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Briefly Noted

1 March 1965

Reflection of Party versus State
Leadership in the USSR
Rivalry?

Wolfgang Leonhard, well-known journalist, Sovietologist, a graduate of the COMINTERN school in Moscow and a one-time instructor at the East German party university, has published (on 22 January 1965, in Die Zeit, Hamburg) an article entitled, "Wer regiert das rote Reich?" ("Who Rules the Red Empire?"). Leonhard's thesis is that there is a long-standing controversy between the CPSU and the State apparatus in the Soviet Union, and that since the fall of Khrushchev, the State has regained some of the authority which it lost to the Party during the post-Malenkov period. Leonhard suggests that in the current situation, a shift in the relative strength of the two "pillars" will probably have effects on the relative status of the two men who head them; in other words, Kosygin may be gaining power at the expense of Brezhnev. In the long run, the present shift may represent an inevitable trend towards a loss of party control, due to the increasing complexity of the Soviet society and economy, too complicated to be effectively controlled through ideologically-oriented Party officials who lack technical knowledge.

Our evaluation of Leonhard's article is that he somewhat stretches his evidence; he does not really prove that the Party-State rivalry now exists. But his thesis is plausible, and can be useful in propaganda. Either by replaying Leonhard's article or by original treat-

ment along the same general line, we can make the Party-State rivalry a subject of discussion. This will tend to make such a rivalry actually develop, especially if Soviet and other Communist audiences learn of the discussion. Watch in particular for Soviet articles and statements which can be interpreted as evidence of such a rivalry; black use of such statements, aimed at Soviet elites, should be considered.

In other play, develop Leonhard's argument that the Party is no longer able to run the Soviet economy effectively. Khrushchev's efforts to impose Party control should be portrayed as a vain attempt to turn back the clock, while the present leaders are carrying out the logic of the bureaucratic machinery established by Stalin. A conclusion could be that revolutionaries neither build nor run modern economies.

Leonhard's article is an attachment to this Biweekly.

* * *

Justice
is the
CPSU

Statutes of Limitation

Justice is what those who control the CPSU say it is -- for the Soviet people as well as their leaders.

Many currently powerful officials in the Soviet Union aided and abetted Stalin in purging those colleagues his paranoid mind feared. Their role was that of bearing false witness, a crime officially punishable by two to seven years imprisonment.

But there is a statute of limitations -- ten years at the most on this crime.

Stalin died in 1953. So it would appear that the current leaders who gave false testimony for Stalin, are safe -- unless the law should be changed and the limitation period extended.

Looking further into Soviet statutes, it is clear that some degree of arbitrariness is written into the laws. Prosecution for crimes subject to the death penalty, for example, can be limited in time. But use of this statute of limitations is optional; and more and more crimes are subject to the death penalty, e.g., economic. Conviction for economic crimes is not difficult to obtain and scapegoats for economic problems are often needed. Since the CPSU controls the courts, a large sector of the Soviet population is in jeopardy of arbitrary action against them by the CPSU. History records that Communist officials have known no compunction against reaching far back into the past, fictionalizing charges or imposing ex post facto interpretations on actions. Statutes of limitations are meant to prevent such action and to protect the citizen -- but they cannot be counted on, in the Soviet Union.

Where the question of the West German Statute of Limitations on war crimes (due to expire in May after 20 years, unless extended)* is raised, we ignore it and discuss Soviet practices, pegging them to current events whenever possible. Or, we raise questions about the involvement of current Soviet leaders in crimes of the past (either with Stalin or Khrushchev) and discuss the significance of the Soviet system of justice in general.

*The cabinet has agreed to ask the Bundestag to extend.

* * *

STORED SOVIET WEAPONS
ENDANGER LIVES

If your country is receiving armaments (gifts?) from the Soviet Union,

the PEOPLE should know.

See Press Comment, 24 Feb 1965 for an article from a Caracas, Venezuela paper, El Mundo.

The story comes from a Doctor who treated soldiers for radioactive illness. They were guards at the caves where Castro stored the Soviet warheads of large rockets in 1962, and currently the small atomic rockets.

The Doctor explains the causes of the illness -- and its effect upon the guards.

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Press Comment includes an English translation of the Spanish language article:

and the El Mundo cartoon, in reproducible proof form.

See pages 36-40 for "Cubans Guarding Soviet Rockets Suffer Radioactive Contamination."

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Significant Dates ▶

MAR

- 14 Karl Marx dies. 1883 (Born 5 May 1818)
- 15 Ten-nation Disarmament Conference opens, Geneva. Fifth anniversary. 1960
- 21 World Youth Week starts. Celebrated by Communist WFDY. Twentieth anniversary of World Youth Council, predecessor to WFDY.
- 25 Treaties creating European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom signed by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. 1957
- 28 Sixteen leaders of Poland's Home Army and Govt-in-exile, invited to Soviet Occupation Hdqrs under safe conduct: arrested for "diversionary activities" and sentenced to up to 10 years in prison. Twentieth anniversary. 1945

APR

- 1 II Afro-Asian Journalists Conf., Algiers (sponsor: Chicom-Indonesia dominated AAJA) once postponed.
- 10 International Auschwitz Committee, General Session (FIR) -- commemorating 20th Anniversary of Camp Liberation, Auschwitz, Poland, 10-11 April 1945.
- 11 International Day of Liberation from Fascism ("Day of Remembrance") celebrated annually by International Fed. of Resistance Movements (FIR - Communist).
- 13 II International Conf. for Teaching Resistance History, (sponsored by FIR) Prague, Czechoslovakia, 13-15 April.
- 17 Nikita Khrushchev born, 1894.
- 18 Easter, traditional Peace marches, e.g., Aldermaston (UK) and Western European countries.
- 18 Bandung Conf. (29 Afro-Asian countries call for elimination of colonialism, for self-determination and independence, for UN membership all peoples) 18-27 April 1955. Tenth anniversary. [Note: Chou En-lai and Marshal Chen I reportedly accepted invitations to celebrations in Indonesia.]
- 22 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin born. 1870 (Died 21 January 1924)
- 24 World Fed. of Democratic Youth (WFDY) Exec. Committee meeting and seminar, Accra, Ghana -- to prepare for 9th World Youth Festival now scheduled mid-summer, Algiers.
- 24 World Youth Day Against Colonialism and for Peaceful Coexistence celebrated by WFDY and IUS.
- 29-30 Hitler commits suicide. Berlin. World War II. 1945 Twentieth anniversary.

GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS



Commentary

3-16 February 1965

#47

Principal Developments:

1. As last period ended, a top-level Soviet delegation headed by Premier Kosygin was departing on a trip to Hanoi seen by most observers as aimed to bring the North Vietnamese Party closer to the CPSU, and perhaps even to induce them to attend the 1 March preparatory commission meeting in Moscow. The itinerary was subsequently expanded to include 1-day stopovers in Peking en route to and from Hanoi and a 3-day visit to North Korea en route back to the USSR. Kosygin's visit was greatly complicated by Vietcong attacks on U.S. troop quarters and U.S. retaliatory air strikes in North Vietnam beginning the day after his arrival. Kosygin became increasingly militant in his public denunciations of the air strike "provocations" in particular and U.S. imperialism in general, and signed a relatively bland joint statement of mutual views in Hanoi, nothing in Peking, and a more harshly anti-U.S. joint statement in Pyongyang. Although, as usual, strict security was observed regarding all talks and we have no information of any secret agreements, most observers believe that Kosygin went no further than to offer increased moral and material support and to urge attendance at the 1 March Moscow meeting as a means of consolidating unity. There is no evidence that he succeeded in the latter effort.

2. The 15th anniversary of the Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship and mutual assistance (14 February) brought expressions on both sides about unbreakable fraternal ties. On the Soviet side, these expressions were stronger than in recent years when Moscow had implied that the treaty had lost its original meaning. China, however, was unyielding and Peking People's Daily even went so far as to refer specifically to the CCP 25-point, 14 June 1963 "proposal for a general line of the ICM" -- which really touched off the open warfare between the two -- as the only basis for unity.

3. We have seen two public Communist Party references to the 1 March preparatory meeting, both reiterated endorsements by parties whose support has not been in doubt: Mongolian First Secretary Tsedenbal in a 5 February speech and the East German SED in a Politburo report to an 11-12 February plenum, reported in Neues Deutschland 14 February.

4. The Rumanians continue their independent ways, publishing criticism of Czech views on Comecon. Although they have apparently not formally withdrawn from Problems of Peace and Socialism, they have distributed no copies of the Rumanian edition since last August.

5. A 4 February Pravda article, signed by an unidentified and obscure name, "A. Weber," made an unprecedented acknowledgment of the successes of the social democratic parties in the West in "expressing demands of the working masses, in leading them, and in achieving ... positive results in everything concerning everyday vital interests of the working people." Communists, it said, are led to "change some of their attitudes which no longer correspond with the objective situation," and to draw some "basic conclusions" on the democratic tenets of social democracy. It concluded that Communists "cannot ignore the fact that a more or less substantial coincidence of views on a number of basic questions makes contacts and cooperation possible."

6. The Albanians, 16 February, renewed their call for the Soviet comrades to join all true Marxist-Leninists in throwing out the "Khrushchevite traitors" (the present Soviet leaders who removed K. not because they opposed his course but to save revisionism). (The last and most strident previous Albanian call for the Soviet rank and file to arise and throw out the K. leadership came in the AWP "open letter to CPSU members" of 5 October 1964, on the very eve of K's ouster!)

Significance:

At the time of this writing, it is still doubtful whether Kosygin's trip satisfied his and the CPSU Presidium's intentions: of course, we cannot be sure what exactly the original purpose of his trip had been. Ideological reconciliation between Moscow and Peking seems as far away as ever -- but a military-tactical understanding to aid North Vietnam and to exploit the U.S. predicament in Southeast Asia cannot be excluded.

There is still no conclusive evidence that the 1 March preparatory commission meeting will be held (or that it will not). We consider it possible that representatives of 18 or 19 of the 26 parties designated may meet and address themselves to the problem of restoring a semblance of unity, -- but it is unlikely that they can at this time reach agreement on organizing a world conference.*

The 4 February Pravda article may foreshadow another reversal of Communist tactics concerning the Social Democrats, possibly a return to the "united front from above" or "popular front" tactics endorsed by the 7th Comintern Congress 1935 (to which the article alludes). Thus far, the article has remained isolated: we have seen as yet neither follow-ups in Soviet media, nor reactions in the foreign Communist or Social Democratic press. It may be a trial balloon: it may have limited meaning for current united front efforts in France and Italy and as an encouragement of certain left-wingers in the British Labor Party. Or, it may have more far-reaching significance, constituting perhaps even an implicit admission of the failure of the Communist Parties in the advanced industrial countries and a concession to similar heretical thoughts developed in the Italian CP since Togliatti's political testament, notably by Amendola. For the time being, we watch further developments and reserve definitive judgment.

*Editor's note: delegates were gathering for the meeting in Moscow at the end of February.

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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#47

3-16 February 1965

January (delayed) In the January issue of the Rumanian Party monthly journal, Lupta de Classa, an article sharply criticizes Czechoslovak views that members of COMECON should adapt their economies to "higher forms of economic cooperation," pegging the attack to a 1964 book by Czech economic expert Prof. Jiri Novozamsky. Lupta strikes hard at Novozamsky's proposals to establish joint industrial concerns (which would lead to "serious economic and political complications in relations between socialist countries") and for the opening of borders (identical with "the liquidation of state frontiers"). Observers also note that no copies of the Rumanian edition of Problems of Peace and Socialism have been distributed in Rumania since August, 1964, when the delayed and censored issues of May, June and July were circulated over a fortnight. (The other editions still list Rumanian as one of the languages.)

January 29 (delayed): Part II of the long article by disillusioned veteran Swedish Communist Strand, started on January 22 (Chrono #46), appears in Ny Dag and Stockholm Tidningen: his theme is that no one takes Swedish Communists seriously because they propose policies which are now being abandoned as failures in Communist-ruled countries, and he discusses these failures at length.

January 30 (delayed); Italian CP weekly journal Rinascita publishes full translation of January Kommunist article on CPI discussions about creating a single party of the working class (first reported by L'Unita on Jan. 23 see Chrono #46). A prefatory note by editor Pajetta gently takes exception to Kommunist's "drastic formulation" in which "the (Italian) Party leadership and its theoretical organs are said to have rejected the theses of Comrade Amendola." Pajetta asserts that the debate is continuing: "About the inquiry, its methods, and its results, we shall have to write more than once in Rinascita, and the comrades from Kommunist will still have to give much information, we hope."

February 4: Pravda features 3,000-word article by A. Veber, "The Communists and the Social Democrats." The first half is orthodox Communist comment on the decline of the socialists since the split of the 2nd International during World War One, their lack of success, and the "painful process of reassessing values taking place" in some of them today. Then, using "the problems of war and peace" as a bridge, he asserts that "there are socialists today who are coming closer to the Communists in their attitude to many problems of external and internal policy." He goes on:

"Historical development has removed or changed some problems and attitudes which in the past were deliberately dividing Communists and socialists and were thrusting the latter back to the positions of the bourgeoisie. Undoubtedly, changes taking place in the world under the influence of the forces of socialism lead the Communists to change some of their attitudes which no longer correspond with the objective situation....

(Chronology Cont.)

"The conferences of the fraternal parties of 1957 and 1960, the 20th and 22nd CPSU Congresses dealt a resolute blow to sectarian and dogmatist trends remaining from the past. The Communists take into account the fact that social democracy has deep traditional roots in the workers' movement in the West, that it presents one of its influential trends and cannot indiscriminately be regarded as an agent of the bourgeoisie. The social democratic parties, at least at certain moments, have succeeded in expressing demands of the working masses, in leading them, and in achieving certain positive results in everything concerning everyday vital interests of the working people....

"Remaining fully on the positions of scientific socialism and uncompromising struggle against bourgeois ideology in any of its manifestations, the Communist parties have drawn some basic conclusions which are important for understanding the problem of unity of the workers' movement. These are conclusions on the growing variety of forms of transition to socialism, on the struggle for democracy as an integral part of the struggle for socialism, on the role of profound democratic reforms and transformations for the advance toward socialism in highly developed capitalist countries, and on the maintenance of a multi-party system and the safeguarding of democratic legality.

"Concerning some important tasks of the workers' movement, there already exist to a certain extent similar or coinciding views between the Communists and socialists....No one closes his eyes to the fact that, as before, there exist profound differences between the Communists and social democrats in the understanding of the socialist goal, its contents, the methods, and the rate of achieving it. But one cannot ignore the fact that a more or less substantial coincidence of views on a number of basic questions makes contacts and cooperation possible."

February 5: At a large meeting of Ulan Bator city Party activists honoring the Shelepin-led CPSU delegation (see also Chrono #46, Jan. 27), Mongolian First Secy Tsedenbal asserts in his speech that "the MPRP attaches great importance to the meeting of the drafting commission of the fraternal parties set for 1 March this year." The Soviet delegation concludes its visit on the 6th.

February 5-15: Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to North Vietnam (see Chrono #46, Jan. 31 and Feb. 4) includes two one-day stopovers in Peking, 4 days in Hanoi, and 3 days in Pyongyang, North Korea. It is immensely complicated by the Vietcong attacks on U.S. installations and the retaliatory air strikes in North Vietnam, 7-8 February.

Kosygin is met by Chou En-lai and lesser officials at Peking airport on 5 Feb., with an unpublicized reception which meets minimum

protocol requirements (conspicuously differing from the "welcoming crowd" which, according to NCNA, met Cuban leader Guevara the day before with bouquets, drums and cymbals, and applause). After a banquet that night, "the two sides held a conversation." In Hanoi, Kosygin talks about moral and material support and signs a long joint statement which expresses common views on a wide range of subjects (but nothing offensive to the Chinese), including: "The unity and solidarity of the socialist camp and the ICM is an indispensable condition...."

Kosygin receives a similar low-key reception in Peking on his return from Hanoi, 10 February, but he is "received" the next morning by Mao and Liu Shao-chi -- with no mention of any talks. His visit to Pyongyang produces some unexpectedly strong speeches by Kosygin condemning the U.S. and supporting Korean unification as well as N. Vietnam, plus a joint statement of 14 Feb. more harshly anti-U.S. than that signed in Hanoi, though it is similarly "neutral" in supporting unity and solidarity of the ICM.

Press observers comment that, despite the militant Soviet language, the Kremlin apparently did not commit itself to any measures "beyond its presumed earlier intent" -- and that "the policy statements evidently did not serve to win Vietnamese and Korean attendance at the projected meeting of CPs in Moscow."

February 7: The old-line, pro-Soviet Indian CP reacts to the highly polemical Chinese reportage of the competing "congresses" of the CPI/L and CPI/R (see Chrono #45, Jan. 16) with a sharp blast by Chairman Dange in the Party weekly New Age. (Text not yet available here, but it reportedly attacks the CCP bitterly.)

Albanian Party daily Zeri I Popullit carries 15,000-word attack on "The Capitalist Nature of Yugoslav 'Workers' Self-Management' in the Light of the 8th Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists." Concluding its long-winded denunciation of the Yugoslav system, ZIP notes Pravda's favorable treatment and adds:

"All attempts by the Khrushchevite Brezhnev-Mikoyan-Kosygin troika and its followers to present as socialist the counter-revolutionary work of the Titoists has not yielded and will not yield any result. The little crows cannot become white. The truth about Yugoslavia cannot be concealed...."

February 8: Moscow correspondent of Belgrade Borba comments that "Three weeks before the scheduled meeting of the drafting commission of 26 CPs, it is not yet clear whether or not it will take place, although there are no signs either that it will be put off again." He adds that "To all appearances the original idea that the commission should draft a number of documents to be submitted to the consultation meeting of CPs has now been dropped."

February 14: The 15th anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship and mutual assistance brings a spate of affirmations of "unbreakable" fraternal ties in speeches at meetings, official messages and media comment, -- but there is no evidence that progress toward a reconciliation has been made or is likely. The Soviet expressions seem to go farthest toward meeting the other side and emphasizing the ties that bind, -- but obviously not far enough to satisfy the Chinese. Even the relatively brief telegram from the "troika," Brezhnev, Mikoyan and Kosygin, in emphasizing Soviet determination to "strengthen the unity of the socialist camp," stresses the recent conference of the Warsaw Pact members, which, of course, did not include any of the Chinese sympathizers and did include an observer from the Yugoslav regime anathematized by the Chinese. The speech at the Moscow public meeting is made by a relatively unknown CPSU/CC member, Boris Beshchev, Minister of Railways. And signed articles (not editorials) in Izvestiya on the 13th and in Pravda on the 14th and 15th refer not only to the Warsaw Pact meeting but also to the Kosygin delegation of North Vietnam and the Shelepin delegation, both of which are obviously aimed at tightening solidarity with the USSR as opposed to the CPR. Moreover, the 13th and 14th articles also include reference to Soviet "resolute support" of China "during the days of the Taiwan crisis [when the Soviets are generally believed to have exerted their utmost influence to restrain the Chinese from their aggressive aims] and in the alarming July of 1960," the latter presumably referring to Chiang's threat to invade the mainland, restrained by the U.S.

The Chinese statements clearly make struggle against U.S. imperialism, "the most ferocious enemy of the people the world over," the minimum condition for "friendship and unity" between the two, but the People's Daily editorial on the 14th goes much further:

"The basis of unity of the countries of our socialist camp can only be M-L and proletarian internationalism, can only be the revolutionary principles of the 1957 declaration and the 1960 statement. The general line of the ICM which the CCP/CC proposed in the form of a summary on 14 June 1963, is completely in accord with M-L, with the revolutionary principles of the statement and declaration...."

After thus reasserting that unity can come only on Chinese terms, PD reaffirms that "our hearts are with the great Soviet people" who "will surely surmount all obstacles standing in their way" [such as the CPSU leadership?] and "together with us Chinese people, struggle to uphold and strengthen the unity between China and the Soviet Union and the unity of the socialist camp and fight against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys until final victory is won."

February 16: Albanian Party daily Zeri I Popullit editorial, "What Lies Behind the Divisive 1 March Meeting Being Prepared by the Khrushchevite Revisionists?" reiterates its denunciation of Soviet efforts to organize a splittist conference. It begins with a reference to the Albanian Party's 5 October 1964 open letter to CPSU members "which not only served notice that it would not reply to the CPSU's original invitation to the preparatory commission meeting and "will have nothing more to do with the renegade group of N. Khrushchev," but also went on to call repeatedly on the Soviet rank and file to arise and throw out the Khrushchev leadership

-- less than two weeks before Khrushchev was ousted. (See also Chrono #39) ZIP then goes on to say that: "Life has shown that the present Soviet leaders removed K. from party and state leadership not because they were against his anti-Marxist ideological and political course, but rather to save revisionism and follow in the K. revisionist path but without a discredited and unmasked K." Though not as blatantly as in the 5 October letter, the Albanians renew the call for Soviet comrades to overthrow the new leaders and join the true Marxist-Leninists:


"Thus the AWP considers that the Communist comrades from the Soviet Union and all their companions who struggle for the great cause of socialism and Communism will strengthen the joint struggle against the Khrushchevite traitors.... It is time for everybody to assume his duty in the struggle against the renegades of M-L -- against the Khrushchevites and their followers. ... It is time for them to save their honor, socialism, and Communism!"

(Late addition:)

February 14: East German Party daily Neues Deutschland notes that a Politburo report to SED plenum 11-12 February endorsed the plan for the 1 March preparatory meeting.

876. COMMUNIST MOB ATTACKS ON WESTERN EMBASSIES AND LIBRARIES
Tar Brush and Kerosene Torch -- Substitutes
for Revolutionary Class Struggle?

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SITUATION: For years now, whenever an action of the U.S. Government (or of any other Western power) displeased the Communists, they predictably unleashed mob action against the embassies, consulates, information offices and libraries of the "guilty" government -- primarily in the Communist countries themselves, especially in Moscow, but also in neutralist and allegedly "uncommitted" countries like Indonesia, Egypt and elsewhere. The exact nature of the attack is always commensurate to the "gravity" of the Western offense, but also to the limit to which Communist governments and parties have decided to go in any given case. Consequently, these allegedly spontaneous "outbursts of popular indignation" are carefully planned, ranging from mere demonstrations with banners, placards, shouting and resolutions to physical assault, involving stone throwing, defacing the facades, coats-of-arms and flags of the embassy, breaking windows, but occasionally also destroying cars, burning books and even invading diplomatic offices, attempting to seize files (e.g., when burning the British Embassy in Djakarta) and committing any other form of vandalism. In certain instances, on the spot TV and other coverage reflects the premeditated nature of the so-called spontaneous demonstrations.

The police, even if given ample advance warning, seldom hinders such mob violence: at the utmost, it sees to it that the demonstration does not exceed its pre-determined limits. It may not permit book burning, if this is not part of the agenda. And it may induce the mob to leave once the time, allowed for this "spontaneous manifestation," has elapsed.

The primary and obvious purpose of such government-authorized mob action is psychological: the Communists (and certain of their allies or sympathizers, such as Sukarno or Nasser) want to humiliate the Western government in question, thereby demonstrating that "all imperialists are paper tigers" (even though the Soviets, unlike their Chinese competitors, shun the latter expression). They can do this with impunity, since they know only too well that no major Western power will stoop to retaliation in kind and that it will even prevent genuine, truly spontaneous demonstrations of their own people from coming too close to a foreign diplomatic installation. The Western government afflicted may send a diplomatic protest -- which inter alia indicates to the Communist perpetrators that their blow has been felt: or it may demand financial compensation for the damage -- which, however justified, can be used by Communists to justify their charge that the

However, the noise and excitement of such mob attacks serves another, more fundamental and more significant purpose: it h i d e s from the Communist rank-and-file and from public opinion at large the embarrassing fact that their leaders can do little else, more specifically that they are lacking the means which they ought to use against the "imperialists." Neither Marx nor Lenin nor any other of the founding fathers of Communism were thinking of tar brushes and burning books when they preached their gospel of the international class struggle which would "inevitably" result in a world-wide dictatorship of the proletariat. According to their doctrine, this proletarian class struggle would become stronger and more powerful, the further the capitalist economy in a given country would advance and the more class-conscious proletarians of the entire world would cooperate in one single, rigidly disciplined, monolithic international organization.

Consequently, if an imperialist government would threaten harm to a socialist country, the proletariat of that imperialist country would rise in righteous wrath to prevent -- or at least to impede -- such outrage. Appeals to that effect, addressed primarily to the workers of England, France and Germany, are contained in numerous early documents of the Communist International, in the first few years after World War One -- to no avail. The Communists tried it again after World War Two, mainly in France, when they endeavored to prevent, first, the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe (1947) and then the NATO alliance (1949) -- again in vain. In the U.S., Britain, West Germany and other Western nations, the Communists have not even tried political mass strikes or other forceful tactics in pursuit of their international objectives. In other words, the most fundamental tenet of Communist doctrine -- the inevitability of successful proletarian class struggle, inexorably advancing in all capitalist countries -- has been completely disproved by recent history.

The Communist leaders are aware of this basic failure, even though they are careful not to admit it. The Chinese Communists have fairly openly written off the Communist Parties in the major Western countries (which mostly side with Moscow, anyhow) and are placing all their bets on "national liberation" in developing areas. Moscow does not abandon the Western CPs -- which the Soviets can use as instruments for subversion, espionage, sabotage and propaganda, even if they have little value as power factors in the global Cold War. But both Moscow and Peking have chosen as "short-range solutions" the easy, safe tactics of spectacular mob attacks on Western installations and representatives -- which they are also promoting in developing countries, to make the imperialists "lose face."

Reference

Political Demonstrations (Confidential), especially its chapter G, "Deceptive Demonstrations."

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
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877.

ARMAMENTS IMPEDE SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH

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SITUATION: Every year, in late January, the Central Statistical Board of the USSR announces plan fulfillment results -- i.e., the results of Soviet efforts to fulfill and surpass the plan targets -- for the preceding year. (There are also quarterly and semi-annual plan fulfillment reports. BPG #818, "Soviet Industrial Growth Declines," 31 August 1964, discussed the results of the mid-1964 report.) As is usual in Soviet statistical reporting, efforts are made to present the figures in as favorable a light as possible, and to conceal major failures. This January, although the report was frank in giving livestock figures which are lower than last year's (this can be blamed on Khrushchev's poor harvest of 1963), grain production figures were omitted for the second year in a row. Perhaps the harvest was not really as good as Soviet sources claimed last fall; perhaps it was feared that the publication of both gross production and percentage increase would enable people to deduce the 1963 crop. Industry also showed a decline in growth, with results particularly poor in the light and food industries.

In the long run, Soviet industrial growth rates would have declined in any case, simply because rapid growth is harder to maintain in any economy as it becomes more developed. But the decline in recent years has been too dramatic to be explained by such long-term considerations. A publication of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, Annual Economic Indicators for the USSR, February 1964, gives the following growth figures for Soviet civilian industrial production:

1959	8.6%
1960	6.3
1961	6.7
1962	7.2

The 1950-1955 average was 10.1 and the 1955-1961 average was 8.7, according to another JEC publication, Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power. Recent estimates by some of the Committee's expert advisors gave a figure of 6 per cent for 1963 and 1964. This 1964 figure (which was preliminary) may eventually be revised downward, for in the past these Western estimates have averaged around 2 per cent lower than official Soviet figures (which involve double counting), and the Soviets now admit to an industrial growth figure of only 7.1 per cent for 1964, the lowest admitted industrial growth figure since World War II. In 1962-1964, Japanese industrial growth came to 12 per cent.

There has been, then, a rapid drop from the USSR's 10 per cent average of the early 1950's, and indeed the decline becomes abrupt in 1958, 1959, and 1960. The decline in the value of new plant completed is even more striking: in 1958, new investment completed increased 16.2 per cent; in 1959, 13.2 per cent; in 1960, 8.0 per cent; and in 1961, 4.3 per cent (Soviet figures, given in Annual Economic Indicators). The explanation for the sudden drop appears to be that the Soviet economy became over-committed, and in particular, that it became overcommitted to military and space development. It was in the post-Sputnik years of 1958, 1959, and 1960 that Khrushchev came to hope that he could bluff his way to world victory, using space spectaculars and nuclear and ICBM demonstrations to overawe the West. The bluff seems to have been put aside, at least temporarily, after the Cuban crisis, but neither that event nor Khrushchev's fall have brought about a serious cut in military-technical expenditures. Such cuts as are advertised appear to affect only conventional forces. (See also BPG #861, "Military Forces in the World Today," 18 January 1965.)

An unclassified attachment, "Problems of the Soviet Economy," discusses the latest plan fulfillment results and the handicaps imposed on the Soviet economy by the Soviet regime. See also BPG #839, "Soviet Economists Advocate Capitalist Techniques," 26 October 1964, and BPG #818, referred to above.

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
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879.

COMMUNIST CHINESE EVICTED FROM BURUNDI

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SITUATION: The Burundi government's early February expulsion of the entire staff of the Chinese Communist embassy temporarily halted Peking's march through the countries forming the northern crescent around their main goal: Congo (Leopoldville). The CPR's success in buying their way into the Burundi government and key organizations apparently led to their overestimating the extent of their control; then they and their local lackeys blundered badly.

In December a massive Chicom arms shipment was transiting Burundi when the King determined to put a stop to the use of his non-aligned country as a base for support to the Congolese rebels. He seized the arms and replaced pro-Peking Prime Minister Nyamoya. Still the extent of Chicom subversion in Burundi might have gone unnoticed had not the new Prime Minister been assassinated. (See unclassified attachment, "Chinese Communist Subversion in Burundi.")

There is nothing new in the Chicom pattern of operation in Burundi. Their clandestine operations might be likened to damage termites do below the surface which is brought to light only by accident -- in this case, murder. Key figures from youth and labor, from government and opposition political parties are suborned (as the Chinese have also done, respectively, in Congo (L), Sudan, Mali, and Senegal). Communications media are established or penetrated (as in Kenya); refugees and dissidents are armed (as in Cameroon and Niger). Political indoctrination and training play a key role: some leaders and students were sent to Peking, as has been standard procedure in other African countries, but Communist guerrilla warfare training facilities in Africa are being increased. Chinese specialists are teaching guerrilla warfare at bases in Congo (B), Ghana and reportedly are negotiating with Algeria.

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
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880.

ANNIVERSARY OF THE BRAZILIAN REVOLUTION
AGAINST GOULART AND HIS COMMUNIST ALLIES

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SITUATION: As the first anniversary of the April Revolution approaches, practically all events of this year have confirmed its unique, Brazilian character. Although initiated by the military, it was consummated by a majority of the state governments and had been supported by truly spontaneous, mass demonstrations in the major centers of population. And although an arbitrary act set the revolution in motion, the government of Brazil was restored to full legality after a lapse of only two days.

Rather than a "revolution" the events of 1 April 1964, marked the restoration of orderly processes and the end to a subtle and gradual drift toward a Communist take-over. Since succeeding to the presidency in late 1961, João Goulart had contributed toward undermining his own government by appointing Communist and ultra-nationalist leftists to important posts.

The first of a series of events that precipitated the crisis was Goulart's reckless sponsorship of a mass meeting on 13 March in Rio. With the backing of the Communists, he called for basic changes in the government structure, legalization of the CP, and dramatically signed two decrees, one confiscating six privately owned oil refineries, the other giving the government broad discretionary powers to confiscate land and hand it over to the peasants. The most important single act was his refusal to discipline the enlisted personnel involved in the mutiny of sailors and marines 25-27 March. When army troops arrested the mutineers, Goulart ordered them released with assurances that they would not be punished. On the evening of 30 March, Goulart addressed a gathering of army sergeants, in a final effort to secure the sympathy of the rank and file of the armed forces. This was the crowning insult, but the revolt was already under way. The next day, Governor Magalhães Pinto, of Minas Gerais state, called for the removal of Goulart. He was followed by General Amaury Krueel, Commander of the Second Army, based in Sao Paulo, and other army commanders and state governors. Goulart flew to Brasilia and sought support from Congress and the people. Not finding either, he flew south to his home state of Rio Grande do Sul. During afternoon of 2 April he crossed the border into Uruguay, and the Revolution was thus consummated without shedding a drop of blood or firing a single shot in anger.

As elsewhere in Latin America, the Brazilian Army looks upon itself as a stabilizing force, a guardian of the constitution. But Brazil is unique among Latin American countries in that it has never been under military dictatorship. Thus it was that, in the early morning hours of 2 April, the Congress met and declared that Goulart had vacated the office of president. Article 79 of the Constitution was invoked and the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Ranieri Mazzili, was declared president and sworn in a few minutes later by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The "violent" phase of the revolution had lasted only 55 hours.

On the 9th of April, the Supreme Revolutionary Council decreed its now celebrated "Institutional Act," which provided for a general purge of corrupt officials and pro-Communist congressmen, depriving some of their political rights over a period of years. On the 11th, in a joint session of congress meeting under the authority of Article 79 of the constitution, General Humberto Castelo Branco was elected interim president by a vote of 361 with 78 abstentions. In order to preserve the civilian character of the office, the new president divested himself of his military rank and title.

It was the role played by Congress that made the April revolution unique in the annals of Latin American upheavals. Congress not only took the initiative during the early confusion, but later cooperated actively with the executive in passing much needed legislation. By the time it recessed on 1 December 1964, 500 bills had been passed, of which only 150 had originated with the executive authority -- and many of these were passed in altered and improved form. Congress has been neither obstructionist nor a rubber stamp, but has found the rare and happy medium between the two extremes all too often encountered among the Latin American democracies. Congress thus became an active partner in the revolution.

When the new government took over last April, it was confronted with the staggering task of bringing some order to the chaotic state in which Joao Goulart had left the Brazilian economy. The gross national product in 1963 had not been able to keep pace with the increasing birth rate. Inflation had climbed to an annual rate of 140% during the last three months of the Goulart regime, about double the average increase over the past decade. Budget expenditures appeared likely to reach 3.3 trillion (3.3 millones des millones, or almost \$2 billion) cruzeiros, with an anticipated deficit of 1.5 trillion. By the end of the year, the projected deficit had been cut in half and inflation had been brought back to a manageable 80% for 1964.

These spectacular results were achieved only through courageous resistance to public pressure and made possible by teamwork between the executive and the legislative powers. Subsidies to inefficient government-managed agencies were slashed, thousands of drones were removed from government payrolls, and new tax laws passed to open up new sources of revenue. Other legislation was enacted with a view toward encouraging private investment, particularly of foreign capital. Thus, the economic outlook for 1965 is good, with massive foreign assistance -- \$450 million from the U.S. -- being an important factor.

Perhaps the most far-reaching legislation to come out of the new government so far is the agrarian reform law, passed by voice vote of both houses of congress on 26 November. Unlike most land reform proposals in Latin America, this one seems to lack the demagogic, political ingredient. It does not promise idly to expropriate from the wealthy to give to the poor. As Castelo Branco sees it, land reform means, first, increased production, and second, redistribution of land. Where large estates are cultivated inefficiently or not at all, they can be expropriated and the owners compensated with bonds whose value will be tied to the cost of living. Conversely, where small holdings are inefficiently used, they will be amalgamated to form larger units.

Other forward-looking legislation that has been passed include the following: National Housing Plan (23 July 1964); a bill removing tax exemptions for judges, lawyers, journalists, and authors (22 July); a constitutional amendment on rural land taxation and expropriation that paved the way for the Agrarian Reform Law (6 November); four bills on union budgets, income tax legislation, consumption tax, and stamp tax (27 November).

Under Article 79 of the Constitution, Castelo Branco's term was to expire in January 1966, when the winner of the 1965 elections would take over. On 22 July, Congress passed a constitutional amendment extending Castelo Branco's term to March 1967. This will give the present governmental team an additional year to carry out its program.

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March 1965

881.

BUDDHISM IN SOUTH VIETNAM:

PEACEFUL FAITH OR POLITICAL MILITANCY?

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SITUATION: A handful of "political" Buddhist monks in South Vietnam are making it almost impossible to establish and sustain a viable government in Saigon. The leader of this faction is Thich (meaning "Reverend") Tri Quang, a controversial man who was twice arrested by the French on suspicion of working with the Communists. However, the charge could not be substantiated and he was released.

Tri Quang's negativeness and his reluctance to be specific about what he wants, casts a serious doubt on his motives, on the one hand; and on the other, make it virtually impossible for other South Vietnamese elements to get his cooperation on any of the myriad life-and-death problems that they face. He will say, for example, in response to questions about what kind of government he will support, only that he will back "any government that agrees with out policy." But he is either unable or unwilling to be any more specific about what his policy is. Regarding Buddhist objectives, Tri Quang says only that "we Buddhists never want anything. To say that we want this or that is wrong. We never sponsor anybody." Tri Quang's reasons for opposing a particular individual within the government are equally vague or general and rarely substantiated. Whether Tri Quang is or is not working with the Communist Viet Cong may be a moot question; but the vital fact is that his actions and his entire position play directly into the hands of the Viet Cong and are becoming the main factor in bringing about the disintegration of law and order that the Viet Cong so strongly desire.

Tri Quang claims that he speaks for some 80 to 90 percent of the Vietnamese people. He arrives at this figure in the following manner: everyone who does not explicitly state that he is a member of another faith is considered a Buddhist and Tri Quang represents all Buddhists. His claim is belied by Dr. Mai Tho Truyen, Chairman of the Vietnamese Association of Buddhist Laymen. Dr. Mai, in his book "Buddhism in Vietnam," estimates that only some 30 percent of the Vietnamese people really qualify as true Buddhists. Further, Quang's faction is by no means the spokesman for all Buddhists in Vietnam. In a secret-ballot election just over a year ago Tri Quang was defeated in his bid to become titular head of all Vietnamese Buddhist. In May last year Tri Quang again challenged Thich Tam Chau, leader of the Buddhist executive apparatus in Saigon, for control of the entire Buddhist hierarchy. Tri Quang failed to achieve his objective and Tam Chau got a vote of confidence in his own leadership, while clearly rejecting Tri Quang's views and tactics.

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Truly religious Buddhists who are loyal to the basic tenets of Gautama Buddha want nothing to do with Tri Quang's constant intrigues and political manipulations. They quietly adhere to Buddha's "Four Noble Truths." (1--Existence or Being is sorrow and suffering; 2--the source of suffering is desire or craving; 3--the only remedy for suffering is to expel desire; and 4--Desire can be expelled by following the Eightfold Path which consists of right views, right endeavor, right mindedness, right intentions, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood and right concentration.) These concepts generally lead Buddhist monks to decry "the wretchedness" of human conditions and to withdraw into a world based on meditation, humility and adherence to the scriptures. Nowhere in Buddha's teachings is there the slightest justification for monks to issue political decrees, organize demonstrations and riots, topple governments and generally seek to take State power in their own hands.

Unfortunately the very views of the unworldly, self-effacing Buddhists make them easy prey for the minority faction that prefer intrigue and political manipulation to the orthodox Buddhist pursuit of "impersonality" through detachment, meditation, begging and other recognized spiritual concepts. These passive attitudes also make Buddhist organizations in general vulnerable to Communist infiltration and manipulation.

In Southeast Asia the Communists attempt to subvert Buddhism and use it for their own ends just as they have done with Christian groups in other parts of the world. They say that there is no conflict between Communists and the principles of Christianity or Buddhism and they exhibit puppet priests and monks as "proof" of their tolerance toward religious groups. However, once these groups are no longer useful to the Communists, their religious beliefs are attacked as being fundamentally in conflict with Communism and then they themselves are denounced as the arch enemies of Communism. Another classic error that religious groups make is to believe they can "handle" the Communists and gradually bring them back into the fold. The sheer numbers of people who have tried this and failed is proof enough of the futility of such an approach.

Inside Communist China the regime is still maintaining the facade of religious tolerance in deference to the strength of Buddhism throughout Asia. Its true intentions, however, are clearly demonstrated in their cruel suppression of Buddhism in Tibet. In North Korea the fate of Buddhism was settled quickly and simply by assigning all monks to manual labor on farms and in factories. A similar fate awaits the Buddhists in any country where the Communists take control.

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GERMAN INDEPENDENT WEEKLY EXPLORES QUESTION
OF 'WHO RULES THE RED EMPIRE?'

Following is a translation of an article by Wolfgang Leonhard entitled "Who rules the Red Empire?" in the German-language independent weekly newspaper, Die Zeit CPYRGHT (Time) No. 4, Hamburg, 22 January 1965, page 47

A highly unusual discussion has lately been going on in the USSR. The role and function of the communist party in Soviet society is being debated. Should the Party have authority over all aspects and areas of living and should it get directly involved in all details - as has been the practice up to now? Or should the Soviet Communist Party limit its activity to setting forth the general policy directives and naming its members to the most important positions and functions? These problems are being discussed not only by the high political authorities but they have sometimes seeped through to the press even though still in rather veiled references.

This is not the first time that contradictory interests between the communist party and the state power authorities have become apparent. Immediately after Stalin's death in March of 1953 Malenkov who was the Soviet Prime Minister at that time, tried to give a greater influence to the State organs - that is to the Council of Ministers of the USSR and to the Supreme Soviet - and thus to trim some of the all-encompassing power of the communist party. At the beginning he even had some success. Important political declarations - such as the introduction of the "new course" in August of 1953 - were made by Malenkov to the Supreme Soviet and not to the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the communist party. For a time the party leadership was pushed somewhat to the background. Only after some difficulties did the party apparatus under the leadership of Mr. Khrushchev regain the lost terrain and the "leading role" of the party in all areas of living was re-established and consolidated. This tendency was even more evident in the last years of

the Khrushchev era. All political and economic problems of the country, even the minutest details in agriculture, industry and construction were almost without exception discussed by the plenary sessions of the Central Committee of the party, decided upon and the decisions announced.

With the fall of Khrushchev in middle of October 1964 a new phase has begun in the changing relationship between Party and State. The highest positions of the Party organs on one side and of the State and Economic Administration on the other were given to two separate persons. As the First Secretary of the Party, 58 year old Leonid Brezhnev represented and represents the interests of the eleven million members of the Soviet communist party.

But besides Brezhnev there is 60 year old Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, which makes him to all practical purposes the Prime Minister. Apparently, the top Soviet authorities, immediately after Khrushchev's ouster, had taken the decision, which by the way has not been publicly announced, to make the separation of the two highest positions final and permanent. This is apparent from a reference the Pravda (Truth) made on December 16 to "certain additional guarantees" that had been taken "against an excessive concentration of power in the hands of one person".

However, this decision has obviously not done away with the controversy between Party and State Administration. On the contrary: now the real tug of war began between the two powers. At the beginning it was the Party which had the offensive. In his speech at the anniversary of the October revolution party leader Brezhnev clearly expressed his views on the supremacy of the communist party.

But it seems that this declaration expressed only the personal opinion of Mr. Brezhnev rather than the views of the entire leadership. In this connection it was noted that at the plenary session of the Central Committee in mid-November it was Podgorny rather than Brezhnev who delivered the decisive report. There was something else which was even more important. Up to now the plenary sessions of the Central Committee had focused their attention on state and economic problems but the November session limited its activity almost exclusively to interior party problems and personnel changes in the hierarchy. Another surprise was the way in which the communiqué about the plenary session was published. For the first time since over twelve years the communiqué was not spread out over the entire front

page of the Pravda but was set in three columns only.

All this was no mere coincidence, as further happenings plainly showed. Two weeks after the plenary session of the Central Committee, the Government paper Izvestia (News) published an article by the Prime Minister of the United Bielo-Russian Republic, Tichon Kisel, which created a sensation. For the first time the article openly discussed the delicate subject of the Party-State relations. Kisel was complaining that "in recent years" the role of the State organs had been "curtailed". This tendency had had a "negative influence on the activities of the State organs". An end must be made to the "petty bossing of the economic organs and to the incompetent interference with their activities". The reader of Izvestia was left with no doubts whatever that "petty bossing" and "incompetent interference" referred to the Party.

The new trend was also apparent at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet which was called in early December. At this meeting Brezhnev gave only a short address while Kosygin delivered the program containing speech in which the new Soviet Prime Minister twice complained about the "petty bossing" of the State and economic organs - which was clear enough to every one of the 1400 delegates to the Supreme Soviet.

On December 6 the Pravda also ventured into this subject. Although the mouthpiece of the party did not go as far as some of the functionaries of the State administration and economic administration would have liked it to, it now openly admitted that "the role of the Soviets" - which means the State organs - "had in recent years been curtailed".

Of course, as could be expected, this same article underscored the leading political role of the party, but at the same time it pointed out for the first time the limits of the party's functions and power, and went so far as to advocate a revaluation of the state organs.

The reaction of the "pure" party functionaries was predictable. The local and regional circles of the party structure - and most certainly also some higher echelons of the party - do not accept this new line without resistance. But the other side is now also making itself heard. With the slogan "Down with petty bossing" the representatives of the state and economic administration are trying to push carefully but firmly a stronger independence of their organs while on the other side the representatives of the party want to reaffirm the supremacy of the Party with their slogan, "The Communists

have sole responsibility for everything".

The present discord about the changing relationship between State and Party has an immediate as well as a long term aspect. The present aspect is in the fact that the Party is represented by Brezhnev whereas the State administration has Kosygin in the Kremlin. A shift of the weight of the two "pillars" would certainly affect also the power position of both men now in top functions.

But the long range aspect is even more important: that is, what kind of role should the CP play in the changing Soviet society. Up to now the party and its organs were simultaneously the ideological mentor, the centre of political power and an economic-technical administration. But the more diversified the industrial society becomes, the more difficult is it for the party to control and resolve all details of practical economic problems on top of the political ideological ones. In the past the party has always successfully fought off any attempts to limit its competence. But now the power relationship has altered. Therefore, it is quite possible that this is the beginning of a development which would upgrade the state and economic organs. It is possible that this shift in power will already be legalized in the new Soviet constitution which is now being drafted. The current controversy between Party and State could thus become the starting point for a penetrating reform in the political system of the USSR.

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Fact Sheet

1 March 1965

Problems of the Soviet Economy

On 29 January 1965, the USSR Central Statistical Board made its annual announcement of plan fulfillment results for the preceding year. The figure for 1964 national income growth -- "more than 7 per cent" -- was 2 percentage points higher than Premier Kosygin had predicted in December. On the other hand, industrial growth fell behind Kosygin's expectations: instead of 7.8 per cent it was 7.1 per cent, the lowest figure since World War II. Since national income is a measure of the whole economy, i.e., of industry plus agriculture, and since industry fell behind expectations, the increase in national income growth would appear, at least at first sight, to be due to the 1964 crop being larger than expected.

Few would doubt that the 1964 harvest compares favorably with that of 1963, a year of agricultural disaster. The 29 January announcement did not, however, reveal figures for the 1964 cereal, sugar beet, potato, and cotton crops, saying only that delivery plans for these crops were "fulfilled," and that the "total harvest of crops increased." Thus it is impossible to say how these crops contributed to the national income result, and the lack of data suggest that the Soviets are concealing something. Theodore Shabad of the New York Times has reported that, according to one theory, a higher proportion of the 1964 crop was delivered to the state than usual, so that record deliveries (claimed last October in preliminary announcements) did not necessarily mean a record crop. In regard to the difference between Kosygin's December figures and the 29 January announcement, it has been suggested that when industrial production fell behind expectations, Soviet statisticians saved the day by calculating from a lower -- and perhaps more honest -- secret figure for the 1963 harvest. This would make the 1964 agricultural production increase higher, and thus raise the national income growth figure despite the sag in industrial growth. In spite of admitted shortages in livestock numbers (an aftereffect of the 1963 crop disaster), the Soviets claim that total "agricultural production" increased 12 per cent. It is very unusual for Soviet agriculture to show better results than Soviet industry -- and in any case it is not really that agriculture is doing so well now, but rather that it did so poorly a year ago. Per capita food production is still below the 1958 level, and the Soviets are still importing grain from Canada.

Parts of Soviet industry did better than others. Chemical production, the object of ex-Premier Khrushchev's last campaign, increased by 15 per cent (1963 -- 17 per cent); the new leaders have reduced the 1965 targets in this industry. The production of electricity and "heat energy" increased by 12 per cent in 1964, and the metallurgical and machine-building industries, always favored up until 1963, scored 8 and 9 per cent increases respectively. But light industry output only increased by 3

per cent, and the food industry production increase is recorded at 2 per cent, partly a result of the 1963 crop failure. As usual, the Soviet consumer received the least benefit from "the building of Communism."

Most Western analysts would reduce the Soviet figures for national income or industrial production growth by about two per cent. This is partly because Soviet statisticians often count the same products more than once, in varying stages of production: to take a hypothetical example, a truck factory counts all the truck components, such as tires, which are supplied to it and already counted by other factories, and the tire and truck figures are added by the statisticians. Also, new products, whose production volume can expand the most rapidly, are given high prices, exaggerating the Soviet industrial growth rate. Alec Nove, an eminent Western student of the Soviet economy, says that "The official index of national income is at all times to be treated with a degree of suspicion" and that "the official claim to a seventeen-fold increase in the period 1913-55, for instance, is utterly incredible." (The Soviet Economy (N.Y., 1961), pp. 312-3.) Soviet figures are not often simply fabricated, but they are influenced in various ways; it is useful to compare one Soviet growth figure with another, but caution should be taken in comparing Soviet figures with figures from non-Bloc countries.

Why should there be a slow-down in Soviet industrial growth? One reason is that the Soviet economy is becoming more developed and mature, and this almost always brings a slowing-down in growth rates. When production is low in absolute terms, it requires little absolute increase to make an impressive percentage increase; this situation changes as absolute production rises. Other reasons for a slow-down in growth are revealed in the 29 January statistics. First, the increase in labor productivity dropped from 5 per cent in 1963 to 4 per cent in 1964. Second, the increase in new capital investment came to 8 per cent, but there was only a 6 per cent increase in completed (new fixed) investment; the failure to complete capital construction projects has been a continuing problem in recent years, with vast funds frozen in uncompleted projects. Furthermore, in 1958, by contrast with 1964's 6 per cent, new fixed investment was 16.2 per cent. A continuing increase in the investment growth rate would be needed to sustain an unchanging production growth rate; the USSR, however, has been reducing its investment growth rate.

Why should there be a decline in the rate of new investment, and even more, in the rate of capital plant completion? Part of the explanation lies in a need to appease the Soviet consumer, and in particular, in a need to spend money on agriculture. The quick, temporary gains in agricultural production, brought about by plowing the marginal Virgin Lands, cannot be repeated. But probably a more serious obstacle to investment, and hence to the growth of industrial production, arises from the diversion of resources to arms and space programs. With a national output about half that of the United States, Soviet leaders spend on military and space programs nearly as much as the US does. More serious, the very size of the Soviet military and space effort means the tie-up of such a high proportion of Soviet high-quality resources on military and space programs that

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that other economic objectives cannot be attained. To take one instance, the Seven Year Plan program for the automation of industry is a shambles. As already noted, the new leadership has cut back Khrushchev's chemicalization program.

The disproportionate expenditure on arms and space spectacles is one of the economic penalties the Soviet Union pays for having its form of economic dictatorship. Other handicaps to Soviet growth arise from other features of the system:

1. Insufficient agricultural production -- a result of years of sacrificing agricultural to industrial interests, even amounting to the use of collectives as a means of seizing crops without compensation. Earlier growth rates were only possible through "primitive accumulation," the deliberate neglect of agriculture and the consumer. Recent efforts to restore agriculture have interfered with other programs.
2. Inability of planning organs to cope with a developed economy -- Soviet planning has been an instrument for forcing the development of favored projects, regardless of considerations of cost. Even in the pre-World War II period, the economy could only be made to work by supplementing the plans with a sort of underground system of black market, wire-pulling, and "fixing." Having achieved a heavy industry base, and needing a more smoothly functioning system, the Soviet and East European governments have lately been turning attention to various ways to substitute profit and initiative for planning (Libermanism).
3. Meddling by party officials -- under Khrushchev, the economic processes were frequently disrupted while the latest reorganization was carried out. This is evidently one of the grievances which led his successors to engineer his downfall. It is unlikely, however, that the new leaders will avoid new reorganizations, even after they complete their present work of reversing Khrushchev's policies: e.g., by reducing the stress on chemical industry, increasing the stress on metallurgy. The targets of the Soviet economy are a political question, and if this question is not settled unilaterally by a Stalin, it becomes the subject of debate between various interest groups. The present leadership situation is likely to evoke a severe struggle, as the proponents of various segments of the economy contend for a bigger slice of Soviet resources.
4. Lack of incentive -- the plan system does not reward imagination, enterprise, and honesty. It compels managers to maintain a high inventory, produce old models, and conceal production potential.

It cannot be said that free enterprise economies always work smoothly, that they are immune to difficulties. But they do provide incentives which work day in and day out, without special campaigns and pressures; they do possess -- in the market -- a mechanism which reconciles interests

and rewards enterprise without political conflict; they do have a means of establishing prices and costs. The economies, so to speak, go with the stream of human nature and human interests, and do not try to swim against it; they have natural self-correcting qualities. The Soviets, on the contrary, have tried to swim against the stream. Some recent symptoms, such as the Liberman proposals indicate that at least some people in the USSR begin to realize the futility of these costly efforts.

Wednesday, Feb. 10, 1965 THE WASHINGTON POST

Does de Gaulle Believe His Gold Views?

By J. A. Livingston

PRIDE underlies President de Gaulle's recommendation that nations of the world cease to rely on the dollar and the pound as international currencies and return to gold, and gold alone. The General's intent is clear:



Livingston

1. To re-establish the French franc on a parity with the dollar and the pound in world esteem. So long as West Germany, or Sweden, or Italy hold dollars and pounds as reserves, and not francs, the French currency is second-rate.

But if gold becomes the sole international currency, then the dollar, pound and franc are on a parity. Things equal to the same thing, gold, are equal to each other.

2. To notify President Johnson, once again, that France does not welcome America's pervasion of Europe. Over and over again, de Gaulle has resisted American takeover of European companies (such as Simca by Chrysler and

Machines Bull by General Electric) and the establishment of American subsidiaries in Europe. Companies such as General Motors, Ford, General Electric, etc. dwarf their European counterparts.

In addition, de Gaulle has resented American military prowess — in Europe and elsewhere. He wants the American commitment in Europe to recede.

BY CASHING in French holdings of dollars for gold, de Gaulle puts pressure on President Johnson. He makes it more difficult for the United States to support the American establishments abroad and, at the same time, to maintain the dollar at \$35 an ounce for gold. His pronouncement on gold added to the pressure.

The de Gaulle recommendation has met with two sarcastic responses in European monetary circles: One is that the General did not mean what he said, the other that he didn't say what he meant.

The second is correct, if modified to: He didn't say all he meant.

President de Gaulle is not a stupid man. Nor are his advisers stupid. Simple arithmetic tells them that a return to the gold standard is impossible unless some-

thing is done about the gold supply.

Total gold reserves of Western nations amount to \$43 billion, only 65 per cent higher than in 1938. In that 26-year interval world trade has increased more than 600 per cent.

Any corporation which grows in size has to maintain greater liquidity—cash and other reserves. Thus, in 1948, when sales were \$4.7 billion, General Motors had \$540 million in cash and government securities. Today sales are \$17 billion and cash and equivalent are about \$1.5 billion.

DE GAULLE knows that world trade has ballooned. He knows that the existing stock of gold is inadequate. That's why nations have used dollars and pounds to supplement gold. If man doesn't have enough of one kind of money to carry on the world's work, he'll devise another kind.

In proposing to return to gold, de Gaulle is really suggesting an increase in the price of gold to \$70 an ounce or even more. This could be done by unanimous agreement among central banks and governments.

No change would take place in the relationship of world currencies. The dollar

would still be worth approximately four West German marks, five French francs, 625 Italian lire and seven British shillings. The market value of U.S. gold holdings would rise from \$15 to \$30 billion, the French gold hoard would increase from \$3.8 billion to about \$7.6, and the gold of other countries would likewise double.

But some governments would be cheated. Those central bankers who relied on the word of Presidents Johnson and Kennedy would discover overnight that the dollar is only half as good as gold. They'd be able to buy only one-half ounce of gold for \$35 instead of a full ounce as formerly.

Ministries have been overturned for less. Why, parliaments would demand, did you rely on President Johnson? Why didn't you keep reserves in gold?

President de Gaulle means well for France. But in his quest for prestige for the franc he is trying to lead the world back to the Nineteenth Century. Man has not yet learned to get along without gold as a means of international payment, but he also has learned that he can't get along with it.

NY TIMES
7 February 1965
Return to Gold?

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The lure of gold has proved irresistible to many men from King Midas to Ian Fleming's Goldfinger. President de Gaulle showed himself to be under its spell last week when he proposed that the world's traders should return to the practice of paying their foreign debts in gold, "which does not change in nature, which can be made either into bars, ingots or coins, which has no nationality, which is considered, in all places and at all times, the immutable and fiduciary value par excellence."

The smooth regulation of international trade does, in fact, depend on the existence of a means of payment which all countries can respect. For a long time the generally accepted international currency was gold, and to facilitate payments the major trading nations maintained their own currencies at fixed values in gold, known as the "gold standard." During the great depression between the wars, however, most countries had to go off the gold standard and the second world war further weakened currencies.

The eventual result was the creation of a new system, the gold exchange standard, under which the dollar and the pound sterling became accepted as alternatives to gold in settling international payments. This was possible because the U.S. undertook to convert dollars into gold, at the rate of \$35 an ounce, and Britain undertook to exchange pounds for dollars, at the rate of \$2.80 to the pound.

This system depends, however, on foreign traders having complete confidence that the American and British currencies will retain their full value and this in turn depends on the health of the economy in the two nations. The financial crisis last fall, caused by a lack of faith in the ability of Britain's new

government to handle the huge deficit in the nation's balance of payments, touched off a wave of speculation in the world's banks that demonstrated the precariousness of the whole system. The U.S.

is also suffering from a chronic balance of payments deficit, accentuated in recent weeks by France's decision to convert most of her dollar holdings into gold.

Reform of the international monetary system has been urged for some time. Discussions on the subject among the Club of Ten (the major non-Communist trading nations) got under way in 1963. But there has been more general agreement on the weaknesses of the present arrangements than on the best way to rectify them.

The problem is that world trade has increased at a much faster pace than the liquidity of the money which backs it up. World trade, for instance, has increased from \$44 billion in 1938 to \$298 billion last year; but the total value of reserves in gold and foreign exchange (mainly dollars) has only increased from \$27 billion to \$65 billion over the same period. Moreover the greater part of this increase has been in the foreign exchange holdings — which have gone up from \$1.8 billion to \$25 billion—rather than in gold holdings — which have gone up from \$25.9 billion only to \$39.9 billion.

President de Gaulle's analysis of the problem at his news conference last week was generally accepted. He also pointed out that when the present system was adopted twenty years ago "nearly all the world gold reserves were then held by the U.S." whereas "the currencies of the Western European states are today restored, to the extent that the total gold reserves of the Six today equal that of the Americans, and would surpass it if these states decided to convert

their dollar holdings into gold."

The President went on to criticize the U.S. for taking advantage of the dollar's status as a reserve currency to put itself in debt abroad without cost. By this he meant that the U.S. could pay off its trade debts abroad with dollars "which they alone can issue" instead of with gold "which has real value." He also complained that since dollars were in demand abroad, American investment in foreign countries became profitable, the result of which was "a sort of expropriation" of industry in some countries by the U.S.

The President's proposal that the world return to the gold standard was generally felt to be inadequate and even harmful. Gold alone, it was agreed, would not be sufficient to maintain the present volume of world trade; one third of the total payments are now made in dollars or pounds. A statement from the U.S. Treasury pointed out that such a standard "collapsed in 1931" and its restoration would be quite contrary to the main stream of thinking" among governments now studying reform of the system.

The main alternative remedy to have been suggested was the adoption of a new reserve currency. This was actually proposed by France at the Club of Ten meeting in 1963 but President de Gaulle's remarks last week suggested that he regarded such a step only as a temporary measure until there could be a complete return to a gold standard. But this proposal has from the start been resisted by both the U.S. and Britain who would prefer to strengthen the dollar and the pound rather than replace them. The prevailing opinion seems to be that it would be better to leave the system as it is than to take any retrograde step.

1 March 1965

Chinese Communist Subversion in Burundi

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On January 15, 1965 Pierre Ngendandumwe, recently installed liberal Prime Minister of the African kingdom of Burundi, was assassinated. On February 2nd, Burundi suspended diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists and expelled the 20 man staff. The eighteen days between these two events revealed a pattern of Chinese Communist activity -- some of it previously unknown even to top government elements in Burundi -- which can be likened to early stages of Chicom or Soviet infiltration in Zanzibar, Mali or other African countries. The Burundi government has not released all details of improper Chinese behavior but enough is known of Chinese contacts and techniques to put together a familiar picture of subversion in one more small country mistakenly believed to be gullible and defenseless against communism.

Government Investigation. An intensive investigation begun immediately after the assassination led to the arrest of several top figures who were outspokenly opposed to Ngendandumwe's replacing pro-Peking Albin Nyamoya. Those arrested included leaders of the trade union federation, the youth group, former ministers and other prominent government figures, many of them close to the confessed assassin and all of them strong supporters of CPR positions. Gradually the Chicom role in Burundi has been pieced together.

Chinese Campaign against Congo. Tung Chi-ping, a 24-year old cultural attache in the Chinese Communist Burundi embassy who fled to the U.S. embassy within 24 hours of his arrival, had worked for the CPR Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. He stated that the Burundi embassy was set up primarily as a base for fomenting political disorder in the Congo (Leopoldville). "Actually, Communist China does not care about Burundi. What they really care about is the Congo. Chairman Mao has said that if we can grab the Congo, we can grab the whole of Africa." He also said the embassy staff was expected to establish the friendliest of relations with the Burundi government so that the embassy could be used as a "stepping stone for our operations in the Congo."

Chinese Communist support to Congolese rebels is well known, beginning with Chinese arms and money invested in the Kwilu rebel movement through Peking-trained Pierre Mulele. Burundi-based Chinese support to the rebels in eastern Congo is supplemented by Chinese military training camps in Congo (Brazzaville) -- which may now be increased in size due to the loss of Burundi as an operating base.

One of the more flagrant abuses of Burundi's non-alignment occurred in December 1964. After 12 months in Bujumbura the Chinese, quite confident of their protected position, shipped in 100 tons of arms and ammunition intended for transshipment to the Congolese rebels. The King of Burundi learned of the plan, however, and seized the shipment.

Subversion inside Burundi. Communist Chinese training, coercion and bribery of key individuals are most significant for all countries. Two groups in Burundi -- labor and youth -- were prime targets as they are in any country which opens its doors to Communist representation.

For example, Augustin Ntamagara, a member of the National Assembly was among those arrested. He established a labor front, Federation Travailleur Burundi as a Communist-line political base but it had no legitimate labor membership. Ntamagara made frequent trips to both Moscow and Peking but Chinese money was apparently decisive. He boasted openly that the Bujumbura Chinese embassy had paid for his cars and had given him 5 million francs for demonstrations against newly installed Prime Minister Ngendandumwe. The FTB planned to publish a news sheet with Chinese funds and FTB apprentices were sent to Peking for "journalistic" training.

Also arrested were Francois Bangemu, President of the Burundi youth organization, Jeunesse Nationale Rwagasore, and Secretary General Prime Niyongabo. Both had led popular demonstrations against the Burundi government and had been strong supporters of the former premier, Albin Nyamoya and some of the JNR leaders were members of his government. The youth group program, like that of the labor group, had a pronounced Communist flavor. According to the West African Pilot of Lagos, Nigeria (1 February 1965), "JNR leaders have long been in the pay of the Chinese and Soviet governments, as police investigations have revealed."

Former Prime Minister Nyamoya and Zenon Nicayenzi, his chief of cabinet, were also among those arrested. Nyamoya's connivance with Communist China culminated in his signing a secret barter agreement including provisions which would have totally enslaved the Burundi economy. This move, coupled with the massive arms shipment intended for the Congo rebels, may have been the immediate basis for suspending relations with the CPR.

Tribal Targets. Communist exploitation of tribal animosities is widespread in Africa. The most radical Tutsi refugees from Hutu-controlled Rwanda (once coupled with Burundi as Rwanda-Urundi) received guerrilla training and money from the CPR. Chicom strategy may aim at overthrowing the republican government of Rwanda in order to gain another base for attack against the Congo. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Memmen Williams told a Senate committee that Communist Chinese involvement,

"...has included encouragement of extremist agitators who stir up the refugees to pursue a militant policy toward Rwanda and to terrorist raids across Rwanda's borders. Communist assistance to refugee extremists reportedly has encouraged financial support to the exiled ex-King of Rwanda and his close adherents, advice on organizing terrorist raids, some arms aid and the training of guerrilla instructors in mainland China. It is believed that this assistance in recent months probably has been coordinated by the Chinese Communist embassy in Bujumbura."

Many of those arrested in Burundi for pro-Chinese, anti-government actions are Tutsi. Burundi is dedicated to "national reconciliation among brothers" and abolition of "racial discrimination," according to the so-called Gitega agreements of the ruling political party. Prime Minister Bamina, who succeeded the assassinated Ngendandumwe, said that the Gitega agreements

"... were sabotaged and compromised, as the facts unfortunately testify. Those who sabotaged the Gitega conference were seeking all kinds of opportunity to further their prestige.

In bringing about the defeat of the resolutions adopted at the Gitega summit conference, the embassy of the Chinese People's Republic gravely compromised itself, and this interference on the part of a foreign country in the internal politics of Burundi obliged the Government of Burundi to suspend diplomatic relations with the Chinese People's Republic. In fact their support and their encouragement were always operated in one direction only and risked compromising not only our feelings of unity and esprit de corps between the Burundi themselves but also the relations between Burundi and neighboring countries."

Who is Next? The CPR now has embassies in Algeria, Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Dahomey, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Central African Republic and United Arab Republic. There are NCNA representatives in Tunis, Ethiopia and Senegal which have no embassies. (The notorious Kao Liang who was expelled from India for "unjournalistic activities" and then became funding channel for CPR agents in Zanzibar, was NCNA representative for East Africa -- including Burundi -- until recently. He has now moved his operations to Brazzaville, Congo.)

Moves against moderate or liberal elements may be expected in any of these countries. Labor and youth groups will most certainly be infiltrated in all of them. All the familiar techniques will be used but the measure of their success may not be evident in some cases until a great deal of damage has been done to African sovereignty and independence.

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RESTAURACION DEMOCRATICA EN BRASIL

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La democracia amenazada por la infiltración comunista, facilitada y estimulada por el Gobierno y por los seguidores de aquella doctrina, quienes ocupaban más de 250 puestos importantes en la administración brasileña, fue restablecida por la rápida acción de las Fuerzas Armadas, con el apoyo de los trabajadores, del pueblo, del Congreso y de los Gobernadores de casi todos los Estados de la Unión. El papel de las Fuerzas Armadas, en el episodio João Goulart, ha sido mal interpretado por quienes desconocen la realidad brasileña — aunque de buena fe — y por muchos a quienes interesa deformar, con fines políticos, el sentido de la transformación por la cual atraviesa el país. Estos últimos insisten en ver en este acto de las Fuerzas Armadas un sentido reaccionario, una connivencia entre grandes hacendados, plutócratas y militares de alta graduación, con el objeto de evitar las reformas reclamadas y defender privilegios inconfesables. Sin embargo, la realidad es diferente, pues no se ha mudado la forma de gobierno, que es la misma; ha sido sustituido un hombre y los métodos que anarquizaban a Brasil, desde la indisciplina que se predicaba entre miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas, la desorganización de la producción, por las constantes huelgas políticas promovidas por el Gobierno, hasta el empobrecimiento de los trabajadores, por la inflación incontrolable y por la demagogia desenfrenada. La intervención militar ha mantenido el Congreso, el Poder Judicial y la libertad personal y política de todos los que no han atentado contra la Democracia, o no se han beneficiado con la corrupción. La prensa mantiene su libertad, y el derecho de vivir libre del yugo comunista ha sido logrado sin un solo disparo.

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ción, pues transforma al hombre en esclavo del Estado. Retrotrae la civilización al régimen de los déspotas orientales. Y son tiranos vitalicios, que sólo pueden ser eliminados por la revolución, el golpe de Estado o el atentado.

Ante la imposibilidad de definirse (como lo desean los comunistas chinos) mediante una guerra — que hoy sería atómica y autodestructora —, la lucha entre la libertad y la esclavitud ha tomado otras formas, englobadas bajo la denominación genérica de "guerra fría". Guerra fría es el denominador común. En los países subdesarrollados, donde aún existe mucha miseria y mucha ignorancia, adopta el nombre de "guerra revolucionaria", con una filosofía propia y una técnica propia. Propende a la destrucción — desde adentro — del Estado democrático, facilitando así, al sobrevenir el caos, el establecimiento de los "Gauleiters" de Moscú y Pekín.

Esa es la guerra de la cual están siendo víctimas África, Asia y América Latina. En los países pequeños la suerte puede ser diversa. En nuestro continente, se impuso en Cuba. Esa victoria fue aprovechada para establecer allí una cabeza de puente, y una escuela de la cual egresan profesores de subversión y sabotaje, luego enviados a otros países de origen ibérico. Esos "técnicos" habrían de actuar, con mayor y menor eficiencia, en Colombia, Perú, Argentina, Bolivia, y muy especialmente, en Venezuela y Brasil.

En esos países la conspiración es realizada de dos maneras: de abajo hacia arriba, como se ha intentado en Venezuela, y de arriba hacia abajo, como se hizo en Brasil. En el primer caso, sería la revolución; en el segundo, el golpe de Estado. Aquí, según las declaraciones del propio Sr. Luiz Carlos Prestes — que es el "Gauleiter" de Moscú en Brasil, desde 1930 — el comunismo ya tenía gobierno.

Solo le faltaba el poder. Y éste iba a ser obtenido mediante las "reformas de base", propugnadas en reuniones populares y con huelgas oficiales — incluyendo la huelga general — preparadas por los asesores rojos del Sr. João

Goulart. Debían culminar el 1.º de Mayo siguiente, con la transformación del régimen. Los comunistas y sus aliados estaban tan seguros del éxito, que hasta se permitían el lujo de divulgar la fecha para su revolución, como si se tratara de una fiesta.

La infiltración era general. Comenzaba en la Presidencia de la República, donde los jefes de la Casa Civil y de la Casa Militar eran conocidos simpatizantes comunistas al igual que el Secretario de Prensa y el equipo técnico del Palacio del Planalto. Varios ministros de Estado militaban en la misma ideología, incluyendo los tres últimos que se desempeñaron en la certeza de Educación, que entregaron a los rojos la dirección de las asociaciones estudiantiles. El Ministerio del Exterior apoyó abiertamente las tesis cubanas, rusas o neutralistas. Los sindicatos obreros, controlados desde arriba por el ministro de Trabajo, fueron puestos en manos de los comunistas. Se crearon organizaciones superiores ilegales, como la CGT (Comando General de Trabajadores), la FUA (Pacto de Unidad y Acción) y varias otras, para promover la paralización general del trabajo. Los recursos del Estado y de organizaciones autárquicas fueron utilizados en una incesante campaña a favor de

las "reformas de base", contra la Constitución — ridiculizada como "arcaica" — como así también en la divulgación de la lucha de clases y en el odio de clases, como jamás se imaginó en Brasil. De la "cortina de hierro" importaron armas para ser distribuidas entre los grupos de campesinos que integraban las "Ligas Campesinas". La inflación fue deliberadamente acelerada, con la finalidad de hundir a las masas en la desesperación por el alza del costo de la vida, situación que el gobierno, arteramente, atribuía a las clases acaudaladas. Finalmente — lo más importante de todo — muchos de los comandos militares fueron confiados a oficiales corrompidos y dóciles a las insinuaciones del poder. Los sargentos, marineros y soldados eran incitados a rebelarse contra sus superiores jerárquicos, asesinarlos, destituirlos y realizar la revolución social.

Ya parecía que iba a ser así, con las consecuencias trascendentales para Brasil y para toda América Latina. Porque el día en que se hubiera concretado la cubanización del país, habrían seguido su huella, inevitablemente, todos los demás países. El comunismo habría dominado el mundo iberoamericano, como ya lo ha hecho con casi toda Asia y parte de África.

Lo más probable sería la reacción "a posteriori" de los brasileños, la cual desencadenaría la guerra civil. Sería, por cierto, una guerra civil similar a la de España, en 1936. Por el propio carácter ideológico de esta guerra, habría intervención de potencias extranjeras. Aparecerían "voluntarios". Se organizarían "brigadas internacionales". La guerra fría se transformaría en guerra caliente. Y entonces, comenzaría en Brasil la tercera guerra mundial, en la cual, por la acción de la "quinta columna" castro-comunista, se verían envueltos, de inmediato, todos los demás países de América Latina.

Por consiguiente, subestimaron la capacidad de reacción del pueblo brasileño — que había derrotado a los rojos en las últimas elecciones — al igual que la reacción de los

gobernadores elegidos democráticamente, y sobre todo, la de las Fuerzas Armadas, que siempre ejercieron un papel político importante en toda la vida de la nación. Fueron ellas tan eficientes y fulminantes, que en 35 horas y sin haber disparado casi un solo tiro, pudieron derribar el gobierno, convertido ya en apéndice de Moscú y de Pekín. Desde el punto de vista militar, ha sido un milagro; y de este milagro habrán de beneficiarse, no solamente los brasileños, sino también los otros pueblos libres de la Tierra, principalmente los de nuestro hemisferio, que ya pueden considerarse exentos de revoluciones paralelas en sus territorios. Estos beneficios favorecen, además, a Estados Unidos y a las naciones democráticas de Europa, que no tendrán que enviar a sus juventudes para luchar en nuestras tierras, como tuvieron que hacerlo en Corea, y aún ahora, en Vietnam del Sur. Porque ésa era la suerte que nos esperaba a todos. Nosotros, los de Brasil, tenemos nítida conciencia de esa predicción.

Si Goulart hubiera logrado implantar sus "reformas", y dado su golpe de Estado con la ayuda de consejeros rusos, cubanos y chinos, las cosas habrían cambiado de rumbo. En un plazo habrían cambiado su destino y llamado al cielo.

POR THEOPHILO DE ANDRADE

La revolución brasileña del 1.º de Abril ha sido una victoria, no sólo para Brasil, sino para todo el mundo democrático. Por primera vez, después del éxito del Plan Marshall, el comunismo internacional ha sido derrotado en una zona de vital importancia para todo Occidente.

En realidad, la lucha emprendida en Brasil — y que aún continúa — ya no interesa sólo a un país, sino a un continente, y en última instancia, a toda la humanidad. El destino del hombre depende, hoy en día, de saber si los años, las décadas y tal vez los siglos futuros, estarán regidos por gobiernos de libertad o de esclavitud. La vieja cuestión que envuelve a la humanidad, desde su organización en sociedad, consiste en saber si la supremacía será para el individuo o para el Estado. Porque la organización primitiva del Estado fue totalitaria. En él, solamente el gran déspota era libre. Así ocurrió en los imperios orientales. La liberación del individuo comenzó en la Grecia antigua, y se completó por medio del cristianismo, en una labor que demandó veinte siglos. Así, sin mayores sufrimientos, todos habrían alcanzado la igualdad política y económica, mediante la democracia, si la historia no marchara en avances y retrocesos, como todo en la naturaleza.

Sobre ese aspecto, el comunismo — tal como se aplica en el Estado soviético planeado por Lenin — es la máxima de la tiranía.

cuando ya todo habría estado perdido. Como los brasileños supieron actuar a tiempo, y están tomando medidas reparadoras, respetando escrupulosamente la estructura de la Constitución democrática, nos critican, pretendiendo darnos lecciones de libertad, como si la libertad no hubiera sido salvada en la undécima hora, cuando estaba a punto de perecer en este país.

Con el apoyo de la opinión pública, fue decretado un Acto Institucional, de efectos limitados, que regirá hasta el fin del presente período gubernamental (31 de Enero de 1966), cuando asuma el mando el futuro presidente a ser elegido en Octubre de 1965. El objetivo de este gobierno transitorio es "descomunizar" la máquina del Estado. Pero, ni siquiera ha sido decretado el "estado de sitio", ni trabas a la libertad de prensa. Por lo demás, la sucesión se ha realizado constitucionalmente, y

el general Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco, que ha pedido su baja del Ejército para desempeñar el cargo, resultó electo por aplastante mayoría del Congreso.

Si hubo intervención de las Fuerzas Armadas es porque, en un país como Brasil, una revolución no se desarrolla sin su concurso. Y ese concurso fue dado al pueblo y a los gobernadores, ya que, según la Constitución, es deber de las Fuerzas Armadas velar por el cumplimiento de la ley y por el Orden, que estaban siendo menospreciados por un gobierno perjuro, que traicionaba sus compromisos democráticos y conspiraba para colocar el país detrás de la "cortina de hierro", tal como sucedió en Cuba.

La democracia es una tradición de un siglo y medio en Brasil, desde su independencia; y, si las Fuerzas Armadas, que son un factor político en la formación y manten-

ción de la nación han intervenido raras veces en la evolución política, ha sido para restablecer el orden democrático y devolver en seguida el gobierno al poder civil. Es lo que también ha sucedido ahora. Las sucesiones por el proceso electoral son norma en la historia brasileña.

La revolución victoriosa del 1.º de Abril, ha sido realizada, por lo tanto, para liberrar al país de una terrible amenaza comunista, que de haberse llevado a cabo habría tenido consecuencias trascendentales para el hemisferio y para el mundo. Contrariamente a las acusaciones de "fascismo" y "gorilismo", difundidas por la internacional roja, la rebelión de los demócratas brasileños habrá de merecer el agradecimiento de todos los pueblos libres de la tierra. Sólo por un pelo Brasil no ha resultado el detonante de una tercera guerra mundial.



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Brasil Retoma la Ruta del Desarrollo

Entre 1957 y 1961, la tasa de crecimiento económico de Brasil alcanzó un promedio del 6,9 por ciento anual (la más alta de América latina, y una de las mayores del mundo). En el último de los años nombrados; el crecimiento alcanzó al 7,7 por ciento. La producción industrial aumentó a razón del 13,3 por ciento anual; la agrícola, en un 5,7 por ciento anual. El ritmo de inflación se mantuvo entre un 15 y un 20 por ciento en 1957/58 y subió a un promedio de 33 por ciento anual entre 1959-61. Con un aumento formidable de población, a razón del 3,5 por ciento anual, Brasil surgía como el nuevo gigante sudamericano, aproximándose con rapidez a la etapa del despegue, según las teorías de Rostow.

En 1962 la tasa de crecimiento económico bajó al 5,5 por ciento. En 1963 descendió al 2,1 por ciento. La inflación, en cambio, aumentó al 52 por ciento en 1962 y el 71 por ciento en 1963. La población siguió creciendo al mismo ritmo anterior, y, por primera vez, desde 1956, la renta nacional per cápita disminuyó. Mil novecientos sesenta y dos fue el primer año de gobierno efectivo de Joao Goulart; 1963 fue el año en que su acción económica y social alcanzó la máxima intensidad. Un impulso asombroso de crecimiento quedó estancado en dos años por una política demagógica, supuestamente nacionalista, basada en la persecución del capital, especialmente el extranjero. A ella se sumó, en los últimos meses de 1963, la campaña de agitación social orientada a permitir, mediante una reforma constitucional, la reelección presidencial.

Esta es la situación que heredó el actual gobierno brasileño, al hacerse cargo del país, hace diez meses. Aunque el cambio oficial era de 1.200 cruzeiros por dólar y el libre bancario de 1.280, el dólar se vendía en el mercado negro (que los brasileños llaman paralelo) a casi 2.000 cruzeiros. La tarea urgente era doble; por una parte, detener la inflación galopante; al mismo tiempo, poner otra vez en marcha el desarrollo. Como ocurre a menudo, las dos fases del problema eran contradictorias. Una política deflacionaria habría agravado el estancamiento. Para sanear la economía y devolverle su vi-

talidad, eran necesarias medidas que, a corto plazo, debían provocar una mayor inflación. El Presidente Humberto Castelo Branco, que ha tenido el buen sentido de instalar como ministros de su gabinete a hombres sobresalientes en sus respectivas especialidades, entregó esta responsabilidad a un equipo encabezado por Roberto de Oliveira Campos, quien tiene el título de Ministro de Planeamiento.

Según lo explicó el propio Oliveira Campos, se decidió antes que nada reducir el Presupuesto Nacional y rebajar el déficit previsto, que era de tres mil billones de cruzeiros, a sólo 750 billones. Para ello se suprimieron las subvenciones

destinadas a mantener precios artificialmente bajos de ciertos productos. Ello significó, naturalmente, fuertes alzas de precios, pero las nuevas emisiones que debieron haber sido de 600 billones, se limitaron a 300 billones. Es decir, que, si las subvenciones hubieran sido mantenidas, la depreciación de la moneda habría sido mayor, y, en consecuencia, también las alzas de precios.

Al mismo tiempo, para reducir el déficit presupuestario, se aumentaron algunos impuestos indirectos, lo que también significó mayores aumentos en el costo de la vida.

Para estimular la decaída producción se suprimieron controles de precios que habían resultado perjudiciales y se reajustó el tipo de cambio a un nivel realista. A fines del año pasado, el cambio pasó a ser totalmente libre, manteniéndose desde entonces alrededor de los 1.800 cruzeiros por dólar.

Como dijo el Ministro Oliveira Campos, el programa gubernativo no tiene por principal objetivo la contención de la inflación, sino la reanudación del desarrollo. Para ello se puso término a la sistemática persecución del capital extranjero de tiempos de Goulart. Ya se ha notado el efecto, en un considerable aumento de las inversiones. Conforme a la ley 4.380, de agosto de 1964, las utilidades podrán ser remesas al país de origen después de haber pagado un impuesto a la renta de un 25 por ciento, más un tributo adicional para las utilidades superiores a un

12 por ciento anual, que va desde un 40 a un 60 por ciento. Para justificar esa medida, funcionarios del gobierno han señalado la experiencia de períodos anteriores. Entre 1954 y 1961, cuando las remesas fueron libres, ingresaron al país 730 millones de dólares y fueron remitidas utilidades por 270 millones, quedando un saldo positivo de 460 millones. En cambio, los períodos de restricción, entre 1947 y 1953 y 1962/63, arrojaron saldos negativos para el país.

La inflación de 1964 ha sido de un 84 por ciento. El Ministro Oliveira Campos recordó que el primer trimestre, durante el cual gobernaba Goulart, arrojó una inflación del 25 por ciento. "En otras palabras, si la tendencia se hubiera mantenido, habríamos tenido un 100 por ciento de inflación. Algo hemos ganado". Pero lo más importante, según él, es que se ha superado la parte más difícil y desagradable del esfuerzo. "Se ha pagado el precio de los beneficios que debemos recoger en el futuro".

En su mensaje de Año Nuevo el Presidente Castelo Branco subrayó que el éxito logrado hasta ahora se debe en gran parte a la cooperación de la mayoría del Congreso, de los gobernadores estatales y de los propios obreros organizados que no han realizado ninguna huelga. Otros funcionarios mencionaron la buena voluntad demostrada por los organismos internacionales de crédito, especialmente la Agencia Internacional de Desarrollo, que durante 1964 otorgó a Brasil 17 empréstitos con un total de más de 150 millones de dólares. El BID, por su parte, concedió 5 empréstitos y la casi totalidad de los países acreedores aceptó la renegociación de las deudas.

Esa confianza internacional se ha reflejado en el mercado de cambio local. En los primeros diez meses de 1964, la inflación fue de un 64,5 por ciento, pero la cotización del dólar solo subió en un 31,5 por ciento. La situación crítica que, a fines de 1963, impulsaba a comprar dólares ya no existe. El mercado es, psicológicamente, optimista.

J. M. N.
Río de Janeiro, febrero de 1965.

La Misión de Humberto Castelo Branco

La revolución brasileña de abril de 1964 tuvo una finalidad preventiva. Fue llevada a cabo para impedir que Joao Goulart diera un golpe de estado, reformara la Constitución contra la voluntad del Parlamento y se perpetuara en el poder mediante la reelección, específicamente prohibida en la Carta Fundamental. Los procedimientos de Goulart ya habían sido exhibidos en 1962, cuando llamó a un plebiscito para recuperar la plenitud de los poderes presidenciales. En aquella ocasión, después de un día de escrutinios, en que se contó aproximadamente el 20 por ciento de los votos de zonas urbanas, anunció que "la ventaja era tan amplia que no valía la pena seguir escrutando". Indicios posteriores sugieren que Goulart no obtuvo una victoria tan fácil en aquel plebiscito (que, por otra parte, nadie disputó) y que no se atrevía a recurrir a una nueva consulta popular. Por eso, prefirió el camino de la fuerza.

En todo caso, en los primeros meses de 1964, después del mitin en favor de la Reforma Agraria y de los disturbios protagonizados por suboficiales e infantes de Marina, Goulart y sus amigos estaban listos. La revolución se les adelantó. No fue un golpe militar exclusivamente, porque en ella participaron los gobernadores de todos los Estados importantes, incluso el de Río Grande do Sul y las figuras políticas más sobresalientes, con la excepción de Juscelino Kubitschek. Y estuvo en la línea tradicional de los golpes preventivos brasileños. Varias veces las instituciones armadas de ese país han intervenido para impedir actos de fuerza contra la normalidad democrática. Está fresco el recuerdo del golpe preventivo dado por Henrique Teixeira Lott para evitar que fuera desconocido el triunfo electoral de Kubitschek.

La revolución de abril de 1964 se impuso, para sorpresa de Goulart, quien la había provocado en la seguridad de tener un respaldo suficiente entre los trabajadores y los suboficiales. Pero, una vez en el poder, los gobernantes provisionales se encontraron ante un dilema que a menudo afecta a quienes eborndan empresas similares. Para que la Revolución no fuera un mero episodio, no bastaba con devolver el gobierno a las autoridades civiles y efectuar elecciones. Era necesario desmontar la máquina armada por el gobernante derrocado, depurar la administración pública, separar a los elementos extremistas que habían aprovechado la am-

bición de Goulart para enquistarse en posiciones vitales y reparar los daños causados a la economía nacional en largos meses de acción demagógica. Todo ello no podía ser labor de simple gobierno provisional, concebido como custodio del país por un plazo muy breve.

Las Fuerzas Armadas aceptaron cargar con la principal responsabilidad, los dirigentes políticos comprendieron la necesidad de esa acción y le prestaron su apoyo, el Parlamento se prestó a dar la sanción legal, sirviendo de intermediario para la transmisión del poder. Y se encontró a un hombre que, por sus antecedentes personales y su falta de ambición política, fuera garantía para los partidos y que, al mismo tiempo, tuviera el coraje personal necesario para aplicar sin contemplaciones las medidas depurativas, aunque ello le significara perder popularidad. El fue Humberto Castelo Branco, General de División, Jefe de Estado Mayor del Ejército en el momento del golpe, militar de carrera que nunca había intervenido en política y respetado por sus colegas debido a su sensatez y honestidad. Castelo Branco aceptó a regañadientes, fue ascendido a Mariscal (lo que significa en Brasil el término del servicio activo) y fijó categóricamente el plazo de su permanencia en el Palacio de Laranjeiras (pues se ha negado a trasladarse a Brasilia). Más allá de octubre de 1966 no seguirá en la Presidencia. Si, por cualquier motivo, no hubiera elecciones entonces, se irá a su casa.

Humberto Castelo Branco tiene 64 años de edad y ha vivido 46 de ellos en el Ejército. Como jefe militar, se dio a conocer por su afán disciplinario. A menudo repetía que "la disciplina es necesaria, aunque no nos guste". Pero también se hizo famoso porque sabía mantener el orden sin exabruptos y sin recurrir a medidas de fuerza. "Inspira respeto", explicó un oficial que fue por algún tiempo su ayudante. Y el propio Castelo Branco ha dicho que se decidió a apoyar la revolución contra Goulart cuando éste comenzó a soliviantar a los sargentos y cabos.

A pesar de su eficiencia militar, fue considerado siempre dentro del Ejército como un intelectual, de gran capacidad para aprender. Sus discursos, que él mismo escribe, son de estilo elegante, como corresponde a un descendiente de José de Alencar, uno de los padres de la literatura brasileña e introductor en ese país del movi-

miento romántico europeo. Castelo Branco pertenece a los Alencar de Ceará, estado del nordeste de Brasil y nació allí, en la ciudad de Crato, en el primer año del siglo actual.

Como Presidente, su principal preocupación ha sido formar un equipo de gobierno eficiente y que inspire confianza y respeto al país. Para ello ha recurrido a hombres de gran prestigio en sus respectivas especialidades. En su gabinete están Vasco Leitao de Cunha, heredero de la gran tradición diplomática de Itamaraty; Roberto de Oliveira Campos, el más destacado de los economistas ortodoxos brasileños; Eduardo Gomes, ídolo de la oficialidad joven y dos veces candidato a la Presidencia de la República; Juarez Tavora, también candidato a la Primera Magistratura en las elecciones ganadas por Janio Quadros. Todos los gobernadores de los estados principales lo respaldan, incluso hombres como Adhemar de Barros y Magalhães Pinto, que dirigen los dos estados más poderosos de la Federación (Sao Paulo y Minas Gerais) y ha logrado el respaldo de políticos como Amaral Paixoto, Ranieri Mazzilli y otros líderes del PSD, que han aceptado finalmente la proscripción de su jefe, Juscelino Kubitschek. De esa manera, Castelo Branco ha logrado la tregua política.

Su fuerza de carácter quedó demostrada en la reciente pugna entre la aeronáutica y la marina, a propósito de los aviones de la flota. El Presidente decidió en favor de la Fuerza Aérea y, aunque los principales almirantes renunciaron, no se produjo la crisis grave que muchos esperaban.

El pueblo lo respeta y parece dispuesto a esperar bajo su mando a octubre de 1966, porque Castelo Branco ha tenido cuidado en borrar toda sospecha de ambición personal y ha evitado las intervenciones estridentes. Más bien prefiere una posición de árbitro, diciendo la última palabra en las disputas que dividen a sus colaboradores. Pero nunca lo hace sin haber escuchado y pesado cuidadosamente todas las opiniones.

Este es el hombre que ha emprendido la reforma de la política brasileña. Parece pertenecer a la nueva escuela de militares sudamericanos, que se consideran guardianes de la democracia y devuelven el poder a los civiles una vez pasada la emergencia. Hombres como Aramburu y Onganía en Argentina, Lindley en Perú y Larrazábal en Venezuela.

J. M. N.
Río de Janeiro, Febrero 1965

El Mercurio
17 February 1965

Santiago de Chile

Imagen y Realidad de la Política Brasileña

Es muy difícil comprender desde lejos la actual situación política del Brasil. Lilo explica en parte los juicios no siempre justos emitidos en círculos democráticos de otros países de América y que desconciertan e irritan a los funcionarios del actual Gobierno brasileño. Para ellos es muy comprensible la saña con que se les ataca en la prensa de extrema izquierda. Después de todo, la Revolución de abril de 1964 impidió que el país más grande del continente se convirtiera en una segunda Cuba. Es lógico que los extremistas demuestren enojo. Menos comprensible les parece, sin embargo, que los críticos sectores democráticos que, según ellos, han resultado favorecidos por la Revolución. "El impacto en toda América habría sido terrible", explican. "La política continental habría tomado otro rumbo".

La verdad es que, desde lejos, las cosas se ven en blanco y negro, conforme a las clasificaciones de un prisma teórico y doctrinario. La revolución brasileña derrocó a un Presidente que había llegado al poder por la vía legal (aunque no había sido elegido por la mayoría popular) y ha limitado más tarde la libertad política, a través del Acta Institucional. En estricta doctrina no es democrática, aunque su único objetivo haya sido salvar la democracia. Sólo desde cerca se aprecian los matices y se empieza a apreciar el cuadro real.

Y el propio Gobierno brasileño no ayuda en nada a disipar los errores que según sus funcionarios, predominan en la opinión extranjera. Por una tendencia profesional quizás o por simple desconocimiento del valor que tiene la opinión pública, el Presidente Castelo Branco y sus inmediatos colaboradores han entregado el contacto con la prensa a funcionarios de escasa categoría y mínima iniciativa, cuya actitud frente a los periodistas es principalmente defensiva y que parecen empeñados en mantener a la prensa a distancia de sus jefes. El resultado necesariamente es negativo.

Nacido de un golpe de fuerza, el Gobierno brasileño legitimó más tarde su situación mediante el respaldo parlamentario. Tuvo a su favor los votos de una amplia mayoría de los diputados elegidos en las últimas elecciones normales.

En sus nueve meses de Gobierno del Presidente Castelo Branco se ha preocupado de obtener el apoyo del Parlamento para sus principales medi-

das, comprometiéndolo de ese modo en la responsabilidad del Gobierno. La propia y discutida Acta Institucional fue ratificada por los diputados.

Ya hemos señalado, en un artículo anterior, que el Gobierno de la Revolución se siente obligado a depurar el ambiente político antes de restablecer la normalidad. Ello quiere decir, según sus puntos de vista, la eliminación, por una parte, de la influencia comunista y, por otra, de la tradicional corrupción administrativa. Deben quedar alejados de las responsabilidades de Gobierno los comunistas, los que hayan colaborado con ellos en forma íntima y quienes se hayan visto envueltos en escándalos administrativos. Algunos fueron privados de sus derechos políticos por el plazo de diez años conforme al Acta Institucional. Otros han sido objeto de los llamados IPM (Inquerito Policial-Militar), que es una investigación acerca de los antecedentes políticos y morales de una persona, realizada por los organismos de la policía y el Ejército a raíz de una denuncia determinada. El ciudadano sometido a un IPM queda suspendido de sus funciones si es empleado público. En caso de ser absuelto, se reintegra a su trabajo y queda a cubierto de cualquier nueva acusación. Si es condenado pierde su empleo y no puede volver a ocupar otro cargo público. No tiene otra pena, a menos que participe posteriormente en actividades conspirativas.

Los gobernantes brasileños no demuestran ninguna inquietud acerca del Acta Institucional y los IPM. "Si después de haber hecho la Revolución, no hubiéramos depurado el ambiente, no habríamos cumplido con nuestro deber. Más aún, la situación que provocó nuestra rebelión se habría reproducido en muy breve plazo".

El caso que mayor preocupación ha causado en el extranjero ha sido la eliminación de Juscelino Kubitschek de la política activa. El ex Presidente se había ganado un sólido prestigio fuera de Brasil. Había sido proclamado candidato a la Presidencia para las elecciones de 1965 y se le consideraba el seguro triunfador.

Los enemigos del Gobierno actual dicen que su eliminación tuvo precisamente por objeto impedir una victoria que parecía inevitable.

En los círculos gubernativos se justifica la medida adoptada contra Kubitschek acusándolo de haber mantenido íntimas relaciones con Goulart, que fue su vicepresidente, y de haber permitido la corrupción administrativa en gran escala, especialmente durante la construcción de Brasilia. Los amigos de Kubitschek señalan el contrasentido de esa acusación de parte de un régimen que mantiene buenas relaciones con Adhemar de Barros, gobernador de Sao Paulo, cuyo nombre en la política brasileña es sinónimo de corrupción. La verdad es que Adhemar de Barros se ganó la buena voluntad de los revolucionarios al colocar en forma decidida al más poderoso Estado de la Federación en el bando rebelde, mientras que Kubitschek prefirió una actitud cauta y nunca quiso apoyar el golpe.

Fuera del Acta Institucional y de los IPM, existe en Brasil libertad total. La prensa de oposición ataca violentamente al Gobierno cada día. "Ultima Hora", órgano de los partidarios de Goulart, cuyo propietario se refugió en la Embajada de Chile, sigue apareciendo sin haber variado en nada su línea política. El "Correio da Manhã", que era un diario conservador hasta hace sólo tres años, es ahora un periódico de extrema izquierda y sigue apareciendo sin restricción alguna. En la calle, la gente habla de política sin demostrar temor y el PTB, partido Trabalhista Brasileño que fundó Getulio Vargas y dirigió Joao Goulart hasta hace poco, sigue actuando libremente, con sus secretarías abiertas y sus diputados en el Congreso.

Tal es, en resumen, la situación de Brasil en lo que a libertad política se refiere. Sólo se la puede comprender desde cerca, al cabo de una observación cuidadosa. La visión lejana, en blanco y negro, traiciona al comentarista. Porque la realidad brasileña está llena de paradojas, contrastes y matices que muy fácilmente pueden inducir a error.

J. M. N.
Río de Janeiro, febrero de 1965