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# Briefly Noted

11 October 1965

*What Purpose* Peking Cuts British  
*Diplomatic* Representation  
*Relations?*

In late September, the British foreign office confirmed the fact that ComChina had asked their government to cut their two-man consular representation in Shanghai in half, to stop granting visas to Hong Kong, and to refrain from flying their flag on the Consulate's car. These demands are highly irregular and interfere in the normal conduct of an official foreign establishment.

Petty harassment and incessant restrictions hamper the legitimate activities of foreign representatives in ComChina; they also raise serious doubts as to the present CPR government's willingness or ability to enter into normal diplomatic relations with any nation.

High level diplomats from the free world in Peking -- e.g., from Great Britain and France -- are largely ignored. Those from Communist countries hardly fare any better, especially when they contest Chicom policy. Even friendly African officials -- including those from countries being wooed with aid and trade by the CPR -- have discovered that they are prevented from carrying out the diplomatic functions normal in state relations.

Many governments are advocating the extension of diplomatic relations with the CPR. They support their proposals by saying that the CPR must be drawn into normal consultative and negotiating relations.

They should be asked to examine their own experience and that of others who have entered into such relations. It should be pointed out that the CPR will not change its approach simply by being brought into normal international relations -- this has been tried for 15 years now. Rather, the CPR must be induced to change its policy by firm resistance on the part of all civilized nations.

\* \* \*

*Targets* Soviet Propaganda,  
*and* Mid-1964 to Mid-1965  
*Tactics*

USIA has published an analysis of propaganda appearing in major Soviet media, especially Pravda (official organ of the CPSU) during the past year. The paper, which finds that Moscow's principal concern has been its dispute with Communist China, examines the lines taken by the USSR on the major subjects treated, as follows: U.S. -- responsible for increasing world tensions; disarray in world communism -- attack on Mao, the Togliatti memorandum, K's ouster; and on the international scene, concentrating on Viet-Nam, Cyprus, the Congo and Latin America -- an attempt to appear active while in fact avoiding greater -- or more specific -- commitments on any of these issues. For example, in the latter, Moscow engaged in complicated actions to supply Nicosia with arms and at the same time made friendly overtures to Ankara -- after the threat of immediate hostilities had subsided.

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# Significant Dates ▶

## OCT.

- 23 Orderly student demonstration in Hungary becomes national anti-Soviet uprising when Soviet tanks fire. (See 1 Nov). 1956.
- 26 Chinese Communist "volunteers" intervene against UN forces sweeping through North Korea. 1950.
- 29 KOMSOMOL (Communist Union of Youth) established. 1918.

## NOV.

- 1 Hungarian Revolt 1-4 (see 23 Oct above). 1956.
- 4 Greek Civil War ends with Communist acknowledgment of defeat. 1949.
- 5 Afro-Asian Bandung II still scheduled for Algeria but increasingly doubtful.
- 6 U.S. grants billion dollar Lend-Lease credit to USSR. 1941.
- 7 Bolsheviks seize power in October Revolution (Julian calendar date is 25 Oct). 1917.
- 10 World Youth Day (Communist). To celebrate 20th anniversary of founding of the WFDY (1945).
- 11 International Student Week, concluding with an International Student day on the 17th (celebrated by communist IUS).
- 12 Trotsky expelled from the CPSU. 1926.
- 15 Bolsheviks proclaim "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia," affirming principle of self-determination of peoples of the former Russian Empire. 1917. (Later abrogated)
- 19 Milovan Djilas arrested. 1956.
- 20 U.S. lifts naval quarantine of Cuba. 1962.
- 22 Charles de Gaulle born 1890 (75th birthday).
- 26 Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF -- Communist) founded 1945. 20th anniversary.
- 29 Yugoslavia proclaimed People's Republic. 1945. 20th anniversary.
- 30 USSR vetoes Security Council resolution requesting withdrawal Chinese Communist "volunteers" from Korea. 1950.

NOV. Proposed meetings of Communist controlled groups -- no firm dates


-- AAPSO (Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization)  
Executive Committee Meeting, Conakry, Guinea.

-- AAPSO sponsored Afro-Asian Women's Conference, Algiers.  
[Previously postponed.]

-- Joint Spark, World Marxist Review Seminar, Accra, Ghana.  
[Previously postponed.]

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#63

  
**Commentary**

15-28 September 1965

Principal Developments:

1. The Chinese assault the Soviet leadership with increasing intensity over Soviet support of India and "collaboration" with the U.S. They even include in an official Chinese Foreign Ministry protest note to India (over a demonstration at the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi) a charge that the Indians' "undivulgeable motive" (in staging the provocation) was "to seek reward from the imperialists and modern revisionists." The Chinese also publicize expressions of support from sympathizers in Albania, Australia, Belgium, Indonesia and New Zealand. (NZ alone of this group did not involve the Soviets with the Indians.)
2. The strongest (and only) Soviet statement, a Pravda report on the Sino-Indian border tension which seems to accept the Indian version of the situation and notes "foreign news" reports of Chinese troop movements on the frontier, warns cautiously: "Reports of this kind cannot but make uneasy" all who are interested in the restoration of peace in south and southeast Asia, including the liquidation of U.S. aggression in Vietnam. Meanwhile, Kommunist sets forth a low-key exposition of the Soviet line on the peaceful achievement of socialism in developing countries via "a new political force -- a revolutionary democracy": the Kommunist article stands in sharp contrast to the Chinese line as freshly expounded by Lin Piao (#62), although there is no polemicizing with, or even mention of, the Chinese.
3. A North Korean Nodong Sinmun article on the 17th on the India-Pak fighting seems to disassociate itself from the Chinese charge of Soviet complicity as it asserts that "the chief manipulators ... are none other than the U.S. and British imperialists." On the 25th North Vietnamese organ Nhan Dan, in a commentary on the Chinese-Indian border issue, comes out with "resolute support" of the "just stand of China," repeating the Chinese charges against India and warning that "the more it (India) persists in its stubbornness, the stronger the opposition it incurs from the Asian-African peoples and progressive opinion in the world."
4. The strongest Communist criticism of the Chinese comes from the Yugoslavs. A Borba commentary of the 26th includes the forceful statement: "Chinese policy would endeavor to attain a number of its goals over the bodies of the people of India and Pakistan!"
5. Bilateral meetings on the Soviet side continue. The visit of the top-level Rumanian delegation to Bulgaria which began last period produces a communique with a strong Rumanian flavor, with repeated emphasis on independence, equal rights and non-interference. The communique from an 11-day visit of an Ulbricht-led East German delegation to the USSR unsurprisingly affirms

"full identity of views" and calls for an international meeting of all parties in the future. A 5-day visit of a Tito-led Yugoslav delegation to Bulgaria emphasizes the resumption of friendly relations and "an identity or proximity of views." And a Kadar-led Hungarian delegation stops off in Moscow en route on a "friendly visit" to Mongolia, with no report of any results.

6. The CPSU/CC is meeting in plenum as we go to press, with no indication thus far of any discussions or decisions on problems of the ICM per se.

7. [REDACTED] bitter behind-the-scenes political infighting over Soviet participation in the 2nd Afro-Asian ("Bandung") Conference; Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi suffered sharp setbacks on this issue during his visits to Guinea and Mali early in September. In a press conference on the 29th, Chen Yi publicly states that the conference should be postponed unless there can be assurance that it will specifically condemn U.S. imperialism. Meanwhile, Pravda raises a question mark with an editorial on the 27th condemning the arrest of Algerian opposition leaders earlier this month.

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Significance:

Chinese attacks on Soviet leaders -- now unequivocally identified -- as well as on the Indian "reactionaries" and U.S. "imperialists," have reached a shrill, emotional vituperation bordering on hysteria (note especially the reports of Chen Yi's press conference on the 29th). The single, cautious Soviet attempt to counter the Chinese onslaught against India, the Pravda article of the 22nd, was an apparent effort to appeal directly to the North Vietnamese and their sympathizers to rally to a position that the Chinese bellicosity toward India at this juncture hinders the North Vietnamese cause. However, it was coldly rebuffed by the Nhan Dan commentary 3 days later asserting full Vietnamese support for all aspects of the Chinese position. Meanwhile, the Yugoslavs mince no words in denouncing the Chinese, accusing them of trying to achieve their own ends over the bodies of the Indians and Pakistanis!

Nothing has yet come out of the continuing top-level bilateral meetings on the Soviet side or the CPSU plenum to give substance to our earlier speculation (#62) on possible significant new developments there.

Sino-Soviet, India-Pakistan, and a wide range of other animosities and problems are interacting to roil planning and prospects for the 2nd Afro-Asian ("Bandung") Conference, with no reliable prognostication now possible.

[REDACTED]

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


11 October 1965

950.

THE U.S. SCENE:

DOMESTIC REALITIES VS FOREIGN SLANDERS



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Image.

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SITUATION: The lot of the average American is almost universally envied abroad, American technology, commercial techniques and living styles are widely imitated, foreign students flock to American colleges and American aid of all kinds is avidly sought after. Paradoxically, though, the very political and social system which begets these much-admired results is misunderstood and slandered -- not only by Communists, but by the mass media of allegedly "non-aligned" countries and in the territory of many of our allies as well.

In recent months, such slander and distortion has concentrated on allegations such as the following:

- a. *The U.S. Government is "aggressive" and "bellicose" (Vietnam, San Domingo, Congo) abroad, while neglecting "far more urgent" domestic ills, such as racial discrimination, mass unemployment, poverty, slums and crime;*
- b. *Whereas President Kennedy pursued a peaceful, progressive policy, President Johnson concentrates on warmongering, reactionary, "imperialist" policies;*
- c. *The American "people" -- notably negroes, students, intellectuals and liberals in general -- are increasingly opposing these policies.*

In order to make these claims more plausible [See, for instance, Lin Piao's article, attachment to guidance #947, "China Advocates World-Wide Wars," 27 September 1965], Communists and other antagonists apply, inter alia, the following techniques:

- a. *They publicize every U.S. military move, draft calls, defense production etc. in great detail (and often exaggerated), while minimizing -- and often completely omitting -- any positive U.S. news, whether from the international*

(foreign aid, contributions to U.N. and other international bodies) or from the domestic scene.

- b. They scream hypocritically about purported U.S. "aggression" or "atrocities," but carefully omit stating what caused such U.S. actions.-- whether Communist aggression in South Vietnam, atrocities committed by Communist-supported rebels in the Congo, Communist terrorism in Venezuela and other Latin American countries.
- c. They claim that any dissenting voice in the U.S., every picket line, "teach-in" or speech critical of government policies, reflects "the masses of the people," while concealing from their audiences the U.S. public opinion polls which consistently confirm popular support for the government's foreign as well as domestic policies and the stand taken by numerous mass organizations (such as, for instance, AFL-CIO with its millions of worker members), public leaders and publications.
- d. They employ numerous sleights-of-hand to present their distortions or exaggerations as "factual reporting." For instance, Soviet newspapers claim that "one third of the U.S. population is inadequately fed" -- without telling their readers that this estimate is based on the very high nutritional standards set in the U.S. (not only a high amount of calories, but also a properly balanced diet): if the same exacting standards were applied to the Soviet Union, perhaps two thirds or more of their population would be found wanting.

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
11 October 1965

951.

THE CPSU RE-WRITES ITS HISTORY ONCE MORE:

"DE-KHRUSHCHEVIZATION" ADVANCES --  
AND "DE-STALINIZATION" RECEDES

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SITUATION: The several CPSU histories. The CPSU has just published the first post-Khrushchev version of its own history, a new (second) edition of KPSS Spravochnik (CPSU Handbook), released to the press 10 June 1965. It represents a major step in the "de-Khrushchevization" process, purging the Party's history of the distortions of the "Khrushchev personality cult" -- and reversing the Party's de-Stalinization course.

Before the first edition of this Handbook appeared in 1963, the only valid CPSU history was the 763-page, one-volume History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (called a "textbook" in Soviet references), second, revised edition, published in 1962. The first edition of this "textbook" in 1959 had finally replaced Stalin's famous "Short Course" -- distributed in 60 million copies over 15 years.

The Party had also announced its intention to publish a massive, definitive 6-volume Party history, to be completed by the 50th anniversary of the "October Revolution" in 1967: Pravda in a 22-column article spread over its issues of 22 and 24 June 1962 proclaimed in great detail the tasks of the editors of the new work, and Izvestiya on 19 July 1962 stated that the first volume would be released in 1963. (See BPG No. 99, Item 569, 10 September 1962.) The first volume actually did appear a few weeks before Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 -- and was subsequently recalled, presumably because of several favorable references to K. in the 54-page Preface! (See BPG No. 158, Item 866, 1 February 1965.)

Current history: first version. The 1963 first edition of the Handbook was overlooked by Kremlinologists (including ourselves). It is a modest little volume in pocketbook format (340 pages): its style is terse and factual, and, particularly in treating the post-WWII period, it is largely an account of the Party's various congresses and plenums, plus some of the major international Communist events, the 1957 and 1960 Moscow meetings, Warsaw Pact, and CEMA affairs. Only 20% of the volume was devoted to the post-WWII period (even less than the 22% of the "textbook"). Although there was no flowery adulation, this was clearly

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Khrushchev's Party history: policies and developments were described from K's subjective point of view; the criticisms of Stalin, the "anti-Party group," and Zhukov are all there as K had detailed them; and K's is almost the only name mentioned positively in the post-WWII period (it appears 26 times in the last 45 pages, mostly in connection with his formal "reports" to the Party meetings). We have not noted K's name in the pre-WWII period (there is no index), but the WWII section begins with a quoted tribute by him to the war heroes, and 3 pages later he appears again when Stalin is accused, *inter alia*, of having ignored an April 1941 letter from Ukrainian First Secretary K warning of inadequate military preparations to meet the German threat.

The second version compared. The new second edition of the Handbook follows the same format as the first. Although it covers 2 more years and is described as "corrected and amplified," the post-WWII part is 18 pages shorter than in the first edition. There, history since 1945 was divided into 3 chapter-eras: 1945 to the death of Stalin in 1953; 1953 through 1958, -- and from the "Extraordinary" 21st Party Congress at the beginning of 1959 through December 1962. In the 2nd edition, Stalin's death no longer marks the end of an era: the events of 1945-1958 are covered continuously in a single section, while the last section continues through May 1965.

The revisions from the 1st to the 2nd editions are significant not only in their treatment of personalities and the historical record of bygone events, but even more for their implications regarding the Party's future policies. Appended as an unclassified attachment is a 15-page detailed analysis of the changes prepared by a competent outside researcher for his own organization. We emphasize particularly the following:

Personalities. Khrushchev is not made an "unperson," nor is he directly criticized in the new volume. However, his name is mentioned only 5 times (by our count; still no index): as speaker, together with Malenkov, Moskatov, and Saburov at the 19th Party Congress in 1952 (the 1st ed. did not name any speakers!); when elected First Secretary in 1953; as the lone speaker at the 21st Congress in 1959 (the same as in the 1st -- but it will be noted that the 2nd ed. does not name any speaker for the 20th Congress, where K. made his most sensational performance); as speaker, together with Kozlov and Gorkin, at the 22nd Congress (same as the 1st); and when he was relieved of his posts in 1964. The 2nd ed. abandons the fiction that K voluntarily resigned and implies that he was guilty of his own cult of personality. There is also criticism of policies which he had promoted, especially in agriculture.

Criticism of Stalin is considerably toned down. Factual reference is still made to the Party's resolutions "about the cult of the personality and its results," and measures to overcome the harmful effects thereof. However, the details of Stalin's transgressions and the names of prominent Communist victims are now omitted.

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Likewise, whereas the 1st ed. named all eight persons purged by K in 1957-8 as associated with the "anti-Party group," the 2nd names only "Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, and others" as a group opposing the line of the Party and adds that these three were expelled by the June 1957 plenum's resolution "On the Anti-Party Group." The charges against Zhukov and his expulsion from "leading Party organs" at the October 1957 plenum are not mentioned in the 2nd.

Pioneering Soviet astronauts, Gagarin, Titov, Nikolayev and Popovich, were named in a tribute to Soviet science under the Party's care in the 1st ed., but the entire passage is missing from the 2nd.

Implications for future: The Party seems to be quietly abandoning Khrushchev's unrealistically grandiose claims and goals for building Communism in the USSR in 20 years, formally set forth in "his" 3rd CPSU Program, adopted by the 22nd Congress. Thus far, however, the changes are largely of omission: the Program itself has not been criticized, and the principal points of its platform, including such controversial concepts as the transformation from a "dictatorship of the proletariat" to an "all-peoples' state," are still listed factually.

Consistent deletion of the 1st edition's references to "mass participation" in the elaboration of Party policies in the K era indicates that the practice of turning CC sessions into mass meetings of several thousand activists will be rejected.

While the 1st edition still accurately reported that the 1960 81-party meeting in Moscow had "confirmed a resolution about revisionism as the main danger to the Communist movement," the 2nd blandly says that "the meeting again pointed to the unavoidability of decisive struggle against revisionism as well as against dogmatism and sectarianism," -- thus further confirming the CPSU's intent to dissociate itself from that embarrassing concession in the 1960 document.

Noteworthy sidelights: The 1st edition implicitly admitted Soviet support for the Communist underground in the UAR, Turkey, and other countries where the USSR is attempting to woo Government favor. It states, under the heading "The CPSU and the World Communist Movement" (p. 336), that "many CPs of capitalist countries carry on their work in a deep underground (in Spain, Portugal, the UAR, Turkey, Iran, the FRG, Peru, and others) ...." The 2nd edition cuts this sentence off after "underground!"

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11 October 1965

952 WH.

FLIGHT OF LATIN AMERICAN CAPITAL

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SITUATION: There is a substantial investment of Latin American-controlled capital outside of Latin America; the amount is estimated to be about \$4 billion. This capital is badly needed within Latin America to foster economic development. The need is now greater than ever in view of the steady decline in the influx of private foreign investment capital.

The basic reasons for the flight of capital are unstable political and economic conditions, the threat of expropriation, and a generally unfavorable climate for private enterprise reflected in a lack of business confidence in government.

Foreign aid programs and private foreign investment tend to encourage local investment to contribute to building a solid base for economic development and expansion, and therefore tend to counter capital flight. And, conversely, substantial local investment tends to attract foreign investment.

Therefore, creating favorable conditions for local investment, which is a matter within the power of the separate nations of Latin America, has the two-fold effect of encouraging local investment of domestic capital and of attracting increased foreign investment capital.

A report on the flight of Latin American capital is enclosed as an unclassified attachment; a Spanish translation is included for the appropriate stations.

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
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11 October 1965

953.

KASHMIR

BACKGROUNDER ON THE INDIAN-PAKISTAN CRISIS



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SITUATION:

*"All attempts by us to normalize our relations with India were frustrated by a persistent refusal to honor a solemn international pledge given by it to hold a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.... We fought for the right of self-determination of our people, and the whole world has come to acknowledge the just and moral basis of our struggle."*

*.....President Ayub Khan of Pakistan,  
Radio address, September 22, 1965.*

*"A plebiscite in Kashmir is neither practical nor necessary." Its accession to India is "legally, constitutionally, politically and ethically complete and just."*

*.....President Radhakrishnan of India,  
Radio address, September 25, 1965*

The circumstances which led up to the current impasse between India and Pakistan, centering on the status of Kashmir, are so complex and ambiguous that it is impossible to single out one party as the aggressor or any one event as the cause of the dilemma.

Not only is it impossible to place the blame unequivocally, which might then suggest a simple solution, but the pervading historic and political influences have created from the present crisis a bitter, emotion-laden conflict of interests involving vital issues of international significance and the maintenance of world peace.

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The escalation of the Kashmir problem has presented the United Nations with one of the most severe tests of its authority and viability; caused an apparent re-alignment of national relationships which a short time ago would have been considered unlikely; provoked Communist China and the Soviet Union into postures previously held untenable; aggravated political tensions in which long-festered national grievances and pride erupted into acts of violence; fomented flagrantly bellicose and intemperate governmental accusations, claims and counterclaims, and prompted dramatic tactical maneuvers which so far have served but to reinforce the stalemate.

Although the dissension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has been a legal and diplomatic issue only since 1947 when the two countries became separate and independent, the emotional, religious, social, geographic and economic factors involved have their roots far back in the past. These historic problems and communal rivalries are to a great extent responsible for the seemingly irrational intransigence of both nations. (See unclassified attachment for historic background of Kashmir.)

Far from solving the Hindu-Moslem problem, the partition of India exacerbated it. In late 1947, mass migrations of some ten million people (Hindus leaving Pakistan and Moslems leaving India) were accompanied by massacres in which one million or more died in a nightmarish communal blood bath.

Communist China's attack on India in October 1962 strengthened India's resolve to hold Kashmir for strategic as well as emotional reasons. That debacle delivered a telling blow to Indian national pride and drove home the fact that India must seriously attend to its Himalayan defenses.

While the Kashmir dispute is but one of India's foreign policy problems, Pakistan's frustration over its inability to wrest Kashmir from India is the basic emotion molding its entire foreign policy. To the Pakistani, Kashmir is a blight on Pakistan's national honor. Proposals aimed at saving face for Pakistan - but leaving India in control of the Vale - have no appeal in Rawalpindi or to President Ayub whose political future is inextricably tied to Kashmir.

In 1959, Ayub first tried to exploit the Sino-Indian border difficulties by proposing a joint Indian-Pakistani defense of the sub-continent -- which had real merit in itself -- predicated on a Kashmir settlement. Prime Minister Nehru of India was unresponsive.


It was then hoped by Pakistan that Chinese pressure on the Indian border would force India to secure its flank with Pakistan by offering concessions in Kashmir. However, in the view of Pakistan, the Western allies of Pakistan, by sending military assistance to India following the 1962 Chinese invasion, eliminated the necessity of Indian concessions over

Kashmir. The sending of US arms in particular, even though intended only for self defense against China, is interpreted by Pakistan as disloyal and treacherous support of an enemy by an ally. It is a fact, however, that the US and UK did succeed in getting India and Pakistan into talks on Kashmir in 1963; but Communist China's gestures toward Pakistan and Pakistan's responsiveness destroyed what little chance of success there may have been for a settlement.

Recent constitutional steps to complete the integration of Kashmir by India convinced Pakistan that time is on the side of India. The Rann of Kutch confrontation which developed in January-April 1965, further seriously strained Indo-Pakistan relations. Following the Rann of Kutch agreement, and the declaration by India in July 1965 that Kashmir is "not a matter for discussion," seemed to convince Pakistan that more drastic action was necessary. Pakistan therefore embarked upon its guerrilla campaign designed to force the Kashmir question into the open. On 5 August 1965, armed men from Pakistan crossed the cease-fire line into Kashmir. The counter action by India and the subsequent escalation by both sides resulted into an undeclared war; a conditional and fragile cease-fire effective September 22 under the auspices of the United Nations, and the subsequent involvement of the Great Powers and many smaller nations in diplomatic efforts and political machinations designed to resolve the Kashmir problem.

The escalation of the conflict has been fanned primarily by Communist China but it is being exploited by the Soviet Union as well. Both look for a solution in which their respective and currently divergent interests and long-range political aspirations will be furthered.

An already complicated situation has been worsened further by the addition of other serious issues, some of which are deliberately inserted into the overall picture by the Chinese Communists, for example: threats of retaliatory action against India for alleged violations of Chicom territory; relating "US aggression in North Vietnam" to "Indian aggression against Pakistan"; setting forth conditions for a seat in the UN while praising Indonesia for leaving that body and probably encouraging Pakistan in its threat to do the same unless her demand for a plebiscite is honored. Other issues tangential to the direct conflict further confuse the problem, such as: alleged use of US arms by both parties; the tactically expedient "cooperation" by the Soviet Union with the US in efforts to reach a peaceful settlement and to counter Chicom aid or intervention to support Pakistan.



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Fact Sheet

████████████████████  
11 October 1965

Some Major U.S. Social Legislation Enacted Into Law  
during and Since the Kennedy Administration

Equal Rights. PL (Public Law) 88-38, signed into law 10 June 1963, guaranteed equal pay to women doing the same work as men.

Public Health. PL 88-129, signed 24 Sept 1963, appropriated some \$175 million annually to provide matching federal grants for construction of teaching facilities for training of medical and dental personnel.

Social Therapy. PL 87-274 was extended in the autumn of 1963, continuing the annual \$10 million to develop comprehensive community support of progress for prevention and control of youth delinquency in areas of need.

Environmental Improvement. PL 88-157, signed 24 Oct 1963, provided continuing federal incentives for control of visual (billboard) advertising adjacent to public motor highways.

Public Health. PL 88-165, signed 31 Oct 1963, and PL 88-156, signed 24 Oct 1963, appropriated over \$611 million for federal aid to mental health facilities and related programs.

Care of Elderly. PL 88-158, signed 24 Oct 1963, appropriated \$225 million for the program of urban housing for the elderly.

Death of Pres. Kennedy. 22 November 1963. Beginning of Johnson administration.

\* \* \* \* \*

Education. PL 88-204, signed 17 Dec 1963, appropriated some \$1.2 billion in federal aid for college classroom construction.

Public Health. PL 88-206, signed 17 Dec 1963, appropriated \$95 million for activities to combat air pollution.

Social Therapy. PL 88-214, signed 19 Dec 1963, provided federal assistance and some \$861 million in funds to educate and train out-of-school, out-of-work youths.

Public Works. PL 88-253, signed 30 Dec 1963, appropriated over \$816 million to expand 11 river basin authorizations and to start or broaden work on five dam and reservoir projects.

(Cont.)

Grants of U.S. Foodstuffs. PL 88-250, signed 30 Dec 1963, provided \$1.9 billion for the "Food for Peace," foreign assistance program.

Foreign Aid. PL 88-258, signed 6 Jan 1964, appropriated \$3 billion for foreign aid.

Civil Rights. The 24th Amendment was ratified by the required three-fourths (38) of the states and became a part of the U.S. Constitution 23 Jan 1964, outlawing use of a poll tax as a prerequisite for voting in federal elections.

Social Therapy. PL 88-268, signed 10 Feb 1964, provided over \$289 million in supplemental funds for programs for the mentally retarded, impacted school areas, student loans, and Mexican seasonal farm labor.

Education. PL 88-269, signed 11 Feb 1964, provided \$55 million for federal assistance to public library construction.

Tax Reduction. PL 88-272, signed 26 Feb 1964, enacted an overall \$11.5 billion tax reform and reduction.

Public Works. PL 88-280, signed 11 Mar 1964, authorized \$75 million annually for federal aid to development of airports.

Peace Corps. PL 88-285, signed 17 Mar 1964, appropriated \$115 million for Peace Corps operations in Fiscal 1965.

Public Health. PL 88-305, signed 12 May 1964, provided for control over use of pesticides potentially harmful to humans and wildlife.

Civil Rights Act. PL 88-352, signed 2 July 1964, the most far-reaching civil rights legislation since the U.S. Reconstruction era, outlawed all racial or religious discrimination in schools or other public facilities.

Public Works. PL 88-365, signed 9 July 1964, authorized matching federal grants up to \$475 million annually for improving urban transit systems.

Public Works. PL 88-423, signed 13 Aug 1964, provided \$1.179 billion for federal highway construction in each of fiscal years 1966 and 1967.

Justice. PL 88-455, signed 20 Aug 1964, authorized federal judicial circuits to establish procedures for providing indigents accused of federal crimes with adequate legal counsel at public expense.

Social Therapy. PL 88-452, signed 20 Aug 1964, appropriated \$947 million for the President's "war" on the multiple causes of poverty.

Public Health. PL 88-497, signed 27 Aug 1964, provided \$69 million in federal funds for public health training.

Public Works. PL 88-552, signed 31 Aug 1964, provided for federal-private joint construction of four major ultra-high-voltage electric power facilities to provide low-cost current in Western U.S. regions.

Social Help. PL 88-853, signed 31 Aug 1964, authorized funds for resettlement and rehabilitation of Seneca Indians who would be dislocated when part of their reservation was inundated by a new dam necessitated by a flood control project.

Public Works. PL 88-560, signed 2 Sept 1964, appropriated over \$1.1 billion to fund urban renewal and public housing programs.

Conservation. PL 88-577 (the "Wilderness Act"), signed 3 Sept 1964, provided for preservation of substantial land areas of the nation in wild, unspoiled condition.

Conservation. PL 88-578, signed 3 Sept 1964, set up a major new program in the field of parks and recreation, providing about \$200 million annually for land and water conservation measures.

Public Health. PL 88-581, signed 4 Sept 1964, authorized \$283 million for four and five-year programs of nursing school construction and expanded nurse training.

Social Therapy. PL 88-582, signed 7 Sept 1964, provided some \$25 million to improve economic and social conditions for migratory and seasonally employed farm workers.

Foreign Aid. PL 88-263, signed 7 Oct 1964, provided for \$3.25 billion in foreign aid, closer to what the President recommended than any previous annual appropriation in the U.S. Foreign Aid Program's 19 years of existence.

Public Health, PL 88-654, signed 13 Oct 1964, provided for federal loans to students of optometry.

Social Therapy. PL 89-4, signed 3 Mar 1965, provided for federal economic development programs needed in the Appalachian region.

Education. PL 89-10, signed 11 Apr 1965, appropriated \$100 million to strengthen and improve educational quality and educational opportunities in U.S. elementary and secondary schools.

Social Therapy. PL 89-15, signed 26 Apr 1965, provided \$46 million in federal funds for retraining of professional employees displaced by changing employment patterns.

Social Therapy. PL 89-36, signed 8 June 1965, provided federal funds to establish a National Technical Institute for the Deaf, in order to train the deaf for successful employment.



Public Works. PL 89-42, signed 17 June 1965, appropriated \$908 million for flood control, navigation aids and conservation measures in 11 major river basins.

Tax Reduction. PL 89-44, signed 21 June 1965, removed federal excise taxes which had been imposed in wartime on the sale of most merchandise and services in the U.S.

Small Business. PL 89-59, signed 30 June 1965, appropriated some \$1.7 billion for federal assistance to "Small Business," and amended the original law to provide for assistance to disaster victims.

Conservation. PL 89-72, signed 9 July 1965, provided federal funds to insure that river basin hydroelectric and flood control programs would also provide, insofar as possible, for the interests of fish and wildlife, and water resources.

Care of Elderly. PL 89-73, signed 14 July 1965, appropriated some \$5 million to \$8 million annually for programs to help elderly persons with respect to employment, housing, etc.

Public Health. PL 89-74, signed 15 July 1965, enacted special controls for new classes of depressant and stimulant drugs and counterfeit drugs.

Conservation. PL 89-80, signed 22 July 1965, appropriated \$13 million for natural resources development through establishment of a water resources council and river basin commissions.

Public Health. PL 89-97, ("Medicare"), signed 30 July 1965, provided a comprehensive hospital insurance program for the aged (under the Social Security Act) with a supplementary health benefits program, an expanded program of medical assistance, and increased benefits under the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance systems.

Public Health. PL 89-105, signed 4 Aug 1965, appropriated some \$30 million annually to provide professional and technical personnel for comprehensive community mental health centers.

Civil Rights. PL 89-110 ("Voting Rights Act of 1965"), signed 6 Aug 1965, set up further enforcement safeguards of the voting rights accorded to U.S. citizens of all races and colors under the fifteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Public Works. PL 89-117 ("Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965"), signed 10 Aug 1965, provided for federal assistance to enable private housing to be available for lower income families who are elderly, handicapped, displaced, victims of natural disaster, or occupants of substandard housing.

Public Works. PL 89-118, signed 11 Aug 1965, appropriated up to \$185 million annually to expand and accelerate the saline water conversion program.

Public Works. PL 89-139, signed 28 Aug 1965, appropriated a supplemental \$3 billion for highway safety and interstate highway development for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1967.

Public Works. PL 89-174, signed 9 Sept 1965, created a new Executive agency known as the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Cultural Expansion. PL 89-209, signed 29 Sept 1965, appropriated \$60 million to create a National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities for federally supported national companies of the performing arts -- e.g., ballet, opera, theater --, for a film institute, for grants to artists in residence, for schools and colleges, etc.

Fact Sheet

11 October 1965

The Flight of Capital  
from Latin America

The World Bank, in its annual report published on September 25, 1965, warns that the growth of developing nations is threatened on two fronts. The flow of capital to poor countries, both private investment and government aid, has leveled off and shows no sign of increasing soon. At the same time, the prices of raw materials, on which the poorer nations depend for foreign earnings, are eroding. This results in a decrease in purchases by the poorer nations of machines and other finished goods which are necessary to hasten their further development. In its report the Bank urges the richer nations to enlarge their aid or to face an even slower rise in the standards of the poor.

Faced with this situation, it behooves the Latin American nations to draw the maximum possible benefit from whatever investment capital is available to them. It is therefore particularly distressing to note that Latin Americans often prefer to invest their own capital abroad. That is, while foreign investors, private and governmental, are being urged to supply more investment capital to Latin America, many Latin American money-holders are sending their own money abroad for investment -- principally in the richer nations of North America and Europe. This transfer of money abroad is commonly called the "flight of capital," a term which has been given various definitions, but is used herein to refer to capital which is owned or otherwise controlled by Latin American individuals or companies and which is invested outside their country.

Private assets may be transferred abroad overtly or covertly. Overt transfers, in the form of bank deposits and purchases of shares in foreign concerns, can be traced in some instances (particularly in the United States where the statistics of such foreign holdings are regularly published), and this permits some calculation of the sums involved. However, an important share is transferred abroad covertly and this amount is obviously not calculable. Such capital may be transferred ostensibly as commercial transfers to agents abroad, or by the techniques of over-invoicing of imports and under-invoicing of exports. Additionally, American dollars or other foreign currency may be purchased domestically and held within the country as a hedge against inflation.

Reliable statistics on the total value of Latin American assets abroad, which include the normal export of capital as well as flight capital, are woefully lacking. Estimates vary from \$3 to 15 billion.

(Cont.)

One report in The Economist, London, in 1962 stated that "wealthy Latin Americans are believed to have some \$10 billion safely lodged in Swiss banks and elsewhere." Since the total foreign holdings in Swiss banks in 1962 were estimated at about \$7.5 billion, this is obviously exaggerated. According to more conservative estimates based on the limited data available, the value of Latin American long and short-term assets in the US at the end of 1963 approximated \$2.8 billion. With this guidepost, it may be presumed that the total value of Latin American assets abroad is perhaps on the order of \$4 billion ... a substantial sum. (This figure is supported by a study prepared for the U.S. Department of Commerce by its Committee for the Alliance for Progress, dated January 4, 1963 and also by research done by the Danish economist Poul Høst-Madsen of the International Monetary Fund, published in the IMF's bulletin Finance and Development, March 1965.)

The reasons for the flight of capital are not difficult to find. Normally it takes place: (a) under conditions of economic instability, such as excessive inflation and currency devaluation, reflecting the desire of business and private citizens alike to preserve their property intact through the purchase of foreign assets; (b) under conditions of political and social instability, frequently aggravated by acts of terrorism or sabotage; (c) under the threat of expropriation; (d) as a result of a general loss of business confidence in the government (as in Mexico in 1961 or Columbia in 1963); or (e) when the profit to be made abroad substantially exceeds that which is locally realizable. In many Latin American countries only income arising from sources within the country is taxable; therefore these nations themselves put a premium on investing abroad.

The existence of conditions of political and economic instability does not, of course, automatically induce massive capital flight. Despite continuing acts of violence in Venezuela, capital flight is not now believed to be a serious problem there. Or again, in the case of Brazil, where turbulent inflationary conditions have existed since 1959, general confidence in the resiliency and potentialities of the nation have helped to deter any sizable flight.

The relationship of capital flight to foreign aid programs is a complicated problem. On the surface the former appears directly to nullify the latter. However it is questionable that the two can be put in rigid opposition. It can be argued that much of the foreign aid represents developmental outlays for projects which are pre-requisites for accelerated economic activity, but which do not attract (for reasons of low profitability, or because of the immense sums involved) capital from private sources. Additionally, some of the flight money probably would not have been available for any developmental purposes even had it remained in Latin America.

However, the important point is that in the long term both foreign aid programs and private capital investments by foreigners tend directly to counter those conditions which lead to the flight of capital. The effort of foreign aid programs to strengthen Latin economies tends to lend both political and economic stability, which in turn helps to eliminate the causes for capital flight. Private foreign investments attract and combine with local capital to build new or expand existing factories. And the confidence evidenced by foreign investment in a country creates the local confidence necessary to persuade persons to invest locally. It might also be pointed out that the strength of foreign investors is also frequently a counter to demands for expropriation, which again reduces one of the principal motivations for capital flight.

The converse is also true: when domestic capital is invested locally, the confidence of the Latin investors in their own country's future will attract foreign investors and support.

The conclusions which may be drawn from these considerations are that: (a) the flight of capital from Latin America is substantial; (b) the causes for it relate directly to local stability and respect for private enterprise; (c) foreign aid programs and private foreign investments, to the degree to which they promote stability and confidence in private enterprise, stem capital flight; (d) it is essential for each individual nation to establish stable conditions which will encourage local capital to be invested locally and, concurrently, will encourage the influx of foreign investment capital.

11 October 1965

THE FIRST DEKHRUSHCHEVIZED VERSION  
OF CPSU HISTORY

With publication of the "second, corrected and amplified edition" of the official reference work "CPSU" ("KPSS - Spravochnik," Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literaturi, Moscow 1965, passed for printing 10.6.65) the first complete dekhrushchevized version of Soviet party history has been issued by the new Kremlin leadership. It is a significant event because it provides, implicitly, the most comprehensive criticism of the Khrushchev era yet to have been published.

Molotov & Co. Partially Rehabilitated

One of the most significant aspects of the revised textbook is the partial rehabilitation of the one-time "anti-party group" of Molotov, Malenkov et al., which was defeated by Khrushchev in June, 1957. This section (pp. 302-303, 1st ed.) has been completely rewritten and drastically curtailed to a nine-line paragraph as follows:

"While the CPSU developed work to implement the decisions of the 20th Congress, the group of Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, et al., came out against the partyline. The question about this group was discussed at the June plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1957. The plenum adopted the decree 'On the anti-party group,' dismissed Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov from membership of the Central Committee and its Presidium. Severe measures of party coercion were adopted also against other members of this group." (p. 305, 2nd ed.)

The most important change here is that the one-time "anti-party group" has been cleared of the charge of being "anti-party." It is twice referred to simply as a "group," while the original epithet occurs only once, with reference to the title of the decree then adopted by the Central Committee, and is carefully set off in quotation marks. In the first edition the group had been repeatedly described as "anti-party" (without quotation marks). Moreover, all its members had been identified by name, including Bulganin, Pervukhin, Saburov, Shepilov, and Vorshilov. The new version has dropped all the more blatant charges previously made against the members of this group, in particular that they had opposed the struggle against the personality cult and abuses of power, as well as the efforts to find those guilty for the repression against honest communists. The charge that Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich were accessories in these (Stalinist) abuses is likewise omitted, as is the reference that this decision of the Central Committee was "unanimously approved by the party and the entire Soviet people."

In the chapter on the 1937-1938 purges Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov have been cleared of responsibility for the repressions and are no longer accused of having formed "the closest entourage of Stalin" (see 1st ed. p. 244; 2nd ed. p. 255).

In the new version of the 21st Congress any reference to the fact that the

"Congress delegates unanimously approved the decisions of the June plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1957, which unmasked and ideologically defeated the anti-party group of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich et al." (pp. 308-309, 1st ed.)

has likewise been dropped. (1)

#### Disunity under Khrushchev?

Should these omissions be taken to mean that there was no "unanimity" about this question in either the Central Committee or the party Congress? It is, in fact, noteworthy that the new edition repeatedly conveys the impression that there was lack of unanimity on various policies. Thus, for instance, whereas the first edition claimed that the 20th Congress "fully approved the theses of N.S. Khrushchev's report 'On the Personality Cult and its Consequences'" (p. 290; emphasis supplied), the second edition merely notes that the 20th Congress "adopted

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(1) An adverse reference to mistakes made by Molotov in directing the party organ Pravda in the pre-World War I period has likewise been dropped from the 2nd edition (p. 81; first ed. p. 78). Moreover, on p. 90 of the new edition Molotov is mentioned as a member of the "leading troika" of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee in 1916 (omitted on p. 86 of the first edition). In the new edition Malenkov, as well as Saburov (another member of the "anti-party group"), are now listed among key-note speakers at the 19th CPSU Congress (p. 292, 2nd ed.), a fact the first edition had tried to erase from the record. Nevertheless, the version about Molotov's and Kaganovich's co-responsibility (with Stalin) for "excesses" in the collectivization drive of the early thirties is upheld by both editions (1st ed. p. 217; 2nd ed. p. 229). According to unconfirmed reports Malenkov returned to Moscow some time after Khrushchev's fall. However, on July 19, 1965, Malenkov was criticized by Pravda for dismissing the possibility of the USSR becoming involved in World War II. Victor Zorza viewed this as indication that Malenkov's present position had become a political issue in the Soviet Union (The Guardian, July 20).

the decree 'On the personality Cult and its Consequences'" (p. 295). In the new edition the earlier claim that the 21st CPSU Congress "fully approved the activity of the party's Central Committee and the great measures it carried through after the 20th Congress in the field of domestic and foreign policy ... (and) demonstrated the monolithic unity... of the party...." has been scaled down by omission of the words underscored by us (see 1st ed. p. 308, 2nd ed. p. 311).

This should not be taken to mean that the very concept of "monolithic unity" is now regarded as outmoded, as some Italian CP leaders have suggested: it is merely with respect to the Khrushchev era that this notion now appears to be taboo. For in a subsequent passage in the new edition we read:

"The monolithic unity of the party, its unflinching fidelity to Lenin's precepts was demonstrated by the October plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1964." (p. 322, emphasis in text)

The regularity with which the "monolithic unity" supposed to have existed under any Soviet leadership is subsequently debunked by its successors would seem to cast some doubt on the claim that "monolithic unity" was at last established after Khrushchev's overthrow.

#### Marshal Zhukov Exempted from Criticism

The harsh criticism of Marshal Zhukov in the first edition has now been retracted, as may be seen from the description of the October plenum of the Central Committee in 1957. In the 1963 edition it said:

"The October plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1957 condemned the gross violations of Leninist principles of leadership by the Armed Forces, dismissed Zhukov from the leading organs of the party, and adopted measures for strengthening party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy." (p. 303; emphasis in text)

The rewritten passage on the same event is now entirely non-polemical.

"The October plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1957 discussed the question of improving party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy. In the plenum decree it was pointed out that 'in the practice of party-political work there are still serious shortcomings, and sometimes it is directly underestimated.' The plenum adopted measures to strengthen party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy." (2nd edition, p. 305; emphasis in text)

While Stalin is still held responsible for disregarding signals about the imminence of war in 1941 and for failing to make corresponding military preparations, it is no longer claimed, as in the first edition, that



"Responsibility for this is also born by the then People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov." (p. 258, first ed.; dropped from second ed. on p. 268)

The claim made in this context that Khrushchev unsuccessfully tried to call Stalin's attention to the lack of defense preparations has likewise been erased in the new edition (see p. 258, 1st ed.; p. 268, 2nd ed.).

#### Hesitating Reappraisal of Stalin

Still on the subject of World War II, the new edition of the history textbook has omitted the following passage:

"The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Fatherland War was achieved by the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party headed by the Central Committee. This disproves the legend created in the period of the personality cult that Stalin was almost the only maker of all the most important victories on the front and at home. The history of the Great Fatherland War shows that Stalin committed gross mistakes and miscalculations in the period preceding the war, and during the war itself, correction of which often cost great efforts and victims." (p. 271, 1st ed.; omitted from 2nd. on p. 281).

The cancellation of this passage seems to make room for a somewhat more positive evaluation of Stalin's role during the war, which may be partly prompted by the fact that it should be difficult to convince even a moderately intelligent reader that the victory was due to "leadership of the ... Central Committee" when he is told at the same time that the Central Committee was convened only once during the entire war period, viz. in January 1944 (ibid., p. 271).

In an amendment to the earlier text, the new edition explains why Stalin was allowed to remain Secretary-General of the party in spite of Lenin's adverse appraisal of his personality in the letter he wrote to the 13th party Congress. Allegedly, this was because of "I.V. Stalin's energetic struggle against Trotskyism which represented the basic danger to the party at that time" (1st ed. p. 196; 2nd ed. p. 207). Incidentally, Lenin's letter, which was previously said to be "known under the designation of testament" (1st ed. pp. 195-6) has now been deprived of this designation. This was presumably done in order not to provide any historical precedent to justify the designation of Togliatti's Yalta memorandum as his "testament."

Kirov Murder in New Perspective?

Whereas the first edition had pointed out that

"Stalin used the murder of S.M. Kirov for reprisals against many people he disliked." (1st ed. p. 231; 2nd ed. p. 244)

this passage has now been eliminated, although the significance of this move is not quite clear. Does it presage a reappraisal of the causes and consequences of the Kirov murder? Or is it merely part of an effort to make Stalin appear less bloodthirsty?

Memory of Purge Victims Obliterated

The latter explanation might appear more plausible because a few pages later the new edition omits the only passage which listed the most prominent victims of Stalin's terror, directly linking their death to the late Soviet dictator:

"Prominent leaders fell victims to the arbitrariness of Stalin and his closest entourage, such as N.V. Krylenko, P.P. Postyshev, S.V. Košior, Ya. E. Rudzutak, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, V. Ya. Chubar, A.S. Yenukidze, R.I. Eykhe, A.S. Kiselev, M.S. Kedrov, V.I. Nevsky, the military leaders V.K. Blyukher, A.I. Yegorov, A.I. Kork, I.E. Yakir, M.N. Tukhachevsky, I.P. Uborevich, R.P. Eydeman and many, many other true Leninists." (1st ed. p. 244; 2nd ed. p. 255)

In the same context, the new edition fails to make the following statement, which had been restated so often under Khrushchev as to be virtually canonized:

"However, Stalin's personality cult, although it hindered the development of Soviet society, could not halt its further advance toward communism. The party carried on a selfless struggle for the interests of the people, for building socialism in the USSR." (1st ed. p. 244; 2nd ed. p. 255)

The omission of this thesis may well be a precautionary measure, for if Stalin's personality cult could not halt the advance of Soviet society toward communism, then obviously Khrushchev's personality cult could not do so either. But the new leaders may soon be in need of a scapegoat to explain why they are unable to stick to the original timetable for the advent of communism in the USSR set by the new Party Program adopted in 1961. What would be more tempting than to blame Khrushchev for having to advance the advent of communism once again? But more about this later.

In discussing the 17th party Congress held in early 1934, the new edition makes one omission which at first glance seems to reflect unfavorably on Stalin:

"The party came to the 17th congress united and monolithic. There were no oppositional groups in the party. The former leaders of the oppositional groups Zinovyev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsy made penitential speeches, recognizing the party's successes." (1st ed. p. 230; 2nd ed. p. 244)

Actually, neither edition discusses in any way the subsequent Stalinist show trials of these leaders, so that any unbiased reader is bound to ask himself why they had to be tried and executed once they had given up their opposition and made "penitential speeches." Rather than to discuss the Stalinist show trials, those responsible for the new edition appear to have preferred to keep mum about the capitulation of the old Bolshevik opposition to Stalin. At the same time it should be noted that since publication of the first edition the notion itself that there was "monolithic unity" at the 17th party congress was debunked by the old Bolshevik Lev Shaumyan who pointed out in an authoritative article published by Pravda (7.2.64) that there were "old Leninist cadres" at the Congress who, remembering "Lenin's Testament," were thinking of how to replace Stalin as Secretary General of the party. Shaumyan, presumably, did not have in mind Zinovyev, Kamenev, et al., but such "stout Leninists" as Khrushchev, Shvernik, Mikoyan, etc.

#### Trotsky - A Lesser Villain?

While virtually no change can be detected in the attitude of the present editors of the CPSU history textbook toward Zinovyev, Kamenev, or Bukharin, a slightly less irreconcilable attitude appears to have been adopted by them toward Trotsky. To keep this statement in perspective, it must be remembered that Trotsky was the chief villain of the 1963 edition and still fills this role in the present edition. Nevertheless, it must be regarded as noteworthy that the new edition omits the following statement about Trotsky's attitude when admitted into the party at the 6th party congress in the summer of 1917:

"... however Trotsky dropped his struggle against the Bolsheviks only temporarily, in order to try afterwards to foist his anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist policy upon the party." (1st ed., p. 124)

Instead, referring to the leaders admitted into the party at the 6th congress, the new edition says, non-polemically, that

"They declared their full acceptance of the policy and tactics of Bolshevism. Among those admitted were M.M. Volodarsky, A.V. Lunacharsky, D.Z. Manuilsky, L.D. Trotsky, M.S. Uritsky." (2nd ed., p. 132, emphasis supplied)

What exactly prompted this omission is not clear, but even if it should have been only the reference to Trotsky's "anti-Marxist" policy, this would be welcome in the interest of a more objective Soviet party historiography.

While the earlier edition had referred to Lenin's sharp struggle "with Trotsky and the 'left communists'" at the Central Committee session of February 18, 1918 (about signing the peace treaty with Germany), the new edition reverses the order of importance, making it read "with the 'left communists' and Trotsky" (1st ed. p. 145; 2nd ed. p. 155).

#### Tukhachevsky Downgraded

Tukhachevsky is the only one of 15 "civil war heroes and military leaders (polkovodtsy)" to be dropped from the record in the second edition (p. 167). In the first edition these military leaders were said to have come "from the ranks of the Communist Party, from the people" (p. 157). Since Tukhachevsky was of noble descent, this claim was false in the first place. But to drop him, on that account, from the record as a civil war hero and military leader and include him instead into a list of "military specialists," as done in the second edition (p. 168) seems to be no less of an injustice to one of the most popular Soviet military leaders. "Military specialist" is the designation given to those who previously served as officers in the Tsarist army.

#### Zhdanovism Undefined

In 1946-1948 the Central Committee adopted a number of decisions "directed against deviations from Marxism-Leninism in science, literature, and art." This reference to the notorious Zhdanovite decrees of the early postwar period in the first edition (p. 283) had been dropped in favor of the noncommittal statement that these decisions "defined the tasks in the field of ideological work." Whereas the first edition had noted some negative aspects of these decrees, as well as their positive effects, the latter are no longer mentioned in the new edition, which thus adopts an entirely negative approach to this episode in Soviet cultural history. The sentence omitted read:

"The Central Committee decrees on questions of literature and art played an important role in the development of Soviet culture."  
(1st ed., p. 283)

The same approach has been adopted with regard to the 1947-1951 discussions on philosophy, biology, physiology, linguistics, and political economy. These discussions (of which only the first one, on philosophy, was held under Zhdanov's direction) were earlier said to have "helped to overcome a number of ideological distortions and strengthened the principle of party-mindedness in science" (1st ed., p. 284). Since this positive

statement has been dropped from the second edition (p. 291), while the negative appraisal of their consequences remains unchanged, the attitude toward these scholastic discussions of the early post-war period appears to have undergone a wholesome change. Partly this might be explained by the fact that the second edition was not edited under the supervision of B.N. Ponomarev, one of the closest collaborators of M.A. Suslov, who must have known that Suslov was more intimately associated with Zhdanov's ideological campaigns than anyone else in the present Soviet leadership.

#### Khrushchev's Blunders in Agriculture

A detailed criticism of Khrushchev's agricultural policies emerges from the omissions and changes that have been operated in the chapters on the agricultural plenums of the Central Committee held since 1953. The chapter on the September plenum of 1953, when Khrushchev took over direction of Soviet agriculture, has been adapted to fit the new edition by making a few significant omissions. Khrushchev's name has been suppressed, of course, as has been the claim that the analysis of the state of Soviet agriculture given at the plenum was "profoundly Marxist." The previous gross mistakes in agriculture are mentioned, but they are not attributed to the "period of Stalin's personality cult," in line with similar efforts elsewhere in the new edition to deny Khrushchev any credit for the destalinization. The achievements of this plenum have been considerably scaled down by omitting (1) the claim that its results "guaranteed the steep upswing of agriculture"; (2) the assertion that the "principle of material incentives was restored"; (3) the statement that "monthly and quarterly advance payments to kolkhoz farmers were introduced"; and (4) the final conclusion that "the September plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was the turning point in the development of Soviet agriculture" (1st ed., pp. 294-295).

Overall approval of Khrushchev's Virgin Lands' program by the new leaders is reflected in the new edition's treatment of the February-March plenum of 1954. Nevertheless, there are some substantial changes: (1) omission of the statement that it was intended to "increase within the next few years state procurements and deliveries of grain by 35-40 per cent as compared with 1953"; (2) The claim that 36 million hectares of new land were "opened up" (osvoyeno) within three years has been reduced to the statement that they were "plowed up" (podnyato), which appears to acknowledge the fact that a substantial portion of these new lands subsequently reverted to their former state or became wasteland as a result of soil erosion; (3) omission of the conclusive statement that "The Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party had accomplished a great feat." (1st ed. pp. 295-296; 2nd ed. p. 299).

The most significant omission (and implicit admission), however, relates to the "profitability" claim made in Khrushchev's time and, incidentally, often doubted by western experts:

"The opened up virgin and waste-lands not only covered expenditure, but brought a net profit amounting to 18 billion rubles. In 1958 the gross production of grain amounted to 8.6 billion poods - 71 per cent over 1953." (1st ed. p. 298, 2nd ed. p. 301)

Omission of the latter sentence would seem to leave the door open for a future downward revision of Khrushchev's grain statistics.

In the chapter of the January plenum 1955, the reference to the stepped up corn-growing program has been dropped. Likewise there is no mention any more of the then adopted principle of assessing live-stock farming results on the "basis of 100 hectares of farmland." Whereas the decision adopted at the time provided, inter alia, for the "creation of reserves" by the state, as noted in the first edition (p. 296), there is no mention of this particular aspect in the second edition (p. 300). This would seem to confirm reports from Peking and calculations by western specialists to the effect that the Soviet strategic grain reserve set up under Stalin was depleted during the Khrushchev period. While reproducing faithfully most of the earlier text on the new planning order of agricultural production adopted at this plenum, the present edition adds: "But in reality this order was frequently violated" (p. 300).

The chapter on the February plenum 1958 has been drastically curtailed in such a way as to leave little doubt that the liquidation of the MTS and sale of their equipment to the farms which was decreed on that occasion is now considered to have been premature or, at any rate, over-hasty in its execution. The only sentence describing this reform carried over into the new edition says that it was considered "expedient gradually to reorganize the MTS which have fulfilled their basic functions" (p. 300). Not underwritten by the post-Khrushchevian editors, however, was the statement that "the machine and tractor stations had completed their historical role in creating and consolidating the kolkhoz order," as well as most of the other enthusiastic claims made in the earlier edition (p. 297).

By contrast, the short account on the June plenum 1958 which revamped the previous pricing and payments structure in agriculture to the advantage of the kolkhoz farmer has been left unchanged in both editions (except for the dropping of Khrushchev's name).

The chapter on the December plenum 1958 which had previously described the successes achieved in agriculture under Khrushchev's leadership has been considerably curtailed and rewritten to include references to shortcomings. There is no mention any more of the (unfulfilled) agricultural targets of the Seven-Year Plan (1st ed. pp. 298-299; 2nd ed. pp. 301-302).

The chapters dealing with the subsequent Central Committee plenums on agriculture held during Khrushchev's leadership have been dropped in toto in the second edition. Summarily referring to these plenums, the new edition says that "In spite of some necessary measures, justified in practice, which were carried out by the party after the 21st CPSU Congress ... agriculture does not satisfy the country's requirements" (2nd ed. p. 318). Dressing a long list of shortcomings in agriculture during this period, the new edition notes inter alia, the violation of economic laws, of material incentives, the "subjectivism of the leadership," the "great harm" of frequent reorganizations, the failure to raise farming technique, "cliché recommendations" etc., etc.

#### Khrushchev's 1957 Economic Reforms Discredited

Summarizing the party's economic achievements during 1953-1958, the new edition significantly fails to mention the fact that the CPSU "improved the organizational forms of production and management of the national economy" (1st ed. p. 290; 2nd ed. p. 296), while the reference to the party's line of priority development of heavy industry during this period has not been found objectionable. The extent to which this omission implies dissociation from Khrushchev's 1957 sovnarkhoz reform is evident from the new text on the February plenum of the Central Committee in 1957 which provides the barest factual information on the reform in three short sentences. The original (1963) text had noted, inter alia, that the "system of leadership of the economy through specialized central ministries had outlived itself," that the then existing 200,000 enterprises could not be directed from one center, that the reform reflected the principle of democratic centralism, "combining centralized state leadership with increased rights of republican and local ... organs," that the reform gave "an enormous political and economic effect," etc. (1st ed. pp. 291-292; 2nd ed. p. 297).

#### Khrushchev's Unrealistic Party Program for Building Communism in the USSR

While officially no criticism has yet been voiced about the new Party Program adopted on Khrushchev's behest at the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961, there is much implicit criticism in the way the editors have found it necessary to reformulate the corresponding chapter in the new edition of the CPSU history textbook. The 22nd CPSU Congress, to begin with, is no longer described as the "congress of builders of communism" (1st ed. p. 310; 2nd ed. p. 313).

Whereas in its earlier interpretation the new Party Program had demonstrated the inevitability of the "destruction" (gibel) of capitalism, this has now been changed to read "the inevitability of the transition from capitalism to socialism" (1st ed. p. 311; 2nd ed. p. 314).

Most portentous for the future, however, are the following omissions which clearly show that the goals set by the Program cannot be fulfilled within the time limits originally set in 1961 (passages underscored have been dropped);

"The Program contains a definition of the communist society and a concrete, scientifically based plan for its building in the USSR calculated for 20 years, which foresees the solution of three inter-dependent tasks: the creation of the material-technical basis of communism, the development of communist social relations, the education of the man of the communist society. As a result of the execution of the 20-year plan the communist society will basically be built in the USSR.

"The Program plans to increase the volume of industrial production approximately 2.5 times within 10 years and surpass the level of US industrial production, to increase the volume of industrial production by not less than six times within 20 years and leave the present volume of US industrial production far behind; to increase the volume of agricultural production approximately by 2.5 times within 10 years, and by 3.5 times within 20 years; to increase labor productivity in industry more than twice within the first decade, and by not less than 2.5 times in agriculture." (1st ed. p. 312; 2nd ed. p. 314).

Omission of these passages shows that some of the key goals set by the Party Program are now regarded as unrealistic and will have to be revised. Especially noteworthy is the implicit admission that the communist society cannot be built even "basically" within twenty years, as provided by the Party Program. This means, in fact, that the grand finale of the Program which says that "THE PARTY SOLEMNLY PROCLAIMS: THE PRESENT GENERATION OF SOVIET PEOPLE SHALL LIVE IN COMMUNISM!" is to be considered null and void (emphasis in Program text).

The first hints that the Party Program for building communism in the USSR cannot be fulfilled were dropped in this year's edition of the May Day Slogans which suggested to us at the time that "the entire pace of communist construction set by the 22nd CPSU Congress is to be slowed down." In retrospect it would seem that this was a key controversial issue which caused the unprecedented delay in publication of the slogans. The issue was subsequently brought most forcefully to public attention by Stepanov's Pravda article of May 17, who championed the "priority of politics over economics" or, more concretely, the building of communism vs. economic reforms. These, in fact, are at the very best compatible with a socialist society, but not with a communist one. Hence the necessity to postpone execution of the Party Program in this respect. Publication of this volume which was passed for printing on June 10, suggests that by that time the die had been cast in favor of Kosygin's economic reform faction.

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This implicit criticism of some aspects of the 1961 Party Program suggests the need for certain amendments to it which may be adopted by the forthcoming 23rd CPSU Congress.

More circumstantial evidence on the slowing down of the advance toward communism is provided by the elimination of two chapters in the second edition, viz. on "The All-People's Movement for Communist Labor" (1st ed. pp. 328-330) and the "Successes of Communist Construction" (1st ed. pp. 330-331).

The title of the text-book's last section has been changed from "The Party is the Inspirer and Organizer of Large-Scale Construction of the Communist Society" (in the first edition) to "The Party is the Inspirer and Organizer of Communist Construction" (in the second edition).

#### All-People's Discussion of Party Policies Undesirable?

The consistency with which references to "mass participation" in the elaboration of party policies under Khrushchev have been eliminated is quite noteworthy. Thus, with reference to the measures worked out by the Central Committee in the 1957 economic reform, the second edition fails to mention that they were "approved by the whole people" (1st ed., p. 292; 2nd ed. p. 297). With reference to the February plenum of 1958 (liquidation of the MTS) the new edition omits the sentence: "The proposals of the February plenum of the CPSU Central Committee were discussed by the entire people" (1st ed. p. 297; 2nd ed. p. 300). In a passage discussing party policies in the 1953-1958 period the following statement is conspicuous by its absence: "The CPSU Central Committee took the initiative for holding all-people's discussions of basic questions of socialist construction" (1st ed. p. 302; 2nd ed. p. 305). The new editors of the textbook also appear to lack understanding for the fact that "In the work of the (December 1958) plenum (on agriculture) participated foremost workers, innovators of agricultural production, scientists, leaders of kolkhozes, sovkhoses, RTS," (1st ed. p. 298; dropped from 2nd ed. on p. 301). The paragraph on the "all-party and all-people's discussion" of the theses of Khrushchev's report to the 21st CPSU Congress has likewise been cut out. By contrast, a similar paragraph giving details about the "all-party and all-people's discussion" of the draft Program and draft Party Rules before the 22nd Congress has been taken over without change in the new edition (1st ed. p. 311; 2nd ed., p. 313). This differentiated approach would seem to suggest that "all-people's" or "all-party" discussions will henceforth be considered justified only in quite exceptional circumstances, in connection with the adoption of very important new documents (the new Soviet Constitution, etc.). The Khrushchevian practice of turning Central Committee sessions into mass meetings also appears to be rejected now.

Fiction of "Voluntary Resignation" of Khrushchev Dropped

Apparently for the first time the fiction about Khrushchev's request to be relieved from his functions because of ill health has now been officially dropped. The new edition of the manual says:

"The (October 1964) plenum adopted the decision to relieve N.S. Khrushchev from his duties as First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers." (2nd ed. p. 322)

According to the official communiqué released after last year's October plenum,

"The CPSU Central Committee plenum granted comrade N.S. Khrushchev's request to be relieved from his duties as First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, member of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium, and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers in connection with his advanced age and deterioration of his health." (Pravda, 16.10.64; emphasis supplied)

Lest the absence of the title "comrade" give rise to any unwarranted speculation about Khrushchev's party membership, it should be noted that the use of "comrade" is not customary in Soviet history textbooks.

The new edition, incidentally, again fails to mention that Khrushchev was relieved also from his position as Chairman of the RSFSR Bureau of the Central Committee and, while mentioning the RSFSR Bureau, has merely dropped a sentence referring to Khrushchev's nomination as Chairman of this Bureau (1st ed. p. 300; 2nd ed. p. 303).

South Vietnam Annexed to Socialist Camp?

Perhaps the most striking revelation of the new edition is that the socialist camp has made new territorial acquisitions to the tune of 100,000 square kilometers since 1961. Both editions refer to the socialist camp as being made up of 14 countries (i.e., including Yugoslavia and Cuba), but its total territory increased from 35.1 million square kilometers in 1961 to 35.2 million square kilometers in 1964. Its percentage of the world's total territory correspondingly rose from 25.9 per cent to 26 per cent. The socialist's camp total population increased from 1,072 million to 1,134 million during this same period. As a percentage of the world's total population, however, the socialist countries fell back from 35.5 per cent in 1961 to 35 per cent in 1964 (1st ed. p. 332; 2nd ed. p. 326). This means that the population of the free world is growing faster than that of the communist camp in spite of China's tremendous population surplus every year. The increase in the socialist camp's territory might be explained by the territorial conquests of the Vietcong in South Vietnam, which has a total territory of 171,700 square kilometers (LSE Year-Book 1964, p. 234).

Bloc Economic Cooperation Loosened

Revisions made in the chapter on the "Struggle for Consolidation of the Community of Socialist Countries" show that economic cooperation requirements between socialist countries have not only been loosened in practice, but also in theory. The following statement, set off in italics in the first edition, is conspicuous by its absence in the second edition:

"All forms of cooperation - political economic and cultural - between the socialist countries are being strengthened and extended." (1st ed. p. 333; 2nd ed. p. 327).

Instead of "all-round economic cooperation" between the socialist countries, the textbook now demands simply "economic cooperation" (1st ed. p. 334; 2nd ed. p. 327).

Even more significant is the alternation of the definition of the "highest form of economic cooperation." In the first edition it said:

"The highest form of economic cooperation that developed during the past few years is direct production cooperation, which concretely manifests itself in the coordination of national economic plans, in the specialization and cooperation of production." (p. 334, emphasis supplied)

These requirements have been considerably lowered in the definition given in the present edition:

"The highest form of economic cooperation is direct production cooperation, the agreement upon and mutual coordination of the most important indices of national economic plans." (p. 327; emphasis supplied)

A bad ideological blunder was committed in this connection by the editors of the present volume in that they unwittingly took over the old formula about the "more or less simultaneous transition to communism" of all socialist countries from the earlier edition. This reads:

"In the process of economic and scientific-technological cooperation of the countries of socialism, the coordination of their national economic plans, the specialization and co-operation of production, conditions are being created for pulling up the economically less developed countries to the level of the foremost, the perspective being opened up of their more or less simultaneous transition to communism within the limits of one historical epoch." (1st ed. p. 336; 2nd ed. p. 328; emphasis in text)

It appears to have escaped the attention of the editors that the "conditions" set by this formula for the simultaneous transition to communism have become obsolete to the extent that they had to be dropped, respectively

amended, in the new definition of the "highest form of economic co-operation" between socialist countries, as noted above.

The above summary of editorial changes made in the "corrected" edition of KPSS - Spravochnik could not be made exhaustive, although an effort has been made to list all the issues involved which appeared to be of more general interest. Many omissions and changes had thus to be left unmentioned, including all the omissions directly or indirectly related to Khrushchev's activities as "preceptor of literature" (pp. 301, 326-328, 1st ed.), the omission of the demand that "primary" attention be paid to the development of industry (in favor of agriculture?; p. 314, 1st ed.), the newly included reference to unspecified "guarantees against relapses into the personality cult" allegedly included in the new Party Program and Party Rules (p. 313, 2nd ed.), the omission of the 1957 claim that the housing shortage in the USSR would be "finished" within 10-12 years, i.e., by 1967-1969 (p. 300, 1st ed.; p. 302, 2nd ed.), the omission of the paragraph on the 1958 school reform (ibid.), omission of the criticism of the "grassland system" which was earlier supposed to have hampered grain production before the war (p. 251, 1st ed.; p. 261, 2nd ed.), omission of the thesis about revisionism being the "chief danger" in discussing the Moscow Conference of 81 parties (p. 337, 1st ed.; p. 329, 2nd ed.), an expanded list of prominent Soviet military leaders during World War II, to which have been added the names of K.A. Vershinin, S.G. Gorshkov, M.V. Zakharov, N.I. Krylov, N.G. Kuznetsov et al. (p. 281, 2nd ed.; p. 272, 1st ed.), a newly inserted paragraph on shortages in economic planning and defense production before the war (p. 259, 2nd ed.; p. 249, 1st ed.), a new periodization of Soviet postwar history covering 1945-1958 which blots out 1953 (Stalin's death) as a decisive milestone in Soviet history (pp. 275 and 287, 1st ed.; p. 284, 2nd ed.) as well as many others.

In spite of such far-reaching changes in the new leaders' view of Soviet party history, it would seem prudent to assume that it will gradually become even more articulate and evolve new and original concepts rather than limit itself basically to a sort of censorship of Khrushchevian historiography.

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Fact Sheets

11 October 1965

India, Pakistan and Kashmir

Although the dissension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has been a legal and diplomatic issue only since 1947, when the two countries became separate and independent, the emotional, religious, social, geographic and economic factors involved have their roots far back in the past. These historic problems and communal rivalries are to a great extent responsible for the seemingly irrational intransigence of both nations.

Lying across the western invansion route from Tibet and Sinkiang into the Indian subcontinent, the picturebook Vale of Kashmir is the heart of a rugged land. All of Kashmir is in dispute, but it is the Vale itself which holds strong emotional and traditional attraction for both Hindu India and Moslem Pakistan. Its suzerainty is the goal of both countries and to both a symbol of national stature without which either would lose face.

Underlining the Kashmir problem through the years is the friction between Hindus and Moslems in the entire subcontinent. It began about 1000 A.D. when the expanding Moslem empires of the Near East and Central Asia pressed heavily on the western border of Hindu India. The doctrine of Islam was spread to the west and to the east by Moslem warriors who ruthlessly 'converted' their captives through death and destruction. By 1200 A.D. a Moslem dynasty had been established at Delhi, and Moslem conquest extended to the states of Bihar and Bengal. Shortly after 1300 A.D., the Moslems penetrated into the Deccan plateau and for the next two hundred years northern India was ruled by a succession of alien Moslem dynasties whose influence was limited by constant conflict with Hindu rulers.

Kashmir proper has been Moslem since the 14th century, and was annexed to the Moghul Empire by Emperor Akbar in 1587. After about 1760 the Moghul Empire fell apart, and its remnants gradually came under control of the British, who ruled most of India from about 1800 to 1947.

Hindu control of Kashmir was not re-established until 1846 when the British turned the state over to the Hindu Maharaja of Jammu as part of their efforts to improve the security of British India along its north-western perimeter. Hindu rule was autocratic and otherwise unacceptable to the Moslems in Kashmir. Moslem resentment led to open agitation, in many cases associated with the efforts of Indian Moslems, in the years preceding World War II. When it became generally recognized that India would eventually achieve its independence, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and other Moslem leaders began to agitate for the creation of a new Moslem nation to be formed from the regions of India where Moslems predominated. It was only

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after an unbreakable deadlock over constitutional arrangements led to serious communal rioting in 1946 and 1947 that Jawaharlal Nehru and his colleagues reluctantly accepted partition of India along communal lines - and Jinnah became the "Father of Pakistan."

Far from solving the Hindu-Moslem problem, the partition of India exacerbated it. In late 1947, mass migrations of up to 10,000,000 people - Hindus leaving Pakistan and Moslems leaving India - were accompanied by massacres in which 1,000,000 or more died in nightmarish communal violence. The peoples of India and Pakistan have never forgiven each other for this mass slaughter; the violence of their sentiments has distorted every effort at mediation and negotiation over Kashmir during the last 18 years.

With the partition of India at the time of independence in August 1947, the status of Kashmir, like that of some 600 other princely states, remained to be settled. The rulers of these states had concluded treaties with the British Crown recognizing Britain as the paramount power. Under paramountcy, the rulers were theoretically sovereign allies of the British Crown, but followed vice-regal foreign policy, retaining all the trappings if not the reality of independence. When independence was announced, it was decreed that paramountcy would lapse on the day the British handed over power and that each princely state would become totally independent again. Only if the ruler agreed to "accede," would his state become part of the new country. At the time of independence all but three of the princely states had acceded either to India or Pakistan. The three which were left out were Hyderabad, Junagadh...and Kashmir.

The Hindu maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir continued to stall, however, in hopes of securing a greater degree of autonomy. By October 1947 a revolt broke out in the Poonch region among the Moslems who were joined by several thousand Pushtoon tribesmen from Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province. Slaughtering indiscriminately, the Pushtoons swept perilously close to Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir. The frantic maharaja belatedly appealed to New Delhi for troops to cope with the tribesmen and to suppress the local Moslem rebellion, with the understanding that he would then accede to India. Lord Mountbatten, at that time Viceroy of India, agreed with the Indian decision to send military aid to Kashmir, and suggested that if the maharaja did accede, the accession must, under the circumstances, be conditional on a plebiscite as soon as law and order were restored. None of the Indian ministers involved, including Nehru, dissented from that fateful decision.

India lays its claim to Kashmir on a technically strong legal foundation, namely, the Hindu maharaja's acceding to India.

Pakistan, on the other hand, points out that the basic concept of partition was that Pakistan was to comprise the contiguous Moslem-majority areas of British India. They insist that Kashmir is such an area and that

the Kashmiri people without question would then have preferred to join Pakistan and that they still do. The people of Kashmir, according to Pakistan, were prevented from doing so only by Hindu troops at the time of accession and by the subsequent refusal by India to conduct a plebiscite.

In 1948 and 1949, the UN Commission for India and Pakistan secured the agreement of both parties to a cease-fire, demilitarization, and a plebiscite in Kashmir. The demilitarization agreement was never fulfilled by either side, and in 1956 India announced that it therefore no longer held itself bound to conduct a plebiscite. With minor interruptions, however, both sides held to the cease-fire, until the present outbreak early in August 1965.

Since the cease-fire of 1949, Pakistan controls several mountain districts comprising about one third of the total area of Jammu and Kashmir. The districts to the north had tenuous ties with the old princely state and are administered as special political agencies. The districts lying along the western edge of the Vale make up what is known as Azad ("Free") Kashmir, supposedly a separate provisional government pending the settlement of the dispute, but actually under Pakistani control.

India's portion of Kashmir includes the famous Vale and the city of Srinagar, by far the most desirable part of Kashmir and the traditional center of power. Over the years the Indian government has integrated Kashmir more fully into the Indian union until there are no significant constitutional distinctions.

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Fact Sheet

11 October 1965

India-Pakistan Dispute  
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

4 September 1965 Resolution.

The Security Council, noting the report of the Secretary General dated 3 September 1965. Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan, concerning the deteriorating situation along the cease fire line in Kashmir.

1. Calls upon the Government of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all steps for an immediate cease fire;
2. Calls upon the two governments to respect the cease fire line and have all armed personnel of each party withdrawn to its side of the line;
3. Calls upon the two governments to cooperate fully with the United Nations Military Observer Group, India-Pakistan in its task of supervising the observance of the cease fire and,
4. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Council within three days on the implementation of this resolution.

6 September 1965 Resolution.

The Security Council, noting the report by the Secretary General on developments in the situation in Kashmir since the adoption of the Security Council cease-fire resolution on 4 September 1965 (S/Res/209) (1965) being document S:6661 dated 6 September 1965.

Noting with deep concern the extension of the fighting which adds immeasurably to the seriousness of the situation

- (1) Calls upon the parties to cease hostilities in the entire area of conflict immediately, and promptly withdraw all armed personnel back to the positions held by them after 5 August 1965.
- (2) Requests the Secretary General to exert every possible effort to give effect to this resolution and the resolution of 4 September 1965, to take all measures possible to strengthen the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan and to keep the Council promptly informed on the implementation of the resolution and on the situation in the area.
- (3) Decides to keep this issue under urgent and continuous review so that the Council may determine what further steps may be necessary to secure peace and security in the area.



20 September 1965 Resolution.

The Security Council, having considered the reports of the SYG on his consultations with the Government of India and Pakistan, commending the SYG for his unrelenting efforts in furtherance of the objectives of the SYG's resolutions of 4 and 6 September, having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan, noting the differing replies by the parties to an appeal for a cease fire as set out in the report of the SYG (S/6683), but noting further with concern that no cease fire has yet come into being, convinced that an early cessation of hostilities is essential as a first step towards a peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences between the two countries on Kashmir and other related matters,

1. Demands that a cease fire should take effect on Wednesday, 22 September 1965, at 0700 hours GMT and calls upon both Governments to issue orders for a cease fire at that moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965;

2. Requests the SYG to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel;

3. Calls on all states to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation in the area;

4. Decides to consider as soon as operative paragraph 1 of the Council's Res 210 of 6 September has been implemented. What steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict, and in the meantime calls on the two governments to utilize all peaceful means, including those listed in Article 33 of the charter, to this end;

5. Requests the SYG to exert every possible effort to give effect to this resolution, to seek a peaceful solution, and to report to the SC thereon.

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ANNEX A.

Shastri's message to the Secretary General

"As already communicated to you in my letter of 15th Sept. 1965, I am willing to order simple cease fire and cessation of hostilities on being informed of Pakistan's agreement to do likewise. To carry into effect such cease fire from 7 a.m. GMT on Wednesday, 22nd Sept, as provided in SC RES, it would be necessary for me to arrange for issue of necessary orders to field commanders by 12 noon GMT on 21st Sept. I would, therefore, request you kindly to inform me of Pakistan's agreement to cease fire before this hour."

Ayub's answer as read by Bhutto on September 22, 1965

"Pakistan considers Security Council Resolution 211 of 20 September as unsatisfactory. However, in the interest of international peace and in order to enable the Security Council to evolve a self-executing procedure which will lead to an honorable settlement of the root causes of the present conflict, namely the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, I have issued the following order to the Pakistan armed forces: You will stop fighting as of 3 a.m. on 23 September -- 2200 GMT 22 September, and from that time you will not fire on enemy forces unless fired on."