

EVANGELISCHES PFARRERBLATT

Leipzig, East Germany

February 1966

Last November the GDR Evangelical Church managements circulated to their pastoral offices a document which was to be thoroughly discussed in parish church councils and among church workers. This was a "circular regarding pastoral attention to those of draft age" which was commissioned by the GDR Conference of Evangelical Church Managements in the spring of 1965 and was drawn up by a group within the Sachsen province church management.

The title of the circular, "Regarding the Church's Service to Peace," promises a treatment in wider scope than the document actually offers. The introduction shows that the circular is interested primarily in a single aspect of the church's considerations regarding peace, namely, the question of conscientious objectors. Although the 25 pages of the document repeatedly say that the church must work for a better "international peace order," the document does not explain the many steps taken during the past few years in the ecumenical movement and by the Christian Peace Conference which have led to concrete recommendations being made by responsible statesmen. These steps include suggestions for general disarmament, the stopping of all atomic tests, banning the proliferation of atomic weapons, the creation of an atom-free zone..., and considerations given to the relaxation of international tension in areas such as Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Central Europe. One would not object to the restriction of the question to that of conscientious objectors, ...if the document pointed out that this was only one aspect of the Christian efforts toward peace. But the tenor of the document shows that the authors ignore the various opportunities of the church to serve peace and concentrate upon only the aspect mentioned above.

Thus, the document names three groups in connection with the attitude of draft-age Christians in the GDR: 1) the majority of young Christians who serve in the armed forces, 2) young Christians who serve, 3) a number of young Christians who refuse to bear arms and are prepared to undertake only civilian work as alternate service. The document takes the open viewpoint: "We cannot say that the peace witness of the church has been reflected equally clearly in all three of the above categories valid in the GDR. Rather, the conscientious objectors and also those serving in army construction units bear a clearer witness to the present peace message of God.... Should not the church ally itself with the conscientious objectors in a way which it can no longer do today in our country with those in the armed forces?"

In referring to that which the church can no longer do for the armed forces..., do the authors of this document mean the conveying of an "ideology" to our army? This complex of questions cannot be discussed here, but we are concerned as to whether the Evangelical Church in Germany, of which the GDR Conference of Church Managements is a part, should be connected with the army, as it is in West Germany.

This question was unanimously affirmed at the West German synod meetings held at the same time this GDR circular was distributed....

One only needs read the report by the military bishop in West Germany to understand the position in regard to pacifism in the church.... The synod meeting in Frankfurt/Main also considered refusal to serve in the army as only one attitude that can be taken in regard to the question of peace, and not an attitude with which the church can easily ally itself.

...In regard to this circular distributed by the GDR Conference of Church Managements, one must ask whether it thereby discredits, in its one-sided support for...a small group of conscientious objectors, all those young Christians who undertake their service in a socialist army as the best form of Christian peace service offered to them "today in our country."

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MURDER INTERNATIONAL, INC. MURDER AND KIDNAPING AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY

INTRODUCTION

(By Senator Thomas J. Dodd, Vice Chairman, Senate Internal Security Subcommittee)

The case of Bogdan Stashynsky,¹ which was tried in the Supreme Court of the Federal Democratic Republic of Germany in Karlsruhe during the month of October 1962, attracted only episodic attention in the press of the Western World. And yet, it deserves to be ranked with the great trials of history, not merely because of the tremendous human drama which unfolded in the course of the trial, but also because of the historic political significance of the Supreme Court's verdict.

The evidence presented at the trial established for the first time in a court of law, that the Soviets employ murder as an instrument of international policy and that, despite the so-called "liberalization" which is supposed to have taken place since Stalin's death, the international murder apparatus of the Soviet Government continues to operate full blast.

Listen to these words taken from the Sentence and Oral Opinion of the Court in the criminal case of the Soviet subject, Bogdan Stashynsky, in custody on a charge of murder. They were pronounced by the President of the 3rd Court of Criminal Appeal of the Federal High Court in West Germany on Friday, October 19, 1962:

"Externally this murder trial has, unfortunately, definitely proved that so-called coexistence and so-called Socialist lawfulness by no means exclude so-called individual terrorism—all of them terms used in the Communist vocabulary."

Stalinism is dead. But individual murderous terrorism still lives on. The real change which has taken place thus has not the least connection with lawfulness: the Soviet secret service no longer commits murder arbitrarily and of its own accord. Murder is now only carried out at the explicit orders of the government. Political murder has now, as it were, become an institution.

That the Kremlin maintains an international murder apparatus has been accepted as a fact by every serious student of communism, even in the absence of the kind of conclusive evidence necessary to clinch a case in a Western court of justice.

When the former Soviet agent, Ignatz Reiss, was found murdered on the shores of Lake Geneva, Switzerland, in 1936, no one believed that this was the work of a simple felon. Even in the absence of proof, the consensus of free world opinion was that Reiss had been murdered by agents of the Kremlin.

When Gen. Eugene Miller, White Russian emigree leader, was kidnaped in Paris in 1937, the free world had no doubt about the political identity of the kidnapers.

¹ Excerpts from the written portion of the Court's verdict follow under the title of "The Stashynsky Story."

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When Leon Trotsky was murdered by the mysterious Jacques Mornard in Mexico City in 1941, the free world understood again that this was the work of the Kremlin, not the work of a disaffected follower as the Kremlin pretended. And there is now overwhelming proof that this was so.

When Juliet Stuart Poyntz, onetime member of the Soviet apparatus in this country, mysteriously disappeared from her room in New York in 1937, every knowledgeable person again suspected the Soviet terror apparatus. According to Chambers in his book "Witness", she left her room with the light burning and a page of unfinished handwriting on the table, and went to meet a Communist friend in Central Park. There she was pushed into an automobile and two men drove her off. She was never seen again.

When the former Red army General Walter Krivitsky was found dead in his Washington hotel room in February 1941, an apparent victim of suicide, the verdict of suicide was not accepted as valid by a single person who knew him or was familiar with his circumstances.

The Stashynsky case suggested to the Subcommittee on Internal Security that it might prove useful to bring together the evidence presented at the Karlsruhe trial with testimony available from other Soviet defectors and with other information that has accumulated in our files concerning the activities of the Soviet murder apparatus.

Particularly significant is the testimony of Petr S. Deriabin who was a high official in the Soviet "Security" apparatus until, like Stashynsky, he joined the forces of the free world to fight Marxist-Leninist despotism.

Mr. Deriabin told the Subcommittee, from his own personal knowledge, about the Soviet's "Department of Blood-Wet Affairs"—how it condemns prospective victims via the "trial in absentia" process; how documents are prepared in advance, accusing the "imperialists" of committing crimes even before the accusers have perpetrated the crimes themselves; how awards are bestowed, from the highest level, on murderers whose deeds are most highly regarded.

He told us in detail of one famous case planned in the Kremlin, in which Dr. Walter Linse, a gallant fighter for West German freedom, was kidnaped on his own native soil, rushed across Berlin's East-West border (the gate was opened especially for his kidnapers), and then maltreated to the point of death in a Communist prison.

Supporting the testimony of Stashynsky and Deriabin in this study are various documents, submitted by the Subcommittee staff, which tell a worldwide, forty-year story of murder as an instrument of Communist policy. They provide historical foundation for the Stashynsky-Deriabin stories, and support their credibility in many ways.

What this testimony and these documents add up to is that political murder of Soviet refugees and of non-Soviet citizens has been systematically carried out by a special planning apparatus of the Kremlin, beginning immediately after the Russian Revolution and carrying on to the present day.

The planners operate under an "authority" which claims the right to "try in absentia" and "pass sentence of execution" against any individual in any country on earth, whom the Soviet Government considers an obstacle to its ambitions to subjugate the world. These "executions" may be committed today; they may be committed tomorrow. Many of them will go completely undetected because of weapons which are specially contrived in a Moscow laboratory to make the death of victims appear "natural." But in cases where suspicion of murder does arise, documents are already prepared, under the same Kremlin auspices, to lay the blame for the murder on the doorstep of "American imperialists" and their "hirelings."

According to the testimony of Stashynsky, at the top of the list of Soviet officials directing this apparatus was Alexander N. Shelepin, Chairman of the Committee on State Security of the U.S.S.R.

Today, this former commander-in-chief of the "Department of Blood-Wet Affairs" is Deputy Premier of the Council of Ministers, Member of the Presidium, and Secretary of the Central Committee, Communist Party, U.S.S.R. His presence in these high posts under the "new" administration strongly suggests that murder will continue as an instrument of Soviet policy, as it has since the days of Lenin himself.

It is to be hoped that this exposure of the facts will help to persuade the men of the Kremlin to abandon these practices which strike at the heart of all international intercourse with the Communist world and mock at every effort to bring peace to mankind through the establishment of a world rule-of-law.

Because of its significance, I have extracted certain key passages from the oral opinion of the court, which I have asked be printed as a part of my introduction because of the special light they throw on the question of the Soviet murder apparatus.

* * * * *

THE STASHYNSKY STORY

(The motivation—Excerpts from the written portion of the verdict)

"The accused, who is almost 31 years of age, comes from a village of West Ukraine near Lemberg. He is the third child of Ukrainian parents who are still living and belong to the Greek Catholic faith * * *.

"At the end of 1939, when Poland was divided between Hitler and Stalin, this village came under Soviet Russian rule * * *.

"Two years later, in 1941, that is to say during World War II, his native village was occupied by the Germans * * *.

"In 1943-44, when the German troops retreated and the Soviets returned once more, both an open and a partisan resistance on the part of the Ukrainians, which lasted for years, began against the Soviet regime. Members of the family of the accused supported this resistance.

"In the late summer of 1950 the accused was caught traveling on the train without a ticket and was ordered to report to the transport police in Lemberg. The transport police is a department of the Soviet Russian state security service (in those days called the MGB-Ministry of State Security and from 1954 onwards KGB-Committee for State Security in the Ministerial Council of the U.S.S.R. An MGB captain by the name of Sitnikovski interrogated him, without however mentioning the fact that he had committed an offense in traveling without a ticket. Sitnikovski questioned the accused as to his personal and family affairs and also as to conditions in his native village. In subse-

quent interrogations Sitnikovski referred to the Ukrainian resistance movement and its chief organization, the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists). He emphasized the 'senselessness' of this Ukrainian resistance, the acts of violence of the OUN by which persons who were not connected with this movement were also made to suffer, and the fact that all persons who supported the OUN were endangering their own lives. 'They will most certainly be arrested, punished and deported.' Sitnikovski gave the accused to understand that he was well aware of the anti-Soviet attitude of Stashynsky's family. He stressed that Stashynsky could do important political work for the MGB and in this way protect his family from the serious consequences of their attitude. The accused, at that time only 19 years old, susceptible, and not acquainted with the cunning methods of the Soviet state security service, agreed to co-operate. He was prompted in this decision by the threat of reprisals against his family, by the confusing experiences which he had had of the grim conflicts and acts of violence between the Ukrainians, Poles, and Soviet Russians, and by the political instruction which he had at the grammar school and at college, where the OUN supporters had always been designated as traitors and their leaders as agents in the pay of the Americans. And, lastly,

Stashynsky, who at that time was in his 5th term at college, was afraid lest he might not be allowed to continue and complete his studies if he refused to work for the MGB.

"Shortly afterwards Stashynsky signed a written declaration binding him to work for the MGB and pledging him to complete secrecy.

"In January 1951 Sitnikovski told him that he had to join a resistance group of the OUN in order to ascertain details regarding the murder in 1949, at the instigation of the OUN, of the Ukrainian writer Galan. In this way, so Sitnikovski informed him, he would be able to cleanse himself of all his previous 'sins' and also save his parents and sisters from being deported. Because of this threat Stashynsky carried out this task. On the pretext that he was about to be arrested by the MGB, which was what the MGB had actually pretended, he managed to get into an underground group of the OUN and there learnt full details about the murder of Galan. After about two months he secretly left this group and reported the information that he had ascertained to the MGB. Since his MGB activity had now become known and it was impossible for him to return home, Stashynsky agreed to the suggestion put to him by the MGB, namely that he should give up his studies and enter the service of the MGB.

"In January 1956 he received instructions to travel to Munich on a Soviet Zone travel permit made out in the name of 'Lehmann' and to establish contact there with a Ukrainian emigrant called Bissage (Bisaha). Under this alias 'Nadytshyn' Bissaga was working there as an agent for the KGB; namely, as a spy and informer on the staff of the anti-Soviet paper 'Ukrainski Samostinik', which was published by a Ukrainian exile organization in Munich. * * *

"In accordance with the orders he had received, Stashynsky also sounded Bissage as to the possibility of the latter's co-operation in an abduction of the Ukrainian exile politician and chief editor of the paper 'Ukrainski Samostinik,' Lev Rebet, who was living in Munich.

"In September 1957 Stashynsky had to report to Sergej in the Karlshorst prohibited zone. On his arrival Sergej merely greeted him with the words: 'The time was come. A man from Moscow is here.' At that moment Stashynsky, as he has testified, suddenly realized with horror that the purpose of his task in watching Rebet had been to prepare the latter's murder. With growing uneasiness and alarm he watched the KGB man from Moscow demonstrate a weapon, of which Sergej affirmed that it had already been used on several occasions with success. The weapon was a metal tube, about as thick as a finger and about 7 inches long, and consisting of three sections screwed together. In the bottom section there is a firing pin which is fixed and can be released by pressing a spring that can be bolted; the firing pin then ignites a powder charge (a small percussion cap). This causes a metal lever in the middle section to move; it crushes a glass ampoule in the orifice of the tube. This glass ampoule, with a volume of 5 cubic centimetres, so the demonstrator explained, contains a poison that in appearance resembles water and escapes out of the front of the tube in the form of vapour when the ampoule is crushed. If this vapour is fired at a person's face from a distance of about 1½ feet away, the person drops dead immediately upon inhaling the vapour. The demonstrator pointed out that since this vapour leaves no traces, it is impossible to ascertain death by violence, and added that the perpetrator suffers no harmful effects from the poisonous vapour if he swallows a certain kind of tablet beforehand as an antidote, and immediately after firing the weapon, crushes an ampoule sewn up in gauze and inhales its vapour.

"During this demonstration which was carried out by means of ampoules containing water, Stashynsky, to use his own words, grew more and more alarmed, for he now realized that he was to kill a human being. At first he was so filled with loathing that he could not bear to handle the weapon and his only 'wish was that this demonstration should be over as quickly as possible.' Next day, however, the weapon was tried out in a small wood. Sergej had brought a little dog with him, which he tied to a tree. The KGB man from Moscow gave Stashynsky an anti-poison tablet and then handed him the weapon,

which was ready for firing and contained a poison-ampoule. Stashynsky was so upset that he could not bear to look at the dog, which to him 'symbolized a human being' and sniffed at him trustingly and inquisitively. Stashynsky turned his head away and fired the weapon about 1 foot in front of the dog's muzzle. There was hardly any detonation, and Stashynsky saw the animal fall over immediately in a brief convulsion and die.

"On October 9, 1957, Stashynsky flew by 'Air France' from Berlin to Munich under the name of 'Siegfried Drager.' He took a room at the 'Stachus Hotel' and filled in the registration slip as Siegfried Drager. On the two following days he took an anti-poison tablet each morning, put the loaded weapon, which wrapped up in a piece of newspaper is not noticeable, in the left inside-pocket of his coat, stationed himself on the Karlsplatz and waited for Rebet to appear. Tormented by agitation and scruples he was unable to sleep at night. He himself has testified: 'I kept hoping and wishing that Rebet would not appear and then there would be no need for me to carry out the deed * * *'

"On October 12th he also felt the same relief to begin with. But shortly after 10 a.m. he caught sight of Rebet as the latter got off a tram and headed for the building No. 8 Karlsplatz.

"On hearing Rebet enter the building, he took the weapon, which was wrapped up in a sheet of newspaper, out of his coatpocket, unscrewed the safety-screw, and went towards Rebet. It was obvious to him that the latter was unsuspecting. When they encountered each other about one-third of the way up the lower staircase, Stashynsky was going down on the left side and Rebet was immediately in front of him on the right side, Stashynsky raised his right hand, pointed the weapon at Rebet's face, and fired. Rebet immediately reeled forwards, and Stashynsky hurried down the stairs.

"At the beginning of October 1959, when he was already secretly hoping that the KGB would not expect him to commit any more murders, he was informed by Sergej that orders had just come through from the 'highest authority in Moscow' that he, Stashynsky, must now liquidate Bandera.

"In addition to his constant misgivings and self-reproaches he was now once more tormented by a moral conflict because of the new commission that he was to carry out. He knew 'Thou shalt not kill,' but in order to appease his conscience at least temporarily he thought of such things as the 'enemy of the Soviet Union', the orders that he had received, and the Communist doctrine * * *.

"After having been equipped with a double-barreled weapon, the antidotes, a skeleton-key for No. 7 Kreittmayerstrasse, and an identity card made out in the name of 'Budeit,' Stashynsky on October 14, 1959, once more flew to Munich. He took a room at the Hotel 'Salzburg', where he registered as 'Budeit'. The scene of the murder, according to Sergej's instructions, was to be the house where Bandera lived, and the time—as in the case of Rebet—was to be in the morning. On the morning of October 15, 1959, Stashynsky took an anti-poison tablet and then set about watching the building No. 67 Zeppelinstrasse, where Bandera had his office.

"Stashynsky spied out all the circumstances of Bandera's life and it was not long before he learnt that he was to murder Bandera. In April 1959 the accused was summoned to Moscow. There he received authoritative orders to carry out the murder. Stashynsky pointed out that Bandera had a bodyguard who usually accompanied him. Thereupon he was given a double-barreled pistol of the same type with which to carry out the murder.

"In the middle of May 1959 a favourable opportunity presented itself. Bandera drove into his garage alone. Stashynsky, who was watching him and was holding the weapon in readiness, was suddenly seized by doubts and pity; he felt the pressure of the orders he had received and at the same time seemed to hear voices which allayed the pangs of his conscience. But he was still bound by the political discipline that had been instilled in him. Western conditions, so remote and different from the way of living and from the mentality that he

had known so far, were still something strange to him, even though his fiancée had already made him acquainted with them. For a brief moment he thought of fleeing. But how was he, the murderer of Rebet, going to start life anew in the West? He was still dominated by the KGB. But he had not the heart to commit the murder. 'He doesn't know how near he is to death—Let him live', he said to himself and ran away and threw the weapon into the Kogelmuhlbad. At first he felt a certain relief. But very soon he once more felt the pressure of the orders that he had received. He now resorted to

camouflage methods. He examined the lock on the door of the house in which Bandera lived in order to be able to produce some evidence of his activity as an agent and thus mollify Moscow. Whilst doing so, he broke two key-bits, which were found two and a half years later in the dirt and dust that had accumulated in the large box of the lock.

"In October 1959 he again received orders from Moscow to commit the murder, together with another weapon. Once again the accused traveled to Munich. He was back again in the old vicious circle; spying on Bandera, postponing the deed, and breathing with relief until next morning, spying anew, waiting and looking at the clock; will Bandera come by 1 o'clock, or won't he? Can I go away, or will I have to kill him? It was the old conflict between discipline, the pressure of orders, and his better feelings. The 'old authority' triumphed. * * *

"Full of agitation and hope he kept looking at his watch. Shortly before 1 o'clock, just as he was beginning to feel relieved, he saw Bandera arrive alone in his car and drive into the yard. From that moment onwards, as he has testified, he seemed to be impelled by 'a kind of unalterable automatism'. Hope was superseded by 'compulsion' ('Now I must do it'). He slipped off the safety-catch on the weapon, which was wrapped in a sheet of newspaper, opened the entrance-door and entered the house. As he was about to go up the stairs he heard a woman say 'Auf Wiedersehen' on a floor above and come down the stairs. So as not to be recognized by her, he turned towards the door of the lift on the ground floor and pressed the button. In spite of the fact that he has a very good memory, he can no longer remember whether the lift actually came and whether he opened the lift-door. In any case he made sure that the woman left the house without having been able to catch the sight of his face. Meanwhile his agitation had increased still more. He can no longer remember whether he went up to the first floor by the lift or by the stairs. There he soon heard the entrance-door being opened. He thereupon went down the stairs and saw that Bandera, who had just come in and had a little basket with tomatoes, or at least with 'something red in it', on his right arm, was trying with his left hand to pull out the door-key, which had apparently got stuck. In order to fill this delay Stashynsky bent down and pretended to be fiddling with his shoe-laces, although he was wearing shoes that had none. He then went towards Bandera, who was still standing by the door, and saying something like 'Won't it work?' as he passed Bandera, took hold of the outside door-knob with his left hand and, pointing the weapon, which was concealed in newspaper, at the head of his unsuspecting victim with his right hand, fired the contents of the double-barrelled pistol, which could be done without any effort, and hastily pulled the door to from the outside.

"In November 1959 Stashynsky was introduced to a Soviet general, whom he presumed to be the KGB chief of East Berlin, by Sergej in the Soviet prohibited zone of Karlshorst. Holding a glass of cognac in his hand, the General stood up and declared that for having executed an 'important government commission' Stashynsky had been awarded the Order of the 'Red Banner', which would be conferred on him by the KGB Chief, Shelepin, in Moscow. In the course of the dinner given on this occasion the General had Stashynsky give him an account of the details of the murders. He told Stashynsky that he

the truce, and that brought some sessions between us and the Chinese because we thought this goes too far. Because they are using the Poles and the Czechs like stooges. They are telling them to block controlling the North at all, and to accuse the Americans in the South and to try to get more control in the South. So they were exposing us as their stooges.

Now, I suppose that was done by purpose, that they wanted it as one of the things to also, to discredit some wide representatives of parties. That was also a nationalist undertone. But they brought some sessions between us.

Mr. McNAMARA. Did this become such a big issue that it was eventually brought to Chou En-lai?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. It was.

Mr. McNAMARA. Did you discuss this with him personally?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Yes, I did.

Mr. McNAMARA. Where did this take place?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. In Peking.

Mr. McNAMARA. Did you make a number of visits to the Chinese mainland?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Yes, I did.

Mr. McNAMARA. Did you meet while there, in addition to Chou En-lai, a number of other Communist leaders?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Yes.

Mr. McNAMARA. Did they, at any time in conversation with you, give you any indication of what their aims were? I am talking now in a broad sense, as regards the United States and Asia generally.

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. In a very broad sense, no. In the global sense, the world sense, no; but in the technical, as to Asia and as to Korea, yes.

Mr. McNAMARA. What did they indicate?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. They said that we should attack always the Americans in order to make their position on the Asian mainland, and Korea weaker and they gave us such, for instance, examples, that they, during the truce negotiations, although every day many people perished and they were already prepared to make a truce, but they did not want to give too much concessions to the Americans, so they always tried that the Americans should make concessions first because that makes them, as they say, "lose their face," and it makes their position weaker. And so they say when such a situation existed, when people perished, it would be easier now to discredit Americans, to work in this direction, politically.

Mr. McNAMARA. Did they also instruct you—that is, the Chinese representatives—to quarrel with the neutral members of the commission?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. They did.

Mr. McNAMARA. What was the psychology in this?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. The psychology of this was to play out the ones against the others. That means by attacking sharply—for instance, that I come back to the Repatriation Commission and by attacking sharply the Swiss and the Swedes, make the Indians afraid.

TESTIMONY OF WLADYSLAW TYKOCINSKI

APRIL 6, 1966

SYNOPSIS

The committee met in executive session on April 6, 1966, to receive testimony from Wladyslaw Tykocinski, who was head of the Polish Military Mission in Berlin when, on May 16, 1965, he asked for political asylum in the United States.

At the time of his defection, Mr. Tykocinski had been an official in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for almost 20 years. He had held posts in Rome, Canberra, Vienna, and Baden-Baden; had been a member of the Polish delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in New York; and vice chief of the Polish delegation to both the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Neutral Nations (Truce) Supervisory Commission in Korea. He had also served as Chief of Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As Chief of the Military Mission in Berlin, he held the rank of minister.

For 6 years of his service in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—from 1946 to 1952—Mr. Tykocinski's Foreign Service posts had been used to cover his operations as an officer of Z-2, the Polish military intelligence service.

The Polish Military Mission in Berlin had about 50 members in it at the time of his defection, Mr. Tykocinski stated. He estimated that about 38 of these people had intelligence assignments, working either for Z-2 or the secret police, which is generally known as UB (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa—Office of Security).

Mr. Tykocinski testified that he had defected because the Stalinists, or hard-liners, were returning to power in Poland. He stated that Mieczyslaw Moczar, the new Minister of Interior, who directs the secret police, or UB, is also "the chief of the new hard-liners in the Communist Party," and was flooding his Mission in Berlin, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other departments of government with his agents.

His major mission, while stationed in Rome in 1950-52, was to devise means for certain Italian Communists to escape from Italy to Poland. These people, he said, had been involved in Polish espionage operations and also in the assassination of other Communists who had been involved in the theft of millions of dollars belonging to the Italian Government. Mussolini was trying to get out of the country with these funds in 1945 when he was killed by Communist partisans.

Tykocinski said that his U.N. experience revealed that all Communist-bloc U.N. delegations are completely controlled by Moscow and vote as the Soviet delegates instruct them. Regular meetings of bloc delegates, he said, are held at the Soviet estate in Glen Cove, Long Island, where plans are made in advance concerning how votes will be cast on all matters brought before the United Nations. Moreover, Soviet control over bloc nations in the U.N. was exercised not only on votes to be cast, but the content and length of speeches to be made and even the epithets that would be used against the United States and the frequency of their use in a given speech.

The same was true, he testified, concerning the Communist-bloc delegations to the Neutral Nations Commissions in Korea, with the exception that, with Moscow's approval, it was Peking which gave orders to them. Ma Mu-min, the Red Chinese official from whom Mr. Tykocinski received orders, subsequently went to North Vietnam to serve as "the principal secret adviser of Ho Chi Minh."

One of the tactics used by the Communists in dealing with neutral

Before the House of Representatives
United States Congress

nations serving on U.N. Commissions, Mr. Tykocinski stated, was to berate one or more of them in an effort to cow the others. The Repatriation Commission in Korea, for example, was made up of representatives of Communist Poland and Czechoslovakia and of neutral India, Sweden, and Switzerland. The members of the Polish and Czech delegations were instructed by their Chinese Communist bosses to "sharply" attack members of the Swiss and Swedish delegations in front of the Indian representatives "so that the Indians get afraid and will be easier to train."

He also testified that the Communist nations do not believe in the principles of the United Nations, but use the U.N. only to advance the interests of the Soviet Union and Communist policy.

ITALY

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. I received nomination to the first secretary in the Embassy in Rome.

Mr. McNAMARA. And you served in Rome from December 1949 to about October 1952; is that correct?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. That is correct.

Mr. McNAMARA. Almost 3 years.

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Yes.

Mr. McNAMARA. And what was your major mission in Rome? You were still working for Z-2; is that correct?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Yes.

Mr. McNAMARA. Throughout your Rome assignment?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. That is correct. My major assignment was to try to disentangle a very complicated process for espionage, namely; I must tell you how it was.

There were some Italians caught in this process that they worked for the Polish military attaché. The Polish military attaché was asked to leave the country, and the Italians were arrested because they were caught when they gave over secret materials to his representative of the military attaché. One of the Italians was also involved in a big affair which compromised the Italian Communist Party, namely, in the so-called Dongo affair, the affair of Mussolini's treasure, whether the party has it or not. The party is suspected of killing some people who knew too much about it. One of those Italians probably took part in these killings and now he was in prison for working with the Polish espionage.

So, I had to get him out of the prison and send him through Switzerland with false documents to Poland. Then I had to make some arrangements that the affair should not be played too high in the press, try to make some arrangements with the Italians for an exchange. The Poles arrested some Italians in Warsaw for black marketing and they proposed an exchange, that the affair should be kept quiet and they will let those people go.

Then I had to follow all possible materials from the affair of how it develops. I got it all from the party; I mean, the materials from the preliminary interrogation procedure and how the affair develops, and so on.

That would be one line. It was an assignment for a long time because the affair got, well—

Mr. McNAMARA. Did you eventually succeed? Where did you get the false documents you gave this Italian who was in prison?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. I gave him documents and money; I got it from Warsaw. The escape route was mapped by the Italian Communist Party. I met him in a tailor's shop; the tailor was a Communist; and then I gave him over the documents and money, and to my best knowl-

edge he is now in Warsaw.

Mr. McNAMARA. What means did you use in your attempts to have this kept out of the press, or at least not blown up to a very big thing? What tactics?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Well, I had a judge who belonged to the Communist Party. I made his acquaintance through the secretary of Togliatti, the chief of the Communist Party of Italy, and he told us what we should do, that we should try for an exchange of some Italians caught in Warsaw.

So, as I told you, they caught some Italian people working in the trade representation on black marketing operations, and later we proposed to the Italians an exchange that we will let those people go without big hello and they should not put too many things in the press about the affair.

Mr. WELTNER. Were the black market charges drummed up, imaginary?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. That I don't know, because this operation was made in Warsaw. I only know that they started there, but probably there was something in this.

Mr. WELTNER. In other words, instructions came out of Italy to Poland saying arrest some Italians in Poland?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Yes.

UNITED NATIONS

Based on your experience in the United Nations and your knowledge of Communist representatives to the United Nations, would you say that the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other Communist governments represented in that body subscribed to, and believed in, those purposes?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. No. I would say that for them it is a question of tactics. They do whatever is in the interest of the Soviet Union at this moment, at the given moment. But they are not guided by these principles.

Mr. SENNER. What about the proposition of universal peace? Do they believe in that, or do they advocate something different, a bunch of little small fires and wars?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. That is only also a tactical move. That means at certain periods they declare, as you know, some kind of peaceful coexistence without ideological coexistence.

That is here the main point, because that means wherever there is trouble in the West, they can help in this trouble because that is ideological war and that does not have anything to do with peaceful coexistence. So, speaking about universal peace and other things, that is also a question of tactics of the given moment. We speak about the United Nations—

Mr. SENNER. Universal peace to them means beginning their ideological programs by setting forth war in small scales here and there; is that correct?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. That means if this war, if there are good conditions for stirring trouble, they will help them. If they start trouble in South America, they will help them. And so all around.

It does not mean they consider the situation right now, that it can be universal war because of the atomic weapons. But they consider they are free to step in where there is trouble.

UN NEUTRAL NATIONS REPATRIATION COMMISSION (Korea)

Mr. McNAMARA. Subsequent to serving with the United Nations in New York City, you also served two stretches in Korea; is that true?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Yes.

Mr. McNAMARA. From June or July 1953 to January 1954 as a member of the Polish delegation to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Could you tell the committee your exact position on that delegation?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. I was the diplomatic substitute to the chief of the Mission. I was his vice chief for diplomatic and political questions. That means I represented the Foreign Affairs Ministry there in this commission.

Mr. McNAMARA. What was the name of the chief of the Mission?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Gajewski.

Mr. McNAMARA. Later, from June 1955 to December 1955, you served on the Polish delegation to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. That is correct.

Mr. McNAMARA. Did you have the same duties on that commission?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. That is true.

Mr. McNAMARA. Was the Polish delegation to both of these commissions free and independent, or did it take directions from other Communist powers, as the Polish delegation to the United Nations in New York did?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. The Polish delegation was entirely "un-free" and it took orders from the Chinese. The Chinese were left there as the ones, by Russians, as the ones who are competent to give orders in this particular area.

Mr. McNAMARA. On the Repatriation Commission, Poland, Czechoslovakia, India, Sweden, and Switzerland were represented; on the Supervisory Commission, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. That is correct.

Mr. McNAMARA. The Chinese were not represented on either of these commissions, and neither were the Russians.

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. That is correct.

Mr. McNAMARA. Could you tell us how the Chinese conveyed their instructions to the Polish delegation?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Yes. They had an entire leading group in the city of Kaesong. That is a city near Panmunjom and there they were there with some very high-ranking officials and military-ranking men, under this guise.

It was easy to disguise because they did not have any ranks, so they were there in the uniforms of soldiers. And they had to supervise—this group had to supervise all what we did and the general situation in this commission and in the area of Panmunjom and to the demarcation line.

We got our orders on briefings, which were almost daily or nightly—because the Chinese like to work during the night—from several Chinese higher officials. Between them our standing adviser was one who was named Ma Mu-min.

Mr. McNAMARA. Where is he now?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. He went, as I heard later, to North Vietnam and was the principal secret adviser of Ho Chi Minh.

Mr. McNAMARA. You say they were uniformed. Were they Chinese or North Korean uniforms?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Chinese.

Mr. ICHORD. How do you know this was the way orders were being given and taken?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Because I received them myself. I was on all these briefings. The chief, me, and, in the Supervisory Commission, also the military adviser, the military substitute, who is now a general, Marian Graniewski, so we were the standing ones who received the orders.

Mr. ICHORD. From whom did you receive the orders?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. From the Chinese.

Mr. ICHORD. And this was the individual who is now, or who went to North Vietnam as, an adviser to Ho Chi Minh?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Yes.

Mr. McNAMARA. From the Communist viewpoint, what was your main task on the Repatriation Commission? That is the commission that supervised the exchange of the prisoners of war when the truce was declared in Korea.

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. The orders of the Chinese were to make as much trouble as possible in order to create a situation where the defeat, the political defeat of the East—namely, that most of the prisoners did not want to go home—that it should be covered by such arguments as that the Americans and the South Koreans are disturbing the real action of persuading those prisoners.

You know that was an action decided, that there should be representatives of China and of North Korea who could persuade the prisoners under the Supervisory Commission.

So that there should be such trouble created at the commission saying, for instance, always criticizing the Americans for hampering the work of the commission, and so on, in order to make the picture unclear. That is a major political defeat, the prisoners really did not want to go back to North Korea and Red China.

Mr. McNAMARA. Operation Little Switch, which was the first exchange of prisoners, took place in April of 1953. At that time, a Peking radio broadcast describing the Chinese prisoners of war returned to the Chinese forces from the U.S. side stated that "Ghosts of men tottered straight from the horrors of Koje Island * * * they looked as though they had come from Belsen." That is the Nazi concentration camp. They were "emaciated," "starved," "maltreated"; Allan Winnington of the London *Daily Worker* played up these charges.

A Kaesong dispatch claimed that among the prisoners of war released by the U.S. there was an excessive number of amputees. And the line was that the U.S. was following Hitler's tactics; when you had someone who is seriously injured, it is easier to cut off an arm or leg than to try to cure the man. The claim was that the U.S. had indulged in this kind of treatment of prisoners.

Winnington wrote, after mentioning some double amputation cases, "amputation—as the German Army discovered—is cheaper than medical attention."

Were you there at the time these prisoners were exchanged?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. No.

Mr. McNAMARA. Were you there at the time of Big Switch, which was later, in August of 1953?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Yes.

Mr. McNAMARA. Did you see the prisoners as they came over the line?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Yes.

Mr. McNAMARA. Were they emaciated, starved; did they look as though they came from a Nazi prison camp?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Not at all.

Mr. McNAMARA. Generally, what was their physical condition?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Their physical condition was good, but they were told it was all part of a propaganda action. They were told to tear the clothes which they received in the camp, and so on, in order to look more pitiful and that they do not want to have anything from America, but I have seen the clothes torn off, and so on; they were quite new and good, in a good shape.

Anyhow, that was a part of this harassing propaganda, this assertion.

Mr. McNAMARA. At the time of Big Switch, the major exchange of prisoners, there were a number of American POW's who refused to come back to this country. They chose to remain there. Do you know anything about any efforts made by the Communists to influence them and other POW's?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Yes. There were made intensive efforts at indoctrination. When they got already nearer on this idea, they were better treated, and then there was a journalist, a Communist, British-Australian journalist—

Mr. McNAMARA. Wilfred—

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Wilfred Burchett, who played also a role in indoctrinating them and in persuading them to remain.

Mr. SENNER. Was there a reward made to prisoners, such as education, and so forth?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. I do not know.

Mr. SENNER. You say Burchett was a Communist. How do you know this?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. I know from some of the Chinese and from Burchett.

Mr. SENNER. What did the Chinese tell you?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. That he is a good man; that he is ideological, good, and he is very helpful. The general atmosphere when we met in the Chinese camp was of great reverence to him and so on.

Mr. McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, I state for the record that Wilfred Burchett is now the Moscow correspondent for the *National Guardian*, a weekly Communist newspaper published in New York City. He has written articles for *New Times* and the *Moscow Daily News*, both published in Moscow. He has made broadcasts on Moscow radio. He has written articles for the *New World Review*, published in New York City, and other Communist magazines in this country. International Publishers, the Communist Party publishing house in the United States, has published two of his books.

He is writing very much on Vietnam. The two books are *Vietnam—Inside Story of Guerilla War* and *The Furtive War; The United States in Vietnam and Laos*, both about Vietnam. And *The Worker* is offering his book, *Vietnam—Inside Story of Guerilla War* as a premium for subscribing to *The Worker*.

Going back to Korea, at the time he was there working on the prisoners, as Mr. Tykocinski has testified, he was also active as a correspondent in spreading the charge that United States was engaged in germ warfare in Korea.

Would you have any comment on the fact that Burchett is sometimes quoted in the U.S. press as a man who is perhaps an authority, or to be listened to?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. No, there is nothing additional I can think of.

Mr. McNAMARA. During the time you were in Korea, your two stays there, did you ever see any evidence of United States use of germ warfare or bacteriological warfare?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Nothing whatsoever.

Mr. McNAMARA. Did you ever hear it discussed by any Chinese or other Communist representatives there? Were they saying that they had such evidence or could produce it?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. No, the only mentions were when political actions of different kinds were discussed, so this was mentioned as one of the political arguments which should be used. Only in this context.

Mr. McNAMARA. To the best of your knowledge and based on your experience in Korea, did the Communist forces sincerely believe in the truce agreement and intend to observe it faithfully and strictly?

Mr. TYKOCINSKI. Observe it faithfully and strictly, no, they did not observe it. They made several violations. For instance, by putting new MIG's into the north from China without control of the commission. But they told us to accuse always the Americans of violations of

Communist bloc governments over to the right. This volume was printed and circulated throughout the country. The book is actually an attack on the U.S. It's full of falsifications about the Hungarian Revolution, for example, that the Revolution came from outside Hungary. It is a good example of AVH domestic disinformation. Hajdu wrote it under the pseudonym Peter Hun.

The part I was to play in the disinformation campaign was small but important. As I have said, before I left for London I was told by Fürjes about my role in it. He told me to submit suggestions for causing friction between the United States and the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth, and to undermine the relations between the United States and other western countries—economically or otherwise.

As Second Secretary for Economic Affairs, I was instructed to supply information that could be used for this purpose and to suggest ideas for forgeries. I did nothing in this field before I asked for political asylum.

VII. The Case of Bela Lapusnyik

The mysterious death of Bela Lapusnyik, a young AVH non-commissioned officer who fled from Hungary early in May, 1962, and died in a Vienna jail early in June where he was being held, created big excitement in the western world. How could a young man who appeared to be in the best of health, and with his freedom assured after escape from Hungary, suddenly die while in the hands of the authorities?

I recall after Lapusnyik's death there was a formal statement or order on Lapusnyik circulated by the Chief of the AVH. This order was read to AVH personnel at departmental or section meetings. In the order from the AVH Chief, Lapusnyik was represented as having been an immoral, corrupt person who hung out in bars and brought loose women to the apartment where he lived. He was also accused of misusing official money and not taking an interest in Communist Party affairs. The facts of his case were outlined briefly: he had escaped from Hungary by misusing his AVH status and in so doing had shot down a border guard. Throughout the document he was referred to as "the traitor, Bela Lapusnyik". The report also noted he died in jail. According to this statement, Lapusnyik had caused very serious damage to the AVH because he had revealed AVH secret locations, identities and surveillance methods. The report pointed out his superiors had failed to exercise adequate supervision and it indicated appropriate punishments had been given. The report demanded more and better discipline from personnel and more careful supervision from senior officers.

I can tell you what I learned later in Budapest about Bela Lapusnyik's death. The people who told me were in a position to know about it. Early in 1965, a little over a year ago, I was ordered by my chief in the External Service to evaluate and screen the file which concerned the safe apartment in Budapest that Lapusnyik had lived in. Lapusnyik had worked in the very secret AVH surveillance unit which required its members to have civilian cover. The apartment which Lapusnyik had used as his own home was used by the AVH for meetings with its agents. Immediately after Lapusnyik's death in Vienna, the AVH had given up the apartment but the file on the apartment still remained at the Registry, and I was given the work of evaluating it. Lapusnyik's safe apartment, administratively, had been the responsibility of the section in the External Service for which I worked.

I examined the apartment file.

In order to make a judgment what to do with this material, I had to know something about Lapusnyik himself. Therefore, as was normal in such matters, after consulting with my chief I asked the Internal Service for Lapusnyik's complete file. I was surprised to be

told by the Counterintelligence Department of the service that his file could not be seen without the written permission of the Deputy Minister of the Interior and the head of the AVH. The man who told me this was chief of the Research Subsection of the Counterintelligence Main Directorate. This subsection investigated cases like Lopusnyik's.

I reported the fact that Lopusnyik's file was under special controls to my superiors. My chief and the Internal Service then talked the matter over and agreed to submit a report on the case in order to close

the file. This report went to the secretariat of the External Service where I was permitted to know that Lopusnyik, after he arrived in Vienna, had given information on all of the AVH cases he knew, including the persons his group had surveilled, even the license plate numbers of some western businessmen who visited Hungary. It was said: "we got some information on some other things that Lopusnyik revealed while he was in jail in Vienna".

Then I asked why I hadn't been shown the whole file. I was told this was understandable since the case was top secret. I had not been permitted to see the whole file because Lopusnyik had been poisoned by the Czech intelligence service in the Vienna jail.*

STATEMENT
OF
LASZLO SZABO

MARCH 17, 1966

I. Life History

My name is Laszlo Szabo. When I asked political asylum of the United States Embassy in London on 18 October 1965, I had served twenty years in the Hungarian security and intelligence service—for convenience I will refer to it as the AVH. In July 1946, I was appointed a sub-lieutenant in the Political Section, Rural Department, Internal Police Headquarters in Budapest. When I left the Hungarian political intelligence service on 18 October 1965, I held the rank of major. I left the Hungarian intelligence and security service because I was unwilling to carry out my assigned missions against the west. I had reached this determination after years of silent, anxious, terrible fighting with myself. This was the first opportunity I had to leave the service of the Hungarian police state in safety, and I took advantage of the opportunity.

My first grave doubts about the morality of the Hungarian security service system were generated in 1948 and 1949 when I assisted in the work on a number of cases that were basically mounted by the service against certain foreigners in the country. I began to fight myself and to begin to justify this action by conceding that in the long run there might be some ultimate justice in these basically illegal actions. Thereafter, however, the AVH service began to choke out any individuality or feeling and I was always under orders. I noted in 1949 and 1950 certain AVH officers began to disappear. These men disappeared, for example one was Oscar Havas, without a trace—that was the period of the persecution of Ferenc Nagy and the period of the Rajk and other cases. But with these doubts also came my fears. What was happening in the service also began to happen in the country itself. Slogans began to repress all thinking and created widespread fear, and this was greatest within the AVH itself. I joined the AVH as a very young man. After a succession of events, I recognized it for what it was. I did not have personal bravery then to turn in any other direction and I found it impossible then to change the course of action.

II. An Evaluation of the Hungarian Security and Intelligence Service (AVH)

The Hungarian intelligence and security service—as I said earlier, for convenience I will refer to it as the AVH—is under the Ministry of Interior and is the instrument of the Hungarian Communist Party.* It protects the Party and the Government from all inside and outside enemies. It works against the "Main Enemy", the United States and other western nations. All capitalist nations are enemies, but the United States is the "Main Enemy". In the Magyar language it is a special term that is used in documents, instructions and briefings: "A főellenség".** The Hungarian Communist Party keeps close contact with the AVH through the Ministry of Interior.

Before the House of Representatives
United States Congress

The AVH works both abroad and inside Hungary. The part for working abroad is called the Intelligence Service, or the External Service. It handles disinformation operations, such as forgeries, to make the west look bad in Africa and Asia. It runs the spies from its intelligence units, or *residenturas*, in Hungarian embassies, and the "illegal" agents who work disguised as non-Hungarian people. The AVH has been looking seriously to recruit agents among the refugees who fled abroad in 1956. AVH officers abroad have to study these people, find out who can be recruited and how. They have some successes in recruiting.

The External Service works mainly against the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, Brazil, Israel, Austria and Germany. There is a subsection for each of these countries. All other countries are handled by the Miscellaneous Operations Section. AVH officers abroad work from centers, generally in Hungarian embassies and legations, called *residenturas*. These are located in Washington, New York, London, Paris, Frankfurt, Vienna, Rome, Rio de Janeiro, Ottawa and Tel Aviv. In Moscow and in each bloc capital there is a special group for liaison on security and counterintelligence. Each *residentura* is headed by a *resident*. He has under him staff officers and temporary, or "coopted", agents who are diplomats or administrative people who are assigned temporary spying functions by the AVH. Possibly there are unofficial *residenturas*, staffed with coopted diplomats, in Tokyo, New Delhi and other cities throughout the world.

The Internal Service of the AVH, the Counterintelligence Service, watches the Hungarian people and foreigners in Hungary. Its officers are good at entering foreign embassies secretly, putting in microphones, following people, monitoring the radio and telephones as well as using internal agents and provocateurs against the people. They are studying the use of television and such things for surveillance.

The Soviets keep several advisors with the AVH. A chief advisor works with the top AVH men, the others work with the operational departments in both the External and the Internal Services. The KGB and the AVH work together closely. They coordinate and plan operational work at periodic meetings in Moscow.

The AVH is a small but developing organization, maybe about 2000 staff officers. Staff officers are recruited from the universities and trained by the AVH. Western countries should not underestimate the AVH. It is neither poor nor weak as long as it has Soviet support. It is dangerous to the west and since 1963 it has expanded its activity against Hungarians overseas. It works effectively against western diplomats and students in Hungary and against western nations inside Hungary's own borders.

III. The Missions of the AVH

I know something about the work of the AVH against the Hungarian emigration. I have seen how they try to penetrate their organizations and destroy these people. They used this technique against Anna Kethly, Imre Szelig and the Hungarian Social-Democrats.*

The internal AVH works against the foreign diplomats, the students who come to study in Hungary and the tourists. Every foreigner is considered a possible spy. Must watch him if he acts strangely or wants to learn too much. Always the internal people are looking for good recruits among the diplomats, the students, the tourists. They monitor telephones, try to plant microphones and maintain the surveillance on foreigners. This is the main principle: if you can recruit a foreigner inside Hungary, you may have a good agent in his home or in another foreign capital one day.

The External Service is always looking for possibilities in the foreign offices in the capitals of the enemy states. Foreign offices are one of the first targets for the Hungarian service, by an agreement made among the Communist services themselves with the Soviets. Recruitments may result from watching the foreign diplomats in Hungary.

Hungarians living abroad are an important and urgent target. The AVH wants to recruit many of these people as agents. Even the children of emigrants and refugees are looked for. These emigrants and refugees are very important to the AVH. Also the AVH is always trying to find out about foreign intelligence services. They do not expect to have a lot of immediate good luck in this field, but still they keep trying.

As I pointed out earlier, the AVH works with the Soviets on disinformation and propaganda. The AVH always works with the Soviets. Anything they do has Soviet support and agreement.

IV. AVH Integration With Soviet and Other Bloc Intelligence Services

The AVH works closely with the Soviets. Since the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, however, the Soviets have relaxed their hold on the Hungarian Government somewhat, and the number of advisors has been cut down. Soviet cooperation with the AVH is carried out by advisors who are assigned to that service. There is a chief advisor. The other advisors are assigned to the Counterintelligence Department, and to the Intelligence Department.

According to the general agreement between the two services, the Soviet advisors can see all the important AVH papers, including the annual report of the service. The Information Department selects the most valuable intelligence information to send to Moscow. Hungary has no secrets from the Soviet Union. Officials of the AVH run to the Soviet advisors with any information they think is important. They are happy to be of service to the Soviet State Security—the KGB.

When the Soviets need it, they can get the operational assistance of the AVH. I remember one case some time ago. The Soviet KGB wished to recruit a woman, a foreigner. They arranged for the AVH to have this woman invited to Hungary. An AVH officer was assigned to handle the invitation to the woman and the details of her stay in Hungary so that the Soviets could approach her.

If the AVH has an operation of interest to the Soviets, they will ask the agent reports be given to them. When the Soviets want original documents or an agent's file, the material is sent to Moscow. If they want, they will also get the code names assigned to agents by the AVH, as well as the agents' true names. The logs and registers of incoming AVH intelligence reports and materials are maintained for the use of the Soviet advisors by the Evaluation and Review Department of the External Service. The Soviet advisors had their offices on the same floor and were in and out of the Evaluation Department at will. When the Hungarian External Service created its disinformation and forgeries unit, it was set up in the Evaluation and Review Department.

The AVH contacts the Soviet service in foreign capitals through Hungarian and Soviet contact officers. The AVH group in Moscow is there for counterintelligence purposes, that is, to watch Hungarian diplomats and students in the USSR. The AVH also maintains groups in the capitals of the Soviet bloc countries, but, again, for counterintelligence purposes only. They watch Hungarian citizens living in those countries. I believe the group in East Berlin also works against the western nations. Officers of one bloc service may be sent to another bloc country to work on specific intelligence cases. As I said earlier, the groups each service maintains in the capitals of the others work only on the citizens of their own nations in those bloc countries.

Periodically the Soviets call conferences with individual services in the USSR for the discussion of intelligence objectives and problems. The Soviets, as far as I know, meet with the representatives of each service individually. On occasion, however, representatives of bloc services may meet to talk over mutual problems.

All of these services work together today more as equals. I want to stress this point. The Soviets try not to order the other services around, they prefer an appearance of giving advice and suggestions. They don't command openly the other services any more in matter of details. You might call the Soviets "the first among equals". But some are still more equal than others. When something has been decided at the chief's level with the Soviets, the other services must stay strictly in line.

The Soviets give counterintelligence training in the USSR for officers from all the bloc services who want to take advantage of the opportunity. Training is not forced on the other services. They can send officers or not. The Soviets tell each service the number of officers they can send, but the services do not have to send this number. They can send less.

I have personal knowledge of the counterintelligence training because I was one of several AVH officers who attended this course in 1957. We were the first group to go to the USSR for training after the Revolution of 1956. Our course began in September 1957 and lasted one year. It was given in a KGB building in Moscow. We lived and studied in the same building. We Hungarians studied alone. We did not work with other national groups. The instructors were from the KGB. Their lectures were interpreted into Hungarian as they were delivered. All our notebooks were classified secret and kept locked in a special room when we were not using them.

The training given us was in counterintelligence subjects. We received instruction on how to find, recruit and handle agents and informers for reporting on individuals and groups. It is fine, the Soviets said, if you can find a person who will work for you of his own free will when asked, but usually he will not want to do so. Then you have to use pressure to force him. You have to investigate your

prospect to see what is the best method to use. Use blackmail if you have to, but recruit your man.

They gave us careful training in some counterintelligence subjects: every secret area of the country, such as military installations, research institutes, scientific installations, and government agencies must receive the attention of counterintelligence. According to the Soviets, special attention has to be given to the "internal enemy", that is, counter-revolutionary groups or nationalist organizations, and to anti-Soviet activity organized from abroad.

All church groups have to be penetrated by agents abroad in order to find out their plans against the Soviet Union. The Soviets consider any kind of religion to be a tool of the "imperialists". For the Hungarians this means Catholics, Calvinists, Lutherans and a number of other small sects. The Soviets gave us in the training course a long list of "subversive" churches.

They gave us training in counter sabotage. This covered counter sabotage in industry, armed forces, communications, space and agriculture.

Sabotage in planning offices must be carefully watched for. We had to plan counter sabotage and other cases which the instructor then criticized.

One significant subject was investigation, that is, how to plan an operation against a hostile person or group, make the arrest, interrogate and assemble evidence to convict the subjects and get confessions. We have to entangle the suspects and get them to confess. They gave us a problem to work out in this field. In general, everything is allowable in working against an identified traitor or group for this purpose.

We received some general instruction on the western intelligence services, their organization and how they work.

A very important part of the course was instruction in work against foreign embassy buildings and foreign diplomats. According to the Soviets, every capitalist embassy and legation in Moscow is a nest of espionage. Every means must be used to penetrate them and find out their work. They taught us to use surveillance, photographic apparatus and planted microphones in this work. Much attention was also given to physical penetration of embassy buildings and the secret theft of materials such as code books.

Whenever they can, the Soviets use agents against foreign embassies. Some of these are Soviet nationals who, for one reason or another, can visit foreign embassies. These people can look and pick up a lot of information. But the best method, the Soviet lecturer said, was to recruit diplomats as agents. This is the best way to get inside the embassy building. The Soviets gave examples of blackmailing diplomats with photographs of their intimate relations with women and with homosexuals. They use any technique: blackmail, threats against relatives, money. Anything that will work.

As a practical exercise, I had to prepare a plan for getting into a building. This included getting the layout of the building, reproducing keys to the building and the safes, working out a schedule of the movements of the diplomats, arranging for the people who will make the entry, etc.

I know there is also a course in the Soviet Union for intelligence training of officers of bloc services. This is a longer course than the counterintelligence training I have just described.

The work among Soviet and bloc intelligence and security services is a direct result of the cooperation between the national Communist parties and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Earlier, during the thirty years when the Communist International existed, the Bolshevik Party ran all other parties through the Comintern, and later the Cominform. They could order them directly. All this meant, generally, was that every Communist party depended upon the Soviet Communist Party for orders and directions. In effect, the Soviet Communist Party exercised total authority and control. This gradually subverted the parties from their own national interests and they became paralyzed. Now the form has changed. The national Communist parties have more authority and can choose the methods for achieving determined overall Communist bloc goals. The integration of bloc and Soviet security and intelligence services takes place in just the same way. As I said before, every bloc service is a Party instrument. Service and Party practices are in parallel. Each bloc service has agreed with the Soviet service to achieve certain broad objectives in its own interest and in the interest of the other bloc services. They all use the same method but they have integrated objectives. For example, the Hungarian service in this integrated framework has agreed to attack western foreign offices, in particular. This doesn't mean, of course, that they won't develop other good opportunities too. This is a kind of intelligence COMECON.*

VI. Disinformation

I know about the use of forgeries and disinformation by the Soviets and the Communist bloc. Of course I don't know everything, but I can tell you something new.

During January 1964, *Newsweek* magazine asked for information about those persons responsible for putting out forged issues of the magazine in November and December 1963. They have probably never learned who was responsible for these forgeries and disinformation.

I can tell them. It was done by the Hungarian intelligence service. Major Janos Fürjes, Chief of Special Activities, the unit responsible for disinformation work in the Hungarian service told me about it before I was transferred to the AVH *residentura* in London. He told

me the whole story.*

There were two forged issues of *Newsweek*. The first issue, dated 18 November 1963, was printed on the secret presses of the Hungarian intelligence service. Fürjes told me that the texts of these forgeries were prepared in French, then given to Noel Field for the translation of parts into English. The first forged issue was sent by diplomatic pouch to certain Hungarian embassies for mailing to African and Asian diplomats and other selected persons. AVH personnel handled the mailings. People doing the work had precise instructions about what to do. For example, they were ordered to wear rubber gloves while handling copies so as not to leave fingerprints in handling and sticking on stamps. I know that London was one of the mailing points. The mailings were countersurveilled by AVH personnel to make certain that they were not detected.

Almost all copies of the first forged issue had been mailed when President Kennedy was assassinated. There were problems for the AVH because the forgery contained cartoons that were critical of President Kennedy. It was feared after President Kennedy's death that there would be an unfavorable reaction. Therefore, a new forged *Newsweek* issue, dated exactly one month later, and carrying President Kennedy's portrait on the cover was put out and mailed in the same manner as the first. One of the cartoons was redrawn so as to be more favorable to President Kennedy, the others were dropped.

This is the reason why two forged issues of *Newsweek*, with almost the same contents, were distributed.

Fürjes was teaching me about my work in London when he told me the *Newsweek* story. He told me they preferred that an item for disinformation should have some real basis, be based on facts, but if I can produce a good idea that does not have any fact send it in anyway. Truth is not important if the idea is good. Just send it in. They will make it look truthful, then get it published in some little paper somewhere. After that we Hungarians will hand it out, get it republished everywhere. Who can prove it is not true? Fürjes said, "the Soviets used such kind of method successfully. It is a very good method." Then he gave me an example.

This was a KGB disinformation operation in an Arab country. Fürjes didn't tell me which one it was. The KGB, he said, sent a forged letter to an Arab leader accusing a person close to him of taking an action against the leader at the request of some western country. The letter prompted the Arab leader to arrest that person. This action caused a breakdown between the Arab leader and the western country. Fürjes said that apparently some parts of the Soviet operation had been discovered. He thought it was probably for that reason that the Soviets used it with him as an example. In any case, the Arab leader found out that the accusation was not true at all but it was too late. That's how Fürjes instructed me in disinformation work.

The AVH had not been formally organized to handle disinformation work when the forged *Newsweek* issues appeared, but, of course, disinformation had been an AVH activity. After the *Newsweek* forgeries, early in 1964, a unit for this work was created. It was known as Special Activities Against the West (*Aktiv Intézkedések Alosztálya*). The Chief is Major Janos Fürjes. Special Activities was put under the Assessment and Evaluation Department, whose chief is Pal Hajdu, a lieutenant-colonel of the AVH.

All disinformation activities must have the approval of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party before they can be carried out. I know that Hungarian disinformation work is discussed with the Soviets.

Pal Hajdu, Chief of the Evaluation and Assessment Department, last year wrote a book called *Political Hucksters for Relaxation (A Fellazítás Kortesei)*, Kossuth Book Publishing House, Budapest, 1965, 71 pp.). He accused the western nations of planning to wipe out Communism by using psychological warfare techniques to push the

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