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N E X T I S S U E

of this Biweekly Propaganda Guidance (BPG)

will be o n e w e e k l a t e,

i.e. will be dated 31 August 1964 (3 weeks after this one).

R e a s o n:

We are changing printing and format of the classified section of

BPG in order to make it more handy and more readable.

Subsequent issues

will again come at two week intervals, as heretofore.

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Briefly Noted

Moon probe Ranger 7's successful mission (28-31 July) made headlines in almost all areas. The effect of this US space success should be prolonged by replaying all forthcoming stories on the scientific results of Ranger 7's photography, or on improved prospects for an early Apollo manned flight to the moon. Press Comment of 3 August carries an article by Sir Bernard Lovell from the British scientific magazine, New Scientist, on 9 July. Future stories might note that even before the successful Ranger 7 shot, Sir Bernard (not noted as being critical of Soviet space achievements) had concluded that "there seems little doubt that the Russians are fast losing ground to the Americans." Sir Bernard also concludes (and President Johnson's comments on Ranger 7 could be used to confirm this) that there is no sign of a real slow-down in the US civilian space program. It might be further noted that Sir Bernard identified the absence of successful moon probes as a problem for both the US and the Soviets; Ranger 7 has since done much to solve this problem for the US.

OAU Heads of State Meeting

African heads of state gathered in Cairo July 17th for the second OAU meeting since its founding 14 months earlier. Accomplishments: Addis Ababa was named permanent headquarters, Guinean Diallo Telli secretary-general; Nkrumah's call for immediate union and an African military high command were passed over in favor of gradual unity urged by Tanganyika's Nyerere; pre-independence borders were declared binding unless changed by peaceful means. Problems: How to enforce the boycott against shippers and airlines who deal with South Africa, without suffering severe commercial losses; how to coordinate rival liberation movements and increase liberation committee assistance to rebels in Portuguese territories and Southern Rhodesia.

Sukarno Plays With a Communist Pandora's Box in Malaysia.

Indonesian agents are reported contacting former Malaysian terrorists in southern Thailand. [NY Times or Press Comment 19 July.] News of Sukarno's expanding "crush Malaysia" campaign comes on the heels of Mikoyan's promise in Djakarta to supply Indonesia with more weapons for aggression and to support Sukarno's war against "neo-colonialists." It also coincides with an Indonesian campaign to incite Malay racial antagonisms against the Chinese (75% of the population) in Singapore.

Most of the Malaysian Communist terrorists, many of whom not only find safe haven in Indonesia but are being trained there by Sukarno, are ethnic Chinese -- whose allegiance both Sukarno and Khrushchev should have reason to question. This strange coalition for aggression makes Sukarno's Panch Shila and Khrushchev's Peaceful Coexistence look phonier than ever. We must expose this deadly war-like adventure of the two self-proclaimed "peace champions" at all opportunities.

French Nuclear Tests in Polynesia

French Prime Minister Pompidou stopped off in Papeete on 26 July to assuage the Polynesian natives' fears over French thermonuclear blasts to be

let off in their midst. He sympathized with the natives' apprehensions, and pointed out that French atomic policy was (a) inaugurated by previous French governments, (b) responsive to international realities ("we cannot be blamed for terrible nuclear devices created by scientific progress") (c) non-atomic powers are destined to disappear or must submit in future conflicts and France intends to do neither, thus is forced to acquire these weapons, (d) scientific activities will be a boon to Polynesian economy. The Prime Minister further promised that there would be careful studies on effect of nuclear blasts on Polynesian fauna and flora.

[We give suitable publicity to these tests and to the apprehensions of the population. We connect current French and future Chicom tests.]

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DATES OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST

- 3 Sept International Union of Students (IUS) Congress, Ibadan, Nigeria, 3-13 Sept.
- 4 Sept Socialist International Centennial Congress, 4-6 Sept, Brussels. First International founded, 28 Sept 1864
- 8 Sept USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland refuse to sign peace treaty with Japan, concluded with 48 nations, 1951.
- 9 Sept 13th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs in Czechoslovakia, 9-12 in Prague and 13-19 in Karlovy Vary.
- 9 Sept Chinese People's "Liberation Army" enters Lhasa, Tibet, 1950.
- 16 Sept II World Youth Forum sponsored by the Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR (CYO), Moscow, 16-23 Sept.
- 17 Sept USSR invades Poland, annexes eastern half of country, 1939. Twenty-fifth anniversary.
- 19 Sept Week of International Struggle Against Fascism and War (Communist) 19-26 Sept.
- 21 Sept People's Republic of China proclaimed, 1949.
- 28 Sept Friedrich Engels born, 1820 (note same date for founding of the First International). Dies 5 Aug 1895.
- October II Nonaligned Nations Conference (I in Belgrade), Cairo. Sponsors: Ceylon, UAR, Yugo. October 1964.
- 2 Oct Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi born, 1862 (assassinated 30 Jan 1948).
- 11 Oct Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung issue joint "peace and unity" pledge" 1945.
- 19 Oct 13th Biennial General Council, World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) Budapest, Hungary.
- 19 Oct USSR and Japan resume diplomatic relations without peace treaty, 1956.

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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#34

18-31 July 1964

Commentary

Principal Developments:

1. The Chinese replied to the CPSU 15 June declaration of intent to accelerate preparations for a world conference in an 8,000-word letter dated 28 July, probably the most brutally arrogant reiteration yet of CCP intent to "bury" the CPSU leaders unless they surrender (see summary in Chrono, July 30/31). It refutes all aspects of the CPSU letter, recalls that the CPSU's "special right" in convoking meetings was made contingent on prior consultation and unanimous agreement, declares that the CCP will never take part in a Soviet-splittist meeting, and taunts the CPSU with having fallen into its own trap and facing an insoluble dilemma. In addition to denouncing Soviet betrayal and subversion of the Japanese CP by conniving with Shiga and company, it charges that the CPSU is "ganging up with Indonesian reactionaries" against the PKI. Chinese media heavily replay anti-Soviet JCP, PKI and N. Korean materials; also the Rumanian protest against joint Danube exploitation.

2. The open warfare between the CPSU and the Japanese CP described in #33 assumed major proportions, with new developments almost daily. The Indonesian and N. Korean parties openly supported the JCP against the "subversive machinations" of the "modern revisionists," the N. Koreans adding: "We have already had bitter experience of such an act of these people." (See Chrono, throughout the period.)

3. Soviet media continued to carry "routine" anti-CCP material and statements of support from other parties -- including specific Finnish support of a Soviet-style preparatory meeting -- while unconfirmed reports say that behind-the-scenes preparations for such a conference are going ahead. Pravda on the 19th and 24th published extensive excerpts from Chinese documents and speeches -- carefully selected and juxtaposed to show how the CCP line has changed over the past five years and more.

4. The gathering of Khrushchev, Novotny, and Ulbricht with Gomulka in Warsaw for the 20th anniversary of "People's Poland," the 5-day visit of the top-level Rumanian delegation headed by Premier Maurer to Paris, and an unexpected 2-day visit of CPSU leader Podgorny to Bucharest added nothing to the overt dissensions in the ICM.

5. The Mongolian Foreign Ministry sent another protest note to the Chinese Embassy in Ulan Bator, this time in connection with "obscene, rowdy acts of certain Chinese citizens" in U.B. during Chinese-Mongolian cycle races (Chrono, July 31).

6. As the period ended, another major public battle, before non-Communist peace partisans as well as hard-line Communists, was developing in Japan in connection with the rival Tokyo and Hiroshima world "Ban-the-Bomb" conferences. The Chinese and their supporters won the first round hands down, -- but the walk-out of almost half of the delegations in support of the Soviets may have made it a hollow victory. (See Chrono, July 30 and continuing.)

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Significance:

The 28 July CCP letter, brazenly but deftly countering most of the points of the 15 June CPSU letter, clearly outlined the dilemma in which the CPSU finds itself. It is most difficult to foresee a successful outcome of Khrushchev's frenzied campaign for a preparatory 26-party meeting: if he manages actually to convene that meeting -- which we still consider rather doubtful, considering the opposition even among pro-Soviet CPs, let alone within the CPSU itself (of which we know too little) --, then he must formalize the split and pay a virtually unacceptable price to obtain some semblance of world-wide support (not from the Chinese themselves who are almost certainly beyond concessions, but from some of the "wavering" parties). His only other alternative is to abandon the plan of a world conference -- which must result in further heavy loss of face for the CPSU and for Khrushchev personally.

Meanwhile, the non-Communist peace movement throughout the world must be further disillusioned by the bitter public battles characterizing this year's rival ban-the-bomb conferences in Japan.

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(Commentary Cont.)

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18-31 July 1964

#34

A. Feud with Japanese CP.

Throughout the period: The open warfare which broke out earlier in the month between the CPSU and the JCP (see Chrono #33, July 5 and continuing) produced the following results:

--15th (delayed); Indonesian CP daily Harian Rakjat, full text of resolution on unity of the ICM adopted at PKI First National Conference (see Chrono, July 3-8), denounces "the activities of the modern revisionists to erode, split, and betray the struggle of the peoples of various countries" while it "welcomes with great pleasure" the "new victory" of the Japanese CP in driving out "the revisionist Shiga-Suzuki group." (It also reiterates PKI insistence on the necessity of bilateral talks between the CPSU and the Albanian Party as well as CPSU-CCP before an international conference can be held.) Chinese press prominently publishes full text on 21st.

--19th; JCP daily Akahata, text of 15 July JCP reply to CPSU letters of 18 April and 11 July to JCP, giving "inside story" of ill-fated JCP delegation visit to Moscow in "refutation" of CPSU "slander."

Re CPSU complaint that delegation refused to sign a joint communique:

"You forced the delegation to accept the draft of a joint communique which was utterly different from the contents of the talks. It is natural, therefore, for the delegation to have rejected it."

Taking up the Soviet charge that the JCP refused to publicize CPSU views, the JCP asserts it has "intensively publicized important Soviet material, including that differing from the stand and opinion of the JCP."

"On the contrary, you have long refrained from informing the Soviet Communists and people of the important decisions and statements of the JCP. After all, you arbitrarily demand that the JCP publish your material only and that the JCP unconditionally agree with your stand and opinion. You, however, have no such rights...."

Regarding the CPSU complaint that their 18 April letter had not been discussed in JCP inner circles,

"Your assertion is not true at all. In any case, just when and how our Party's Presidium and CC discuss the problems of the ICM and relations with the CPSU is our Party's internal problem."

Noting that "we have mutually agreed not to announce the contents of the Japan-Soviet party conference in Moscow," the statement asks rhetorically:

"What is the objective of this unilateral announcement of your letter? The only answer is that you are providing materials to slander our Party in favor of Shiga, Suzuki, and other anti-Party elements who are engaged in subversive activities against our Party..., and also that you are stepping up your subversive activities against our Party."

It closes by reaffirming the JCP's determination not to tolerate "any unreasonable interference in the affairs of our Party by any country (sic)." (Text front-paged by all Chinese papers on 24th.)

--20th; JCP leader Shoichi Kasuga, addressing the national convention of the Japanese trade union federation Sohyo, apologizes for his Party's error in opposing the 17 April strike called by Sohyo.

--20th; Mainichi Daily News, Tokyo, (in English on 21st), reports Japanese dissident Communist leader Shiga's press conference at the quarters of his new "Voice of Japan Society," denouncing the JCP's "self-criticism" of its opposition to the April strike and saying that neither he nor Suzuki had been informed of the contents of the CPSU letter to the JCP, although they were still leading members when the letter was sent.

--21st; Moscow central trade union daily Trud criticizes JCP "sectarianists" opposition to the 17 April strike and quotes "the statement made by Communist Deputy of the Japanese Parliament I. Suzuki," condemning the JCP course in this respect as "erroneous."

--22nd; Akahata, texts of 3 JCP letters to CPSU over past year and a half. First, 6 March 1963, replies to CPSU 22 February 1963 letter inviting JCP to send a delegation to Moscow: pleads delay on pretext impending local elections and party convention -- but emphasizes importance of settling dispute between CPSU and CCP soonest. Second, 22 October 1963, replies to CPSU letter of 12 October, which apparently tried to expedite visit: offers further pretexts for delay and dwells at length on differences over test-ban treaty, complaining particularly about Zhukov report in Pravda "openly denouncing our Party" after the 9th world anti-bomb conference in Japan last year. The third, 10 January 1964, replies to CPSU letter of 26 November 1963: says that the JCP is "examining a plan to send a delegation," and returns to the test-ban conflict, rebuffing an apparent Soviet effort to defend the Zhukov report.

Texts of these 3 JCP letters and the 2 CPSU letters published 18 July are published by all Chinese papers on 24th.

--22nd; Akahata, text of undated statement by Tsuyoshi Doki, JCP/CC Secretary, rebutting the Shiga-Suzuki press conference statements of 20th. Branding their statement that they learned about the 18 April CPSU letter for the first time when it was published as "a downright lie," Doki writes about Shiga's "secret visits to the Soviet Embassy."

--24th; Akahata, two articles -- "In Reply to the Public Criticism by Mr. Zhukov" and "In Refutation of the Radio Moscow Broadcasts and Other Criticism" -- with an editorial note which concludes:

"Though we shall make a necessary reply later to a series of unfounded criticisms in the CPSU/CC's letter of 18 April, we must here openly refute Zhukov's article, against which we have so far reserved any formal retort for nearly one year, and other criticisms...."

Chinese press publishes excerpts on 30th.

--25th; Chinese papers, extensive excerpts of 11 July Akahata article: "Anti-A/H Bomb Movement and the Splittists' Theories and Practice."

--27th; North Korean Party daily Nodong Sinmun, editorial of over 4,000 words, "Subversive Machinations Against JCP Can Never Be Tolerated," -- a severe denunciation of CPSU (un-named) policies:

"...Some people are wantonly violating the standard guiding mutual relations among fraternal parties (FPs)...

"...These people, spreading their wrong views, try to force all others to follow them blindly and try to put pressure on and plot against those parties which do not obey them. We have already had bitter experience of such an act of these people. They accuse others of having started polemics after they themselves provoked open polemics, and they condemn others as splitters while they themselves are resorting to splitting machinations....

"This is a most typical great-power chauvinist act intended to establish superior-and-inferior relations between FPs. Acting as if they hold a certain central position in the ICM, they attempt to issue orders to others and willfully meddle even in the internal affairs of FPs....

"....What can justify such a criminal act of backing renegades who are trying to subvert the party leadership and disrupt the party...?"

"Today the KWP and the JCP are firmly united....The unity between the two parties...is unshakable.... We support in its entirety the righteous struggle of the JCP...."

Peking People's Daily reprints full text on 29th.

--31st; CCP letter to the CPSU dated 28th and published on 31st (see Chrono, July 30/31) condemns the CPSU repeatedly for its "unscrupulous open attacks on the valiant JCP," its "act of betrayal," "interference and subversion," etc.

B. Other Developments.

July 18: Pravda, article by Finnish CP SecyGen Ville Pessi reiterates FCP support for world conference, but also endorses Soviet position that preparatory committee should consist of those parties represented on the drafting committee for the 1960 meeting and affirms that the FCP is ready to take part in preparations.

July 19 & 24: Pravda "Documents Expose," two installments of Chinese CP materials showing how the present CCP line diverges from "the agreed line of the ICM" and from earlier speeches and documents by the Chinese leaders themselves.

July 21: Pravda, article by Bakulev, criticizes "substantial shortcomings" in the 3-year plan for Zanzibar worked out by CPR specialists. "The main shortcomings of their plan are the absence of economic justification, its substitution with bare figures, and insufficient elaboration of the questions of profitability."

July 22: Warsaw gathering of Khrushchev, Novotny and Ulbricht with Gomulka for 20th anniversary of "People's Poland" produced no overt contribution to the struggle in the ICM.

July 23: Czech Party daily Rude Pravo, "A Strange Courtship," charges that, in pursuing their concept of "intermediate states," "the Chinese leaders are now courting certain circles in West Germany, and this process is reciprocal." It concludes: "This provides an example of how birds of a different feather can meet on the same twig....this strange courtship is directed against the Soviet Union."

In Izvestiya, Canadian CP Chairman Tim Buck derides "Maoism" or "Chinese or Asian Marxism," as Liu Shao-chi called it, and reiterates Canadian CP advocacy of a world conference.

July 25: At a Moscow press conference on preparations for the World Youth Forum due to open there 16 September, Iraqi Behnan Petrus of the Permanent Secretariat said that no reply had been received to two letters sent to Chinese youth organizations but that the forum would be successful without Chinese participation.

July 26: Peking People's Daily, full texts of the 12,000-word Rumanian Viata Economica attack on Soviet Professor Valev's proposal for joint development of the lower Danube basin, together with Valev's article and the subsequent Izvestiya article repudiating the proposal (Chronos #31 and #32).

July 27-28: CPSU/CC Secretary and Presidium member Nikolay Podgorny made a 2-day "friendly visit" to Rumania: content of discussions not divulged.

July 27-29: At a 3-day Tokyo peace conference attended by "some 400 religious leaders of different faiths from 16 countries, including Communist Bloc countries as well as Japan..., a delegate of the Soviet Union and his Communist Chinese counterpart Monday staged a strange version of the Soviet-Chinese ideological squabbling." The test-ban treaty was again the main bone of contention, and "the Communist Chinese argument was upheld by Indonesian, Cuban, North Korean, and Canadian (sic) representatives," according to Kyodo in English on the 28th.

July 27-31: The top-level Rumanian delegation to Paris, led by Premier Maurer, brought an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation and on negotiations for a long-term commercial pact, cultural exchange and consular convention, but the Rumanians affirmed their loyalty to the USSR on major East-West issues.

July 28: A NCNA statement (front-paged in all Peking papers on the 29th) rebuts the 8 July Pravda article "slandorously alleging that China collaborates with Portugal, does not deny planned establishment of diplomatic relations with that country, and uses Macao to export opium, etc."

"The allegations about Sino-Portuguese relations published in Pravda are out-and-out groundless fabrications.... China has never considered establishment of diplomatic relations with Portugal...."

Izvestiya correspondent Y. Kosyukov writes about the universal militarization of Chinese society, as well as the most pressing task today.

July 29: Pravda reports that "recently the Chinese press has sharply intensified the unbridled slanderous campaign against the WCM..., attacking the SU and the CPSU especially fervently. In the period from 16 to 24 July this year, People's Daily alone published about 500 items attacking the CPSU and other M-L parties."

July 30/31: NCNA on 30th announces that CCP/CC has sent a letter dated 28 July to the CPSU in reply to its letter dated 15 June: full texts of both are published in all Peking papers and Red Flag on 31st. The 8,000-word CCP letter -- probably the most brutally arrogant reiteration to date of the Chinese intent to "bury" the CPSU leaders unless they surrender -- comprehensively and totally refutes all aspects of the CPSU letter, declares that the CCP "will never take part" in a Soviet-style meeting, and taunts the CPSU with its "insoluble dilemma."

The CCP letter is divided into 5 numbered parts. The first, addressing itself to the Soviet charge of a Chinese "volte-face" on the question of a world meeting, reviews the history of the question a la CCP, beginning with their endorsement in the spring of 1962 of a joint Indonesian-Vietnam-New Zealand proposal through a Khrushchev 16 January 1963 statement, to show that it is really a Soviet "volte-face." Of particular interest:

"You have brought great political and organization pressure to bear upon fraternal parties (FPs), intensified your subversive and diverse activities within FPs, and extended your collusion with defectors, renegades, Trotskyites, the Tito clique, and reactionaries of every description. For example, you staged the act of betrayal by Yoshio Shiga, Ichizo Suzuki, and others in order to injure the JCP which upholds M-L. You are busy ganging up with the Indonesian reactionaries in order to injure the Indonesian CP which upholds M-L."

Part II denounces the "pure fraud" of the CPSU claim that their meeting will "seek ways to unity" when their proposal "boils down to one thing: you really want to force the M-L parties to accept the revisionist line peddled by the 20th and 22nd congresses of the CPSU."

"Your favorite trick is to try and make capital out of the sentence in the declaration of 1957 and the statement of 1960 concerning the 20th Congress of the CPSU. But you know perfectly well that the CCP has always been against that sentence. At both meetings of the FPs, you made repeated requests, claiming that you would face great difficulties unless the sentence was included. It was out of consideration for your difficulties that we made concessions on this point.... It is absolutely impermissible that you should use this sentence as a subterfuge for pushing your revisionist line or as a big stick with which to attack fraternal M-L parties."

Part III treats "the procedure and steps" advanced by the CPSU "for openly splitting the ICM."

--First, on the preparatory meeting, the CCP repeats its proposal and dismisses the Soviet plan for participation of the 26 parties which drafted the 1960 statement by saying that "they have no hereditary rights." It repeats that the situation is now "vastly different," that "two parties now exist in

some of the 26 countries and you and we differ as to which of the two should attend." Also, "it is necessary to achieve unanimity" or "no preparatory meeting of whatever kind will be legal."

-- Second, on CCP-CPSU talks, it notes that the CPSU is now "trying to brush them aside" as "of little import" and preparing to call a world meeting without agreement between the two. "What is this if not a resolve to call a meeting to precipitate a split?"

-- Third, on the composition of the international meeting, it rejects emphatically the CPSU criterion for new participants, stating that "M-L parties which have been rebuilt after breaking with revisionism...will of course be entitled to participate, and no one has any right to exclude them."

-- Fourth, on the right to convene an international meeting, it rebuts the CPSU claim of a "special responsibility" deriving from a 1957 decision by noting that the full text of that decision requires "consultation with the FPs before calling any meeting."

"Moreover, we wish to point out that the principle of unanimity through consultation among the FPs was established at the meeting of the FPs in 1960.... Should you dare to violate this principle..., you will have no right whatsoever to call any international meeting."

Section IV is a bold claim of the rapidly growing strength of the true Marxist-Leninists -- which "strikes terror into your hearts" -- and reaffirmation of CCP "duty" to "give firm support" to them, including some of the following passages:

"Your letter brazenly charges us with 'the intensification of factional, disruptive activities, and the utmost exacerbation of polemics.' This only serves to show that you are so terrified by the mighty forces of M-L that you have taken leave of your senses and are talking nonsense.

"The splits that have occurred in the CPs of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Ceylon, and many other countries are the result of your own pursuit of a revisionist and divisive line and of your own frenzied subversive and factional activities....

"So long as you persist in your revisionist line and refuse to admit your errors publicly, we will certainly continue the great debate Without thoroughly clarifying such major issues..., how can there be a basis for the unity of the FPs and how can an international meeting of the FPs be held successfully?

".... To get at the root of the matter, time is not on your side, and you have lost faith in your own future. Reality is a compelling force, and your letter, which lacks reason and conviction and is characterized by a mouse-like timidity despite its air of ferocity, reflects your state of mind...."

In Section V, the CCP "solemnly declares: We will never take part in any international meeting, or any preparatory meeting for it, which you call for the purpose of splitting the ICM." It notes that "during the 14 years

from the dissolution of the Communist International in 1943 to 1957 there was not a single international meeting of all CPs. But this did not hinder the progress of the cause of international Communism. On the contrary, during those 14 years, the Chinese revolution triumphed.... Why should a meeting be called in such a great hurry now?"

"Since you have made up your minds, you will most probably call the meeting. Otherwise, by breaking your word, would you not become a laughing-stock down through the centuries? As the saying goes: You can't dismount from the tiger you are riding. You are caught in an insoluble dilemma. You are falling into a trap of your own making and you will end by losing your skin.... We firmly believe that the day your so-called meeting takes place will be the day you step into your grave."

July 30 and continuing: The opening of the "Tenth World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs" in Tokyo is accompanied by bitter political struggle and recriminations between the Soviet-and Chinese-line factions. This was expected after the powerful, Soviet-sympathizing Japanese Socialist Party had broken away from the Hiroshima Conference last year and this year is holding its own "World Conference" in Hiroshima August 3-9. The Soviet and some other delegations planned to participate in both, but they were coldly received in Tokyo. The Soviets charge that the Chinese, taking advantage of the fact that only half of the delegates were on hand, began their machinations in meetings during three days preceding the scheduled opening. After the Chinese succeeded in freezing the Soviets out of any share in the leadership of the 56-nation meeting at the opening session on the 31st (by ramming through a rule barring any nation from participating in both the Tokyo and Hiroshima meetings, though they could attend in observer capacity), the Soviets led 26 other delegations in a walk-out from the conference. Further developments will be reported in next installment.

July 31: Ulan Bator Montsame service announces: "On 28 July 1964 the MPR Foreign Ministry delivered a note of protest to the CPR Embassy in connection with the obscene, rowdy acts of certain Chinese citizens who, during the Mongolian-Chinese cycle races held in Ulan Bator 24-26 July, openly initiated provocations creating disorder on the raceway and grossly encroached upon the liberty of certain MPR citizens and militiamen."

S E C R E T

10 August 1964

813. De Gaulle's Impending Tour of South America (20 September - 16 October)

25X1C

SITUATION: De Gaulle's grand design of restoring France to the rank of a world power -- as she had not been since the days of Louis XIV and Napoleon I -- has three principal aspects: in Western Europe, he wants a loose federation of governments under French hegemony (possibly with West Germany as a junior partner), eliminating U.S. influence as much as possible; outside Europe, especially in Africa -- but now also extending into Asia and Latin America --, he wants, at the very least, to re-establish a French "presence" by means of active diplomacy (which includes offers of intervention in matters of little real concern to France, such as Cyprus), trade, some technical-economic aid and especially cultural relations, utilizing for these purposes the far-flung net of former French colonies; finally, he wants to make himself arbiter between East and West -- which he has started by recognizing Communist China, by proposing "neutralization" of Southeast Asia, and, most recently, by rapidly improving France's relations with the Eastern European Communist regimes, at the moment focusing upon Rumania.

The tenor of de Gaulle's press conference on 23 July 64 reflected his continuing determination to obstruct Western unification wherever it does not meet de Gaulle's terms and to undermine U.S. influence with friendly nations. There is every indication that his month-long Latin American tour, ambitious sequel to his more modest visit to Mexico last March, is designed to enhance French relations in the Western Hemisphere at the expense of US relations and policies as necessary. De Gaulle's regime attempted to befriend leftist Brazilian President Goulart until he was overthrown, while Peronistas in Argentina are looking forward to the visit of the man with whom they share enmity against the U.S., a preference for "strong-man" rule and a common nostalgia for the policies and military tactics of the long-dead past.

De Gaulle is pre-occupied with certain themes which he adapts to the situation or locale of the moment. The unclassified attachment itemizes some of these recurring themes, along with pertinent rebuttals which de Gaulle has provoked from France's own allies. It is particularly notable that the loudest expressions of distress over de Gaulle's actions have come not from the Communists of China, the Soviet Bloc, or France, but from France's Free World partners. But US criticism in Latin America would be counterproductive.

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S E C R E T

(813 Cont.)

If it appears at all necessary to counter statements by de Gaulle or any high French official accompanying him (or comment made by officials or media of the host countries), such counter moves should follow these guide lines (and should not use any US comments):

1. Criticism should be based on Latin American or free world interests and views, but not as a defense of U.S. interests and policies.
2. Personally slighting attacks on de Gaulle or adverse criticism of France or of the French people as a whole must be strictly avoided.
3. Critical analysis of de Gaulle's grand design and his resulting foreign policy should emphasize that (i) France's human and material resources cannot fulfill these over-ambitious plans, (ii) weakening of free-world unity and solidarity threatens the national security of every free country and tends to endanger world peace, (iii) his views on Communism are utterly unrealistic ("neutralization" means to leave the Communists in possession of the areas they rule, e.g. North Vietnam, while offering them a partnership in the areas they have not yet conquered, e.g. South Vietnam).

If de Gaulle offers a host country economic advantages, media should attempt to pin him (or his spokesmen) down to specific figures, times and conditions. Where applicable, those advantages might be compared with the host country's gross national product, total foreign trade, or with benefits under the Alliance for Progress. Data on French expenses for her former colonies, especially on a per capita basis, might also be used in this context. See in this context --

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See also Biweekly Propaganda Guidance #135, 24 Feb 64 regarding de Gaulle's foreign policy and related questions:

Item #747, Can Southeast Asia be Neutralized

For unclassified material: Press Comment frequently carries relevant articles.

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814. Chicom Aggression and the UN

SITUATION: The Chicom leaders, educated in the hard school of the Long March, the Yen-an caves and the fierce struggle to take over China, place their confidence in violence and armed revolution as the most efficient and effective means of solving the problems of the world. Without their "messianic" ambition, their racial arrogance and their fanatical intolerance of any view save their own, Mao and his colleagues would never have been able to survive, let alone seize power and exert control over all of mainland China. These same characteristics have led them to arrogate to themselves the rights of sole arbiter not only of what is good for China but what is good for the entire world. These same characteristics cause them also to make the same mistakes over and over and prevent their adapting their outmoded dogma to conditions and circumstances that exist in China and in the rest of the world today.

The aggression against Tibet, Korea and India, the chaotic failure of the Great Leap Forward, the moralizing stridency and righteousness of their dogmatic position in the Sino-Soviet split are all evidence of Chicom determination to mold the world into her own narrow image, by force if, where and as soon as they are able. They have allied themselves with extremists everywhere and have played on nationalistic differences and racial prejudices; they make their appeal to the dissatisfied and the disgruntled to bring disorder and chaos to established governments, especially those that need all of their resources for their own people's welfare and can ill afford to create large organizations to resist dissident elements encouraged and supported by the Chicoms.

In spite of clear Chicom behavior, beliefs and goals, many countries sponsor or support the CPR application for UN membership. Some do so believing that she can be dealt with more effectively there, by being forced to adhere to UN principles, or simply that all nations should belong to the world organization. Others, like de Gaulle, believe that nationalism will, of its own force, win over communism everywhere and, therefore, that the Chicoms should be treated as everyone else. Still others, who participate in international organizations and maintain various other types of relations with the CPR, either feel obligated to extend these relations into the UN or feel embarrassed or inconsistent in their actions if they refuse such admission. There are those, in addition, who truly want to see Chicom membership in the UN, for a variety of reasons which include failure to recognize any serious consequences from such membership or an assumption that they themselves will benefit from CPR admission (e.g. leftists or extreme nationalists in Afro-Asian groups, those who themselves still feel they must use might to make right in individual situations).

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815 d. Khrushchev's Cultural Destalinization

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SITUATION: Khrushchev faces a difficult problem: he needs to maintain the rule of the CPSU and its leadership, since this is the foundation of his power; on the other hand, he wishes to win popular support, to encourage initiative, and to rebut Chinese Communist demands for uncompromisingly revolutionary policies. He tries to answer the problem by exonerating the Party and himself, while blaming past terrorism on Stalin, and present stagnation and factionalism on "survivals of the personality cult." But the logic of anti-Stalinism leads the Soviet Union, and especially its intellectual avant garde, in directions which Khrushchev never intended. In particular, the conflict with Peking, and the consequent need to bid for support from revisionist elements abroad, handicaps the efforts of the CPSU to insist on intellectual orthodoxy at home.

Khrushchev's aims differ sharply from those of the "liberal" writers and artists in Moscow and Leningrad. Khrushchev has sanctioned poems and novels which he thought would help to discredit Stalin. The younger poets, novelists, and artists seek to extend the attack to condemn all efforts to dictate a rigid orthodoxy. Leaving aside the old Stalinists, there is within the liberal camp itself a range of opinion about the degree to which artistic work should contribute to "Communist construction." Tactical compromises are often made. But in general, the liberals bring a continuous pressure for more freedom of expression and more freedom to travel. They promptly seize on any apparent relaxation of party control for new publications and exhibitions. After Khrushchev approved the publication of Aledsandr Solzhenitsyn's prison camp novel, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, editorial offices were (according to one of the Party's chief ideologists, L.F. Ilichev) flooded with "vile, anti-Soviet manuscripts." When it was rumored that Khrushchev had made a secret speech in the Central Committee calling for greater creative freedom (23 November 1962), Moscow's "underground artists" organized within one week a public exhibition of their paintings and sculptures.

Knowing how Khrushchev would react to abstract art, conservative artists and bureaucrats saw to it that he visited this exhibition (they also probably helped arrange it, as provocation), and after making various unprintable remarks, he "declared war" on the liberals. (The remarks were printed in Encounter, April 1963.) Conferences of writers, artists, and party leaders were held in December 1962 and March 1963, and a party plenum in June 1963 repeated the customary calls for strict observance of the party line. During this period sharp attacks were made against Ilya Ehrenburg, Viktor Nekrasov, Yevgeny Yevtushenko, Vasily Aksenov, and Andrey Voznesensky, and in July 1963 the liberals lost control of the Moscow writer's organization.

But after April 1963, there was on the whole a relaxation. The leadership apparently became concerned over domestic fears of a return to Stalinism, and over hostile comment from abroad; the Italian Communist Party publicly dissociated itself from the Soviet hard line on 17 April. The cultural aspect of the June plenum was eclipsed--and probably influenced by--the open eruption of the Sino-Soviet controversy. During the past year, liberal writers have

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continued to get their material published. When the official newspaper Izvestiya published (August 1963) Aleksandr Tvardovsky's anti-Stalin poem, "Vasily Terkin in Paradise," and the conservative magazine Oktyabr (October) objected violently, Izvestiya ruled that the conservative criticisms were "unacceptable." Now the conservative writers are writing stories about loyal party men who maintain their party spirit despite imprisonment, or who suffer anguish over the terrible orders they must carry out.

It still is easy for reactionary officials to punish or harass those whom they think remiss in party spirit. The case of Josef Brodsky shows what can happen to a young poet. (See attachment: since attachment was written, Victor Zorza has reported that Brodsky has been released, but on what conditions is not yet known.) In Poland, once considered relatively permissive, the regime has acted against the liberals by tightening press censorship, and by restricting paper supplies. 34 leading Polish intellectuals signed a letter of protest which received publicity in the west, and the regime retaliated against the signers by suspending their passports and stopping the publication of their work.

The Polish government has since withdrawn most of its punitive measures as a result of the public protest, including that abroad. As in the Soviet case in 1963, the opinion of foreign intellectuals seems to have effect. And even if foreign intellectuals could be ignored, the Soviets and their friends must respond to Chicom attacks. On 11 July, Lituraturnaya Gazeta, not ordinarily liberal, defended Yevtushenko, Voznesensky, and Yevtushenko's ex-wife, Bella Akhmadulina, against Chinese charges of revisionism and, in answer to Chinese mockery of the Soviets for only criticizing erring writers, the Soviet journal answered: "What else would you want, to arrest them?" Domestically, as in an article in Kommunist #10, the CPSU has tended lately to take an "above the struggle" stance, and this kind of position is certain to be exploited by the intellectuals.

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10 August 1964

816 WH,g. Juanita Castro's Defection

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[For more complete background information see unclassified attachment: Juanita Castro Chooses Freedom and its Spanish version Juanita Castro escoge la libertad. Either of these may be passed to indigenous assets, but with the caution that they are to be used for the facts contained in them and n o t reproduced verbatim. Forwarded also is a zerox copy of her statement as it appeared in Excelsior, Mexico City, 30 June, along with an English translation. See Press Comment for further background or for any future developments.]

SITUATION: FYI Only. It is fairly evident, from the volume of the news stories and the tenor of the editorial comment, that Juanita Castro's defection has had a notable impact upon world opinion. Speaking as she did some three weeks before the Washington meeting of foreign ministers of the OAS, it was natural for her to make a special appeal for OAS action against Cuba, whether or not this actually influenced any votes. In any event, the strong wording of the resolution and the 15 to 4 decision was certainly better than most anti-Castro observers had hoped for. Also, just how far her action will go in weakening the internal fabric of the Castro regime time alone will tell. All in all, her move is an important and favorable development in the cold war against Castro.

As this is being written, it has been learned that Juanita has sold exclusive rights to her story to Life magazine. Since Life en espanol is second in circulation only to Selecciones del Readers Digest in Latin America, this will serve to keep the subject in the public conscience of that region for some time to come.

Some time during the month of August, Juanita will probably proceed to Brazil, where she has a number of devoted and very influential friends. Her arrival there will undoubtedly be the occasion of additional interviews and feature stories. She received her asylum papers from the Mexican government on 30 July. In order to be able to re-enter Mexico after her trip to Brazil, she will have to make a formal request for a re-entry permit. Thus, it is not known where she will make her permanent residence. While in Mexico she will be inhibited -- unofficially, by the government -- from making further critical remarks about Cuba.

From the point of view of U.S. interest, perhaps the only unfavorable development in the whole affair was the allegation in a number of papers -- generally not included in Press Comment -- that Juanita had been secretly working for the CIA for years. The most important of these appeared in the New York Herald Tribune, 3 July 1964, over the by-line of Barnard L. Collier. The writer did not identify his sources but claimed that the information was confirmed by highly placed intelligence sources in Washington. See below for treatment of this aspect of the case. End FYI Only.

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10 August 1964

817. Ceylon: First Trotskyite Entry Into Coalition Government

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gives Trotskyism a new lease on life.

SITUATION: For the first time in history, a non-Communist nation has included a Trotskyite party in its government. Ceylon, since its independence (1947) racked by communal strife between Sinhalese and Tamils, beset by economic difficulties and ruled since 1956 by a vacillating, though autocratic, leftist and neutralist leadership, has now "broadened its base of government" by forming a coalition, in a desperate attempt to overcome economic and communal strife as well as reckless Marxist opposition.

Communists, whether orthodox or "deviationists" (such as Trotskyites, Titoists, etc.), never treat non-Communist "allies" as equals -- due to their doctrinary insistence that the future belongs to the workers and peasants, that only one party can represent one class and that they are that one party, thus entitled to monopoly rule. However disguised for tactical reasons, Communists apply this basic strategy in all united front combinations, whether in or out of government. This was originally demonstrated by the first Popular Fronts in the thirties, in France and Spain. It is now being exercised in Indonesia, where the Communists -- though not formally in the government -- increasingly dominate Sukarno's regime, in Cuba -- where Castro's non-Communist supporters were gradually eliminated -- and in quite a few other instances.

Even though the government of Ceylon (where the non-Communists are faced with an orthodox CP, now split into Moscow and Peking factions, as well as with a Trotskyite Party) would appear to have a better than even chance to keep its dangerous partners in bounds, it remains very much to be seen whether Mrs. Bandaranaike, despite her anti-imperialism, anti-Westernism and neutralism, will be realistic and farsighted enough to keep the Communist factions disunited and to strengthen her mass support from non-Communist labor and other groups.

SUPPORT MATERIALS include an unclassified attachments: Ceylon and Trotsky ~~Said~~. See also the following Biweekly Guidances:

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
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Books

"Ceylon, Dilemmas of a New Nation," by W. Howard Wriggins, Princeton Univ. Press, 1960

"The Land and People of Ceylon," by Donald N. Wilbur, J. B. Lippincott, 1962

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Fact Sheets

For Background Only
August 1964

THE DREAM WORLD OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

The U.S. Versus Free Europe

At his 23 July press conference de Gaulle resumed his self-appointed role as prophet and spokesman for Europe, and recited his favorite non sequitur - "the division of the world into two camps led respectively by Washington and Moscow no longer corresponds to the new situation," therefore, the interests of Free Europe and the U.S. are in conflict. While de Gaulle has never explained the why and how of this vague assertion, he has been using it ever more insistently to confront Free World governments with an alleged necessity to choose between French and American policies. In the face of America's post-war rehabilitation of Europe, de Gaulle presents the U.S. as economically predatory, politically domineering, and militarily unreliable as a partner.

Whereas de Gaulle's reasonings are obscure, his intent to regain the glory that was France and raise her to an eminent position as a world power is clear. The flood of reactions by his European allies to his latest pronouncements are likewise clear and somewhat more to the point.

Belgium. An article in Brussels' Le Soir criticized de Gaulle for, "in a sense refusing to accept the world as it is. - - - France cannot again become a world pivot by simple affirmation of its grandeur." [The French term "grandeur" means greatness as well as splendor.] The article added that the Gaullist concept suffers from "internal contradictions": unwillingness to accept the "supremacy of two 'great powers' because France is not one of them," and French inability to "oppose power constituted by two great confederations of people which are the U.S. and USSR with an equivalent force because it can be obtained only through a federation of European nations which would dissolve some of the French fatherland's prerogatives which he (de Gaulle) does not intend to renounce at any price." The article concludes that the "European Europe" which de Gaulle pleads for would already exist if it were not for his opposition. A front page editorial in Brussels' Libre Belgique condemned the Gaullist concepts as "short-sighted" and asked, "who follows de Gaulle?" The French nuclear force concept was derided as a "design resulting from de Gaulle's pride," and it was charged that nuclear force in the hands of such a "middle-class power" as France is a grave peril to world security and is bound to enhance the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The editorial concluded that the world asks more than that of France.

Under a headline, "The Dramatic Isolation of France," Brussels' Socialist Vooruit noted that after the Americans had twice saved Europe, "de Gaulle pretends that they would not do so a third time." The Vooruit article went on to say that not only had de Gaulle faced 900 journalists an old and solitary man, but that France is also alone, having lost many Free World friends, and is in the process of alienating the youngest, West Germany.

Brussels' Catholic Labor newspaper Het Volk accused de Gaulle of seeking French Communist support by putting spokes in the wheels of NATO and Western unity. The paper suggested that French recognition of Communist China permitted de Gaulle to escape Communist propaganda in Africa, and that his attacks on the U.S. are used to advantage with the French Communists. Het Volk had "the impression that de Gaulle desires to play the role versus America that Tito plays versus the USSR."

West Germany. The irritated reaction of the West German government to de Gaulle's 23 July press conference was an immediate news release attributed to "highest Government circles in Bonn," and widely reported in the 24 July press. De Gaulle's pointed attack on the Federal Republic was described as unexpected and troubling after the positions taken by de Gaulle during his visit to West Germany just previously. Bonn considered that the views expressed by de Gaulle could only be interpreted as a demand for the Federal Republic (FRG) to choose between American and French policies and leadership. Bonn could not understand this in view of the French knowledge that there is no real choice in the matter for Germany. According to the press release, the FRG considers an integrated defense and a close alliance with the U.S. essential: de Gaulle's "characterization of the close relationship of Europe and the U.S. in NATO as one of 'subordination' to the U.S. is rejected by the FRG." Bonn regretted that de Gaulle failed in his press conference to define what he conceives to be a "European Europe" with its own independent policy. If the FRG was resisting a disintegration of NATO and the concomitant reduction of its defensive power, this was held to be precisely in order to enable Europe - insofar as possible all of Free Europe - to become a genuine partner of the U.S. Concerning de Gaulle's expression of disappointment over cooperation, up to now, under the Franco-German treaty, Bonn regretted that the French President evaluated the results already achieved so negatively - "In the German view there is no basis for this."

FRG Press Office spokesman Von Hase issued an additional statement pointing out that "German policy is dependent neither on the U.S. nor France. It was added that a "joint policy of two governments cannot mean that one government adopts all the viewpoints of the other." The FRG too expressed regret that the Franco-German treaty had not yet led to an accord of viewpoints of the two governments on important questions, such as the Allied Multilateral Force (MLF). It was noted, however, that the FRG had made quite clear upon signing the treaty that it wished to participate in the MLF. France, which had indicated its intention not to do so, had repeatedly declared that it understood the German position.

Foreign Minister Schroeder said in a Cologne speech, "We did not enter into the Franco-German treaty in order to take over French policy."

Lastly, the daily Frankfurter Allgemeine saw a "dangerous inconsistency" between de Gaulle's statement that Europe is an entity and his rejection of European political integration. "We believe that before pursuing a joint policy Europe has to be united - - -"

Italy. De Gaulle's press conference singling out of Italy, which considers itself the most pro-European of the "Six," as obstructor of European unity, served to whip up the strongest anti-de Gaulle reaction in the Government and press since de Gaulle blackballed entry of the U.K. into the European Economic Community (EEC). While the Foreign Ministry press release was comparatively restrained, the press itself was not. Christian Democratic Il Popolo charged that the Gaullist grand design was "Born in an atmosphere of daydreams of grandeur, foreign to the true interests of Europe, the West, and the French people themselves."

Socialist daily Avanti editorialized that Italy, Belgium, and Erhard's Germany "are not at all disposed to submit to de Gaulle's blackmail, and as for Italy - since the General wished to single her out as responsible for the failure of a 'Europe of Fatherlands' - it would be well to repeat that such a Europe is not for us."

An Agenzia Democratica communique universally ascribed to Social Democratic Foreign Minister Saragat took indignant issue with de Gaulle's call for Europe to liberate itself from American hegemony. "What hegemony and what Europe? The hundred millions of Europeans in satellites who must endure governments propped up by foreign armies? The 20 million Germans separated by threat of 20 enemy divisions - one for every million inhabitants - from the mother country? Countries like Italy, Great Britain, West Germany and France itself which owe their survival as free nations on extreme western edge of immense Eurasian continent to the Atlantic Alliance? Would it be this Europe which ought to liberate itself from American hegemony? One can well understand the irritation of the German Government and the amazement of other European governments, which are asking themselves in what dream world France exercises its foreign policy If the EEC should fail, and the Atlantic Alliance disintegrate, there would be only one alternative: neutralism, forerunner of disaster for Italy and for everyone."

France. Even the French press conceded the negative foreign reception of de Gaulle's press conference. The Director of Paris' Le Monde commented editorially that France is not responsible for all difficulties in uniting Europe, but "It remains true that Gaullist nationalism offers all others a precedent and a sort of justification." He added that de Gaulle had clearly signalled to France's partners that a "European policy" had to be a French policy. "By this fact he paralyzes effort, whose necessity he proclaims, and throws our neighbors still more on the Anglo-Saxons, whom he wishes so much to keep at a distance."

The Paris Figaro commented that whatever is happening in the U.S. and USSR, it was doubtful that European states, themselves in disarray, would willingly rally to a France, "whose language they considered too rude, whose manners undiplomatic and whose ambitions quite disturbing."

Challenging U.S. Reliability

In exhorting Western nations to look to France instead of America for leadership, de Gaulle has repeatedly tried to raise doubts on American integrity by suggesting that good intentions of the present U.S. government would not be binding on future administrations.

This is a weak and unbecoming argument in the face of the U.S. Government's recent demonstration of its capacity for smooth leadership succession and policy continuity. It is even weaker in the face of the prospects that France, after de Gaulle, would be in poor shape indeed to be an effective partner, much less a leader.

The "Anglo-Saxon Menace"

To justify his disruption of Western unity, de Gaulle says that the Western Alliance is "unhealthy," and "satisfies only the Anglo-Saxons." Not since the 19th Century doctrine of Manifest Destiny have Anglo-Saxons been heard of politically, except from de Gaulle. This anachronistic mental reversion reveals him exercising French foreign policy in terms of issues long dead and forgotten by the rest of mankind.

France: Whose Ally?

Whereas de Gaulle professes opposition to Communism, his actions have consistently given aid and comfort to the Communists. The worst, of course, was his diplomatic recognition of Communist China. Like the Soviet Union, de Gaulle has refused to support UN peacekeeping operations, financially or otherwise. It is universally recognized that his suggested "neutralization of Southeast Asia" would leave the area open to Chicom takeover. He insinuated France back into the Vietnamese picture by talking of the four major powers concerned with "the past and present fate of Vietnam." However, it is questionable that his proposal for massive outside aid to "Indochina as a whole" is more than talk so far as France is concerned. Any increase in France's current aid program there would impose strains on the French budget which de Gaulle could relieve only by cutting French commitments elsewhere, such as in Latin America.

Fact Sheets

Background Use Only
August 1964

Chicoms Advocate Violence and War

The Chinese Communist leaders see their policy problems and their own role in world affairs in the light of their own past experience. Their view is dominantly colored by their lengthy existence as outlaws in the Yen-an caves followed by the fierce guerrilla war against the forces of Chiang Kai-shek. During all this time, Stalin (who was then considered infallible in the Communist world) advised Mao to bide his time and enter a united front with Chiang's Kuomintang. With the exception of his collaboration with the government for the sole purpose of fighting the Japanese in WW II, Mao ignored Stalin's advice. Both before and after that war, he plunged China into a savage civil war that ended in the Communist seizure of power and the destruction of any elements in Chinese society that did not support the Communist program. In the light of this experience it comes as no surprise that Mao and his colleagues place their entire confidence in violence as the most efficient and effective means of solving problems and that they recommend this means to others. (Nor is it surprising that Mao and Company are in no mood to listen to the advice of the Soviet comrades--or of anyone else for that matter--regarding the solution of the world's problems today.)

On a great number of occasions the Chicom leaders have expressed their preference and support for violence. In 1936 in his "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War," Mao called war "the highest form of struggle." He also said:

"The (Chinese) Communist Party has led and continues to lead the stupendous, sublime, glorious, and victorious revolutionary war. This war is not only the banner of China's liberation, but it is also pregnant with significance for world revolution." (Emphasis added.)

In his "Problems of War and Strategy," Mao said:

"Experience in the class struggle of the era of imperialism teaches us that the working class and the toiling masses cannot defeat the armed bourgeois and landlords except by the power of the gun."

Mao's report to the November 1938 plenum of the Chinese Communist Central Committee plenary session, in which he made his famous observation that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun, was also quite explicit regarding his views of revolution and war. He said:

Some people have ridiculed us as advocates of the 'omnipotence of war.' Yes, we are the advocates of the omnipotence of revolutionary war, which is not bad at all, but is good and is Marxist."

Mao leaves no doubt that his views on the subject are the same today as they were in those earlier times. On 8 August 1963, the New China News Agency reported that Mao said "The people who have triumphed in their revolution should help the struggle of those who are still struggling for liberation."

Fifteen Years of Violence: Not only have the Chicoms on many occasions stated their views on the subject, they have demonstrated those views by their actions. In the relatively brief 15 years in power they have viciously subjugated the Tibetan people, they have made a mockery of the U.N. Charter and the members of the U.N. by their aggressive attacks against U.N. forces in Korea, and they have wantonly attacked India in spite of India's earlier role as Communist China's chief apologist. Communist China's refusal to sign the nuclear test-ban treaty was the final straw for many people and nations who had earlier hoped to bring her closer to the rest of the world.

In addition to aggressive attacks on her neighbors (not to mention the countless occasions when the Chicoms subjected their own people to terror and deprivation), Communist China openly advertises herself as the supporter of violence and insurrection everywhere in the world. On 4 March 1964, the principal Chicom newspaper PEOPLE'S DAILY carried an editorial on South Vietnam which applauded the Viet Cong for having "exposed" the United States as a paper tiger. (See Propaganda Notes Series A, #51, March 24, 1964.) The editorial said that

"the people of a n y country or region subjected to U.S. aggression can win victory if only they are not overawed by its (U.S.) apparent strength and dare and know how to struggle. So, in this sense, the victories won by the South Vietnamese people have u n i v e r s a l significance."

The editorial also in effect calls on the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America to rise in armed insurrection against "the imperialist aggressors"--a misnomer they apply in an attempt to denigrate the free world. It adds that in doing so they will not only be winning their own battle, they will at the same time "assist the South Vietnamese people by harassing U.S. imperialism everywhere and thus preventing it from throwing its entire strength against the South Vietnamese people."

In case any more explicit proof of Chicom support for the Communist Viet Cong insurrection in South Vietnam were required, that proof was provided by the Chicom delegate to the 15 February 1964 Budapest World Students Conference, Chien Ta-wei, who said that the South Vietnamese people had no choice but "armed struggle," which he declared to be "the most reliable road for the oppressed nations to win complete liberation." Chien called for extensive mass activities and propaganda in support of the Viet Cong as well as "substantial political and material help, including w e a p o n s."

Guerrilla Training for Latin Americans: It was reported in July 1960 that a special school had been set up in Peking for "the training of Latin American Communists in the art of subversion" and that the curriculum included training in organizing labor movements, education for and direction of the anti-imperialist struggle and guerrilla warfare." In June 1963

five Ecuadorans were arrested at Quito Airport as they returned from a trip abroad. They had been in contact with Chicoms while abroad and instructions for carrying out subversive activities were discovered in the luggage of two of the arrested persons. In November 1963 there was a similar report from Peru. Six members of the Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) left in October enroute to China for guerrilla warfare training. There are rumors that the MIR plans to send as many as 50 members in small groups on a similar mission.

Peaceful Coexistence and the Bandung Spirit: The Chinese Communists, like all other Communists, have from time to time found it expedient to mask their basically violent views and to pose as advocates of conciliation and peaceful coexistence. In the mid-1950's the Chicoms sought to expand their influence among the Asian nations and the newly developing countries that made up the majority of the so-called neutralist bloc. At the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian nations in April 1955 the Chicoms played a prominent role in creating the "spirit of Bandung" and in publicizing the five principles adopted at the conference: (1) Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence. The Chicoms pose as the arch-advocate of peaceful coexistence so long as it serves their purposes, but the pose has become increasingly hard to maintain particularly since the wanton Chicom attacks against India in violation of every one of the vaunted Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. In spite of their blatant violations of the "Bandung spirit" all around the world, there are many people who still are vulnerable to Chicom exploitation on this point. Chou En-lai, for example, on his latest trip to Africa succeeded in convincing many people, some in influential positions, that the Chicoms desire only to be left alone to develop their own country and to help other countries who need Chicom help. Those who are inclined to accept this description of Communist China's aims and aspirations should take the trouble to acquaint themselves with the long-standing (and openly stated) views of the Chicoms.

STATUS OF THE SOVIET INTELLECTUAL FRONT, 1964

The meetings of Khrushchev and other party leaders with writers and artists in December 1962 and March 1963 seemed to foreshadow serious repression; Leonid Ilichev condemned formalism and reaffirmed the principles of "socialist realism," while Nikita Khrushchev roundly denounced modernism in all the arts, attacked several writers and artists by name, and made it clear that all intellectuals would be expected to conform to the lines prescribed by the CPSU. A Central Committee plenum was scheduled for May 1963, with ideology as the subject matter, and the press discussed various measures, such as eliminating small newspapers and magazines and forming a single (conservative-dominated) cultural union, which would effectively curb the liberal elements. Yet the plenum was delayed a month, and when it met it failed to take any drastic action; even though Ilichev himself endorsed the single union concept, it was not imposed by the plenum. Perhaps the incapacitating illness of a prominent conservative, Frol Kozlov, caused a change in course, perhaps the reaction from the West influenced the party leadership. Certainly Soviet leaders were preoccupied with the rivalry with the Chinese Communists, which came to a full boil just before the plenum when the Chinese published an open letter to the CPSU. And certainly it became clear that the younger intellectuals were not impressed by mere slogans, while Khrushchev was not really ready for more drastic action, such as Stalin and Zhdanov would have taken.

Liberals Not Routed

In July 1963, the liberals did lose control of the Moscow writers' union. But many of them kept their editorial positions, and their writing continued to appear. That summer, Novy Mir (New World) published a new Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn story, For the Good of the Cause, which showed that what was "the cause" in the eyes of the officials was not the same thing as "the cause" embraced by the people. On August 18, 1963, Izvestiya ran a poem by Aleksandr Tvardovsky, entitled "Vasily Terkin in the Netherworld"; the fact that this was preceded by an introduction by Aleksey Adzhubey implied that Khrushchev himself approved the publication. When the conservative magazine Oktyabr got into a controversy with the liberal Novy Mir over the propriety of Tvardovsky's attacks on Stalinism in "Vasily Terkin," Izvestiya ruled that the conservative complaints were "unacceptable." Viktor Nekrasov, whose reports on Italy and the United States had caused Khrushchev to demand his expulsion from the party, was back in print (in Novy Mir) in December 1963.

A long public debate took place as to who should be given the 1964 Lenin Prize for literature. Liberals wished to award the prize to Solzhenitsyn for his One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, which was abhorrent to the conservatives: the latter focussed their criticism on the character of Solzhenitsyn's hero, Ivan Denisovich Shukhov. One critic even indicated that Shukhov should have attacked the guards of his camp, as a Mikhail Sholokhov character had done against the Nazis in a German POW camp. A liberal critic, on the other hand (N. Gubko in Zvezda (Star), February 1963), had already argued that One Day showed "the terrifying corrupting force of uncontrolled power which demoralizes and corrupts people," and called on Soviet writers to lead their country out of the mire, stating: "the immediate perpetrators of all this and their executors lost all semblance of morality and humanity." Considering the implications of Gubko's remarks, it was somewhat surprising

to see that in the spring of 1964 he was still on Zvezda's editorial board and still defending One Day; he now demanded recognition of the moral responsibility of every individual for the events of the Stalin period, and he condemned "the moral corruption of people in whom uncontrolled power over others has exterminated everything civic, everything human." Despite liberal argument, however, the Lenin Prize went to A. G. Gonchar for Tronka, a saccharine portrayal of collective and state-farm life; even the conservatives had not taken it seriously.

The Conservatives on the Bandwagon

Other novels on the Stalin period include Konstantin Simonov's Soldiers Are Not Born, describing an officer who, after arrest in the 1937 purges, is released to fight in the war, and who finally, after meeting Stalin personally, suddenly realizes that Stalin was fully aware of the nature of the purges, and Yuriy Gert's Who if Not You, on the disillusionment of young Komsomol members who, after fervent belief in Stalin, find out about the real world. Because of Khrushchev's political interest in denigrating Stalin's memory, such books as this are not now very daring. Indeed, conservative writers are climbing on the bandwagon; they join in showing--less graphically than Solzhenitsyn did--the suffering of the period of the cult, but their heroes are loyal party men who never lose faith in the ideals of Lenin, and who inspire their fellow prisoners with their own party spirit. A classic story by the conservative leader Vsevolod Kochetov recently appeared in Oktyabr, showing the prolonged sufferings of a lieutenant who, during the Civil War period, made "excessive demands" on the peasants; this "victim" is arrested, nearly condemned to death, reprieved because he thought he had acted for the good of the state, rearrested in 1937, and released when the war begins. As if to show skeptics that some officers actually were released when the war began, the memoirs of General Aleksandr Gorbatov appeared in print this spring; Gorbatov described his arrest in 1938, claimed that he refused to testify falsely under torture, described Arctic gold-mining conditions resembling those undergone by Ivan Denisovich, and concluded with an account of his release, thanks to the intercession of Marshal Budenny. This developing legend of party courage in the camps might be described as the domestication of Denisovich. An arrest under Stalin is now almost a status symbol: a story was recently told in Ogonyok (Little Light) (the Soviet equivalent of Life) that Stalin's agents were preparing to kill Mikhail Sholokhov, the Grand Old Man of Soviet official literature, and that his life was probably saved by a friendly Cossack who knocked on Sholokhov's door one night and advised him to hide. Needless to say, Stalin's agents could easily have caught Sholokhov if they had really wanted to do so.

Continued Pressure by Writers

Some writers do keep pushing, however, against the limits of what is permitted. A. Ya. Kucherov recently wrote a novella, "Once in a Lifetime," (in Zvezda, #12, 1963), in which he painted an unattractive picture of contemporary Soviet society, still riddled with the fears and hypocrisy of the cult years. In August 1964, a new Solzhenitsyn story described a Siberian village whose inhabitants receive as gifts the dogs from a disbanded mining camp. When the villagers parade on a holiday, the dogs remember their training and surround the people, snarling and baring their teeth. Fortunately a former

prisoner has the presence of mind to lead the group into a courtyard resembling the prison compound and the dogs stopped snarling. The story can be read as a parable on the survival of Stalinism in Soviet society. The conflict of generations is a sensitive subject; Khrushchev violently denied the existence of such a conflict in his speech to the writers on March 8, 1962, while his very remarks showed the gulf between himself and the younger Soviet public. The problem of the generations was raised in Aleksandr Shteyn's play, "Between the Cloudbursts," (Teatr #4), based on the Kronstadt Rebellion of March 1921. Instead of following the conventional Soviet treatment, which blames the Revolt on counter-revolutionaries and foreign imperialists, who are supposed to have exploited the political backwardness of young sailors Shteyn (like most western scholars) analyzes the Rebellion as one of disillusion. He opposes a bureaucratic father, Commissar Pozdnyshv, to his son, Ivan, who joins the rebels and who accuses his father of belonging to a "Commissarocracy" which has "betrayed the ideas" of the Revolution. Instead of exhorting the masses, as is usual in Soviet mythology, Lenin is seen as following the story of the Revolt in French newspapers, and as deciding to switch from war communism to the New Economic Policy. Shteyn's play appeared in print in April 1964, but Pravda sharply attacked him for his many "errors," and he has been told that the play cannot be staged unless it is re-written.

Shteyn's memoirs have also been appearing this spring; in one place, Shteyn describes the 1949 arrest and post-Stalin release of a novelist friend, S. A. Zonin. Zonin was unable to return to his old life, and soon died. A more important victim of Stalin was Isaac Babel, whom western critics consider to have been the greatest of the post-revolutionary prose writers. He ceased to publish in the 1930's, though he continued to write, and he was arrested and executed in 1939. Now Babel's letters and unpublished writings of the '30's have been collected in an English translation by Andrew R. MacAndrew and Max Hayward, Isaac Babel: The Lonely Years, 1925-1939. The Soviet magazine, Moskva, is preparing to publish the memoirs of the writer Lev Nikulin, Years of Our Life, and this will also include correspondence with Babel and other figures of the 1920's and '30's.

Repression Continues

Even now, people are sent to prison camps for non-criminal reasons: on July 21, 1964, Literaturnaya Gazeta (Literary Gazette) disclosed that members of a sect, the True Orthodox Wandering Christians, had been sent to Siberia for forced labor. The case of Josef Brodsky, arrested and sentenced as part of a campaign against "parasitism," shows that those who do not have established reputations and especially those who are Jewish are still very vulnerable to the whims of party bigots. In May, employees of two Moscow bookstores were arrested on charges of selling "pornographic literature"; it seems that much of this was actually Western or unauthorized Soviet writing. Even better known figures, like Andrei Voznesensky and Viktor Nekrasov, were banished to factories and construction sites for a time in 1963, though they have now been permitted to return to Moscow. It is now reported that Olga Ivinskaya, the model for Boris Pasternak's character Lara in Dr. Zhivago, is seriously ill and becoming blind in a prison camp 300 miles east of Moscow. Arrested in 1960 after Pasternak's death, she received an eight year sentence on a manufactured charge of currency speculation, and she still remains in jail, despite personal pleas from Nehru, Bertrand Russell, and Eleanor Roosevelt. If not released and given proper medical care, she will probably not survive much longer.

Vested Interests

Cultural conservatism is backed by powerful vested interests. For example, on February 7, 1964, Marshal Malinovsky spoke to a group of writers and artists, and denounced recent "incorrect trends" in the description of war: the "portrayal of little, lost people in naturalistic detail," unflattering descriptions of the army in peacetime, and works which undermine the authority of commanders (as in the description of a Soviet officer evading identification by the Germans by putting on a private's tunic). Like the Nazis, Malinovsky has little use for the work of Erich Maria Remarque: "We have no right mechanically to transfer Remarque's ideas into our creative art and to deprive it of the real and true heroism natural to our life." No doubt many people, such as the ex-KGB man who masterminded Brodsky's arrest, would like to put a stop to all the talk about the camps and the executions.

Myth and Reality

The strategy of the top leadership is to use the writers and artists to sweep away loyalty to Stalin, and at the same time to try to make them propagandists for the present Soviet system. Instead of rigid controls, the party seeks both to spur and to placate the intellectuals. It wants to warn them, but it doesn't want to lose contact with them. Early in June, the CPSU Central Committee's Ideological Commission held an expanded meeting with various of the tamer writers, composers, and artists. It was agreed that tremendous progress had been made since the December 1962 and March 1963 meetings, and that:

"in the past year Soviet literature and art has taken a new stride forward in the artistic embodiment of the labor exploits and the spiritual world of the builders of Communism...the Soviet writers and artists, having repudiated esthetic views alien to us, have rallied even more firmly around the positions of socialist realism, whose fruitfulness has been proved by life itself."

This picture of the situation scarcely reflects the facts. Despite all the sermons of 1963, there were no full-dress recantations, only a half dozen vague promises to do better. Shteyn still wrote his Kronstadt drama, and Viktor Rozov has had a play ("On the Wedding Day") approved for production in which a young girl says: "They cannot understand at all that their age is past and another is coming...." and "The old people will die off and we'll get our way." The central character in a recent novel by Vasily Aksenov (It's Time, Friend, It's Time), Valentin Marvich, openly expresses his anger over the deprivation of independence and the work under orders which Soviet artists and writers suffer. In mid-June, a controversial artist, Ilya Glazunov, held a show at Moscow's Manezh Gallery. The conservatives first tried to prevent the exhibition; nevertheless, it was approved personally by Aleksandr N. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Culture. To settle the controversy, after the exhibition had been seen by enthusiastic crowds, a private viewing and discussion was arranged for Kuznetsov and the conservatives. But a large number of young people staged a "sit-in" and demanded a chance to take part in the debate and an extension of the exhibition, which had been scheduled to close. The youth of the USSR will not be poured back into the old molds.

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A special issue of Survey, No. 46, January 1963, contained many articles on Soviet art and literature. Current numbers of Problems of Communism are also likely to cover this subject.

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THE CASE OF JOSEPH BRODSKY

Russian Writers Protest Against a Grave Miscarriage of Justice

By Victor Frank

On March 13 last, Joseph Brodsky, 24, a Russian poet and translator of unusual promise, was sentenced by a Leningrad court to five years' deportation with hard labor on the somewhat odd charge "of earning too little money." The verdict said literally: "Isolated instances of earnings made by Brodsky do not indicate that he fulfilled one of the most important duties laid down in the constitution, the duty to toil honestly for the benefit of the country and for one's own well-being." The young man, who suffers from a chronic nervous disability, and who has been under treatment for several years, is now reported to be living on a state farm in the remote province of Archangel where he is employed as a driver carting manure to the fields.

Joseph Brodsky's trial may yet become a cause célèbre in modern Russia - not because of the nature of the charge brought against him, but because he has been courageously defended by some of the most famous personalities in Russian arts and letters. The greatest living poet, the 76-year-old Mrs. Anna Akhmatova; the translator of Shakespeare's "Sonnets" and of Burns' poems, Samuel Marshak; the immensely popular author of children's books, Korney Chukovsky; and the composer Dmitri Shostakovich - were all prepared to vouch for the innocence of Joseph Brodsky, whom they consider an outstanding poet and translator. After their efforts to prevent a blatant miscarriage of justice had failed, they appealed directly to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and to the Union of Soviet Writers. The text of their petition has become known abroad. It is a remarkable document on two counts; first, it reveals what can and still does happen in Mr. Khrushchev's Russia, eight years after the denunciation of Stalin's crimes; secondly, it shows that people (some people, at least) are no longer afraid of speaking out on behalf of innocent victims of the State.

The broad outline of the Brodsky case is as follows. In 1962, two men, Shakhmatov and Umansky, were arrested and sentenced in Leningrad on charges "of exerting harmful influence on young people and of preaching mysticism (Yoga philosophy), anarcho-individualism etc." The young people implicated in this affair included Joseph Brodsky, at that time a young man of 22, who after leaving school at 14, had earned his living as a stoker, a metal worker and a laborer with a geological expedition. The case against Brodsky was dropped, however, when the investigating magistrate learned that Brodsky had broken with Shakhmatov of his own accord a year earlier. The police merely confiscated Brodsky's papers, among them diaries dating back to 1956 and 1957 when Brodsky was a youth of 16-17. The diaries contained some anti-Soviet remarks but the investigating magistrate came to the conclusion that Brodsky had discarded this "unhealthy adolescent mood," and that there was no case against him.

The authors of the petition do not say so in so many words, but imply that these diaries confiscated by the police became Brodsky's perdition eight years after their composition. There was one man in Leningrad who, for reasons of his own, was evidently bent on Brodsky's destruction. This was a certain Lerner who until 1956 served as an officer with the K.G.B. (political police) and who, after dismissal from the K.G.B., became a leading light in the so-called "people's squads," officially sponsored vigilante groups with the task of assisting police in combating crime, hooliganism, etc. The authors of the petition say that in performing his duties Lerner used "methods and devices condemned by the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses," that he forced people detained by the squads to become informers, confiscated documents, bullied and blackmailed people, fabricated false evidence, etc.

Impeccable Life

It was this frustrated ex-police bully who finally succeeded in running down Brodsky. Brodsky's friends say that, within the last few years, the young man had become an outstandingly able translator and poet in his own right, and that he had been leading a frugal and morally impeccable life, devoting all his energies to his literary activities. The first round shot by Lerner was a scurrilous attack on Brodsky in a local newspaper, Vecherny Leningrad, which, late in November 1963, described Brodsky as a cynical, loose-living good-for-nothing, ascribed somebody else's poems to him, maliciously distorted lines from his own poems and generally defamed his character. Letters to the editor in Brodsky's defence were ignored, but Lerner visited the employers of the writers of the letters and described them as "protectors of a political criminal." Lerner also succeeded in enlisting the support of some local party officials and of the secretary of the Leningrad branch of the Union of Soviet Writers, the Stalinist poet Alexander Prokofyev. A closed meeting of the branch secretariat, from which Brodsky's friends were excluded, passed a resolution demanding that Brodsky be brought to trial as "a parasite."

Witch-Hunt

As a result of this witch-hunt, Brodsky's health broke down, and in January 1964 he entered a Moscow hospital. On his return to Leningrad, he was arrested in the street on February 13 as "a parasite trying to evade the course of justice," although (as the authors of the petition say) he had never been served with a summons. Despite protests by the local prosecutor, Brodsky was kept in prison as a common criminal. On February 18 he made his first appearance in court. He was remanded in custody, and a number of well-known writers and scholars appealed to the relevant party and law authorities offering evidence in Brodsky's defence. They pointed out that the case was based entirely on Brodsky's old diaries and on new evidence fabricated by Lerner. The court disregarded their pleas, and on March 13 passed sentence on Brodsky - characteristically not for any political offences, but merely for alleged moral misdemeanor. It was after the verdict was pronounced that Brodsky's friends took an unprecedented step: they made public the text of their petition on his behalf. In this document they not only point to a blatant perversion of justice and to a disturbing revival of old police methods, but also to the dangerous mood

generated during the trial which was interpreted by the crowd as a condemnation of the intelligentsia in general. What shocked the signatories even more was that the press was allowed to heap gross abuse on counsel of defence - "an unprecedented fact in the history of our press (they say): even in 1937-1938, counsel defending 'the enemies of the people' were not abused in the press." It remains to be seen whether this courageous step by a group of Russian intellectuals will achieve its purpose: the clearing of the name and the alleviation of the fate of a young and gifted poet whose only offence appears to have consisted in having aroused the wrath of a frustrated ex-policeman.

Fish in Winter - A Poem by Joseph Brodsky

Fish in the winter,
Fish chewing oxygen,
Fish swimming in the winter,
Brushing the ice with their eyes,
To where it is deeper,
To where the sea is,

Fish,

Fish,

Fish,

Fish swimming in the winter,
Fish trying to swim free,
Fish swimming in darkness,
Under a wintry, weary sun.

Fish swimming away from death
Along the eternal route of fish.
Fish don't shed any tears,
Pressing their heads against ice.
In the cold water
The eyes of the fish
Are freezing.

Fish,

Fish,

Fish,

Poems about fish
- like fish -
Stick in one's gullet.

* * *

JUANITA CASTRO CHOOSES FREEDOM

The defection of Juanita Castro Ruz, younger sister of Fidel and Raul, is undoubtedly the severest blow that the Castro regime has suffered since the missile crisis of October 1962, more embarrassing even than the findings of the recent meeting of foreign ministers of the OAS. The revelations which she made to the press in Mexico City on 29 June 1964 are in themselves a serious enough indictment; but coming from a devoted sister who had loyally served the 26 of July Movement, they are symbolic of the disintegration and disillusionment that are developing in Cuban society and government.

According to newspaper reports, Juanita had arrived in Mexico some nine days before and had remained in seclusion at the home of a younger sister, Emma, who is married to a Mexican engineer, Victor Lomeli. (Although Emma has made no public pronouncement, she, too, is looked upon as a defector.) After the interview, Juanita again went into hiding, presumably awaiting action by the Mexican government on her request for political asylum. This she received some four weeks later.

Although Juanita's defection may have come as a shock to Fidel, it was apparently no surprise to Raul: she left the Havana airport via a scheduled Cubana Airlines flight, with 21 pieces of luggage and in full view of dozens of agents of the "G-2," Castro's secret police. Subsequent stories reflect that no less a person Raul Castro himself arranged for her flight and that he did so in order to protect her from the wrath of their brother Fidel.

Juanita Castro Ruz appears to be the fourth of six children born out of wedlock to Angel Castro, a wealthy plantation-owner of Oriente Province, and Lina Ruz, a servant-laundress in the household. Angel was born in Spain and immigrated to Cuba in 1898 as a day laborer. He soon made good and married Maria Argota, of a respected Santiago family. There were two children born to this family: Pedro Castro Argota, who fled to Central America in 1960, and Lidia Castro Argota, who lives in Havana and works for the government.

Throughout the duration of this marriage, Angel consorted with Lina Ruz and produced six children by her, born, according to the best available information, in the following order: Ramon, Fidel, Raul, Juanita, Emma, and Angela. There have been conflicting reports about Juanita's age. Some newspaper writers have said recently that she is only 31 years old, others that she is 41. She claims she was born 6 May 1933. It is definitely known that Fidel was born 13 August 1926.

Eventually, Maria Argota left Angel Castro and returned to Santiago, where she obtained a divorce. Some time later, apparently when Fidel was about 20 years old, Angel and Lina were married, thus legitimizing the six children, at least under civil law. Angel died in 1956, and Lina in November 1963.

By Cuban standards of the last three decades, Angel Castro was a wealthy man. It was estimated that his assets, which consisted primarily of the sugar plantation which he operated in conjunction with his oldest son Ramon, totaled half-a-million dollars. The children had access to the best available education. Fidel studied at the University of Havana, finally graduating in law. Juanita was educated in an Ursuline convent school in the elegant Miramar section of the capital. This experience left a deep impression upon her, for she has been a devout Catholic ever since.

Shortly after leaving the convent, Juanita returned to Oriente Province to help run the family plantation and started a small rural movie house nearby. Later, after her brother came to power, she set up a small business concerned with selling movie cameras and projectors toshcools. When the agrarian reform law was about to be implemented, she sold some of the family cattle in order to realize some needed cash. These deals have been resurrected to malign Juanita's character, and they explain Fidel's remark to newsmen on 2 July to the effect that if he had permitted the spoils of his regime to enrich members of his family, he would not have been confronted with the problem of Juanita's defection.

But relations have not always been so bad between Juanita and her bearded brother. From the moment that Castro and his band began guerrilla operations against Fulgencio Batista late in 1956, Juanita became active among Cuban exiles in Mexico, Central America and the U.S. in the collection of funds for munitions, provisions and medical supplies. She was thus one of the most valuable assets of the 26 of July Movement, for it would have been impossible for Castro to carry out his ambitious plan of sabotage and insurrection against Batista without substantial help from abroad.

Juanita returned to Cuba in early 1959 and dedicated her energies to the creation of hospitals and rural schools. It was not long before she began to be disillusioned as a result of the Communistic and totalitarian direction which her brother's regime was taking. In particular, she was distressed by the summary trials and executions of so-called enemies of the regime. Not all of the victims, she was able to observe, were former collaborators of Batista: many were members of the 26 of July Movement who had become disillusioned and been unable to conceal their opposition to Castro.

According to her own statement, Juanita broke with her brother's government in mid-1960. This put Fidel in an acutely embarrassing situation: inside Cuba, it was certainly not to his interest to bring a family quarrel out into the open; for it to become known abroad would be even worse. In December 1961, nearly a year after the United States and other leading nations of the hemisphere had severed diplomatic relations with Cuba, Castro made his famous speech in which he claimed that he had always been a Marxist-Leninist. According to a friend, Juanita wept all that day.

For over a year Juanita Castro had been secretly engaged in aiding friends and former members of the 26 July Movement who had fallen into disfavor. Some time during this period, she was given possession of a large mansion which had been seized from an emigre family and was allowed to set up a boarding house for girl students of the University of Havana. Actually, the establishment provided cover for Juanita's increased activities in aiding the underground resistance to the Castro government. Although under constant surveillance by Fidel's security police, she was instrumental in helping at least 200 Cubans escape from the country. Strangely enough, some of these were personal friends of Che Guevara and her brother Raul who had incurred the capricious wrath of Fidel. According to recent refugees from Cuba, Raul had much genuine affection for his younger sister and protected her throughout this critical period of her open break with the policies of the Castro government. Ultimately, they conclude, it was Raul who paved the way for her "escape" -- in full view of the secret police.

Juanita's revelations to the Mexican press in her well-publicized interview add little to what has long been known of the conditions that combine to make of Cuba the first Communist totalitarian police state in the Western Hemisphere. However, they confirm some important details and should convince even the more recalcitrant minds. Here are some of the conditions in the socialist paradise of the Americas which she describes:

1. As in other Communist lands, Children are taught that it is their duty to inform on their parents if these are not completely loyal to the regime.

2. Each city block is organized in such a way that neighbors watch each other's movements, visitors, etc., and inform the G-2 of any unusual activity.

3. The Department of State Security -- whose name is patterned after that of its Russian counterpart, the KGB -- maintains a large section devoted exclusively to directing espionage and guerrilla activities in Latin America.

4. There are 75,000 political prisoners in Cuba, according to information which she has obtained from government sources.

5. Although there is no law prohibiting church attendance, those who do go to church are considered opposed to the regime. The only reason the government has not made an all-out attempt to eliminate religion is that it does not want to make a bad impression abroad.

6. The Compulsory Military Service Law, passed last December, is used to provide forced labor for government-operated enterprises at a salary of seven pesos per day.

"For Castro-Communism, it appears that the beginning of the end has begun," said Excelsior, of Mexico City 1 July in an editorial entitled "Juana Castro Confirms." Whether Excelsior is guilty of excessive optimism or not, Juanita Castro's defection will give encouragement to those elements in Cuba who still hope for eventual complete liberation. More importantly perhaps, both her act of defecting and her subsequent declarations constitute a well-nigh irrefutable confirmation of countless other reports of the inhuman conditions that exist in Cuba today.

EXCELSIOR, Mexico City,
30 June 1964

COMPLETE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT OF JUANITA CASTRO

Gentlemen of the Mexican Press:

I am Juanita Castro Ruz, sister of the Prime Minister of Communist Cuba, Fidel Castro Ruz. I have lived in Cuba until a few days ago and because I have a high opinion of the Mexican people, I have decided to make these statements.

It is difficult for me to speak in public, especially concerning my own family. In spite of this, my conscience does not permit me to remain quiet about one part--that of Cuba--and especially when I am so familiar with the subject and with the person who is responsible for the situation confronting my country. My brothers Fidel and Raul were the principle leaders of the Revolution against the dictator Fulgencio Batista. My brother Fidel filled the Cuban people with hope, promising to eliminate forever injustice, terror, and military domination. He guaranteed free elections and, in short, everything that people desire to be happy.

I, like many Cubans, embraced this cause and aided as much as I could, first in Cuba and later in exile within the 27 July Movement. I collected funds to buy arms, provisions, and medicine for the Cuban patriots who were struggling from the mountains of my country. In this way we were contributing to the defeat of the existing regime and to the introduction of a system of freedom and social justice which was the basis of our struggle. When the Revolution triumphed and my brothers took the reins of power, I began to work with great enthusiasm, dedicating my greatest efforts to the creation of hospitals and rural schools because I considered this to be one of the immediate tasks which should be carried out by the revolutionary government. I worked for what I considered to be a revolution until the middle of 1960, at which time I began to realize the trend that our Revolution was taking. We began to be victims of deceit. Then, in spite of the fact that Fidel publicly denied the Communist nature of the Revolution, we could observe as the days passed that the country was being handed over to Russian imperialism.

In the middle of 1960 I broke with the government. Sometime later this government stopped concealing its intention and no longer hid behind the banner of the just revolution. In December 1961 the Prime Minister of the revolutionary government declared himself a Marxist-Leninist. I, and the majority of the Cuban people, felt that this was not the revolution for which we had fought. I, and the majority of the Cuban people who believed in the promises of Fidel when he spoke of returning justice and freedom to Cuba, believed that our ideals had been betrayed. I know that there are many persons in the government and the rebel army who are not with the Communist government and they know perfectly how and when the Revolution was betrayed. Upon breaking with the government I did everything I could against it. I helped to hide persons who were pursued by the famous G-2, which is comparable to the worse elements of the Gestapo of Hitler. I helped many Cubans leave the inferno that Cuba is today. I helped buy arms and hide them for counterrevolutionary groups. I helped by sending medicine and provisions to political prisoners. I tried on many occasions to save the life of prisoners condemned to face the firing squad. I helped by maintaining my contacts in government spheres and

by receiving information which I sent to the intelligence of the counter-revolutionaries. In short I helped in everything that I could because I believed that I, better than many, knew that the revolution and the people had been betrayed and deceived. My country, Cuba, is constantly threatened, being one victim more of a brutal dictatorship which depends upon terror and crime.

I will not speak of the lack of basic necessities to life in Cuba today. This above all is known. It is enough to say that the "famous booklet" which is the measure of control for rationing foods permits the following for a family composed of father, mother, and two children:

Milk: two cans for each person every 15 days.

Meat: a quarter of a pound (125 grams) per person each week.

Sugar: three pounds ($1\frac{1}{2}$ kilograms) per person per month.

Coffee: one half ounce (14 grams) per person per week.

Corn: six pounds (3 kilograms) per person per month.

Chicken: only for children under 7 and people older than 65.

Eggs: only for children under 7 and people over 65.

I will not speak of the scarcity of clothing and shoes. I will not speak of the scarcity of medicine although we continually ask ourselves what they did with the 63 million dollars in medicine that was sent immediately after the exchange of prisoners from the Playa Giron since in Cuba children and adults die daily for lack of medicine. I will not speak of the forced labor that the Communists call "voluntary." I will not speak of the lack of freedom of each individual to choose his own work. The government arranges where the work is to be done, the salary, and the hours. The known Communist unions, far from guaranteeing security to the worker in his labor and his achievements, have done nothing else but divest the worker of all his rights. I will not speak of the Compulsory Military Service which they imposed even when Fidel had not tired of announcing to the people on numerous occasions "why arms" "why soldiers." The worst thing about the Compulsory Military Service is that it is not a Compulsory Military Service. It would be better to say that it is a Compulsory Agricultural Service since the recruits are sent to the fields to carry out various agricultural tasks, receiving as their only pay 7 dollars each month.

What I wish to speak about is the terror and panic existing in my country. Children informing on their fathers and friends; Defense Committees composed of neighbors in each block who observe all the persons who enter and leave their houses and inform the beasts of the G-2. I wish to speak of the panic which seizes every home when the monsters of the G-2 knock at the door at any hour of the day or night. I know well that this terror and this panic are felt not only by those who oppose the regime, but also even the military men themselves and the government officials. The concepts of friendship and confidence have been lost. I know of military men in the rebel army who are not with the government but they will not tell anyone for fear of being informed on by their own comrades.

I would also like to speak of the situation of the church in my country. The Communist Government has not wanted to eliminate religion in Cuba because it is feared that it would be considered harmful to propaganda overseas; nevertheless, high schools of religious orders were confiscated and closed and large numbers of priests and nuns were expelled. There is no law which prohibits church attendance, nevertheless, all who visit them are considered as opponents of the regime.

I also wish to speak of the political prisoners whose only crime has been to disagree with the Communist regime. There are those who state with assurance that there are more than 100,000 political prisoners in Cuban jails. Of course, it is impossible for the majority of the people to know the exact quantity since the government regards this information as secret. I have discovered from reports made by government personnel involved in prison affairs that there are around 75,000 political prisoners. Nobody can imagine the condition of these people. They are victims of the cruelest treatment, and I can state that the penitentiary system in Cuba with regard to the political prisoners have completely disregarded that these people are human beings.

As I explained before, I have many friends close to people of importance within the Communist regime. Through them, I have been able to find out that Cuba is directing Communist subversion in Latin America. I know of Latin Americans who have entered Cuba with forged documents, some in a legal manner and others in ships which operate clandestinely. These individuals have been trained as guerrillas and agitators and when prepared are sent to their respective countries. I know of flights of airplanes carrying personnel and arms to hidden airfields in Latin America. They also do this using ships and fishing boats.

A friend, very close to the government, whose name I cannot mention, told me that the Department of State Safety has an important section dedicated solely to directing espionage and guerrilla affairs in Latin America. This section prepares forged documents, trains personnel specialized in espionage and subversion and prepares Cuban diplomats to work in countries who say they are friends of Communist Cuba. The Cuban diplomatic mail belongs to this section. Its mission is to carry instructions to Communist agents and to bring arms and propaganda to friendly countries to be distributed in them as well as in countries which do not maintain relations with the Cuban Government. I have also discovered that the Cuban Embassies in Latin America are nests of subversion and espionage. The section of the Department of State Safety which is occupied with the above mentioned task is called the General Directorate of Intelligence and its chief is Major Manuel Pineiro Losada, also known as "Barba Roja" (red beard).

All America is unaware of the fact that Cuba is an immense prison surrounded by water. It is unaware of the fact that the Cuban people are nailed on the cross of martyrdom imposed by international Communism through those who, betraying their country have turned it over to Russian imperialists, who are exploiting and bleeding our beloved Cuba. It is my desire, as well as that of all Cubans, that in the coming conference of the OAS, that this organ will take a definitive action against the dictatorial government of Cuba as it did with the dictatorial right wing government of Trujillo. I know that the majority of the Latin American people believe in the self-determination by the peoples of their mode of government. I know that this determination

is demonstrated by the use of the vote by the people. Fidel promised elections 18 months after the time of the revolution. Afterwards, so they would not have to be carried out, he filled the civic plaza with people and made them declare that they did not want elections. The history of the Latin American peoples is full of dictators filling plazas at the order of the dictator and screaming yes to anything that the dictator suggests. I know that there are in Cuba groups opposed to the regime, anxious to receive effective aid as soon as possible. Since we know that these groups are not sufficient to carry out the overthrow of the Communist Government supported by thousands of Russian troops, we hope that this call will be heard by our sister American nations and that in this manner we can avoid repeating in Cuba a situation similar to that of Hungary in 1956.

I would have liked to have remained in my country and to have continued cooperating in the anonymous fight being carried out by the Cuban people against the Communist tyranny implanted in Cuba, but my situation grew worse these last few months, obliging me to abandon my country. I hope that the Government of Mexico will accept me as a political refugee until I can return to my free fatherland, Cuba.

Many thanks for your kind attention.

Fact Sheets

For Background Use Only
August 1964

CEYLON

Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike became Prime Minister of Ceylon in the general elections of July 1960, following the collapse of a moderate government and less than a year after the assassination of her husband who had served as Prime Minister for more than three years. Her government is committed to neutralism along the Indian pattern in foreign affairs and to developing socialism and routing Western influence in the domestic sphere.

She rules over a people who are approximately two-thirds Sinhalese (and Buddhist) and about one-fifth Tamil (and Hindu); the remainder are predominantly Indian or Arab Moslems and European Christians. The Buddhist clergy is rich, powerful, politically influential and anti-Western. The great tea plantations support a pro-Western aristocracy which patterns its life on that of the British from whom Ceylon obtained her independence in 1947.

Political Parties. The ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) is a loose grouping of leftist socialists who won a bare parliamentary majority (75 out of 151 seats) in the 1960 elections by making "no contest" arrangements with the Marxist parties. The SLFP has catered to the Sinhalese Buddhists to obtain popular political support -- thus increasing the latter's xenophobic nationalism. At the same time the Prime Minister sought support from the leftist parties whose labor agitation stalled economic and trading improvements.

The United Left Front (ULF) is a Marxist aggregation formed in August 1963 by the Ceylon Communist Party (CCP) led by S. A. Wickremesinghe, now strongly pro-Moscow in orientation; the Peoples United Front (called MEP after its Sinhalese name) led by firebrand Philip Gunewardena; and the largest Trotskyite party in the world, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) of Dr. Martin Perera. Together they commanded 18 seats in Parliament. The three groups (originally including the pro-Chinese Communists) fought viciously among themselves for years; their new found unity lasted less than a year--broken on the coalition government issue.

The CCP members sympathetic to Peking challenged the others' agreement to abandon their revolutionary efforts, implicit in the ULF's decision to seek the parliamentary road to power. Nagalingen Sanmugathanan, a CCP founder and Politburo member, visited Peking in 1963 to seek support for his dissident views. His anti-Soviet activities on returning to Ceylon led to his expulsion from the CCP in October. In mid-January 1964, Sanmugathanan and 400 sympathizers held a "seventh Congress," hailed as the legitimate CCP convention, and declared themselves the legitimate Communist Party. The rump group and the original CCP continue their separate organizational ways, split precisely along lines of the Sino-Soviet fault.

The United National Party (UNP), the largest opposition party in Ceylon, ruled from independence in 1947 until the election of Mme. Bandaranaike's husband as Prime Minister in 1956. Their leader is former Prime Minister

Dudley Senanyake whose conservatism lies close to the British Conservative tradition. By-elections in 1964 indicate the UNP may have picked up some voting strength as the electorate protests the deteriorating economic situation and increasing civil strife. They now hold 30 seats in parliament.

Problem. The past three years have quickened an economic crisis which has some political roots. N. Sanmugathasan, head of the pro-Peking CCP is also Secretary-General of the Ceylon Trade Union Congress which the CCP frequently maneuvered into crippling strikes against western trade, the life blood of Ceylon. Responding to leftist political pressure, the Prime Minister nationalized the (U.S. and Anglo-Dutch) oil-producing firms. Six months later no compensation had been arranged for; the U.S. canceled its foreign aid.

The Communists and Trotskyites woo the anti-Western Buddhists by proclaiming that Buddhism and Communism have much in common -- both are based on pure reason and deny a personified god! Exploiting this anti-Western feeling discourages capital ventures by industrial nations and reduces foreign exchange. Also affected is the British tea market on which Ceylon depends for sale of more than half of her principal crop. Unable to fulfill her own demands for rice, Ceylon must import great quantities so it is essential to maintain good relations with China, the principal supplier.

The Coalition. Faced with these problems, Mme. Bandaranaike's government gradually lost its parliamentary strength. Anticipating the possibility of a "no confidence" vote, the Prime Minister prorogued parliament in March, 1964 and turned to the LSSP for help. On June 11, 1964, Dr. Perera and two other Trotskyites joined the coalition cabinet over the protests of the ULF partners (and many of the SLFP), adding the LSSP's 12 votes to the government's parliamentary strength. In early July parliament reconvened.

Both the CCP (Soviet wing) and the MEP opposed Dr. Perera's decision to join the government -- a move they saw as a betrayal of the unity of action agreement under which the ULF was formed. The MEP announced its withdrawal from ULF on 28 July. At the same time the more revolutionary members of the LSSP denounced the coalition move, determined to form a separate party and asked the Fourth International to read Dr. Perera's "reformists" out of that body.

The uneasy government coalition must try to reverse Ceylon's downward economic slide and reduce communal tensions in order to broaden its popular base before the next general elections, which must be held by spring of 1965. Success could put the SLFP into political debt to the Trotskyites -- the price of ineffective leadership and thoughtless nationalism.

TROTSKY SAID.....

817. About the permanent revolution before achieving power:

"The permanent revolution, in an exact translation, is the continuous revolution, the uninterrupted revolution. What is the political idea embraced in this expression?

"It is, for us communists, that the revolution does not come to an end after this or that political conquest, after obtaining this or that social reform, but that it continues to develop further and its only boundary is the socialist society. Thus, once begun, the revolution (insofar as we participate in it and particularly when we lead it) is in no case interrupted by us at any formal stage whatever. On the contrary, we continually and constantly advance it in conformity, of course, with the situation, so long as the revolution has not exhausted all the possibilities and all the resources of a country as well as to its extension over the international arena." (New Course. Emphasis added)

About the permanent revolution after power is achieved:

"For an indefinitely long time and in constant internal struggle, all social relations are transformed. The process necessarily retains a political character, that is, it develops through collisions of various groups of society in transformation. Outbreaks of civil war and foreign wars alternate with periods of 'peaceful' reforms. Revolutions in economy, technique, science, the family, morals and usages develop in complicated reciprocal action and do not allow society to reach equilibrium. Therein lies the permanent character of the socialist revolution as such." (Permanent Revolution)

"The socialist revolution begins on national grounds. But it cannot be completed on these grounds. The maintenance of the proletarian revolution within a national framework can only be a provisional state of affairs, even though, as the experience of the Soviet Union shows, one of long duration. In an isolated proletarian dictatorship, the internal and external contradictions grow inevitably together with the growing successes. Remaining isolated, the proletarian state must finally become a victim of these contradictions. The way out for it lies only in the victory of the proletariat of the advanced countries. Viewed from this standpoint, a national revolution is not a self-sufficient whole: it is only a link in the international chain. The international revolution presents a permanent process, in spite of all fleeting rises and falls." (Permanent Revolution)

About conflicting Bolshevik strategies in Russia, 1917....

"The fundamental controversial question, around which everything else centered, was this: whether or not we should struggle for power; whether or not we should assume power. This alone is ample proof that we were not then dealing with a mere episodic divergence of opinions

but with two tendencies of utmost principled significance. The first and principal tendency was proletarian and led to the road of world revolution. The other was 'democratic,' i.e., petty bourgeois, and led, in the last analysis, to the subordination of proletarian policies to the requirements of bourgeois society in the process of reform. These two tendencies came into hostile conflict over every essential question that arose throughout the year 1917. It is precisely the revolutionary epoch -- i.e., the epoch when the accumulated capital of the party is put in direct circulation -- that must inevitably broach in action and reveal divergences of such nature. These two tendencies, in greater or lesser degree, with more or less modification, will more than once manifest themselves during the revolutionary period in every country...."
(Lessons of October, emphasis added)

About proposed Bolshevik method of dealing with the bourgeoisie of Russia, 1917:

"...the method was essentially...to 'exert pressure' on the ruling bourgeoisie, a 'pressure' so calculated as to remain within the framework of the bourgeois democratic regime. If that policy had prevailed, the development of the revolution would have passed over the head of our party and, in the end, the insurrection of the worker and peasant masses would have taken place without party leadership; in other words, we would have had the repetition of the July days on a colossal scale, i.e., this time not as an episode but as a catastrophe. It is perfectly obvious that the immediate consequence of such a catastrophe would have been the physical destruction of our party. This provides us with a measuring rod of how deep our differences of opinion were."
(Lessons of October, emphasis added)

About pressing the bourgeoisie for reforms:

"But the road of reform serves a useful purpose in subsidiary and not in fundamental questions. State power cannot be obtained by reforms. 'Pressure' can never induce the bourgeoisie to change its policy on a question which involves its whole fate. The war created a revolutionary situation precisely by reason of the fact that it left no room for any reformist 'pressure.' The only alternative was either to go the whole way with the bourgeoisie, or to rouse the masses against it so as to wrest the power from its hands..."
(Lessons of October, emphasis added)