



25X1C10b

RECORD COPY







21 June 1965

Briefly Noted



25X1C10b







Significant Dates ▶

JULY

- 1 Communist Party of China founded. 1921.
- 6 East Germany (Grotewohl) and Poland (Cyrankiewicz) recognize Oder-Neisse line as permanent frontier. 1950. Fifteenth anniversary.
- 7 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) World Congress, Amsterdam, 7-16 July.
- 10 World Congress for Peace, National Independence and General Disarmament, Helsinki, 10-15 July, sponsored by the Communist World Peace Council (WPC) which is working toward the formation of a "united front" of world peace organizations.
- 10 Lavrenti Beria arrest for treason announced. Secretly tried and shot, 18-23 December. 1953.
- 12 Soviet Russia signs treaty with Lithuania recognizing its independence and sovereignty. 1920. (Occupies Lithuania 1940). Forty-fifth anniversary.
- 13 Cuban President Urrutia charges Communism endangers Cuban revolution. Four days later Castro charges Urrutia with treason. 1959.
- 16 Potsdam Conference (16 July-2 August) (Churchill, Attlee, Truman and Stalin) 1945. Twentieth anniversary.
- 18 Big Four "Summit" Conference, Geneva, 18-23 July. France, Great Britain, US and USSR. 1955. Tenth anniversary.
- 25 11th annual World Conference, All Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo); Tokyo, Nagasaki, Hiroshima. 25 July-9 August, supported by JCP.
- 27 Korean Armistice signed. 1953.
- 28 Ninth World Youth Festival, Algiers, 28 July-7 August. Sponsored by Communist WFDY and IUS.
- 30 Pathet Lao guerrillas, armed by Communist North Vietnam, attack army posts in northern Laos. 1959.
- 31 30,444 flee to West Berlin in July -- East Germans seal the border two weeks later (13 August). 1961.

AUG.

- 5 Friedrich Engels dies. 1895. (70th anniversary). [Born 28 Sept 1820].
- 6 20th anniversary atomic explosion Hiroshima; A-bomb dropped on Nagasaki 9 August. 1945.
- 11 World Convention, Japan National Congress against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikin), Tokyo, for about 4 days. Supplementary events, Hiroshima, Nagasaki 5-9 August. Supported by JSP and SOHYO.

PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS



#55

Commentary

26 May-8 June 1965

Principal Developments:

1. The Chinese Communists continue to press their political/propaganda offensive against the Soviet and Yugoslav "revisionists," the Indian "reactionaries," and the U.S. "imperialists." Most aggressive are: (a) a speech incorporating the most extreme Chinese charges against the Soviet leadership delivered by Peng Chen, chief of the Chicom delegation to the Indonesian Party's 45th anniversary, at the PKI's Aliarcham Academy; (b) a People's Daily Observer article expanding NCNA's earlier denunciation of the Shastri visit to Moscow; (c) further expansion of the Chinese campaign against "brutal suppression of Asian, African and Latin American students" by the Yugoslav authorities; and (d) an interview given to a French journal by Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi maintaining that Chinese anti-Soviet polemics are making a positive contribution to the Vietnam situation. Peking also lists 9 world languages in which it is distributing its March book, Polemics on the General Line of the ICM (which includes 11 major attacks on the CPSU previously published as separate pamphlets, as described in #49). And as the period ends, Premier Chou En-lai is in Tanzania on another visit apparently aimed particularly at building support for the Chinese line at the 29 June Afro-Asian Conference II ("Bandung") in Algiers (though he hurried back to China on the next day, after expected invitations for subsequent African visits apparently did not materialize).

2. In introducing Peng Chen at Aliarcham, Indonesian CP Chairman Aidit admits that the PKI follows "the pronouncements and attitudes of the CCP toward modern revisionism," -- even though "sometimes we are not quick enough in understanding" them!


3. The Albanians publish four more major attacks on the Soviet leadership, one of which spreads its fire to include the Italian revisionists.

4. Meanwhile, the CPSU/USSR continues to take a public stance of restraint in the face of these inflammatory provocations. Even while protesting Peng Chen's truly outrageous conduct in abusing Indonesian hospitality to attack another PKI guest from a PKI rostrum, the Soviets are defensive and refrain from any counter-charges. Behind-the-scenes Soviet political activity is indicated, however, in visits of high-level Party delegations to Bulgaria and France and a Marshal Grechko-led military mission to Rumania, plus talks in Moscow with a Kadar-led Hungarian delegation and a North Korean military mission, which is granted a new military aid pact. There are further indications of (somewhat belated) Soviet intent to press for participation in the Algiers Afro-Asian Conference II.

5. French and Italian CP chiefs met secretly in Geneva (24-25 May) while the CPSU delegation was in France (19-31 May), -- and just a week before delegations of all West European CPs were to meet in Brussels. (We have had no report on the Brussels meeting as yet.)

6. The Rumanian leadership surprisingly decides in plenum to change the name to Rumanian Communist (instead of Workers) Party, -- to correspond with the current stage of development of Rumanian socialism.

25X1C10b





CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#55

26 May-8 June 1965

May 25 (delayed): Albanian Party monthly theoretical journal Rruga E Partise No. 6 features a 23,000-word editorial: "The Modern Revisionists, Greatest Liquidators in the History of the ICM." (Also published in daily Zeri I Popullit in 2 parts, 25 & 26.) It is a ponderous attack on the Italian Communist debate published in Rinascita in recent months, centering around the controversial Amendola "Hypotheses" on the need for creating an entirely new "single party of the left" in the 28 November issue. The editorial ties this development to the "ill-famed 20th CPSU Congress" and refers back to the 7 April 1964 ZIP article entitled "The Modern Revisionists on the Road of Social Democratic Degeneration and a Merger with Social Democracy." (Chrono #27). It then turns to the 4 February 1965 Pravda article, "The Communists and the Social Democrats," (Chrono #47) and asks: "Can one not see clearly where Amendola got his inspiration?" It answers itself: "Both parties are unanimous in declaring that to sabotage the proletarian revolution in the capitalist countries and to restore capitalism in the socialist countries, the revolutionary party of the working class must be liquidated at all costs."

"But the liquidating positions of Amendola, of the revisionist leadership of the Italian CP, and of the Khrushchevite revisionists, have become the positions of all international modern revisionism. Thus the discussion within the ICP about the 'single party', the new, perfidious and liquidating step by Amendola, is by no means a unique and isolated phenomenon. It represents, in fact, one of the aspects, and perhaps the most typical and the clearest one, of a whole new campaign, which has been started by all modern revisionists for rapprochement, collaboration, and fusion with social democracy. This emerges from the decisions, resolutions, and discussions with the various revisionist parties of Western Europe. This is clearly demonstrated by the round-table discussions on the problems of 'unity of the workers and the democratic movement in the capitalist countries' organized by the international revisionist journal Problems of Peace and Socialism, discussions which were published in issues Nos. 1 and 2 of this year."

May 25-June 5 (continuing from #54, May 7-24): Party delegations to the Indonesian CP's 45th anniversary celebration busily engage in local political activity. Most active and controversial is the Chinese delegation, headed by Politburo member and CC Secretary Peng Chen, whose 25 May speech at the PKI's Aliarcham Academy of Social Sciences turned into an anti-Soviet harangue incorporating the most extreme Chinese charges against the CPSU leadership, including passages such as the following:

"Khrushchev revisionism is disintegrating the socialist camp, splitting the ICM, sabotaging the national liberation movement and the people's revolutionary movement in all countries, lulling the vigilance of the people of the world, and playing the role of a special detachment of the U.S. imperialists and all reactionaries.... By all this, the K. revisionists have set themselves against the masses of the people who comprise more than 90% of the world's population

K. revisionism is the creation of the capitalist forces in the Soviet Union. With K's coming to power, a bourgeois privileged stratum gradually came into being (It) has completely divorced itself from the Soviet people K and his like are the political representatives of this bourgeois privileged stratum

... K's successors ... are more crafty than K They think that acting stealthily may be better for them Precisely because the K. revisionists are putting on more subtle camouflage and are more deceptive, it is all the more incumbent on the M-Ls to expose the essence behind their false appearance and the deeds of betrayal concealed by their fine words However numerous the metamorphoses of the K. revisionists, they will eventually reveal their true features as monsters."

Introducing Peng, PKI Chairman Aidit says that "the PKI and the CCP are like nails and fingers" and explains that:

"It is true that sometimes we are not quick enough in understanding the pronouncements made by the CCP against modern revisionism; we must first read these pronouncements over and over again and study them thoroughly. This is generally because we do not have a complete grasp of the overall situation. However, ultimately we are able to understand these pronouncements thoroughly. Based on this experience, we consider the pronouncements and attitudes of the CCP toward modern revisionism as a 'signal' light which serves as our beacon and guide."

Just before its departure from Djakarta on the 4th, the CPSU delegation issues a terse statement briefly thanking "the Indonesian Communists and all friends of the Soviet Union" for their welcome and then protesting Peng's "provocative and slanderous attacks" at Aliarcham!

"The CPSU delegation files its protest in view of the fact that an authoritative representative of the CCP, while misusing the hospitality of the PKI, has used the forum it was given for improper and offensive attacks against the CPSU, whose delegation is a guest of the Indonesian Communists"

The statement concludes:

"Nevertheless, there need be no doubt that any efforts to undermine the friendship between Soviet and Indonesian Communists, to undermine the anti-imperialist unity between the Soviet Union and Indonesia, are bound to end in failure."

May 26: A Radio Peking broadcast (in English to South Asia) lists nine foreign languages in which the People's Publishing House has issued its book Polemics on the General Line of the ICM: English, French, Spanish, German, Russian, Japanese, Indonesian, Vietnamese and Arabic. This volume is a collection of 11 "vital articles" previously published as separate pamphlets -- the 14 June 1963 CCP letter to the CPSU, the nine editorials in the series of "Comments on the Open Letter of the CPSU," and the November 1964 "Why Khrushchev Fell" -- plus the CPSU letter to the CCP of 30 March 1963 and the CPSU open letter of 14 July 1963 (see Chrono #49 for first Chinese notice of publication of this volume on 5 March).

May 26-June 4: A CPSU delegation headed by leading theoretician Suslov pays "a visit" to Sofia to "acquaint themselves with the activities of the BCP and exchange experiences." In a 13,000-word speech at a 2 June meeting (published in Sofia Rabotnichesko Delo on 4th and Pravda on 5th), Suslov attributes difficulties in the ICM to differences in economic development, historical traditions, and political conditions. He warns against "every attempt at artificially erecting a wall between 'one's own' CP" and the rest of the movement, and says that no "detachment" will be able to solve any task "if it isolates itself, if it retires into its national shell, if it passes on to a platform of national egoism."

May 26-June 4: Soviet media press for Soviet participation in the Afro-Asian Conference II ("Bandung") in Algiers, in an article in No. 22 of the multi-language weekly New Times and a Radio Moscow English-language commentary to South Asia, both on the 26th. NYTimes correspondent Peter Grose reports from Moscow on the 4th that -- according to "diplomatic sources" there -- "the Soviet leadership has decided to challenge Communist China's bid for primacy among the African and Asian nations" at the conference.

May 27: Pravda 5,000-word Sevastyanov article on 45th anniversary of Lenin's book Left-Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder says that "the entire contents" of the book "were intended to strengthen unity" and shows that Lenin would be on the CPSU's side in the dispute with the Chinese. However, it does not mention the Chinese by name and is generally restrained and conciliatory in tone.

An Observer article in People's Daily expands harshly on the 21 May NCNA comment on Indian Prime Minister Shastri's visit to Moscow (Chrono #54), concluding:

"The more K's successors fraternize with the Indian reactionaries, the more clearly will their revisionist face be exposed.

Since K's line of aligning with India to oppose China has gone bankrupt, will the present Soviet leaders come to any better end than K.?"

The French CP announces that its chief Rochet and Italian CP chief Longo had conferred secretly in Geneva 24-25 May on a wide range of subjects, -- not identified.

May 28: NCNA reports an interview given by Chinese Vice Premier (and Foreign Minister) Chen Yi to correspondent K.S. Karol for the French journal Nouvel Observateur on the Vietnam problem. One question is: "Do you not think that the polemics (between People's China and the USSR) tend to divert world public opinion from the important problem and, therefore, play a negative role?" Answer:

"This is not my view The polemics help the people of the whole world to distinguish between truth and falsehood, between real and sham struggle against imperialism, and between real and sham support for this struggle; they contribute to the struggle of the people of the world against U.S. aggression"

May 29: The Albanian Zeri I Popullit blasts "the hypocritical, anti-revolutionary, and capitulationist attitude of the Soviet leadership" again, this time in connection with Indian Premier Shastri's visit to Moscow.

May 30: Pravda publishes joint communique on the "friendly visit" of a Kadar-led Hungarian Party delegation to Moscow, 23-29 May: it stresses "complete identity of the viewpoints of both sides on the situation in the ICM" and reports that they "decided to wage a consistent struggle for the cohesion of countries of the socialist comity and for the strengthening of unity"

May 31: TASS announces that a CPSU delegation headed by Boris Ponomarev returned home after a 19-31 May visit with the French CP. A communique says that the visit "reaffirmed the profound identity of the views of both parties on all main problems of our time."

TASS also announces the signing, with a North Korean military delegation in Moscow, of an agreement to strengthen further the defensive capabilities of the DPRK: no details are given.

June 2-8: Chinese Premier Chou En-lai stops in Pakistan 2-3 June enroute to Africa on another visit, seen by observers as aiming particularly to rally support for Chinese leadership at the forthcoming Algiers Afro-Asian Conference II. A 4-day visit in Tanzania 4-8 June produces a joint communique, worded much like Chou's speeches in its references to "foreign intervention in the Dominican Republic," the "Vietnamese people fighting heroically against foreign intervention," and the Congolese people's "fight for national independence and freedom," without, however, naming the U.S. -- or the U.S.S.R. Chou's repeated remarks on revolution bring

a sharp denunciation from neighboring Kenya, and he unexpectedly flies back to China from Tanzania on June 8 instead of continuing the anticipated round trip, -- leading to press speculation that the Chinese have worn out their welcome among the true neutrals of Africa.

June 3: Bucharest releases a communique on a 31 May-2 June CC plenum: it includes the statement that "The plenum unanimously decided to submit to the (4th) Congress the proposal that the party be named the Rumanian Communist (instead of Workers) Party, which corresponds with the current stage of development of our society, the stage of fulfilling socialist construction, and the final aim of the Party, namely construction of a Communist society."

June 5: The Alicata-led Italian CP delegation to Cuba (Chrono #54, May 13) departs for Moscow. NYTimes reports from Havana that they held long talks with Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders on "the conflict between Moscow and Peking and Communist involvement in Latin America."

The Chilean Ministry of the Interior grants permission to move to Santiago the Latin American Conference on Solidarity with Cuba which had been scheduled for Montevideo June 18 but which the Uruguayan authorities banned in a last-minute reversal of policy.

The Albanian Zeri I Popullit denounces the Khrushchevite revisionist for "committing treason toward the Dominican people" by pursuing "their policy of collaboration with and unprincipled concession and capitulation to American imperialism."

June 6: NCNA reports three messages sent by the All-China Students Federation in connection with the "brutal suppression by Yugoslav authorities of students from Asia, Africa, and Latin America who took part in a demonstration on 12 May against the U.S. imperialist invasion of the Dominican Republic" (see Chrono #54, May 17, for first NCNA report on subject):

a. A message of protest to the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council which stated: "Your present act of violence again exposes to the world's people the villainy of the Yugoslav leaders. They are acting as a special detachment of U.S. imperialism to stamp out the national liberation movement" It "demands" that the Yugoslav authorities "immediately terminate the imprisonment of the students from Chile, Colombia, and Palestine" and "apologize" to the Asian, African, and Latin American students who participated," with "assurances that there will be no repetition."

b. A letter to the Peking office of the [Arab] Palestine Liberation Organization expressing "deep sympathy with the Palestine student persecuted by the Yugoslav authorities," paying "high respect to his militancy."

c. A message to the persecuted students in Belgrade, sent "in care of the Embassy of the Republic of Chile in Yugoslavia." "The Chinese people as a whole, including the students, firmly support your just action"

June 7: In a departure from their recent policy of non-involvement in Sino-Soviet polemics, the Polish press publishes the 4 June protest of the CPSU delegation in Djakarta against the Peng Chen speech at Aliarcham.

The three English-language Calcutta newspapers report that a new Indian CP was formed by Communist centrists critical of both the Soviet-aligned CPI/R and the Chinese-sympathizing CPI/L at a meeting in Calcutta, 5-6 June. The Statesman comments that the new party is more inclined toward the CPSU on major international issues but strongly opposed to CPI/R Chairman Dange.


June 8: An Albanian Zeri I Popullit editorial on Vietnam denounces the "vile attitude of the K. revisionists": "The anti-imperialist garb in which the K. foursome of Brezhnev, Kosygin, Mikoyan and Suslov are momentarily masquerading will not dupe anyone. It cannot hide the anti-revolutionary and anti-Vietnamese plot which they have hatched with the American imperialists." It concludes with another dire prediction:

"... The Soviet people ... will find the strength and opportunity to put in their places the revisionist traitors who play with their fate and that of socialism. In the end, true M-L will triumph over lies and revisionist treason, and that day is not far off!"

~~SECRET~~

21 June 1965


25X1C10b





App

~~SECRET~~


(914 Cont.)











25X1C10b


















916 AF,FE,NE,WH.

LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS
IN COMMUNIST CHINA



25X1C10b

SITUATION: An official Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman has denied the recent spate of rumors that Mao Tse-tung is seriously ill. But the fact remains that Mao was 71 years old last December, and that he certainly is infirm and under the constant watch of medical attendants. His current prolonged absence from public view has encouraged speculation that his poor health now keeps him from performing even routine ceremonial duties. However, Mao's health at this or any other particular moment merely symbolizes the crucial fact that China will very soon face a succession problem, not only in transferring power from Mao to his individual successor, but also the far more complex task of passing authority from one generation to another. Totalitarian societies have always shown themselves to be ill-equipped to deal with these problems. Some quarters contend that the history of the Chinese Communist party suggests that the CPC will be able to achieve these immensely complex tasks without much difficulty. When Lenin died and again when Stalin died, it was also contended that the remaining Communist leaders were firmly united in their determination to carry on the policies of the dead leader, and yet in both cases, the former subordinates of the late departed were soon deeply divided and engaged in life and death struggles for power.

The Chinese have attempted to ease the situation by grooming Liu Shao-chi as Mao's appointed successor. In 1959 Mao turned over to Liu the Chairmanship of the Government while retaining the more important post of the Party Chairman. Liu however is 67, nearly as old and frail as Mao and even if he should achieve a successful takeover from Mao, his would necessarily be a caretaker administration. Liu certainly does not have the status to appoint his own successor as Mao had done, so the question of his successor can be expected to be even more problematical to the remaining leaders.

Only two other men besides Liu appear as possible candidates to succeed Mao. They are Premier Chou En-lai and Party General Secretary Teng Hsiao-ping. Both of these men are about the same age as Liu and neither of them is likely to challenge him so long as Mao is alive. Whether they would willingly accede to his leadership during a critical period after Mao's death remains to be seen. Peking's Mayor Peng Chen and Foreign Minister Chen Yi are dark horses who would assume increased


prominence on the demise of any one of the Party leaders mentioned above. (See unclassified attachment for biographic sketches of high-ranking Chinese Communist leaders.)

The average age of the 18 Politburo members is over 66 and most of them are in their late 60's or early 70's. No attempt has been made to bring younger, second-echelon leaders into the higher bureaucracy gradually and train them for ultimate leadership. On the contrary, a strenuous effort seems to have been made to keep them out. The top 40 men in the Party are all in the older age-group, and even in the layer below these men, the majority is in the 55-60 bracket. There is twofold significance in these facts: First, the younger men may react strongly when the legendary Mao departs the scene. Their long frustration at being kept away from the seat of power may come to the surface and cause them to rebel against the "Yenan Caves" mentality of their elders. Second, the advanced age of all of the immediate contenders for the top post may mean that the top post will change hands several times in the next few years, and the competition might enhance considerably the influence of this younger group as the competing factions vie for support against their antagonists. The most important question therefore is not who will succeed Mao, but how many times in the next few years will the leadership change hands, and how long will it take before power is transferred to the hands of the next generation.


The old men who rule China have become increasingly alarmed by what they consider the flagging revolutionary zeal of the younger people, and they have undertaken an intensive indoctrination campaign to remedy the situation. The course of events in the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin has made them painfully aware of what might happen to their own revolution once they are gone; it has made them fear that their successors will grow soft and betray the sacred trust of carrying the revolution to the rest of the world. Their alarm is probably the best evidence that there is at least some possibility for a change in the attitude of China's future leaders. If the hard, doctrinaire inflexibility of the current leaders appears to the younger generation to pay off in the desired results, that generation can fully be expected to continue the pattern, and even to increase Communist China's arrogant militarism and interference in the affairs of other countries. If, however, today's leaders meet firmness and resolution in all their attempts to foist their views on their neighbors and on developing nations around the world, it may be possible to convince the next generation that its best prospects lie in devoting their full attention to their own internal affairs and solving the vast problems that have plagued the Chinese people for so many centuries.

25X1C10b

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~





Red Spies in the UN

by Pierre J. Huss and George Carpozi, Jr.
1965. Coward-McCann, Inc., 200 Madison Avenue,
New York 16, N.Y. Indexed. Illustrated.
287 pages. \$5.50

As the title suggests, this book concerns the use of official and diplomatic status by Communist intelligence officers. The authors, two well-known journalists, obtained a number of incriminating photos on Communist espionage cases from the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and included them with the FBI's permission. Some of the photos show the Communist UN officials in the act of making clandestine rendezvous with espionage agents.

The book relates more than a dozen cases of Communist espionage and conspiracies to commit espionage in the United States, all conducted under the shelter of the UN missions of the Soviet Union, and of some of its satellites. The first known case of espionage involving a Soviet employee of the United Nations occurred in 1949, when Valentin Gubitchev, an engineer attached to the Secretariat, was arrested with an American woman, Miss Judith Coplon. Gubitchev had conspired with Miss Coplon to steal highly classified official documents from the United States Department of Justice. A court found Gubitchev guilty, and he was sentenced to 15 years in prison, but the U.S. Department of State intervened, and asked that the court suspend the sentence provided that Gubitchev agree to leave the country, a condition which the latter accepted. Miss Coplon received the same sentence, but it was later reversed on a technicality, and she was freed.

As subsequent events have shown, Gubitchev was but the first of a long succession of Soviet and other Communist officials working at the UN (either as officials of national delegations or as employees of the UN itself) who have been caught spying, and been sent home as a result. Again and again, the book shows, the protection afforded by the UN to the foreign nationals employed there has been abused by the Communist Bloc.

One of the most spectacular cases related involved a 1962 attempt by Cubans to sabotage oil installations in New Jersey, and to create terror in a large New York department store by causing an explosion. According to the authors, there is strong evidence that the Soviets masterminded the whole plot, although this was never alleged in court.

The book concludes with a Soviet espionage operation which was exposed in 1963. It involved two Soviet agents, living together as man and wife, who had "borrowed" the identities of two American citizens, unbeknownst to the latter. In fact the man whose name was used by the Soviet agent in Washington, D.C. was actually a Catholic priest in

Amsterdam, New York. The case was solved largely because the FBI had information that Petr Egorovich Maslennikov, First Secretary of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in 1962-63, was actually a Soviet Military Intelligence officer, and kept him under surveillance almost from the moment of his arrival in the United States in January, 1962. Through their surveillance of Maslennikov, the FBI agents noticed the strange couple in Washington, D.C., who were using the names of two American citizens, and checked extensively on their backgrounds. In this way they learned that the couple were really Soviet citizens, who had somehow managed to enter the United States illegally, and that they were involved in espionage against the United States. Maslennikov evidently became aware that he was being watched, for he abruptly ceased both his espionage activity and his official work at the UN, and departed for the Soviet Union. However, another Soviet national, Ivan Dmitrievich Egorov, who was involved, but who did not hold diplomatic status, was arrested, as were the couple who were using other people's names, and were discovered to be couriers for a Soviet spy ring operating in New York and Washington.

The book is as exciting as most fictional spy thrillers and has the advantage of being true. Unfortunately, it is marred by occasional slight errors such as giving a date incorrectly. Nevertheless, the book is well worth reading, and should be read by those interested in preserving the United Nations, and keeping it free of Cold War activities detrimental to its main mission of preserving the peace.

United Nations Disarmament Commission
Resolution Passed 15 June 1965

The Disarmament Commission,

Having considered the report dated 17 September 1964 of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee submitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the nineteenth session of the General Assembly,

Reaffirming the ultimate and continuing responsibility of the United Nations for disarmament,

Noting with regret that during 1964 despite the efforts made by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee no specific agreements were reached either on general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension, or halting and reversing the arms race,

Deploring that, notwithstanding General Assembly resolutions 1762 (XVII) and 1910 (XVIII), nuclear weapon tests have taken place and also that no agreement has been reached on the QTE discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time UNQTE, which is one of the stated objectives of the partial test-ban treaty,

Considering that the memorandum of 14 September 1964 submitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, represents a fair and sound basis for the conduct of negotiations towards removing the remaining differences for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty,

Convinced that failure to conclude a universal treaty or agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons leads to the most serious consequences,

Deeply conscious of the urgency of making early progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and of reaching agreement on measures which would facilitate the attainment of that goal,

Bearing in mind the proposals made at its present session for measures to reduce international tension and halt and reverse the arms race, and also at the meeting of the Organization of African Unity and the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries,

Recalling the principle that a substantial part of the resources that will be released through disarmament should be devoted to the economic and social development of the developing countries, thus contributing to the evolution of a safer and better world,

(Cont.)

1. Reaffirms the call of the General Assembly upon all States to become parties to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and to abide by its spirit and provisions;

2. Recommends that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should:

(a) reconvene as early as possible to resume as a matter of urgency its efforts to develop a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and to consider all proposals for measures to relax international tension and halt and reverse the arms race, including those submitted to the Disarmament Commission at its present session;

(b) consider as a matter of priority the question of extending the scope of the partial test-ban treaty to cover underground tests;

(c) also accord special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures;

(d) keep in mind the principle of converting to programmes of economic and social development of the developing countries a substantial part of the resources gradually released by the reduction of military expenditures;

Requests the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to report to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly during its twentieth session on the progress made in respect of the above recommendations.

Biographical Data

21 June 1965

MAO Tse-tung

Chairman of the CCP Central Committee and Politburo; Deputy for Peking to the National People's Congress; Honorary Chairman of the CPPCC.

Since 1935 Mao Tse-tung has been the accepted leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 1930, Mao put down, in a bloody purge at Fu Tien, revolutionaries who opposed his orders and from then his claim to the party leadership was only a question of time.


Mao was born in Hainan in 1893, the son of a middle peasant family, and was graduated from Changsa Normal College in 1918. In the summer of 1920 he became a Marxist and was a delegate to the convention that founded the Chinese Communist Party in July 1921. His early years in the Party were spent in organizing the peasants and conducting propaganda among them. His experiences in these early days led him to develop the thesis for which he is now best known, namely, that the peasants were the vital element in any successful revolt in an agrarian country like China. This thesis was opposed by the party leadership of the time. They were following Soviet advice at the time and attempting to conduct a revolution based on the urban proletariat. The official Party leadership in Shanghai gradually lost influence and authority to Mao and his lieutenants and finally joined him in Kiangsi in 1932. During these years the Communist Army successfully fought off four attempts by Chiang Kai-shek's forces to crush it, but a fifth attack forced the Communists to undertake the "Long March" in October 1934--6,000 miles through Kweichow and the mountainous border provinces to Shensi, where a new headquarters was established in 1935 at Yen-an.

The Party extended its control during the Sino-Japanese war (1937-45) by guerilla tactics and the mobilization of the patriotic peasantry against the Japanese. At the end of the war in 1945 the Communists were thus in a stronger position than in 1935. On the establishment of the Central People's Government in 1949, Mao became Chairman of the Government Council, of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, (CPPCC), and of the People's Revolutionary Military Council. In January, 1953, Mao was Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee and on the consequent reorganization of the government structure in 1954, he was elected Chairman of the Republic and ex officio became Chairman of the National Defence Council.


Mao was seriously ill during 1953 and 1954, and little was heard of him until July, 1955, when he came back to call for the rapid full-scale socialization of agriculture. After this he remained well in the public eye, and all subsequent major policies have been ascribed personally to Mao.


In December, 1958, it was announced that Mao was about to retire from the Chairmanship of the Republic "in order to devote himself more to ideological study." His retirement came in April, 1959. Mao remains Party Chairman, appears in public regularly and continues to be treated as the leader and father of the Chinese people.


Mao married three times, first in 1919 in Shanghai, his wife being executed in 1928. His second wife was with him on the "Long March," during which some of her children are said to have been abandoned. One was killed in the Korean War, one is evidently a Russian translator at a Ministry in Peking, another an army officer in Szechwan. His third marriage, to an actress, has produced two daughters. No member of his family takes part in public life.



(Cont.)








Biographical Data


21 June 1965




Biographical Data

21 June 1965


Page 01





Biographical Data

21 June 1965



Biographical Data


25X6F
21 June 1965

Marshal LTH Bonghng




Biographical Data

21 June 1965





25X6F



Biographical Data


21 June 1965





Biographical Data


21 June 1965





Biographical Data

21 June 1965



Biographical Data
Marshal Chen Yi

25X6F
21 June 1965

