

SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN FOREIGN TRADE

By A.J.

CPYRGHT

Example of Foreign Trade Policy as Interpreted by Communists

The desire on the part of the Czechoslovakian people to introduce reforms, whose realization abruptly terminated with the country's occupation, not unlike the uprising in Hungary in 1956, had important economic implications in addition to its political-philosophical background. Again, as in Hungary, the most important cause is to be found in the Soviet exploitation as applied to foreign trade. The following article will outline shortly some points of emphasis of these relationships.

Imposed Foreign-Trade Prices

It is generally known that the "socialist brother countries" are greatly dependent on Soviet foreign trade which by no means always operates to the advantage of both partners, but rather unilaterally in favor of the Soviet Union. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the following picture emerges. Table 1 lists some classes of goods including Soviet export prices charged to Czechoslovakia as well as those charged the free Western world. The classes of goods selected cover major Soviet export items.

For the goods listed, the prices which must be paid by the CSSR are almost without exception higher. If we consider the entire range of foreign trade, the ratio is reversed only for a few main categories. Conversely, the weighted average CSSR price level for export goods to the USSR is about 35 percent lower than for the export of the same goods from Western countries to the USSR. Only five items could be evaluated regarding Soviet imports from the CSSR, as a result of the somewhat unreliable Russian statistics (Table 2).

Table 1  
Export Prices of Soviet Goods, 1966  
(in DM)

	Exports		
	to the CSSR	to Western countries	
Bituminous coal	50.2	32.0	per ton
Anthracite	56.8	66.1	per ton
Crude oil	68.4	40.9	per ton
Gasoline	123	65.6	per ton
Petroleum	130	122	per ton
Diesel oil	139		per ton
Electricity	0.12	0.016	per kw/hr

	1966	1967	per ton
Manganese ore	844	940	per ton
Chromium ore	1305	999	per ton
Pyrite	380	128	per ton
Pig iron	2060	1540	per ton
Primary aluminum pig	1920	1883	per ton
Apatite concentrate	749	630	per ton
Cement	1954	324	per ton
Saw wood	179	136	per m <sup>3</sup>
Plywood sheets	515	426	per m <sup>3</sup>
Cotton fiber	3100	2380	per ton

(Source: Vnyeshchnyaya Torgovlya SSSR tsa 1966 god. Moscow, 1967)

Table 2

Import Prices for Czechoslovakian Goods, 1966  
(in DM)

	Imports from the CSSR	Imports from Western countries	
Power transformers	1.19	4.68	per kVA
Calcium carbide	72.5	77.5	per ton
Vellum paper	438	375	per ton
Corduroy fabric	5.95	4.90	per meter
Woolen textiles	18.50	31.20	per meter

The price differential, also weighted, shows that the CSSR purchases from Russia at prices 113% higher than from the West.

Heavy USSR Debt

In spite of the distorted "terms of trade," i.e. in spite of the import prices, raised on the average, and export prices depressed in their majority, in their foreign trade with the Soviet Union, the CSSR continues chalking up a more or less positive balance in its trade with the Soviet Union (Table 3).

Table 3

CSSR Foreign Trade with the Soviet Union  
(in millions of DM)

	CSSR exports	CSSR imports	Positive balance
1960	2603	2522	81
1961	2788	2605	173
1962	3296	3080	216
1963	3800	3391	409
1964	3872	3600	272
1965	4140	3700	440
1966	3683	3675	8

(Source: Vnyeshchnyaya Torgovlya SSSR 1962, 1964, 1966)

Developments show that the trade balances during the 1960's were

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 always positive, i.e. that Czechoslovakia's foreign trade with the Soviet Union has led to a continuous increase of the Russian foreign trade debt owed the CSSR. It rose almost uninterruptedly until 1965. 1966 brought about a sudden change in this trend, together with a considerable decline in overall export and import values. The fact that small Czechoslovakia supplied more than 1.700 billion DM more to the USSR during the statistically-covered seven years of this decade than it imported from there, is a further indication for the very unilateral structure of the bilateral Soviet-Czechoslovakian trade.

#### Economic "Tribute"

The inflated prices charged for goods imported from the USSR and the depressed prices paid for Czechoslovakian export goods as well as the enormous debt owed by the USSR to Czechoslovakia are evidently the reflex of a certain trade policy. Prices have been "negotiated" and are not based on the world market price level. To what degree the Czechoslovakian-Russian trade is distorted by these absurd price relations, is shown in Table 4.

Table 4

Distortion of CSSR-USSR Foreign Trade in 1966,  
 (in millions of DM)

	CSSR exports	CSSR imports	Balance
Current prices	3683	3675	+ 8
Without price discrimination	7838	2227	+5611
USSR's foreign trade advantage due to distorted terms of trade	4155	1448	+5603

Czechoslovakian national income in 1965, according to communist statistics, amounted to 50.6 billion DM. As seen from Table 4, this amount, without the practices of USSR foreign trade, should lie 5.6 billion DM higher, i.e. more than 11% higher. Evidently, this does not only apply to 1965. Each year, due to the distorted foreign trade prices, the USSR "siphons off" increasing amounts of the Czechoslovakian national product. It should be clearly pointed out that this "siphoning" effect is not limited to the CSSR. This system prevails vis-a-vis all countries of the Eastern European bloc, wherein the CSSR for many years has been one of the preferred East bloc countries. Hungary and --in earlier days Albania--have for many years been subject to much more rigorous foreign trade practices.

#### Precarious Quality

During the early March days of this year, the well-known Czechoslovakian economist Pravoslav Selucky made the following statement during an interview on radio Prague concerning the restructuring of Czechoslovakia's economic life: It is extremely unhealthy for Czechoslovakia to buy equipment and machinery from the Soviet Union which can by no means compete with domestic engineering and technological quality, and thus there is no need for this equipment. This statement also applies to the raw materials

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 purchased by the CSSR from the USSR which--and this must be especially emphasized--amount to 71% of Russian shipments, while only 28% consists of machinery and industrial equipment and 1% of consumer goods.

As an example, let us list two items which by far make up the most important Russian exports to the CSSR, namely crude oil and iron ore. Soviet crude oil has an unreasonably high sulfur content which forces Czechoslovakian and satellite oil refineries to build additional costly equipment. The Krivoi-Rog iron ores of the USSR, on the other hand, have an exceedingly high silicon content which has the following effect: in Czechoslovakian as well as other Eastern bloc blast furnaces, limestone and coke consumption is exceedingly high. Under these conditions, the blast furnaces break down much more frequently than in the West, which obviously leads to additional costs. Production costs, compared to Western standards, are much higher. To the low quality we must also add that in the border transshipment railroad depot of Cierna nad Tisou, iron ore shipments from the USSR are covered with ice from October to March and the Soviet authorities do not permit heating the cars. They are therefore weighed including snow and ice, so that for almost half of each year snow and ice are sold at the price of iron!

While the Soviets, therefore, are rather generous in the sale of their products, the behavior of Soviet acceptance commissions upon taking over Czechoslovakian goods is much more pedantic. The fact that, for example, Czechoslovakian machinery provided with Russian bearings is frequently not accepted and the addition of West European bearings is demanded, will be mentioned merely as a unique feature. The commissions complain even about minute scratches on the surface lacquer of a machine and refuse acceptance of whole shipments due to minute irregularities. They then charge the particular company with the contractually agreed generally very high conventional fines.

#### Secret Uranium-Ore and Armament Shipments

Upon studying Russian foreign trade statistics with some care, it is noted that there are no items concerning weapons and ammunitions (similar to item 93, Brussels Foreign Trade Nomenclature), i.e. they are not listed. However, it is known that Czechoslovakia as well as the GDR and Hungary produce considerable amounts of weapons and armaments and a large part of these are exported to the USSR. These items cannot be found in the foreign-trade statistics published yearly in Moscow.

An item which is probably even more important valuewise which does not appear in Russian foreign-trade statistics are uranium concentrate shipments from satellite countries. There are major uranium ore deposits in the Bohemian-Moravian basin and particularly in the Carpathian basin. By far, the biggest uranium producer in the Eastern bloc is Hungary. However, Czechoslovakia too has major uranium reserves both in the Czech basin as well as in southern Slovakia, which obviously are being exploited. They are being concentrated in major dressing plants and then exported down to the last kilogram to the USSR. Although officially the quantities involved are not listed, in Hungary's case, following the 1956 uprising, many details regarding uranium mining filtered through to the West. This year, Czechoslovakia yielded interesting data regarding its uranium wealth. The most interesting item on this appeared on 21 April 1968 in

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Rez, V. Pekarek, wrote about the uranium ore problem of the CSSR. CSSR annual production is given as 10,000 tons of uranium oxide (U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>). This is barely less than the US' production in 1964 (11,847 tons). In this article, rather uncomfortable questions are asked of the Soviets, for example "why do we export raw ore (or practically raw) like the underdeveloped Congo? Why don't we export pure uranium or uranium fuel under much more advantageous conditions? We are in a position to prepare these and it would be no problem for our chemical industry to provide the necessary equipment."

When it was determined that the average level of CSSR export prices to the Soviet Union was about 113% lower than if this country exported directly to the West, it is easily seen that the Soviets are trying rather clumsily to maintain the price of uranium-ore shipments low.

#### Frozen Credits

CSSR foreign trade with the Soviet Union resulted in a positive balance of 1.7 billion DM in the 60s. This amount may be considered frozen, since there is little hope for this trend to ever change. In addition to the enormous losses created by Russian price discrimination, Czechoslovakia is also bearing the results of the bilateral trade system created within the Eastern bloc by the Soviets. In the Comecon, the CSSR has always been a good supplier. As a result, as stated by finance minister Sucharda on 19 April in Prague, Soviet credits in the Comecon bank in Moscow add up to several billion kroners. The fact that the development aid given by Czechoslovakia under pressure by the USSR also amounts to "several billion kroners" shall only be mentioned briefly. To top off these practices, under extreme pressure by the USSR, an agreement was signed on 23 September 1966 in Moscow whereby Czechoslovakia assumes the obligation to grant a 2.2 billion DM loan to expand crude-oil production in Siberia, with repayments starting in 1975. Thus, Czechoslovakia is financing the production of relatively low-grade Russian crude oil and is then forced to accept this oil together with other East-bloc countries from the USSR as has been the case for many years!

NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG

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## ' Die sowjetische Ausbeutung der Tschechoslowakei ' im Außenhandel

CPYRGHT Beispiel einer kommunistisch verstandenen Außenhandelspolitik

(AJ) Die tschechoslowakischen Reformwünsche, deren Verwirklichung durch die militärische Besetzung des Landes ein jähes Ende fand, hatten, wie der Aufstand in Ungarn 1956, neben weltanschaulich-politischen auch gewichtige wirtschaftliche Gründe. Die wichtigste Ursache dieser Art liegt, wiederum wie in Ungarn, in der sowjetischen Ausbeutung im Rahmen des Außenhandels. In den folgenden Ausführungen sollen kurz einige Schwerpunkte dieser Zusammenhänge skizziert werden.

#### Aufgezwungene Außenhandelspreise

Es ist eine allgemein bekannte Tatsache, daß die sozialistischen Bruderländer in starkem Maße vom sowjetischen Außenhandel abhängig sind, der keineswegs immer zum Vorteil beider Partner verläuft, sondern vielmehr einseitig zugunsten der Sowjetunion spielt. Im Falle der Tschechoslowakei ergibt sich dabei folgendes Bild. In Tabelle I sind einige Warenarten aufgeführt mit den sowjetischen Exportpreisen gegenüber der Tschechoslowakei sowie denjenigen gegenüber

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dem freien Westen. Bei den ausgewählten Waren handelt es sich um wichtige sowjetische Exportgüter.

**Tabelle 1**  
Ausfuhrpreise für sowjetische Waren, 1966  
(in DM)

		Ausfuhr nach dem westl. Ausland der CSSR (in Mio. DM)	
Steinkohle	(je t)	50,2	32,0
Anthrazit	(je t)	56,8	66,1
Rohöl	(je t)	68,4	40,9
Benzin	(je t)	123	65,6
Petroleum	(je t)	130	122
Dieselmil	(je t)	122	70,6
Elektrischer Strom	(je kWh)	0,12	0,016
Eisenerz	(je t)	398	222
Manganerz	(je t)	84	950
Chromerz	(je t)	1305	999
Pyrit	(je t)	380	128
Roheisen	(je t)	2060	1510
Hüttenaluminium	(je t)	1020	1883
Apatitkonzentrat	(je t)	749	630
Zement	(je t)	1954	321
Nagelsüßholz	(je m <sup>3</sup> )	179	136
Laubholzurnier	(je m <sup>3</sup> )	515	426
Baumwollfaser	(je t)	3100	2380

(Quelle: Vneschtschnaja Torgowlja SSSR za 1966 god. Moskwa 1967)

Bei den aufgeführten Waren liegen die Preise, die die CSSR zu bezahlen hat, fast durchweg höher. Wenn die ganze Außenhandelskala betrachtet wird, so liegt das Verhältnis nur bei einigen weniger bedeutenden Kategorien umgekehrt. Umgekehrt liegt das gewichtete durchschnittliche CSSR-Preisniveau für Ausfuhrgüter nach der UdSSR um 35 % tiefer als bei der Ausfuhr derselben Waren westlicher Staaten nach der UdSSR. Bei den sowjetischen Einfuhren aus der CSSR konnten zufolge der wenig aussagekräftigen russischen Statistik nur fünf Fälle ausgewertet werden (Tab. 2).

**Tabelle 2**  
Einfuhrpreise für tschechoslowakische Waren, 1966  
(in DM)

		Einfuhr aus der CSSR	Einfuhr aus d. westl. Ausland
Netztrafos	(je kVA)	1,10	4,68
Kalziumkarbid	(je t)	72,5	77,5
Pergament	(je t)	438	375
Kordgewebe	(je m)	5,95	4,90
Wollgewebe	(je m)	18,50	31,20

Der (ebenfalls gewichtete) Preisunterschied zeigt, daß die CSSR von den Russen um 113 % teurer kauft als aus dem Westen.

**Schwere Verschuldung der UdSSR**

Trotz den verzerrten «Terms of Trades», d. h. trotz den im Durchschnitt überhöhten Einfuhr- und überdurchschnittlich herabgedrückten Ausfuhrpreisen im Außenhandel mit der Sowjetunion, schließt die CSSR im Außenhandel mit der Sowjetunion noch immer mit mehr oder weniger beträchtlichen aktiven Saldi ab (Tab. 3).

**Tabelle 3**  
Außenhandel der CSSR mit der Sowjetunion  
(in Mio. DM)

Jahr	Ausfuhr der CSSR	Einfuhr der CSSR	Aktiensaldi
1960	2603	2522	81
1961	2788	2605	173
1962	3206	3080	216
1963	3800	3391	409

Jahr	1965	1966
1965	4140	3700
1966	3083	3675

(Quelle: Vneschtschnaja Torgowlja SSSR 1962, 1964, 1966)

Die Entwicklung zeigt, daß die Salden der sechziger Jahre immer positiv gewesen sind, d. h. also, daß der Außenhandel der CSSR mit der Sowjetunion zu einer ständigen Erhöhung der russischen Außenhandelschuld der CSSR gegenüber geführt hat; sie sind bis 1965 zudem fast ununterbrochen gestiegen. 1966 brachte dann eine plötzliche Änderung dieses Trends, zusammen mit einem empfindlichen Rückfall der globalen Ausfuhr- und Einfuhrwerte. Die Tatsache, daß die kleine Tschechoslowakei in den bisher statistisch erfaßten sieben Jahren dieses Jahrzehnts für rund 1700 Mio. DM mehr nach der UdSSR lieferte, als sie von dort bezog, ist ein weiteres Indiz für die höchst einseitige Strukturierung des bilateralen sowjetisch-tschechischen Warenverkehrs.

**Wirtschaftliche «Tributpflicht»**

Die überhöhten Preise für die aus der UdSSR importierten und die stark herabgesetzten Preise für tschechische Ausfuhrgüter sowie die große Verschuldung der UdSSR der Tschechoslowakei gegenüber sind offensichtlich der Reflex einer bestimmten Handelspolitik. Die Preise sind «ausgehandelt» und stützen sich nicht auf das Weltmarktpreisniveau. Inwieweit der tschechisch-russische Handel durch diese absurden Preisrelationen verzerrt wird, zeigt Tabelle 4.

**Tabelle 4**  
Verzerrung des Außenhandels CSSR - UdSSR 1966  
(in Mio. DM)

	Ausfuhr der CSSR	Einfuhr der CSSR	Saldo
Zu gegenwärtigen Preisen	3683	3675	+ 8
Ohne Preisdiskriminierung	7838	2227	+5611
Außenhandelsvorteil der UdSSR wegen verzerrter «Terms of Trades»	4155	1448	+5603

Das Nationaleinkommen der Tschechoslowakei belief sich 1965 nach kommunistischen Statistiken auf rund 50,6 Mia. DM. Wie aus der Tabelle 4 ersichtlich ist, sollte dieser Betrag ohne die Praktiken der UdSSR im Außenhandel um 5,6 Mia. DM, d. h. um mehr als 11 %, höher liegen. Und dies gilt natürlich nicht nur für 1965. Jedes Jahr werden von der UdSSR mit Hilfe der verzerrten Außenhandelspreise immer größere Anteile des tschechoslowakischen Nationalprodukts zugunsten der Sowjetunion «abgeschöpft». Es ist ausdrücklich darauf hinzuweisen, daß sich dieser «Abschöpfungseffekt» nicht nur auf die CSSR beschränkt. Dieses System besteht gegenüber allen Staaten des europäischen Ostblocks, wobei die CSSR sogar viele Jahre hindurch zu den bevorzugten Ostblockländern gehörte; Ungarn oder — früher — Albanien wurden lange Zeit viel rigorosor an die außenhandelspolitische Kette gelegt.

**Prekäre Qualität**

In den ersten Märztagen dieses Jahres hat der bekannte tschechische Volkswirtschaftler *Pravoslav Selucky* im Rahmen eines Interviews im Prager Rundfunk zu Fragen der Neugestaltung des wirtschaftlichen Lebens in der Tschechoslowakei u. a. festgestellt, daß es höchst ungesund sei, daß die Tschechoslowakei von der Sowjetunion Ausrüstun-

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... und Maschinen überlegen, nicht nur mit dem im Inland erreichten technischen und technologischen Niveau in keiner konkurrieren können, dafür also kein Bedarf besteht. Diese Feststellung ist auch für die von der UdSSR an die CSSR verkauften Rohstoffe gültig, die — und dies muß besonders betont werden — 71 % der russischen Lieferungen ausmachen, während auf Maschinen und industrielle Einrichtungen lediglich 28 % und auf die Konsumgüter alles in allem 1 % entfallen.

Als Beispiel kann auf die zwei mit Abstand größten Posten der russischen Ausfuhren nach der CSSR hingewiesen werden, nämlich auf Erdöl und Eisenerz. Das sowjetische Erdöl hat einen unverhältnismäßig hohen Schwefelgehalt, weshalb sowohl die tschechoslowakischen wie auch die Satelliten-Erdölraffinerien zur Errichtung zusätzlicher kostspieliger Anlagen gezwungen sind. Die Kriwoi-Rog-Eisenerze der UdSSR haben andererseits einen übermäßig hohen Siliziumgehalt, was dann dazu führt, daß sowohl in den tschechischen als auch anderen Ostblockhoehöfen der Kalkstein- und Koksverbrauch ungewöhnlich hoch liegt. Unter diesen Umständen fallen die Hoehöfen viel häufiger aus als im Westen, was natürlich zusätzliche Kosten verursacht. Die Produktionskosten liegen deshalb gegenüber dem Westen sehr viel höher: Zu der niedrigen Qualität kommt noch, daß in dem großen Grenzümschlagbahnhof Cierna nad Tisou die Eisenerzlieferungen der UdSSR von Oktober bis März schnee- und eisbedeckt einlaufen und die sowjetischen Behörden ein Aufwärmen der Waggons nicht erlauben. Diese werden also mit Schnee und Eis abgewogen, so daß von der UdSSR beinahe ein halbes Jahr hindurch Schnee und Eis zum Preis des Eisens verkauft werden!

Während die Sowjets beim Verkauf ihrer Erzeugnisse also ziemlich «großzügig» sind, ist umgekehrt das Verhalten der sowjetischen Abnahmekommissionen bei der Übernahme tschechoslowakischer Waren sehr viel pedantischer. Die Tatsache, daß sie z. B. häufig tschechoslowakische Maschinen, die mit russischen Lagern ausgerüstet sind, nicht übernommen und der Einbau von westeuropäischen Lagern verlangt würde, soll hier lediglich als Unikum erwähnt werden. Die Kommissionen beanstanden selbst kleinste Kratzer im Schutzlack einer Maschine und lehnen wegen geringster Fehler die Abnahme ganzer Lieferungen ab; sie belasten dann den zuständigen Betrieb mit den vertraglich vereinbarten, zumeist hohen Konventionalstrafen.

### Die geheimen Uranerz- und Rüstungslieferungen

Wer die russischen Außenhandelsstatistiken eingehend studiert, dem muß auffallen, daß es darin eine Position für Waffen und Munition (ähnlich der Pos. 93 der Brüsseler Außenhandelsnomenklatur) nicht gibt, bzw. diese nicht angeführt wird. Es ist aber bekannt, daß sowohl die Tschechoslowakei wie auch die DDR und Ungarn beträchtliche Waffen und Ausrüstungsmengen produzieren und davon einen großen Teil nach der UdSSR exportieren. In der in Moskau jährlich veröffentlichten Außenhandelsstatistik ist von diesen Positionen nichts zu finden.

Eine wertmäßig wahrscheinlich noch wichtigere Position, die in der russischen Außenhandelsstatistik nicht in Erscheinung tritt, sind die Urankonzentratlieferungen der Satellitenländer. Im böhmisch-mährischen Becken und von allem in Karlovy Vary gibt es große Uranerzlagun. Der

ist Ungarn; aber auch die Tschechoslowakei hat sowohl im tschechischen Becken als auch in der Südslowakei große Uranerzvorräte, die natürlich in raschem Tempo ausgebeutet, in großen Aufbereitungswerken konzentriert und dann bis zum letzten Kilo nach der UdSSR exportiert werden. Die Mengen werden zwar offiziell nicht angegeben, aber, wie im Falle Ungarns, sind während und nach dem Aufstand von 1956 sehr viele Einzelheiten über den Uranerzbergbau nach dem Westen durchgesickert. Die Tschechoslowakei hat auch im Laufe dieses Jahres außergewöhnlich interessante Angaben über ihren Uranerzreichtum geliefert. Die interessanteste darüber erschien am 21. April 1968 in der «Svoboda» (Freiheit), wo ein Mitglied des Instituts für Atomforschung in Rez, V. Pekarek, über das Uranerzproblem der CSSR schrieb. Die CSSR-Jahresproduktion wird mit 10 000 t Uraniumoxyd ( $U_3O_8$ ) angegeben. Dies ist kaum weniger als die Produktion der USA im Jahre 1964 (11 847 t). Im erwähnten Artikel werden für die Sowjets sehr unbequeme Fragen gestellt, so zum Beispiel «Warum exportieren wir rohes (oder praktisch rohes) Erz, wie der zurückgebliebene Kongo? Warum exportieren wir nicht reines Uranium oder Uranbrennelemente zu viel vorteilhafteren Bedingungen? Wir sind in der Lage, diese herzustellen, und es wäre für unsere chemische Industrie kein Problem, die dazu notwendige Ausrüstung zu liefern.»

Wenn festgestellt wurde, daß das durchschnittliche Niveau der CSSR-Ausfuhrpreise gegenüber der Sowjetunion um etwa 113 % niedriger liegt, als wenn dieses Land denselben Außenhandel mit dem Westen abwickeln würde, so kann man sich leicht vorstellen, daß von sowjetischer Seite auch mit nicht sehr wählerischen Mitteln versucht wird, den Preis für die Uranerzlieferungen tief zu halten.

### Eingefrorene Guthaben

Der Außenhandel der CSSR mit der Sowjetunion weist allein in den sechziger Jahren einen Aktivsaldo von 1,7 Mia. DM auf. Dieser Betrag kann als eingefroren betrachtet werden, da wenig Aussicht besteht, daß sich dieser Trend einmal ändern wird. Außer den enormen Verlusten, die durch die russische Preisdiskriminierung entstehen, belastet die Tschechoslowakei auch das von den Sowjets geschaffene bilaterale Handelssystem innerhalb des Ostblocks. Im Rahmen des Comecon war die CSSR immer ein guter Lieferant. Als Ergebnis belaufen sich — wie Finanzminister Sucharda am 19. April in Prag erklärte — die tschechoslowakischen Guthaben bei der Comecon-Bank in Moskau auf «mehrere Milliarden Kronen». Die Tatsache, daß sich die teilweise ebenfalls von der UdSSR erzwungene Entwicklungshilfe der Tschechoslowakei ebenfalls auf «mehrere Milliarden Kronen» beläuft, soll hier nur kurz erwähnt werden. Und als Krönung all dieser Praktiken wurde, unter schwerstem Druck der UdSSR, am 23. September 1966 in Moskau ein Vertrag unterzeichnet, worin sich die Tschechoslowakei verpflichtete, zur Erweiterung der Erdölproduktion in Sibirien eine Anleihe von 2,2 Mia. DM zu gewähren, wobei der Beginn der Rückzahlung erst 1975 erfolgen wird. So finanziert die Tschechoslowakei die Produktion des qualitativ nicht sehr guten russischen Erdöls, zu dessen Übernahme sie dann mit anderen Ostblockländern von der UdSSR seit vielen Jahren

"Reflections Before Sunday: Question Marks About COMECON"

(Interview of Dr. Viteslav Vinklarek, deputy minister for national economic planning and Czechoslovak representative in the bureau of the COMECON Executive Committee.)

Question: What is your opinion on the position of the Czechoslovak economy among the COMECON countries?

Answer: We must realize two characteristics of our position in the world. First, that Czechoslovakia has an inadequate and incomprehensive raw material base, is short of agricultural soil per capita, and has an unfavorable position from the viewpoint of transportation. Thus we must import foodstuffs and raw materials and export the maximum possible finished products preferably to nearby markets. With the aid of the socialist countries and particularly COMECON we have essentially solved this problem.

Second, in view of the relatively small size of our domestic market we need an extensive exchange of all types of finished products. "We need them in the most varied forms. We need imports of technically advanced machinery and equipment and of attractive specialization and cooperation in production, and so forth. So far we have failed in this effort."

It has been frequently pointed out in the past that the orientation toward the socialist market has lowered and still lowers exactingness about quality of Czechoslovak products. I do not think that this is completely accurate, because what is decisive is the problem of what is, and even more, what will be the quality of the market of the COMECON member countries. We know that Italian, French, British, and Japanese companies are wooing the Soviet market like a rich bride. Why should we abandon the field to them? The quality of the socialist market is growing rapidly.

Question: Thus in your opinion what matters is not only that we more effectively penetrate dollar markets but that we preserve the socialist markets?

Answer: Certainly we strive to sell our products on the developed East European markets, but at the same time we shall have to strive for the strengthening and developing of our position in the USSR and on the markets of the other COMECON countries.

Question: And what prevents us from using our opportunities among the COMECON countries?

Answer: I would like above all to point to the domestic obstacles. Though it is stated in general that Czechoslovakia is interested in deepening the international division of labor, in practice it is different. According to a poll conducted by a research institute for national economic planning, most plants asked about their evaluation of the chance to develop cooperation with socialist countries replied: "The enterprise does not see any benefit deriving from a cooperation." Sixty percent of the



enterprises which sent in replies are unable to cover the demands of the domestic market for their products. Naturally such plants have no interest in promoting cooperation. The cooperation contacts established so far, both with socialist and with capitalist states, are only of incidental importance. This also is one of the results of the former administrative management system where concepts such as price, credit, interest, and so forth did not play their proper role.

Question: What is the situation concerning the coordination of plans among the COMECON countries?

Answer: Coordination of plans has played a certain positive role in insuring foodstuffs and raw materials and in selling our products. In the future coordination of plans must also assure our supplies of oil, gas, iron ore pellets, potash, copper, sulfur, lead, grain, and cotton. For these articles which are so important for us we cannot possibly make any suitable arrangement but with COMECON member countries. In the future it will no longer be sufficient for the central authorities to decide on exports or imports. For example, the enterprise which buys the pellets will be authorized to reject them because of poor quality. Hence it is only fair for representatives of the enterprises concerned to participate in the dealings.

Question: In your opinion what is the effectiveness of the work of COMECON and what justifies its existence?

Answer: Multilateral coordination of plans is beneficial because of its informational effect. We thus obtain data on the development of industry, national incomes, agriculture, and on basic trends of investment and foreign trade.

"As far as the economic role which COMECON should play, however, the result of its activity is altogether insufficient. COMECON as an institution has undoubtedly become outdated in its methods of activity. Its pattern was essentially built according to the model of a national economy managed by directives. In the years 1962-63 this model even led up to Khrushchev's idea of an international planning organ. It is obvious today that the views of that time are unrealistic and impracticable. If on the national scale we are unable at one center to decide problems related to the effective development of an enterprise, it is illusory to assume that some international organs would be able to do so. However, since no new concept for the work of COMECON was found, a certain stagnation took place.

"I believe, however, that COMECON is a useful and purposeful organization. But we must not conceive of it as an organization of a directive nature. I do not uphold such a view nor did I ever advocate it, not even when COMECON was criticized in our country from the standpoint of 'why does COMECON not settle this?' The whole COMECON system requires a considerable modernization in the foreseeable future. COMECON must not decide who is going to manufacture what, but must prepare studies on the possible trends of an effective development of the member countries and above all it must help work out the economic prerequisites such as basic principles

concerning determination of prices, rates of exchange, credits, and so forth."

When we assume that the trend of development tends toward integrated economic systems we need an economic organization which will be a basis for negotiation of the economic prerequisites of economic collaboration. "The understanding of the need for a modernization of the system of collaboration among the COMECON member countries and COMECON as an institution is gaining strength. For example, expressions of this understanding are some of the decisions adopted at the session in Budapest last December, including the decision on the need to perfect the system of foreign currency collaboration. It is understandable that so far each COMECON member state has a different idea of this modernization. They have different economic standards, different interests, and their management systems also are considerably different.

Question: What would you like to add in conclusion?

Answer: COMECON is not an institution without countries. Hence it is only through the collaboration of these countries that a system can be found for the modernization of both bilateral and multilateral collaboration, a system which will make it possible more efficiently to solve problems of economic advancement in conformity with the specific interests of individual countries and hence also with the interests of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

statement of Dr. V. Vinklerek, Czech representative to COMECON. He was quoted in Prague's Trade Union daily Prace on 18 May 1968 as follows:

"Regarding the economic role which COMECON should play, the result of its activity is altogether insufficient. COMECON as an institution has undoubtedly become outdated in its methods of activity. Its pattern was essentially developed according to the model of a national economy managed by directives. In the years 1962-63, this model even led to Khrushchev's idea of an international planning organ. It is obvious today that the views of that time are unrealistic and impracticable. If on the national scale we are unable at one center to decide problems related to the effective development of an enterprise, it is illusory to assume that some international organ would be able to do so. However, since no new concept for the work of COMECON has been found, a certain stagnation has taken place.


"I believe, however, that COMECON is a useful and purposeful organization. But we must not conceive of it as an organization of a directive nature.... The whole COMECON system requires a considerable modernization in the foreseeable future. COMECON must not decide who is going to manufacture what, but must prepare studies on the possible trends of an effective development of the member countries and above all it must help work out the economic prerequisites, such as basic principles concerning determination of prices, rates of exchange, credits, and so forth.

"When we assume that the trend of development is toward integrated economic systems, we need an economic organization which will be a basis for negotiation of the economic prerequisites of economic collaboration. The understanding of the need for a modernization of the system of collaboration among the COMECON member countries and COMECON as an institution is gaining strength.... It is understandable that so far each COMECON member state has a different idea of this modernization. They have different economic standards, different interests, and their management systems also are considerably different." (The full translation of this article is attached.)

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There is no indication whether the Soviets will be able to forestall changes in COMECON's structure and functions, or whether the East European countries will be able to bring about such changes. However, if past events are a guide to the future, it must be considered most likely that the Kremlin will discourage any radical innovations in COMECON which might weaken its control over Eastern Europe.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA HUNGARY MONGOLIA POLAND RUMANIA  
USSR  
CONFERENCE OF FIRST SECRETARIES OF CENTRAL COMMITTEES AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS



COMECON: LITTLE ACCOMPLISHED IN TWENTY YEARS

Formation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance\* was announced on 25 January 1949. This was viewed at the time as a Soviet maneuver chiefly to mollify Czechoslovakia after the Soviet Union had forced it to withdraw its stated interest in participating along with Western European countries in the U.S.-backed Marshall Plan. After twenty years of close economic ties under COMECON, economic frictions played a large role in the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia and put an end to its search for greater freedom. Other East European countries are also dissatisfied with COMECON arrangements. In the light of these difficulties, it is appropriate to take a close look at COMECON as an organization and at its effect on the development of the economies of Eastern Europe.

COMECON's History as an Organization

COMECON's initially announced purpose was to seek ways for wider economic cooperation among the countries of Eastern Europe: the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania, Mongolia has been included since at least 1963. Between 1949 and 1956, however, COMECON's activities were largely confined to yearly council sessions at which only general matters were discussed. In 1956 a number of permanent commissions, most of them headquartered in Moscow, were set up to review Economic Questions, Foreign Trade, Coal, Electric Power, Steel, Chemistry, etc.\*\* In 1958 Khrushchev started a move to change COMECON from a deliberative body to one which would play an active role in establishing an "international division of labor" among the economies of Eastern Europe. By 1962 this move had gotten to the point where COMECON, as an organization, felt it could allocate specific industries and agricultural specializations to the individual member countries. In a test of wills, however, Rumania successfully resisted COMECON's attempt to assign to it the primary role of supplying crude oil, minerals, and forest and farm products. The Rumanians recognized their unique position among COMECON countries: they could readily market large amounts of their goods in the West in exchange for hard currency, and thus were not so susceptible to pressure to comply with COMECON's schemes. The Rumanians used this advantage to embark on a large integrated steel mill at Galati, a petrochemical complex, and other industrial projects equipped with Western machinery. The Rumanians also exploited the Council's charter containing a clause which requires unanimous consent, a device the Soviet Union had inserted to protect itself from being outvoted by its vassals. Thus, Rumania's refusal to accept COMECON's grandiose blueprint for the economies of Eastern Europe marked the effective limits of the Council's authority.

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\*Most frequently abbreviated to COMECON; also referred to as CEMA or CMEA.

\*\*See the attached table of organization of COMECON.

COMECON has taken a few concrete steps toward international cooperation. These, however, suffer by comparison with parallel Western European achievements. For example, it has set up a Freight Car Pool, under which one COMECON country can reload emptied railroad cars sent in from other COMECON countries. This arrangement was copied from a Western European interchange system set up much earlier -- in 1949 -- and which operates far more efficiently. The Western European countries have also established a railroad equipment trust, EUROFIMA, which has been very effective in pooling capital to purchase locomotives and freight cars for the mutual benefit of the participating countries. But COMECON has no similar arrangement. COMECON also claims success for INTERMETAL, an association set up in 1965 to promote trade in iron and steel. Eventually, INTERMETAL is supposed to coordinate the development of Eastern Europe's iron and steel industry. In comparison, Western Europe's Coal and Steel Community has been operating since the early 1950's, and has played a dominant role in coordinating investments and establishing common policies. Thus, COMECON's claims to advances in international cooperation, though valid, are not very impressive.

In contrast to these modest achievements, COMECON has fallen far short of a number of its stated goals. Primary among these is the "international division of labor," the objective of which is to assign specialized tasks to the most efficient producer. Exemplifying the failure of specialization is the machinery industry, which all of the COMECON economies are developing in a wild scramble towards "universalization." According to Professor Karlik, a Soviet economist, out of 2,000 engineering products in COMECON trade most are produced by firms lacking enough capital or enough expertise to compete in a free market. Many of these products are identical to those of other countries. Another goal, multi-lateral trade, has not been realized. There are no convertible currencies and, furthermore, there are no realistic price structures in its member economies, the lack of which makes it impossible for any multi-national body to effectively coordinate long-term economic planning. Indeed prices for goods exchanged in intra-bloc trade are based on free world market prices. (East Europeans relate the story of a Soviet economist who, when asked how the Communist countries would price goods once Communism had conquered the entire world, replied that they would leave one free economy -- probably Switzerland -- for this purpose.)

#### COMECON as an Economic System

To many observers, the term COMECON connotes not just the Council but the full sweep of economic activities of the Eastern European countries linked to the USSR. Underlying the entire COMECON system is the USSR's need to control the countries of Eastern Europe and to treat them as subordinate members of a federation rather than as sovereign states. This means that the Soviets do not permit the multi-national Council and its related organs to play more than advisory or informational roles. It explains why the Soviets caused the COMECON countries to mold their economies on the largely inflexible Soviet model. It is the reason that

the Soviets conduct trade bilaterally with all the COMECON countries, and in so doing carefully control the allocation of important materials. The inevitable result of the USSR's control is that the COMECON countries' economies have come to resemble that of the USSR; they are inefficient, and they place a low priority on consumer welfare.

Economic inefficiency is obvious to East Europeans, who are quite aware of conditions outside the Communist bloc and can, moreover, make comparisons with their pre-Communist situations. One basic consequence of this inefficiency is the fact that considerably larger investments are required in the Communist countries, compared to those of Western Europe, in order to raise output a given amount. As an example, the Czechs, who are very efficient relative to most other COMECON producers, have admitted that their industry consumes two to three times as much steel and fuels as Western European countries do to manufacture an equal amount of goods. To add to this problem, labor productivity has grown more rapidly in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe, so the disparity is growing rather than lessening.

The inefficiency also causes -- and is caused by -- the poor quality and unsatisfactory assortment of goods produced. Output of many products is greater than can be sold, while others could be sold in greater amounts than are produced. The product assortment (sizes, qualities, styles) is far narrower than in Western Europe. Moreover, the newer, more modern machinery to be found in Western Europe which could make their output competitive in the West is not available to East European manufacturers. Consequently, as the East Europeans feed inferior materials and machinery back into the economy, it becomes ever harder to catch up with the West.

Another basic cause of East Europe's inefficiency, and a large obstacle to its improvement, is the Soviet Union's rigid policy of bilateralism in trade with Eastern European countries. The USSR negotiates trade agreements with each country for one- or five-year periods. By and large the USSR agrees to provide industrial raw materials and farm products for machinery and consumer goods. The Soviets' goods are frequently of inferior quality but, to compensate, the Soviets readily accept and pay the same price for low quality products from their COMECON partners as they would for high quality products bought in the West. This sort of exchange reduces the East Europeans' incentives to improve quality.

The effect of these low standards is readily apparent in East European efforts to expand trade outside of COMECON. Because of poor quality, exports from Czechoslovakia and East Germany to the European Common Market in 1968 brought on the average only about one-half the price paid for similar Western goods from outside the Common Market.

One of the Eastern Europeans' main motivations in reforming their economies is to bring the quality of their products up to "world standards" (i.e., to the point where they can be sold in the West without discount). The economists and many government leaders believe that

production managers, if freed from the customarily tight central controls of the Soviet-style economy and if offered appropriate incentives, will raise efficiency and improve quality. But a nagging question remains: If a COMECON producer does raise his output to world standards, won't the Soviets take it before it can be sold for hard currency in the West?

A low priority for consumer welfare has become characteristic of the COMECON countries. Total output of consumer goods has suffered as COMECON countries have squeezed the share of GNP allocated to consumption down to about 60 percent, as compared to over 75 percent in Western Europe. East Europeans also clearly see the reduced quality and variety of shoes, clothing, household goods, automobiles, toys, musical instruments, etc. The reluctance of the people to buy the available goods is seen from the increases -- up to 25-fold since 1955 -- in savings deposits of individuals, and also in the exceptionally high manufacturers' inventories -- up to four percent of gross national product (GNP).

#### Prospect for COMECON

Wide differences in viewpoints cloud the outlook for COMECON's future. The Soviets tend to express confidence -- albeit vaguely -- that COMECON will go on about as before. The Eastern European countries, on the other hand, are pressing for improvements in COMECON.

In an article entitled "Cooperation Among the Socialist Countries" appearing in the USSR's Economic Gazette in early December 1968, Soviet economist S. Pomazanov makes it clear that Soviet views on COMECON remain unchanged: economic cooperation has become a necessary condition for rapid development and for victory in the world competition with capitalism; the socialist economies' links are dictated by common interests and are a natural development in accord with objective historical processes. Pomazanov refers to a 1967 book by O.T. Bogomolov who asserted that the socialist countries have a right to structure their economies as they see fit and to create industries and engage in production they deem expedient provided those countries restrict this right by taking into account the "objective process of international life in the world socialist system." Pomazanov makes clear that such considerations impose severe restrictions on the character of national economic complexes.

Pomazanov avoids discussing economic integration of the socialist countries although he notes that in some COMECON countries, particularly Poland and Hungary, this question -- including its nature and type, forms and methods, and potential and prospects -- is being intensively discussed. The article adds that "these problems unfortunately have not been posed in Soviet economic literature."

An idea of the interest of the Eastern European economists in the possibilities of future development of COMECON may be gathered from a



COMECON: LITTLE ACCOMPLISHED IN TWENTY YEARS

1. COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance -- also known as CEMA) has come to symbolize not only straightforward economic exploitation by the USSR of its East European allies, but it is also widely regarded as a tool by means of which the Soviets continue their economic and political dictatorship over Eastern Europe. In one sense or another, each of these impressions is valid, and we wish to deepen them by tying them in with COMECON's record and its methods of operation.

2. COMECON has the reputation of being a means by which the Soviets bilk their trading partners. The fact is that COMECON trade agreements are so tangled that it takes an expert to determine which country is favored by the resulting terms of trade. We are attaching an article from the *Neue Zurcher Zeitung* which presents price data on Czech-Soviet trade showing that the Soviets are heavily exploiting their "socialist brother country." Although the *NZZ's* point is not entirely proven, owing to insufficient data, it is an excellent example of propaganda exploitation of this theme.

3. A far stronger case can be made for the Soviets' having made economic vassals of the East European countries. The Soviets' first steps under Stalin to control the East European economies have not been retraced. Over time, they have strengthened their control by imposing their will in bilateral trade negotiations, and by exercising virtual veto power over the long-range economic development plans of East European countries. The Soviets have meshed Eastern European economies with their own by making the East Europeans dependent upon them as a supplier of raw materials and as a market for manufactured goods. In this barter-type arrangement, the Soviets have led the East Europeans into producing inferior quality goods, thereby making it disadvantageous even for Czechoslovakia and East Germany to compete in Western markets. The resultant shortage of foreign exchange limits Eastern Europe's ability to purchase modern, higher quality Western machinery and thus tends to perpetuate its economic vassalization to the USSR.

4. The complex COMECON organization is often regarded as a Soviet instrument for supporting their political domination of East Europe. We are attaching COMECON's (unclassified) table of organization, which on the surface tends to support an assertion to this effect. Actually, COMECON is a rather harmless, ineffective organization which may inform and recommend but has little authority. The reason for its insignificance probably is that the Soviets choose not to allow a multi-national body to have any authority which might conceivably undermine their own. They use COMECON as a front, all the while exerting their economic power directly and bilaterally.

5. Czechoslovakia's efforts to slip out of COMECON's harness partially account for the 1968 Czech crisis. An important goal of the Czech's

economic reform was to relax centralized controls and offer management incentives to improve quality and trim costs in order to enable Czech goods to compete in Western markets. The Soviets, perceiving the possibility that Czech success in this undertaking would weaken COMECON bonds, have unleashed a continuing, unmerciful propaganda barrage against Professor Ota Sik, the most renowned contributor to the Czechs' economic reform program. We should encourage assets to stress the issue of Soviet apprehension over the prospect of Czech economic success when they review the Czech situation, noting that this would not only have increased the existing Czech lead over Soviet economic standards, but would also have stirred jealous demands from the other satellites. It is likely that Professor Sik will be writing from his present exile in Switzerland and will provide material well worth exploiting.

6. COMECON has scheduled meetings of its Council and Executive Committee in Moscow in January 1969, presumably to coincide with COMECON's 20th birthday on 25 January. Preceding those functions will be a meeting in Moscow of top party and government leaders from the COMECON countries to discuss "problems of the perfection of economic cooperation." These occasions provide useful pegs for calling attention to the true nature of the organization and of Soviet manipulation of the economies of the Eastern European satellites through COMECON in order to further Soviet interests.

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CURRENT HISTORY  
May 1968

*In this issue, seven authors look at West Germany under Kiesinger, to bring readers new perspective on the political, economic and military problems of this Common Market member. Our first author sees dangerous political tensions rising in Germany unless Great Britain is admitted to the Common Market.*

## Germany, France and "Europe"

BY HANS A. SCHMITT  
*Professor of History, New York University*

THREE ENTITIES compose our title, related but separate. "Europe" requires quotation marks, referring only to a fraction of Europe. "Europe" was reborn in the minds of men after World War I had cast serious doubt on the efficacy of an international order composed of nation-states.

Between the world wars, "Europe" was only a vision. After World War II, however, there emerged some determination to act. The new European movement was pragmatic rather than idealistic; one might prefer independence, but one could not survive with it. Hitler had given the Continent the experience of union under tyranny, proving in the process that national sovereignty required resources that most European peoples did not possess. After the war, the European world stood between one solution which it could not accept, and another—national self-determination—which it could not afford. A European order had to be built which would both protect and liberate. Each ethnic entity would remain culturally independent, speak its own language, preserve its own peculiar forms of worship and of local government.

At the same time it would join its neighbors in a covenant under which the collectivity of Europeans could foster their productive capacities and their political powers, so that they could jointly participate in the numerically declining concert of world powers. Paul-Henri Spaak expressed the concept one way when he protested that Europe should not subsist on Soviet threats and American charity. Putting it more positively, one might say that the driving intellects in the European movement wanted to be able to compete with the United States and to resist the U.S.S.R.

What they have accomplished has been chronicled in this journal.<sup>1</sup> The accomplishment has fallen far short of European union. The Balkans and East Central Europe have experienced a union of sorts under another old-fashioned hegemonical order dominated by the Soviet Union. Their microcosm is at peace; it is capable of protecting itself against outside attack; and it has developed its economic resources beyond any level previously attained. The cultural and spiritual freedom of its peoples, however, exists precariously and fitfully.

North, central, southern and western Europe remain divided, though less so than before. The inhabitants are likewise at peace among themselves and with each other. The North Atlantic Treaty Alliance includes all of the nations beyond the Soviet sphere except Spain, whose dictatorial regime is anathema to most governments in the area,<sup>2</sup> and Switzerland and Sweden, who have persevered in their traditional policies of neutrality. Like Soviet Europe, the rest, pledged to defend one another, and protected by the resources of an outside world power, live more safely and in greater harmony than before. Economically, this portion of Europe has split into the "inner Six"<sup>3</sup> and the "outer Seven."<sup>4</sup> The Six compose the European Economic Community (E.E.C., or Common Market), now approaching the state of complete economic union. The Seven have banded together into a Free Trade Association

<sup>1</sup> Hans A. Schmitt, "The European Communities," *Current History*, November, 1963.

<sup>2</sup> Greece is now comparably isolated, although it has not been expelled.

<sup>3</sup> Belgium, France, The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

<sup>4</sup> Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

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seek to join the E.E.C. In both organizations, productivity has reached record levels and continues to rise. The achievement of both compares favorably with that of the Soviet Bloc. Throughout these "western" groups the freedom of nations to retain their cultural identity has not been challenged or threatened.

There can thus be no question of European union, merely of a number of regional compacts, limited in size and purpose. Understandably, the Europe of the Six has attracted most attention, because it has gone furthest toward a voluntary surrender of sovereign prerogatives, and because it includes France, Germany and Italy, three of the five great powers of pre-1914 Europe. It is therefore not unreasonable to hope that if this limited community were to succeed in creating a complete economic and political union in freedom, other nations would join to create a complete European community extending, if not to the Urals, at least to the Vistula.

Unfortunately, the Six have not yet found a way of moving beyond economic solidarity, and they have not been able to agree on the conditions that would expand their membership. Five countries profess to be anxious to proceed in both directions. In effect, France has vetoed both functional and physical expansion.

#### A FRUSTRATED FRANCE

France remains frustrated as a nation. Whereas her armies played a key role in holding back the German invader in 1914, her part in the outcome of World War II was modest. French participation in the peace settlements that followed that conflict was substantially smaller than her participation in 1919, when Georges Clemenceau spoke the last word on many major aspects of the peace. This decline in French influence introduced a fatal ambivalence into French initiatives for a united Europe. Without deprecating the extent of her leadership in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, the abortive European Defense Community, the European Economic Community and Euratom, one must recognize that France followed divergent motives. Jean Monnet, who led the French State Planning Office after World War II, represented an enlightened international capitalism, on whose

1909:

The capitalist has no country, and he knows (if he be the modern type) that armies and conquests and jugglery with frontiers serve no ends of his and may very well defeat them.<sup>5</sup>

Robert Schuman and René Pleven, enlightened nationalists both, embraced a European policy as a means of containing Germany. Monnet wanted a continental authority to supplant national authority. Schuman's reasoning spoke from the parliamentary committee report which urged acceptance of the treaties establishing the European Economic Community by promising that France would thereby

liberate herself from economic policies which have kept her from maintaining in the world those economic positions which she occupied in the middle of the nineteenth century.<sup>6</sup>

This French ambivalence becomes all the more understandable if one considers that the threat of resurgent German power was not France's only problem. On May 8, 1954, nine years after the surrender of the German armies in the West had been sealed in the Little Red School House in Rheims, Frenchmen laid down their arms at Dien Bien Phu. After that humiliating defeat, Tunisia and Morocco regained their independence, and the war against Algerian nationalists, bloody and costly, dragged on indecisively. In 1956, American and Soviet pressure forced the French to abandon their beachhead at Suez. Their government's inability to prevent this succession of setbacks resulted in a French army uprising which only the magic of General Charles de Gaulle stopped short of civil war.

De Gaulle's new republic was led by men many of whom considered Monnet a traitor and Schuman a weakling. They respected the agreements signed by their precursors, but their purpose was to strengthen France and to put an end to further supranational experiments. Whereas Schuman believed that what was good for Europe was good for France, de Gaulle insisted that there could be no Europe without a strong France to lead the continent. As a result, he withdrew from NATO because it was dominated by the non-European "Anglo-Saxons," and he denied

<sup>5</sup> Sir Norman Angell, *Europe's Optical Illusion* (London: 1909), p. 106.

<sup>6</sup> France. Assemblée Nationale, *Session Ordinaire, 1956-57, Doc. 5266*, p. 210.

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ently into the European Community to Great Britain, which he considered the American Trojan Horse. Until France had regained those economic and political positions "which she occupied in the middle of the nineteenth century," European union must stand still, lest it get unwholesomely ahead of itself.

While the other five members of the European Economic Community have opposed both the thrust and the implications of this French policy, their motives are not necessarily identical, their intentions not exclusively "European." The small Benelux nations can be said to have recognized that cultural nationalism is all they can afford.<sup>7</sup> Italy has adopted a curious passivity, in which she "goes along" with a Europe of the Six that does itself not seem to be going anywhere, without however indicating any desire to embark again on any policy of national aggrandizement.<sup>8</sup> Which leaves the last remaining power in "Europe," the Federal Republic of Germany. West Germany's national problems are as complex and as pressing as those of France.

#### THE GERMAN POLITY

There have been many changes since the Federal (Bonn) Republic was last discussed in the pages of *Current History*.<sup>9</sup> Ludwig Erhard has muffed his date with history and has become another Caprivi. His successor, Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, has sought to improve on the touted economist's performance by choosing the Grand Coalition with the Social Democrats. As a result, the government controls 447 seats in the *Bundestag*, and the declining Free Democratic Party, which lost heavily in the elections of 1965, constitutes a significant opposition (49 votes) by courtesy only.

Kiesinger's gambit may go down in history as the moment at which the Federal Republic turned from a thriving polity into a decadent system. The Social Democrats, accused as far back as 1965 as being increasingly a pink image of the Christian Democrats, have surrendered their independence. In 1965, they campaigned as the opposition. It is safe to assume that they attracted a record vote as a result. Then they turned around and joined the establishment. The Free Democrats, now in opposition, electioncered as a government party.

Is there an opposition left? And if so, who represents it? The answer can be found in

the growing radicalization of West German political life, both in Berlin and west of the line of demarcation.

A radical left is so far most vociferously present among university students. But that is important enough. These young people have legitimate grievances against university conditions that make Berkeley a terrestrial paradise by comparison. To a new generation, pressed by experience and conviction to come to grips with unprecedented moral and social issues, West German institutions of learning—where massive anonymity and a rigidly unchanging curriculum is the norm both in the lecture hall *and* in the seminar—symbolize an order doggedly dedicated to futility.

It is impossible, as yet, to calculate how many student demonstrators are sowing wild oats, and how many will found and populate a new revolutionary mass movement on the left. The specific conditions they oppose and condemn can hardly be defended.

The radical right (discussed elsewhere in this issue at greater length) manifests itself more conventionally through the National Democratic Party, not to be confused with a shadow party of the same name in the German Democratic Republic (D.D.R.). It, too, has a following among students—its *Deutscher Studenten Anzeiger* is the largest such paper in the Federal Republic—but two-thirds of its support derives from an age group between 30 and 60, while 95 per cent of its clientele consists of Germans who have not enjoyed the privilege of higher education.<sup>10</sup>

The motto of the N.P.D.'s newspaper *Deutsche Nachrichten* is "Fatherland-Honor-Right to Existence" (*Vaterland-Ehre-Lebensrecht*), and Europe plays no part in its program. It accepts the close political association with France until the achievement of unification will presumably render Germany strong enough to stand by herself. Meanwhile it castigates the assumption of Hitler's

<sup>7</sup> See the fervent indulgence of that luxury by Flemish and Walloon.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Altiero Spinelli, "Supranationale Politik mit nationalstaatlichen Methoden. Kritische Randbemerkungen zur Aussenpolitik der italienischen Republik," *Europa Archiv*, XXII (1967), 657-666.

<sup>9</sup> Hans A. Schmitt, "Ludwig Erhard: Another Bismarck?" *Current History*, May, 1966, pp. 257-262, 308. The title was not the author's.

<sup>10</sup> Klaus Liepelt, "Anhänger der neuen Rechtspartei über das Wählerreservoir der NPD," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, VIII (1967), 237-271.

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war guilt, and discusses *Allied* war crimes as well as the role of "World Zionism" in unleashing World War II. It is anti-Communist, anti-socialist and, like the Communists and the radical left, anti-American. It appeals with some success to the "small people," farmers, tradespeople and small businessmen, and to other social groups which are generally characterized by a low level of education. It has sought, less effectively, to gain a hearing among refugees, "victims of denazification," veterans ("restore the honor of the German soldier"), and noncommissioned and junior officers in the armed forces.<sup>11</sup>

While the N.P.D. drew only 2.9 per cent of the vote in the federal elections of 1965, the appeal from its posters ("Now, you too can vote") clearly went to the alienated supporters of a Germany of another day, and in subsequent state elections their showing improved notably. Today N.P.D. representatives sit in the state legislatures of all larger states of the Federal Republic. Some observers feel that the future of the N.P.D. is mainly a matter of momentum. "Should one realize some day that neighbors, friends, and colleagues share one's views, that [Germany] should stop restitution to Israel, finish with war crimes trials, no longer pay attention to foreign powers, put energetic men [in positions of authority] instead of parliaments, decree shorter hair for boys and longer skirts for girls," this party may indeed turn into the opposition which has all but disappeared from the political scene.<sup>12</sup>

The sum total of these appeals is powerful. Correcting the mores of the young is always a favorite reactionary pastime. Beautifying or simply wiping out the memory of a painful past is a universal human instinct. Deprecating foreigners and revolutionaries is a popular sport among all nations and in all societies. No amount of reasoning can hold back a political tide which indulges these pervasive habits and prejudices. If a people is satisfied with its condition it will not hear such voices of discontent; if it is at odds with itself and the world, no warning will keep it from listening to them.

#### PUBLIC DISCONTENT

Are the citizens of the Federal Republic today content? Probably less so than they were two years ago. Even then, prosperity seemed

to many no "be-all and end-all" of existence.

Now that prosperity has become more precarious, it is less of a barrier against radicalism. And among those whose economic existence has deteriorated, the search for alternatives to the Federal Republic is obviously more than a passing fancy. Not that the economy is in trouble. Despite rising unemployment, there are still more skilled jobs going unfilled than there are unskilled jobless to fill them. West Germany's public debt at all levels—local, state, and federal—is still so much lower than in the United States and Britain for instance,<sup>13</sup> that sectors of weakness could easily be strengthened by a substantial infusion of public funds. But West Germany does not need an economic crisis to generate substantial discontent.

For almost two years now the Federal Republic has been governed by its Grand Coalition, but the problems of unification and identification remain unsolved and no one knows how to solve them. This has not only led to an impasse *per se*, but threatens to stultify West German achievement on other foreign policy fronts.

West Germany is obviously interested in establishing relations with eastern Europe. She has succeeded in Rumania; and on January 31, 1968, full diplomatic exchanges were resumed with Yugoslavia. But success in the two maverick capitals, Belgrade and Bucharest, has remained isolated. Poland, together with Czechoslovakia the most important and elusive objective of West Germany's diplomatic offensive, has named her price: Bonn's acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line as Poland's western border, and the recognition that there will continue to be two governments representing what is left of Germany. This puts Chancellor Kiesinger right back into the famous railway car in the forest of Compiègne. The Polish position is to tell the Germans that they have no bargaining position and must pay whatever price others fix.

As far as the Oder-Neisse Line goes, Germans themselves realize that they must accept

<sup>11</sup> Herbert Kohl, "Die 'Deutschen Nachrichten' . . ." in *ibid.*, 272-292.

<sup>12</sup> Liepelt, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

<sup>13</sup> Germany's per capita indebtedness in DM is 1,882 compared to 8,658 (equivalent) in the United States.

it implicitly if not explicitly. They have no way of recovering these lands, and no other government is committed to help them. After suffering the most unheard-of outrages at the hands of their western neighbor, Poles have settled this area. The Germans have been driven out and have been absorbed into the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the Federal Republic. Regardless of the legal niceties, according to which the disposition of this "East Germany" was assigned to a peace conference which never met, the diplomacy of passing time has rendered a verdict that cannot be reversed. Nonetheless, the Polish position, which is perpetually to cry "revanchism" while doing everything possible to promote that dreaded symptom, is sterile. Only a helpless, defeated enemy can be asked to make his commitments before the negotiations begin. West Germany may have to sign away what she had lost before the war was over, but to deny her a bargaining right in this transaction reveals that the Polish government, too, forgets nothing and learns nothing. Poland's second demand, that Chancellor Kiesinger accept Germany's division, is tantamount to saying that Poland is not interested in restoring diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic. It is like exacting the liquidation of the Bonn regime, which even to a Communist ought to look better than any of its forerunners. Perhaps Warsaw is dreaming of a Communist succession, but these are foolish and dangerous dreams. The strongest opposition to the Bonn system in West Germany today is on the right, not the left.

Meanwhile, the Bonn government stands by its European commitments, as well it might. To the Common Market, West Germany has sacrificed her high agricultural prices, but in return she has obtained equalization payments whose total compares favorably with her current restitution payments to the victims of Nazism. Since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in March, 1957, all available statistics reflect staggering increases in the Federal Republic's national product, in individual productivity on farms and in factories, in raises in individual income and investment abroad both within and without the European community. And as West Germany has not succeeded in thawing the Eastern bloc, her only diplomatic ties remain with the West, and she must nurture and expand them.

"Europe" and its growth, rather than national resurgence, is therefore also her chief foreign policy objective. This means that she supports Britain's entry into the Community, and it means that she favors functional as well as physical expansion. As Chancellor Kiesinger told the Bundestag on June 7, 1967:

Europe will only be able to attain its rank, its dignity, [and] its influence in the world, also for peace, if it decides and further if it succeeds . . . by whatever methods to found a European political union.<sup>14</sup>

#### FRANCO-GERMAN INTERESTS

Kiesinger's view of the substance of this political union is probably not too far removed from de Gaulle's. France seeks to recover national self-respect, Germany, national unity. Both have made overtures to the Soviet bloc countries; both have been rebuffed, by Poland in particular. (When de Gaulle recalled to Wladyslaw Gomulka past Franco-Polish friendship, he was reminded that not a single French soldier defended Poland against the German assault in 1939.) The economies of both have become so thoroughly Europeanized that a return to prewar isolation is impossible. Both are dependent on the American presence in the now less likely case of an attack from the East.

Under these conditions both remain equally unwilling to surrender the control of their foreign policies to a supranational European government. A European foreign office could not pursue such Gaullist adventures as the French presence in Latin America, the cultural and political separation of Quebec, and the nuclear *force de frappe*. The jurisdiction of a European foreign office, furthermore, would clearly extend only as far east as the line of demarcation, and could not even include West Berlin, which is under an occupation regime including non-European powers.

Germany and France differ over the territorial composition of a "Europe of states."

France prefers the present association of the Six, ostensibly because the entry of Great Britain and her E.F.T.A. friends would weaken what has been accomplished. But one must not overlook the fact that de Gaulle's design of limited political union, consisting of periodic meetings by heads of

<sup>14</sup> *Das Parlament*, June 14, 1967.

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state, and a secretariat without powers, would be dominated by him. He is the only Common Market executive with substantial powers. The monarchs of the Benelux states and the presidents of the Federal Republic and Italy are figureheads. This European union would be de Gaulle's union. If France's present constitution survives him, it would become his successor's preserve. If not, the specter of German hegemony would again arise, causing tensions in the West which would weaken the Community as seriously as would the difficulties attending the absorption of Great Britain.

Thus French policy is both unsatisfactory and risky. It confronts a Germany boxed in on her eastern borders with a Western community in which she can only play second fiddle to France. This French policy rests

on the questionable assumption that France is strong enough to preserve her present eminence in the community of the Six. That eminence is tolerated by the other members largely because they have enough patience to await de Gaulle's demise.

Meanwhile Franco-German tensions inevitably and unnecessarily mount. Only the installation of a balancing wheel through the admission of another power such as Great Britain can reduce them to a point where the death of Charlemagne's successor can be faced calmly. With more than two former powers in the community, answering the question of who leads would become academic, and Europe could instead concentrate on attaining once more "its rank, its dignity, and its influence in the world."

Excerpts from  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
January 1968

## WESTERN INTEGRATION AND THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES

CPYRGHT

*By Jerzy Lukaszewski*

**D**URING his recent visit to Poland, General de Gaulle discreetly but repeatedly called upon the Central European countries to assume an independent and creative role. By challenging the unnatural East-West dichotomy in Europe he showed himself again a statesman of vision. Yet, regrettably, while he has a highly desirable political goal he has failed to choose the means most likely to attain it. The French Government in the last few years has not favored the growth and cohesion of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) and other common institutions of the West and has sought to raise the independent international status of France. It is essential to the General's plan that analogous processes be stimulated in Central Europe: in his mind the rigid commitments of nations east and west of the Elbe to antagonistic "blocs" impede the rapprochement between these nations, the definitive elimination of the Iron Curtain and the restoration of a "European Europe."

A prominent member of the French cabinet, Edgar Faure, outlined this policy as follows: "One must, moreover, consider with all due concern the problem of the countries of Central Europe, which number 118 million people and which seek to escape from the abnormal situation in which they found themselves as a result of Stalinist policies. We obviously must avoid allowing an immediate political construction of 'Little Europe' to hamper this operation." (*Le Monde*, December 1, 1965.) Thus the views of the

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French Government about the effect of West European integration on relations with the communist states, although differently motivated, are not far from the official communist position on the E.E.C., according to which its progress—and even its very existence—constitutes a major obstacle to rapprochement between the “socialist” and the “capitalist” nations of Europe. . . .

Public opinion in the People’s Democracies deserves the closest attention. It has been steadily gaining importance since the collapse of Stalinism, and the governments are less and less in a position to neglect it. Whereas the ruling élites of the communist states and the “lines” they espouse are sometimes subject to dramatic changes, public opinion is a constant factor.

The people of Central Europe lost much of their traditional respect for the West before and after the last war. Nor is de Gaulle’s message of nationalism and friendship to Central Europe likely to revive the prestige of the West there, in particular among the intelligentsia who traditionally have played the crucial role in shaping public opinion. These people realize that in the past nationalism plunged Europe—and particularly Central Europe—into chaos and paved the way for foreign domination; and that the alliance of their nations with France before 1938 did not avert the disaster.

If anything has restored the West’s attraction in Central Europe it is the E.E.C. experiment. Citizens of the People’s Democracies watch with respect the adventure which has united onetime enemies through organic coöperation, led to the virtual abolition of frontiers and laid foundations for the real independence of Europe. Subject themselves to restraints on their freedom and to shortages of consumer goods, they cannot but have a high regard for the community of Western nations where the living standard of all classes is high and still growing, freedom of individuals and groups is respected and common problems are resolved publicly instead of in the secrecy of ministries and politburos. Therefore the news about the development of the E.E.C. which comes to Central Europe by Western radio or other means is received with extraordinary interest.

Evidence of this interest is found in the accounts of travelers visiting the People’s Democracies, in the rapidly increasing number of official publications aimed at indoctrinating citizens with the governments’ viewpoint on Western integration, and even in certain communist pronouncements. Thus one of the Polish experts on the E.E.C. states: “Much is expected from the processes of Western European integration. This explains the immense interest in these problems which we also observe in Poland. These problems command the attention not only of the circles professionally concerned by them, such as the representatives of corresponding scientific disciplines and personalities responsible for practical political activity, but also—to no lesser degree—of the large parts of society.”<sup>1</sup> Consequently, there seems to be no question that it is not a resuscitation of nationalism, not a “freezing” of the E.E.C., but the progress and consolidation of the Community which can increase the attraction of the West for the general public in Central Europe.

.. The successes of West European integration at the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties induced the Soviet leaders to revise their position with regard to the Common Market. This seemed to offer Central Europe the opportunity to improve its economic relations with the Six. In an article published in *Kommunist* in 1962, Khrushchev recognized the achievements of Western integration, in effect gave credit to its "objective character" and foresaw economic collaboration "not only between different states having different social systems but also between their economic unions."

Almost simultaneously with the publication of the Khrushchev article, "The Seventeen Theses" on Western integration—worked out in 1957 by the Moscow Institute for World Economy and International Relations to guide the struggle of international communism against the E.E.C.—were replaced by a new document, "The Thirty-two Theses." A comparison of the two shows the evolution of Moscow's attitude. In 1957 the creation of the Community was presented as the work of American imperialism, doomed to failure according to the laws of history. Five years later, the Franco-German alliance was identified as "the spine of integration," and the viability of the E.E.C. was recognized as follows: "The pace of economic development having been faster in the Common Market countries than in the United States, there is a resulting increase in their share of world capitalist production, international trade and gold reserves. For the first time in postwar history, the possibility of creating a 'center of attraction' equal or comparable to the United States from the viewpoint of human and material resources, volume of industrial production and foreign trade, is beginning to take shape. . . ."

This trend, however, has not continued in the years since then. Careful observation of Soviet policy on Western integration indicates that Moscow's attitude has been determined by the fluctuations in the integration process itself: the tendency to accept the E.E.C. as a partner in economic coöperation coincided with its initial period of vigorous progress; the subsequent recurrence of the original hostility reflects the crises which have shaken the E.E.C. since the beginning of 1963.

The Central European states have generally imitated the Soviets, although certain nuances in their attitude merit attention. They have largely returned to the conception of the "Theses" of 1957, according to which the E.E.C. is the creation and the instrument of a non-European power. Communist propaganda has presented the E.E.C. as a harmful product of the cold war, divisive of Europe, anachronistic in this period of peaceful coexistence, undermined by contradictions and threatened in its very existence. The E.E.C. was not accorded recognition. Needless to say, this has impeded the expansion of stable economic relations between Western and Central Europe and has fostered the latter's economic dependence upon the U.S.S.R. . . . . .

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January 1968

## THE FRAMEWORK OF EAST-WEST RECONCILIATION

*By Zbigniew Brzezinski*

EUROPE is increasingly restless with the division imposed on it more than twenty years ago. To end that division, and thereby to take a step toward a larger community of the developed nations, is a task requiring the often conflicting virtues of perseverance and imagination. It also requires asking explicitly: What can be done in the next twenty years to change this condition—and to change it in a way that is compatible with historical trends and more immediate requirements of political reality?

### I. THREE CONCEPTS IN SEARCH OF REALITY

Several concepts currently purport to provide an answer to the above questions. Three among them particularly stand out and deserve closer attention: The Atlantic conception, the "European Europe" Gaullist vision and the Soviet idea of a European security arrangement. Let it be said immediately that each, though in different ways, is inadequate or only partially satisfactory. One, rooted in the transitional setting of the cold war, even if generally in tune with the wider sweep of history, fails to respond to the growing political concerns of Europe; the second reflects current political moods but ignores historical trends; the third fails on both scores.

Usually, the Atlantic concept is employed to express not only an existing reality—that America and Europe have a special affinity—but a desire for a particular kind of relationship between them. The spectrum ranges from the notion of an intimate and integrated Atlantic community, with the United States and individual European states merging into one, to the famous concept of partnership between America and a more united Western Europe. Such a partnership, it is asserted, would generate an irresistible magnetic attraction to the East, and eventually the European problem—particularly the division of Germany—would somehow be resolved. Such a Europe would also share with America certain global responsibilities—a hope voiced more frequently by American than European spokesmen.

The nature of the eventual European settlement, and the ways and means of reaching it, are rarely spelled out in any detail by the Atlanticists. This is not surprising. The concept of Atlantic partnership presupposes the creation of a united (or integrated) Europe; this is bound to take a long time, certainly longer than originally assumed. Till then, the problem of the other half of Europe must be held in abeyance, given the scale of priorities subscribed to by the Atlanticists. Premature ties with the East would dilute Western institutions and bring alien systems and

ideologies into the family setting. This would delay the appearance of "the partner" in the Atlantic partnership.

Moreover, the question of Germany introduces a special complication. An implicit and necessary component of the Atlantic concept is the idea that the West European partner cannot prosper and endure unless all its member states have identical status in all respects. The futility and tragedy of the Versailles-type solution for Germany has often been cited as the reason for eschewing arrangements that would imply a discrimination against the Federal Republic. To the extent that the united European partner in the Atlantic community would also presumably be a party to Atlantic security arrangements, including the nuclear field, the right of Germany to participate on an equal basis in a European nuclear defense force follows logically.

Thus, in so far as the problem of Europe's unresolved partition is concerned, the pure Atlantic approach poses two basic dilemmas. Until a united Europe appears, East-West relations are relegated to a secondary position, primary emphasis being put on creating an undiluted Western Europe. Even Eastern entry into or association with existing Western bodies, such as O.E.C.D. (Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development), is opposed, either as premature or inherently subversive of the fundamental purpose of Western multilateral coöperation. At the same time, the fear (or suspicion) of some Western European states that the Atlantic concept is essentially a scheme for the preservation of American hegemony in Europe and for relieving American burdens in the Third World stiffens European resistance to the partnership, thus postponing indefinitely the moment when the West can address itself seriously to the unresolved legacies of World War II.

In addition, emphasis on complete uniformity within the European component of the Atlantic partnership, including the nuclear security field, introduces an element of unreality into discussions of the German problem. No spokesman for the Atlantic idea has yet been able to spell out how—and why—the East should accept the notion of German reunification if the end result is an automatic accretion of strength to a Western Alliance that includes a German finger on the nuclear trigger. Unwillingness to draw a distinction between inequality—which rightfully cannot serve as a solid foundation for a united community of several nations—and a special position dictated both by the reality of political circumstances and the desire to change them peacefully, has led to the formulation of an Atlantic position on German reunification that assures continued German—and thus also European—division.

Finally, implicit in the Atlantic concept, although never deliberately asserted, is the idea that Europe is really Western Europe (indeed, Atlanticists usually say "Europe" when speaking of its Western half). It is thus unresponsive to the strongly held European feeling that the cold-war division of the Continent into American and Soviet-dominated halves no longer corre-

sponds either to security or political needs, and that the time has come to end Europe's partition. The inherent inapplicability of the Atlantic concept, in its pristine form, to this condition explains much of our own difficulty in making the United States relevant to new East-West relations, even though in fact it has creatively pioneered in developing these relations.<sup>1</sup>

Indeed, failure to adapt the Atlantic concept to what might be called the post-cold-war era in Europe has distorted the meaning of the actually farsighted, imaginative and usually constructive American initiatives on the East-West front. Since we have pursued our initiatives in the context of a concept that to some implies U.S. hegemony and to others an American preference for the status quo (including partition), they have tended to reinforce the European suspicion that we want to strike a bargain with Russia, even at the expense of Europe. Misgivings concerning that kind of détente have not been restricted to Western Europe; even Easteners have whispered that this is not what they hope for. The attraction of de Gaulle thus has grown in direct proportion to our efforts to promote East-West reconciliation.

To some extent, President Johnson in his path-breaking speech of October 7, 1966, strove to cope with this difficulty by emphasizing that progress in strengthening the Atlantic Alliance was interdependent with further growth of East-West ties. However, the basic conceptual difficulty remained unresolved; the lingering tension between Western unity and détente was not overcome. This condition was aggravated by the Vietnamese war, which intensified cross-Atlantic suspicions, and by de Gaulle's peremptory moves, which created openings for Soviet diplomatic diversions. The combined effect was to push the Germans (as hinted in Kiesinger's and Brandt's speeches in June-July 1967) toward a basic reappraisal of their interest in close Atlantic ties and a growing interest in exploring bilateral dealings with Russia. In the process, American relevance to both Western and Eastern Europe declined.

De Gaulle exploited both this decline and the conceptual inadequacy of the Atlantic approach. Far from desiring a reunited Germany, though occasionally going through the ritual of referring to it, he strove to create a new European equilibrium. De Gaulle has never spelled out his ideas to the extent that the Atlantic concept has been, but his central objective has been to reduce the presence in Europe of the two external "hegemonial" powers. This he hoped to accomplish by creating a West European hard core, led by France—detached from an integrated Atlantic relationship but continuing to enjoy U.S. nuclear protection—which would then proceed to forge a "European Europe to the Urals," *i.e.* translating the East-West détente in Europe into an eventual entente.

<sup>1</sup> It has become fashionable to credit de Gaulle with having invented the idea of détente in Europe. The truth is that the United States pioneered—first by aiding Yugoslavia and then Poland, by developing cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union and the other states, and by exchanging top-level visits. At the time, de Gaulle scorned these moves and only later began to emulate them.

While murky in specifics, it is evident that to accomplish his ends de Gaulle played on European restlessness and shrewdly strove to exploit the Asian involvement of his two powerful adversaries. He counted on the Sino-Soviet dispute to drive Russia into Europe, and he exploited American involvement in Viet Nam to generate a sense of distinctively European interests. Though cautious not to detach himself too much from U.S. nuclear protection, de Gaulle indicated that the eventual solution to the partition of Europe would come through the dissolution of the two confronting alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, both de facto agencies of the respective hegemonial centers. A Europe built on bilateral relations, respecting the primacy of national sovereignty, engaging whenever expedient (especially to France) in closer economic coöperation, would be a Europe restored—indeed, a Europe ascendant.

The General's concepts are superficially plausible. Moreover, his dedication to the nation-state responds to traditional European nationalist notions. At the same time, the anti-hegemonial components of his concept are a useful additive, especially attractive to some in the younger generation who are tired of what appears to them to be excessive American or Soviet preponderance on the European scene.

Yet it is more than doubtful that de Gaulle's concepts are any more relevant to Europe's present—not to speak of its future—than the ideas that he rejects. The dissolution of the two alliances perhaps might solve the problem of confrontation but it would certainly create new ones. The argument that the cold war can be abolished by abolishing the blocs, or vice versa, is not only deceptively attractive, it is dangerously wrong.

In fact, if a loosely organized Europe sought détente with the East, the result could only be the West's acceptance of the status quo, in particular the permanent acceptance of two German states. A politically fragmented Western Europe would be a Europe incapable of steering in a common direction on behalf of commonly shared goals; détente for the sake of détente could be the only common denominator. Inevitably, it would lead to Western rivalry in seeking to improve relations bilaterally and to develop advantageous trade with the East.

Accordingly, it is probably true that a loosely organized Europe, lacking an integrated political and defense structure, at most a free-trade area and without close ties to the United States, could more easily reach a détente with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. For the East, accommodation with such a Europe would not require any substantial ideological evolution, especially since no special concessions or adjustments in the Eastern position would be required. The communist élites, having nothing to fear from a Europe of this kind, would probably be quite responsive to Western overtures because they could thus have their cake and eat it too: they could savor the tangible benefits of closer economic contacts with the West without any

substantial change in the overall political situation.

In this connection, it is important to bear in mind that the present communist élites, especially in Eastern Europe, are in the first stage of post-peasant political awakening. By and large, their political attitudes are a curious mixture of communist formulas and of rather primitive and intense nationalism. Their outlook is basically parochial and conservative. A détente that perpetuated their domestic dictatorship and left the European political map unchanged would be for them the ideal solution.

Whether a détente of this kind would be stable is another matter. There are strong reasons for skepticism. It would mean a recreation of a Europe based on the old principle of state supremacy, with a major European nation—Germany—condemned to division. In those circumstances, frustration and insecurity in West Germany would almost certainly follow. Having attained neither national unity nor fulfillment in a larger European community, the Germans could be expected to seek accommodation with the Soviet Union. Irrespective of original Soviet motives—even if it is assumed that the Soviets sincerely seek a stable détente in Europe—the temptation to exploit German anxieties could be too strong for Moscow to resist. The result could be a new phase in European tensions, with the Continent's stability in general and East European security in particular being its first victims.

Yet that is what de Gaulle seems to be precipitating, not only by exploiting the involvement of the United States in Asia and the end of the Atlantic orientation in Bonn (the latter clearly demarcated by the coming to power of Kiesinger-Brandt), but by his apparent determination to quit NATO altogether. Perhaps deliberately, the French President, in his speech of August 10, 1967, has given the world his reasons for rejecting the Alliance:

By withdrawing from NATO, France, for her part, extricated herself from [United States-Soviet] subjection. Thus she would not find herself drawn, eventually, into any quarrel that would not be hers and into any war action that she would not herself have wished. Thus she is capable of practicing—as she considers right, from one end of Europe to the other—entente and coöperation, the only means of achieving the security of our continent. Thus she can uphold, in a world that many old and new abuses hold in a state of ferment, according to her vocation, the right of each people to self-determination, a right that is today the necessary foundation of any confederation, the imperative condition of international agreement, the indispensable basis of a real organization of peace.

In so doing, he may well be hastening the day when a German leader will make a similar pronouncement.

The Soviet Union also has an entry in the competition for the best European solution. The Soviet formula has developed slowly, in response to external opportunities appearing in the West and internal political turmoil in the East. Under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union did not really have a European policy; it was too busy pursuing a global chimera. Anxious to become co-equal with the United States, and then even determined to dethrone it as the world's number-one power, Khrushchev alter-

nated between a grand courtship and a grand contest. Both ended tragically: the courtship was buried in May 1960 in a meadow near Sverdlovsk, marked by the remnants of a fallen U-2; the contest ended ignominiously with Soviet ships submitting to armed inspection by the United States while ferrying Soviet missiles from Cuba back to Soviet ports.

From that time on, the Soviet Union gradually shifted to a more regional foreign policy. Its outlines took clearer shape after Khrushchev's fall, especially given the opportunities created by the growing American involvement in Viet Nam. Exploiting them, and also taking advantage of de Gaulle in a manner somewhat reminiscent of earlier U.S. support for Tito, the Soviet leaders proceeded to forge, through words and actions, a new European policy. The Soviet leaders exchanged an unprecedented number of visits with their NATO European neighbors and became eloquent exponents of the separate identity and interests of Europe. Indeed, even the terms "technological gap" and the "brain drain" became part of the peripatetic Soviet leaders' lexicon. Although it was not made clear how a semi-developed Soviet Union could be of much help to Western Europe in these regards, it may be assumed that raising such issues was calculated less to produce a practical common response to the American challenge than to evoke a sense of shared emotion in the face of the alleged American threat.

More important was the Soviet sensitivity to the growing feeling in Europe that gradual improvements on the East-West front cannot be confined to the economic and political fields. Western public opinion increasingly has felt that the time is becoming ripe for doing something about the European security problem. Although careful not to spell out precisely what the nature of an eventual European security arrangement might be, communist leaders, especially from 1966 on, began to reiterate the need for a European security conference designed to address itself to this issue. In calling for such a conference, Soviet leaders were deliberately coy about American participation; while not explicitly excluding it, they obviously hoped that some Western states would be willing to discuss the question, thus drawing a distinction between European powers, including the Soviet Union, and non-European intruders.

Soviet motives were not difficult to discern. On the immediate tactical level, even a low-key dialogue with West European chancelleries on the subject of a security conference, with its consequent impact on West European public opinion, could contribute to the isolation of Bonn, in turn stimulating West German anxieties. A weakening in European-American ties was also not unwelcome, although Moscow presumably realized that a total Atlantic rupture could increase German influence in Western Europe. But short of such a sharp break, which the Kremlin probably calculated was in any case unlikely, the intensification of Atlantic "contradictions" was desirable. Finally, there was a tactical payoff inherent in making proposals which seemed rea-



From the longer point of view, the Soviet Union no doubt hoped that any broadly gauged East-West security discussion would legitimize the status quo in Central Europe, and particularly the existence of the two German states. In addition, by reducing Western attachment to the notion of Atlantic interdependence in security matters, a trend could be set in motion toward the eventual neutralization of Western Europe. Although it may be an exaggeration to say that the Soviet goal is to make Western Europe into a Finland, the Soviet leaders could not be unaware of the increased political leverage that they would gain over a Western Europe less intimately tied to the United States in matters of security.

Finally, even if treated at face value as a bona fide effort to find a solution for the problems of Europe, the Soviet approach still has grave shortcomings. It simply disregards the fact that the unsolved legacies of World War II cannot be resolved by a fiat that transforms them miraculously into a generally accepted and enduring settlement. Unwilling to separate those aspects of the status quo which perhaps may—and in some cases even should—endure as a consequence of the traumatic upheavals of World War II from those that are merely a temporary manifestation of the cold war, the Soviet leaders proffered a solution which was really not a solution but a means of obtaining a ratification of maximum Soviet objectives.

It is therefore more than doubtful that merely convening a European security conference—presumably with the participation of East Germany, which in itself would be a major Soviet success, and also of the United States, which naturally some of the more gullible Westerners would classify as a generous Soviet concession—would settle anything. A conference which ignored the problem of Germany's division would serve only to stimulate West German frustrations and disappointment. Indeed, while one can easily catalog the unsettling consequences of the Soviet initiative on the West, one is hard put to find similar costs for the East. This asymmetry simply deprives the Soviet proposal of political relevance. . . . .

In the course of the next decade or so, Western Europe is almost certain to move further toward an integrated economic community; there may also be the beginning of some European political consultations. Some common defense arrangements are also likely, especially after de Gaulle. It will hence be an increasingly important force, with an emerging identity of its own, though probably reluctant to share in U.S. global responsibilities.

Eastern Europe, given its relatively backward stage of political development and social modernization, will certainly be less homogeneously organized. None the less, it too is already moving toward some subregional cooperation, exclusive of Soviet participation. It may be expected that this trend will continue, although probably more on the basis of a network of bilateral economic and political arrangements. Eventually, some confederal arrangements may develop, creating by the mid-1980s a

loose community of about 130 million people with a G.N.P. of about \$215 billion. In any case, greater coöperation within Eastern Europe should be encouraged, for without it the region will continue to be a source of instability and a political vacuum filled by outsiders. For example, as the East European nations decentralize their economies, Western assistance in creating currency convertibility would make a great deal of sense.<sup>3</sup> Another useful possibility would be a Balkan customs union consisting of Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece, and one that included Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and even, perhaps, East Germany. . . . .

In some respects, East-West relations will be purely European; in others, they will involve also the United States and the Soviet Union. This is especially likely in regard to security arrangements. Eastern Europe's fear of a united Western Europe allegedly prone to domination by the Federal Republic will decline if the scope of collaboration includes some East-West security relationships between the two existing but looser alliances. While the old dichotomic confrontation will have faded, it is unlikely that either the West or the East Europeans will wish to face the other side without some backup strength from the respective superpower. The East Europeans, as de Gaulle learned in Warsaw and as the Czechs have made clear, will not wish to face alone a Germany that is so much more powerful than they; this is likely to remain the case even if West Germany is more fully absorbed into an integrated European community. Lingering fears will make them desire some assurance of continued Soviet protection and even American involvement.<sup>3</sup> . . . .

East European economic ties with the Soviet Union will probably become more bilateral—or involve more specialized and limited forms of multilateral coöperation. CEMA (Council of Economic Mutual Assistance), an essentially political-ideological body, which includes an economic giant, the Soviet Union, and an economic irrelevancy, Mongolia (much as if the Common Market contained both the United States and Haiti), is not likely to duplicate the success of the E.E.C. (European Economic Community) in achieving economic integration. It is more likely to become a communist equivalent to O.E.C.D., which in itself would make it quite important and useful. (Accordingly, coöperation between O.E.C.D. and CEMA could be quite constructive.) . . . None the less, it is not unreasonable to expect that the next decade will probably see continuing erosion of the more militant aspects of Marxism-Leninism. The Sino-Soviet dispute and domestic pressures in the Soviet Union both conspire to bring on such a change in perspective. Ideological change will help to bring on political change. To be sure, for a long time to come the Soviet Union and most of the East European states will remain single-party dictatorships. The ruling bureaucracies are becoming increasingly nationalist and that, combined with their étapist

<sup>3</sup> Thus a Czech commentator, J. Sedivy, in "European Coöperation—European Security," *Foreign Affairs*, 25, 1967, flatly states that a European security arrangement would have to be safeguarded not ~~only~~ by the U.S.S.R., but "certainly by the United States."

and socialist tendencies, gives them some resemblance to prewar social-fascist movements in Eastern Europe.

Nevertheless, as these countries become aware of their growing social and economic complexity, they will probably show more tolerance for political and intellectual dissent. Progressive decentralization of the communist economies will facilitate international economic cooperation, hitherto handicapped by centralized national planning. It will also facilitate the emergence of more independent, technologically oriented élites, likely to be strongly interested in economic cooperation with Western Europe and the United States.

Indeed, some communist countries already recognize that they have at least an economic stake in Western unity.<sup>6</sup> East European trade with Western Europe is the primary source of hard currency for communist economies, and the development of a prosperous European economic community has become a factor in the further economic development of the communist states. In time, a changed economic perspective might lead to a changed perspective in politics.

There is already considerable evidence that not all East Europeans welcome a communist policy designed to split the West and to detach Europe from the United States. A number of voices have been heard in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to the effect that such a policy is shortsighted, and that it will result in a revival of German nationalism. Eventually, the communist élites may come to view an integrated Western Europe, absorbing German energies and ambitions, as something in their interest as well.

In this connection, the East Europeans would be especially attracted by Western invitations to participate in common efforts to avoid a "technological gap" between Europe and America. They have only recently become aware of this problem, but their concern has been magnified by their unspoken fear of becoming technologically obsolescent not only in relationship to the West but also to the Soviet Union. Hence the extraordinary interest of the East Europeans in such initiatives as the Fanfani proposal to create a transatlantic technological community, open also to communist states; hence the spate of comments in their journals about the desirability of broader international cooperation. . . . .

<sup>6</sup> After predicting for years the inevitability of the Common Market's disintegration, communist spokesmen have finally realized its durability. Thus S. Albinowski, in his appropriately entitled "Condemned to Success," *Zycie Warszawy*, March 20, 1967, admits past skepticism and concludes that "the Common Market is a permanent institution which will influence our trade relations with Western Europe more and more."

A UNITED EUROPE: CHANGES IN THE WIND

Following are excerpts of press highlights for this end-of-the-year period. The themes (both plus and minus) do not include all pertinent news items for 1968; only those which are indicative of intra-European efforts to alter the economic status quo were selected:

EEC: (The Common Market) In July the last tariff barriers to internal Common Market trade were removed. But by November the market faced new woes as a result of the European (specifically, French) monetary crisis. President de Gaulle's decision not to devalue the franc saved the Common Market from an immediate financial crisis. However, the austerity measures taken by France provided additional barriers to imports. It was a move which, while not in violation of the Rome Treaty (the Market's charter), did violate the spirit of the community, in which goods and capital are supposed to move freely inside the frontiers of the six member states. The situation underlined the weakness of having free trade without more closely coordinated monetary policies.

In a burst of year-end optimism, Jean Rey, President of EEC's Executive Commission forecast that by Easter France would have eased her stand against Britain's EEC membership. Rey told an 18 December news conference that in the next few months a formula might be worked out making it possible to carry out German and French proposals for special trade links with Britain without infringing on GATT regulations. To do this, he said, trade links should be presented as a prelude either to a customs union or to economic integration.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL BOOST: In October, Britain's three major political parties gained admission to Jean Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of Europe. Leaders of the major non-Communist political parties and trade unions in all the EEC countries (except for the Gaullists in France) are represented on the Monnet committee. The impact of the committee on the unity movement has not been decisive to date --- but it is the only significant private pressure group working toward unity.

EURATOM: French austerity measures taken in November also threatened to reduce to a token minimum this integrated European program, which maintains four EEC-financed nuclear centers. The French proposed that emphasis be placed on projects agreed to and financed solely by interested member states.

THE "UK AND TWO": In December, two EURATOM members, the Netherlands and West Germany joined Britain in a cooperative project to produce enriched uranium by a new centrifuge-separation process. The implications of the three-power arrangement are far reaching as representing a decision by Britain to bypass France and join forces with European members through the nuclear side door.

THE "UK AND FIVE": December also saw Britain in Rome with all members of the European Community but France. (The French declined on the basis that the affair was "illegal".) The meeting was held following proposals made by Belgium's Foreign Minister Harmel before the Western European Union in October which called for "consultations" on political, defense, financial, technological and youth questions. An earlier and more concrete German proposal for "interim measures" between the Community and applicants for membership (Britain, Ireland, Norway, and Denmark) to be taken in three fields (commercial policy, technological cooperation, and contacts) had been killed by French veto.

INTRA-SCANDINAVIA: At the end of 1968, a customs union, an integrated capital market and freer trade for agriculture were among issues being discussed among the four Scandinavian countries which find themselves frustrated by the continuing economic division of Western Europe. The current intra-Scandinavian initiatives reflect a belief that more is needed than participation in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Big gains have been scored by EFTA economic ties, but big dynamic markets such as West Germany's are increasingly difficult to reach behind the Common Market's tariff wall. Denmark and Norway have twice applied for Common Market membership and have twice been rejected as a backlash of France's veto of U.K. membership applications. Sweden has asked for some sort of association, but balks at the political obligations of membership. Finland stands pat. The contrasting political attitudes of the four and their differing economic problems do not make for a strong union. As one correspondent wrote: "The interests of Danish bacon, Norwegian fish, Swedish machinery, and Finnish pulp do not always coincide."

EAST EUROPE LOOKS WEST: In March 1968, a British publication designed to promote East-West trade glibly quoted an official of the Netherlands Foreign Affairs Department as saying "Holland is sincere about enlarging the EEC...And it is not unimaginable that in the future the Community will take in East European countries although there can be no question of this at the moment."

In mid-September, the Communist-dominated French (CGT) and Italian (CGIL) General Labor Confederations issued a joint communique which, while stressing their mutual condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, emphasized that: "Both Confederations will intensify action to develop initiative favoring trade union unity in Western Europe."

In November, Rumania applied for membership in GATT thereby joining Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (the other East European member states) in efforts "to find practical ways to increase the flow of trade, irrespective of the political and social systems of her trading partners."

Polish Communist Party leader Wladyslaw Gomulka, threw an oblique compliment to the viability of Western Europe's economic groupings in a mid-November public statement which called for renewed efforts to better integrate the East European economies in the CEMA grouping: It was "economic integration," Gomulka emphasized, "that had enabled Western Europe to make speedy progress."

After the case of Czechoslovakia, Albania left us in peace, and did not attack us. It seemed that her wish was to improve relations. However, as soon as the situation settled down to some extent, the fiercest attacks again began to be applied against our country every day. Therefore, we cannot take any initiative when their moves are such as to prevent any initiative to that effect."...

We Regret That People in Bulgaria Do Not Realize That it is Necessary to Leave Alone Old Matters

In reply to the next question about cooperation in the Balkans and about the attacks on Yugoslavia and Macedonia from Bulgaria, President Tito said that the Balkans had always been the beginning of clashes in the past, but that matters have changed after the last war. The Balkans have been an ever stronger factor of peace in this part of the world. Recently, however, the Bulgarian press started to mention the San Stefano Agreement, to bring up old matters, not to recognize the right of the Macedonian people to independence, etc. Of course, this provoked the revolt of the Macedonians, and as Macedonia is part of the Yugoslav federation, all peoples of Yugoslavia are extending all-out support to the Macedonian nation. We regret that one does not realize the fact in Bulgaria that it is necessary to leave alone old questions, and to try to find out elements which can bring us closer to each other, which can contribute to a stabilization ... this part of Europe, that is, in the Balkans.

"As far as Greece is concerned," President Tito went on to say, "our relations were good until the moment the army took over the helm of the state there. These relations appeared to have deteriorated a little after this. Eventually, however, people in Greece realized that there is no reason for deteriorating relations with Yugoslavia, and our relations are now normal again.

"With respect to Bulgaria, we wish good relations with them," President Tito said. He added that "our hand is extended to them in accordance with this. If there is something to be discussed, then it is certainly the need for stopping polemics about what was in the past, for stopping such arguments once and for all, and concentrate on what is now the reality, and what should be in the future. This is what matters, and this is what one should talk about."...

The representative of the U.S. CBS television company asked President Tito -- in connection with rumors that the Warsaw Pact might hold maneuvers in Rumania -- whether these reports alarm him and whether he considers protesting in the event that this takes place.

"As far as I know," replied President Tito, "maneuvers are not envisaged in the near future. If they take place next year why should this alarm us? Rumania is in the Warsaw Pact," said President Tito, "and the consultative meeting of military leaders of the Warsaw Pact on the

readiness and preparedness of the armies was held in Rumania lately. This means that, in the event of maneuvers, Rumania will participate in them and agree that they be held on its territory. Consequently, this concerns Rumania and in this case we are not at all worried...."

The representative of the Dutch television asked President Tito whether he agreed with the opinion that the cold war period has returned after the events in Czechoslovakia as this is believed by many people in the West.

President Tito replied that it had seemed so at the beginning and that he had made a statement of this kind in which he had said that the danger of rekindling the cold war existed. "I think that this will not take place to the degree to which this had existed in the past," added President Tito. "All states are somehow or other looking for a positive approach for preventing the recurrence of the situation which had existed in the past. It is true that elements of the cold war will exist because numerous outstanding problems still exist...."



# Интересне сфере престају на нашим границама

**Тишо: Ми смо наш суверенишеј градили у шоку борбе од 1941. године и као независна, самостална и суверена држава, која гради социјализам, желимо најбоље односе не само са социјалистичким нећо и са свим другим земљама**

(Јајце, 30. новембра, Танјуг) — Председник Републике Тито одржао је данас пре подне у Јајцу своју до сада највећу конференцију за штампу у нашој земљи, и одговорио на више десетина питања пред преко двеста новинара, међу којима је половина била из иностранства.

Прво питање је гласило: **Господине Председниче, као што је познато, Стаљин је имао примедбу већ на прво заседање АВНОЈ. На другом заседању АВНОЈ није дошла делегација Совјетског Савеза. После Ваше посете Совјетском Савезу, значи после Вашег одласка из Москве, који су се залажени за повратак краља Петра у Југославију. Можете ли нам нешто рећи о разлозима Совјетског Савеза за овакав став?**

Да ли сматрате, наставно је са питањем дописник западнонемачког часописа „Дер шпигел“, да се нова совјетска теорија о ограниченом суверенитету односи и на Југославију, и да Совјетски Савез намерава да је искористи и према Југославији? Да ли сматрате да Совјетски Савез не разумева Југославију о члана социјалистичке заједнице, чији оквир, ствари, Совјетски Савез никада није тако дефинисао?

Председник Тито: Овдје је било друго заседање АВНОЈ-а, 1943. године, када су на свим фронтovima биле најжешће битке. Разумије се, Совјетски Савез није могао послати тада делегацију, јер је било немогуће да он стигне, нити смо ми позивали било кога од наших савезника да дође.

Ја не могу да тумачим мишљење Совјетског Савеза о коме се све ради, кад се говори о условном суверенитету. Само, Совјетском Савезу је познато, као и свима другима, да смо ми наш суверенитет градили у току борбе од 1941. до 1945. године. Ви сте видјели наше одлуке АВНОЈ-а, које су врло детаљно, прецизно формулисале питање наше независности, суверенитета и интегритета. Јуче сте могли и из мог реферата видјети како ми гледамо на суверенитет.

**Нема никаквог разлога за војну акцију Совјетског Савеза према Југославији**

— Молим Вас, друже Председниче, реците нам нешто о томе како гледате на еволуцију у међународном и комунистичком покрету након догађаја у Чехословачкој? — гласило је следеће питање.

Председник Тито је на то ратко одговорио: — Пожељно је да сада ствар не драгитизирамо, него да приступимо смиривању ствари, да међународном радничком окрету буде чим боља садања.

— Да ли сматрате да постоји могућност да Совјетски Савез предузме неку војну акцију против Југославије? И какав биете желели да у таквом случају

заузму став Сједињене Америчке Државе? — упитао је један од америчких новинара.

Председник Тито: — Што се тиче војне акције са стране Совјетског Савеза према Југославији, мислим да нема никаквог разлога за њу, нити вјерујем у то.

Када говорим о некој агресији против Југославије ја не рачунам само на Совјетски Савез него мислим уопште на агресију са било које стране. Ми имамо довољно способности и могућности да своју независност и суверенитет бранимо сопственим снагама. То је већ свакоме познато.

**Градимо социјализам, али не у оквиру „Комонвелта“ него као независна, самостална и суверена држава**

Питање: — У последње време све се чешће чита у совјетској штампи да је наша политика несврстаности могућа зато што постоји Варшавски уговор и заједница социјалистичких земаља. Шта можете о томе рећи?

Председник Тито: — Ја могу казати само да је то њихово тумачење. Наше тумачење је другачије. Оно се стоји у томе да је политика несврстаности заснована на принципима коегзистенције, неприступања ни једном блоку, то јест на принципима независности. Такво је наше тумачење, и то је био главни фактор који нам је омогућио да у свету грамо извесну улогу међу европским земљама, то јест међу онима које не припадају никаквим блокуима.

Некада се говорило о социјалистичком лагеру а сада је овај термин у Совјетском Савезу замењен једним новим термином „социјалистички Комонвелт — социјалистичко подручје“. Да ли сматрате да Југославија припада том социјалистичком Комонвелту? — упитао је специјални штампа лондонског листа „Дejли телеграф“.

— Ми градимо социјализам, као што то чине те земље. Разумије се да ми идолошки припадамо социјалистичком свету. Али, не у оквиру „Комонвелта“, него као независна, самостална, суверена држава, која гради социјализам и која жели да има најбоље односе, не само са социјалистичким, него и са свим другим земљама, без обзира на друштво не системе.

**Нисам видео неку непосредну опасност за социјалистички друштвени систем у Чехословачкој**

Дописник чешког листа „Ревност“ поставио је затим следеће питање:

— Друже Председниче, учини уласка армија пет земаља Варшавског споразума у ЧССР, Ви сте били у Прагу. Да ли сте претпостављали, после разговора са представницима владе и ЦК КПЧ, или после суочавања са њима, да су социјализам и ЧССР угрожени? Уколико јесте у којој мери?

— Кад сам био у Чехословачкој са мојим друговима, сарадницима — одговорио је председник Тито — имали смо исцрпне разговоре са представницима Централног комитета и владе Чехословачке. На конференцији за штампу у Прагу дао сам позитивну оцјену бразилских закључака. Јер сам сматрао да је основна у њима да се Чехословачкој призна је суверенитет и независ-

**У случају агресије ми не бисмо никога званично помоћ**

Дописник аустријског ТВ — је питао да ли би, у случају агресије против Југославије, био позван у помоћ НАТО пакт? Он се заинтересовао и да ли председник Тито види неку непосредну опасност за неутралност Аустрије и колико би таква опасност постојала да ли би он и како реаговао.

— Мислим да је свима вама већ добро познато шта ми мислимо у случају агресије ма са које стране она долазила — одговорио је председник Тито. Ми не бисмо никога званично помоћ, јер имамо доста сопствених снага које почивају на веома великом јединству наших народа одлуч-

ност и да она има право на сопствени начин унутрашњег развоја. Према томе није ми падало у очи ништа што би наговјештавало неку непосредну опасност за социјалистички друштвени систем. Тим више што су другови из владе и Централног комитета тачно казали да је њихов циљ да имају тим боље односе са свим социјалистичким земљама, у првом реду са Совјетским Савезом и да не мисле да иступају из Варшавског пакта. Према томе, за мене је то био снажан аргумент да су збиља нема никакве опасности по унутрашњи поредак, нити има опасности да би могло доћи до некоег изигравања са Совјетским Савезом и другим социјалистичким земљама. Морам да кажем да сам последије тога био изненађен. То је све што могу да кажем.

них да бране свој суверенитет. Према томе отида свака потреба да ми некога зовемо у помоћ. Када сам примио америчке државнике, ја сам рекао да ми ни од кога не тражимо никакве помоћи, па ни од Америке. Ми хоћемо само да на равноправној основи развијамо наше економске односе, и то је било све.

Што се тиче Аустрије — наставио је председник Тито — ја не вјерујем да њој прети нека опасност за њену независност и интегритет. Уговорима између савезника регулисан је статус који она сада има у међународним односима. Сматрам да најмање постоји нека опасност за њену независност.

**„Сива зона“**

**светла зона**

Специјални извештај лондонског листа „Санди тајмс“ поставио је следеће питање:

Пре две недеље министар Раск је на састанку НАТО рекао да постоји „сива зона“ земаља које не припадају блокцима. Он је рекао да се, по његовом мишљењу, Југославија налази у тој зони и да НАТО пакт има интереса за Југославију.

Председник Тито је одговорио:

Што се тиче изјаве господина Раска у Бриселу наш став је супротан. Никакве интересне сфере ми не признајемо још од 1943. године. Интересне сфере престају на нашим границама. Каква је тамо зона, да ли је она сива или не,

ја то не знам. Овдје је у Југославији светла зона, и ми немамо шта да страхујемо. (Аплауз и живост у сали).

Следеће питање односило се на мишљење председника Тита о томе да ли се садашње совјетско руковођство поново враћа на сталинстичко позиције у Совјетском Савезу и у земљама Источног Блока, које је било напустило после 20. конгреса КПСС.

Председник Тито је одговорио да он не зна да ли совјетско руководство намерава да се враћа на старе позиције, али сматра да је немогуће да се оно врати на онакве сталинске позиције какве су онда биле.

**Специфичности наше борбе**

Представник „Нове Македоније“ поставио је питање о специфичностима југословенско револуције.

Председник Тито је одговорио да смо почели нашу борбу 1941. године под паролом истеривања окупатора из земље, под паролом братства и јединства наших народа, јер је у Југославији постојала завађеност између појединих националности. Окупатор је, разуме се, још у припреми напада искористио разне елементе као пету колону. Према томе, нама је било стало да спречимо братоубилачку борбу и самоуништавање наших народа.

У процесу те борбе — наставио је Тито — с обзиром на издају бивших властодржаца и бекство владе у иностранство ми смо видели да су у народу влада и бивши режим потпуно изгубили поверење, јер су га оставили на милост и немилост окупаторима. И онда смо, постепено почели уводити наш нови систем, преко народноослободилачких одбора. То су били ембриони будуће власти, која је онда добила своју пуну афирмацију на другом заседању АВНОЈ-а 1943. године. Према томе, борба против окупатора била је у исто време револуционарна борба за унутрашњи преобраћај земље. У томе је специфичност која је настала на самом почетку. У току борбе са непријатељима који су дошли из

моћнији али којег смо ми знали да обуздавамо, успели смо да створимо нову Југославију, заједницу више националности, са федеративним уређењем и рижешеним националним питањем. Сви наши народи су прихватили такву солуцију. Према томе, наша специфичност је била што је борба против окупатора истовремено представљала и револуционарну борбу за друштвене промене.

**За сарадњу између свих земаља и народ.**

Извештај листа „Економист“ из Лондона говори о Југословенско — албанским односима упитао је да ли председник Тито намерава да успостави контакт с Енвер Хоџом?

Ми немамо разлога да имамо лоше односе с Албанијом — рекао је председник Тито. Али, на жалост то не зависи од нас. Албанија нас је последије случаја са Чехословачком оставила на миру, није нас нападала. Изгледало је да им је жеља да поправе односе. Међутим, чим се мало смирила ситуација, најжешћи на пади поново се свакодневно упућују на нашу земљу. Према томе, никакву иницијативу ми не можемо дати кад су њихови поступци такви да онемогућују такве иницијативе.

Дописник суданског агенције рекао је затим да развијене афричке земље желе да буду у добрим односима са Југославијом. Председник Са-

незом и социјалистичким земљама. Али, упитао је он, како ми можемо то да остваримо после инвазије Чехословачке? Он је додао да сматра председника Тита јединим човеком који искрено и дубоко жели да примењује интернационализам.

— Што се тиче жеља вас у Африци да имате добре односе са Совјетским Савезом и другим социјалистичким земљама, сматрам да је она исправна без обзира шта се у прошлости догодило. Ви треба на томе и даље да радите, да имате добре односе.

Што се тиче ваше друге опаске нисам ја једини чов

### Демонстрације на Космету не треба драматизовати

Новинар „Политике“ питао је затим да ли је, за обезбеђење независности појединим народностима у Југославији битно признавање државних елемената тим народностима и права која из тих елемената проистичу и у вези с тим, како Председник коментарише најновије догађаје у неколико градова Косова и Метохије.

Председник Тито је одговорио да су наша гледишта формулисана и у нашем Уставу и у другим документима. Јуче сам у свом реферату, наставио је Председник, објаснио како ми гледамо на питања независности, државних елемената, и суверености. Када говоримо о суверености полазимо од личности на све до Федерације.

Што се тиче догађаја на Косову и Метохији мислим да се сувише не ствари драматизирају, да није баш онако како то неки замислијају. Ми смо знали, да тамо још постоје елементи старога, који су нам у прошлости, нарочито у току рата много тешкоћа задавали. Још непријатељ тамо постоји, а с друге стране, има мјешања и изваја. Дакле,

### Руководиоци СССР изразили жељу да са Југославијом развијају дуготрајне добре односе

Један од иностранних новинара упитао је затим председника Тита како тумачи дуготрајне циљеве Совјетског Савеза у односу на Југославију и шта мисли о ставу Кине према догађајима у Чехосло-

ваки у свијету који жели да односи међу народима буду много бољи него има много таквих. Сви они теже да се односи што прије попправе, да почивају на принципима Повеље УН и Београдске и Каирске конференције, то јест да се остварује сарадња са свим земљама и народима, без обзира на друштвене системе. У томе је питање коегзистенције веома важна ствар, али не коегзистенције између блокава. Јер у томе постоји увек опасност сукоба, него коегзистенција између свих малих и великих народа.

ријеч је о једној групи, која је нахушњала један мањи дио омладине и студената, који су разбијали излоге, као што то чине и на Западу, или у готово свим земљама. Мало ко нема таквих случајева. Шта сада ту треба драматизирати? Показало се да је на Косову, руководство састављено углавном од Албанаца а у коме нарочито има Себа и Црногораца, успјело да тај случај оконча. Не силно, него су просто објаснили људима о чему се ради. И данас је дошло до опште осуде тих поступака код народа. Дошло је до манифестација на којима је народ рекао да неће дозволити да му разни елементи онемогућавају правилан унутрашњи развој, то јест да разбијају братство и јединство на територији аутономне покрајине. Косово и Метохија је последњих година постигла огромне успјехе благодарени вчешћу и помоћи свих других развијених република, па и саме Републике Србије. Према томе тамо се ништа трагично није догодило. Сада је све свршено и мислим да би било вријеме да се то не преувеличава.

Председник Тито је одговорио да је у поздравима које је добио од руководиоца Совјетског Савеза, као и од многих државника у свијету, врло пријатно и чврсто изражено жеља да са Југославијом развијају

тежња свих совјетских народа. Вјероватно је да ће и убудуће бити идеолошких размислажења, али је исто тако вјероватно да је и њима као и нама стало да имамо добре односе јер смо социјалистичке земље. Председник Тито је затим рекао да не зна шта у Кини мисле о догађајима у Чехословачкој, али, је израбио мишљење да она ова догађаје користи за своје циљеве.

Дописник италијанског листа „Унита“ интересовао се до којег степена су дошли припреми радонија за следећу конференцију на врху несврстаних земља?

Председник Тито је рекао да би на то питање најбоље могли одговорити етиопски државници, јер они контактирају са разним земљама.

„Но, ја могу казати шта ми сада мислимо — додао је он. Припреме су мало у застоју, не зато што ми мислимо да није потребно да се таква конференција одржи, него зато што је данас таква ситуација да припреме није потребно убр-

### О опасности сукоба на Средоземљу

Следеће питање односило се на стање у Средоземљу где се, како је Један новинар рекао, у последње време појављују флоте великих сила, у вези са нерешеним питањем на Средњем истоку?

Председник Тито је изразио мишљење да има елемената за забринутост, али не би требало из тога извлачити закључак да неминовно мора доћи до неког сукоба. Елементи такве опасности се повећавају уколико се више концентрирају те флоте.

У односу на ситуацију у Средоземљу, председник Тито је рекао да у првом реду треба имати у виду интерес оних земља чије обале заплускују средоземне воде. Велике силе, које су тамо, вјероватно ће једног дана увидјети да је овај проблем потребно ријешити на дуготрајнији рок. Тачно је да је дошло до совјетског појачавања флоте због израелско-арапског сукоба, наставио је председник Тито. Ми смо сматрали, кад је америчка Шеста флота већ дуго тамо, а Америка је знатно удаљенија од Средоземља, не можемо осудити Совјетски Савез што је и он до-

треба мало одгодити, док се мало не покаже куда се свијет даље креће, каква ће бити ситуација у наредним мјесецима. А да ми и даље радимо и да се консултирамо то је тачно“.

На питање новинара западнонемачке телевизије како гледа на будући развој западнонемачких и југословенских односа, председник Тито је рекао да на те односе, гледа позитивно. „Имамо прилично развијене економске односе који су донекле били у застоју, последице прекида дипломатских односа од стране Савезне Републике Њемачке, а сада су поново кренули напријед. Постигли смо већ извјесне резултате. На примјер, постигнут је споразум око наших радника, који сада имају статус као и други који се тамо налазе. У скорој будућности приступићемо рјешавању и других питања. Економска размјена се све више шири, тако да, ако нешто непредвиђено не наступи, сматрам позитивним правац кретања у односима између наше земље и Западне Њемачке“.

шао ту. Јер, мислили смо да ће се на тај начин убрзати рјешење израелско-арапског сукоба. Стагнација је, на жалост, и даље таква, каква је и била, јер Израел стално игнорира све одлуке које су донесене у Савјету безбједности и Уједињеним нацијама. Мислили смо да ће присуство совјетске флоте допринијети рјешењу и сматрало смо то позитивним. Сада се бојимо да једног дана не дође до сукоба између њих, јер се никад не зна гдје може пући. Боље би било да их ни једних ни других нема тамо, да се не концентришу, али кад је већ ситуација таква, морамо примити чињенице онакве какве јесу.

Специјални извештач „Њујорк тајмс“ упитио је новинара писца совјетске штампе, да ли председник Тито сматра да су совјетски напади на Вијетнам оправдани?

Одговарајући да не зна шта све Вијетнам говори о Совјетском Савезу, председник Тито је изразио мишљење да он сувише говори и да би боље било да то мање чини. Његова помоћ

није нам потребно. Пустим да разне интервјуе и "интервју" родавно" истуђити као неки представник Југославије.

**Жалимо што у Бугарској не увиђају да је потребно да оставе старе ствари**

У одговору на следеће питање новинара о балканској сарадњи, и о нападима на Југославију и Македонију из Бугарске, председник Тито је рекао да је Балкан увијек развијао био зачестиле сукоба али да се после овога рата ствар промијенила Балкан је све више био фактор мира у овом дијелу свијета. У последње вријеме, међутим, бугарска штампа почела је да помиче Сајгестфански уговор, да потеза старе ствари, не признаје право на самосталност македонског народу итд. Разумије се да је то изазвало револт

у Македонији, а пошто је она у саставу Југословенске федерације, сви народи Југославије дају пуну подршку македонском народу. Ми жалимо што у Бугарској не увиђају да је потребно да оставе те старе ствари и да настоје да проналазе оне елементе који нас могу оближавати, који могу допринијети стабилизацији у овом дијелу Европе, то јест на Балкану.

Шта се тиче Грчке, настало је председник Тито, наши односи су били добри, до тренутка када је војска преузела државно кормило у руке. Изгледало нам је да су се ти односи после тога мало попрачили. Но постепено је и у Грчкој дошло до сазнања да се Југославијом нема разлога да се односи погоршавају, тако да су сада наши односи нормални.

У односу на Бугарску ми желимо добре односе иста као је председник Тито. Он је додао да је у том погледу наша рука изручена. Ако треба да се разговара, додао је Председник, онда треба разговарати да се једанпут заувјек прекину полемике око онога што је било у прошлости и усмерити се на ово што је сада, и што треба да буде у будуће. У томе је ствари и о томе треба да разговарамо.

Представник „Комуниста“ је поставио питање о суштини најновије оријентације на идеолошком плану источноевропске социјалистичке штампе, које пише о ревизионизму као о империјалистичкој

интервенцији у социјалистички свет и која често повезује ту паролу са критиком нашег социјалистичког пута.

Председник Тито је рекао да је некад Хрушчов, кад му се приговарало што нас нападају ни криве ни дужне одговорио: када је туча онда се тољага не бира. То значи да се и сада, пошто постоји извјесан сукоб, не бирају ријечи ни формулације. Али, то не треба драматизирати, рекао је председник Тито, и додао да смо и ми понекад прилично зубати.

На питање новинара да ли у последњих неколико месеци има битних промена у међународним односима које би утицале на положај Југославије, председник Тито је одговорио да се положај Југославије није промијенио на горе, него на боље. Имао сам прилике да разговарам са нашим друговима који су били у Јапану, Камбоџи, Индији и рачним земљама, и који су стекли невјероватно повољан утисак о великом повјерљиву које ти народи гаје према нашој земљи. Немамо разлога страховати да бисмо могли бити, било по чијој иницијативи, изолирани. Југославија је стекла свој статус, и престиж, и ми ћемо настојати да убудуће радимо тако да не допринесимо смањивању тог престижа. На најбољем смо путу да на слиједеној конференцији несврстаних заједно са другима пронађемо реалне могућности за сарадњу. Не да се састајемо да би осуђивали овога или онога, него да кажемо шта мислимо о томе каква би свијет требало да буде. Шта би требало учинити за помоћ земљама у развоју.

Ви сте јуче чули из мога расфјерата — наставио је председник Тито, да ми у Југославији тежимо да повећавамо помоћ мање развијеним од стране више развијених крајева. Ту политику ми преносимо и на међународне односе сматрајући да би они на тим принципима требало да се заснивају.

Следеће питање односило се на припреме за Девети конгрес СКЈ и на питања о којима ће конгрес расправљати.

Председник Тито је рекао да ће основни материјал представљати документ о друштвено-економском развоју, који је већ разрађен и припремљен. Он треба да представља крупан допринос бржем развоју у нашој земљи. Неких нових заокрета неће бити, већ ће конгрес обилежити даље кретање напријед.

На конгресу ће се, што је више могуће, подвући потреба дефинитивног усавршавања радничког самоуправљања, како би оно посједовало све елементе и располагало свим потребним средствима. По речима председника Тита, у том погледу још има извесних етатистичких елемената код нас. Мора се постепено обезбјевити да они који стварају вишак вриједности њиме углавном и располажу.

Поводом гласина да би Варшавски пакт могао да одржи маневре у Румунији, представник америчке телевизијско компаније ЦБС — питао је председника Тита да ли га те вести забрињавају, да ли ми сли да протестује уколико би до тако нечег дошло?

— Колико ја знам, одговорио је председник Тито у блиској будућности нису предвиђени маневри. А ако до њих дође слиједће године зашто би то нас забрињавало? Румунија је у Варшавском пакту, настајао је председник Тито и у њој је недавно одржано савјетовање војних руководилаца Варшавског пакта о спремности и способности армија. То значи да ће Румунија, ако дође до маневара и сама учествовати и са-

**О састанку комунистичких партија у Москви**

На питање дописника „Монд“ шта би могао да каже о предстојећем састанку комунистичких партија у Москви, предвиђеном за следећу годину, и каква је стања Савеза комуниста према том саветовању, председник Тито је рекао:

Саветовање је одгођено. Наше чледиште о њему је познато, рекао је Председник и наставио: Ми у прип

ма прихватити да се на њеној територији они одрже. Према томе, то је ствар Румуније, и ми у том случају нисмо нимало забринути.

На друго питање америчких новинара да ли су припреме за одржавање конференције несврстаних земља успорене због тога што Уједињена Арапска Република и Индија нису осуђиле интервенцију у Чехословачкој, председник Тито је категорички одговорио да то није разлог.

„То је била наша иницијатива, рекао је председник Тито. Ја сам сам рекао да сада ситуација није зрела за такав састанак. То није ствар само Индије и УАР“.

Специјални извештач западнонемачког листа „Франкфуртер Рундшау“ ухватио је да ли су тачни извештаји у иностраној штампи да је Југославија у последњим контактима са Совјетским Савезом тражила неке врсте гаранције да Совјетски Савез нема никаквих интервенцијских намера према Југославији.

Председник Тито је рекао да је то нетачно, и да никакве гаранције нису тражене од Совјетског Савеза.

Следеће питање је гласило: — Са свих страна се тражи и предлаже, господине Председниче, да будете поново изабрани за председника Савеза комуниста. Да ли би могли да нам нешто кажете у вези тог избора.

Председник Тито: Не знам, то је иницијатива потекла одоздо, без мојега знања. Па ако ме изаберу мораћу остати. Иначе ја сам већ доста дуго на тој дужности.

ципу нисмо против саветовања комунистичких партија, али смо против тога да се оно одржава а да нема конкретних питања која треба ријешити. Ја сам већ једанпут рекао да сам ишао на савјетовање у Москву када је била криза на Блиском истоку. И у Будимпешту сам ишао из истих разлога. Али, то је био конкретан случај и ми смо били јако забринути за ситуацију која је створена. Сматрали смо да Совјетска унија је велика сила, а осим тога и социјалистичка земља, има најви

ше можда да се јави јално помоћне земље које су биле нападнуте. То је био разлог. Када би се слично догодило и због тога дошло до савјетовања, вјероватно би и Југославија учествовала.

Представник холандске телевизије уписао је предводника Тито да ли се плаши да он гледајући да се не еле догађаја у Чехословачкој пратило време хладног рата, у шта многи људи на Западу верују?

Председник Тито је одговорио да је у почетку изгледало тако и да је и сам

**Оваква ситуација — ни рат ни мир — не може вјечито трајати**

Одговарајући на питање о отварању Савеза комуниста према младима, председник Тито је рекао да је то веома позитиван процес. Млада генерација, која ће преузимати терет на своја леђа, треба да стекне искуства радних заједно са старијим друговима, како би једног дана што успјешније извршавала обавезе које има према нацији. Веома је позитивно што се наша омладина све више интересује за политику, наставио је председник Тито. То показује да омладина Југославије није аполитична, да се она саживјела са нашим друштвеним системом, са социјализмом, и да она схвата да у даљем развоју нашег друштвеног, самоуправљачког система, треба већ сада да преузима одговорност. За нас је то велика satisfакција.

Следеће питање једног западног новинара је гласило: — Раније ове године имао сам велико задовољство да будем присутан приликом красног дочека на који сте наишли у Прагу. Интересује ме да ли постоје планови да се чехословачки руковођици позову да појду у Београд, где би, сигурно сам, наишли на исто тако топао пријем.

Председник Тито је одговорио да то зависи од чехословачких другова. Када они нађу за корисно и потребно да дођу у Југославију биће веома лијепо примљени. Јер, наш народ према чехословачким народима гаји велике симпатије

**Ја имам повјерење у студентску омладину**

Констатирајући да је после Четвртог пленума наступило поље вал демократије

којој је рекао да постоји опасност да се поновно распири хладни рат. „Сматрам да ипак до тога неће доћи у оној мјери како је то било у прошлости — до дао је председник Тито. Јер све државно траже некако позитиван пријаз да се спријечи таква једна ситуација каква је била у прошлости. А да ће бити елемената хладног рата то је тачно, јер постоји још много неријешених проблема.

**ни рат ни мир — не може вјечито трајати**

и оне традиционално постоје међу нашим народима. Још једанпут подвлачим, кад они процене да би то било корисно, врло радо ћемо их примити.

На питање шта мисли о перспективама попуштања затегнутости у свету, председник Тито је одговорио:

— Премда има доста ствари које човјека нападају пессимизмом, надам се да ће се у будућности, ипак, кренути напријед ка олакшавању међународне ситуације, и смиривању у свијету. Огромна већина човјечанства тражи данас мир. Огромна већина човјечанства данас, баш због такве ситуације, страда и има великих тешкоћа у свом развоју. Вјерујем да је данас немогуће да дође до ситуације која би довела до ратног сукоба крупних размјера, односно до свјетског сукоба. Јер, атомска енергија стављена је у службу уништавања свега што је живо на земљи. Тога су свјесни они који посједују данас стокове атомских бомби. Они знају да би такав сукоб могао довести до пропасти човјечанства. Према томе, не може вјечито трајати оваква ситуација — ни рат ни мир. — него ће она морати да се крене у правцу бржег и темељитијег рјешавања међународних проблема. А то треба да доведе до олакшања у свијету и до кретања другим правцем, да би се могло мање развијеним земљама од стране високо развијених земаља.

био по држављанин. Један од домаћих новинара указао је на појаву да се под паролом „чисто демократије“

одлучио да се упушта у нуму а која тежи прањању на чврсту руку. Према његовом мишљењу инциденти у Приштини и неки други, имају конзервативно а не авангардно обележје.

Председник Тито је рекао у одговору да таква схиштања и ексцеси имају реакционарно обилежје, и дубоко класни реакционарни карактер. Што се недавних догађаја тиче они су, по мишљењу председника Тита били чисто локалног карактера и нису поклекли у самој омладини. „Ви сте видјели како смо ми брзо ријешили читаву ствар на универзитетима. Ријеч је о онима о којима ви говорите, о старијима који имају другачије концепције. И није ствар само у конзервативнима, него и онима другима који су, да споменем овдје, своје теорије лансирали кроз „Праксис“. А тога има и на Београдском

**Напредак радничког самоуправљања**

На следеће питање: како предвиђа даљи развој радничких савета у следећих десет година и да ли сматра да ће њихова улога јачати или ће слабити, председник Тито је одговорио да радничко самоуправљање у Југославији никада није ишло натраг, него увек и само напред.

Оно је напредовало сразмерно средствима којима смо располагали. Убудуће ће се све више и више средстава остављати радним организацијама. Према средњорочном плану предвиђено је да оне располажу са

неким професорима. Разумије се да ми сада не мислимо предузимати неке административне мјере против таквих појава. Али, мораће се предузимати политичке мјере објашњавања, да сами студенти поставе питање да на једном универзитету не може бити наставник онај који има сасвим другачија идејна гледишта о даљем развоју социјализма у Југославији.

Ми сада видимо да се омладина већ тога прихватила. Она критикује, не дозвољава да се међу омладином на универзитетима ствара раздор, ја имам повјерење у студентску омладину. Ми ћемо дати све што можемо да јој омогућимо лакше школовање. Али, у исто вријеме, морамо више пажње посветити да она не буде трована идеолошким скретањима са нашег социјалистичког правца развојка.

**Напредак радничког самоуправљања**

70 одсто средстава за проширење производњи.

Ми идемо за тим да раднички савети своје активност у производњи, нарочито тамо где се више фабрика интегрише и улажу сопствена средства за сопствене нове фабрике. Они ће улагати у оне фабрике за које знају да ће бити продуктивне. Они неће стварати политичке фабрике, него реалне фабрике из којих ће моћи да издвоје нова средства. А пошто ће они то користити од тога ће имати користи и читава земља, сви наши народи.

**Зашто цијени председника Де Гола и свог пријатеља Насера?**

Председнику Титу затим су постављена два питања. У првом је констатовано да је пре неколико година председник Тито рекао да је тадашњи совјетски премијер Хрушчов учинио велики допринос светском миру. Да ли сматрате да и садашње совјетско руководство настапља да иде тим путем. Упитао је један од иностраних новинара. У другом овај дописник желео је да чује мишљење југословенског Председника о томе која је подела личност света са којом се он суорео у протеклим четврт века најпрогресивнија и има највише маште?

Хрушчов чинио са овим шта чини садашње совјетско руководство. „Будућност ће показати ко је шта учинио, тако да ја не бих могао сада то оцјењивати.“ Одговарајући на други део питања, председник Тито је рекао да већина државника које је познавао и високо цијенио, данас није више међу живима, или је збачен с власти. За нове екипе које су дошле тек ће се видјети како ће даље радити. Председник Тито је рекао да цијени председника Де Гола, који је умео да заврши рат у Алжиру, који је много допринео да се Француска толико подигне. Истицући да не може оцјењивати његову унутрашњу то могу нај-

боље да се одлучи о политичким и радним људи Француске, председник Тито је додао: „Ја видим код њега велику смјелост. Волим људе који су смјели, који се не боје предузимати разне мјере и експерименте“.

У одговору на ово питање, председник Тито је рекао да ту спада и његов велики пријатељ Насер, кога он цијени.

Извештач „Вјесника“ поставио је питање да ли Председник верује да војни и политички кругови САД у овом тренутку искрено желе окончање рата у Вијетнаму, односно да су дошли у фазу кад демократи морају инајније на мир и признати Фронт националног ослобођења.

### Зашто републички конгреси пре конгреса СКЈ?

Извештач београдског „Комуниста“ поставио је два питања. Прво се односило на разлоге због којих се конгреси републичких организација СК сада одржавају пре конгреса СКЈ а друга на оцене о управно одржаним конгресима СК Македоније и Србије.

Веома позитивно оцењујем оба конгреса — рекао је председник Тито. Ми смо размишљали о редоследу и разматрали питање одржавање конгреса Савеза комуниста Југославије и републичких конгреса. Дошли смо до гледишта да је боље да се републички конгреси прије одрже, јер ће сваки од њих нешто новог допринијети, што ће користити

### Ситуација је још увијек тешка — нарочито у Средоземљу

Следеће питање је гласило:

Сматрате ли да је дошло до извесног побољшања светске ситуације после озбиљног погоршања у августу и ако то сматрате у чему видите знаке побољшања?

Председник Тито је одговорио:

До неких видљивијих знакова побољшања није дошло. Има ту и тамо елемената који показују да се тежи томе да се ситуација некако побољша. Али не могу да кажем да је сасвим извјесно да ће тако ићи даље, да је то сада прекретница. Ситуација је још у-

Председник Тито је одговорио да сматра позитивним то што је председник Консон обуставио бомбардовање Северног Вијетнама. Такође је важно да су САД сада спремне да заједнички воде разговоре у Паризу са Фронтом националног ослобођења и јужновијетнамском владом. Позитивну ствар представља и то што су се ријешили да иду да разговарају, то је већ, корак напред и може да да позитивне резултате. У сваком случају, дошло је до увјерсња да се један народ не може никаквим бомбама покорити ако је он спреман да се бори до последњег човјека за своју независност и да сам собом управља.

ти да послуже на конгресу Савеза комуниста Југославије то дефинитивно оформимо.

Статути који су донесени на конгресима Македоније и Србије не одступају од оних поставки које се предвиђају и за конгрес СКЈ. Дакле боље је било то него да републичке организације саме спроводе одлуке када их ми већ донесемо, можда и са неким мањкавостима. Боље да акумулирамо сва искуства из базе па да онда то у савезном саставу оформимо. Ето, то је био разлог. Корисно је то. Ми одлучно и широко идемо сада, ви сте то примијетили, на демократизацију и у Савезу комуниста.

вијек тешка у Европи и у свијету, нарочито у Средоземљу. Уопште је тешка ситуација. Разумије се, видјемо како ће се она даље развијати. Али, свако треба нешто да допринесе томе да се ситуација побољша. Сматрам да не могу само велике силе да рјешавају судбину свијета, то јест да ситуацију час погоршавају час побољшавају, него да то зависи од најширих маса у свијету, од тога како оне гледају на ситуацију. А оне су савјест човјечанства и њихове жеље и потреба треба такође да се узимају у обзир.

### Откуд незадовољство младих широм свјета?

Да ли нерасположење и незадовољство младих — питао је извештач „Дејли експреса“ — проистиче отуда што су неки од руководилаца у свијету већ сувише дуго на својим местима, што су постали демотивирани, што би, према томе, требало да олу и да препусте место другима? Ја мислим — рекао је председник Тито — да то није баш најважније. Па, ја сам најдуже на том мјесту, а видите да код нас нико то не тражи. Има ту разних других разлога. Омладина се данас не слаже са свим оним што стари раде. Мени се чини да се пре споро реагира на тежње младе генерације, па и оне на универзитетима када је у питању застарјели начин наставе итд. Млада генерација хоће и када се школује да учествује у ономе што њу интересира, то јест она захтијева што савременији начин третирања школске и универзитетске омладине. То је једно. Друго, мени се чини да у капиталистичком систему, велики дио омладине не види перспективу за своју будућност и онда тражи да се нешто мијења. Ствар је у томе да она још не зна шта би требало радити, шта би требало да се мијења. Али, види да треба нешто мијењати.

Она кроз своје демонстрације указује да је потребно да се у складу са савременим друштвеним и уопште техничким развојем у свијету мењају и неки друштвени елементи система. То омладина тражи.

### Радне акције омладине — одличне школе

Да ли сматрате да ситуација у којој је Берлин подељен на два дела може да доведе до нове кризе у Европи? — гласило је следеће питање.

— Председник Тито одговорио је одречно. Ја мислим — рекао је — да се оно што је било прије две-три године неће вратити. Данас су се већ ствари прилично смириле. Ја знам врло добро да постоје између ДР Њемачке и СР Њемачке, прилично живи економски односи, прилично жива размјена. Такви односи у приличној мјери ће онемогућавати даље заоштравање ако се неко извана не буде мијешао.

То су одличне школе. Ја подржавам радне акције. Оне су дале у прошлости велики допринос нашем унутрашњем јединству, упознавању омладине из свих република итд.

Одговарајући на питање које се односило на предстојећу посету председника СИВ Мике Шпиљака Будимпешти, председник Тито је рекао да је таква посета корисна.

Међутим, друг Шпиљак је сада болестан и не може да иде, али када оздрави отпутоваће у Будимпешту. Ја сматрам позитивним ту посету и размјену мишљења.

Једно од питања односило се на организовање радних акција, које млади предлажу, али које неки сматрају економски неоправданим.

Те акције — рекао је председник Тито — имају, и веома велики значај за образовање и васпитавање младих.

Да ли постоје неке могућности побољшања односа са Израелом? — гласило је следеће питање.

То зависи — рекао је председник Тито — од односа Израела према рјешењу питања са Арапима. Он сам може томе допринијети.

### „Тајна“ здравља и доброг држања

Један амерички извештач поставио је следеће питање:

Господине председниче, са пуним поштовањем хтео бих сада да поставим једно питање мало лакшег карактера. Йуди у САД се питају како један човек, који има 76 година, може да изгледа тако здрав и да се тако добро држи?

Стална динамика. Рад и запосленост. Немам времена да старим — рекао је председник Тито. (Дуготрајан аплауз и живост у сали).

Председнику је затим постављено питање да ли је Југославија учинила грешку када је 1959. године признала ДР Немачку,

Зашто би била грешка што смо признали Њемачку Демократску Републику? одговорио је Председник и рекао да сматра да је то било позитивно. Јер ми не можемо да не признамо земљу која има сличан друштвени систем и да не настојимо да са њом имамо по могућности чим боље односе. Разумије се, у ДР Њемачкој има сада људи који нападају нашу земљу. То што нас они неоправдано нападају ме не јако чуди. То не доприноси даљем учвршћивању односа. Али због тих напада ми нећемо одустати од оне одлуке о признању ДР Њемачке. Ми ћемо настојати да са наше стране не дајемо елемената да могу против нас наступати. А то што чине — није више критика.

Следеће питање је гласило:

Да ли верујете да ће КП Чехословачке и њено руководство истрајати у спровођењу јануарског курса?

Вјерујем — рекао је председник Тито — да ће руководство КПЧ савладати све тешкоће, које постоје. Разумије се то не зависи само од њих, већ и од других. И ако се дуги буду поставили флексибилније, то јест они изванз, у социјалистичким земљама, онда ће се још лакше и брже моћи савладати тешкоће.

Дуго нисте били у Црној Гори, приметно је извештач Радио-Титограда.

Имам намеру да одем тамо чим ми то буде могућно — одговорио је председник Тито.

На питање: шта би могао рећи о даљем развијању скупштинског система, председник Тито је рекао да тај систем још није сасвим догађен. Неке промене нису још извршене, а најважније је питање националнос-

ти као политички фактор. Оно се мора одлучити на основицама још шире демократије, што правилније одлучења националног питања, тако да све националности буду заступљене у оном делу Скупштине који највише одлучује о политичким и другим проблемима. Тако да ће то значити још даље учвршћавање националних односа у нашој земљи.

Последње питање односило се на могућности да се нешто учини за извесно побољшање живота македонског живља на грчкој територији.

„Ви знате, одговорио је председник Тито, да се ми строго чувамо мијешања у унутрашња питања појединих земаља. Но питање Македонаца, њихово исељавање, разумије се, ми не можемо одобравати. Ни из каквих хуманистичких и других разлога не може се прavedати такав поступак.

Шта ми сада можемо учинити? — наставио је председник Тито. Наши односи нису баш такви да би ми могли њима казати немојте ово, немојте оно. Уколико се односи буду даље правилно и добро развијали можемо нешто учинити, јер такви поступци нису у складу са нашим гледањима на проблем националних мањина. Код нас националне мањине мале и велике имају потпуно равноправност. Никога ми не исељавамо, него настојимо да сопственим примјером покажемо да би тако требало и у другим земљама поступати. Није само у питању Грчка него и друге земље.

Секретар информативне службе Савезне скупштине Јован Мариновић у име свих присутних новинара из земље и иностранства захвалио је председнику Титу на датим одговорима и закључио конференцију за штампу.

## Пригодни написи у совјетској штампи

(Москва, 30. новембра — Танјуг) — Совјетски листови „Правда“, „Известија“ и „Краснаја звезда“ објавили су пригодне написе поводом Југословенског националног празника 29. новембра.

У чланку посвећеном Југословенском националном празнику, орган ЦК КПСС „Правда“ пише да је у динамичким народним властима Југословенски народ „извршио дубоке социјално-економске преобрабаке, преставио раније заосталу, селачку земљу у индустријско-пољопривредну државу“.

Напомињући да је пријатељство народа СССР-а и Југославије било учвршћено крвљу у заједничкој борби против фашизма, аутор пише: „Совјетски људи изразили су уверење да ће развој пријатељских односа између наших земаља на бази принципа марксизма-лењинизма и пролетарског интернационализма служити основним интересима два народа, ствари из

градње социјализма и комунизма, ствари учвршћена мира и безбедности народа“.

Орган совјетске владе „Известија“ у општем изјављу посвећеном националном празнику Југославије 29. новембра, који је објављен 28. новембра, пише о пријатељству совјетског и југословенских народа, које је исковано у другом светском рату, и указује на потребу да се ушкорискупишњима то пријатељство и даље сачува и продуби.

„Краснаја звезда“ је 29. новембра објавила чланак својих дописника потпуковника Шичалина и капетана другог ранга Шумишкина, који су боравили у Југославији, о томе како Југословенски радни људи чврсто традицијом пријатељства и бољшевицистичког народног и радничког људима Совјетског Савеза.