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27 July 1964

Briefly Noted

Trade Can't Buy Communism. Says Austrian Foreign Minister

Speaking at a 4 July meeting of Munich's Catholic Academy, Austrian Foreign Minister Dr. Bruno Kreisky said that the practice of expanding trade with Communist countries could not alter basic Communist designs. During discussion of "The Policy of Detente," Dr. Kreisky stated that "developments in the communist countries of Eastern Europe do not constitute a development away from Communism but are developments within the Communist orbit."

Commenting on the Moscow-Peking rift, Dr. Kreisky stated that "only with the beginning of this conflict did the West recognize the growing polycentrism within the Soviet Bloc. This conflict has international importance because these two Communist super-states have different opinions on the best way to communize the world. And that's all this conflict means really," the minister added.

On the evolution of polycentrism in the East Bloc, Kreisky judged that all depends on Khrushchev's successor. "If the successor, whoever he is, does not have to face rivals, the destalinization, which has nothing in common with democratization, might continue. But if the successor gets into trouble he will return to a system of terror, though it may be camouflaged by alleged ideological necessities. In this case a Peking-Moscow rapprochement could occur very quickly.

On the policy toward Communism, the minister stated that the West should deal with the Communists - politically and economically - but in all dealings the West should insist on "the democratic presence," and should never forget the fact that it is dealing with Communists and that "there were no means to change Communists."

This expression from the Foreign Minister of a neutral country having 1200 kilometres of common frontier with Communist Bloc countries is a clear reminder of facts which the Free World might tend to forget. Better East-West relations and increased East-West exchanges may tend in various ways to erode the despotic powers of Communist dictators over their subjects. The visible effects of this erosion from below are not to be mistaken as a change in the purpose or intent of such dictators.

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
27 July 1964

Briefly Noted

The Competition of Ideas -- Inside the Bloc and Outside

While visiting Tokyo recently, Anastas Mikoyan spoke to an audience of Japanese university students. He told them (and his remarks were carried by Tokyo television): "I became a Marxist after reading not only Marxist books, but also anti-Marxist and bourgeois books." The more anti-Marxist books he read, Mikoyan said, the stronger had become his conviction of the truth of Marxism.

Such are the advantages of having been an Old Bolshevik, educated under the Tsars. Today the Soviet regime does its best to shield young Soviets from such two-sided reading. When Pravda printed a report of Mikoyan's Tokyo speech the next day (26 May), the statement quoted above was omitted. Mikoyan of course intended to show the Japanese a supposed Soviet readiness for a free comparison of ideas. He would not have made ~~such~~ statements in the USSR.



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DATES OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST

- 12 Aug European Youth Congress, 12-13 August, East Berlin.
- 13 Aug Third anniversary of The Wall, sealing East-West Berlin border.
- 16 Aug Cyprus becomes fully independent (under agreement signed 19 February 1959 ending 4-year conflict). 1960.
- 17 Aug Alliance for Progress Charter signed by US and 19 L.A. countries (all except Cuba), Punta del Este. 1961.
- 20 Aug Interparliamentary Union Conference, 53rd, Copenhagen, 20-28 August.
- 23 Aug USSR and Hitler's Germany conclude Non-Aggression Treaty, 1939.
- 3 Sept International Union of Students (IUS) Congress, Ibadan, Nigeria, 3-13 Sept.
- 4 Sept Socialist International Centennial Congress, 4-6 Sept, Brussels. [First International founded, 28 Sept 1864]
- 8 Sept USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland refuse to sign peace treaty with Japan, concluded with 48 nations, 1951.
- 9 Sept 13th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs in Czechoslovakia, 9-12 in Prague and 13-19 in Karlovy Vary.
- 9 Sept Chinese People's "Liberation Army" enters Lhasa, Tibet, 1950.
- 16 Sept II World Youth Forum sponsored by the Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR (CYO), Moscow, 16-23 Sept.
- 17 Sept USSR invades Poland, annexes eastern half of country, 1939. Twenty-fifth anniversary.
- 19 Sept Week of International Struggle Against Fascism and War (Communist) 19-26 Sept.
- 21 Sept People's Republic of China proclaimed, 1949.

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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#33

4-17 July 1964

Commentary

Principal Developments:

1. The CPSU confirmed its intent to push ahead with preparations for a world conference by publishing on 15 July the text of a 7,000-word letter which it had sent to the CCP on 15 June in reply to the 7 May CCP letter (the last of the series of 7 published by the Chinese on 8 May). Obviously aimed beyond the CCP leadership to the reluctant leaders of other parties, the letter argues that a world conference is needed now -- to discuss the many important changes in the outside world in the 4 years since the last meeting as well as to overcome the difficulties in the movement. It attempts to establish the right of the CPSU to take the initiative in convoking one (citing Mao himself in support), declares the right of all parties attending the 1957 and 1960 meetings to participate in this -- and to decide in conference whether any new participants should be invited, and focuses immediate attention on convening a preparatory meeting of the 20 parties nominated by the 1960 conference to draft its resolution. It concludes with the flat declaration that no party can hinder the convocation of, or unilaterally dictate terms for a conference. Unconfirmed reports state that the CPSU distributed copies of this letter or a summary of it to other parties on 16 June. And it has been confirmed that Khrushchev will gather with Gomulka, Novotny and Ulbricht in Warsaw on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the establishment of "People's Poland," 22 July. Meanwhile, the Soviet propaganda machine concentrates on the anti-Chinese offensive, with Pravda contributing at least one item almost daily, with Izvestiya, Literaturnaya Gazeta, Partiynaya Zhizn (Party Life), Kommunist and publications of less authority contributing other material, and a heavy broadcasting schedule.

2. The splitting in the Japanese CP described in #32 has now developed into open warfare, with the CPSU publishing two strong letters it had sent to the JCP and the JCP publishing accusations of Soviet interference in their internal affairs. (See Chrono, July 5 and continuing.)

3. The Chinese CP published a 20,000-word denunciation of "the revisionist Khrushchev clique" and its "phoney Communism," the 9th in the series of joint People's Daily/Red Flag "comments on the open letter of the CPSU." Amplifying on its previous rebuttal of the Soviet line that a "state of the whole people" has replaced the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR, it charges that the Khrushchev clique has replaced the dictatorship of the proletariat with that of its own "privileged stratum," which is appropriating the fruits of the Soviet people's labor and Approved For Release 2000/04/14 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080005-8 and bourgeois lords while severely repressing

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the masses who are diametrically opposed to them. In a strangely defensive turn at the end, however, the article indicates a mortal fear -- "a matter of life and death for our party and our country" -- lest Chinese cadres become "corrupted and demoralized" by such revisionist ideas and "the whole of China change its color."

4. The unexpected visit of the high-level Maurer-led Rumanian delegation to Moscow on July 6 ended with a joint communique on the 14th which mentioned better mutual understanding but said nothing of any agreements reached. Meanwhile, the Soviet-controlled, multi-language Problems of Peace and Socialism for July published a long account, without comment, of the long 22 April Rumanian "declaration of independence" statement (July 9) -- just as it is reported (without confirmation as yet) that the Rumanians have stopped participation in the PP&S operation.

5. It is speculated that the death on July 17 of French CP Chairman Thorez might lead to some relaxation of that party's rigid pro-Soviet stance.

6. The CPSU obtained statements of general alignment against the CCP line from delegations to Moscow of two of the world's most militant "socialist" parties; the left-wing group split from the Italian SP (July 6 & 9) and the Japanese SP (July 15).

7. The Sino-Soviet battle continues to disrupt the activities of the international fronts: during this period conflicts erupted in meetings of the AAPSO standing secretariat (July 11) and the WFDY executive committee (July 14).

Significance:

The CPSU is attempting once more to seize the initiative in international Communist affairs, both in its long campaign to convene a world conference and its new drive to overthrow the pro-Chinese leadership of the Japanese CP. With the publication of its 15 June letter to the CCP, the CPSU has emphatically asserted its right as well as its intent to proceed immediately with preparations for convoking a conference along the lines it has previously proposed. The Soviet case would seem to make it very difficult for any "fraternal" party to refuse to participate, no matter what may be the misgivings regarding the consequences. It remains to be seen whether these fighting words will be followed by equally militant actions.

Meanwhile, there is no evidence of any Soviet progress in bringing the principal hold-outs among the major parties any closer to support for such a conference, -- but the formula stated in the above letter would obviate the Yugoslav problem by limiting participation, at least initially, to those who participated in the 1957 and 1960 meetings.


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The CPSU's open warfare against the JCP leadership must be considered a great gamble, based on the assumption that a sizable majority of the leading cadres are either inclined toward the Soviet line or susceptible to Soviet carrot-and-stick treatment. If this should prove to be true and the CPSU would be able to unseat the pro-Chinese leaders and bring the party back into the Soviet-aligned camp, it would be a great feat -- but we remain skeptical .

Meanwhile, the detailed and heavily documented Chinese charge of the degeneration of the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the self-serving "New Class" in the USSR is a document of high importance, paralleling in many respects the charges of disillusioned former believers such as Milovan Djilas -- though the Chinese draw the opposite conclusions. Incidentally, we might note that the statements of general alignment with the CPSU by two important socialist parties mentioned above could be taken to confirm the theme of a recent (April 7, Chrono #27) Albanian Zeri I Popullit editorial: "The Modern Revisionists on the Path of Social Democratic Degeneration and of a Merger with Social Democracy."

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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#33

4-17 July 1964

July 3-8: The first national conference of the Indonesian CP in Djakarta July 3-5 adopts 10 resolutions on international affairs and 12 on internal. One of the former states:

"The absolute condition for holding an international conference of all the Communist and workers parties is to make efforts to solve the differences of views and arrange bilateral talks between the fraternal parties with a most objective attitude and the greatest possible patience...."

A third plenary session of the PKI/CC on July 6-8: Chairman Aidit's speech calls on all members "to make utmost efforts to be...good students of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin." Peking press publishes the speech on the 11th.

July 5 and continuing: The split in the Japanese CP (see Chrono #32, June 18 and continuing) has developed into open warfare between the leaderships of the CPSU and JCP, as demonstrated by the following events:

--On 5th, Pravda's "The Tragedy Must Not Be Repeated," a long article by V. Valentinov on the Japanese people's support of the test-ban treaty, despite the fact that "the Peking preachers are constantly striving to implant in Japan their erroneous view on the Moscow treaty, to deal a blow to the nuclear disarmament movement, and to propagandize their concept 'without trousers but with the nuclear bomb.'" "Moreover, there are people in Japan who compulsively become Peking's mouthpieces...."

-- On 9th, at a central rally in Tokyo to mark the JCP's 42nd anniversary, SecyGen Miyamoto condemns "the betrayal by Shiga and others" who "maintained contact with certain foreign forces" and are "plotting to organize a revisionist party." He also deplores "some Communist parties which are blindly subservient to a certain influential Communist party in the world."

"...There is a certain foreign Communist party which is trying to justify the anti-Party activities of Shiga and others and to interfere in the internal problems of our party...."

Miyamoto says that "...As for the convening of an international conference in the future," the JCP sincerely hopes that an international conference will be held in order to realize the true unity of the ICM, --but says nothing of the conditions for one (according to a summary published in JCP daily Akahata on July 12).

-- On 16th, Pravda's article by Ye. Alekseyev on "the first international newspaper Nihon No Koe (The Voice of Japan) published in Tokyo by a group of patriots-internationalists" [i.e. Shiga and Co]. It quotes extensively from a statement by

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the editors: "Nihon-No Koe intends to become the real representative of the JCP,..."

-- On 18th, No. 14 of the CPSU biweekly journal Partiynaya Zhizn (Party Life) publishes CPSU letters dated 13 April and 11 July to the JCP, saying that the CPSU/CC can no longer leave the Party in ignorance of the situation "when the leadership of the JCP, ... increases attacks on the CPSU, ... refuses to undertake any steps whatsoever to eliminate the differences with the CPSU and declines to discuss our comradely proposals on this matter." "The JCP delegation [earlier this year (see Chrono #24, March 13)] avoided frank talk and refused to discuss questions of joint struggle against our common enemy -- world imperialism -- and of the concerted line of action in the most important questions of our time. After the talks the JCP delegation refused to sign any joint communique with the CPSU."

Because of this situation, "and being alarmed by the fact that the JCP leadership began more and more openly to retreat from the agreed line of the ICM," the CPSU sent their 13 April letter proposing joint efforts to solve differences.

"The CPSU/CC expresses deep regret that even after this letter the JCP leaders, ... embarked on the road of further aggravation of relations with the CPSU, to a course aimed at an open rupture with the CPSU and the ICM."

In concluding, the 11 July letter charges that the 13 April letter has not yet been discussed in the JCP/CC or the Presidium.

-- On 19th (according to press reports), a JCP statement replies directly to the Soviet Charges, accusing the CPSU of seeking to disrupt the internal activities of the JCP, of having given active support to Shiga and Suzuki, and asserts that the Soviets themselves are responsible for the conflict which has arisen.

July 6: At an informal press conference on board a Danube steamer at Vienna, Rumanian First Deputy Premier Apostol, head of the economic delegation to Austria, acknowledged "normal" differences with the USSR, reaffirms Rumanian opposition to supranational control, and speaks of "improving CEMA statutes" to permit non-Communist countries to join or associate themselves.

July 6 & 7: Among the continuing flow of statements of support for the CPSU by other parties reported in Soviet media, two are of particular interest:

-- On 3th, Pravda carries an article by E. Burnelle, Chairman of the old-line Belgian CP entitled "Tailure of the Belgian Splitters." Quoting from a CCP message paying tribute to the BCP at its 13th Congress, he asks:

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"Why did the Chinese not inform us through normal channels about the reasons for a change in their positions? Why did they not write to us? Why did they not propose an exchange of opinions through bilateral meetings?... They tried to sow disarray in the Party, to weaken the authority of the Communist-chosen leadership, to create a deep split in the Party to seize the levers of control. On failing this they wanted to split from the Party a considerable part of its members and leaders to orient them mainly toward anti-Soviet activities. These attempts ended in a complete fiasco."

Burnelle asserts that "anti-Soviet policy is retreating everywhere" and "the prestige of the SU has never been greater," but he avoids any mention of the great question of a conference.

-- On 7th, No. 13 of Partiynaya Zhizn publishes, under the heading "Loyalty to the Jointly Formulated General Line Must Be Preserved," an article from Ecuador signed by Fernandez (?) "unmasking the splitters and their inspirers who have emerged in the ranks of the PCE. He says:

"CCP leaders cannot...conceal their insidious interference in the affairs of our Party. The case of Jose Maria Roura is well-known. At one time he was a member of the PCE/CC. Secretly he traveled to Peking where he was given a large sum of money to start pro-Chinese propaganda in Ecuador and to support the extremist elements. Upon returning from Peking he was arrested at the airport. This was a signal for a campaign of repression against the Communists and the democrats. Yet even after this scandalous affair the Chinese did not stop.... (They) did not even stop short of such unsavory methods as blackmail and bribery."

July 6 & 9: Tass announces that "CPSU leaders have met with a delegation of the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (militant left-wing split from Nenni's PSI) which has arrived in the SU to re-establish traditional relations between the Italian Socialists and the CPSU." GenSecy Vecchietti led the delegation in "a friendly meeting marked by a spirit of proletarian internationalism." On the 9th, Radio Moscow broadcasts in Italian an interview with Vecchietti in which he says: "We consider the Chinese Communists' attitude to be wrong as much from the ideological point of view as from the political point of view." He specifically discusses the Chinese attitude toward and assessment of Western capitalism, their opinion on nuclear war, and their evaluation of Stalin.

July 7: Pravda reviews Prof. S. L. Tikhvinsky's new book Sun Yat-sen, Foreign Political Views and Practice favorably, as "A Great Fighter for Friendship Between the Soviet and Chinese Peoples." Reviewer Prof. M. Kapitsa regrets that

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"...the Chinese leaders, ignoring their international duty and consigning Sun Yat-sen's behests to oblivion, have developed propaganda hostile to the USSR...."

Moscow's Literaturnaya Gazeta article by N. Gribachev, "The Splitters from Peking," tells "why we Soviet writers ...consider it necessary to express our attitude...toward the line which the CCP leaders are trying to force on the entire Communist movement. Referring to Peking Radio ("constructed with the assistance of the SU"), he writes colorfully:

"The impression of these broadcasts is that of an endless stream of intellectual garbage which is a mixture of fabrications and conjectures, of primitive judgements and groundless emotional outbreaks, of unctious phrases about equality of rights and obviously vain aspirations to the role of hegemonic power, phrases about peace and thinly veiled appeals to adventures.... Do the Chinese leaders realize in what world and in what century they are living?"

July 8: Pravda carries an article by P. Dolotov on how Chinese "ultrarevolutionary phrases are frequently at odds with their deeds." "No denial has come from Peking," for example to Western speculation about impending establishment of diplomatic relations between Lisbon and Peking. The author then looks at Macao, which, as he puts it, throws "some light on the reasons for Peking's peculiar tolerance for the Salazar regime."

July 9: Pravda publishes a dispatch from its Peking correspondence Kyuzadzhyan about the report of First Secy Hu Yao-pang to the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Young Communist League, 11-29 June:

"...The Congress was used as a rostrum for casting aspersions on Soviet Youth, the Leninist Komsomol, the Soviet people, and the CPSU.

...Chinese youth will hardly draw any inspirations from the report's thesis that 'the period of transition from socialism to Communism will evidently last for five, ten, or even more generations.' It was not so long ago, however, that the Chinese leaders said quite the opposite: the 'realization of Communism in our country is not a thing of a distant future.' Such swings from one extreme to another breed only uncertainty and speak of a lack of principle on the part of the Chinese leaders."

The multi-language Problems of Peace and Socialism for July publishes a long account of the long 22 April Rumanian CC "declaration of independence" statement, without rebuttal or comment.

The last group of Chinese workers in Mongolia departed, completing a movement begun on 24 April.

July 10: Pravda article by "noted Soviet economist" Lev Leontyev denies capitalist trends in the USSR. A Tass summary reports:

"...The Peking leaders, for instance, attack the principle of material incentives and concern for the people's welfare, depicting these major features of socialist economy as evidence of bourgeois degeneration. The purpose of these attacks is to detract public attention from the apparent economic failures of the Chinese leaders....the Chinese leaders are trying to present want as a virtue...."

July 10-11: Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi make an unexpected 2-day visit to Burma, just 10 days after Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan was there. The joint communique stated, inter alia, that the two leaders "agreed that a conference on the Laotian problem of the 14 Geneva agreement powers should be convened."

July 11: Izvestiya's article, "Peking's False Tone," by K. Dontsov, cites facts to demonstrate that China's foreign aid is low in quantity and quality. The USSR and other CEMA countries are rendering economic and technical assistance to 45 developing countries -- 16 Asian, 18 African, and 11 Latin American -- while the CPR renders aid to 18, 8 Asian and 10 African. Whereas the CPR is helping these countries to build a hundred facilities, the CEMA countries are building 1,223 various plants and facilities. Heavy industrial enterprises built with CPR assistance are less than 20% of the total, whereas they made up 50% of Soviet assistance. Moreover, "non-observance of aid schedules by the Chinese has become a common thing." Projects have fallen way behind schedule in Nepal, Guinea, Cambodia, Burma and Indonesia. Thus, "out of the 100 projects which the CPR Govt pledged to build, there have actually been built only five industrial plants, three hospitals, and a few facilities." Worst of all, the plants supplied by the CPR often fall short of international standards. Last year the CPR was forced to give up building a metallurgical plant in Cambodia because the surveying work done by Chinese specialists was very inferior.

Pravda carries an article by its Cairo correspondent based on "an article in Al Hakaiq about the splitters' efforts to sow discord in the ranks of the peace fighters." It says that the AAPSO standing secretariat received invitations to participate in two anti-nuclear-weapons conferences in Japan, one in Tokyo and one in Hiroshima, and accepted both.

"The Chinese and Japanese representatives, however, unexpectedly spoke against participation in the Hiroshima conference on the grounds that it is being organized by 'Japanese reactionary forces in concert with international imperialism.'.... The Japanese representatives on the standing secretariat, Katayama and his wife, 'threatened' the Soviet representative that the Japanese National Council for the invitation to the SU to attend the Tokyo conference if Soviet peace champions supported the Hiroshima meeting."

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Literaturnaya Gazeta carries a long article by S. Smirnov against the "unscrupulous literary critics of the Chinese magazine Wen I-pao, who are deliberately distorting the facts of Soviet reality."

The death of ailing French CP Chairman Thorez (on a Soviet liner) is seen by commentators as possibly presaging a relaxation of the PCF's rigid support of a CPSU-style conference.

July 13: Tokyo daily Asahi Shinbun reports that Mao told the Japanese Socialist delegation under Sasaki which had spent two weeks in China (see Chrono #32, June 27/28): "Communist China, in principle, is in favor of Japan's demand to the Soviet Union for the return of the northern islands." Mao was also quoted as saying that the SU occupied "considerable land" in the Amur region and in East Europe.

Peking People's Daily devotes 4 pages to excerpts from recent Soviet anti-China statements, with an editor's note. "Incomplete figures for April, May and June this year show" that the Soviet press has published "more than 1,300 articles and other items attacking China. These attacks, or, to be exact, slanders and fabrications, are, as before, lengthy, rancid, and extremely preposterous."

July 14: The Chinese publish another in the series of joint People's Daily/Red Flag articles: "On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World -- Comment on the Open Letter of the CC/CPSU (IX)." (See extensive summary of this 20,000 word statement in the Addendum.)

The joint communique at the conclusion of the 6-14 July friendly visit to the Soviet Union of a high-level Rumanian party delegation led by Premier Maurer says that "an exchange of opinions took place" on questions of Rumanian-Soviet relations, RWP-CPSU relations, "current questions of collaboration among socialist countries," the situation in the ICM, and the struggle for peace. The meeting "took place in a comradely, sincere atmosphere, contributing to better mutual understanding," but nothing was said about any specific agreement.

Tass reports from Budapest on the "malicious and slanderous attacks" on the general line of WFDY at its executive committee meeting:

"The Chinese delegate's outbursts aroused the indignation of members of the executive committee and met with a fitting rebuff. Delegates of youth organizations of the GDR, South Africa, Iran, France, Argentinian and other countries emphatically rejected his concoctions and condemned the disruptive policy of the Chinese leaders. Speakers sharply criticized the attempt to convene a separate Afro-Asian

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conference made last January by the Chinese leaders behind the back of the WFDY. Delegates of Lebanon, the Sudan, Senegal, and other African countries resolutely rebuffed attempts by the splitters to isolate the Afro-Asian solidarity movement, tear it away from the WFDY, and subordinate it to their special aims."

July 15: No. 10 of the CPSU theoretical journal Kommunist publishes the text of a 7,000-word CPSU letter dated 15 June replying to the CCP letter of 7 May 1964 (see Chrono #20 for 7 earlier items in CPSU-CCP letter exchange). In a departure paralleling Chinese practice, Kommunist also published the 7 May CCP letter. In contrast to the earlier CPSU letters, this is obviously written for readers other than the CCP leaders to whom it is addressed, polemically reaffirming the CPSU position vis-a-vis the CCP and justifying its intent to call a world conference without further delay.

The letter begins by telling the "Dear Comrades" of the CCP that in their 7 May letter they "virtually refuse to meet with representatives of the parties..." It asserts that "the overwhelming majority of the fraternal parties have declared for convening a meeting without delay," and that "as far as we know, the leadership of no party, with the exception of the CCP and the Albanian Workers Party, rejects the necessity for collective measures to overcome the difficulties in the Communist movement and promote its unity."

Citing CCP letters supporting a conference in 1962, 63 and 64, the letter says:

...you never before thought seriously of a conference, any more than you do now, because you could not count on support for your ideological and political platform in a world Communist forum...you are in fact afraid to attend a world Communist conference...."

Although admitting that "the conference may not fully succeed in arriving at a common view on all matters," the CPSU is convinced that such an outcome would not amount to a split, given "elementary concern for unity, tolerance, and good faith, which the Communist movement has a right to expect from all its contingents."

On the other hand, "4 years have passed since the last world conference," and "many important changes have taken place which require study, generalization, and conclusions."

"In the light of these tasks, the CCP/CC's proposal for putting off a new world conference is particularly unacceptable. All indications are that the conference is indispensable and the question of convening it cannot be shelved."

(Chronology Cont.)

Taking up the Chinese claim that no one party has the right to call a conference now, the CPSU letter says that

"From the viewpoint of the democratic principles on which the Communist movement is based, it must be recognized that any party or group of parties is free to take such an initiative.... The decision adopted by the 1957 meeting reads: Entrust the CPSU with the function of convening meetings of the Communist and workers parties in consultation with the FPs. This decision was passed unanimously, with the CCP delegation participating. What is more, Comrade Mao Tse-tung ...said that it is necessary to recognize the CPSU as the party which should take the initiative in calling meetings."

Turning to the question of the meeting's composition,

"We are of the opinion that all those parties which participated in the 1957 and 1960 meetings, which signed their documents, are entitled to participate in the conference. Only the conference itself has a right to decide whether any new participants should be invited. During the years since the last world meeting, there have arisen in several countries parties which agree with and implement the general line.... Naturally those parties are entitled to expect an invitation to attend.... But when the CCP/CC poses the question of inviting new participants, ...it is thinking not of those parties but of anti-party factional groups which it has brought into being and which it designates by the high-sounding name of parties.... No matter how hard you try to represent those imposters as revolutionaries, they are outside the Communist movement, and no power on earth can push them into its ranks."

The CPSU rejects the CCP proposal for an agreement on reciprocal publishing of each other's polemics, saying: "No Communist party has ever undertaken to reprint, circulate, and propagate slanderous material alien to socialism."

The CPSU concludes by reaffirming its position on a conference:

"...We suggest that in the immediate future we should agree in principle that a meeting must be convened and that it should not be put off for long, and that agreement on its specific date as well as on its agenda and composition should be reached through further consultations with the fraternal parties.

The CPSU/CC considers that at the present stage the main effort should be concentrated on holding a preparatory conference. We reiterate our proposal that...(it) should be convened and attended by representatives of the 23 parties represented by the world meeting...in 1960. We

(Chronology Cont.)

consider it necessary to reach agreement with the fraternal parties on the specific date of such a conference in the immediate future.

...No party can, without breaking with internationalism, hinder the convocation of the meeting or unilaterally dictate terms under which such a meeting must be held."

Pravda publishes a joint statement by the high-level Japanese Socialist Party delegation headed by GenSecy Narita, which had been visiting the USSR since 29 June (see Chrono #32, June 27/28), and the CPSU. As reported by Tass, the statement said that, "Notwithstanding differences in views in the sphere of ideology and some political problems, the positions of the CPSU and the JSP mainly coincide on a number of questions, specifically the struggle for peace, democracy, and national independence."

July 17: Izvestiya compares statements of the Chinese leaders with extracts from documents of the CCP/CC made in the past few years to show "a sharp 180-degree about-face on important questions of theory, policy, party and government practice." (As reported by Tass: text not yet available.)

Addendum to Chronology #33

Summary of Chinese Joint People's Daily/Red Flag article dated
13 July 1964:

"On Khrushchev's Phony Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World -- Comment on the Open Letter of the CC/CPSU (IX)."

This argumentative, repetitious 20,000-word tract elaborates on previous Chinese denunciations (see especially sections 17 and 18 of the 14 June 1963 CCP letter) of the Soviet line on the replacement of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR by a "state of the whole people." It charges the "usurpation of the leadership of the Soviet party and state" by the "revisionist Khrushchev clique," and its replacement, under the "signboard of Communism," of the dictatorship of the proletariat by a dictatorship of the Khrushchevian "privileged stratum", which is "appropriating the fruits of the Soviet people's labor and living the life of bourgeois lords" and "stands diametrically opposed to the Soviet people" and "extremely antagonistic to the masses of the population who comprise over 90% of the world's population." It contains 70 footnotes to references -- Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Khrushchev and other recent CPSU statements, Soviet press reports, Rusk, Douglas-Home, and J.F. Dulles.

The text is grouped under six un-numbered headings, with almost one-third of the total in the first section: "Socialist Society and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." Marx and Lenin are quoted on the need for continuing the dictatorship of the proletariat (D. of P.) over "a very, very long historical stage" until the social revolution is complete and conditions are ripe for the transition from socialism to communism. "Lenin pointed out a number of times that...(inter alia)...political degenerates and new bourgeois elements may emerge in the ranks of the working class and among government functionaries," and "life has confirmed these conclusions." Comrade Mao points out that "the complete victory of socialism cannot be brought about in one or two generations; to resolve this question thoroughly requires five or ten generations or even longer." In fact, "only by emancipating all mankind can the proletariat ultimately emancipate itself."

Stalin, "a great Marxist-Leninist," erred when, with "no foreign experience to go by," he "prematurely declared...that there were 'no longer antagonistic classes' in the Soviet Union and that it was 'free of class conflicts.'" The article then cites 13 accounts from the current Soviet press of the operations of bourgeois elements in the USSR, such as the manager of a furniture factory in Kharkov who set up an "illegal knitwear workshop" and carried on secret operations in the factory, accumulating "several wives, several cars, several houses," etc.

"These antisocialist activities are nothing if not the sharp class struggle of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat....There is nothing terrifying about this so long as the leadership of the party and state remains Marxist-Leninist. But in the Soviet Union today, the gravity of the situation lies in the fact that the revisionist Khrushchev clique has usurped the leadership of the Soviet party and state and that a privileged bourgeois stratum has emerged in Soviet society."

The next section, headed "The Soviet Privileged Stratum and the Revisionist Khrushchev Clique," starts with the unequivocal statement:

"The privileged stratum (PS) in contemporary Soviet society is composed of degenerate elements from among the leading cadres of party and governmental organizations, enterprises, and farms, as well as bourgeois intellectuals; it stands in opposition to the workers, the peasants, and the overwhelming majority of the intellectuals and cadres of the Soviet Union."

Stalin "waged a staunch struggle against the forces of capitalism...the Trotskyites, Zinovievites, and Bukharinites," although "it cannot be denied that before Stalin's death high salaries were already being paid to certain groups and that some cadres had already degenerated and become bourgeois elements." However, "since Khrushchev usurped the leadership..., there has been a fundamental change....K. has carried out a series of revisionist policies serving the interests of the bourgeoisie and rapidly swelling the forces of capitalism in the Soviet Union."

"On the pretext of 'combatting the personality cult,' K. has defamed the D. of P. and the socialist system and thus in fact paved the way for the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union. In completely negating Stalin, he has in fact negated M-L, which was upheld by Stalin....K. has substituted 'material incentive' for the socialist principle '...to each according to his work.' He has widened, not narrowed, the gap between the incomes of a small minority and those of the workers, peasants, and ordinary intellectuals. He has supported the degenerates in leading positions, encouraging them to become even more unscrupulous in abusing their powers and to appropriate the fruits of labor of the Soviet people. Thus he has accelerated the polarization of classes in Soviet society."

"...not only have the new bourgeois elements increased in number as never before, but their social status has fundamentally changed. Before K....their activities were restricted in many ways and they were subject to attack. But since K. took over,...the new bourgeois elements have gradually risen to the ruling position in the party and society....the main social basis of the revisionist K. clique."

(Addendum Cont.)

"The revisionist K. clique has carried out one purge after another...throughout the country....Nearly 70% of the members of the CPSU/CC elected at its 19th Congress in 1952 were purged in the course of the 20th and 22nd Congresses ...in 1956 and 1961. And nearly 50% of the members of the CC elected at the 20th Congress were purged at the time of the 22nd Congress...."

"Through this series of changes the Soviet PS has gained control of the party, the government, and other important organizations...(They) appropriate the fruits of the Soviet people's labor and pocket incomes dozens or even a hundred times those of the average Soviet worker and peasant. They not only secure high incomes in the form of high salaries, high awards, high royalties, and a great variety of personal subsidies, but also use their privileged position to appropriate public property by graft and bribery. Completely divorced from the working people of the Soviet Union, they live the parasitical and decadent life of the bourgeoisie."

"...they are turning the Soviet state under the D. of P. into a state under the dictatorship of the revisionist K. clique; and, step by step, they are turning socialist ownership by the whole people and socialist collective ownership into ownership of the PS."

Saying that "people have seen" how in Yugoslavia the Tito clique took the road of revisionism, transforming it into a "dictatorship of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie" with "state capitalism," the article adds that "K. looks to Belgrade as his Mecca." This section concludes:

"...The Soviet PS represented by the revisionist K. clique constitutes only a few percent of the Soviet population,...The contradiction between the Soviet people and this PS is now the principal contradiction inside the Soviet Union, and it is an irreconcilable and antagonistic class contradiction...."

"The broad masses of the Soviet workers, collective farmers, and intellectuals are seething with discontent against the oppression and exploitation practiced by the PSThe broad masses of the Soviet people, Communists, and cadres are using various means to resist and oppose the revisionist line of the K. clique....The great Soviet people are fighting to defend the glorious traditions of the Great October Revolution, to preserve the great gains of socialism, and to smash the plot for the restoration of capitalism."

The third section, headed "Refutation of the So-called State of the Whole People," begins with citations from M & L asserting that the D of P is necessary for "the entire historical period which separates capitalism from...Communism." The K. clique "has taken great pains to find a sentence from Marx and distort

it by quoting it out of context," and the article refers to a Soviet quote from the Marx critique of the Gotha program. "As it happens, Lenin seems to have foreseen that the revisionists would make use of this phrase to distort Marxism...(and) gives an excellent explanation of it." (Explanation follows.)

The section turns to K's talk of "democracy for the whole people" and first cites Lenin on the dialectics of the development of democracy: "From absolutism to bourgeois democracy; from bourgeois to proletarian democracy; from proletarian democracy to none."

"Under the rule of the K. clique, there is no democracy for the Soviet working people; there is democracy only for the handful of people belonging to the revisionist K. clique, for the PS and for the bourgeois elements, old and new....

"In the SU today, anyone who persists in the proletarian stand, upholds M-L, and has the courage to speak out, to resist or to fight, is watched, followed, summoned, and even arrested, imprisoned, or diagnosed as "mentally ill" and sent to "mental hospitals." Recently the Soviet press has declared that it is necessary to 'fight' against those who show even the slightest dissatisfaction, and called for 'relentless battle' against the 'rotten hookers' (footnote) who are so bold as to make sarcastic remarks about K's agricultural policy. It is particularly astonishing that the rev. K. clique should have on more than one occasion bloodily suppressed striking workers and the masses who put up resistance....

The brief fourth section moves on to "Refutation of the So-called Party of the Entire People." "On this question, too, K. is a worthy disciple of Trotskiy."

The fifth, "Khrushchev's Phony Communism," repeats previous charges and carries them forward to new extremes:

"K. is truly an incorrigible wastrel. He has squandered the grain reserves built up under Stalin and brought great difficulties into the lives of the Soviet people....(He) is serving as a missionary for the decadent American culture ...Because of him, manual labor is again considered sordid

"thus it can be seen that K's 'communism' is indeed 'goulash Communism' -- the 'Communism of the American way of life' and 'Communism seeking credits from the devil.'..."

After citing Secretary Rusk, Prime Minister Douglas-Home, and former Secretary Dulles on the preferability of "goulash Communism," the section concludes:

same kind of disease as the imperialist ruling clique: they are extremely antagonistic to the masses of the people who comprise over 90% of the world's population, and therefore they, too, are weak and powerless and are paper tigers."

The final section, "Historical Lessons of the D of P," is largely a 15-point review of "the main contents of the theories and policies advanced by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in this connection." This is followed by references to a previously unreported 9 May 1963 Mao "note" turning unexpectedly and defensively to internal Chinese problems.

"In the light of the historical lessons of the D. of P., Comrade Mao Tse-tung has stated: class struggle, the struggle for production, and scientific experiment are the three great revolutionary movements for building a mighty socialist country....

"If, in the absence of these movements, the landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and ogres of all kinds were allowed to crawl out, while our cadres were to shut their eyes to all this and in many cases fail even to differentiate between the enemy and ourselves, but were to collaborate with the enemy and become corrupted and demoralized; if our cadres were thus dragged into the enemy camp or the enemy were able to sneak into our ranks, and if many of our workers, peasants, and the intellectuals were left defenseless against both the soft and the hard tactics of the enemy, then it would not take long, perhaps only several years or a decade, or several decades at most, before a counter-revolutionary restoration on a national scale inevitably occurred, the M-L party would undoubtedly become a revisionist party or a fascist party, and the whole of China would change its color....

"In short, it is an extremely important question, a matter of life and death for our party and our country. It is a question of fundamental importance to the proletarian revolutionary cause for a hundred, a thousand, nay ten thousand years...!"

But the article concludes on a defiant note of confidence:

"Regarding the emergence of the rev. K. clique in the SU, our attitude as M-Ls is the same as our attitude toward any 'disturbance' -- first, we are against it; second, we are not afraid of it. We did not wish it and are opposed to it, but...there is nothing terrifying about it, and there is no need for alarm. The earth will continue to revolve, history will continue to move forward, the people of the world will, as always, make revolutions, and the imperialists and their lackeys will inevitably meet their doom...."

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Background references:

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15 July 1963
- BPG Item #692, "Iraq: Communist Blueprint for
Subversion," 26 August 1963
- BPG Item #721, "Soviet Contacts with the Free World--
Post-Barghoorn," 16 December 1963
- BPG Item #722, "Soviet Subversion in the Congo,"
16 December 1963
- BPG Item #754, "New China News Agency (NCNA):
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- BPG Item #755, "Chinese Communist Penetration of
Latin America," 9 March 1964
- David J. Dallin, Soviet Espionage (New Haven, 1955)
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27 July 1964


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Looking ahead to areas in which fighting may erupt in the future, we must anticipate that no hostilities, however provincial they may appear, will be free of Chinese interest and possible involvement. Exploitation of the essentially tribal wars which plague Africa serves Communist China's goals of chaos and revolution nearly as well as would any truly politically motivated rebellion. We may see more examples of uprisings fomented by the Chinese as greater numbers of Africans go to China for "education" and guerrilla training. They came close to achieving a Chinese-influenced government in Zanzibar -- and may yet succeed. Such Chinese activities show that indirect aggression used without scruple against struggling young countries -- independent or not -- is a formidable and spreading danger to all Africa now, as it has already been to Asia for years.

For a brief description of the Chinese role in African military actions see the unclassified attachment of the same title and watch for continuing developments in Press Comment coverage. See also:

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25X1C10b Political Climate Encourages French Communists

BACKGROUND: At its Congress of 14-17 May 1964, the PCF installed Waldeck Rochet as Secretary General in place of Maurice Thorez, shortly before the latter's sudden demise on 11 July. This convenient sequence of events first spared the Party the usual crisis of Communist leadership succession and lent it an air of organizational reform; then removed entirely the embarrassing Stalinist figure of Thorez. The Party is now in a better position to pursue its perennial quest to reduce the resistance of the anti-Gaullist opposition to fuller collaboration with the Communists. At the same time, Gaullist internal policies are driving the French to two extremes; the Union for the New Republic (UNR) dominated right and the Socialists and Communists on the left. With a French presidential election slated for 1965, there is a serious danger that the PCF, now the second largest French party with 20-25% of the popular vote -- which was sufficient to make it the largest party until the upsurge of the UNR in 1958 -- will gain further political power. The visible signs and portents are set out in the unclassified attach-

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27 July 1964

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911. USSR Tough Policy: Hard Lines and Peaceful Coexistence

BACKGROUND: During June-July, Soviet leaders again stated basic hard-line policies while attempting to win friends through a propaganda campaign of peaceful coexistence -- into which some acid and toughness crept from time to time. On his "goodwill" tour of Scandinavian countries (June 20 - July 4) Khrushchev presented officials with an unyielding position on, for example, Germany and disarmament. At the same time, he attempted somewhat successfully to show himself to their publics as a harmless old man; but, he also irritated his hosts with tactless statements and they were relieved when he departed without some expected demonstrations and similar provocative incidents.

During this period, Mikoyan was in Indonesia guaranteeing Sukarno yet more military assistance (a good proportion of the already extended billion dollars has been for military use) to prosecute aggressive guerrilla-type war against Malaysia. Then the Soviet Union made a surprising, but nonetheless unacceptable, proposal for a UN peacekeeping force and Castro extended a warped olive branch to the US to renew trade. If accepted, Castro's proposition would have indicted the US as engaging in the same kind of aggressive foreign activity as Cuba's own admitted subversion in Latin America.

The unclassified attachment ("The USSR's Tough Line on Coexistence") sketches the recent Soviet hard line statements against their backdrop of peaceful but tough relations. See also 25X1C10b following references:

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812 P. Communist Front Youth and Student Events

BACKGROUND: The Second World Youth Forum. The World Forum of Solidarity of Youth and Students in the Fight for National Independence and Liberation and for World Peace will be held in Moscow from 16-23 September. The First Forum, also sponsored by the Communist front World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), was held in Moscow from 25 July - 3 August 1961. The Forums differ from the Communist-sponsored World Youth Festivals in being openly and exclusively political. Official Festival pronouncements carefully try to mask their Soviet sponsorship and political aspects by disguising them as "spontaneous gatherings of peace-loving youth". In contrast, the Forums openly propose to unite the youth of the world into an international political force, which will then serve the objectives of Soviet foreign policy. The advertised theme of the first Forum was "The Youth of the Mid-Twentieth Century and Their Problems". However, the closing communique endorsed all of the themes of Soviet propaganda on the prevention of war, peaceful coexistence, elimination of foreign military bases, colonialism, and disarmament.

At a 10 March 1964 Moscow press conference, Vladislav Shevchenko* stated that the idea for a second Forum emerged from the International Conference of Youth and Students for Disarmament, Peace and National Independence held in Florence, Italy from 26 February - 1 March 1964 (see BPG #134, item 746, dated 10 February 1964). Representatives of 57 Organizations from 40 countries gathered at the Florence meeting to draft a letter to youth and student organizations throughout the world proposing the convocation of another Forum. This suggestion was forwarded under a covering letter from the Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR (CYO) which called for a Constituent Meeting of the IPC in Moscow, 17-20 April 1964.

In a vituperative response addressed to the CYO, the All China Student Federation (ACSF) objected to the short notice given for the IPC and referred to the CYO's "bad habit of launching surprise attacks" and "requiring us to go to Moscow at half a month's notice". The Chinese decried the CYO's "pursuing in the international youth movement the erroneous line of peaceful coexistence and general complete disarmament advocated by the leaders of the Soviet Union" and "refraining from opposing imperialism.... and [even] opposing others fighting against imperialism". An

*Head of the Press Department of the USSR State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, formerly Soviet representative to the WFDY Secretariat and head of the Permanent Secretariat of the International Preparatory Committee (IPC) for the first Forum.

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additional allegation stated that the Soviets were "utilizing the banner of national independence to further and peddle your erroneous line". The Chinese claimed that the Soviets had misrepresented the original proposal as advanced in Florence and demanded that the CYO account for its unilateral role in organizing a second Forum. The ACSF closed its vituperative response with a blast at the CYO for employing "pure and simple big power chauvinism". Copies of the Chinese letter were widely distributed to youth and student groups. As a further protest, the Chinese did not participate in the IPC meeting.

The IPC was attended by representatives of 103 youth and student organizations (which included regional groups, WFDY and the IUS) from 62 countries. Not all of the delegates were Communists, but the bulk of the organizations represented were considered by the sponsors to be "progressive and anti-imperialist". It is anticipated that approximately 1,000 delegates representing Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America will attend the September Forum.

Suspensions that the Soviets might use the Forum as a vehicle for advancing their position in the Sino-Soviet split were confirmed during the IPC. The Soviets refused to yield to an Algerian proposal that the Forum agenda include a seminar dealing with the means for realizing national independence and rapid economic development in the colonial or newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. Soviet representatives contended that the inclusion of such a topic would be readily exploited by the Chinese and would nullify any hope for a unified and successful Forum. In spite of the Soviets' vetoing the Algerian suggestion, the feeling persists that African, Asian and Latin American youth groups may arrive at the Forum with the idea of interjecting a topic relating to the Algerian proposal in order to provoke such a debate within the Forum. Reports indicate the Soviets are attempting to canvass Forum delegations with a view to excluding pro-Chinese elements from the Forum.

The following program for the Forum was presented by the IPC:

1. The role of youth and students in the joint struggle of all progressive forces of the world for national independence and liberation, for peace, democracy, and progress against reaction and imperialism.
2. The problems of economic independence and national reconstruction.
 - a. The role of youth and students in the economic, social, and agrarian transformation, and the industrialization of their countries.
 - b. Collaboration of the youth of the economically developed countries with the youth of the countries which are in the process of development.
3. The role of youth and students in the development of the political consciousness of the masses and in the rebirth and development of

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national culture, liquidation of illiteracy, training of national cadres.

4. The contribution of the national liberation movement to the struggle of all peoples for peace; relaxation of international tension, peaceful coexistence, general and complete disarmament, total prohibition of nuclear tests, prohibition of spread of nuclear weapons, and the creation of deatomized zones.
5. Strengthening unity of action and solidarity of youth and students of the entire world in the struggle for national independence and liberation and for peace, against colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialism.

Forum regulations on participation, as established at the IPC, state: Participation will be open to "all local, national, regional and international youth and student organizations, social and labor organizations, and the public personalities of various countries who support the struggle of the peoples for national independence and liberation, and for peace". The IPC set up a Solidarity Fund for Financial Assistance to aid the participation of youth and students. The Fund is simply a decoy mechanism as the transportation and living expenses for delegates to the IPC were paid by the Soviets, who can also be expected to fund most expenses of delegates attending the Forum.

A Permanent Secretariat of 14 members (USSR, Portugal, East Germany, Kenya, South Africa, Algeria, Brazil, Venezuela, Cuba, Iraq, Ceylon, China, WFDY and IUS) was selected at the IPC and will handle all Forum preparations. Consistent with the reaction to the CYO convening the IPC, the Chinese will not send a representative to the Secretariat, although a seat has been designated for them. The latter obviously is a Soviet tactical maneuver. As the Chinese boycotted the Florence Disarmament meeting, and the IPC of the Forum, they can probably be expected to sit out the Forum as well. If the Chinese, indeed, do refuse to appear, they will be open to Soviet criticism which will blame the ACSF for attempting to splinter the international youth and student movements. To substantiate this assertion, the Soviets can state that in all good faith and toward the fulfillment of mutual objectives, the Chinese had been included in the decision-making mechanisms of the Forum, but had chosen not to participate.

The Soviets finally responded to the ACSF attack on 30 May 1964 in a speech by First Secretary Sergei Pavlov to the plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee. He rebuffed the Chinese leaders "who have invented the terrible lie about the nature of the World Youth Forum" and who insulted the representatives at the IPC. He attacked the "Chinese splitters who try to sever the youth movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America from international democratic youth organizations and thereby undermine the democratic youth movement", and promised that Soviet youth would do "everything in its power to see that the Forum resolves into a vivid political manifestation of solidarity and turns into another powerful blow at imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism".

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The Soviets will exploit every advantage offered them at the Forum to advance their political line. Arrangements have been made for delegates to visit Soviet industrial enterprises, collective farms, and theaters and to see films devoted to Soviet youth. Although from a propaganda point of view the Ninth World Youth Festival, scheduled for 1965, may appear the more important, actually the Forum may well be one of the most significant events from a political point of view to take place among youth movements. In Moscow, the delegates will take part in working and training sessions rather than in a mere propaganda show; the great majority of them can be expected to return to their countries with specific instructions for their roles in the movements for "independence, liberation, and world peace."

IUS CONGRESS: The 8th Congress of the International Union of Students (IUS) has been announced for 3-13 September 1964 in Ibadan, Nigeria. Based on an offer by the National Union of Nigerian Students (NUNS) to host the biennial Congress, the Nigerian site and date were given preliminary approval at the IUS Executive Committee meeting held in Budapest, 12-21 February 1964. Since then, the IUS has met with serious difficulties in attempting to convene the Congress and it is doubtful that it will take place as planned.

In April, when it was decided that the Forum be held in September, Moscow attempted to renegotiate the proposed Congress date with the Nigerians in order to avoid holding the World Youth Forum and the Congress almost simultaneously. The Soviets wished to postpone the IUS Congress until later in the year; Nigeria would consider only September, as a later date would conflict with the Nigerian university schedule and the annual NUNS Congress. The problem has been further complicated by increased activity toward an Indonesian headquartered, Peking-oriented international student front which would hope to draw membership from Asian, African, and Latin American student groups. To counter these efforts of the Chinese, the IUS prefers an African or Asian site for its 8th Congress.

NUNS has cooperated in preparations for the Congress, but the Nigerian government, while not actually prohibiting the Congress, has placed obstacles in the path toward its realization. In June the IUS indicated to NUNS its acceptance of the Nigerian site. However, at that time NUNS had not yet obtained clear-cut endorsements for the Congress from its government, nor an agreement that the government underwrite a portion of the expenses. The Nigerian government reportedly refused to grant even a token amount. Nigeria has not guaranteed delegates' entry visas, has insisted that a three-months notice is required for any visa applications, and has steadfastly refused to accept the IUS requirement that visas be granted on a wholesale basis to all participants.

Current indications are that the IUS is exploring an alternate site in Ceylon in the event the Congress cannot be held in Nigeria. Should the locale of the Congress be moved from Ibadan, the meeting will probably be postponed until at least November of 1964, so as not to conflict with the World Youth Forum.

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The Intelligence Spiderweb

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Every few weeks, the world press and radio report the arrest of another Soviet spy or the expulsion of one more Soviet bloc official, found engaged in illegal activities. Early in July, to take a recent example, Georges Paques, a French official at NATO Headquarters in Paris, was sentenced to life imprisonment because he had passed to Soviet officials secret documents on NATO military deployment. Many of these exposures, as in the case of Paques, reveal the all-consuming Soviet interest in information on the weapons and forces, and on the economic and political capabilities and intentions of all, even small and neutral nations. Apparently the Soviets believe that they must make the greatest espionage efforts to enable them to overcome the handicap of inferior technology and lesser production capacity. Classic espionage has been refined to the highest degree by the Soviet experts; in this area, at least, they overtook and surpassed other nations long ago.

To the Communist, however, military advantage is not an isolated end in itself, but part of a total political-military-economic advantage. What the Communist seeks is power, and he seeks it by every path. By training and experience, he is conditioned to think that the secret, clandestine paths are the best ones, and there are several of them. Whether stealing British submarine plans or smuggling arms into Africa, the clandestine forces of the Soviet Union follow a single goal, that of building up Soviet power.

Clandestine Instruments of Bloc Policy

These forces do, it is true, divide along certain lines of specialization. The basic division is between the organs of military intelligence (for the Soviets, the GRU or Main Directorate of Intelligence) and those of state security (the KGB or Committee for State Security). Soviet military intelligence is the responsibility of a department of the General Staff of the Red Army, while the state security organs -- the secret police -- have the primary duty of maintaining the political power monopoly of the Communist state. But the state security service has always had a tendency to take on other duties as well, and outside the Soviet Union, it has long collected foreign political intelligence, carried out covert political operations, and performed other secret and often extremely dirty tasks for the Soviet leaders. The KGB and its predecessors have watched the activities of Soviet citizens, including Soviet diplomats and even the officers of the GRU, and their vast collection of personal dossiers contains confidential information on millions of people, Soviet and non-Soviet. Despite the supposed reduction of the KGB since the days of Stalin and Beria, the number of KGB officers now in foreign countries is larger than ever. It is primarily the KGB which pulls the hidden political wires for the Soviets abroad.

Embassies, trade missions, TASS and NCNA offices, and technical assistance groups all provide cover for bloc intelligence activities, military and state security alike. Peter Deriabin, a former KGB officer in Vienna, has written

(in Show Magazine) that 65-75% of the staff members of Soviet embassies are not really diplomats at all, but intelligence officers who direct the activities of local agents. Other estimates run as high as 80%. An official's social life may betray his intelligence affiliation; non-intelligence personnel are discouraged from making social contacts, while many KGB officers pursue them avidly, hoping to find potential agents. In addition to these "legal" officers (as those associated with Soviet missions are called in the jargon of the Soviet intelligence services), there are the even more dangerous Soviet "illegals," whose passports allege that they are members of the local populace, or immigrants from third countries. These "illegals" usually run some small private business, and they are never seen together with embassy officials; they do, however, meet and direct local agents.

The German Example

We get some idea of the scope of bloc intelligence from the estimate (based on the reports of defectors and others) that the East German counterpart of the KGB, the MfS (Ministry for State Security), has 16,000 local agents in West Berlin and West Germany, directed by an organization with 22,000 staff officers. In 1959 alone, 2,802 agents were caught in West Germany. West Berlin and West German authorities estimate that since 1945 there have been 255 cases of successful kidnaping, 143 planned or attempted kidnapings, and six assassination attempts by East German agents. The MfS is backed up by a Soviet KGB installation in Karlshorst, East Berlin, manned by 700 agent-running officers and hundreds of support and administrative officials. KGB operations directed from Karlshorst extend far beyond the territory of West Germany, even to North America. The GRU also has a staff of over 150 in Karlshorst, as well as another office with over 100 officers in Wuensdorf, a short distance away.

In a way, West Berlin and West Germany are atypical, since Central Europe is the area where the military forces of East and West stand face to face. The situation requires that priority attention be given there to military intelligence. But it is probably not the need for intelligence so much as the operating opportunities which determine the numbers of bloc intelligence officers in Germany. Wherever there is a chance to place some Soviet intelligence operators, the Soviets crowd in as many as they can; in Germany they have a divided country and a divided city, and parts of both are under their own domination, so that there is room for large staffs. In other areas, they may give more attention to subversion and less to the collection of information, but they will still introduce the maximum possible number of agent handlers.

Germany itself was in fact one of the cradles of Soviet subversion. In the early 1920's, when the Soviets thought that there was a good chance for a revolution in Germany, both the Comintern and the Cheka (the first ancestor of the KGB) sent scores of men there to prepare for and lead the expected uprising. In those days, the Trotskyite dream of world revolution was still much alive, and many of these imported agents were non-Russians. Among the Cheka's contingent, separate departments took responsibility for military matters, intelligence, terror, and the infiltration of other

organizations; these were called the M-service, N-service, T-service, and Z-service respectively. But the Chekists and other Communists were as yet relatively inexperienced, and their strikes and uprisings collapsed.

Organized Assassination

Terror and other action operations still continue in Germany, as shown by the kidnappings referred to above (a notable kidnapping by Soviet state security itself -- not the MfS -- was that of Dr. Walter Linse, a West Berlin lawyer, in July 1952). KGB terrorism reached a climax with the assassination operations in which Nikolay Khokhlov (1954) and Bogdan N. Stashinskiy (1957, 1959) were ordered to kill certain exile leaders resident in West Germany. Khokhlov defected rather than carry out the directive, but Stashinskiy followed orders, using a special cyanide gas gun. The KGB and its predecessors have conducted many assassinations over the years; most such killings go undetected, but known cases include those of Simon Petlura (shot in Paris, 1925), Ignace Reiss (Switzerland, 1937), Juliet Stuart Poyntz (USA, 1937), Willy Muenzenberg (France, 1940), Evhen Konovalets (Rotterdam, 1938), Walter Krivitsky (USA, 1941), and of course Leon Trotsky, slain with a mountaineer's ice axe in Mexico City in 1940. The Stashinskiy and Khokhlov cases show that there has been no moratorium on assassination since the death of Stalin.

Political Subversion in Latin America.

In recent years, KGB political action has mushroomed in other areas of the globe, such as Latin America. An example is the case of Major Yuri Nikolaevich Paporov, ostensibly the Second Secretary and Cultural Attaché at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. As an intellectual and writer, he made good use of his cover, giving lectures and developing contacts in literary circles. Aside from recruiting long-term agents, he worked among Mexican student groups to spur them into rioting against the government. He was exposed in the press of Mexico City in May 1957, and after student demands for his recall, he suddenly left in September of that year. That same month, two Czech "diplomats" were expelled from Ecuador for their subversive activity among student and labor groups; the Czech legation in Peru was closed for the same reasons. In September 1958, a Polish intelligence officer was exposed as the real directing force of a secret Communist training school in Argentina, and in April 1959, the Argentine government declared Major Vasily Ivashov, Konstantin Monakhov and Dmitry Dyakanov personae non gratae because they had incited street riots in Buenos Aires. Second Secretary Nikolai Aksenov and Naval Attaché Nikolai Remizov were expelled from Mexico in 1959 because they had organized a strike. On May 6, 1964, a leading Rio de Janeiro newspaper, O Globo, exposed the names and records of 11 Soviet intelligence officers then in Brazil, many of them engaged in subversive activity.

The Care and Feeding of African Rebellion

In Africa, Soviet activists are equally busy. In the Congo, eight Soviet specialists arrived in Stanleyville in July 1961 with instructions to start a rebellion against the central Congolese government. When this project

failed, four of the eight went to the capital in Leopoldville, where they joined other KGB operators in boring from within, trying to recruit agents in the government and trade unions. Late in 1963, a Leopoldville newspaper published the names of some 16 local Soviet diplomats definitely involved in subversion, identifying most of them as being in the KGB. In Guinea, Communist "diplomats" organized a "teachers' plot" against the government of Sekou Touré; the plot was uncovered, and the Soviet Ambassador, Daniel Solod, was expelled in December 1961. (The real Soviet attitude about Africans, and perhaps also the difference between purposeful fraternization by KGB officers and the enforced isolation of non-KGB Soviets abroad, was shown when Soviet embassy officials in Guinea tried twice, early in 1963, to abduct a Soviet school teacher, Svetlana Ushakova, because she had associated too closely with Guineans.) The Soviets are not the only active Bloc nationals in Africa; aside from the usual supplementary contingents from Eastern Europe, the Chinese Communists compete actively for political power. A report in the New York Times of June 24, 1964, describes the activities of two Chinese Communists in the Kivu province of the Congo, where they are helping to direct a revolt against the Congolese government. The Chinese Communist Embassy in Burundi has for some time been advising the Kivu rebels who come to the Burundi capital of Bujumbura, and now, apparently, the Chinese are joining the rebels in the field.

The Secret Empire of NCNA

Chinese Communist political action work abroad is most often performed by representatives of the New China News Agency (NCNA). This may result partly from the fact that Peking still suffers from a shortage of embassies outside the bloc, and partly also from a desire not to compromise what embassies there are. But NCNA employees, supposedly newspapermen, work aggressively against non-communist governments, especially in Africa and Latin America. According to news reports, the NCNA office in Mexico City is staffed by five trained intelligence officers, three of whom hold military rank: Capt. Wu Chu, Lt. Tuan Chih-chi, and Lt. Ch'eng Pien. Nine NCNA employees were jailed in Brazil for subversive activities, after the anti-communist revolution there last spring. Significantly, when the Czechoslovak government wanted to put an end to Chicom subversion, it expelled the NCNA staff in Prague; Communist governments are well aware of the use which Peking makes of its news agency offices.

Although Communist China has the most advantageous position for clandestine activity in the Far East, thanks in particular to the presence of the overseas Chinese, the Soviets strive hard to maintain their agent nets. An interesting revelation occurred in March 1963, when the United Nations Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) met in Manila. ECAFE's reason for existence is to promote the economic development of the area, without regard for politics. But the Manila press disclosed that 11 of the 20 Soviet delegates were trained intelligence officers, including A. S. Lavrentyev (active in Calcutta from 1954 to 1956), M. S. Pankin (a 20 year veteran of military intelligence), Y. V. Filipov (used journalistic disguise in Germany in 1951), and V. V. Moskov (in Iraq in 1955).

Making the Victims Pay

One interesting feature of Communist subversion in many African and Asian countries is that these countries themselves pay a large share of the

financial cost. Countries receiving technical advisory assistance pay for that assistance along with the rest of the equipment and materials they purchase under their "aid" agreements with the Bloc. In some countries, such as Afghanistan, Ghana, and Iraq, the advice costs one fourth of the total aid cost; in Guinea, advisors soak up one third of the aid. While there are some genuine technicians among the technical assistance teams, there are also others without real professional skills; it has been remarked that it takes five Soviet engineers to do a job which can be done by one German engineer. It is clear that technical assistance groups are being used as cover for intelligence operations, directed against the governments which are footing the bill.

One revelation of the Bloc's misuse of trade and aid occurred in July 1963: the Iraqi government declared five Bulgarian diplomats and an East German trade mission officer personae non gratae, the Bulgarian First Secretary, Konstantin Nikolov, having directed an abortive coup d'etat against the government on July 3. The East Europeans had recruited agents to gather information for clandestine radios, to plant false rumors, to supply doctored photographs for Communist newspapers, to distribute anti-government propaganda, and to buy military intelligence. The Bulgarian trade office, TECHNOEXPORT, served as a funding mechanism, using money (which the Iraqis would have to repay) ostensibly intended for an airport construction project. Leaflets used to inspire the July 1963 coup appear to have been prepared at the Bulgarian Embassy.

Inside a Soviet Residentura

Probably the fullest description of Soviet activity in a single country was given by Aleksandr Kaznacheev in his 1962 book, Inside a Soviet Embassy. Kaznacheev, who defected to the United States Embassy in Rangoon in 1959, had served in Rangoon as a Soviet Foreign Service employee and later as a KGB operative. In the former capacity, he learned how powerless the ordinary Foreign Service officers were in an embassy. In the latter role, he worked for the KGB's "political intelligence" staff, the "legal residentura" in Burma. Since Kaznacheev had been trained in the Burmese and English languages and not in intelligence operations, his own duties largely concerned the translation of articles written in Moscow, so that they could be placed in the Burmese press. In his book, he lists the following Southeast Asian newspapers as the ones most often used for the publication of Soviet material: Bintang Tirmur in Indonesia; La Patrie in Thailand; Amrita Bazar, Patrika, Blitz, and New Delhi Times in India; and Mirror, Botataung Daily, and People's Journal in Burma. But Kaznacheev was able to observe the activities of more experienced intelligence officers, who gathered military information and exploited their positions as economic advisors; in particular, KGB officers sought to penetrate and subvert the local political parties, trade unions, and youth groups, and tried to recruit the members of foreign embassies in Rangoon as well. The KGB served as a channel for transmitting instructions and money from Moscow to the Burmese Communists -- although by this time, the Soviets had lost control of the Burmese Communists to Peking. In particular, the Communist insurgents, whose cause the Soviets by this time considered hopeless, found continuing support and direction from the Chinese, and naturally sided with Peking.

One characteristic Bloc activity, in which Kaznacheev was involved, is to forge letters and other documents, supposedly originating in the US or British government, or with wealthy Americans or anti-communists elsewhere. The bloc services publish the forgeries in non-bloc newspapers they control, and then republish the documents elsewhere, naming the first newspaper as a source. Kaznacheev translated forged letters after their arrival from KGB Headquarters in Moscow, and these would then appear in the Mirror or the Botataung Daily: if they concerned Indonesian affairs, they would be attributed to "Our Correspondent in Djakarta," and if they involved India, the supposed author would be "Our Correspondent in New Delhi." TASS and various other newspapers would then pick up the story, and Soviet embassies elsewhere would see to it that the story came to the personal attention of influential persons who might be misled by it. The advantage of planting a forgery outside the bloc is that people are then less likely to suspect that it may be false. However, the MfS, a service which has worked extensively in the field of forgery, often publishes its counterfeits in Neues Deutschland, the official party newspaper of East Germany. Copies of 24 different bloc forgeries were shown to a committee of the US Senate in 1961, together with proof of their falsity. The Ghanese and Algerian press has since several times reprinted one of these forgeries, an alleged British cabinet paper on Africa, the latest appearance being on May 14, 1964.

When we are first told of bloc intelligence activities, we may be inclined to say that they represent only a continuation of what governments have always done, and that the scope of these activities is exaggerated by reactionaries and professional anti-Communists. Much of the literature on the subject is tainted by the obvious bias of the writers. But the evidence is now overwhelming that the Communist bloc security services are active in every country in the world, and that they are trying to control every country in the world. Pressure on West Berlin or South Vietnam may rise or fall, Khrushchev may increase or decrease the number of threats to wipe countries off the map, but the pressure of subversion, directed from headquarters within the bloc, has increased steadily since Stalin's death.

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Communist China's Indirect Aggression In Africa

809.

Communist China's refusal to sign the nuclear test ban treaty and her bold, aggressive interference in the internal affairs of independent African countries are accurate indicators of her fundamental militancy; these contrast sharply with Chou En-lai's peaceful words to African leaders during his African tour in late 1963. However, Chou revealed his belief that Africa is "ready for revolution" just before departing the continent. Since that time Chinese Communist Party voices have been even more specific. An editorial in the 24 June Jenmin Jih Pao declared that the "excellent revolutionary situation" in the Congo would bring the rebels "still greater victories like the people's armed forces of South Vietnam." It further said that the Chinese people supported these rebellions in line with Communist China's contention that armed revolution is the only proper means of spreading Communism. The deadly intent of this message is clear enough. It makes no apology for the fact that these are rebellions against legally constituted, independent governments of sovereign countries. Often however, Chinese propaganda attempts to disguise Chinese military interventions as "wars of national liberation," an appealing label which fools the less thoughtful among the Africans.

Rebellions in the Congo. The Chinese are eagerly exploiting two areas of fighting in the Republic of the (former Belgian) Congo and may be expected to get into the third. They advise and support the CNL (Council of National Liberation), an heterogenous collection of leftist exiles led by former parliamentarians and ministers, many of whom were followers of the late Patrice Lumumba or of his disciple, Antoine Gizenga.

The CNL headquarters in Brazzaville (in the former French Congo) directly across from Leopoldville is in direct touch with the Chinese officials who descended on this small capital en masse following diplomatic recognition in early 1964. In addition to the embassy staff of 16, there are 2 New China News Agency staff members and 30 "technicians." The latter may assist a stepped-up CNL propaganda campaign over a radio transmitter provided by CPR officials. The obvious Chinese goal is to strengthen a weakening CNL.

Pierre Mulele, leader of the Kwilu revolt in Southwestern Congo not far from Leopoldville, uses the tribal passions of young fighters (called Jeunesse) against the Congolese government to satisfy his own ambitions. After the collapse of Gizenga's Haut Congo government in January 1963, Mulele, who was Gizenga's representative in Cairo, went to Moscow and thence to China where he received military training at the Chinese War Academy. He returned to Kwilu province in mid-1963 and began to train the young warriors with whom he launched the revolt. CNL documents seized from two Soviet diplomats who were smuggling them into Leopoldville from Brazzaville in late 1963 described Mulele's operations as somewhat independent of the CNL

groups and supported directly by the Chinese who had trained him in guerrilla warfare.

The Communist Chinese have found the Kivu rebellion to be more directly accessible by virtue of Kivu province's common eastern border with Burundi. The latter's recognition of Peking, in January 1964, was quickly followed by the arrival of fourteen staff members -- plus one who defected to US embassy officials almost immediately on arrival. In the capital city of Bujumbura the CNL, which now claims to lead what was essentially a tribal war in Kivu, has set up an office to serve as the contact point for Chinese financial and military support to all Congo areas where rebels are fighting. The Chinese have reportedly also set up terrorist training facilities in Burundi. With the Kivu area fairly firmly in rebel hands, the Chinese are growing bolder; two Chinese were reportedly seen in Uvira, the Congolese town directly across the border from Bujumbura. Intimate, daily contact with the spreading Kivu rebellion can be inferred from the detailed coverage Radio Peking gives to news of the fighting there.

Kindu, capital of neighboring Maniema province has also fallen to the rebels in a northerly-westerly spread of fighting. These advances suggest that the Chinese may be advising and attempting to coordinate the action, perhaps through Gaston Soumialot, the CNL leader in Bujumbura.

Less is known of the North Katanga rebellion which appears to be spreading north along the west coast of Lake Tanganyika toward the Kivu areas now occupied by the Chinese-supported, CNL-led rebels. The impetus to revolt in North Katanga is believed to be tribal, as it was originally in Kivu. Given Katanga's geographical location and vulnerability to exploitation (as demonstrated in 1962 when former Katanga president Moise Tshombe sought to secede from the new Republic), the Communist Chinese may be expected to try to increase the resulting chaos and perhaps to link up with both the Kivu and Katanga revolts.

Burundi and Rwanda. The two tiny but densely populated, independent countries which formerly constituted Ruanda-Urundi are deadly enemies. Thousands of Rwandan refugees have fled into Burundi to escape their tribal enemies who now govern Rwanda. In Burundi Chinese Communists are giving them arms, money and training and, with the Burundi government's agreement, are encouraging them to return and overthrow the republican government of Rwanda. All three groups would benefit, at the expense of Rwanda's legal government: the Rwandan exiles by seizing power in their own country, the Burundis by getting rid of their hated neighbor and China by obtaining an expanded staging area and greater numbers of men to turn against the neighboring Congo -- the real goal.

Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya. The Somali Republic's determination to bring the nomadic Somali tribesmen and tribal territory in Kenya and Ethiopia under its control is ready-made

for Chinese exploitation. The Chinese have offered training in guerrilla warfare to persons designated by the Somali government, have invested money in the leftist opposition Somali Democratic Union, and attempted to goad Mogadiscio into battle against the Ethiopian government. Any major outbreak of fighting would unquestionably draw in the Somali areas of north-eastern Kenya, one of the most important countries in east Africa. The Kenyan government, independent only since December 1963, is attempting to find a bloodless solution to the Somali dispute. The Ethiopian government is attempting to confine the fighting as much as possible but the Chinese, who would benefit only from increasing the difficulties between the three countries, continue guerrilla training efforts and incitement among all three.

Cameroon. One of the earliest known cases of Chinese training for military subversion in Africa provides an excellent case study. In 1960 six Cameroonians were arrested on their return from training in a Peking military academy--unbeknownst to the Cameroon government. Their notebooks indicated that the Chinese had provided instruction in sabotage, in modern weaponry and in political indoctrination. The Cameroonian delegate might have been describing the Communist Chinese military program in all of Africa when he told the United Nations that

"many young Cameroonians, inveigled and led into China under false pretexts, receive there psychological and military preparations for the ultimate goal of being sent back to our national territory, there to engage in subversive activities and to serve as the instructors and personnel in an eventual general rebellion."

On their return they were to have joined the militant terrorist wing of the opposition Union des Peuples du Cameroun which publicly urged revolution against the newly independent government. The Chinese Communist government continues to train young Cameroonians in Peking, against the wishes of their government.

Zanzibar. China found it easy to exploit nationalism in Zanzibar. One of the directors of Revolution, the Chinese voice of communism in underdeveloped areas, was also the NCNA representative and China's instrument in the 1964 coup action. He, Mohamed "Babu," has made frequent trips to China as have others now prominent in the government which Tanganyika is trying to consolidate into the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

Communist China is not operating alone in any of the above areas. The Communist governments of Soviet Union and East Europe are also busy with their own investments in African subversion, often using the same organizations or individuals. But the Chinese put stronger emphasis on armed conflict and show less concern for diplomatic niceties to camouflage their aggres-

The New Face of French Communism

After 19 years of convening in the suburbs or provinces, the French Communist Party (PCF) decided at the last minute to stage its 1964 (17th) Congress in downtown Paris. High ranking Mikhail Suslov (Central Committee Presidium) headed a delegation from Moscow, French youth were much in evidence, Thorez was replaced by Waldeck Rochet as Secretary General, and "new" party statutes were adopted. Among other things, these called for the election of all party officials by "secret" ballot; youth protests that candidates were still to be screened down by "nominating commissions" to a single candidate for each vacant office were summarily rejected as being "an overly great attachment to bourgeois democracy." All in all, no effort was spared to present a new PCF facade to the world, (and hide the fact that no significant changes were made in Party organization or policy).

The prime policy which the PCF carries on unchanged is Thorez's unrelenting campaign (begun soon after his shift away from popular front tactics in 1947 boomeranged) to enmesh the Socialists in a Communist-dominated coalition. Ever since the PCF escaped from political isolation through the 1962 parliamentary election, circumstances have been driving Socialist and Communist electorates together in opposition to Gaullist candidates. The new election system for cities over 30,000 decreases the chances for smaller or even larger parties by themselves to win at the polls and forces them into collaboration if they are to gain significant representation. In the present situation, dominated by a united (coalition) rightist party government held together by the personal attraction of President de Gaulle, other parties and particularly those grouped around the center, feel they must make a clear choice of right or left.

There have been various "tactical" electoral understandings between Socialists and Communists in local elections; in the March 1964 cantonal elections, a Communist with Socialist support in the Lorraine defeated a Gaullist. The Communists point to this as vindication of their longstanding courtship of the Socialists. Unfortunately, many voters may grasp at this specific union as the only apparent way to shackle de Gaulle's personal power and restore viable democratic government in France, the latter being a common desire among a wide variety of electorates.

Apart from carrying on Thorez's policy of Communist-Socialist rapprochement, the 17th Congress reaffirmed the PCF's absolute fidelity to Moscow, transcending any function as a true political party or as part of the democratic body politic of France. The PCF has been the most vociferous advocate of Moscow's call for a world Communist conference to expel the Chinese Communists. In his parting oration, Thorez violently attacked the Chicoms and indirectly attacked the Italian Communists for failure to close ranks with Moscow on this issue. Suslov was able to say at the Congress that "complete unanimity exists between the PCF and the CPSU on all major problems of our time, on

all problems of the international Communist movement." Suslov could hardly make it clearer that the PCF stands diametrically opposed to the interests of the French people.

Walter H. Mallory's Political Handbook and Atlas of the World, 1964 gives the statistics setting forth the various strengths of the French political parties, the political events in the Fourth and Fifth (1958) Republics, and the fortunes of the French Communist Party in and out a united front. We quote (pages 89-91, 93) as follows (underlinings added):

"POLITICAL EVENTS DURING THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

The first National Assembly, elected on November 10, 1946, showed the Communists to be unmerically the strongest party (5.5 million votes, 163 deputies), closely followed by the MRP (Popular Republicans), a new Catholic liberal party which obtained 5.1 million votes (158 deputies). The Socialists, with 3.4 million votes (90 deputies) were the third strongest party. (All figures of votes pertain to Metropolitan France only.) In the first phase of the Assembly's life, the Communists, Socialists, and MRP governed together. The Radical Socialists, Peasants, Independents, and PRL had between them only a third of the seats in the National Assembly.

The Communists in May 1947 ceased their cooperation and reverted to their original role of opposition, with full emphasis on the class-struggle and on alignment with Soviet Russia. The re-emergence of de Gaulle as the leader of the new political movement, the Rally of the French People (RPF), also profoundly changed the political line-up, although this was not fully reflected in the National Assembly until 1951. From 1947 to 1951 the Government was one based on center parties (Socialists, MRP, Radical Socialists - then called "Third Force" - plus miscellaneous rightists), with the Communists on the left and the Gaullists on the right constituting the opposition.

New national elections were held on June 17, 1951. Whereas the 1946 elections to the Assembly had still been held under a system of proportional representation, the 1951 elections featured a limited form of majority voting. It resulted in a loss of seats by the Communists and MRP and the advent of the Gaullists.

By popular votes, the Communists were still the strongest party in the 1951 elections (4.9 million votes) but they lost about 10 per cent of their supporters and obtained only 103 seats in the Assembly. The Gaullists, with 4.0 million votes, obtained 119 seats.

After the election of 1951 the Socialists finally went in-to outright opposition and a new majority was achieved when M. Pinay presented himself for investiture in March 1952. His Government, which was accompanied by a relative stabilization of the economic situation, saw a further development of the trend toward cooperation among the Gaullists.

After Pinay was overthrown in December 1952, the RPF finally made a complete break with its past, accorded support to the Government of Rene Mayer and subsequently not only supported but also participated in the Government of Joseph Laniel. The Laniel Government, which lasted from June 28, 1953, to June 19, 1954, represented the final stages of the post-war trend to the right.

With the advent of Pierre Mendes-France to the Premiership in June 1954, a new and heterogeneous majority was formed consisting largely of the Radicals, the Social Republicans (Gaullists), the Socialists and scattered deputies from other parties. Opposition to Mendes-France consisted primarily of the MRP, the conservative groups (Independents, Peasants and ARS), and also the Communists. In view of the Prime Minister's own policies and of Socialist support, although they did not participate in the Cabinet, the Government and its majority tended to have a center-left orientation.

Mendes-France was voted out of office by the National Assembly on February 5, 1955, on his Northern African policy. He was succeeded by Edgar Faure on February 23rd. Faure received a vote of no confidence on November 29, 1955, and invoked the procedure provided by the Constitution for dissolving the Assembly, and called for new elections on January 2, 1956. This election was fought by four main political groups: the Communists on the Left, the Left-of-Center following of Mendes-France, the Right-of-Center group behind caretaker Premier Edgar Faure, and the anti-tax rightists.

Guy Mollet, the Socialist leader, succeeded Edgar Faure on February 1, 1956, with a Left-of-Center Minority Cabinet made up largely of Socialists and Radicals, and joined later by the Social Republicans. The Mollet regime received shifting support - from the Left on internal and on economic and social issues, and from the Right on Algerian and foreign policy. Its forceful stand of the Suez nationalization united all parties except the Communists, behind the Government.

Mollet was defeated in the Assembly on May 21, 1957. He was replaced on June 12, 1957 by Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, Radical Socialist. The Bourges-Maunoury Government completed action on the ratification of the Euratom and Common Market treaties. It then set about the task of drafting a basic law for Algeria. The Parliament was called back into special session in September. After considerable attempts to find common ground for the proposed Algerian legislation, Bourges-Maunoury was forced to ask for a confidence vote. The government fell on September 30. After a 36-day crisis, Radical Socialist Felix Gaillard was invested with a majority running from Socialists through Moderates. Gaillard was succeeded by Peirre Pflimlin on May 14, 1958, and by General de Gaulle on June 1, 1958.

THE FIFTH FRENCH REPUBLIC

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France for many months, came to a head in the spring of 1958,

with dissidence in Algeria and resurgent Gaullism at home. The National Assembly declared a state of emergency in May. The situation continued to deteriorate, however, and on June 1st General de Gaulle was invested as Premier by the Assembly which accepted his terms...General de Gaulle was elected President of the Fifth Republic on December 21st to take office on January 8, 1959. The new National Assembly convened in April, 1959.

...

As a result of the referendum on October 28, 1962, a Constitutional amendment was voted providing that the President of the Republic shall in future be elected for a seven-year term by direct popular suffrage.

In the elections of November 13 and 25, 1962, the Gaullists won a resounding victory....

COMMUNIST PARTY: The largest party in Parliament during the Fourth Republic. In the 1958 election for the new Assembly, however, its representation was reduced from 144 to 10. While playing down communism and the dictatorship of the proletariat, the party's national program heavily emphasizes demands for peace and social betterment. It has endeavored to promote "unity of action" with the Socialists but without success (as of January 1964 - ed.) because of opposition to Socialist policies regarding Europe. It advocates some nationalization measures, but also the support of small industries and crafts, and "the defense of the peasant landowners against trusts." Because of their more decisive and more definitely left-wing policy, the Communists immediately after the war managed to win over many Frenchmen who formerly voted Socialist. They control France's largest labor organization, the Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT). They also exert some influence among the peasants. They emphasize the democratic and national character of their party. In foreign policy: opposed to NATO, to the Common Market and to German rearmament. Favors the Soviet-sponsored "peace" movements, uses nationalist slogans to warn against German association with Western Europe, and indirectly encourages "neutralist" propaganda and anti-colonialism. Profiting from electoral arrangements with the Socialists in the 1962 elections, the Communists won 41 seats in the National Assembly.

Leaders: Maurice Thorez (deceased July 1964 - ed.), Jacques Duclos, Francois Billoux, Etienne Fajon and Waldeck Rochet."

The USSR's Tough Practice of Coexistence

The Soviet Union's series of agreements (with the West) in support of its peaceful coexistence strategy has been paralleled in recent months with hard line policy statements on major issues. For example, while Khrushchev's 16 June - 4 July good will tour through Scandinavia has been variously described, there is general agreement that it was a tough political performance in private and a soothing, if something tactless, propaganda display in public which was irritating to official hosts. Some of the reaction to what was said in private meetings between Khrushchev and government officials reached the newspapers, -- e.g. that if Khrushchev's strong arm methods in private meetings were known publicly, his tour would prove a "political catastrophe"; that all three host countries were shocked by his uncompromising line on Germany; that the Soviets used thumb screws and acted like "rug merchants" in bargaining and forcing unwanted language in joint communique upon their hosts.

For all his apparent good fellowship in public, neutral Sweden was bitterly disappointed. Khrushchev angrily refused to talk about Wallenberg -- the Swedish diplomat who, having successfully helped Jews to escape in 1945, disappeared in Soviet-occupied Budapest in 1946; and they were shocked at the Soviet response that they could not conduct a more thorough investigation to determine the fate of innocent Swedish fishermen who disappeared into USSR prisons during World War II.

Norwegians, angry at past Soviet refusal to share scientific information as well as at the unexplained disappearance of their fish detection buoys, which they believe Soviet ships to have pulled up, received no indication that Soviet attitudes or behavior would change. Neither they nor Danish officials were pleased with K's innuendoes that their Western Alliance (NATO) could mean rockets on their territory and that these could be "dangerous to have around."

On major issues in the cold war, Scandinavian leaders found little cause for relaxation. K. refused to entertain any compromise on international questions; and he was unwilling to listen to Scandinavian points of view. His expressions on critical problems, taken with other Soviet actions on the same subjects, gave no cause for immediate hope.

Cuba. K's hosts were shocked at the unyielding nature of his remarks on Cuba and his refusal to concede any reason for American overflights.

He authorized Cuba to shoot down American reconnaissance planes; said that if the US should retaliate, the Soviet Union would come to Castro's aid; and ignored his own failure to fulfill the Soviet agreement to provide inspection of Cuban territory for weapons of aggression so

Under the circumstances, Castro's offer (made in an interview with the NY Times on July 6th) could not be interpreted in any manner other than another Soviet-related propaganda move to present a peaceful Cuba to the OAS meeting and remove the barriers to trade which have seriously hurt the Cuban economy. Castro offered "to cease assisting Latin American subversives if the United States and its allies would discontinue aiding anti-Havana rebels." To this attempt to reduce the US to Castro's level of state relations, the United States simply said it would not negotiate trade relations until Cuba ended her "ties of dependency" on the Soviet Union and ceased to promote subversion in Latin America.

Germany. North European officials were dismayed at K's unpleasant and uncompromising tone on the German problems. He said

there would be no plebiscite in East Germany;
two Germanies would have to be recognized;
there should be a free state of Berlin (West, that is);
and that a unified socialist (Communist) Germany would evolve over time.

Disarmament. All were distressed at his insistence that no progress could be made on disarmament until the German problem was settled and hardly encouraged at his tone about the Geneva conference. Khrushchev said,

we will not be "the first to withdraw" -- we can send representatives of lower rank, and "we can write their speeches in the Kremlin and simply forward them";
the disarmament talks at Geneva are completely useless without a peace treaty recognizing both East and West Germany.

Southeast Asia. Lumping together the situations in Laos and South Vietnam, K. used the platforms provided by his hosts to talk about US "imperialist aggression." This does not square with his admonition to his counterparts in Peking, namely that they can expect no help from him if they embroil themselves and cause an all-out war in Southeast Asia. But such inconsistency is no cause for relaxation in the free world over the hot war in SEA.

While Khrushchev was talking about US aggression in SEA, his chief emissary was in Indonesia guaranteeing to supply President Sukarno with more military hardware with which to continue and intensify prosecuting his war against the Federation of Malaysia. The Soviets support this aggression on the flimsy charge that the Federation is neo-colonialist. Mikoyan stated the Soviet argument in Djakarta on July 3rd as follows:

"Malaysia is nothing but a form of neo-colonialism." The Soviet people "wholeheartedly support the Indonesian workers who are fighting against neo-colonialism, the concrete form of which is Malaysia. Destroy colonialism in all its forms!"

UN Peacekeeping Missions. Khrushchev's remarks to his Scandinavian hosts on UN peacekeeping missions may well be the key to the Soviet's subsequent proposal (July 6th) to the Japanese ministry on such a force. On June 30 in Oslo he said that, while he considered the UN "useful," he held "no brief for the peacekeeping mission." The proposal made to the Japanese and then circulated to other UN members can only be interpreted now as having been propaganda, first, to support the Kremlin's peace-image, and second to dissuade the General Assembly from rescinding the USSR's voting rights for refusal to pay its UN assessments [Article 19 of the Charter]. For the Soviet proposal contained at least two unacceptable points, namely: that the Security Council maintain exclusive control over peacekeeping missions, thus enabling the USSR to exercise its veto power and usurping the General Assembly's proper authority; and that no troops from the permanent Security Council members be used in such a force. Such a blanket prohibition is unrealistic in the event of need for substantial troops (e.g. Korea) and further, it leaves the USSR, unbound by ethics or agreements, free to use its troops where and when it pleases. At best, the Soviet proposal provides a basis for discussing the need for a UN peacekeeping force -- a situation which Soviet stands have all but precluded in recent times.