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Who Owes and Communists as Creditors
Who Pays and Debtors*

The Soviets' current default of their UN financial obligations is a major threat to stability of that organization. At the same time, the Soviets are pressing for longer and longer term credits from Western nations.

On 28 Jan 65 Radio Moscow discussed the question, "Does the USSR owe the United States any war debts" in the following terms: "Edward Stettinius, who in your country headed lend-lease, said when a person lends a hose to a neighbor whose house is on fire he helps himself because the fire threatens his home, too. And Mr. Stettinius considered it very strange to demand from your neighbor payment for the use of the hose. For all our help, Mr. Stettinius continued, the Russians have already paid in full in a way that cannot be expressed in dollars - in millions of fascist soldiers killed - the sacrifice of millions of Soviet sons and daughters, whose blood cannot be evaluated in money."

To set the record straight, the USG long ago wrote off the entire amount of lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union which was actually consumed during the war -- military or otherwise. Its demands concern exclusively the value of goods which were still available on VE-day -- i.e., which were not used up.

In like vein, Pravda stated as follows on 3 Dec 64: "The Soviet Union has not only saved Cyprus from enslavement and prevented the events in the East Mediterranean from growing into a catastrophic war but also rendered a noble and selfless assistance to the Government of the Republic

of Cyprus in defending the life of that nation. This assistance did not entail any conditions."

The first manifestation of the "noble and selfless" assistance to the (Greek) Cypriots was the January arrival of military equipment, accompanied by numerous Soviet "technicians." The Nicosia daily Patris revealed on 29 January that within a few days after arrival of the equipment, the Soviets had informed the Greek Cypriots that the first installment of eighteen thousand pounds was due on the debt of sixty-eight thousand pounds, the cost of equipment furnished "unconditionally" by the USSR.

Propaganda aside, the Communists act as if only they deserve gifts and credit - all others pay cash.

* * *

If at First Communists Expelled
You Don't from Congo
Succeed

Sept, 1960. Soviet and Czechoslovak diplomatic personnel are expelled from Leopoldville for supporting anti-government forces of Antoine Gizenga.

November, 1963. All Soviet diplomatic personnel (returned to Leopoldville after resumption of diplomatic relations in September 1962) declared p.n.g. after discovery of documentary evidence that they are supporting armed rebellion against central Congo government.

January, 1965. Nikolai Khokhlov, Izvestiya Leopoldville representative, arrested for trying to set up a spy ring in Congo.

February, 1965. Czechoslovakia protests the arrest of Khokhlov.


*To Cyprus, Greece and Turkey:
not to be used in your reports.

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Significant Dates ▶

MAR

- 1 Afro-Asian Islamic Conference, Bandung (orig. sch'd 20 Feb).
- 2 First Congress of Third International, Comintern, Moscow, dedicated to Communism and world revolution. 1919
- 5 Joseph Stalin dies. 1953 (Born 21 December 1879)
- 6 Soviet's Vyshinsky demands Rumania's Coalition Government be dissolved. A Communist cabinet is placed in power. 1945 (20th anniversary)
- 8 International Women's Day. Originally (1910) Social Democratic celebration furthering emancipation of women; appropriated since 1945 by Communist women's front (WIDF).
- 12 Sun Yat-sen dies. 1925 (40th anniversary) (Born 12 Nov 1866)
- 12 Finland, after brief defensive war with USSR, yields Karelian Isthmus, Viipuri, Hango Naval Base. 1940 (25th anniversary)
- 14 Karl Marx dies. 1883 (Born 5 May 1818)
- 15 Ten-nation Disarmament Conference opens, Geneva. Fifth anniversary. 1960
- 21 World Youth Week starts. Celebrated by Communist WFDY. Twentieth anniversary of World Youth Council, predecessor to WFDY.
- 25 Treaties creating European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom signed by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. 1957
- 28 Sixteen leaders of Poland's Home Army and Govt-in-exile, invited to Soviet Occupation Hdqrs under safe conduct: arrested for "diversionary activities" and sentenced to up to 10 years in prison. Twentieth anniversary. 1945

APR

- 1 II Afro-Asian Journalists Conf., Algiers (sponsor: Chicom-Indonesia dominated AAJA) once postponed.
- 10 International Auschwitz Committee, General Session -- commemorating 20th Anniversary of Camp Liberation, Auschwitz, Poland, 10-11 April 1945.
- 11 International Day of Liberation from Fascism ("Day of Remembrance") celebrated annually by International Fed. of Resistance Movements (FIR - Communist).
- 13 II International Conf. for Teaching Resistance History, Prague, Czechoslovakia, 13-15 April.

NOTE: WORLD WAR II commemorative dates --
March 6, 12, 28; April 10, 11, 13.

PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS



#46

Commentary

20 Jan-2 Feb 1965

Principal Developments:

1. With the Moscow 26-party preparatory meeting still nominally scheduled for 1 March, a scant month from the end of this period, available evidence indicates intense Soviet political activity aimed to achieve maximum attendance, -- while their truce on polemics continues in the face of considerable Chinese provocation. Soviet activities which observers see as tied wholly or partially to this campaign include:

a. The Warsaw Pact meeting, 19-21 January. The communique was unrevealing, and we have seen no conclusive clandestine reporting (in fact, there has been no word of the Albanian exchange described below). The departure of the Rumanian delegation immediately after the formal session concluded, while others remained another day or two, was seen as confirmation of reports that Gheorghiu-Dej had agreed to come only if there would be no discussion of problems of the ICM and the world conference, -- and it is assumed that such discussions did take place only after the Rumanians departed.

b. Discussions with British CP leaders in Moscow, 25-28 January. Press reports opinion that the visitors came to try to induce the CPSU to postpone the 1 March meeting but failed: no reliable information available.

c. Visit of N. Korean Ambassador with Kosygin in Moscow, 26 January. Seen by some observers as part of the Soviet effort: we note also that a N.K. Party delegation visited in Moscow 15 January, en route home from Cuba.

d. Discussion with Iraqi Party leaders in Moscow, 27 January. The joint communique stressed the need for a conference.

e. Visit of CPSU delegation to Mongolia, 27 January and continuing. Reports point to concern on part of both about Chinese subversion in border areas.

f. Meeting with a French CP delegation in Moscow on February 2, including an FCP delegate to the 1 March meeting.

g. Visit of a Kosygin-led Soviet delegation to N. Vietnam, with stop in Peking en route, departing Moscow 4 February. Observers generally agreed that one of its major objectives is to build up the position and influence of the CPSU vis-a-vis the Chinese, and most see

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in the presence of Andropov an indication that the Soviets will try to bring the N. Vietnamese Party to a more favorable attitude toward their conference plans, perhaps even inducing them to attend the 1 March meeting (on which they had not committed themselves) by assuring them that it is not intended to excommunicate China.

2. Although Moscow did not officially re-state its commitment to the 1 March date, it did so indirectly by publishing, mid-way in the period, a Canadian CP resolution which supported it specifically. Some clandestine reports and published rumors have said that the meeting would be postponed 2 months or indefinitely, and a Yugoslav Radio Moscow correspondent indicated that there had still been no final decision by the end of January.

3. The Chinese formally refrained from any polemics on their own during the period, but they published and distributed a veritable flood of polemical materials from other parties, both supporting and attacking Chinese positions. Chinese poems ridiculing Khrushchev published on the last day came very close to polemics.

4. On 1 February, the Albanians published 5 documents in an exchange with the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, in connection with the January Warsaw meeting. The documents implied that the Poles had unilaterally invited the Albanians to attend, and the Albanians replied with a 7,000-word letter which they requested the Poles to distribute to participants at the session. It was a scathing indictment of Soviet "extremely hostile acts against Albania" since 1961, including charges that the USSR "stole from Albania eight submarines... and Albanian ships which were undergoing repairs in the Soviet port of Sevastopol"; that the 1961 Soviet letter unilaterally destroying all relations with them was "signed by the present Soviet Premier Kosygin"; and that the Albanian Govt. has documents proving that "a group of men, who were and still are at the head of a powerful socialist state, a member of the Warsaw Pact, collaborated with the Titoist renegades, the Greek monarcho-fascists, the U.S. 6th Fleet, and their agents inside Albania to overthrow the Albanian people's regime by violence and armed attack." It haughtily set its conditions -- including immediate return of all stolen property and compensation for damages by the USSR as well as renunciation of all arbitrary violations, and the immediate cessation of Soviet weapons shipments to the Yugoslav Titoists and Indian reactionaries -- for taking part in Pact meetings. The Warsaw Pact reply takes cognizance of the letter and notes that "the matter of Albania's further participation... depends on the decision of the Albanian Govt." Tirana has the last word, denouncing the "contempt" shown in the decision and "resolutely" standing by its demands and legitimate rights.

5. A new group of 11 Chinese scientists arrived for work at the "Joint Institute for Nuclear Research" at Dubna, near Moscow.

6. Khrushchev was not among the CPSU elite who turned out for the Moscow funeral of Frol Kozlov, whom he had apparently once chosen as his heir apparent.

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(Comments Cont.)

Significance:

The new Soviet leaders have apparently launched a determined political drive to regain the initiative and some of the old Soviet hegemony in the Communist world, but there is as yet little evidence of the degree of success they may be meeting. Likewise, although the 1 March date set for the "old business" of the 26-party preparatory commission meeting is almost at hand, the prospects are still unpredictable, with conflicting reports on postponement, and one (Yugoslav) to the effect that a final decision has not yet been made.

The Kosygin mission to Hanoi apparently hopes (a) to trade increased political and material support for a more "independent" (less anti-Soviet) N. Vietnamese position in the conflict in world Communism, and (b) to improve Soviet stature generally as a friend and supporter of the national liberation movement throughout the under-developed world. The N. Vietnamese undoubtedly genuinely welcome the Soviet initiative, not only because they need the materiel which the Soviets can supply but also as a balance to their dependence on China, -- but, given their position deep in the Chinese shadow, they cannot move so far in the Soviet direction as to endanger relations with Peking. They will certainly not attend the 1 March meeting unless given iron-clad guarantees that it will take no anti-Chinese action.

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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#46

20 January-2 February 1965

January 19-21: See Chrono #45 for Warsaw Pact meeting under way at close of last period, with communique on 21st. Additional information: the Rumanian delegation departed immediately on conclusion of the formal meeting, while others stayed on another day or more, giving rise to speculation that Gheorghiu-Dej was adhering to an original agreement to participate in the Warsaw meeting only if problems of the ICM and the Soviet drive for attendance at the 1 March preparatory commission meeting would not be discussed.

January 20-30: Chinese media continue to publicize materials from other parties supporting or attacking CCP positions in conflict with the CPSU, as follows:

--20th, People's Daily devotes $1\frac{1}{2}$ pages (other papers less) to: 18 December speech by Japanese CP SecyGen Miyamoto (which reiterated JCP view that Moscow preparatory meeting should not be held unless all attend -- Chrono #44); 31 October article from Danish CP organ Land og Folk; 1 December article from Finnish CP organ Kansan Uutiset; and the 28 December Akahata, 20 December Pravda, 6 December Pravda, and December Kommunist articles mentioned in Chrono #45, 18 January.

--21st, Chicom press publishes: the 6 January Albanian Zeri I Popullit editorial described in #45; a 27 October editorial from "the organ of the Peruvian CP, Bandera Roja," (actually the organ of the pro-Chinese dissident group) which viciously denounces Khrushchev and "expresses the hope that Khrushchev's revisionism will be liquidated without pity" (NCNA); extracts of a Jan Szimek article from No. 11, 1964, of Czech CP journal Nova Mysl; excerpts from 7 December speech by Bulgarian First Secy Zhivkov; extracts from articles from two Hungarian party organs, November Partelet and December Tarsadalmi Szemle; excerpts from 5 December speech by E. German First Secy Ulbricht; excerpts from 19 December article in Italian CP weekly Rinascita; from 22 November Yves Moreau article in French CP weekly L'Humanité Dimanche; and from November CPUSA monthly Political Affairs.

--28th, NCNA distributes text of article from November issue of "The Australian Communist, theoretical journal of the Australian CP -- Marxist-Leninist."

--30th, NCNA distributes text of 21 January Akahata editorial described below.

January 21: Japanese CP daily Akahata 5,000-word editorial, "More on the Question of an International Conference of CPs," blasts CPSU efforts to convene 26-party preparatory meeting and international conference and

(Chronology Cont.)

reiterates the JCP position that the Soviet move must be stopped and that "prior consultations should be held among all parties concerned, while right now concrete agreement should be reached on the problem of unfolding a common struggle against imperialism headed by the U.S."

Paris independent daily Figaro reports rumor from Warsaw that Warsaw Pact meeting agreed to delay 1 March preparatory meeting two more months as price for Rumanian participation.

Paris independent daily Le Monde runs AFP Peking report that series of consultations with Asian "fraternal parties" have begun in Peking.

January 21-22: Belgrade daily Borba correspondent Bajalski writes from Moscow:

"The CPSU apparently does not intend to react publicly to reports received here of Peking's increased anti-Soviet activity. On the contrary, Soviet political workers repeat that the CPSU will maintain its attitude in order not to thwart in any way preparations for the meeting of the draft commission... scheduled for 1 March. Any public reaction to the new Chinese attacks, people here emphasize, would only worsen the climate in the ranks of the Communist and workers movement and revive polemics, which would certainly have an unfavorable effect on the atmosphere of the Moscow draft commission session...."

"The Warsaw meeting of party leaders, Moscow political circles assume, was also used for an exchange of opinions on the coming meeting of the 26-party draft commission. They expect that after Warsaw many things will be clearer regarding the nature of the 1 March Moscow conference."

On the 22nd, Belgrade Radio's Moscow correspondent Sundic also reports that "Moscow political observers are more and more of the opinion that the Warsaw gathering also discussed the situation in the Communist movement...."

January 22: The social-democratic Stockholm Tidningen and the Swedish CP organ Ny Dag carry identical texts of a long article (the first of two) by veteran Swedish Communist Anton Julius Strand detailing his disillusionment with the Party. Strand joined the Party at age 17 and has been a paid functionary for 36 years, is still a member, and serves as Secretary of the Swedish Peace Committee.

"The Swedish CP has not contributed one single new thought to socialist theory and ideology. After 40 years of struggle, there is nothing left of the Party except its name, and even this should be changed, according to the thinking of some. Everything we have struggled for -- cornerstones like the dictatorship of the proletariat and proletarian internationalism -- has been thrown on the rubbish heap."

As the main source of disillusionment among Party members, Strand points to the failure of Communist theory to be matched by reality in the countries where "socialist society" has been built, the Soviet Union, China, and the peoples' democracies. "Bitter reality looked different than the great and perfect ideal community we had read about in socialist literature."

January 23: Italian CP daily L'Unita carries article by Moscow correspondent Pancaledi reporting that No. 1 of CPSU monthly Kommunist prints long staff article on the discussion in the CPI about the problem of creating a single party of the Italian working class. It describes the much discussed Rinascita (Nov. 28) article by Giorgio Amendola, including his observation that 50 years of experience have demonstrated that neither the social-democratic solution as practiced in Western Europe nor Communism as practiced in the Soviet Union has achieved the goal of socialist transformation of society or satisfied the needs of the workers.

January 25-28: A British CP top-level delegation of Chairman Palme Dutt and W. Wainwright visits Moscow, meeting with Brezhnev, Suslov and Ponomarev for "frank and cordial" discussions of the problems of "strengthening the unity of the ICM on the basis of the principles of M-L and the documents of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow conferences," according to Tass. Western press commented that the visit was intended "apparently to try to talk the Kremlin out of the March 1 conference, ... or at least to delay it," but that it failed.

January 27: A CPSU delegation headed by Presidium member and CC Secy Shelepin arrives in Ulan Bator, Mongolia "at the invitation of the MPRP/CC." Included are Biryukov, Head of the CPSU/CC Construction Section, Mesyatsev, Chairman of the State Committee for Radio Broadcasting and Television, and the First Secretaries of three local Party committees in the Siberian territories near Mongolia. They are still reported visiting factories and farms and attending meetings as the period ended.

Pravda reports that Suslov and Ponomarev met in Moscow with Iraqi CP leaders and issued a joint statement calling for unity in the ICM and citing the need to prepare for a new conference of Communist and workers parties.

Tass reports a meeting of Argentine and Chilean CP representatives in Buenos Aires which voiced support for an international CP conference in view of "the urgent need to discuss changes in the world" and "to strengthen the unity of the ICM."

East German Party daily Neues Deutschland reports briefly: "A new group of Chinese staff members of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna (USSR) was welcomed by the Institute Director, N. Bogolyubov. The Chinese specialists total 11 physicists and engineers."

January 28: Tass publicizes a resolution adopted "earlier this month" by the Canadian CP National Committee supporting the proposal for holding a new international conference of Communist and workers parties and also the proposal to convene on 1 March this year a working committee to prepare for such a conference.

January 31: Pravda announces that "a delegation of the Soviet Union headed by member of the CPSU/CC Presidium and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Kosygin will shortly leave for Hanoi at the invitation of the Government of the DRV." Included are CC Secretary for relations with other ruling parties Andropov, Minister of Civil Aviation Loginov, First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, Deputy Defense Minister Chief Air Marshal Vershinin, and Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations Sidorovich. N. Vietnamese comment, including an authoritative Nhan Dan editorial, emphasize that the visit "will certainly contribute actively to the consolidation and promotion of the solidarity and friendship among the socialist countries," as well as its obvious impact on Soviet-N. Vietnam relations.

February 1: Moscow and Budapest release an announcement that a top-level CPSU delegation of Brezhnev and Podgorny had visited Budapest (secretly) January 29-31, where they held discussions "in a cordial and comradely atmosphere" with Kadar and other Politburo members "on questions of interest to both sides." The Western press comments that "it is widely assumed that the meeting dealt with the March 1 conference of the 26-member drafting commission of the ICM" and notes that the Hungarian party has been one of Moscow's staunchest supporters in this matter.

In a dispatch from Moscow pegged to Kosygin's forthcoming trip to N. Vietnam, Yugoslav Radio correspondent Sundic comments:

"Judging by all signs, apart from talks on international problems in that part of the world, Premier Kosygin will also discuss the state of affairs in the international workers movement. The CPSU is trying to insure that the planned meeting of the 26-member drafting committee is attended by all members. Although this is not likely, CPSU efforts in this direction have not weakened. Numerous consultations are in progress with those parties which share the CPSU view and with those which oppose it or show a certain amount of reserve. This was certainly the aim of the Budapest meeting between Brezhnev and Kadar.... A CPSU delegation spent a few days in Ulan Bator for the same purpose, and CPSU/CC First Secretary Bezhnev recently had talks in Moscow with the DPRK Ambassador. He also received a delegation of the British CP.

These contacts, including the recent Warsaw meeting, point to new interparty consultation. The CPSU took this road to avoid any complaints in connection with the convening or cancellation of the drafting committee meeting, the latter having been suggested by the CCP....

Although it is presently impossible to draw more definite conclusions on the course of the talks thus far held and further prospects, it is believed in Moscow that the final decision on the drafting committee meeting will be made only when the views of all CPs have been analyzed."

Peking People's Daily publishes 3 poems by Chao Pu-chu, Vice President of the Chinese Buddhist Association, ridiculing Khrushchev. One describes K's fall as a change of labels and depicts him as accusing the new leaders of "practicing my doctrine -- without me."

February 2: Top members of the new CPSU leadership turn out for the funeral of Frol Kozlov, one-time heir apparent to Khrushchev's throne before his stroke in the spring of 1963. Khrushchev is not present or accounted for.

Suslov meets with two top French Communists in Moscow, Politburo member Raymond Guillot and Jean Canapa, Moscow correspondent of L'Humanite and French delegate to the 1 March meeting.

Albanian Party organs Zeri I Popullit and Bashkimi publish texts of an exchange of documents concerned with the January meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee:

1. A 5 January Polish Govt note notifying the Albanian Govt of plans to convene the WPPCC meeting and inviting them to take part.
2. A 15 January Albanian note taking cognizance of invitation but saying that Alb. Govt is unable to reply positively "for reasons known to the Polish Govt which are again stressed" in an attached letter, which it requests the Poles to hand to the WPPCC plenary session to read and study.
3. A 7,000-word Alb. letter attached to the above, addressed to all participants. It begins stating Albania's righteous position and honorable fulfillment of its obligations as a WP member and complains that the other members permitted the SovGovt headed by N. Khrushchev to violate the Pact's fundamental provisions and trample upon Albania's sovereign rights in "innumerable hostile actions," "recalled" briefly as follows:

(1) Soviet arbitrary and illegal de facto exclusion of Albania from the Pact in 1961, plus boycotts and illegal decisions at irregular meetings by other WP members.

(2) WP states permitted SovGovt to commit following "extremely hostile acts":

(A) SovGovt "arbitrarily tore up the bipartite agreements," "discontinued delivery of arms and other equipment," "stole from

Albania eight submarines, which were the property of the Albanian State, and Albanian ships which were undergoing repairs in the Soviet port of Sevastopol," and "thereby weakened the defensive strength of Albania and the socialist camp."

(B) "All relations were unilaterally destroyed," credits cancelled, and specialists withdrawn. The Albanians cite a 26 April 1961 letter signed by present Soviet Premier Kosygin" as serving notice of the break.

(C) Soviet leaders "called on the Albanian people... to embark on counter-revolution against the ALP and Govt."

(D) "To crown this..., the SovGovt for diabolical reasons brutally broke off diplomatic relations with Albania in December 1961."

(E) "The Albanian Govt accuses the SovGovt of many overt and concealed hostile acts... Other WP members are aware of the above facts. They are also aware that the SovGovt headed by Khrushchev openly armed the Yugoslav Titoite group, which is a well-known agency of American imperialism and has been and is continually plotting to suppress Albania and turn it into a Yugoslav province. They are also aware that the SovGovt openly dispatched plentiful supplies to the Indian reactionaries, who attacked the CPR, a socialist country, and imprisoned and tortured Indian Communists."

The letter adds that "the AlbGovt appreciates the solicitude of the Polish Govt, which undertook to inform it of the... meeting and send it the invitation," but asserts that the current WP Chairman should have consulted with the AlbGovt beforehand and should have sent the invitation himself. It then states four "legitimate demands" which must be met before Albania will take part in WP meetings:

(1) "Recognition and condemnation of all arbitrary violations... and of the illegal and hostile acts committed by the SovGovt...."

(2) "SovGovt immediately return all military facilities, materiel, and equipment which are Albanian property, and that it repay losses suffered by the Alb. economy... as a result of the unilateral cancellation of credits, agreements, and various relations of an economic nature." (It)... "must immediately and courageously redress the fatal error of breaking off diplomatic relations," or it will indicate that it is still hostile to Alb. and that the invitation was a "hoax." "The AlbGovt demands... that the SovGovt immediately halt the supply of weapons to the Yugoslav Titoists, Indian reactionaries, and any govt using these weapons for aggressive aims and to oppress its own and other people."

(3) "The AlbGovt demands that the govts of certain WP members... take necessary measures to normalize diplomatic relations with Albania."

(4) "The AlbGovt rightly desires to know the following:"

(a) What reasons led to violations? "Copies of minutes of meetings at which illegal decisions against Alb. were discussed and adopted should be handed over...."

(b) "All minutes and decisions on various questions adopted during that period... should be sent...."

(c) "Copies of reports, discussions and decisions... by steering organs...."

(d) "The AlbGovt wishes to know whether the Moscow treaty banning tests of nuclear weapons... was concluded on the basis of a collective decision of WP member states or whether it was the work of a single member state to which the other states have adhered separately."

This is followed by a harangue on the "shameful capitulation" of the treaty, and further denunciation of Soviet policies, including the statement:

"The AlbGovt possesses documents and undeniable facts proving that a group of men, who were and still are at the head of a powerful socialist state, a member of the WP, collaborated with the Titoist renegades, the Greek Monarcho-fascists, the U.S. 6th Fleet, and their agents inside Albania to overthrow the Albanian people's regime by violence and armed attack.... Will one continue to protect these men, and will their criminal actions remain unpunished?"

The letter then sets forth its position on problems now facing the pact, including the MLF and nuclear weapons for West Germany, an immediate peace treaty with East Germany, and forthright denunciation of the Moscow test-ban treaty.

4. A two-sentence reply from the WFPCC taking cognizance of the Albanian letter and saying: "In these circumstances, the matter of Albania's further participation in WP proceedings depends on the decision of the Albanian Govt."

5. A two-sentence 29 January Alb. reply to the WFPCC: "The contempt which you have shown in your unnumbered and undated decision [i.e., para. 4 above]... imposes great responsibility on you. The AlbGovt stands resolutely by its demands and legitimate rights based on WP provisions."


ADDENDUM

February 4: Kosygin delegation departs on trip to Hanoi: it is announced after departure that they will stop off for visit with CCP representatives in Peking en route. Reporting Soviet announcement of departure time from Moscow on the 3rd, NYTimes correspondent Tanner adds that "Western observers here have gained the impression that the Kremlin may be less firm than it was a few weeks ago in its determination to go through with a meeting of world Communist representatives scheduled for March 1...."

871.

NO WISHFUL THINKING ABOUT THE COLD WAR

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SITUATION: Current Soviet policy, which vigorously attempts to project a peaceful image of itself, is considered harmless by two opposing sides, namely: by the Chinese Communist Party which describes it as "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" and derides it as inept revisionism incapable of successfully pursuing revolutionary Communist goals; and by wishful thinkers in free countries who accept Soviet statements at face value and believe there is no further threat in a Communism which professes peaceful coexistence -- ignoring the facts that CPSU-directed subversion continues on all fronts and that the Soviets have neither renounced nor ceased to advocate the use of force.

As shown in BPG No. 143 of 15 June 64 ("Not So Peaceful Coexistence"), "there is no detente in the cold war.... the limited East-West agreements are hopeful signs but they do not yet touch the heart of the crucial issues nor do they indicate any trend in Soviet foreign policy away from the goal of Communist world domination.... In the long run, it is possible that the Soviet policy of indirect aggression and subversion is more dangerous than direct aggressions.... The Kremlin's continuing aggressive actions against the free world and democratic institutions are real, no matter how they are rationalized as necessary.... That these attacks continue against the West in general and the U.S. in particular is a fact." # 794

It is clear that the above assessment of "Khrushchevian" policy, written in mid-1964, remains valid today despite the intervening upheaval in CPSU leadership. The world-wide pattern of Soviet mischief-making itemized in BPG No. 143 continues to manifest itself, to wit:

Anti-Western and anti-U.S. Propaganda. BPG No. 158, 1 Feb 65, "Twentieth Anniversary of the End of WW II," forewarned of a massive Communist campaign, using the pretext of an anniversary and featuring the following propaganda themes.

- a. Germany's war guilt and the alleged recrudescence of militarism and Fascism in West Germany.
- b. The Soviet Union's paramount role in WW II, which it allegedly won virtually single-handed.
- c. The U.S.A.'s alleged postwar policy of remilitarizing West Germany for aggressive purposes, including U.S. plans to make nuclear weapons available to West Germany.

Since the first of the year, not one day has passed that the above allegations have not been hammered ad nauseam in Moscow press and radio, echoed in descending volume by East Germany, Poland (Warsaw Pact meeting) and the other satellites. Not only are these claims repeated to sickening excess of and by themselves, but they are somehow dragged into press and radio "reporting" on virtually every conceivable subject. See unclassified attachment.

Bloc Cold War Export Via Czechoslovakia. BPG No. 864, 18 Jan 1965, "Czechoslovak Economic Reform Promised," documented the Communist exploitation of once-respected Czechoslovakia for widespread export of Bloc subversive penetration in developing areas of Africa, Latin America and Asia. That Guidance and its unclassified attachment illustrate, inter alia, that this pattern has prevailed unchanged before, during and since Khrushchev's ouster.

Indochina. There has been no abatement in Moscow's daily propaganda barrage and Moscow's active interference with U.S. efforts to assist Indochinese countries to fend off brutal aggression from the north. The Soviets threatened the US with dire consequences should the beleaguered peoples be encouraged to defend themselves to the extent of pursuing the enemy into their privileged sanctuary in the North. Less belligerent sounding but nonetheless significant in the Soviet cold war are the following statements of positions:

Moscow Tass, 30 Dec 64. "A permanent representation of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam will be opened in Moscow early next year. An understanding to this effect was achieved in the course of the talks between the Soviet committee of Afro-Asian solidarity and a delegation of the National Front which visited Moscow."

Moscow Tass, 4 Jan 65. "The Soviet Government fully shares the concern of the DRV over the present situation in Indochina that has arisen as a result of the aggressive actions of the U.S. and its interference in the affairs of the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.... The Soviet Government demands that the U.S. discontinue all interference in the affairs of South Vietnam, evacuate troops and armaments from there, and allow the Vietnamese people themselves to settle their internal affairs."

Cuba and Latin America. Although there are reports that Moscow has had misgivings about the large financial burden of propping up its bridgehead for the penetration of Latin America (Havana), there is no evidence of any actual Soviet letup in Latin America. Moscow still supports Castro's blustering and Castro's refusal to allow the Cuban inspection which Khrushchev promised to Pres. Kennedy incident to their 1962 confrontation. The following typifies Moscow's recent pronouncements on the subject:

Radio Moscow reporting of a Kremlin speech by Yu. V. Andropov on 29 Dec 64. "Together with all nations we declare: Hands off

revolutionary Cuba! Having failed with their plans for throttling the Cuban revolution economically and having failed with their military provocations, the aggressive, militarist U.S. circles are now trying to amalgamate against revolutionary Cuba a joint front of the forces of reaction on the American continent and in the NATO aggressive bloc. They are trying to justify their provocative actions against Cuba by alluding to the odious lie that Cuba is threatening other Latin American countries and exporting its revolution."

Pravda, 14 Jan 65. "The upsurge of the national liberation movement in Latin American countries has been to a great extent a result of the activities of communist parties.... The Soviet people have regarded and still regard it as its sacred duty to give support to the peoples fighting for their independence. True to their international duty the Soviet people have been and will remain on the side of the Latin American patriots."

Africa. Although Soviet propaganda and subversion aimed at Africa has not lessened perceptibly, it has been overshadowed in some areas by the massive atrocities and political murders instigated by the Chicoms. However, Moscow set a new record low for callous cynicism in its propaganda treatment of the Belgian-American rescue operation in the Congo, where hundreds of defenseless men, women, and children were narrowly saved from the senseless savagery and indiscriminate butchery which had broken out there. While the entire civilized world was applauding this humanitarian initiative, Radio Moscow stated as follows on 24 Nov 1964 --

"The situation in the Congo: As we have already reported, a battalion of Belgian paratroops, carried by American military aircraft, seized Stanleyville airport this morning.... The Western powers' open armed intervention against the people of the Congo has become a fact. In the face of this imperialist aggression, all the independent and truly progressive forces of Africa cannot stand aside and reconcile themselves to acts of open brigandage and armed interference in the internal affairs of other countries."

Moscow Tass, 24 Nov 64. "The editorial note in today's Izvestiya says the alarming news of the planned imperialist armed aggression against the people of the Congo Leopoldville has been confirmed.... There is no need to prove, the note says, that the plea of "rescuing" the white population in Stanleyville is utterly false."

With the propaganda line having been set by Moscow, these outrageous falsehoods were echoed from satellite capitals all the way to Belgrade, whose independent stance and reiterated neutrality have brought such handsome dividends in U.S. aid.

Others. Another tactic was exposed when the Greek Cypriots joined the ranks of those who had learned the hard way the error of counting on the Communists. No sooner had Archbishop Makarios shifted virtually all his eggs to the basket of anticipated all-out Moscow backing for his

demands, when he suddenly found himself holding an empty basket as Moscow abruptly began courting Ankara and proclaiming the sacred rights of both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. Nor was Moscow's double-dealing offset by the sympathy-seeking tour of Africa by Dr. Lyssarides, Makarios' crypto-Communist advisor, who managed to stir up nothing but a great deal of public apathy.

And in the UN, the USSR's cold war against the United States (as the major Free World adversary) reached a new high over the issue of enforcing Article 19. For years the Soviet Union had attempted to thwart UN efforts to maintain the peace. Its refusal to pay its legal assessments for peace-keeping missions brought the issue to a head and a large number of Member States were intimidated into charging that the US was being bullish in insisting that the principles of the UN Charter had to be upheld. Even Free World media consistently fell prey to Soviet cold war techniques by treating the issue as though it were a battle with the United Nations itself.

When the death of Winston Churchill, Britain's most admired and respected statesman, was bringing sympathetic expression from throughout the civilized world, one of Moscow's first reactions was to comment publicly that Sir Winston had coined the phrase "iron curtain" and had "master-minded the cold war."

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
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LENIN'S UNREHABILITATED COMRADES

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SITUATION: Since 1956, the Soviet press has announced periodically that certain persons have been cleared of accusations made against them during the Stalin period, and that they are to be considered rehabilitated. Usually, the persons in question perished in prison camps or were shot; nevertheless, the admission that they were wrongly accused has given the impression that the CPSU is (as the phrase goes in West Germany) "overcoming its past," and is attempting to atone for Stalin's misdeeds. Moreover, posthumous rehabilitation has some tangible advantages for surviving family members: confiscated property may be returned, even back pensions paid, children admitted to higher education (from which they were barred) or given better jobs, etc.

Khrushchev's Secret Speech of 1956 and his 27 October 1961 speech at the 22nd CPSU Congress described some of the crimes and miscarriages of justice which occurred under Stalin. In both speeches, he related some of the mysterious circumstances surrounding the murder of S.M. Kirov in December 1934, both times stating that the case was under investigation; apparently the investigation did not progress very far between 1956 and 1961. In the 1961 speech, Khrushchev also endorsed a proposal for some mark of respect for the victims of Stalin, stating: "Perhaps a monument should be erected in Moscow to the memory of the comrades who fell victim to arbitrary rule." To date there has been no sign of such a memorial. Khrushchev's zeal in exposing the crimes of Stalin seemed to arise much more from a sporadic desire to discredit his rivals within the USSR and within the Communist movement than from a love of justice; still, he seemed to hold out the prospect that justice might be done.

This prospect was almost certainly a delusion, as can be seen from an examination of the lists of those who have and have not been rehabilitated. The victims of the purges who have been rehabilitated fall mainly into two categories, the generals:

Marshal Tukhachevsky, Marshal Blyukher, Marshal Yegorov, Generals Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, Eideman, and the Chief of the Political Department of the Red Army, J. Gamarnik,

and the party officials who had risen under Stalin in the late 1920's and early 1930's:

G.K. Ordzhonikidze (Politburo member), I.E. Rudzutak and V.Y. Chubar (candidate Politburo members), A.V. Kosarev (General Secretary of the Komsomol), S.V. Kossior and V.P. Satonsky (Ukrainian CP leaders), A.I. Ugarov and M.S. Chudov (alleged members of the "Leningrad Center" of 1937), I.S. Unshlikt (Deputy Chief of the GPU), I.D. Kabakov

(Oblast Secretary, Sverdlovsk), E.I. Kviring (Deputy Chairman of Gosplan), V.I. Meshlauk (Deputy Chief of the Council of People's Commissars), I.D. Orakelashvili (Secretary of the Transcaucasian Party Committee), K.V. Ukhanov (Peoples' Commissar of the RSFSR), M.L. Rukhimovich (Peoples' Commissar for Defense Industry), and N.M. Goloded (leading official in Byelorussia).

These generals and officials were probably cleared through the initiative of one-time comrades now in high positions.

Two post-World War II victims who have been redeemed were A.A. Kuznetsov and N.A. Vosnesensky, both of whom had been shot in connection with the 1949 "Leningrad Case." P.P. Postyshev, an old Bolshevik from the Ukraine, is the only rehabilitated figure known to have protested against the blood purges. Only three of those who have now been cleared are known to have opposed Stalin in the early 1920's: G.I. Lomov, V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko, and A.S. Bubnov. Of 71 full members in the 1934 Central Committee, 51 were liquidated in the purges and of these last, only one third have now been cleared. Minor figures have been rehabilitated and their families informed, but no public announcement is made in such cases.

The known list of those who have not been cleared of guilt is not only longer, but also contains much more important names. At the top are Zinoviev and Bukharin (past Chairmen of the Comintern), Kamenev (first Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets), Rykov (Chief of the Government after Lenin), Tomskey (past Chairman of the Central Committee of Trade Unions), Radek (Secretary of the Comintern), and of course Trotsky, who if he did not face trial was nevertheless executed. All these men played leading roles in the Revolution and were associated with Lenin. Other important victims include Joffe, Rakovsky, Preobrezhensky, Serebryakov, Pyatikov, Mrachkovsky, Smilga, Krestinsky, Yevdokimov, Safarov, Sokolnikov, Saluzky, Ryutin, Uglanov, Dogadov, A.P. Smirnov, and Stezky. It is suspected that S.M. Kirov, V.V. Kuibyshev, and Maxim Gorky were assassinated on Stalin's orders, so as to eliminate particularly influential critics and to provide pretexts for the execution of others. Party membership statistics indicate that over a million party members were liquidated, and judging by population losses revealed in official census returns, the number of non-party members who died in the camps, from forced migration, or through mass execution probably came to 15 million.

Why has the rehabilitation process been so incomplete? The fact that Khrushchev himself was deeply involved in purges and mass executions, especially in the Ukraine, may have been one restraining factor, but (perhaps for reasons of conscience) he did rehabilitate the Ukrainian leaders Kossior and Postyshev; his own record apparently was not a major obstacle. Nor can the continued disgrace of figures like Zinoviev and Rykov be explained by supposing that they were opponents of Communist dictatorship; while some of these men sometimes called for discussion within the party, they were all supporters of one-party Communist rule, and indeed all of them except Trotsky collaborated at one time or another with Stalin.

A more real difficulty has been that for 29 years, Stalin in effect made all the decisions of the party, and in a sense was the party. Khrushchev's party history (see attachment to BPG No. 158, item #866, 1 February 1965, "The Soviets Rewrite History Again") condemned the "cult of personality," but praised Stalin's policies--the attack on Trotskyism, collectivization, the Five Year Plans, the "verification of party documents" (a euphemism for purging "impostors," "rogues," and "wreckers") --and claimed that credit for such "successes in socialist construction" belonged to the party and the people. Many of those who remain condemned had doubts about these policies; the party still cannot admit that honest doubts were possible, let alone that they were justified.


Another serious problem is that, in their criticisms, some of these victims of Stalin once claimed a right to discuss major policies within the party. As First Secretary, Khrushchev, at least, was not prepared to allow party members to debate major problems, such as the space program, the development of the chemical industry, or the share of consumer goods in the nation's output. The publication of One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich or the Liberman discussions have been exceptions, deliberately permitted by Khrushchev to build up his own political position or to encourage technical improvement. Indeed, the more Liberman's proposals are carried out, the more difficult it will be to do justice to Bukharin, since if Bukharin's old position becomes known, it will seem that government policy has returned to where it started. It will begin to appear that all the suffering of the Stalin period was useless, and was a costly, terrible mistake.

This leads us to the greatest obstacle: to rehabilitate the major victims of Stalin would be too great an exposure of the past. Even if the party did not admit that these men were right, and only conceded that execution was too severe a penalty for them, it would be calling attention to their execution. The scale of Stalin's crime is still a state secret: while parts of Khrushchev's published speech of 27 October 1961 repeated almost verbatim his 1956 Secret Speech, he did not publicly repeat his Secret Speech statements that 98 out of 139 full and candidate members of the 1934 Central Committee were shot, and that 1,108 out of 1,966 voting and non-voting delegates to the "Congress of Victors," the 17th CPSU Congress (1934), were arrested on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes, which were punishable by death. Even in his Secret Speech, this "true Leninist" did not mention that out of the 24 members of the Central Committee elected in August 1917 -- the group which helped Lenin organize the October Revolution -- 12 were killed at Stalin's orders, two were imprisoned (one probably died there), and one was induced to commit suicide. In fact, except for Stalin himself and the two women members (one of whom was temporarily imprisoned), all the members of this 1917 Central Committee who were still alive in 1930 were liquidated. Exposure of this data, or of data on the mass execution or death by hardship of the kulaks, the alleged Ukrainian nationalists, the Chechen-Ingush, the Polish prisoners of war at Katyn, the Crimean Turks, the Kalmyks, or the Volga Germans would raise serious doubts as to the right of the party to rule. It

would be asked, "What moral difference is there between the organizations which carried out these actions under Stalin and other organizations which carried out similar orders under Hitler?"

Khrushchev's partial revelations on the death of Kirov may show the limit of what the CPSU can admit; this limit was reached in the Secret Speech, and could not be exceeded in the 27 October 1961 speech. To say more might raise awkward questions about the role of the NKVD, or about the tens of thousands who were executed for participation in Kirov's murder. Probably the new leaders will make no more significant revelations than this. Indeed, they have less interest than Khrushchev had in exposing the crimes of Stalin, and so far indications are that they will maintain silence on the evils which occurred.

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SECRET MEETING OF LATIN
AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES

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SITUATION: On 18 January 1965, the Soviet News agency TASS released the official communique of a conference of the Communist parties of Latin America, attended by representatives of all these parties, which "took place at the end of 1964." No mention was made of the site of the meeting or exact date. As is usually the case with such Communist conclaves, this one was carried out under maximum security conditions. According to reports that have subsequently leaked out of the various national parties, several important representatives met in Moscow in early November to arrange the agenda for the Havana meeting. The delegates used aliases and even traveled to Havana via Prague, making a journey three to five times longer than direct travel would have involved.

The general public knew nothing about the meeting until the Tass release was published and commented on in the Western press. There was one leak -- presumably accidental -- to a small La Paz (Bolivia) daily of dubious ideology, Clarín, which stated on 29 November that the conference had begun on the 22nd in Havana and was scheduled "to end today." According to some reports, 22 parties were represented; according to others, 23. Since there are only 20 Latin American countries properly speaking, there is speculation that parties from the U.S., Canada, British Guiana, Puerto Rico, or other Caribbean islands might have sent delegates. The CPSU was represented by Yuri V. Andropov.

The basic reason for the meeting, without doubt, was concern over the growing divisions within the Communist Movement in Latin America. Perhaps the immediate stimulus was fear that the pro-Chinese factions were about to consolidate: according to a rumor, a meeting in Peking in early October decided to schedule a conference of pro-Chinese Latin American Communist parties in Santiago for May 1965. At any rate, the last seven of the sixteen or more recommendations that can be isolated in the 18 January communique form the gist of a resolution "For the Unity of the International Communist Movement." They deal with one aspect or another of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The first point of this resolution stresses concern "with the situation that has developed in the international Communist movement;" another "calls for the immediate cessation of polemics and underlines the necessity to emphasize the need to find proper channels so that existing problems may be solved in the fraternal spirit which should prevail in relations between Marxist-Leninist parties."

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At the party level, the resolution held that "the unity of each party is an indispensable condition for the development of the revolutionary process in each country. Consequently, any factional activities, no matter what their source or nature, should be condemned categorically."

By far the most important points are those that can only be interpreted as calling for a shift in emphasis in some countries from legal and peaceful, to violent and illegal, methods to be used by the national parties in the pursuit of Communist goals. For some time, the official Soviet line has stressed peaceful coexistence at the international level and the use of the parliamentary path, via the popular front, at the national level, when it suits their purposes. Most of the Communist-inspired violence that has occurred in Latin America in recent years has come from the "hard-line" parties, Cuban or Chinese-oriented, or from the hard-line faction within a Moscow-oriented Party. The latter situation applies to the Venezuelan party, which has led the most intense campaign of violence and sabotage that Latin America has seen since Fidel Castro took over five years ago in Cuba. Ominously, one of the points made in the communiqué was that: "An active movement of solidarity of all the Latin American countries with the liberation struggle of the people of Venezuela should be organized on a continent-wide scale." Elsewhere the communiqué recommends that aid should be given to "the freedom fighters of Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay and Haiti." Thus the real significance of the Havana meeting is that the communiqué is tantamount to a public admission that the Soviet Communists have never changed their basic strategy -- especially not for the developing areas. They still support violence, and the communiqué is a blueprint for increasing it in those countries where it has the best chance to prosper.

In a sense, the November conference can also be looked upon as a subtle political action operation carried out by the USSR against the Castro regime. The opening paragraphs of the communiqué call on all parties to support Cuba, by organizing an intensive propaganda campaign and by working for the resumption of diplomatic and commercial relations between the governments of their countries and that of Cuba. The shift in emphasis from peaceful to violent methods is, in a sense, a concession to the Castro thesis. The passionate appeal to all orthodox parties to help Cuba improve her diplomatic and commercial position within the Western Hemisphere certainly carries with it the obligation, on Cuba's part, to be a better team member, of the international Communist movement. Therefore, the Havana conference of Latin American Communist parties, if anything, has consolidated Moscow's hold over the Cuban party and hence over government policy.

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
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RIVAL COMMUNIST PARTIES PLAGUE INDIA

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SITUATION: In late December the Indian government arrested nearly 800 pro-Chinese members of the so-called leftist Communist party which split away from the Moscow-oriented CPI and laid formal claim to being the Indian party in November 1964. The Home Ministry charged that those arrested were plotting treason in support of possible new attacks from Communist China. No description has been given the public of the evidence which led to the arrest but there is little question that Indian opinion generally recognizes the threat posed by an illegal apparatus which subscribes to the policies of India's most powerful enemy, China. Thus the detention of members of the left group known to be in sympathy with, and believed to have direct ties to, China has brought relatively little protest from non-Communists.

The rightwing Communists, however, also have considerable capability for subversive mischief. They exploit India's massive problems by agitational use of their labor and other front groups against the government, despite their announced intention of forming a people's front with that same government. Furthermore, the March elections in Kerala may provide an unfortunate example of the ability of two rival Communist parties to cooperate with each other and with non-Communist parties when some political prize makes it expedient.

REFERENCE MATERIAL

Biweekly Guidances (Secret, *unclassified attachment)

#751 China Attempts to Split the Indian Communist Party


#791 Communist Threat to Indian Labor

#847 State Elections in Kerala, India

"United We Fall," Douglas Hyde London: Ampersand Books 1964 3s6d

See unclassified Fact Sheet attached.

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
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FREE WORLD SUPPORT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM


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SITUATION: The volume of U.S. aid to South Vietnam is so massive that it obscures the efforts of the other 14 countries who are also rendering aid and assistance in various forms and amounts, not to mention the 10 other countries who have recently pledged at least token assistance. (See unclassified attachment for specific details on the countries who are aiding the South Vietnamese and the form of their contribution.) Highest levels of the U.S. government have ordered a major effort to induce additional Free World countries to show their flags in defense of the freedom and independence of South Vietnam. The goal is not only to get contributions from those countries who are not now contributing, but also to get increased contributions from those countries who are already contributing, and above all, to demonstrate that the defense of South Vietnam is of common concern to the Free World.

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Fact Sheet

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15 February 1965

The Anti-German Slant of Communist Propaganda

Reunification: A Main Task of 1965 (New Year's Eve Address by Walter Ulbricht) "... For the past 15 years we have, after all, been the only one in Germany who have developed initiatives consistently and persistently to overcome its division, who have submitted constructive plans for an understanding between the German states.

All we hear from Bonn in reply is a call for more arming, and recently even for laying an atomic mine belt, an atomic death strip along the frontier between the German states.

What a monstrous thing this is. Do the citizens of the West German state not see that a game is being played with them when the policy of revenge of the West German ruling circles produces such poisonous flowers?

The three Western powers should realize clearly: According access to West Germany to join atomic arming in any form will not only be a hostile act against the peace-loving states of Europe but will at the same time destroy prospects for negotiations on unification of the German states."

Steps to Strengthen European Security Outlined (Radio Moscow, 3 Jan 65)
"... West Germany is making no effort to seek ways to build up European security; on the contrary it is even undermining peace in Europe. It is doing its utmost to get into the nuclear club, and Washington is supporting it in this direction."

Peace Policy (Neues Deutschland, East Berlin, 31 Dec 64) Correspondent Lothar Killmer reviewed the "progress made in 1964 by the GDR in international prestige due to its peace policy." "Whereas the U.S. people unmistakably demonstrated their support of peace by reelecting Johnson, Washington's main ally, the Bonn revanchists, strive for the atomic bomb in order to revise the results of WW II by military-political blackmail."

West Germany Alarmed by Policy Setbacks (Radio Moscow, 5 Jan 65)
"... the present rulers of West Germany over the last few years have never let the occasion pass to exert pressures on their allies regarding the German problem. They deliberately speculate on the problem of German unity in order to aggravate the tension in the center of Europe, and they need the kindling of chauvinist passions in order to force the armaments race, for the restoration of a new Wehrmacht admitted to nuclear missile weapons."

Ardennes Victory Made Possible by Soviet Aid (Moscow Tass, 6 Jan 65)
"Eisenhower and his yes-men from the West German military camp today echo Goebbels' propaganda. And Eisenhower is using marked cards.... Referring to Eisenhower's allegation that Germany 'suffered defeat after the

battle in the Ardennes,' the author (V. Pavlov) writes: 'This is a monstrous distortion of historical facts, indeed, it is well known that in the Ardennes operation the American and British troops themselves were on the brink of defeat. They succeeded in avoiding catastrophe only because of the effective assistance rendered them by the Soviet Army'"

Rotmistrov Attacks German Mine Belt Plan (Moscow, Red Star, 29 Dec 64)
".... Blinded by their plans of revenge, the Bonn militarists are recklessly striving to deploy as much nuclear ammunition as possible on the territory of the German Federal Republic Hassel and those who think like him in this matter, of course, refer to the need 'to strengthen the defense.' It is clear to everyone, however, that motives of defense are far from being the foundation of the current Bonn plans. Posing itself the task of obtaining access to the 'nuclear trigger' at all costs and in the end possession of nuclear weapons, the Bonn militarists, as the saying goes, stop at nothing. Covering their revanchist adventurist plans with the bogey of the 'communist danger,' the West German militarists are trying to tie their bloc partners tighter to the strategy of revanchism and to draw them into war for the implementation of their aggressive intentions Feeling its strength, the West German militarist clique is increasingly setting the tone in the North Atlantic bloc and is beginning to determine the entire NATO military strategy The antihuman ways of the Bonn militarists time and again underline the tremendous danger inherent in the attempts of the NATO leaders to open access for them to nuclear weapons through the so-called multilateral force or any other nuclear forces The Bonn militarist clique is apparently sparing no means to step up the implementation of their program of military preparations and to create the conditions for a revision of the results of WW II. The ruling circles of West Germany, whose policy is already openly made by the Bundeswehr generals, have again unmasked themselves as enemies of peace."

Johnson Statement to the U.S. Congress (Neues Deutschland, 8 Jan 65)
"Johnson begins with assurances, although not quite clearly expressed, that he favors peace, friendship, and striving for understanding However, less than five minutes later, the U.S. President himself debased his assurances U.S. soldiers and officers plunder and murder in the jungles of South Vietnam; U.S. planes and warships invade the DRV But Johnson obviously especially undermines his peace assurances by his statements, or rather omissions, on European security. For a long time, the European public has observed with alarm the alliance of the revanchist and militarist forces of West Germany with the U.S. The U.S. President does not disappoint the Bonn revanchists. He avoids mentioning the revanchist 'Germany initiative' so longed for in Bonn; he deals with the German problem only in one sentence, and, in addition, rather noncommittally. Yet even from this one sentence the Bonn extremists derive new hope."

U.S. Right to Troops in Europe Not Perpetual (Izvestiya and Radio Moscow, 11 Jan 65) "Let us recall the events of 20 years ago. At the cost of huge sacrifices the Soviet Union insured victory over Fascist Germany The members of the anti-Nazi coalition solemnly proclaimed that German militarism and Nazism would be uprooted Yet it is well known that the U.S. and her Western partners acted contrary to the policy they had proclaimed themselves They took care not to uproot militarism and revanchism in West Germany but to arm that country and include it in the aggressive NATO bloc Everybody realized the danger of the creation of an Atlantic nuclear torpedo providing the Bundeswehr with access to nuclear weapons, the establishment of a kind of Bonn-Washington axis."

Johnson's Words Do Not Match U.S. Deeds (Berliner Zeitung, East Berlin, 9 Jan 65) "It is well known in the U.S. that the greatest danger to world peace is Bonn revanchism. This is all the more known because, after all, West German militarism was fostered with U.S. support. As long as there is no change in such matters as U.S. murdering and plundering in South Vietnam, encouragement for the atomic armament plans of Bonn, and refusal to recognize the real situation in Germany, demonstrated by the existence of two German states, peace and understanding is impossible, and all promises by the U.S. President remain empty words."

GDR Leaders Congratulate Albert Schweitzer (East Berlin Radio, 13 Jan 65) "Walter Ulbricht salutes Albert Schweitzer on behalf of the GDR population as a great humanist, who has at all times advocated peace and understanding Walter Ulbricht says that the efforts of the West German Government to obtain nuclear weapons and a say in their use and its desire to lay atomic mines along the eastern frontier of the Federal Republic constitutes a serious danger Notwithstanding the fact that up to now Bonn has rejected all GDR proposals for an understanding between the two German states, the GDR is steadfastly continuing its efforts to insure peace in Germany."

USSR Replies to Bonn Note on Nazi Criminals (Tass, Moscow, 16 Jan 65) "After noting that the majority of fascist murderers did not bear any punishment for their crimes, A. Leontyev writes (in Red Star): 'The gentlemen who dream of replaying WW II do not want to condemn the crimes committed during that war. The gentlemen who are borrowing the know-how of former Hitler generals do not want their teachers to find themselves behind bars. Such is the real reason why the West German legislators show such concern over the statute of limitations Whereas mankind remembers everything and has learned much, the American 'madmen,' like the Bonn revenge-seekers, do not remember anything and have not learned anything. But vain are the hopes of our adversaries, Leontyev writes, that they would be able to save from retribution their kin, the Nazi butchers.'"

Bonn's Atomic Minefield Raises Threat of War (Radio Moscow, 21 Jan 65)

"The Pentagon wants to arm West Germany to the teeth and give that country nuclear weapons The West German militarists will gain access to nuclear weapons. They hope to revenge themselves and to undertake aggression against many peoples in Europe and Asia. History has shown that these men will not stop at killing hundreds and hundreds of millions to further their mad plans."

Commentators Discuss West German Militarism (Radio Moscow, 24 Jan 65)

"The year 1965 is the year of the 20th anniversary of the end of WW II. Perhaps the approach of this date provokes a particularly strong feeling of bitterness and indignation when one sees the Rhine revenge-seekers once more threatening peace and security in Europe Roughly, in the last 350 years there have been more than 150 wars in Europe. It was here that the German militarists unleashed two world wars lasting for more than 10 years and killing many millions of persons."

15 February 1965

Facts on the Stalin Terror

Khrushchev said in his Secret Speech, 24-25 February 1956:

"Out of a total of 139 full and alternate Central Committee members elected at the 17th Party Congress, 98, or 70% were arrested and shot.... Out of 1,956 delegates to the [17th] Congress with deciding or advisory votes, 1,108 were arrested and accused of counter-revolutionary crimes."

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95 mass graves containing 9,439 victims were discovered at Vinnitsa, the Ukraine (then under German occupation), in 1943. Examination indicated that they were killed between 1938 and 1940, when Khrushchev was First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

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In 1961, after the 22nd CPSU Congress had openly discussed some of Stalin's crimes, an Armenian newspaper ventured to state that Malenkov had been responsible for the arrest of more than 3500 leading Armenians in a few months in 1937, many of whom were shot.

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According to an NKVD report dated 13 June 1941, 16,255 Latvians, 21,114 Lithuanians, and 11,102 Estonians (total 48,471) were shipped off in 871 freight cars; many of them died later. The population of Riga, 393,000 in 1939, was 308,000 in 1943. An analysis of Lithuanian population statistics shows that 630,000 Lithuanians were killed or deported by the Soviets, 60,000 in 1940-41 and 570,000 in 1944-58. (250,000 others were victims of the German occupation.)

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Census reports state that the USSR had 170.6 million persons in 1939 and 208.8 million in 1959. Official vital statistics indicate that 1950 population was 178.6 million. Considering territories annexed in 1940, Soviet population in 1941 should have been about 200 million. This means that there was an absolute population loss of about 25 million persons during the 1941 to 1950 period. The war obviously caused much of this loss, but the highest estimate of military deaths was 9.5 million. (Russian military deaths in World War I were 1.7 million.) Apparently the deportation of nationalities would be one explanation for the remainder; the sending to slave labor camps of tremendous numbers of prisoners (esp. from territories recaptured from the Germans) would be another. A study of Soviet population (Frank Lorimer, The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects Geneva, League of Nations, 1946) estimated that there were 5 million "excess" deaths during the collectivization, 1930 to 1934.

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(Cont.)

In his study of the Stalin regime (Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party, Munich, Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1959), Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov estimates, using official party figures, that 1,220,934 party members were purged and liquidated between 1 May 1935 and 1 March 1939. Stalin declared in 1939 that he had appointed 500,000 young Bolsheviks to leading posts in the state and party; as Avtorkhanov points out, these were replacements for purged officials. Most of the Soviet leaders of today were among these appointees.

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Leonard Schapiro estimates (in his The Communist Party of the Soviet Union New York, Random House, 1959) that 1,140,000 were expelled from the party in 1933 and 1934, and that about 850,000 (36 per cent of the membership in January 1937) were purged in the 1936 to 1938 period. In 1939 (at the 18th CPSU Congress), Malenkov revealed that only 8.3 per cent of the membership had been in the party before the end of 1920; this amounted to 132,000 persons, out of an early-1921 membership of 733,000. Less than a quarter of those who joined from 1921 to 1928 still belonged to the party in 1939. Of those who joined from 1929 to 1933 (when recruitment was suspended), less than half were members in 1939. The purges also gave Stalin a chance to create the "New Class." In two republics, only 1.7 per cent of the 1929 parties belonged to the categories of "intelligentsia" and "office worker," while in 1939 these categories formed 42.8 per cent of one and 44.5 per cent of the other. Today's party leaders are not the heirs of the Revolution, since Stalin wiped out the Revolutionists; today's leaders are the heirs of Stalin.

25X1C10b

Fact Sheet

15 February 1965

Text of the communique of the meeting of representatives of the communist parties of Latin America:

A conference of the communist parties of Latin America, attended by the representatives of all these parties, took place at the end of 1964. The conference passed in an atmosphere of fraternal cooperation and in the spirit of a sincere exchange of opinions and understanding of common problems. There was a useful exchange of experience accumulated in the struggle of all the peoples of the continent against imperialism, for national liberation, peace, democracy, and socialism.

The conference devoted special attention to questions of solidarity with the people and government of Cuba. The conference resolutions speak among other things, of the need to extend on an increasingly greater scale the movement of solidarity with Cuba on the whole continent, and of making this movement more resolute and more organized in nature. By boosting the solidarity movement, local organizations, leaders, and parties, apart from carrying out their duty to the world and Latin America, also defend the interest, freedom, dignity and future of their peoples.

Among the tasks confronting the solidarity movement, special attention is devoted to the resumption of diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba, to the struggle against the economic blockade, and for the development of trade; to the exposure of the preparations for aggression and of the activities of the counterrevolutionaries and other CIA agents; to the timely rebuff to the calumniating campaign organized and directed by the U.S. imperialists against Cuba and its government; to the organization of an extensive propaganda campaign of the achievements of the Cuban revolution in all the spheres; economic, social and cultural.

The conference made the following recommendations with regards to the support of the struggle of other Latin American peoples against imperialism:

Assistance should be rendered for the formation of a solidarity movement and unions, and the campaigns against repressions should be organized on a permanent basis so that this work will not dwindle to sporadic manifestations or disunited statements.

Active aid should be given to those who are subject at present to cruel repressions -- for instance, the freedom fighters in Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, and Haiti.

The movement should be developed more extensively against colonialism on the continent, and resolute aid should be rendered to the struggle for the independence of Puerto Rico and British Guiana; for the autonomy of Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guiana; for returning to Argentina the Falkland Islands; and for rendering support to the national aspirations of the British and Dutch colonies in the Caribbean basin.

An active movement of solidarity of all the Latin American countries with the liberation struggle of the people of Venezuela should be organized on a continent-wide scale.

It is necessary to intensify the movements of solidarity with the people of Panama who are waging a struggle against imperialism in difficult conditions.

It is necessary to activate the campaign for the liberation of the communist leaders kept in jails: Jesus Faria, Gustavo Machado, and Pompeyo Marquez from Venezuela; Pedro Saad from Ecuador; Jacques Stephen Alexis from Haiti, Antonio Maidana from Paraguay; Mario Alves, Ivan Ribeiro and Astrogildo Pereira from Brazil; and of all the patriots, workers, and democratic leaders who are being persecuted.

It is necessary to develop the spirit of solidarity with the Latin American proletariat by supporting the manifestations of protest of workers at all enterprises and informing the World Federation of Trade Unions and all the independent united workers centers in Latin America.

The conference also emphasized the need for promoting the rapprochement between various parties, their exchange of experience and a better knowledge of one another.

The conference carefully studied the questions dealing with the differences in the international communist movement and adopted, in this connection, a resolution whose main points are as follows:

For the unity of the international movement:

The communist parties of Latin America, whose representatives gathered for an exchange of opinions, reaffirm their determination to work actively for the unity of the international communist movement, a unity based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and on the programmatic documents of the meetings of 1957 and 1960.

The communist parties of Latin America consider that this unity is the main guarantee of the success of our struggle against imperialism for the national and social emancipation of all the peoples, for world peace, and for the construction of socialism and communism.

In this connection we are deeply concerned with the situation which has developed in the international communist movement in which acute differences occur, differences fraught with the threat of a split and play into the hands of our enemies, whose aggressiveness keeps growing in view of this.

The communist parties of Latin America consider that it is necessary to exert all possible effort to clear the way for unity, insure mutual understanding in the socialist camp, and avoid everything that increases the danger of the split, interferes with fraternal and constructive discussions, and makes it difficult for the fraternal parties to act in a united front; it is necessary to do this so that it would be possible to avoid the present differences and use all the energy for the struggle against the imperialists and other reactionary forces.

It is necessary to use as a basis the coinciding points of view, which are the expression of our common ideology, Marxism-Leninism, and do everything possible so that an inviolable unity of principle would take the upper hand.

In connection with this and in view of the fact that the differences in the form in which they are now discussed inflict harm to the international communist movement, the conference calls for an immediate end to public polemics and emphasizes the need for finding proper channels to solve the questions which have arisen in the spirit of fraternity which should prevail in relations between Marxist-Leninist parties.

At the same time the conference holds that the unity of each party is an indispensable condition for the development of the revolutionary process in each country. Consequently, any factional activities, no matter what their source or nature, should be condemned categorically.

The conference holds that resolute steps should be taken to insure the unity of the international communist movement. With this aim in view the necessary bilateral and multilateral meetings and a conference or conferences of all the Marxist-Leninist parties should be held.

25X1C10b

Fact Sheet

15 February 1965

Indian Communism

"India faces the danger of becoming blind to the wrongs of pro-Russian communism in its hatred and fear of China and her agents in this country. Dange's design for a national government which includes himself and his fellow-travelers inside the Congress is as dangerous for India's freedom."

HIMMAT, (New Delhi) Jan 8, 1965

The Communist Party of India before the split once boasted a membership of between 200,000 - 300,000 and at the height of its popularity received approximately 10% of the vote in the national election. The two factions have split and reunited on many questions following the Sino-Soviet feud but the source of greatest strain was the Chinese military attack on India in October 1962. Many of the group now called the left Communists maintain that India provoked the conflict. The right-wing majority which supports the Soviet position in international Communist affairs denounced the Chinese attack and urged adoption of parliamentary tactics against the Indian government. In 1964 their increasingly bitter divergence culminated in a formal split into two Communist Parties of India, each claiming orthodoxy and each proclaiming its own strategy for achieving a Communist state of India.

Left Communist Conference. The rebels, suspended from the Moscow-led central party in April 1964, convoked a Seventh Party Congress of their own in Calcutta from October 30th to November 6th. The four hundred delegates passed an amended draft party program which, they claim, will cure all of India's political ills. The program advocated inter alia a return to clandestine organization and revolutionary tactics against the ruling Congress Party. The program was a triumph for the more radical leftists among the rebels led by M. Basavapunniah, one of those looking toward China as a model for Communist development, and a defeat for the less militant leftist views of former Kerala Prime Minister, E.M.S. Namboodiripad. The conference claimed to represent the majority (104,000) of Indian Communists and thus the authority to use the name and flag of the Communist Party of India and to represent the Indian party at international Communist meetings. In pursuit of these claims they determined to seek Soviet recognition as the official party and Indian permission to use the CPI election symbol.

Their organization plans are significant indication of future activity. The new constitution is reliably reported to call for a return to a cell-type organization (the usual base for conspiratorial action). The conference elected a 38-member central committee and a 9-member politburo

(the CPI's 1958 change from "politburo" to "secretariat" marked the beginning of revisionism according to the leftists) and P. Sundarayya, an advocate of extreme militancy, was elected Secretary General. This tight command structure is readily adapted to illegal functions.

Too blatant a pro-China stance would have prejudiced their efforts to lure members from the rightist party and to recruit new members among the Indian public but their conference resolutions were only thinly veiled reflections of the militant Chicom doctrine. Among others, the resolutions called for Indian initiative in negotiating with Communist China on their "border disputes" which were termed detrimental to "Afro-Asian and anti-imperialist solidarity"; and praised the replacement of Khrushchev which, they aver, will unquestionably result in improved Sino-Soviet relations and world Communist unity on the basis of the 1960 statement of the 81 Communist parties.

Right Communist Conference. On December 13th, the right-wingers opened their own Seventh Congress of the CPI which was attended by 570 Indian delegates and representatives of 24 Moscow-line fraternal parties. The convention called for a broad national democratic front, to include workers and peasants, which will carry on a mass struggle to transform India, "the most advanced capitalist country among the newly independent nations," into a socialist state. Peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism was the theme but the resolutions were more critical of the new government than the CPI had been of Prime Minister Nehru.

Mention of the new leftist party shows both the fear of rivalry and the need for strength through cooperation. Although the rightists also claim a majority (over 130,000) of Indian Communists, much of their political strength is derived from the all-India Trade Union Congress. AITUC Secretary General is also the CPI (right) Secretary General; President of AITUC has joined the CPI/left. A split in AITUC -- or even worse -- a loss of the whole labor federation to leftist leadership would be calamitous for the right CPI. One resolution notes the threat to AITUC but adopts an attitude of "patience, reason and fraternity" and promises to try "to draw the rival party into joint mass campaigns while simultaneously exposing its wrong ideology, policies and organizational methods..."

CPI (right) reelected S.A. Dange as Chairman and left unchanged their organizational structure: 101-member National Council; 25-member Central Executive Committee and a 9-member Central Secretariat.

As with the CPI (left) the rightist party lacks total unanimity. The members are still split on the authenticity of letters discovered in the Indian archives in 1964 which were written by Dange in 1924 offering to serve the British in return for his release from jail. A committee assigned to the task of judging their authenticity in the face of Dange's denial of authorship, concluded that there was no basis for disputing Dange's denial; a minority report dissented on the grounds that there was no proof that he did not write the letters!

Differences between the Parties. The essence of their differences lies in their separate attitudes toward the ruling Congress Party and their differing strategy to achieve the same goal: a Communist state. The CPI (right) currently calls for a national democratic front which will require temporary cooperation with the bourgeois Congress Party. As their National Council said earlier, combining and manipulating elements of the bourgeois Congress Party is a

"temporary tactical manoeuvre. After having shared power with the bourgeoisie, the proletariat will fight to dislodge it from leadership and assume complete leadership." (New Age, CPI (right) newspaper, October 25, 1964.)

The CPSU convention delegate, Boris Ponomaryev, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, confirmed the rightist position on major issues. He mentioned the Soviet Union's concern that her foreign policy line be supported by CPI action against imperialist efforts to "eliminate the progressive features of India's foreign policy" -- a clear reference to the USSR's friendly relations with the Indian government.

Ponomaryev said he was confident that the CPI would overcome the "difficulties" of the party split and urged an international meeting of the Communist parties which could "start to overcome in practice the differences in the Communist movement." Only on the eve of the right congress did Pravda mention for the first time the establishment of a leftist party which they labeled "Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of India."

The CPI (left) called for a people's democracy, or front, of all classes under the leadership of the working class for mass action against the government. Although they deny any plans to overthrow the government by force, the Indian press reported that radical leftists urged building an underground organization.

The left group is anxious to escape a pro-China label which would be anathema in India. Equally aware of this danger, the Chinese Communists avoided the customary public fraternal greeting which could be a kiss of death to their protégés. Not until January 22, 1965 did the Chinese acknowledge formation of the new left group which they, of course, call the Communist Party of India. (Peking Review reported that the CPI Congress expelled the "renegade Dange group" which then usurped the name of the Communist Party of India and convened a "Seventh Congress" of their own.) Despite lack of open Chinese support of this meeting there has been considerable conjecture on the source of funds for conference arrangements which were rather lavish for a rump group with no large-scale support. But Indian official interest centered on an even more significant clue.

Pro-Chinese Leftists Arrested. According to The Statesman (New Delhi) of January 4, the Italian intelligence service tipped off the Indian government on contacts which an Indian Communist had made with

both the Italian Communist party and with Chou En-lai and Chen Yi during their 1964 trip to Africa, Asia and Europe. A leftist secret circular quoted as speaking of "liberating the masses" by "international revolutionary forces" and describing the Chinese not as "aggressors but liberators" somehow reached the Indian press. On December 30 the government, acting on information from "reliable sources" arrested more than 700 pro-Chinese Indian Communists charging that they were a threat to national security at a time when Chinese troops were again behaving menacingly on the Sino-Indian border. Although those arrested are members of the CPI (left), the move was apparently somewhat discriminating: two prominent leaders of the CPI (left) who had spoken out against China's actions in the border question were not arrested. The ultra leftists have voiced their suspicions that the Dange group played some background role in the arrests but no charges have been publicly made.

Kerala State Elections. In 1957 the Communists won the Kerala elections and elected E.M.S. Namboodiripad Chief Minister. The central government suspended the Communist regime in 1959 following uncontrolled civil disturbances. Namboodiripad, now prominent in the CPI (left) is one of the two major leaders not now in jail -- presumably because he has been critical of China on the border issue. The pro-China Kerala figures now under detention are not prevented thereby from becoming candidates in the March 5 Kerala legislative assembly elections. One important imponderable in the election is the Communists' (of both parties) ability to capitalize on undeserved halos of martyrdom ascribed to the arrests.

If, despite all their differences, the right and left Kerala Communist groups form an alliance for the state election, they might obtain a small majority of the vote and form the next government. If they cooperate, their election chances will be enhanced by the Congress Party's declared intention of making no alliances with any party as well as by the fact that the many small parties must accept election agreements with larger ones in order to survive.

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Fact Sheet

15 February 1965

Free World Support for South Vietnam

The South Vietnamese defense forces are strengthened by direct military support not only from the United States, but from several other countries. None of this direct military support is committed to action against the Communist Viet Cong except in cases of self-defense. The New Zealand government has sent a 25-man engineer detachment to build roads, bridges and hospitals. Australian and Thai pilots fly transport missions to deliver supplies and equipment to combat zones in support of the South Vietnamese armed forces. Psychological warfare specialists from Taiwan and the Philippine Islands are helping train South Vietnamese units to combat Communist propaganda as well as to disseminate factual information about their own achievements and programs. South Korean military veterans teach specialized combat methods to South Vietnamese soldiers. Malaysia has provided the South Vietnamese army with armored cars and other military vehicles in addition to giving special training in Malaysia for more than 2,000 army officers. Three of the countries --the Philippines, Malaysia and South Korea--are passing on to the South Vietnamese the benefit of their experience in having successfully defeated international Communist aggression against their own countries similar to that being waged now against South Vietnam.

Medical Aid: Many countries have provided South Vietnam badly needed medical personnel and supplies. These are especially useful because in addition to the usual needs of caring for the sick, the South Vietnamese are faced with the necessity of caring for the many victims of Viet Cong ambushes and innocent villagers who are subjected to Viet Cong atrocities. Medical specialists from Australia, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea, West Germany and the United States, in addition to practicing their own life-saving skills, assist in establishing and administering professional training programs for South Vietnamese medical personnel. Medical supplies have been sent or pledged by Austria, Brazil, Greece, Israel, Japan, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and the United States. Other countries have made contributions in the form of medical equipment of various kinds. The Swiss, for example, presented 30 precision microscopes to Saigon University for the use of the students in the College of Pharmacy.

Direct Economic Aid: Some 10 nations are providing direct grants of goods and services designed to bolster the economy of South Vietnam and improve the living conditions of the people. Canada has supplied \$150,000 worth of flour, Iran has promised 1,000 tons of petroleum products, Thailand delivered 100 tons of cement and 10,000 sheets of metal roofing. Several countries have sent or promised to send economic specialists to assist the South Vietnamese in the very important task of

developing their economy and taking steps to improve the lot of the South Vietnamese people. West Germany has sent 25 technical experts and over 75 Japanese specialists are in Vietnam working on electric-power programs. Both the Netherlands and the Republic of China have agreed to provide agricultural experts to help the South Vietnamese make the most of their good potential for agricultural production.

Educational Aid: Teachers and school supplies and equipment have been furnished to the South Vietnamese by many countries. Canada is erecting a new science building and auditorium at Hue University and has sent a professor of orthopedics to Saigon University. West German funds were used to build a technical high school and a New Zealand grant was used to build a science-faculty building at Saigon University. The United Kingdom has provided special equipment for the medical, science and pharmacy faculties at Saigon University in addition to books and other equipment for several secondary institutions. Over 1,000 South Vietnamese civilian students have been given assistance to allow them to study at the university level in Australia, Canada, the Republic of China, France, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, West Germany and the United States.

This partial list of countries that are contributing to the South Vietnamese struggle for freedom is indicative that many nations are aware that they have a direct interest in the success or failure of that mission. The South Vietnamese are fighting on two fronts--against the Communist Viet Cong aggression and to improve the living conditions of their own people. Their needs are so great and so varied that almost any country has products or services which, if they could be spared, would be useful to South Vietnam in its hour of need.