


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26 April 1965

**Briefly Noted**



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Finally,  
Too  
Far?

FISE Teachers Protest  
Polemics

The Fourth World Conference of the Soviet dominated World Federation of Teachers' Unions (FISE) met in Algiers from 10 to 15 April (which is in turn a division of the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions based in Prague). It was marked, and its deliberations pushed a full day behind schedule, by Albanian and Chinese Communist polemics against and clashes with the Soviet Union. The Chicoms also attacked the procedures of the conference as undemocratic--for allowing majority votes and following the "UN system" of giving each country one vote regardless of its size--and charged the Soviets with responsibility for these "procedural injustices."

The Algerian President at one point resigned from his position in an effort to bring the conference back to "a serene atmosphere" and to its announced schedule.

The Chicoms carried on their feud not only in an attempt to prove the Soviets could not lead the anti-imperialist forces of the third world generally, but through attacks on a Soviet report on teacher training. Delegates and observers became so irritated at one point that they attempted to drown out an Albanian speaker by banging on table tops for three minutes.

Communist tactics in their internal struggle for power over regional and world organizations have been further displayed at the FISE meeting. This should serve as a warning to all future gatherings in which Communists have substantial influence or control, that legitimate

business will be pushed aside, that non-Communist delegates (and even non-S-S Communists) will have to give their attention to problems, issues and disputes which in no way pertain to their interests and which in fact are likely to involve them to the detriment of their own development.

\* \* \*

Remnant of Art Theft in Moscow  
Bourgeois  
Ideology?

News reports of 3 April stated that a Franz Hals painting of St. Luke, worth \$140,000, had been cut from its frame in the Pushkin Museum and stolen, after the drugging of a woman attendant. It seems that two other paintings were stolen from the Hermitage Museum in Leningrad last December. [NYTimes 1 and 4 April in Press Comment 1 and 5 April respectively] In ironical treatment, we point out that as in other fields of endeavor, the Soviets are now striving to overtake and surpass the West in the realm of art theft--though they have yet to achieve the heights reached in the London theft of Goya's "Duke of Wellington." Also, the procedure of cutting a canvas from its frame seems a little crude, possibly "uncultured," and likely to diminish the value of the painting. One might speculate that there must be some monstrous conspiracy behind all the thefts, East and West--and ask, suspiciously, why it is that no one yet has reported any art thefts from Peking.

A serious note could be added, to the effect that many treasures of modern art are kept in the basements of Soviet museums and are never exhibited because they are ideologically "unsuitable."

\* \* \*



# Significant Dates ▶

## MAY

- 8 VE-Day. Armistice ends World War II in Europe - 1945. (20th anniversary.)
- 9 IV Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) Conference, Accra, Ghana.
- 11 (Soviet Bloc) Warsaw Pact for military cooperation and mutual aid concluded (11-14 May). Tenth anniversary. 1955
- 15 COMINTERN (third international) dissolved, declaring autonomy of Communist Parties outside USSR. 1943 Austrian State Treaty 1955 (Tenth Anniversary)
- 16 Treaty of Aigan, first of "Unequal Treaties" ceding part of Chinese "Great Northeast" west of Amur River to Russia. 1858
- 22 Organization of African Unity (OAU) signed at Addis Ababa, 22-25 May, 1963.
- 23 Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) founded. 45th anniversary. 1920
- 23 Federal Republic of Germany proclaimed (made fully independent 5 May same year, as Western Powers lifted remaining controls). Tenth anniversary. 1955
- 26 Khrushchev speech in Belgrade blaming Soviet side for errors and Beria for break. Tenth anniversary. 1955

## JUNE

- 1 International Children's Day, celebrated by the Communist Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF).
- 14 Treaty of Tientsin, second "Unequal Treaty," similar to Treaty of Aigan. 1858
- 15 Magna Carta signed at Runnymede by King John. 1215 (750th anniversary)
- 17 International Christian Democratic Youth Congress, West Berlin, June, to end on 17 June, anniversary of East German revolt. 1953.

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## PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS



#51

Commentary

31 March-13 April 1965

### Principal Developments:

1. Communist dissensions during this period are focused in all media primarily on comments on the warfare in Vietnam and President Johnson's Baltimore speech. All condemn U.S. aggression, and vary in their criticism of the Johnson proposals in accordance with their own position in the Communist spectrum. The CPSU -- with top leadership away a full week on a party-state visit to Poland -- continues to accent unity and solidarity against imperialism and to refrain from open intra-Communist polemics. The Chinese, while prominently publishing a strong Malayan CP attack on the modern revisionists, likewise add no new polemics. The Albanians continue in their role as spearhead of the "anti-revisionist" camp, hammering away at "collaboration of the Khrushchevite revisionists with U.S. imperialism," which now causes the "grave situation" in Vietnam.
2. The Polish-Soviet talks, despite a great show of fraternal solidarity, apparently brought no noteworthy new developments.
3. French and Norwegian CP resolutions call for and approve, respectively, a conference of West European CPs on the problems of CPs in capitalist nations.
4. The Italian CP announces it will send in the near future a top-level delegation to Hanoi, invited by Ho Chi Minh to seek "more effective collaboration between the two parties in the struggle for independence and peace." The PCI daily L'Unita greets the Johnson speech as "the first cracks in the truculent attitude of the U.S." which should be appreciated by all people interested in peace and freedom. This recalls the 31 January 1965 NCNA report that Kang Sheng, a CCP Politburo alternate member, held talks in Peking with Calo Vincenzo, one of the leaders of the Italian pro-Chinese renegade "Long Live Leninism" group.
5. It is belatedly reported that in February the pro-Soviet group of dissident Japanese Communists headed by 1964 expellee Shiga adopted the name "Japanese Communist Party (Voice of Japan) [Nihon-no Koe]." 25X1C10b

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
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(Classification)

CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#51

31 March-13 April 1965

February 2 (delayed): Issue No. 29 of Nihon-no Koe (The Voice of Japan), published by the pro-Soviet Japanese dissident Communist "Voice of Japan Comrades Society," headed by 1964 JCP expellee Shiga, announces a double change in designation:

- a. Beginning with No. 29, Nihon-no Koe becomes the "official publication of the central organ of the Japanese Communist Party";
- b. Simultaneously, the publisher is now "The Japanese Communist Party (Voice of Japan.)"

March 30 (delayed): Norwegian CP daily Friheten publishes "Resolution on the Situation in the ICM" adopted unanimously at NKP Congress over previous week-end. It briefly "noted" that the 1-5 March 19-party conference "was carried out as a consultative meeting at which they sought new ways and new initiatives to strengthen cooperation and restore unity," expressed the "viewpoint" that a new international conference "can restore unity only if all parties are willing to take part," and approved "the proposal raised by several fraternal parties for a conference of all CPs in the capitalist countries in Europe...."

March 31: NCNA reports text of a statement by the Political Committee of the CP of New Zealand denouncing the 1-5 March Moscow "consultative meeting" and rejecting the proposal in its communique to call an 81-party "consultative meeting" to prepare for a world conference.

"In the absence of real conditions to make such a 'consultative meeting' productive, such a gathering would have virtually the same results as the conference planned by Khrushchev -- the open splitting of the world movement through attempts to impose on all parties the anti-M-L revisionist line of the CPSU leadership."

The Political Committee "calls instead for bilateral talks in which the modern revisionists can start a thoroughgoing self-criticism of their mistakes and an abandonment of attempts to impose their capitulationist practice and theory on the WCM." It says, in passing, that

"neither during the meeting nor since have the leaderships of the CPSU and the other seven participating socialist countries taken concrete steps in practice to repulse the aggression (in Vietnam). This fact exposes the words of the communique calling for unity to fight imperialism as being no more than hollow deception."

The Malayan Monitor carries a statement by the Malayan CP/CC denouncing "the sectarian and divisive activities perpetrated by the modern revisionists under the guise of unity." All Peking papers prominently publish the statement 2 April.

(Chronology Cont.)



April 1: The French CP/CC approves a resolution calling on other Western European CPs to join it in organizing a conference on the problems of CPs in capitalist nations. It also "unreservedly shares the opinion that the holding of a new international conference of parties would be fully in the interests of the ICM."

April 2: Albanian Party daily Zeri I Popullit article -- "The International Imperialist-Revisionist Policemen" -- denounces Soviet collaboration with the U.S. imperialists in U.N. peace-keeping activities.

"The present Khrushchev revisionists are most perfidious, but their tricks deceive nobody. The whole world is aware that the hypocritical clamor and noisy anti-imperialist declarations made by the K. revisionists are a poor mask indeed to distract the attention of the people from the bargainings and plots which the former are carrying out behind the scenes with American imperialism."

April 5-9: A top-level Soviet Party-State delegation headed by Brezhnev and including Kosygin visits Warsaw amid a great show of fraternal solidarity, signing on the 8th a new 20-year treaty of friendship and mutual assistance to replace the treaty of 21 April 1945. Despite flowery language and treaty mention for first time of the Oder-Neisse frontier, the meeting seems to have brought no noteworthy new developments.

April 6: An Albanian Zeri I Popullit editorial saluting "the DRV people and army for downing 61 American aircraft... and sinking an American Ranger ship" adds that "this grave situation is the inevitable result of the perfidious attitude of the Khrushchevite revisionists," who "are even more inclined than N.K. himself to engage in bargaining with imperialism."

April 9: TASS reports from Cairo that Algiers-bound Indian leftist former Defense Minister Krishna Menon "told a correspondent of the newspaper Al Musavar that he demand participation of the Soviet Union in the forthcoming conference of Afro-Asian countries in Algiers, since the Soviet Union is a major country including a large part of Asian territory inhabited by Asian nationalities."

April 10: The Italian CP announces in Rome that a top-level PCI delegation headed by Giancarlo Pajetta would visit Hanoi at the invitation of North Vietnamese boss Ho Chi Minh, to seek


"ways and forms of an ever more effective collaboration between the two parties in the struggle for independence and peace." (As reported by UPI.)



Venezuelan Interior Minister Barrios announces that three Italian Communist Party members were arrested in Caracas for having carried \$330,000 from Italy to finance Communist terrorism in Venezuela. PCI daily L'Unita, reporting the case on the 12th (after all other Italian press had given it heavy play), called it "the affair trumped up by the Minister of the Interior of the reactionary Venezuelan Government."

April 12: TASS reports that No. 5 of CPSU theoretical journal Kommunist features an editorial on "Solidarity: A Formidable Weapon of Communism." It admits that "the restitution of unity of the WCM under present conditions is a complicated matter," but emphasizes that "practical actions in the process of joint struggle against the common foe would be the easiest way to rid oneself of the encumbrances that have gathered during the polemics."

26 April 1965

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




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COMMUNIST AGRICULTURE  
STILL AILING IN EASTERN EUROPE

OBJECTIVES: Add to the growing pressures on European Communist regimes to drop excessive state control of agriculture; turn new nations away from Communist models.

\* \* \* \* \*

SITUATION: BPG Item No. 886 and its unclassified attachment, 29 Mar 65, dealt with the various internal reforms which Bloc regimes are being forced to permit as a consequence of decades of Communist failure in the economic sector. These reforms, however, have scarcely touched the agricultural sector, which still suffers fully (except in Poland) the administrative stranglehold and mismanagement of Communist bureaucracy. The encouraging upturn which ensued from and prevailed for some time after Poland's abandonment in 1956 of forced farm collectivization, should have convinced leaders of other Communist regimes that agriculture prospers everywhere in direct proportion to the absence of state coercion and state interference with individual initiative. But the other regimes could not or would not see the implications of this working example in their midst. For state ownership and control of the land is at least as important to Marxism as is control of industry. So their agricultures continue to languish, unable generally even to supply their own populations adequately, while regime apologists (as in the economic sector) try to rationalize the endless failures or to blame them on the occasional natural adversities which are the lot of farmers everywhere, and which are taken largely in stride by the non-Communist countries.

In the economic sphere, the Bloc regimes are talking of substantial administrative and ideological concessions to private initiative. Not so in the case of agriculture. While there is undoubted recognition of the superior effectiveness of private agriculture, steps are not being taken to actually revert to private ownership or relax state control to any extent. The regimes certainly want the land and farmers to produce as successfully as possible, i.e., to feed the population and to have surpluses for export (including aid to developing areas). But they seek to achieve this end with so-called "incentives" or ideological subterfuges, rather than grant the farmers any bona fide proprietary interest.

See the unclassified attachments for a summary of the agricultural situation in Communist Central Europe. The one titled "A New Look at Bloc Agricultural Growth" was produced by RFE (Radio Free Europe).

TREATMENT: There are few subjects of such basic and universal human interest, and none on which the Communist countries are more vulnerable, than the business of producing enough to eat. The manifest difficulties of Communist regimes to properly feed their populations -- e.g., witness

food lines, grumbling and sporadic demonstrations against price increases and short supplies, hasty government moves to purchase enough from abroad to feed their people, meanwhile reassuring them that bread would arrive -- is a telling propaganda theme for all audiences, if properly presented.


Much publicity has been given recently to trends away from command economics and to plans for economic (industrial) reforms among the Communist states of Eastern Europe and even the USSR. Very little has been heard of relaxation of timeworn Communist agricultural policies. The available record of facts and statistics makes clear that agriculture, least of all, can be excluded from liberalization programs or left at the mercies of CP functionaries. To counter the Communist smokescreen of excuses, promises, and ideological gibberish, we should keep the pertinent facts of Communist agricultural bankruptcy in the foreground and in perspective for Bloc audiences in general.

Potential Western creditors and Communist trading partners in the Free World should be reminded of a basic fact, i.e., that so long as Communist countries cannot even keep up with the food requirements of their own population growths, long-term commercial deals with those countries may rest on an equally shaky base and be subject to the risk of inadequate economic performance in trade goods.

Government officials, planners and opinion molders in developing countries should be kept aware of the rapid decline of agriculture in every country where communism has taken over. The acid test for Communism has been agriculture, the field in which political maneuvers and propaganda slogans were no substitute for success, and we should show that Communism has failed conclusively in this test. We should point out, in this light, the incongruity of agricultural advice or aid from Communist sources -- the cynicism of food-deficit Bloc countries buying Western foodstuffs and re-exporting same to buy influence in Cuba or other areas of political unrest.

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
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
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



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
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




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Fact Sheet

~~Background Use Only~~

26 April 1965

The Situation of Soviet Labor

To judge by official titles, the slogans on the walls, and the symbolic hammer and sickle, the workers and peasants--and especially the workers--rule the Soviet Union. All the industry, all the capital plant of the country officially belong to the people. The state is now "the state of the whole people." Paradoxically, all these trappings only weaken the real power of the workers, and strengthen that of the managerial elite, the "New Class." Strikes are illegal, since (so the official reasoning goes) the economy belongs to the people and any strike is a strike against the people. The ruling Communist Party, dominated by New Class elements, issues continuous propaganda representing itself as the "vanguard of the working class," and pretending that its interests and those of the workers are identical. Whenever the managers and party officials want to organize a speed-up, or force workers to do unpaid overtime work, they stage "voluntary" and "spontaneous" resolutions by "the workers." The Stakhanovites have been largely replaced by competitions between groups or labor brigades, but this is only another technique for forcing individuals to work harder, and for breaking down any solidarity among workers.

No independent newspapers exist to expose these tactics, no soap-box speakers are allowed to attack them. And of course it is the New Class that reaps the benefits of the system: higher pay, better apartments, official automobiles, vacations on the Black Sea, special privileges of every kind. The present situation contrasts with Lenin's insistence in 1917 that officials must be elected, subject to recall, and paid no more than a competent workman. There is no ruling class anywhere that exploits the workers more effectively than the Soviet New Class. If Karl Marx were alive today, he could easily write a critique of Soviet society; the examples he gives in Capital of early Victorian capitalist exploitation could readily be matched with cases from the present-day Soviet Union, with an added element of chicanery and coercion. What would the capitalists Marx described have given for such levers as the Soviet worker's labor book, in which an unfavorable entry can bar future employment, or for the practice of "voluntarily" surpassing the plan, under which each Soviet worker made an average contribution of 108 rubles worth of production to the state in the first four-and-a-half years of the Seven Year Plan!

It is true that conditions have improved since Stalin's day. It is no longer a criminal offense to be late to work, or to seek a new job without being ordered to do so. The Soviets have finally recognized what Marx saw clearly, that slave labor is uneconomic, and the slave labor camps have been replaced by much smaller prison camps, mostly occupied by real criminals. Working hours have been reduced and pensions have been increased and extended. Soviet propaganda claims that unemployment is non-existent, and boasts of such services as free medical care. But Soviet workers depend on the crumbs which the system chooses to give them; they cannot strike for better working conditions, or even complain about them without danger of punishment.

The crucial weakness of Soviet labor is that it cannot form genuine unions and bargain collectively. In Chapter 28 of Capital, Marx described the legislation which, from the end of the 15th century, had attempted to fix maximum wages and prevent workers from organizing. He ended with a scathing account of the Loi Chapelier of 1791, by which the French bourgeoisie tried to forbid any coalition of workers, although he admitted that for the most part British anti-union laws had been repealed in 1825 "before the threatening bearing of the proletariat." But as far as genuine union organization goes, it is forbidden today in the USSR; wages in the USSR are also fixed by the state, as under Edward III of England. True, bodies exist in the Soviet Union which call themselves trade unions; controlled by the party, they in fact serve as "yellow unions" or "company unions." Their aim is to induce the workers to increase production, not to fight for better wages or working conditions. In 1963, an official union publication called on Soviet unions to concentrate on the following:

"An early fulfillment of the production plan for 1963, further growth of labor productivity, lowering the cost price, improving the quality of output, eliminating losses due to breakdowns and other non-productive expenditures, and implementing a strict economy regime; wide introduction of new equipment, perfecting technological processes, and raising of the level of mechanization and automation of production."

As for wages, a compilation of Soviet labor legislation states flatly:

"The amounts of wages and the application of different systems of wage payments to workers and employees are established by the government..."

Soviet apologists say of course that there is no conflict of interest between state and worker. We shall see later how true this is.

As a result of the absence of effective union organization or of an effective labor lobby in the USSR:

1. Real wages fail to rise and even decline as the cost of living rises faster than wage payments. The average number of hours of work required to earn weekly food for one person (i.e., a fixed quantity of bread, flour, potatoes, sugar, beef, milk, eggs, butter, and other fats) was 7.9 hours in 1958 and 9.4 hours in 1962, almost as many hours as in 1953. Actual food budgets would run substantially higher. In 1963 and 1964 there were food shortages, and free market prices went up 30 per cent in the fall of 1963. Like the unscrupulous London bankers described in Capital, though with somewhat different motives, the Soviet government degraded the quality of flour and bread. In many localities, breadlines formed in 1963-1964, and fruit, vegetables, sugar, and milk were often unavailable. In the USSR more than 50 per cent of the family budget goes for food, as



compared with about 30 per cent in Great Britain. In regard to other consumer goods, an inexpensive suit costs 75 rubles and a cheap pair of shoes 25 rubles, while the average worker's full monthly earnings (according to Soviet officials) were 80 to 90 rubles in 1964. Some do much better; foremen make 200 rubles a month. Unskilled laborers barely achieve the monthly minimum wage of 40-45 rubles, and often do not earn that much. In the early 1960s, reductions in the work week and upward revisions of labor norms led to serious cuts in the wages paid to many workers.

2. Workers are paid largely on the piece-work system, usually considered unacceptable by organized labor. In the early 1950's 75 per cent of Soviet workers were on piece-work. This proportion has now fallen, since with mechanized and automated production processes it is often not feasible to pay on a piece-work basis. But over half of Soviet workers are still on piece-work.

3. There is no unemployment compensation, and very little in the way of an employment service. Officially, unemployment--like worker discontent--does not exist. Actually, the problem is simply pushed out of sight. There are various jobs which amount in practice to work relief, such as unnecessary positions as porters and sweepers, and there are many persons who cannot find jobs in the specialties they are trained in, and who are forced to take jobs which do not pay a living wage. There are also those whose labor books are lost or contain adverse comments, who cannot legally find a job at all. Beggars and others spend the night in railroad stations. Western countries might reduce unemployment too if they denied all unemployment assistance, forced people to take whatever job was available, and above all, kept no unemployment records.

4. Penalties for work stoppages and unacceptable products fall on the worker even when management is at fault. In cases of work stoppage or spoilage due to bad management, workers on time scales are paid from one-half to two-thirds the wages they would otherwise have been paid. If the workers are responsible themselves, they receive nothing.

5. Effective safety programs and measures are lacking. Safety campaigns are common, with posters, edicts, resolutions, and the like, but these have little effect on accident rates. Measures which would be effective, such as the provision of safety devices, the improvement of overcrowded factory conditions, a relaxation of pressures to exceed the norm, or the elimination of excessive overtime work, all seem to be regarded as too expensive by the Soviet hierarchy. The situation is typified by the fact that in early 1964 there was no production of safety goggles for farm machine operators or of asbestos hoods and gloves for metallurgical workers.

As a result, the Soviet Union has an annual accident rate of 45 per thousand persons employed, as compared with a US rate of 24.4 per thousand. (Even this understates the difference, since the Soviet rate only includes those incapacitated for at least three days, while the US rate is based on those absent for one day or more.) An American visitor to a Leningrad plant stated:

"The rooms are dark, dirty, and crowded with machines. Not even primitive safety equipment is to be seen. Graphite is used as a lubricant, and it covers everything with its characteristic black and slippery coating: stairs, walls, railings, and workers--generally black from head to toe.... This plant looked like something out of the nineteenth century...."

Paul Metzger, a Swiss engineer employed in installing a chemical plant at Balakovo, fell victim (as did his Soviet co-workers) to mercury poisoning, due to conditions arising from carelessness and haste in trying to meet a deadline.

"Not only I, but also the Russians who worked in the same area began to suffer severe headaches, attacks of dizziness, bleeding of the nose, and fatigue, which finally led to interruptions in the work.... Mercury vapor even in slight concentrations, causes severe damage to the liver, kidneys, and nerves. Headaches commence, the hands begin to shake, memory fails, and the teeth become loose."

The local hospital identified the illness, but the management took no preventive measures and permitted no delay. There was also danger of explosion and poisoning from carbonic disulphide. Metzger finally had to return to Switzerland for a period to recover.

6. Women are widely employed in unhealthy and dangerous work. Until 1957, Soviet women were employed in mines as miners; they are still employed there as engineers, supervisors, cleaners, ventilation operators, etc. (In England, all employment of women in mines was prohibited in 1842.) Occupations with serious occupational hazards --especially under Soviet conditions--are largely filled by women:

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Percentage of female workers</u>
Electric welders	73 per cent
Pressers and stampers	64 " "
Grinders and polishers	53 " "
Galvanizers	60 " "
Chemical industry	57 " "
Production of building materials, glass, and chinaware	54 " "
Printers	70 " "

One woman reportedly lifted up to 33 tons of weight a day in the course of her work. Izvestia noted (24 October 1964) that women were laying crossties on the railroad "while able-bodied men standing nearby are writing down in their notebooks that the norms are being fulfilled." These women also do a days' housework when they get home. As a result of such conditions, there are reports of increasing ill-health among working women, and the birth rate fell from 31.3 per thousand in 1940 to 23.8 per thousand in 1961.

7. The Soviet worker is unable to emigrate. Although industrial workers are now able (as they were not in Stalin's day) to travel without permission within the USSR, collective farm workers are not, not having internal passports. Various pressures and regulations are used to compel people to settle in Siberia, and to prevent them from returning to Moscow, Leningrad, or Kiev. Only very exceptionally can a worker get permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union, even if only to go to another Bloc country. This state of affairs contrasts with the ability of European workers in the 19th century, including workers in Czarist Russia, to escape an oppressive system by emigrating to South America, Canada, Australia, or the United States. It also contrasts with the present-day freedom of movement in Western European countries, which has permitted thousands of Italian and Spanish workers to find better wages in West Germany and elsewhere.

8. The supposed benefits often have gaps. In practice, medicines, bandages and dentures must be paid for -- if they can be obtained. The collective farmers only began to receive old-age pensions in 1964, and then at very low rates, averaging under 17 rubles a month; such a pensioner would have to spend more than four months' pension to get that inexpensive 75 ruble suit. The minimum monthly wage was supposed to be raised in 1960 to 40 rubles in rural areas and 45 in urban areas, and public statements gave the impression that this was already in effect; then in the summer of 1964, Khrushchev admitted that it was not in effect, and promised that the new minimum would be applied everywhere by the end of 1965. Whether this will happen remains to be seen. Persons who are involuntarily unemployed are ineligible for sickness benefits. Rents are low, but no bargain for those who lack influence and must make do with the average housing area for urban dwellers of 6.5 square meters--or less, since some of course have less than the average amount of space; the real beneficiaries of low rentals are the New Class, since they pay the same rates per square meter and obtain large, modern apartments. Similarly, the tax system, based mainly on a turnover or sales tax on necessities, favors the well-to-do; previously promised income tax alleviations for the lowest brackets have been postponed. The sanatoria and rest homes, widely advertised in propaganda, only have facilities to accommodate about 10 per cent of the working population each year, and the cost for a Moscow worker, including

transportation, of a two-week Black Sea vacation amounts to about five or six weeks' wages; the rest facilities are thus enjoyed mainly by the New Class, who at the same time have the influence or status necessary to get reduced fare or free tickets from the trade union organizations. A change from a six-day, 41 hour week to a five-day, 40 hour week, first promised for 1962, has been postponed; the average actual working week is probably at least 54 hours, with overtime frequently unpaid. One hour can hardly be a serious difficulty -- it is rather that a five 8-hour day week would not have room for the extra hours that can be worked into six days, five of which are supposedly seven hours.

It would be surprising if Soviet workers suffered all these hardships without resentment and complaint, and in fact it is clear that they are full of resentment and that they occasionally complain, despite all the dangers. Accounts have leaked to the West of civil disturbances in Karaganda in 1959 and in Novochoerkassk in 1962, the Novochoerkassk riots apparently being set off by an increase in meat and butter prices of 30 and 25 per cent, following reductions in pay. Dozens, possibly hundreds, of people were killed. In Karaganda, the trouble reportedly started when young people brought in to the Virgin Lands found lodgings unhealthy and food both inedible and insufficient; they sought to complain, and the authorities refused to listen to them, so the demonstrators siezed the food in a kolkhoz market. The first troops sent against them fraternized, instead of dispersing the demonstrators, and outside forces had to be used, killing over a hundred persons. No one knows how many other riots and strikes have gone unreported. In their open letter of 14 July 1964, the Chinese Communists claimed that "the broad masses of the Soviet workers, collective farmers, and intellectuals are seething with discontent," and stated that "on more than one occasion (the Soviet government) bloodily suppressed striking workers and the masses who put up resistance." Sometimes discontent arises from compulsory overtime, from the denial of vacation time, or from the arrogant behavior of officials; the director of a kolkhoz was described as follows in 1963:

"He does not need people, but a labor force: he doesn't look after anyone, speaks with no one politely, always screams at everyone. The people have complained more than once that he is likely to bait, maltreat, or insult anyone. He lives like a petty bourgeois, acknowledges no one and submits to no one. Young people do not run away to Nefekumsk for no reason."


This internal unrest helps to explain why the Soviet government has purchased grain abroad for the past two years, despite the cost in gold and the damage to the prestige of the Soviet Union abroad.

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
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
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
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




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


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Fact Sheet

~~Background Use Only~~

26 April 1965

Ailing Agriculture in Communist East Europe

Up until the time of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Russia herself was a substantial exporter of grain, averaging 10.5 million tons yearly from 1909 to 1914. Her grain exports were negligible for 37 years following the revolution.

Prior to WW II, Eastern Europe too was a food surplus area; between 1934 and 1938, Hungarian wheat exports averaged 430,000 tons yearly; Rumanian, 549,000 tons; and Bulgarian, 99,000 tons. Following Communist subjugation of Eastern European countries, the agricultural situation there went steadily from bad to worse. Khrushchev at one point was able to stem temporarily the USSR's food production decline by plundering the soil of the Virgin Lands. Thus the USSR was able to export some wheat to its European satellites: 548,000 tons in 1956, 4.6 million tons in 1957, 2.8 million tons in 1958, 4.4 million tons in 1959, 4.2 million tons in 1960, and 3 million tons in 1961. The late 1950's were the post-war production peak years for Bloc agriculture. However, production stopped rising or went into decline as the exhausted soil of the Virgin Lands began turning into a dust bowl in the 1960's. Presently, sugar is the only food in surplus supply in the USSR and Communist East Europe. The diet of the average Satellite worker has remained at the level of that of 1959/60. Communist imports of grain from the Free World are running at a high level; only Rumania was able to export substantial quantities of grain (mostly corn) from the 1964 crop, and the Soviets, while themselves net importers, are expected to export some grain to the Satellites in 1964/65.

According to recent announcements by CPSU First Party Secretary Brezhnev, Soviet farm output, which was slated to rise by 70 per cent during the current Seven Year Plan (1959-65), rose by only 10 per cent in the first six of the seven years. The figure of 10 per cent is not only 0.4 per cent less than USSR population increase during the same period, but is probably 10 to 15 per cent above the actual net, since official Soviet crop figures include chaff, dirt and moisture. The investment needs of Soviet and Satellite agriculture are great. For years, the regime leaderships have transferred large sums from agriculture into industry. Much of the burden of a hasty and unwieldy industrial program has been carried by the peasants. As a result, agriculture has been deprived of the investment critical to its development. Even a massive program of agricultural investment will only replace the vast sums which have been drained out of agriculture. It is significant that the 71 billion rubles which Brezhnev proposes to spend on agriculture in the next five years, a sum equal to that spent on Soviet agriculture during the last nineteen years, is estimated by Western experts to be only one quarter the amount needed to put Soviet agriculture on its feet.

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Planned increases in Satellite gross agricultural production for 1965 range from a modest two per cent for Hungary to an unrealistically high 8 per cent for Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. It is obvious from these planned increases, however, that none of the Satellites has any illusions that they will fulfill original five-year plan (1961-65) goals. Such figures as are available would indicate that in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Rumania, net agricultural production declined in 1964. Preliminary estimates of the important grain crop indicate a total output for the Satellites as a whole in 1964, slightly below the mediocre yields of 1963 and also below the normal average for 1957-61 (when the number of mouths to feed was considerably smaller than it is now). Total Satellite imports of grain reached a record level of 8 million tons in the consumption year 1963/64 and are expected to be no less during 1964/65. As in 1963/64, more of this 8 million tons is expected to come from the Free World than from the Soviet Union.

Soviet and Satellite production figures wherever farming is collectivized (in other words, all Bloc countries except Poland) show that the private plots of the collective farmers account for a share of yields that is all out of proportion to their relative size -- and precisely in the case of some of the staples that are of vital importance in feeding the populations. For example, tiny peasant plots produce about 50% of Soviet meat and milk, 60% of the potatoes, and 75% of the eggs. The regimes of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria have been particularly conscious of this production factor and anxious not to lose it.

Because Rumania has naturally rich and plentiful farmlands - more than 27 million acres under cultivation - the Communists could afford in the early years to simply exploit the agricultural sector while devoting their prime attention to industrialization. The year 1956 marked the beginning of a period of intensified pressure and persecution of the peasants by the Rumanian regime. In 1961 the regime launched an all-out drive for collectivization, aiming at establishing a form of collective farming in which the peasants would no longer have any right of land ownership. This was brought to a temporary halt by peasant demonstrations in the countryside, but in April 1962 the government claimed that the collectivization of all arable areas had been achieved three years earlier than planned. As of 1963, State and collective farms reportedly accounted for 93% of arable land, with private agriculture restricted to "private plots" on State-owned land or small "Free Farms" in the uncollectivized 7% or so of land. Despite this, privately owned livestock still accounts for over 40% of the total of cattle, sheep and pigs in Rumania. 40% of the milk, egg and vegetable production of Rumania is accounted for by private ownership, as is 66% of poultry production. For private initiative to feed a major part of the populace from a tiny percentage of the land and against great odds is a living refutation of regime agricultural doctrine, but it is a factor which the regime cannot ignore and dare not disrupt. The best the Bucharest regime has been able to do is to refer to the private plots as "auxiliary" parts of collective farms.

The Hungarian CP's pragmatism where certain bread and butter questions are concerned was illustrated by the regime's public encouragement of "household" plot cultivation by collective families. The farm journal Szabad Fold carried a reminder of this in its 21 March issue in the form of a warning to local authorities that household plots must not be neglected nor regarded as "an anomaly hostile to the collectives." The journal reminded the authorities that the household plots must receive full consideration in the drawing up of annual plans by the collectives. However, the farmers recognize this for what it is - sharecropping - with the regime making sure that the state gets a cut of all the fruits of private initiative; the farmers do not mistake this for any generosity or good will on the part of the regime. The upward trend in livestock numbers, which began in Hungary in 1964, is now being threatened by the most serious outbreak of hoof-and-mouth disease in years, which has spread into 15 of the 19 counties since last autumn. The Hungarians have not controlled the disease and have not reported it, leaving it to the Czechoslovak government to do so in the form of an order closing the Czech-Hungarian border to tourist travel. Meanwhile, outbreaks have cropped up in adjoining Bloc areas of southern Slovakia, Bohemia, Rumania and the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany. Adjoining non-Communist Austria has not experienced any outbreaks. Along with the hoof-and-mouth disease, Hungarian agriculture has been damaged by the unchecked spread of field mice, which caused damage valued at several hundred million forints to green fodders in 1964. The Ministry of Agriculture has ordered a nationwide campaign to kill off the mice in March and April, during which the whole population, including school children, will be pressed into field work.

Fact Sheet

~~Background Use Only~~

26 April 1965

A New Look at Bloc Agricultural Growth

The measurement of agricultural progress by countries is generally given in terms of gross production figures or by indices of output using selected years as a base for comparison. In surplus producing countries as well as those industrial nations with a productive agriculture these accounting procedures are adequate. It is with the developing countries, however, and those nations faced with a continued underproduction of food products that a more sensitive yardstick to measure agricultural development seems imperative. The concept of per capita output in terms of net agricultural production provides a meaningful addition to the existing methodology of measurement. This is particularly true in the East European communist bloc countries with unresolved problem of chronic underproduction of foodstuffs in relation to their grandiose plans of agricultural development.

The United States Department of Agriculture has worked out an index of net agricultural production based on the value of crop production less feed, seed, and waste; the value of livestock products are also included. The base period selected was the span from 1953/54 to 1955/56 for the USSR, a period of unfavorable conditions in agriculture. For the bloc countries the base is as given. The split year system is used which includes the harvests of the second half of a calendar year and the value of livestock products for the first half of the succeeding year.

In the European communist countries as a whole net farm output recovered this year from the serious setback suffered during 1963/64 but was still below the levels reached in 1961/62. Thus with the steady population increase, net productivity per capita continued to deteriorate from the moderate high of four years ago. The weight of the Soviet Union's agriculture in the composite total is clearly felt: about half the output comes from the USSR, so the ups and downs of the Soviet harvests appreciably affect the index figure. Nor is the continued regression a credit to communist central planning. Each country sets its farm production plan in accordance with the projected population growth. The record for the bloc in the aggregate is cumulative failure to reach not only their target goals but even to maintain previous levels of productivity. This is solid regression in any economic order.

Only two bloc countries were able to improve net productivity per capita, Bulgaria and the GDR. Bulgaria improved its position during the last two years but failed by two points to reach its 1962 level. This performance was mainly the result of an expansion of the irrigation system, greater use of fertilizers, and a shift in the cropping structure toward the high value crops: tobacco, sugar beets, vegetables. Substantial price rises in recent years contributed to the moderate growth. Nonetheless, agricultural plans were only partially fulfilled.

Eastern Europe: Indices of Net Agricultural  
Production, Per Capita by Countries  
1961/62 to 1964/65<sup>1</sup>  
(1952/53--1954/55 = 100)<sup>2</sup>

Country	1961/62	1962/63	1963/64	1964/65 <sup>3</sup>
USSR	122	121	112	120
Other Eastern Europe:				
Poland	123	117	111	112
East Germany	107	107	110	113
Czechoslovakia	120	118	115	113
Hungary	117	118	115	117
Rumania	117	109	113	117
Bulgaria	133	140	134	138
Yugoslavia	124	120	122	121
Total	120	117	115	117
Total Eastern Europe & USSR	122	120	113	119

- 1) The 1965 Eastern Europe Agricultural Situation, U.S. Dept of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, March 1965.
- 2) Base period for the USSR is 1953/54 -- 1955/56.
- 3) Forecast.

The GDR performance is attributable to a recovery from the precipitous drop in production following collectivization in 1960. Present output levels correspond with the average of 1955-59, however.

Czechoslovakia continued its steady decline for the third straight year in net growth per capita. The output of all major grain crops, as well as sugar beets, dropped during 1964. Meat output fell off as did the number of livestock. The migration of farm labor to cities has made additional inputs a precondition to normal yields. It is apparent that the levels of investment for machinery and fertilizer allocations have been inadequate, which along with the inefficiency of the collectivized farm system, account for the stagnation in farm output.

Hungarian net output has remained virtually on an even keel during the last four years with no improvement registered however. This stabilization, no doubt, was partially due to liberal state investments. For the third successive year, government investments were greater than planned. These relatively large investments have raised production costs at a faster rate than gross production value. But the experience of Hungary is not unique -- it applies to all the bloc countries. The hard lesson is that investment returns in a collectivized farm system come slowly and with declining marginal returns. The record shows that sustained and accelerated rates of investment are necessary to a steady expansion in agricultural growth.

Poland has been unable to match its record harvest performance reached in 1961, and what with the annual population increment, the net output per capita is 11 points below that base year. Gross farm output grew by 2 percent during 1964 which accounted for a 1 point rise in net output per capita. Here too, investment inputs have been inadequate to insure a modest acceleration in net agricultural output. This recognition no doubt influenced the regime in its decision to raise agricultural investment 60 percent during the 1966-70 plan period.

For Rumania, a near record corn crop pulled the net output back to the 1961 level. Two successively good corn crops were decisive and indicate an improvement in livestock output. Tobacco and sugar beets, both high value crops, improved substantially. However, no progress in per capita output was recorded. In national planning, moreover, the record in plan fulfillment is one of near failure. The only major agricultural targets that will be attained in the 1960-65 plan are the land collectivization goal and state investments in agriculture. The fact that collectivization was accomplished more rapidly than planned led to overfulfillment of the agricultural investment plan. On the other hand, no major production goals have been, or will be, fulfilled. The big gap between 1964 performance and 1965 goals is due to failures other than shortfalls in the irrigation and chemical fertilizer plans. Inadequate capital outlays and the built-in restraints of the collectivization system are primarily responsible for failure to improve the net output of farm products per capita.



Fact Sheet

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26 April 1965

Confrontation: Can It Crush Malaysia?

Last year President Sukarno vowed that "before the cock crows on 1 January 1965, Malaysia will be crushed." His talent as a prophet has to date proved to be on a level with his talent for mustering the vast natural resources of his country for the benefit of his people.

Since the formation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963, the new Federation has not only refused to succumb to Sukarno's bullying, it has: withstood the most bloody racial riots in Chinese-Malay history in July and September 1964; continued to enjoy a favorable balance of trade and increased foreign capital investment; raised what is already the highest standard of living in Southeast Asia, and begun to develop new industries to absorb labor that was dislocated as a result of the cut-off of trade with Indonesia.

Indonesian subversion, infiltration, sabotage and military aggression forced the Federal Parliament to pass new internal security laws giving the Government wide powers to detain persons alleged to constitute a threat to peace and public order. There is no evidence or complaint that the Government has abused its emergency powers or used them to quell opposition criticism. Even after Indonesian invasion attempts against the Mainland began, minority parties were not gagged even on the most sensitive policy issues. In October, for example, an opposition party (Socialist Front) proposed U.N. supervision over the Borneo territories, and in November the leftist Sarawak United People's Party boycotted the Government's Malaysian Solidarity campaign. In neither case did the Government attempt to invoke its emergency powers or harass the opposition in any unusual way. In Sukarno's Indonesia, any such attempt to resist or even oppose Government fiat would have found the individuals concerned in jail and the parties banned from any further activity.

Malaysia's future is by no means assured and the forces that drive it apart can still exert influence on those that hold it together. Nevertheless, a new Five Year Plan is being drafted on the basis of sound economic development of the entire territory of the Federation and a number of other forward-looking activities are being undertaken to build a better life for all the peoples of Malaysia while simultaneously guaranteeing them basic freedoms within a democratic framework.

Sukarno's confrontation results in a vastly different situation for Indonesia. The confrontation has taken place within the framework of constantly increasing influence and power for the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The consequences include a gradual transition toward a Communist form of government domestically and, as the junior partner of the Peking-Djakarta axis, increasing isolation for Indonesia internationally. Sukarno's precipitate withdrawal from the United Nations, applauded only by Communist China and her Satellites, is the ultimate symbol of that isolation.

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Even Sukarno's myth of national solidarity was shattered when he was forced to suppress even those enemies of the PKI who expressed devotion and loyalty to Sukarno personally. That is what happened in January 1965 when he banned the Murba Party, a party of Indonesian nationalists of Marxist persuasion who organized a "Body for the Protection of Sukarnoism." That group set itself the task of protecting Sukarno and Sukarnoism from manipulation by the PKI and immediately incurred the violent opposition of the latter. In Indonesia today, however, no one can do that and survive. D.N. Aidit, the powerful chief of the PKI, welcomed Sukarno's decision to ban the Murba Party and called it "a nice New Year's present for us from Bung Karno."

Economically Indonesia continued toward fiscal bankruptcy. Her debts to the Soviet Union and the West are now over \$2.5 billion and her future is mortgaged for at least 20 years.

Additional credits are apparently unobtainable from both sources and the Indonesians have turned to the only remaining source left to them, the Chinese Communists. In mid-November 1964 more than 500 billion Rupiahs were in circulation, more than twice the amount on December 31, 1963. Gold and foreign exchange deficits approached \$300 million. The best single indication of the dilapidated state of the Indonesian economy is the official rate of exchange is 45 Rupiah to one dollar in contrast to the black market rate of 9000 to one!

This economic deterioration is particularly distressing because Indonesia is the largest nation in southeast Asia and potentially the wealthiest. There are abundant natural resources in the form of rubber, oil and tin. Crude oil production in 1960 was 20.6 million tons and proven petroleum reserves exceed nine billion barrels. The prospects for expansion of the oil industry on both Sumatra and Borneo are good. Tin production has fallen in recent times, from a high of 36,400 tons in 1954 to 23,000 tons in 1960, but reserves are certainly large enough to rehabilitate production to earlier levels. Rubber production in 1960 was 620,000 metric tons, down from a high of 805,000 metric tons in 1954. Yet ever since Indonesia became independent her people have endured a subsistence level of living.

The PKI is not opposed to the economic deterioration for the simple reason that the worse it is should they finally take over the Government, the easier it will be for them to institute a few minor reforms and take credit for considerable improvement in the people's living standards. The PKI-inspired confrontation policy has been primarily responsible for the increasing ruin of the Indonesian economy and the PKI can be expected to continue to take advantage of Sukarno's preference for swash-buckling imperial adventurism over the less romantic, but more vital tasks of economic development.

The first full year of Sukarno's confrontation policy makes two points crystal clear: First, if the Malaysians fail to find suitable solutions to their problems, it will be because of their own shortcomings and inability to put first things first, not from Indonesia's confrontation. Second, so long as Indonesia continues her confrontation, her economic decline can never in fact be reversed; the PKI will grab more and more power, and Indonesia will become an increasingly junior partner in the Peking-Djakarta axis.

Fact Sheet

~~Non-Background Use Only~~

26 April 1965

Collection of Controversial Statements from  
Moscow Broadcasts Concerning African Leadership

(Note: Underlining in following statements has been added for emphasis.)

Moscow Gives the OAU Its Marching Orders

Moscow in English to Africa, 26 February

"The Agenda of foreign ministers meeting of independent African states in Nairobi contains a large number of important questions. They concern the strengthening of African unity, the national liberation movement, and the struggle against racial discrimination. Obviously, however, the Congolese problem will have greatest attention... Ministers will discuss the report of a special OAU Commission on the Congo - and not only discuss, but will take concrete constructive measures for speedy normalization of the situation... which is a result of domination of the foreign monopolies in the Congo, and Tshombe's reactionary regime which they have imposed upon the Congolese people. The committee of liberation of the OAU which met in Tanzania condemned the imperialist interference in the Congo and the bombing of Uganda by Tshombe's US-made aircraft. Most important, the committee recommended that the African states reconsider their attitude to the present Leopoldville regime. Great responsibility rests with the participants in the session for the maintenance of peace, in all of Africa. We should like to express the hope that the resolutions adopted in Nairobi this time will go beyond the framework of simple recommendations."

Moscow TASS International Service in English, 27 February

"The Soviet Union sides with the government and people of the Congo Republic (Brazzaville) in face of an imperialist conspiracy.

Attempts to Make the Best of Things

Moscow TASS International Service in English, 6 March

Commenting on results of the Nouakchott conference, the commentator notes that "despite pressure brought to bear on the conference by the anti-communist-minded leaders, the concluding communique did not include an article condemning the development of normal diplomatic and other relations between the African and socialist states. This is because 8 countries out of the 13 who met at Nouakchott have already established diplomatic relations with the USSR and other socialist states and are now expanding economic and cultural cooperation with them." Touching on the conference decisions to set up a new so-called Afro-Malagasy general organization, the commentator says this decision is regarded "as an attempt to re-establish

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the political Afro-Malagasy Union which discredited itself by openly pro-imperialist leanings. The concluding communique of the conference is worded rather hazily. However, if studied, it sheds light on the purposes pursued by the new organizations. First, the communique distorts the true reasons of the present aggravation of the political situation in Africa, caused by the growing interference of imperialist powers in the internal affairs of African states. Secondly, it attacks the OAU. Third, the conference makes groundless charges against several African states which abide by a consistent anti-imperialist stand, particularly against Ghana. Fourth, the authors of the communique come out in support of the Tshombe puppet regime."

Soviet Excuses for Nairobi OAU Meeting "Failure"

Moscow in English to Africa, 12 March.

"The session (Nairobi meeting) did not pass any new resolutions on the Congo.... The Congolese patriot, Thomas Kanza, assessing the results of the session, declared that 20 of the 35 governments represented refused to recognize the Tshombe regime as lawful.... Yet the imperialist powers did everything they could to frustrate the opposition of independent Africa to the Tshombe regime.... Under the direct influence of outside forces, a group of African leaders spoke (at Nouakchott) in support of the Leopoldville regime. This line was continued at the session of the OAU in Nairobi. The imperialist politicians, however, failed to neutralize independent Africa on the Congolese issue.

"How events will develop is still too early to say. The imperialist powers, using their agents, have apparently launched a wide offensive against independent African countries which are supporting the Congolese people. Tshombe's blunt statement that the commission of the OAU on the Congo allegedly no longer exists puts one on guard.... The absence of new resolutions on the Congo is explained by the New York Times as practically the abandonment of the old positions of the OAU. It goes as far as to say that after the Nairobi session, Tshombe is not under obligation to disband his mercenaries.... The actions of the colonialists and their henchmen are complicating what is already an extremely difficult situation in the Congo; but despite all this, events in that country are developing in favor of the patriots."

Moscow Reassurance to French Africa

Moscow in French to Africa, 13 March

"The Western press has been vociferous about the failure at the conference of the countries which fight for the elimination of colonialism on the African continent, and about the worsening of differences among African countries. When one reads the comments of Western papers, one may have the impression that African unity has disappeared.

"It is a fact that the hesitating attitude of several African countries at Nairobi did not make it possible to pass a constructive resolution on the Congo such as would contain concrete recommendations to solve the Congo crisis.

"Since the closure of the session, several African countries have confirmed their decision to lend assistance to the Congo insurgents who are fighting against the colonialists. Formerly, the insurrection movement of Congolese patriots was often of a spontaneous nature. At present, it is a well-organized struggle with its political and military centers, its government and administration. At the moment preparations are successfully underway for the final rally of all forces fighting in the Congo and of all Patrice Lumumba's disciples into a unified national anti-imperialist front. One should not be surprised that they (US and other Western countries) try to represent the Nairobi session as a failure of African unity."

#### Soviet Criticisms of African Leaders

Moscow Domestic Service, 17 March.

The lack of the Congolese rebels' success could be attributed to "disunity and estrangement within their leadership" and "frequent personal quarrels between political and military leaders."

#### Moscow Warns Africa of Danger to Unity

Moscow in English to Africa, 20 March

"Africa is living through another difficult period. Grave danger to cause of its freedom is caused by imperialist maneuvers spear-headed against Africa's unity, the maneuvers with Tshombe-type puppets. Imperialism is trying to set up warring clans to Congo-lize the whole of Africa. An example is the resurgence of the political bloc of 13 nations from among the former French Colonies, the bloc which has lately been known as the Africa-Malagasy Union. It is indicative that as soon as the organization was set up, its Western inspirers began to predict the restoration of another, a broader bloc, the so-called Monrovia group, which is also known for its close collaboration with imperialist powers. It is not difficult to understand that these maneuvers, aimed at restoring groups and organizations, strike at the unity of Africa, the forging of which began as the OAU merged two years ago.

"Ben Bella said, 'Obviously taken aback by the success of the African Unity Organization, imperialism and colonialism have developed a strategy geared to wreck its activities.' The meeting of the four presidents (Ben Bella of Algeria, Modibo Keita of Mali, Sekou Toure of Guinea, and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana at Bamako on 14 March) will be followed by more meetings to offset the maneuvers,

expose their actual meaning, and offset the danger they spell to the cause of African unity. Ben Bella noted the viciousness of the theory of dividing Africa into white and black, stressing that all Africa has common interests as it struggles against reaction. The statements (of the four presidents) have swept aside the slander of the imperialists and their agents who claim that the revolutionary countries were setting up their own grouping."

Soviet Explanations to Arab Africa and East Africa

Moscow in Arabic, 1 April

"The maneuvers by Washington and Brussels are embodied in the results of the OAU foreign ministers conference in Nairobi. The adoption of a number of useful decisions there, such as intensification of the boycott against Portugal and the Republic of South Africa, the special decision on the OAU budget and others, but the ministers did not reach an agreement on the most important question - the Congo... The situation which developed in Nairobi on the Congolese question was not unexpected. On the eve of the meeting, some of the African states announced that they recognized the Tshombe government and demanded that the other African countries halt their aid to the Congolese rebels. From the start, this was expressed by Nigeria and it was also adopted by the bloc called the moderate states... in Nouakchott."

Moscow in Swahili to East Africa, 3 April.

"The US realized that African unity is a chief obstacle to its imperialist policy in Africa. As a weapon in the struggle against this powerful obstacle, the US chose the Afro-Malagasy organization, which unites old colonies. The plan adopted by the Afro-Malagasy group has little to do with the task of the African Unity Organization. The resolution adopted in February by the heads of state of the Afro-Malagasy organization in Nouakchott called for full solidarity with Tshombe administration.

"The divisionist activities of the leaders of the Afro-Malagasy organization affect the work of the OAU. The recent meeting of the OAU foreign ministers in Nairobi could not adopt a single resolution on the Congolese problem.... The imperialist plots in the Congo will not succeed because today the destiny of Africa is in the hands of the African people themselves who by jointly confronting the common enemy were able to create a very important and strong weapon - unity."

Continued Attacks on the OCAM and Support of the OAU

Moscow Domestic Service, 6 April.

"Without renouncing attempts at direct suppression of the liberation struggle of the peoples, the imperialists are attempting to place in

the paths of the national liberation revolutions covering detachments from reactionary regimes and from the unification of pro-imperialist puppet governments. Thus in Africa the Tshombe clique is used not only to control the riches of the Congo (Leopoldville), but also for repression and pressure on neighboring states.... Attempts have been made to create, using the so-called Afro-Malagasy Union, a political bloc of states aimed at splintering the OAU. Leaders of independent African states have called upon people of their continent to take measures against imperialist intrigues. Ten liberated states openly support the movement against the Tshombe regime and for true independence of the Congo."

Moscow TASS, 7 April

"Most of the Africans have begun to realize clearly that the basic prerequisite for their independent development is unity. It is becoming clear why the OAU, which has proven its strength, is being subjected to such vehement attacks. The recent meeting in Nouakchott, where the leaders of the former Afro-Malagasy Union tried to white-wash the actions of the imperialist in Africa, actually came out against the foundations of the OAU."