nam. U.S. planners plot the course of every Soviet ship in the Pacific on a huge map in the war room of the U.S. Pacific Fleet headquarters in Hawaii; the U.S.'s Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets keep similar grids on the location of Red warships. As a precautionary measure, U.S. carriers keep a so-called Air Cap of three or four fighters in the air at all times whenever they sail within range of Soviet navy bombers. The Air Cap mission is to intercept the Soviets at

least 200 miles out and to "escort" the Russians as they fly over the U.S. task force.

Search for Scars. The most dangerous game of all takes place beneath the seas. For the U.S., the game involves chiefly the detection and tracking down of Soviet subs. For the Russians, it is largely a matter of attempting to elude the American searchers.

As they pass through the ocean depths, submarines invariably give off "scars"—traces of heat and turbulence caused by the ship's passage through the waters. The U.S. employs ultra-sensitive infra-red devices in satellites and planes to look down into the oceans and detect the scars. Submarines also give off what Navy men call "an electronic signature" that, like a human fingerprint, is unique. The signature is the sum total of the sub's sounds—the beat of its screw, thump of its pumps, rustle of its wake. To detect those signatures, the U.S. uses a variety of acute listening devices, including two networks of sonar cables, called Caesar and Sosus, that are placed in the ocean depths in areas frequented by Soviet subs. U.S. planes, destroyers and hunter-killer subs also use sonar devices to trace Soviet subs. Through such systems, the U.S. Navy is able to track Soviet subs with uncanny accuracy throughout most of the world's waters.

Sub Hunting. A sonar operator needs a highly trained ear to sort out the sounds of the sea. Apart from a sub's noises, the sea is full of other sounds, a syncopated symphony of crackling shrimp, clucking sea robins and grunting whales; there is even the engine-like throb of an unknown sea animal that Navy men call the "130-r.p.h. fish." Once the various sounds have been sorted out, the American sub hunters flash the details of the sub's signature to a Navy base in the U.S., where a computer has memorized the signatures of the vast majority of the Soviet submarines. Within seconds, the computer flashes back the name and description of the sub.

On some occasions, the U.S. hunters pounce on the Soviet sub in what the Navy euphemistically calls "informal exercises." The object of the chase is to give the Soviet submarines a healthy respect for the capabilities of the U.S. Navy's ASW (Antisubmarine Warfare) forces. In a duel reminiscent of the fictional shoot-out in *The Bedford Incident*, a U.S. destroyer locks on the enemy boat and tracks his every move. Sometimes, to impress on the Soviets the futility of their plight, an American skipper will play *The Volga Boatmen* over and over again on his destroyer's underwater sound system until the ears of the Russian sonar operator are numbed by the noise and the Soviet

The Russians lag well behind the U.S. in submarine warfare. One reason is that their ships are slower (about 25 knots submerged), make more noise and cannot dive so deeply as U.S. subs, and are thus easier to detect. But the Soviets are continually trying to improve. They are using their big hydrographic fleet to learn more about the sea environment and to find hiding places in the canyons of the ocean for future generations of deep-diving submarines. The U.S. Navy tries to keep up with even the most minor changes in the development and deployment of Soviet subs. One reason that *Pueblo* was cruising off Wonsan was to check on a report that, because of ice in Vladivostok, the Soviets had temporarily switched their Pacific sub base to Wonsan and the nearby island of Mayang-Do. The U.S. is also equipping its nuclear submarines with silent pumps and heat-dispersal systems so that the Soviets will not be able to use infra-red detection systems to locate the scars of American subs.

Soviet Sixth Fleet. One reason the Soviets watch the U.S. Navy so closely is that they learn so much from it. As perceptive students of naval warfare, Gorshkov and his admirals were impressed with the performance of the U.S. Navy in World War II. When they began to build their own navy, they consciously patterned much of it on the successful American model. Soviet admirals even refer to their new Mediterranean flotilla as "our Sixth Fleet."

The Soviets have a long way to go before they catch up with their American teachers. They lag far behind in perhaps the most important aspect of all: combat experience. Many Western experts refuse to rate the Soviet navy as a truly efficient seapower until its untested officers have been called upon to handle their complicated modern weaponry under combat conditions. Nor have the Russians yet mastered the sophisticated technique of refueling and replenishing their ships while under way, as U.S. ships do. Thus, they must spend great amounts of time in sheltered anchorages where they would be easy targets in time of war. Because their navy has no large attack carriers, Soviet warships lack air coverage when they venture away from their own shores, even though Gorshkov himself has conceded that no fleet can fight successfully on the high seas without air protection.

American Response. Such drawbacks are unlikely to deter the Soviet Union from placing increasing emphasis on seapower. Moscow not only relishes the new global reach that Admiral Gorshkov's navy has finally brought it, but it also views as an ideal opportunity the chance to capitalize on the U.S.'s preoccupation with Viet Nam and Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez,

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seeking to impose its own presence where Western influence is diminishing. The West, and especially the U.S., has no alternative but to accept the Soviet challenge on the seas, because the welfare of the U.S.—and of the entire free world—is so solidly tied to the sea and to the untrammelled flow of trade. It would be a historic error if a nation as powerful as the U.S. allowed a crisis elsewhere, no matter how troublesome, to distract it from its determination to retain the mastery of the sea that Admiral Gorshkov is so anxious to wrest from it.

demand is difficult to pin down. The bustling affluence and complacent calm apparent from the traffic jams and crowded cafes of Cairo can be misleading; and with the Suez Canal blocked, there is grave hardship in places like Port Said and among the many thousands of people evacuated from Suez and Ismalia.

Still, Egypt's economic situation is a lot stronger than it was a year ago. This is largely thanks to the £100 million annual subsidy which Kuwait, Libya and Saudi Arabia are paying to make good the loss of Canal revenues. Also, if the projected oil pipe-line from the Gulf of Suez to Alexandria materialises, Egypt may expect to draw revenue in five or six years' time from the passage of up to 200 million tons of oil a year. Cotton prices have been high and new markets are opening up overseas. Thanks to the Aswan High Dam, rice exports have boomed from 60,000 tons in 1966 to an estimated 1,000,000 tons for the current year. So, as long as the Arab subsidy continues and the Soviet Bloc goes on buying and delivering the goods, Egypt should be able to stand a long siege.

The Army and Air Force have been completely re-equipped and, after a purge of some 200 senior officers, reorganised. About two-thirds of its strength—100,000 men—are dug in along the Canal's west bank, with many hundreds of gun emplacements and shelters for fighter aircraft well concealed and with Russian advisers directing the defences. Neutral military experts believe not only that Israel could scarcely repeat last year's surprise attack on these defences but that the balance of strength on the Canal front is today with Egypt, always provided she remains on the defensive.

The question, therefore, is how far the Egyptians can go in their efforts to force the enemy out of Sinai by making life intolerable for the numerically weaker Israeli army on the Canal's east bank. The October 26 attack on Israeli missile sites threatening the Suez refinery clearly shows that the Egyptian artillery can cause the Israelis more hurt than vice-versa, and that Egyptian commandos can cross the Canal with relative impunity to harass Israeli communications at the Mitla Pass.

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Anthony Nutting

reports on prospects for Arab-Israeli peace after talks with President Nasser

Russia is holding the balance in the Middle East

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"because we want peace and because continuation of the war will bring only destruction to both sides. But Israel's interpretation of the resolution does not admit of complete withdrawal from occupied Arab territories; and without this, there can be no settlement."

Both the President and his closest advisers whom I saw in Cairo were at pains to proclaim their support for the UN intermediary, Dr Jarring, to whom they had confirmed Egypt's readiness to concede all that the UN resolution demanded and had proposed a time-table for carrying out its provisions so that neither side could at any stage be at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its adversary. But as the President's foreign affairs adviser, Mahmoud Fawzi, told me, "the lemon of concessions has been squeezed dry"; and today nobody in Cairo gives Dr Jarring more than an outside chance of accomplishing anything. They despair of American pressure bringing Israel to withdraw, saying that if King Hussein cannot so persuade his friends in Washington, nobody else can. And, failing an Israeli withdrawal, any settlement would be made under duress and would mean for any Arab ruler who accepted it political, if not physical, suicide.

Therefore Egypt's leaders are resigned to the inevitability of a "long-haul" strategy of preventive defence to re-create a balance of military power in their favour, as the only way to induce Israel to retire from occupied territory. In the President's own words, "we must be patient and prepare ourselves for a long struggle."

How well equipped Egypt is to withstand the pressures, political and economic, which

"I WANT a settlement with Israel, not a surrender; and so far Israel has only offered us terms of surrender." In these words President Nasser expressed to me last week Egyptian thinking about peace prospects in the Middle East. "We accept last November's UN resolution."

Russia's naval presence in Egyptian waters also acts as a deterrent to Israeli reprisals against Port Said and Alexandria. But against this, the recent Israeli commando raid on the isolated Naga Hamadi power station was an equally clear warning that, if Egypt continues to exploit her advantage on the Canal, Israel will strike at vital installations far behind the lines. And, though I was assured that Aswan was well defended against aerial or commando attack, it is doubtful that the newly-planned home guard will be able to protect every Nile barrage and power station from similar reprisals.

If Israel can thus checkmate Egypt's military advantage on the Canal, what will happen then? Egypt is in no position to take the offensive. Yet public opinion, in one of its periodical bouts of euphoria, could override the caution of the regime and the young officers now in command might try to liberate Sinai by force and restore the injured image of the Army. With each recent Israeli strike, these young men have strained at the leash, although the President seemed confident that neither the army nor the public would force a clash with the present leadership which offered them "the only real hope of ultimate liberation."

The key to this problem lies largely with the Russians, for whose help President Nasser frankly admitted his indebtedness. Though normally claustrophobic about getting over-committed to any great Power bloc, he had had no alternative but to let Russia plug the gaping holes in Egypt's defences.

"Only the Russians helped us after the June war, with emergency aid from wheat to fighter aircraft, while the Americans were helping our enemy. And they have asked nothing of us in return, except facilities for their navy to use Port Said and Alexandria." Not a pound had Egypt paid for the re-equipment of her defence forces or for the military advisers whom Russia had supplied at the President's insistence. But, he asserted, Russia wanted a peaceful solution and did not want to be involved in another conflagration.

Russia has certainly been scrupulously careful to supply hardly any offensive weapons

to Egypt—about a score of T.U.16 bombers are spread between Iraq, Sudan, Egypt and Algeria. The American Phantoms deal with Israel may change this; and Moscow will probably be asked for a matching contribution. But Russia is under no illusions about Egypt's ability to conduct a war of liberation and Mr Brezhnev has clearly warned in the strongest terms against launching a premature offensive and getting trapped again in Sinai.

In all these strategic and political calculations, Egypt is concerned primarily with the problem of clearing the Israeli invaders from her own territory. Her leaders are very evidently disenchanted with some of their more belligerent, though hitherto non-combatant, Arab allies; and their attitude to the Persian Gulf and South Arabia is today that of the spectator rather than the partisan. This is not to say that President Nasser is contemplating a separate peace. Egypt remains the core of Arab resistance and cannot escape that responsibility. But, as he candidly admitted to me, there has been since last year a noticeable abdication from his former role as leader of the Arab world, and the accents of Arab spokesmanship which previously emanated from Cairo have been perceptibly toned down. With no army left after the war, he could hardly speak for anyone outside Egypt, he said. But he was not dismayed. "Beforehand everyone was depending on us, as the war in Yemen showed: now everyone is depending upon himself and this is much healthier."

Nevertheless there is concern in Egypt for the critical situation of King Hussein, whose survival is not only essential to prevent Jordan collapsing into anarchy, but also necessary for President Nasser to continue to hold the balance against the forces of extremism in the Arab world. For if Jordan were taken over by the Al Fatah the President would find it more difficult to resist the demands of extremists to take the offensive. Although Jordan also receives generous help from the oil-rich Arab states, her economic plight inevitably makes her the weak link in the Arab chain.

The King has reassured the Egyptians that he will not sell

out to Israel. Indeed, even if he wanted to, last week's clashes in Amman show that he could scarcely do so with the Palestine resistance movement based on his kingdom. For the Resistance is a new element, born in the failure of the Arab armies last year, and whose dedication and effectiveness commands approbation and attention in every Arab capital. Still Cairo wonders how long Jordan can feed herself with no West Bank.

But, anxiety for Jordan apart, Egypt is very much minding her own business these days. Her President is a lonely, embattled, though still resolute, figure who knows far better what he cannot do than what he can. Unable to make peace or war, he has little choice but to keep on leaning against the occupiers of his territory in the hope that such pressure may ultimately bend, if not break, their iron resistance to all concessions.

Pointing out that the "old imperial principle of divide and rule" applies to Soviet policies in the Arab world, this article shows how "Russia stands to gain more by exploiting the weaknesses and the special circumstances of individual Arab states than by dealing with a stronger unified organism."

Soviet Policy in the Middle East

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BEGINNING IN 1955, the Soviet Union undertook an offensive of rapprochement with the countries of the Middle East. This offensive was aimed primarily at the Arab states, but it encompassed also such non-Arab countries as Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. Soviet progress in the Northern Tier was slower because Turkey and Iran, mindful of Russian aggressiveness in the first postwar decade, were suspicious of Soviet motives and preferred to link themselves to the West through such multilateral instruments as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Baghdad Pact (subsequently CENTO).

In contrast, Russia scored considerable successes in the Arab world, especially between 1955 and 1957. The Soviet-Egyptian arms deal and the Suez crisis marked high points in the Soviet policy of building friendship with the Arabs. A decade later, the Arab-Israeli war and the resulting complications in Arab-Western relations provided another opportunity for the Soviet Union to increase its influence and stature in the Middle East. This time its success was even more pronounced than it was during the Suez crisis of 1956. While at that time the U.S.S.R. and the United States both ranged themselves against the combined Anglo-French and Israeli aggression, in 1967 Russia enjoyed a monopoly of pro-Arab posture.

In a more general sense, the decade of the 1960's has been characterized by intensive Soviet penetration of the Middle East in the political, economic and cultural sectors. This penetration has been aided by a number of factors, of which the following could be identified as most significant:

- (a) putting its emphasis on peaceful coexistence, Soviet policy avoided violence and threats;
- (b) the Soviet Union displayed a marked willingness to deal with the established Middle Eastern governments regardless of their hue, while at the same time de-emphasizing its support for local Communist parties;
- (c) major efforts were made to identify Russia with Arab nationalist aspirations; the struggle against Zionism, imperialism and feudalism became standard catchwords of both the Arab and Soviet political vocabularies;
- (d) Russia was willing and able to respond to the urgent quest of Middle East governments for speedy development irrespective of the political structure of the recipient countries;
- (e) Socialist trends in some states, expressed in the expansion of the public sectors of national economies, were conducive to closer links between Russia and the Middle Eastern "clients" inasmuch as they led to an enlarged volume of government-to-government transactions;
- (f) the weakening of the United States alliance system (both NATO and CENTO) was enhancing the Soviet opportunities of penetration;
- (g) the diversion of the major American effort to the war in Vietnam weakened the relative position of the United States in the Middle East, thereby strengthening Russia's influence;
- (h) a dramatic loss of United States influence in the Arab world on account of the Arab-Israeli war of June, 1967, worked to the direct advantage of the Soviet Union.

In its policy of penetration, the U.S.S.R. was seconded by other countries of the Soviet bloc. Numerous aid-and-trade transactions and cultural cooperation agreements concluded between Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Rumania and Bulgaria, on the one hand, and the countries of the Middle East, on the other, greatly added to the overall cumulative effect.

In spite of the intensity of the Soviet penetration, none of the Soviet Union's Middle Eastern partners was ever linked to it by an alliance. From the formal point of view, all Soviet transactions were conducted with governments which were either neutralist (most of the Arab states and Afghanistan) or allied to the West (Turkey and Iran). However, behind the facade of formal neutralism, certain Arab countries, most notably the United Arab Republic, were in fact rather closely aligned with the Soviet Union on most major issues of foreign policy. An attempt to measure the intensity of Soviet penetration might, therefore, lead to the following tentative categorization in a descending order from high to low:

1. political ties and arms aid (the U.A.R., Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Yemen);
2. political ties and economic assistance (the U.A.R., Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Yemen);
3. economic assistance but no political ties (Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey);
4. arms aid but no political ties (Iran, Sudan).

Some clarification of the terms used here may be in order. "Economic assistance" embraces a wide spectrum of transactions which may include cash credits, long-range loans at a low interest rate, direct Soviet participation in major construction projects and barter agreements. Soviet preference has generally been to assist, through direct participation, in major—sometimes monumental—works, such as big river dams, steel plants and similar basic infrastructural ventures. But occasionally Russia would also undertake a major consumption project provided it had a proper publicity value (such as paving streets in Kabul). Generally, Soviet economic assistance has tended to be directed toward industrial objectives, but agriculture has not been altogether neglected, as evidenced by Soviet aid in erecting silos in Iran and regulating certain rivers. In recent years, i.e., beginning with the mid-1960's, Russia began modest expansion in the oil sector by concluding exploration or pipeline construction contracts with such countries as Iran, Syria and Iraq.

The term "arms aid" similarly embraces a variety of transactions ranging from barter deals (arms for cotton in Egypt), through other forms of payment to outright grants.

Both the economic assistance and the arms aid have involved the participation of Soviet experts—civil and military. Scant information about the activities of these technicians and officers seems to indicate that their contacts with local populations are restricted to the transaction of essential business with their opposite numbers; that there is little or no socializing; and that they have not been caught engaging in any obvious propaganda or indoctrination activity. In fact, it would appear that the relative isolation of these Soviet-imported communities (experts are sometimes accompanied by their families) has been imposed upon them by Soviet authorities out of fear of having them "contaminated" by the "bourgeois" ways and thinking still prevalent even among the Socialist bureaucrats of certain recipient countries.

On the military side, "arms aid" should also be understood to encompass the training of Middle Eastern, particularly Arab, officers in the use of more sophisticated weaponry in Russia or the Soviet satellite states. The most pronounced type of military assistance is in the form of Soviet airplanes and pilots, units of the Soviet navy, or crews handling missile sites in the recipient countries. Thus far, there has been no firm evidence of the Russians or satellite nationals having shared in actual military operations, in spite of the rumors about the activity of Soviet pilots in the civil war in Yemen.

Soviet "cultural" penetration may be regarded almost as a misnomer because there has really been no significant export of Soviet proletarian culture to the countries of the Middle East. What little activity there is has usually taken two forms: it has consisted either in sponsoring occasional lectures, concerts and art exhibits by Soviet scholars and artists (with fairly negligible impact on the target groups in the Middle East), or in making scholarships available for Middle Eastern students in Russia and the Soviet bloc countries. Regardless of country or social class, Arabs, Iranians and Turks still prefer United States or European films, books and illustrated magazines (if admitted by local censorship). By the same token, young girls in those countries follow "decadent" patterns of miniskirts, bikinis, lipstick and discotheque addiction rather than the models set by squat, hard working and drably dressed Soviet women.

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In contrast, Soviet and East European institutions of higher learning make an impact upon the education—particularly technical—of substantial numbers of young men, especially from Arab countries. There is no conclusive evidence that such educational experience in the Eastern bloc has resulted in massive conversions to Communist ideology. In fact, there is some evidence of the opposite result. For example, Iraqi students studying engineering in Odessa protested to the Iraqi embassy in Moscow against the attempt to introduce into their curriculum a course on the history of the Communist party of the Soviet Union as irrelevant to their academic objectives and as a possible device of indoctrination. As a result, Soviet authorities abandoned the idea.

It would be obviously improper to disregard the presence of the local Communist parties in the Arab countries and in Iran. Generally outlawed, they tend to operate in secrecy but in some cases, notably in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, they have (depending on the period and the circumstances) operated almost openly. However, their existence antedates the intensive Soviet policy of penetration and their fortunes are not invariably linked with the success of Russian dealings with the established governments. In fact, sometimes closer government-to-government relations have had an adverse effect on the growth of the local Communist movements. Perhaps the closest point to real ideological penetration has occurred when the ruling parties of Russia and Syria (i.e. the C.P.S.U. and the Ba'ath) have organized mutual visits of their representative groups to discuss their ideological and organizational problems. It is not unlikely that in a dialogue of this sort the discovered similarity of approaches of the two parties on a number of issues might result in a greater tolerance toward communism on the part of the Ba'ath, although again firm evidence on this matter is lacking.

U.S.S.R. AND TURKEY AND IRAN

Between 1966 and 1968, relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey and Iran showed a marked improvement. Not only were previous threats and hostile propaganda campaigns abandoned, but many positive steps were taken. While a detente and cooperation were characteristic of the new Soviet policy toward both southern neighbors, major successes could be registered particularly in

comprehensive Soviet-Iranian agreement provided for Soviet assistance in erecting a steel plant and a metallurgical complex in the vicinity of Isfahan, a provincial capital located in the center of Iran, remote from the traditional sphere of Russian influence in the north. The agreement also pledged Soviet assistance in the construction of grain elevators throughout Iran, joint regulation of the border rivers of Aras and Atrak, and aid in a number of other industrial projects. Payment for the steel plant was to be effected by supplies of natural gas from Iran's southern oil fields, which in turn would be conveyed to the Soviet Union's Caucasian border by a pipeline to be constructed partly by Iran and partly by the Soviet Union.

Hand-in-hand with this basic agreement went complementary deals concluded with Rumania (Iranian oil for a \$131-million tractor factory to be built in Tabriz), Czechoslovakia (a \$100-million generator factory to be constructed by Skoda works), and other East European countries, generally providing for barter-type transactions. Furthermore, for the first time since the abortive attempt in 1946, the Soviet Union made its entry into the Iranian oil sector. On April 15, 1967, the National Iranian Oil Company and the U.S.S.R. reached an agreement giving the Soviet Union the right to explore and drill for oil in certain areas outside the territory exploited by the Western-owned consortium.

An interesting innovation in Soviet-Iranian relations was the conclusion, on February 9, 1967, of an arms agreement worth \$110 million. Russia undertook to provide armored troop carriers, trucks and anti-aircraft guns in exchange for light goods. This was the first time that a country linked to a Western defense system became a recipient of Soviet military equipment. This agreement was symbolic of gradual Iranian emancipation from the United States-sponsored system of political and military guarantees. It was based on the conviction of Iran's ruling group that strict ties with the West should be relaxed inasmuch as the Soviet Union ceased to present an immediate threat to Iran. This view of the Soviet Union stemmed from the Iranian evaluation of Soviet internal changes since Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, and Soviet preoccupation with China. Thus, Iranian policy underwent a modification: it began stressing the economic aspects of

CENTO while playing down the military, without, however, repudiating the alliance in any formal way. This new mood in Soviet-Iranian relations was enhanced by Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin's visit to Iran in April, 1968, to be followed by the state visit of the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to the Soviet Union in September.

Similarly, Turkish-Soviet relations took a friendlier turn after 1966, partly because Turkish appraisal of the Soviet reality and motives coincided with the Iranian and partly as a reaction to the much-criticized American neutrality in the Turkish-Greek conflict over Cyprus. Kosygin's visit to Ankara in December, 1966, the signing of border settlement protocols and economic cooperation agreements, and the return visit of Turkish Premier Suleiman Demirel in Russia in September, 1967, marked the steps in the normalization of Turkish-Soviet relations. Commenting on his visit to Moscow upon his return, Demirel stated that "the traces of hostility" in their mutual relations have been eliminated. Not unlike Iran, Turkey maintained her alliance ties with the West through NATO, CENTO, and the bilateral security agreement with the United States. However, the presence of a sizable American military establishment on Turkish soil caused certain anti-American manifestations in the summer of 1968, thus further strengthening the lingering neutralist trends to Russia's implicit advantage.

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD

Soviet relations with the Arabs have to some extent been conditioned by the nature of the Arab political systems. Thus, invariably, Russia would maintain closer and more friendly relations with the states of the Arab revolutionary camp (the U.A.R., Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Republican Yemen, and more recently the People's Republic of South Yemen) than with the right-wing monarchies or such "neutrals" as Lebanon, Tunisia and Sudan. It should be pointed out, however, that the political conservatism or monarchical structure of certain Arab states have not, *per se*, deterred the Soviet Union from maintaining or seeking to maintain diplomatic and economic relations with them. The Soviet Union has embassies in Jordan, Kuwait, Libya and Morocco. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has thus far been the only Arab state

steadfastly refusing to open diplomatic relations with Moscow despite the latter's informal solicitations.

Soviet transactions with the "neutral" Arab camp (in terms of inter-Arab alignments) have varied from trade relations with Lebanon, through cultural relations with the guided democracy of Tunisia ((the June 22, 1967, agreement), to arms aid to Sudan (the September, 1967, negotiations in Khartoum).

The main thrust of Soviet endeavors, however, has been directed toward the cementing of political friendship with the Arab military dictatorships born of coups and revolutions. Egypt has been the principal target since the 1955 so-called Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal (later publicly acknowledged to represent a Soviet-Egyptian agreement) and U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser's attack against the Western-sponsored Baghdad Pact. Soviet diplomatic support to Cairo during the Suez crisis coupled with the undertaking to build the high Aswan Dam constituted the highlights of Russia's politico-economic offensive. From that time on, Soviet ties with Egypt, through arms supplies, barter deals and support of various development projects, have been steadily maintained and strengthened. Because of the firm grip of Nasser's government on the domestic situation, this close friendship with Russia and the Soviet bloc did not result in the growth of communism in Egypt. But the prestige accruing to the Soviet Union through its dealings with a leading Arab nationalist country did have an encouraging effect on the growth and influence of Communist movements in other countries of the revolutionary camp, especially Syria and Iraq and, to some extent, in Jordan as well.

Egypt's ambitious development programs together with her militant Pan-Arab policy and experimentation with socialism produced serious economic strains and an unceasing need for foreign economic assistance. Although Egypt (later the U.A.R.) did not limit her search for aid and credits to the Soviet bloc and availed herself both of United States surplus food assistance and West European credits, her main provider was the U.S.S.R. This in turn created a degree of Egyptian dependence on the Soviet Union—economic, technical, military and ultimately political—which to a large extent contradicted Nasser's claim of having achieved the full emancipation of his country from foreign

forming a new Mediterranean command, to be called Maritime Air Forces, Mediterranean, or MAIRAIRMED. It is based at Naples and will provide an added watch over the Mediterranean. The decision to set up this new command was made in June at the NATO ministerial meeting in Iceland, and it was activated on 21 November, when a base at Naples was opened. This new element is made up of American, British and Italian forces, with Greek and Turkish forces scheduled to join it later.

Continued Soviet penetration in the Middle East

The Soviet drive into the Mediterranean follows years of Soviet penetration, through military and economic aid, into the Arab world. Since the Arab-Israeli war the Soviets have used the disastrous state of the Arab armies and air forces as leverage to increase Arab dependence on the Soviet Union. They have replaced an estimated eighty percent of all equipment lost by the Arabs in the war, and in addition have given Egypt, Syria and Algeria about forty patrol boats which carry the Styx missile, of the type that sank the Israeli destroyer Elat off Port Said in October 1967. They have doubled the number of military advisers in Egypt to at least 2,000 and have sent large training missions to Algeria, Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

In addition to its "hard-core" clients, the UAR, Syria and Iraq, with each of whom it has recently concluded new military aid agreements, the Soviet Union has made military and economic deals with Iran, Sudan and both the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Republic of South Yemen; it has also made progress in expanding its influence in the oil-rich nation of Kuwait.

In all, Soviet teams are working on an estimated 100 or more projects throughout the area, including a dam on the Euphrates that will supply electricity to much of Syria, making oil surveys in Egypt, and constructing a railroad in Iraq, a steel plant in Algeria and a machine-tool plant in Iran. Accompanying the military and economic penetration is the Soviet cultural drive, with Soviet dance groups and circus troupes touring major Arab cities, local cinemas and television networks featuring Soviet films, universities offering Russian language courses and local bookstores filled with Soviet books and periodicals translated into Arabic.

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control. It would be more accurate to say that Egypt freed herself politically from the remnants of British tutelage to fall under an increasing Soviet influence.

This influence was particularly enhanced as a result of the June, 1967, war. The destruction of the U.A.R. army, together with its equipment and most of its airplanes, opened the floodgate to massive Soviet arms supplies. Egypt not only became a target for Soviet penetration but began playing an ever-increasing role as a transit route and staging point for Soviet ventures in Yemen, South Arabia and Africa. While thus reaping political benefits from the crisis of 1967, the Soviet Union suffered also the inconvenience of being denied (along with other nations) the use of the Suez Canal. In purely strategic terms due to the war in Vietnam, the continuous passage through the canal would probably benefit the Soviet Union more than the United States and its Western allies.

Substantial Soviet effort was also exerted in Syria after 1957 and in Iraq after the revolution of 1958. In both cases, Russia undertook to supply quantities of arms and to assist in a variety of development projects. Economic and technical penetration of Syria by the Soviet bloc countries was especially noticeable. An oil refinery at Homs was constructed by a Czechoslovak firm in the late 1950's, while in 1967 Russia undertook to assist in the development of Syrian oilfields in the Jezira province (Karachuk and Rumaylan). Even more important was the agreement reached on December 27, 1967, whereby the Soviet Union undertook to supervise the construction of the Euphrates Dam. In contrast to Egypt, this cordiality in Soviet-Syrian relations was partly reflected in the more favorable treatment accorded to Syria's domestic Communists. In 1967, Syria's leading Communist, Khaled Bakdash, was not only allowed to return from exile in the Soviet Union but also to make public statements and grant press interviews. By the same token, there were two members of Syria's cabinet in 1967 who were regarded as members of—or closely affiliated with—Syria's Communist party. A brief visit to Damascus paid in July, 1967, by Soviet President N. V. Podgorny was indicative of the Soviet desire to take full advantage of Syria's pro-Soviet and anti-American mood in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war.

Soviet endeavors in Iraq have followed a similar pattern. Assisted by its European satellites, the Soviet Union concluded with Iraq a number of economic, cultural and arms aid agreements, including an oil agreement of December, 1967. In spite of these similarities, however, Iraqi-Soviet relations differed in five important respects from the Soviet-Syrian pattern:

- (a) the excesses committed by the overconfident Iraqi Communist party during the era of Abdul Karim Kassim in 1959 alienated many hitherto vacillating elements from communism and, implicitly, from Moscow;
- (b) the Soviet Union did not undertake in Iraq a project of a magnitude comparable to the Aswan or Euphrates Dams;
- (c) Iraq's economy continued to have a close relationship to the West through the revenues derived from the operations of the Western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company;
- (d) the Kurdish problem in the north of Iraq, with an ever-present possibility of interference by outside powers (including Russia) added another note of caution to Iraqi-Soviet relations;
- (e) the Damascus maverick regime of left-wing Ba'ath (since February, 1966) has effectively isolated Syria from the West and from the Arab community of nations, thus inevitably drawing the country toward close ties with the Soviet bloc; except for a period of Kassim's regime (1958-1959) no such isolation has occurred in Iraq's relationship with the non-Communist and Arab nations.

Soviet relations with Algeria and Republican Yemen followed the lines broadly traced in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The same political vocabulary of common struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction was used, and similar offers of economic and arms aid were made and accepted. It is doubtful whether the Soviet Union could ever count on a position of near-monopoly of influence in Algeria as it did in Egypt and Syria because of Algeria's close economic involvement with France. As for Yemen, Soviet penetration was intensified by the withdrawal of U.A.R. troops from Yemeni territory following the debacle in the June war in Sinai and the subsequent Saudi-Egyptian agreement (at the end of August, 1967). Soviet equipment and military advisers began increasingly to fill the gap left by the U.A.R. evacuation; their presence in Yemen has probably been a major factor in preventing the collapse of the Republican regime under a renewed tribal-royalist offensive.

The Arab revolutionary camp has been

identified with the slogans of Arab unity. Aware of the emotional impact of such slogans upon the Arab masses, the Soviet Union has generally paid lip service to the idea of Arab unity. Thus, in November, 1966, when Syria and the U.A.R. concluded a military cooperation pact, Soviet official comments spoke favorably of the "unity of progressive forces" in the Arab world. In reality, it is doubtful whether the U.S.S.R. really desired Arab unity. In fact, it gave indications of opposing it. In February, 1958, when Syria's last parliament voted for union with Egypt, the only Communist deputy, Khaled Bakdash, cast a dissenting vote, went into hiding, and eventually appeared in Moscow to remain in exile until 1967. There is no reason to think that the old imperial principle of divide and rule does not apply to Soviet policies in the Arab world as well. Profiting from the natural tendency toward Arab revolutionary polycentrism, the U.S.S.R. stands to gain more by exploiting the weaknesses and the special circumstances of individual Arab states than by dealing with a stronger unified organism.

RUSSIA AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

The essentials of the Arab-Israeli relationship have favored the Soviet position from the outset. In November, 1947, the Soviet Union cast its vote in the United Nations for the partition of Palestine, because the existence of a Jewish state in the midst of a hostile Arab world would inevitably provide a constant irritant in Arab-Western relations. The Soviet policy was not limited to voting in favor of the creation of Israel; it materially contributed to the entrenchment of Israel's independence by providing her—through clandestine channels—with arms during her war with the Arabs in 1948. By the same token, the U.S.S.R. was one of the first major powers to extend recognition to Israel within hours of the proclamation of her independence.

Assured that Israel was there to stay, the Soviet Union promptly aligned itself on the side of the Arabs, invariably supporting Arab nationalist aspirations, but never formally endorsing repeated Arab calls for the annihilation of the state of Israel.

The Soviet Union played a significant role in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. In the first place, it may be asserted that it had ma-

terially contributed to the outbreak of the conflict in two ways: (a) by heavily arming the U.A.R. and Syria and thus assisting in the growth of exaggerated self-confidence of the military rulers in Cairo and in Damascus; (b) by warning Syria of an impending Israeli invasion on the eve of the war, and thus setting in motion a politico-military chain reaction leading to U.A.R. President Nasser's expulsion of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from the U.A.R.'s territory.

Once the war broke out, Soviet support to the Arab states was limited to verbal attacks against Israel. Soviet political leadership clearly resolved to avoid direct involvement and a possibility of armed confrontation with the United States; neither Nasser nor Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol would be permitted to choose for the Soviet Union the time and place of a third world war. However, the Russians did their utmost to give verbal support to the Arabs. In the U.N. debates, they were at one with the Arab delegations in ignoring the elements of provocation supplied by Nasser's removal of UNEF from Sinai and by his announced blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. In fact, they made massive use of the U.N. deliberations to give maximum publicity to their pro-Arab stand and to contrast it with the timid and vacillating policies of the United States. To give an even greater effect to this strategy, Premier Kosygin appeared personally in the United Nations, while, simultaneously, President Podgorny paid visits to Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad. Personal involvement in this matter of the highest Soviet office-holders testified to the importance attached to the Middle East in Soviet global strategy.

American press comments on Soviet policies at that time inclined toward oversimplified optimism by dwelling on two facts: (a) that the Soviet Union's prestige had suffered because its arms supplied to the Arabs proved of no avail in the contest with the Israelis; (b) that it suffered a political defeat by having its strongly pro-Arab motion rejected by the U.N. General Assembly. In the light of subsequent developments, these opinions appear unwarranted. Soviet proposals in the U.N. were made not for the purpose of being accepted by the majority (which the Soviet delegation knew was unrealistic), but with an eye to the maximum publicity advantage to be derived from their one-sided tenor. As for the defeat of Soviet arms, it was not the

arms but the Egyptians and Syrians using them who were defeated.

This was not inconsistent with long-range Soviet policy objectives in the region. It created among the Arabs a sense of deep frustration coupled with a sense of alienation from the United States and invariably drove many of them into the proffered Soviet embrace. Furthermore, Russia immediately offered to—and did—replace most of the destroyed weapons, equipment and planes with new ones. At the same time, the Arab governments were offered critical suggestions from Moscow on how to replace their officer corps by a new one whose social origins would assure a greater class harmony with ordinary soldiers. Another lesson to be learned by the Arabs was that to use the new weapons effectively, they would have to rely more completely on expert Soviet advice.

In sum, it may be asserted with good reason that on balance, despite the inconvenience of the blockage of the Suez Canal, the Soviet Union emerged from the Arab-Israeli conflict with impressive gains. The defeated Arab states, resentful at what they regard as definite American partiality toward Israel, tend to turn to the U.S.S.R. as their one remaining friend among the big powers. Rupture of diplomatic relations, trade boycott, temporary oil embargoes, and the continuing refusal of Syria, Iraq and Egypt to grant to airlines of United States registry overflight rights has created a real vacuum in American-Arab relations, into which the Soviet Union and its satellites are stepping with eagerness and success. The presence of a large Soviet naval contingent (45 ships) in the Mediterranean further adds to the weight of Soviet influence in the area.

As these lines are written, the Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis seems to have reached its

peak, with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the capitulation of her political leaders. There is already evidence to indicate that this act of undisguised aggression has offered sobering thoughts to those Northern Tier states like Turkey and Iran which in recent years were inclined to accept Soviet protestations of peaceful coexistence at face value. The effect of the Soviet aggression on attitudes in the Arab world will be less clear. In the Arab non-revolutionary states it will confirm the already existing suspicion and fears of Soviet and Communist designs. But in the Arab revolutionary camp the immediate effects may be negligible. Just because the Soviet Union is settling its accounts with a rather remote (from the Arab point of view) Czechoslovak Communist leadership, the basic pro-Soviet orientation of Cairo or Damascus—dictated as it is by their own concept of their true national interest—is not likely to be upset. One indication that indifference is to be expected may be found in the behavior of their controlled press during the crisis; relatively scant attention was paid to news about Soviet-Czechoslovak tensions and negotiations preceding the invasion and often the only sources of news and comments were *Tass* (Soviet press agency) dispatches and articles reprinted from *Pravda* (the Soviet Communist party publication). While even the controlled newspapers could not avoid printing the actual news of the invasion, they generally avoided editorializing in an obvious attempt to avoid mutual embarrassment.

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