


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
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Briefly Noted

13 January 1964

Czech Communist Regime Claims Divine Sanction

A Czechoslovak theological lecturer told the 19th quadrennial Ecumenical Student Conference at Ohio University on 29 December that he believes Czechoslovakia came under Communist rule through divine intervention. This lecturer talks of the "deepening humanism in Marxist thinking" and suggests that Christians should seek to help rather than to undermine the Marxists in Czechoslovakia. He says, "We can strengthen them by our firmness and our faithfulness in our Christian beliefs, by our solidarity, by our understanding and by our love." The speaker is one Rev. Milan OPOCENSKY, a professor of Protestant Theology at Comenius Theological Seminary in Prague. New York Times of 31 Dec 63; Press Comment7

Professor Opocensky called the Communist seizure of power in 1948 "The logical consequence of a long historical process which is certainly rooted in the strong and well organized working class movement, and which is undoubtedly connected with the epoch of national rebirth, of the Counter-Reformation, of the unity of the Czech Brethren, and of the Hussite Revolution of the 15th century. --- I am convinced that the Socialist line of 1948 means an organic step in the history of my country, that it was not a deviation from the so-called normal course of history and that it did not wreck God's plans."

Czechoslovakia has been for years the center for manipulating Churches and religious lay groups in all Soviet Satellites and in contacts with the free world. The Czechs send sizeable delegations to most international religious gatherings, such as those to assemblies of the World Council of Churches (WCC), headed by Dr. Josef L. HROMADKA, Dean of the Comenius Theological Seminary: in 1948 to Amsterdam; in 1954 to Evanston, Illinois where he clashed in open debate with the late John Foster Dulles; and in 1961 to the third, in New Delhi. One of Dr. Hromadka's assistants, the aforementioned Opocensky, concentrates on youth activities and was the Czech "youth delegate" at the New Delhi conference. He participated in the one-week youth assembly which preceded the New Delhi Congress and lived in the international youth camp. Opocensky was the main author of the document which had been drafted in Prague on "Peace and Youth." Finally, the "All Christian Peace Conference" in Prague in 1961 stressed the importance of approaching the youth of the churches in the West and neutral countries "to infiltrate from inside."

We are not opposed to contacts between the Church groups in the Bloc and those in the Free World per se. However, we expose known Communists (Bloc regimes allow only the politically reliable to travel repeatedly to the Free World), masquerading as Churchmen, and misusing naive religious groups to help

(Briefly Noted Cont.)

promote Communist peace campaigns, "peaceful co-existence," etc. We say that, while Free World religious conferences can afford a hearing and even an air of respectability (New York Times reporting) for such themes as "Marxist humanism," Marx's original concepts and the methods of Communist rule are obviously incompatible.


We draw attention to Communist infiltration and misuse of Free World religious forums pointing out that arguments coming from such persons are primarily political and not bona fide religious concerns.

#### Jane's On Space

A New York Times story of 18 December 1963 (Press Comment 19 December 1963) noted that in the latest issue of Jane's All the World's Aircraft, published in London, the editor judged that the Soviets had lagged in air and space in 1963. John W.R. Taylor, the editor of the authoritative, non-governmental reference book, called attention to reported deficiencies in Soviet aircraft delivered to India and Ghana, and commented that in terms of day-to-day aviation service, "the Soviet picture looks less self-assured than it did at the end of 1962." In the field of space, Taylor pointed out that the Soviet "space-twin" flights of Valeriy F. Bykovsky and Valentina V. Tereshkova apparently failed to achieve all their objectives (which may have included a space rendezvous), and that the Soviets lost contact with their Mars probe before it could provide information about that planet. Gordon Cooper's 22-orbit flight, on the other hand, exceeded its original objectives, and the Mariner-2 probe to Venus produced valuable information. Taylor added that when the US Saturn booster becomes operational in 1964-1965, American activities in space may become "more adventurous": "the suggestion that America and the Soviet Union should work together on major projects like lunar exploration is both timely and sensible now that the prospective partners are attaining a measure of equality."

The Times story also noted that Jane's had one new Soviet plane to report: a Yakovlev high-altitude reconnaissance plane (NATO code name: Mandrake) which is the Soviet counterpart of the U-2.

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Bertrand Russell Returns Medal Bestowed By East German Peace Committee

Earl Russell, British pacifist and leading world figure in left-wing "peace" campaigns, announced on 7 January that he is returning a medal awarded to him by the East German affiliate of the World Peace Council (WPC) because Heinz Brandt, a socialist and democrat, remains a political prisoner in East Germany. Russell said that he had been appealing privately to the East German regime on Brandt's behalf for two years but is "abandoning private appeals, for they have come to nothing." "I wish to urge public protest against the intolerable condition of Brandt's imprisonment."

A veteran Communist, Brandt spent 11 years in Nazi concentration camps. After 1945, he worked in the CP propaganda department in East Berlin. He was purged for "deviationism" in 1954. In 1958, the Brandt family, which included three small children, fled to West Germany. Brandt became editor of a West German trade union paper. He flew to West Berlin in June 1961 to cover a congress for his paper but vanished. A week later the East German news agency ADN announced that he had been arrested as a Western agent. Following a secret trial by the East German Supreme Court, a 13-year prison sentence was announced on May 10, 1962.

Brandt's disappearance (he apparently was kidnapped from West Berlin) and sentence were protested in many resolutions and appeals, especially on the part of international trade union organizations -- and indeed the protests that followed his disappearance may have prevented the meting out of the death sentence. Bertrand Russell's protest action is of special significance: as a world-renowned philosopher and "peace partisan" he often condemns Western policies but rarely finds fault with conditions in or actions of the Communist countries, be it in the area of peace and disarmament, or in other fields.

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- 1 Feb UNGA adopts resolution charging Chinese Communist aggression in Korea, 1951.
- 14 Feb USSR and CPE sign treaty of alliance repudiating Soviet-Nationalist Treaty (14 August 1945), 1950.
- 24 Feb Treaty of III (or St. Petersburg) returning most of Sinkiang territory to China but granting portion to Russia, 1881.
- 25 Feb Khrushchev denounces Stalin in secret speech at CPSU 20th Congress, 14-25 Feb. 1956.
- 25 Feb Soviets imprison leader of Smallholders Party, Bela Kovacs, in campaign to destroy major anti-Communist opposition, Hung. 1947.
- 26 Feb Inter'l Conf. of Youth and Students for Disarmament, Peace, and National Independence (WFDY sponsored), Florence, Italy, scheduled for 26 Feb-1 Mar, 1964.
- 27 Feb Mao Tse-tung delivers "Hundred Flowers" speech, 1957.
- 2 Mar "Trial of the 21" charging attempt to restore capitalism by Bukharin, Rykov and Yagoda et al, (18 sentenced to death) 2-13 March 1938.
- 5 Mar Joseph Stalin dies (born 21 Dec 1879), 1953.
- 8 Mar Russia -- February Revolution (Julian Cal. 23 Feb-2 Mar) 8-15 March 1917.
- 9 Mar Latin American Youth Congress (Communist sponsored) Santiago, Chile, scheduled for 9-13 March.
- 13 Mar Chinese Communist attempt to arrest Tibetan Dalai Lama, 1959.
- 14 Mar Karl Marx dies (born 5 May 1818), 1883.
- 18 Mar Kronstadt Uprising crushed (started 23 Feb), 1921.
- 1 Ap Berlin Blockade begins, 1948.
- 2 Ap Red Army enters Rumania, disclaims desire acquire territory or change Rumania's social structure, 1948.
- 4 Ap North Atlantic Treaty signed in response to Soviet imperialism in Europe, 1949.
- 11 Ap "Day of Remembrance" - Liberation from Fascism, celebrated annually by Commie resistance fighters, FIR.
- 17 Ap Nikita Khrushchev born 70 years ago, 1894.

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## PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#19

7 December 1963-3 January 1964

CommentaryPrincipal Developments:

1. The initiative and apparent gains throughout this period were almost entirely with the Chinese in their continuing battle with the Soviets. The Chinese published two major polemical tracts of their own and republished extensively from the organs of sympathizers: their belligerence was further emphasized by the fact that one of the two Chinese texts and one of those by a sympathizer were resurrected from previously unpublished materials and now brandished more than a month after the Soviets suspended their attacks and resumed their pleas for an end to open polemics. More important, perhaps, the Chinese crossed swords with the Soviets in two concrete political actions aimed particularly at the Afro-Asian peoples.

2. The first heavy Chinese attack was the sixth in their long series of joint articles pegged to the 14 July CPSU open letter, entitled "Peaceful Coexistence -- Two Diametrically Opposed Policies" (Chrono, Dec 11/12). This hard, bitter, 13,000-word diatribe draws selectively from Marx and Lenin to provide the basis for Mao's very militant definition of "peaceful coexistence," even going so far as to quote the famous Lenin prediction that "a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable," which has been cited so often in the past by anti-Communist crusaders. The Chinese charge that "in manufacturing the lie that China opposes peaceful coexistence, the leaders of the CPSU are prompted by ulterior motives," and scream that "the heart and soul" of Soviet peaceful coexistence is Soviet-U.S. collaboration for domination of the world." The second of the Chinese blasts was the text of an 18,000-word speech by Chou Yang, Deputy Director of the Party's Propaganda Department, which had been delivered 26 October at a conference of the Academy of Science, on the subject: "The Fighting Task Confronting Workers in Philosophy and the Social Sciences." This "inside" discourse on "how to carry on the struggle against revisionism on the academic front" is particularly noteworthy because it openly encourages dissidents in countries where the Party leadership is pro-Soviet to establish new pro-Chinese parties (See Chrono, Dec. 27). On the eve of the joint article, the Chinese press published another "round-up report of continuing Soviet attacks on China" (People's Daily used the shrill headline: "CPSU Leadership Continues Its Two-Faced Tactics"), though the few examples described were vaguely referenced or obscure.

3. Most important of the political actions was the tour of Chou En-lai and Chen Yi to Africa (and Albania) described in the Chronology (December 14 and continuing). In addition to the overt information on this trip, we have received a reliable secret report that in his private conversations with UAR's Nasser at least, Chou spent most of his time criticizing Soviet policy toward the underdeveloped nations in much the same terms that Communists have always used to castigate the U.S. imperialists. The other political action was the deliberate and successful Chinese effort to cut the ground from under the Soviet delegation at the U.N. on its opposition to increased representation for the newly admitted Afro-Asian countries in the principal UN organs (Chronology, December 10-21).

4. Overt Soviet response to the Chinese onslaught was limited to efforts to play it down and a few mild defensive moves, such as those described in our account of the Chou tour and the U.N. affair. There has been speculation that Khrushchev will tour Africa and Asia in the near future to restore the Soviet image, but no firm plans have been announced. Clandestinely, it is reported that the CPSU sent a long letter to the CCP proposing conditions for closing the rift, ceasing open polemics, reviving economic cooperation, etc., and circulated copies to certain other parties requesting their support.

5. Meanwhile, evidence of further Chinese gains in the other countries continues. Most important was the political report by Indonesian CP Chairman Aidit who openly acknowledged "differences of opinion between the PKI and the CPSU," put the PKI on the Chinese side in such disputes, and promised to establish relations with the pro-Chinese dissident factions split from other Soviet-aligned parties throughout the world (Chrono, Dec. 23). Classified reports have described the revival of the pro-Chinese elements in the Indian CP and further progress of the pro-Chinese dissidents in Belgium. The pro-Chinese "wing" of the Austrian CP has launched a primitive new mimeographed publication (Chrono, Dec. 8), though there is no info as to the strength and composition of the "wing."

6. The Rumanians have taken further steps to assert their independence, replacing the Rumanian edition of Moscow's weekly New Times with their own "East-West balanced" weekly and agreeing to supply oil to China and wheat to Albania, both for the first time. (Chrono, Dec. 27-30).


Significance:

In the face of the continuous, unrelenting Chinese attack and apparent gains throughout the month, the Soviets have limited themselves overtly to patient but undoubtedly face-losing efforts to ignore or play down the conflict and to a few mild counter-actions. We can not be sure whether




the Soviets have really been unable to meet the Chinese onslaught more effectively -- whether due to preoccupation with internal problems, the December plenum and attendant concentration on economic matters, or to growing difficulties in manipulating the Communist movement, or both -- or whether it is their intent to give the Chinese more rope with which to hang themselves publicly. In any case, the evidence seems to forecast a deepening and broadening of the conflict in the coming months, with both protagonists concentrating more than ever on the underdeveloped areas, and with more and more individuals in the movement being forced to an agonizing reappraisal and to declare themselves on one side or the other.

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## CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#19

7 December 1963-3 January 1964

December 7 - Articles on the 3rd anniversary of the Moscow 81-party statement in the Soviet Izvestiya and Kommunist (see also Pravda lead editorial on Dec. 6) interpret the Moscow agreements as supporting the Soviet line, without criticizing, or even mentioning, the conflicting Chinese interpretation. Izvestiya does mention public polemics which are "an inadmissible luxury for world revolutionary forces," proposing to "let time 'work' by stopping the polemics in the press on disputed questions."

December 8 - A London Observer article by Lajos Lederer describes the establishment of an underground Communist 'information bureau' similar in character to the old Cominform, based on the Albanian Legation in Vienna, paid for by China and directed against the Soviet Union. He also refers to "a split in the Austrian CP, where "a pro-Chinese wing has developed among the rank and file," which has started a new publication, Die Rote Fahne (The Red Flag), which calls itself the "organ of the anti-revisionists of Austria" and attacks Moscow sharply.

December 10 - Reviewing the Warsaw World Peace Council meeting (Chrono, Nov. 28-Dec.2) in the Slovak central Party organ Bratislava Pravda, Jaroslav Brabec describes "the strongly destructive attitude of the Chinese delegation (which) proved very harmful to the world peace movement." He acknowledges "the diversity of conditions in the struggle for peace (which) was aptly expressed by Italian Senator Spano, who said: 'Nowadays things are not either black or white: they are grey, too.' ... And this was also the best answer to the black-and-white stand of the Chinese delegation which has no room in the present complicated world, and, under the roof of an organization such as the World Peace Council, no hope of success at all."

December 10-21 - The Sino-Soviet struggle for influence in Africa and Asia carried over into the United Nations, precipitated by a resolution to increase seats in Security Council and ECOSOC to provide enlarged representation from these continents. Soviet representative Fedorenko on the 10th opposed action until "the restoration of China's legitimate rights," causing outspoken dismay among the A-A delegations. On the 12th, a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement (given top front-page play in all Chinese press on the 13th) brands Fedorenko's statement as "completely at variance with the position of the Chinese Government." "What is especially regretted, the Soviet representative has used this as a pretext for opposing the proposals for a fair and reasonable share of seats in the principal U.N. organs for the Asian and African countries." (The Chinese did express an opinion that redistribution of seats rather than enlargement would be "simpler and easier to carry out in the present circumstances," but they clearly insisted on keeping this question separate from that of "restoring China's legitimate rights.") Peking's

proxy in the U.N., Albanian delegate Halim Budo, followed up by attacking the Soviet position in the General Assembly: "The Soviet representative not only has misinformed the G.A., but has completely distorted the position of the People's Republic of China." After a mild Soviet response that they indeed spoke for China, the Albanian returned to the floor to reassert that the Soviets were not telling the truth.

The resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority on the 17th, with only the USSR and other members of the Soviet Bloc, Cuba and France opposing (and the U.S. and U.K. abstaining). On the 18th, a People's Daily editorial said:

"Even after the (Chinese) spokesman on 12 December gave a comprehensive and clear-cut explanation of the position of the Chinese Government, he (the Soviet delegate) still stuck to his misrepresentation of the Chinese position .... This shows that the Soviet delegate was maneuvering for ulterior motives.... The Soviet Union has no justification whatever for pretending ignorance.... Anyone who tries to create obstacles to the implementation of the resolution under any pretext will only reveal his true features and meet with opposition from the Asian and African countries and all the people upholding justice."

The USSR Foreign Ministry on the 21st issued a statement which ignores the CPR Foreign Ministry statement of the 12th and refers only to selected passages from the People's Daily editorial of the 18th. "If a statement of this sort ... were to have been made by the CPR Government during discussions on the above-mentioned question by the G.A., then in this case the Soviet Union would obviously have voted for the resolution ...." It concludes by proposing "to hold new consultations."

December 11 - All Peking papers carry another round-up report to prove that "the Soviet Union is continuing to fill its press with attack after attack on China at the same time as it is trumpeting its call 'to put an end to open polemics.'" People's Daily headlines the report "CPSU Leadership Continues Its Two-Faced Tactics," with sub-titles like: "In the Half Month After Khrushchev's Latest Suggestion To End Open Polemics Soviet Papers, National and Local, Published 38 Anti-Chinese Editorials, Articles and Material in Other Forms. Sixty-five More Editorials and Articles Attacking Chinese Leaders and Vilifying the CCP Were Printed in National and Local Journals Published in the Period From the End Of October to the Latter Part of November ...." The few examples cited, however, are largely vaguely referenced or obscure. People's Daily on same date resurrects and reprints -- under the heading "V.G. Wilcox Says CPSU Leadership Takes Revisionist Path" -- the text of a 9 September address by the New Zealand CP boss to students of the Allarcham Academy of Social Sciences in Djakarta.

December 11-12 - The sixth in the long series of joint Chinese People's Daily/Red Flag articles replying to the 14 July CPSU open letter is released on the 11th and featured in all Chinese papers on the 12th: it is another harsh, uncompromising, 13,000-word polemic entitled "Peaceful Coexistence -- Two Diametrically Opposed Policies."

Amplifying their previous statements, the Chinese in the first 3,000 words weave selected quotations from Lenin and Stalin into a definition of "positive" peaceful coexistence to support the CCP position. The militant Chinese views are then outlined in the next 1500 words, with pertinent quotes from Mao. The remainder of the article consists largely of a laborious dissection and denunciation of "the general line of 'peaceful coexistence' of the CPSU leaders" as "class capitulation," "social pacifism," and "brazen betrayal of Marxism-Leninism."

The Chinese treat the foreign policy of a socialist country in three aspects -- relations with countries having different social systems; between socialist countries; and between classes -- and emphasize that "Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence" applies only to the first. They reproduce the Lenin observation which is so often cited by anti-Communists on this subject:

"... the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And, before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable."

Railing at the Soviets for betraying their duties toward socialist states the Chinese contrast their own actions:

"we unreservedly perform our proletarian internationalist duty. We actively support the national liberation movements of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the working class movements of Western Europe, North America and Australia, and the people's revolutionary struggles, and the people's struggles against the imperialist policies of aggression and for world peace."

Among the "great achievements of the CCP and the Chinese Government in upholding Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence," the Chinese list the treaties of friendship, etc., concluded over the last 10 years with such an impressive list of progressive powers as "Yemen, Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, Guinea, Cambodia, Indonesia and Ghana." "At the same time, we have waged the appropriate and necessary struggles against countries, such as India, which have violated or wrecked the five principles (of Peaceful Coexistence, which 'the Chinese Government initiated in 1954')."

Nearing the end, the Chinese finally blurt out the true nature of their hurt: "The heart and soul of the general line of peaceful coexistence pursued by the leaders of the CPSU is Soviet-U.S. collaboration for the domination of the world." They ask rhetorically if "more than a hundred countries and over 3 billion people" must "submit to the manipulations of the two 'giants.'" "Isn't this arrogant nonsense of yours an expression of great-power chauvinism and power politics pure and simple?"

The Chinese observe bitterly: "All that the leaders of the CPSU have received from the U.S. imperialists is humiliation, again humiliation, always humiliation."

In the final section, they ask

"Leading comrades of the CPSU, just think the matter over soberly. Can U.S. imperialism be depended upon when a storm breaks in the world? No! ... He who betrays the people of the socialist camp and the world and dreams of dominating the globe by colluding with U.S. imperialism is bound to end up badly.... It is not yet too late for the leaders of the CPSU to rein in at the brink...."

December 14 and continuing - A new Chinese bid for influence in Africa started with the arrival of Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi in Cairo to begin a long series of visits to various African countries (and Albania). In the UAR, where his reception was described as coolly cordial, Chou conducted himself with bland diplomacy in his public remarks, acknowledging, in response to questions from correspondents, "serious differences with the leaders of the CPSU on questions of principle of Marxism and Leninism" but emphasizing their common socialist alignment and their mutual assistance treaty. ✓NCNA✓ Moscow, publicizing the visit of a top-level Algerian delegation (accompanied by a new Soviet aid commitment to Algeria), made no direct comment on the Chou odyssey, but on the 20th, the day before Chou's arrival in Algeria, the local newspapers Alger Republicain and Le Peuple featured a long (9,000 words) Khrushchev "interview" (also given to the Ghanaian Times and Botataung of Burma, and published in Izvestiya on the 21st) obviously timed to steal Chou's thunder. It is primarily a reiteration of the Soviet line as the most effective kind of anti-imperialism, and it faces up to the Chinese challenge, without mentioning them by name.

December 16 - The Bulgarian radio describes an article in No. 12 of the organ Novo Vreme by Yaroslav Radek which rejects various distortions of Marxism-Leninism on the development of the socialist state, and analyzes the changes necessary in the transformation of the dictatorship of the proletariat into a people's socialist state.

December 21 - The Albanian Zeri I Popullit used the 84th anniversary of Stalin's birth for another attack on Khrushchev.

December 23 - At the opening of the Indonesian CP's "Second CC Plenum -- Seventh National Congress" in Djakarta, Chairman Aidit delivered an 80-page political report which (according to the 7,000-word NCNA summary published in Peking People's Daily 31 December) comprehensively defines PKI policies in terms attuned with Peking, acknowledges "differences of opinion between the PKI and the CPSU," and promises to establish relations with dissident factions split from "parties under the control of revisionists."

Aidit says, "It is quite out of the question for the people of southeast Asia, to accept the idea that such leaders /of imperialist countries like the U.S./ are "reasonable" and "peace-loving." Rejecting the idea that the struggle for national independence cannot succeed without help of the socialist countries, Aidit says that "this idea is deliberately being disseminated so that Communists struggling for national independence will not dare to express opinions differing from those of certain socialist countries because the result would be that their own country would be deprived of assistance."

Aidit vigorously deplores the test-ban treaty, which, among other negative results, "has paralyzed the world peace movement." Without naming the CPSU, he denounces the Soviet intent to develop the abundance necessary for the achievement of Communism in the USSR while other countries lag far behind.

Under the heading "The International Communist Movement," Aidit supports "independence and equal rights" for all parties, "Indonesianization of Marxism-Leninism" for the PKI, and bilateral preparations for an international meeting, stating:

"In a number of countries where the parties are under the control of revisionists, many Marxist-Leninists have been expelled and have already set up Marxist-Leninist circles or new Communist parties; the PKI will establish relations with them."

And in the following paragraph he names the CPSU as on the other side:

"The independent attitude adopted by the PKI has been the cause of great consternation among the reactionaries. They previously slandered the PKI for so-called "trailing behind others," and now in every case of a difference of opinion between the PKI and the CPSU (for example, on the question

of Yugoslavia, the Moscow tripartite agreement, etc.), they strive to get the PKI to alter its stand."

December 27 - Peking People's Daily publishes the full text (and other papers carry summaries) of an 18,000-word 26 October 1963 speech, "The Fighting Task Confronting Workers in Philosophy and the Social Sciences," by Chou Yang, Vice Director of the Propaganda Department of the CC/CCP, at the "fourth enlarged conference of the committee of the Department of Philosophy and Social Science of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. It is a high-level, thorough, hard, "inside" discourse on the question which Yang poses at the outset: "How should we carry on the struggle against modern revisionism on the academic front?" Of particular interest is a passage in which he describes and predicts the shift from support of the CPSU to the Chinese line in international Communism.

"In a number of countries, the vanguard of the proletariat, formerly standing at the forefront of the struggle, is now corroded by modern revisionism. ... In Europe, North America and Australia,... they are expelling true Marxist-Leninists from the party and taking other measures to create splits. Under these circumstances, political parties genuinely representing the revolutionary proletariat are bound to appear on these continents. Such a process is also taking place among some of the Communists in Latin America and Asia.... In short, ... where there is revisionism, there will be Marxism-Leninism fighting against it; and where expulsion of Marxist-Leninists from the party and other measures are taken to create splits, new outstanding Marxist-Leninists and strong revolutionary parties are bound to emerge."

Discussing "how the modern revisionists have tampered with the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism in its main aspects, philosophy, the theory of socialism and Communism, and political economy," Chou attributes their errors to their worship of the American brand of pragmatist philosophy." They "look down on theory" and "regard the basic theories of Marxism-Leninism not as truths which must be adhered to, but as expedient tools and as apologetics which they can wilfully concoct and revise in order to serve their immediate interests."

After denouncing the revisionists in turn for equating Communism with humanism, for "flagrantly abolishing" the dictatorship of the proletariat and "energetically advertizing" the "state of the whole people" as a new invention, for their infatuation with "material incentives" and "quest for profit" as the motive force in the growth of socialist production, and for their economic imperialism under the signboard of "international socialist division of labor," Chou concludes his refutation of revisionist ideology and demands that



"Revolutionary workers in philosophy and social science should come forward to smash the attacks of modern revisionism and in the course of this struggle further develop Marxist-Leninist theory in all spheres of learning,"

December 27-30 - Several press reports indicate further assertion of independence by the Rumanians. The Washington Post' reports that the Rumanian edition of Moscow's New Times has been terminated with the launching of Rumania's own weekly equivalent, Lumea (The World), which is described as a professional-looking Journal including articles from various world capitals, East and West. A December issue contained an interview with Paul-Henri Spaak and reprinted columns of Walter Lippmann, Drew Pearson and an unnamed Soviet writer. The tone is said to be "polite throughout, by Communist standards." And the new Rumanian-Chinese trade agreement signed on the 27th provided, for the first time, for Rumanian petroleum to China; likewise, the Rumanian-Albanian agreement signed on the 30th included, for the first time, Rumanian wheat to that vociferous Chinese satellite.

December 29 - The Tokyo English-language Mainichi Daily News reports the publication of a National Police Agency pamphlet entitled Prospect and Retrospect on developments in the Japanese left over the past year. It says that "the ideological dispute between Peking and Moscow greatly affected the confrontation between the Communists and Socialists, with the Soviet Union supporting the Socialist policy while Communist China backed the Communists." However, "in spite of the handicap due to the ideological confrontation with the Socialist Party and the ideological differences among Party members themselves as the result of the Sino-Soviet split," the JCP made large gains during the year, in membership, in circulation of Party organs and in votes in the recent election, figures for which are given.

December 31-January 1 - The exchanges of greetings between the Soviet and Chinese leaders on the occasions of Mao's 70th birthday and the New Year followed a pattern of correct cordiality. The People's Daily New Year editorial, however, reflected hostility forward the USSR as well as the USA and said that the attempts of the modern revisionists to "isolate" China had gone "bankrupt. Khrushchev's message to the heads of states of all countries of the world dated 31 December proposing a treaty on the renunciation of the use of force for the solution of territorial disputes and questions of frontiers contains passages, such as his reference to "Border conflicts existing between some states of Asia" and his reference to Taiwan, which directly impinge on Chinese interests.

January 2 - Khrushchev arrived in Warsaw unexpectedly for a "hunting" visit with Gomulka which was seen by most observers as intended largely to discuss problems in international Communism (Gomulka has long been reported as seeing a special mission for himself in helping to bridge the Sino-Soviet rift).

January 3 - Preliminary reports indicate that the Sino-Soviet dispute figured loudly in the opening session of the Swedish CP's 20th Congress which opened in Stockholm this date, -- with the proceedings open to the public for the first time. A CPSU delegation headed by CC Secretary Boris Ponomarev is attending.

725. Against Complacency and Delusions In The Cold War

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**BACKGROUND: Pitfalls of Peaceful Coexistence.** In little more than one year, the Soviet Union has retreated from a nuclear confrontation of its own making (Cuban missile crisis, October 1962); it has openly admitted that nuclear war would ruin Communism just as much as "imperialism" (CPSU Open Letter, 14 July 1963) -- an admission which had contributed to Malenkov's downfall only 6 years earlier; it has signed a limited nuclear test ban treaty -- proposed by the West for the last two years but previously rejected by Moscow (6 August 1963); and it has proclaimed a turn towards increased food and consumers goods production, even at the cost of a slight reduction in military expenses and heavy industry investments (CPSU Plenum, 9-13 December 1963). The latter decisions were preceded by blunt Soviet admissions of crop failures and food shortages and by the start of huge purchases of wheat and other grains in the West.

**Consequences of the Sino-Soviet Rift.** During the past year, relations between Moscow and Peking have continued to deteriorate in virtually every direction -- ideological, diplomatic, economic, military (See: Propagandist's Guide to Communist Dissensions -- in every issue of the BPG since April, 1963; plus numerous separate guidances and staff studies). Moscow's interpretation of peaceful co-existence, more recently focused upon the test ban treaty (violently rejected by Peking), has given certain Western observers the impression that the free world should side with the Soviets against bellicose China, while others, on the contrary, saw in Peking's isolation from most of the Communist Bloc an opportunity to develop trade -- or even diplomatic -- relations with Peking. Not only uncommitted nations increasingly extend diplomatic recognition to Communist China (Chou En-lai's current trip through Africa is likely to add to their number further: note invitation by pro-Western Tunisia), but also countries who were hitherto considered staunch allies of the West, such as Pakistan, have come markedly closer to Peking.

**Is World Communism Weakening?** Despite the negative effects of the Sino-Soviet schism, serious economic (especially agrarian) difficulties and other knotty problems, there is no reason to assume that the global strength of Communism has diminished during 1963 or that its threat to the free world has been reduced. On the contrary, we note that

- a. the Italian Communists, even though now isolated from their one-time Socialist allies, have scored tangible successes in the last general elections;

(725. Continued)

- b. the chances of the French Communists to become the king-pin in an anti-DeGaulle popular front, though still doubtful, have unquestionably improved;
- c. the Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam have recovered from the initial setbacks suffered after more active US military support had started and have made significant progress, both militarily and politically;
- d. Indonesia's increasingly aggressive operations against Malaysia cannot but help the Communist cause throughout the area, just as -- on a smaller scale -- developments in Burma and Cambodia;
- e. Castro remains firmly in the saddle, despite serious economic difficulties and despite his dilemma between his military and economic dependency upon Moscow and his ideological affinity to Peking;
- f. a near-Communist regime is developing in British-Guiana;
- g. In recent Japanese elections, the JCP was the only party to increase its seats in the Diet, its percent of the total vote, and its absolute number of votes.

World Communism, on the whole, is thus holding its own and even scoring successes along secondary, yet still highly important sectors of the Cold War fronts.

Communist Disunity Does Not Mean Weakness. World Communism is not now a monolithic organization. Despite Soviet or Chinese wishes, the Communists of the world will probably never again follow a single leader, as all but the Trotskyites once followed Stalin. But the Sino-Soviet conflict leaves the local vitality of Communism as strong as (if not stronger than) ever.

Despite quarrels between parties and factions, Communists are still disposed in a crisis to join forces against "the class enemy" or "the imperialists." Also, rival factions compete to see who can do most harm to the "capitalists." While factions will probably continue, they will doubtless join in various alliances and combinations to meet particular conditions. Various types of mutual aid will also continue despite quarrels -- Mao's military vehicles could not move today were they not supplied with Soviet oil.

Aside from these qualifications, the main strength of Communism is not any single leader, but its organizational coherence and discipline. Marxism-Leninism applies military principles to politics. The Marxist-Leninist pushes constantly for positions of political power (e.g., in unions, parties, schools, armies, etc.), abandons hopeless attacks against strong resistance, exploits pockets of weakness, and tries to divide his enemies and defeat them separately. He covers his actions with a smoke-screen of pseudo-scientific dogma and demagogic slogans (e.g., "peaceful coexistence"). Communism is a tool by which ambitious and unscrupulous -- or sometimes misguided -- leaders can gain political power for themselves. The fact that there may be more than one such leader at a time does not much reduce the danger of Communism.

ACTION:

Policy. It is and remains the policy of our government to do everything possible to resolve conflicts between the free world and the Communist Bloc without resorting to war, let alone nuclear war. Our government will therefore continue and intensify its efforts to negotiate armament controls and other safeguards against war, to settle other controversial issues by agreements, whether through the U.N. or directly, always consulting our allies where their interests are involved, too. However, in view of the intention of Communists to rule throughout the world, whether by force or by stealth, such peaceful policy can be successful only if the free world


- a. remains united against Communism;
- b. maintains its military (nuclear and conventional) defenses on a level to discourage -- and, if unavoidable, to defeat -- Communist aggression;
- c. continues to fight Communist subversion, propaganda, infiltration and any other Communist maneuvers.

Argument. While the official spokesmen of our government engage in negotiations with the Communist governments, it is the prime task of our c o v e r t propaganda to support their efforts by strengthening unity, defenses and political alertness of the free world, as well as by promoting and encouraging disunity and disarray within the Communist parties of the world. For this purpose, we stress especially:


- a. Communists have not abandoned their plans to rule the world; on the contrary, all official documents keep stressing the "inevitability" of their global victory (see CPSU program 1961, declaration of leaders of 81 CPs 1960).

- b. Communist promises and treaties can be trusted only as long as their leaders remain convinced that they can neither overwhelm us militarily, nor play off one part of the free world against the others, nor deceive us into false "popular fronts" or other traps.
- c. The free world has no reason to believe Khrushchev's (or any other Communist leader's) word -- unless corroborated by solid facts. Khrushchev has changed his tactics repeatedly (and abruptly) in the ten years since Stalin's death and may do so again, either on his own initiative, under pressure from domestic opposition (the Soviet Generals, among others) or because of his contest against Peking. Moreover, he cannot commit his successor.
- d. Contacts with Communists, whether diplomatic, economic or social-cultural, can be undertaken without jeopardizing free-world interests only, if the non-Communist participants are fully aware of, and familiar with, the nature of Communism, if they insist on full equality and reciprocity (e.g. printing a joint statement in the free-world press only if it also appears in the Communist press; or the like) and if they refuse to be misused -- e.g. in a "peace campaign" against their own government or against their allies, and so forth.


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
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13 January 1964

726. Khrushchev Renews Peace Offensive

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BACKGROUND: See in particular Department of State circular telegram, Info Guide #1232 of 11 January 1964 "Khrushchev Letter on Territorial Disputes"

On 31 December 1963, Khrushchev, as Chief of the Soviet Government, addressed a lengthy note to all chiefs of governments and heads of states with whom the Soviet Union maintains diplomatic relations /Full text: New York Times, 4 January; reprinted in Press Comment, 6 January/. After complaining about the delays encountered in negotiations for general and complete disarmament (but promising to continue efforts in this direction), the note proposes a treaty to renounce war as a means to settle territorial disputes.

In a detailed discussion of past conflicts, Khrushchev significantly singles out from the numerous territorial disputes connected with World War One only the dispute over Alsace-Lorraine, between France and Germany, for specific mention. In line with standard Communist practice, differentiating between "just" and "unjust" wars, Khrushchev also puts different tags on different types of border disputes. He emphasizes, for instance:

"Taiwan's unlawful occupation by American troops should be terminated."

After a brief reference to West Irian (high pressure annexation of West New Guinea last year by Indonesia), the note makes the following general statements:

"The demands of the liberated states for the return of territories that are still under the colonial yoke or under foreign occupation are unquestionably j u s t."

.....

"The right of all colonial peoples to liberation, to freedom and independence, proclaimed in the United Nations declaration to give independence to colonial countries and peoples, cannot be questioned by anyone."

.....

".... Unification of Germany, Korea and Vietnam is associated to a certain degree with the territorial question .... the question of reunification should be settled by the peoples of these



countries and their governments themselves, without any interference or pressure from the outside and certainly without any military intervention -- occupation, as is actually the case, for instance, in South Korea and South Vietnam."

Having thus exempted virtually all cases of -- current or potential -- Communist insurrection, aggression or military intervention, Khrushchev turns against the "revenge-seekers" (i.e. West Germany, though not mentioned by name) and emphasizes that today even local conflicts "might quickly escalate to involve many other states." He then warns the peoples of Asia in strong, but nevertheless ambiguous terms:

"Is it not a fact that the border conflicts between some states of Asia even now have a most adverse effect on their life?"

(Does he refer to China's border attacks against India, or Indonesia's aggressive threats against Malaysia, or to the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir?) Similar remarks about Africa and Latin America follow, with only oblique references to the recent border clash between Algeria and Morocco and the long past wars of Paraguay.

The note concludes with a proposal for an international agreement, or treaty, between all states, not to resort to force to alter the existing state frontiers, not to invade or occupy other nations' territories, not to use differences in social and political systems or lack of diplomatic recognition as a pretext to violate the territorial integrity of other states and to settle all territorial disputes exclusively by peaceful means.

ACTION:

Analysis. This new Soviet peace offensive -- of which the note, summarized above, is obviously only a first, formal step -- can be traced to three main motivations in recent Soviet policy developments:

- a. Reality of Nuclear War. After having claimed for years that nuclear war would mean the end of imperialism, but the world-wide victory of Communism, the Soviets, in their 14 July, 1963, Open Letter, finally admitted that nuclear war would be as destructive for Communist nations as for others (see article WAR in "Issues and Slogans of the Sino-Soviet Conflict").
- b. Sino-Soviet Conflict. Among the many issues contested between Moscow and Peking, Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" line, as against Mao's far more openly bellicose stance, appears to have been most successful.

Especially after Khrushchev concluded the nuclear test ban treaty, Communist China, rejecting the treaty (together with Cuba, Albania and France), found itself in a far-from-splendid isolation.


- c. Budget Difficulties. The Soviet Union's continued agricultural stagnation, plus perennial consumer goods shortages, forced Khrushchev at the December Plenum of the Central Committee, CPSU, to announce an ambitious program, focused on raising food output through rapidly increased fertilizer production and on improving the consumer goods supply via accelerated investment in the chemical (especially plastics) industry. This makes reductions in other budget sectors, including military, space and heavy industry programs, highly probable.

Add to this the traditional Communist emphasis on peace propaganda as one of their most effective instruments in a world uneasily living under the shadow of nuclear war threats and the vital importance of the new peace moves for the ultimate fate of Khrushchev's policies -- and of Khrushchev himself -- becomes convincingly obvious.

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
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
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13 January 1964727 WE, d. Don't Hold Non-Communist Meetings In Bloc

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**BACKGROUND:** About 1,000 architects and 500 students of architecture -- the latter invited to a preliminary meeting-- attended the 7th Congress of the International Union of Architects (UIA), in Havana, Cuba, from 29 September to 3 October 1963. The UIA is a bona fide, non-political international organization composed of professional associations in over 40 countries.

The attendance was only about half of what the Cuban Government seemed to have expected; nevertheless, perhaps as many as 70 countries were represented with the USSR sending the largest delegation. No internationally famous architects participated and better-known ones failed to take an active part in the proceedings.

Indications are that the Congress failed to achieve the propaganda success expected by the Cuban Government because of a concerted campaign to have it cancelled, or failing that to harass and deflate it. While undoubtedly falling far short of Castro's propaganda expectations, Castro propaganda did permeate the Congress -- UIA President Sir Robert Matthew stated in the inaugural speech at the Assembly in Mexico City, which followed immediately, that the Havana meeting had been "too political."

In preparation for the Congress, the Cuban Government followed a pattern set by the governments of Communist countries on previous similar occasions. Downtown Havana took on a festive atmosphere, with banners, flowers, last-minute erection of new buildings, paving of streets, etc. Good food, consumer and luxury goods were available in and near hotels which housed delegates. Exhibits and a variety of cultural activities (musical groups, parades, special performances of the National Ballet of Cuba and of visiting Soviet opera and ballet groups, special tours, exhibitions of Cuban painting and sculpture and of books of art and architecture, etc.) were featured to impress the foreign visitors, but were generally not accessible to the ordinary Cuban.

The proceedings were well organized and carried off without disturbances or open dissensions. But, the Cuban Government, thwarting the efforts of the executive, and not the UIA, controlled the Congress. The organizational committee of the Cuban National Congress of Architects, headed by Osmani Cienfuegos, Minister of Public Works and an architect, relentlessly exploited the propaganda possibilities in a Congress staged under the theme "Architecture in Developing Countries" and featuring an international competition, sponsored by the Cuban Council of Culture, for the best design for a monument to the Cuban "victory" at the

Bay of Pigs -- i.e. the abortive anti-Castro invasion (first prize went to a Polish team).


Disregarding Sir Robert Matthews' opening admonition for delegates to concentrate on architectural matters and to abstain from politics, Cienfuegos immediately attacked the U.S. and Cuban President Dorticos maintained in his address that it was impossible to treat the matters of substance isolated from political considerations. In working sessions, the good-sized Cuban delegation aided by left-wing Latin American delegates made every effort to introduce political slants into discussions. The political aspects of the resolutions were carefully phrased, but their overall implication was that architectural progress in the underdeveloped countries can be achieved only where private enterprise is absent and where the people are in control of all the fundamental means of production.

The general report rendered at the closing of the Congress was quite political and not pertinent to the Congress in many respects: it stressed social progress in the Bloc countries, achievements of the Cuban revolution, and deplored conditions in most of the "unenlightened countries" of Latin America. The report came as a shock to the majority of delegates, and the Cuban Government may afterwards have felt that it overplayed its hand, inasmuch as the Cuban press excerpted the report rather than running it in full text. In the final Congress session, Castro delivered a somewhat restrained speech in which he was self-critical about Cuban experiences and shortcomings in housing development; but he also referred to the Cuban model for world progress and other subjects of no interest to foreign architects.

While the UIA Congress may have pleased the Communist and pro-Communist attendees, it is not judged as having left a positive impression on the non-Communist professionals. The above-described facades, which may have initially impressed the non-aligned professionals, were probably later obscured by the rather heavy Cuban political hand. The purely political aspects found acclamation only by Cuban officials, Cuban architects and students, and other pro-Communists. Reportedly, delegates including some Eastern European ones, commented for instance on the inappropriateness of the politically-tainted general report.

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723 WE, e, g Current Perspective on the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany (SOZG)\* 25X1C10b

**BACKGROUND:** Despite having held power for 13 years, Walter Ulbricht's Communist regime in the SOZG has been unable to achieve political or economic viability. During the same period the German Federal Republic's socio-economic recovery from war devastation has been strikingly superior to progress in the Soviet Zone. Pankow's comparative shortcomings have tried the patience of their Soviet protectors and have adversely affected the whole Soviet East European Bloc. Despite this the Soviets have kept Ulbricht in charge to serve Moscow's foremost need in the SOZG -- a reliable satrap who can exert tight control over the SOZG.

Undiminished Stalinism. Since Khrushchev triggered de-Stalinization, other Soviet Bloc states have managed to assert a degree of independence from Moscow and have experimented with various internal relaxations. Among this company Ulbricht has remained an unmitigated Stalinist. He is thoroughly experienced at the arts of walking the tight rope and executing the about face. He has been consistent only in his servility toward Soviet desires and his opportunistic resort to whatever ideological pretensions or abuses might cement his grasp of personal power. He has purged the leadership of his Socialist Unity Party (SED) of all but his personal vassals. This regime maintains itself in power through physical and psychological terror. Nor can Ulbricht, hated even within the SED as the symbol of misdeeds and failures since 1945, afford to allow any significant liberalization of the system, because every broadening of freedom of expression automatically tends to generate stronger pressure for his removal. In 1957 the regime reverted drastically to the kind of harsh policies which had sparked the 1953 uprising and the consequent "thaw" in the Soviet Zone. The Politburo and the Secretariat of the SED Central Committee are still dominated by the leaders who ended the "thaw" by staging a witch hunt against "revisionist" intellectuals; who brought about ever stricter isolation from the West and, in the Berlin conflict always wanted to go a step farther than Khrushchev; who in 1960 completed State takeover of the farms which had not already been collectivized. Since the

\* To native Germans who know their history and geography, the term "East Germany" has a very different geographical and political meaning than what is now the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany or "GDR". The use of the term "East Germany" for GDR is therefore an unnecessary irritant in propaganda directed at German audiences. Use of the term "SOZG" not only avoids this irritant, but helps counteract Pankow/Moscow efforts to depict the GDR as a sovereign state and helps reemphasize that the GDR survives as such primarily by virtue of occupation by 20 Soviet Army Divisions.



Sixth Party Congress in January 1963, Ulbricht's formal position has been further strengthened. In April the pseudo-parliament of the SOZG enacted a law degrading the authority of the Council of Ministers by relegating it to the status of "executive organ of the parliament and the State Council" -- the latter body being under Ulbricht's thumb. In addition to these organizational changes, the renewed accentuation of the cult of personality surrounding Ulbricht demonstrates that he retains the final decision in all key matters. Even if he were to disappear, his lieutenants -- notably Erich Honecker -- could be expected to use the same coercive methods to retain power.

Soviet Control Over the SOZG. In 1945 the Red Army entered the SOZG bringing a team made up of Ulbricht and other German Communists who had spent World War II in the USSR. This team was to establish a civil administration to govern under Soviet direction. Until 1949, when the Soviet Military Administration was abolished and the "German Democratic Republic" was established, the Soviets ran things themselves without pretense, accompanying this with extensive plundering of the East German economy (heavy reparations and dismantling of industrial plants, etc.). In 1949 a process commenced of ostensibly handing over some sovereignty to the SOZG (with a codicil that the Soviets would control Allied travel to West Berlin) was signed by the Soviets in 1955. Control over internal affairs is circumscribed by Ulbricht's dependence upon Soviet military, political and economic support. While he makes many domestic political decisions, he is fully responsive to Soviet basic policy, no matter who dominates the Kremlin -- a Stalin, a "collective," or a Khrushchev. Although there have been indications that the Pankow leaders heartily disliked some Kremlin tactics on the Berlin and Germany questions, the Ulbricht regime has never been permitted by the Soviets to exercise control over the basic aspects of foreign policy.

Ulbricht Regime's Economic Ineptitude. The SED has announced three major economic programs, supposed to lead to outstripping of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) within the "historically shortest time" and to prepare the group for eventual Communist takeover in the Federal Republic.

In January 1951 the first five-year plan (1951-55) was announced; its objective was to double the industrial output of 1937, the previous peak year in Germany. This plan foundered in the economic-political debacle following the second SED party conference in mid-1952. In an action paralleling the Rajk and Slansky purges in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Ulbricht purged all leading opponents. The flight of refugees to West Germany increased, along with a continued dearth of consumer goods, rising prices, bad working conditions and decrees ordering more work for less pay. Despite signs of a milder policy within the USSR following the death of Stalin, Ulbricht continued his hard program during this period of Kremlin confusion and uncertainty. Party

and popular pressure for relaxation mounted and for a short time it appeared as though Ulbricht would be displaced by Moscow. But the worker demonstrations, culminating in the uprising of 17 June 1953, brought immediate Soviet support for Ulbricht. Soviet tanks and troops were used to crush the revolt. An estimated 50,000 Germans were arrested during the following two weeks while the Soviets ruled under martial law. After the initial harsh repression Ulbricht shifted to relatively moderate programs (the "new course"). But damages which the economy of the SOEG had suffered because of the earlier forced socialization of industry and business, the forced establishment of farm collectives, the bureaucratic ineptitude and the mass flights to West Germany set the economy back by several years. Ulbricht nevertheless reverted to the same discredited policies as soon as he was able.

The second five-year plan (1956-60), which was overburdened with problems from the collapsed first five-year plan, was abandoned in 1958. Nevertheless by 1958, 69 percent of the farms had been brought under state control and 120,000 farmers had left their homes rather than be forced into collectives. Many of these joined the mass of refugees which fled the SOZG before the Berlin wall went up. Another 18 percent of the farms were brought under state control during 1959.

Then in 1958 there was the "Seven-year plan of peace, prosperity and happiness for the people" (1959-65). By April 1960 the collectivization of farms was complete and most remaining small businesses had been brought under state control. By the time the Berlin wall was built in August 1961, the total number of Germans who had fled the SOZG (since 1949) reached nearly 3 million, leaving about 17 million under Communist control in the SOEG, 65 percent of whom were either too old or too young to work. The Soviet Zone's aircraft industry had to be abandoned in 1961 owing to poor planning. The annual rate of industrial growth in the SOEG descended according to the regime's official figures, from 12.4 percent in 1959 to 8 percent in 1960, to 6.2 percent in 1961, and today is among the lowest in the Communist European bloc. The people in the SOZG are still forced to subsist with a standard of living below that to which they were accustomed before the war and far below that of West Germany (FYI the living standards of the SOEG are the highest in the bloc, including the Soviet Union). Soon after Khrushchev began applying pressure on Berlin in 1958, Ulbricht gave high priority to making the SOZG independent of Western industry, as an essential basis for his policy of "the two German States" between which even family links have been reduced to a minimum. A parallel objective has been the integration of the SOZG's industry into the Communist bloc economy. The latter program has been a monumental demonstration of how Communist methods can reduce one of Europe's most industrialized economies far below its capabilities. The Pankow regime was forced quietly to abandon its Seven-year Plan in 1961 and to put an end to forced-draft efforts to make itself "invulnerable" to western economic pressures. After this experience, Moscow itself had to prop up its Pankow

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satellite; in March of 1962 Russian aid equivalent to \$310 million was granted, roughly twice that which was granted in 1961. In February 1962 the SOZG tried to obtain from Bonn a long-term commodity credit of 2.75 billion marks. At the same time, new trade pacts or negotiations with West Germany on the part of Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria have been undermining efforts of the SOZG to isolate West Germany and West Berlin, and have tended instead to isolate the SOZG within the Soviet bloc.

The Ulbricht regime itself has finally had to admit that in practice it could not make good its promises of raising the standard of living and must act instead to raise prices and limit further wage increases. The populace has been bombarded with slogans such as, "Produce more in the same time at the same pay" in a drive to increase production by means of propaganda campaigns supplemented by political pressure.


Opportunistic Practices of Ulbricht Regime. Developments in 1959 had all the earmarks of an incipient Peking-Pankow axis, apparently reflecting the regime's fears that the USSR might seek to reach an agreement with the US at the expense of the SOZG. The emergence of strong Chicom leanings in the SED were reflected in its noisy eulogizing of the Chicom leadership and the "great leap forward." For example, a 1959 statement by Herman Matern, a member of the SED politburo, held that the Chinese people's communes were a "model" for all nations of the world. In the Chinese-Indian dispute, premier Grotewohl openly attacked Indian "aggression" against China -- and later had to issue a formal retraction. After a series of like incidents, the Soviets cracked down and in the spring of 1960, Ulbricht abruptly began to echo the Soviet opinion of the Chinese people's communes and referred to them as "unsuited for East Germany." Honecker delivered the Lenin-day speech bringing overall regime doctrine back into line with Moscow and on 17 June Neues Deutschland editorialized that, "We must reject the idea that the Chinese course of land reform via agricultural collectives to people's communes is also right for other countries." Although Ulbricht obviously shared Mao Tse-tung's annoyance that Khrushchev was apparently not disposed to force an early settlement with the West on the status of Berlin, he obediently fell in line with Khrushchev.

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729 FE, NE. Indian Politics and the Succession Problem

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**BACKGROUND:** Continuing successful economic and political development in India is immensely important to US policy objectives. India's example for developing countries everywhere will affect many courses of action and relationships among them. Afro-Asian reaction to India's plight following the 1962 Communist Chinese invasion revealed India's loss of stature among the developing countries; serious internal disturbances in India would intensify this trend.

A strong, unified government is essential if India is to overcome her chronic problems of population "explosion," poverty, religious, ethnic and linguistic frictions, and to deal with an aggressive, expanding Communist China. Economic progress is below that of the first years of independence and short of the goals set by the Third Five-Year Plan (1961-1966). For India's future political stability and continuing commitment to democratic institutions, agricultural and industrial growth must be stepped up. As the Indian's life improves, political strength will increase whether or not Nehru remains as Prime Minister.

The Congress Party must be on guard to maintain the strength and unity necessary to guarantee an easy transition to a new government if that should be required in the near future.

For a resume of Congress Party strength, weaknesses and leadership, see the unclassified attachment of the same title. For additional material, see:

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"Common Sense About India," K.M. Panikkar, Macmillan, 1960

"After Nehru, Who?", Welles Hangen, Harcourt, 1963

"India, a World in Transition," Beatrice P. Lamb, Praeger, 1963

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**BACKGROUND:** See referenced items in following issues of Press Comment:

- December 9, "The Red Split Splinters," page 2.
- December 3, "Asia Reds Find Peking More Cozy," page 1.
- November 21, "Chinese Policy in Southeast Asia," page 1.
- November 6, "Workers of What Color," page 1.
- October 17, "Chinese Ambitions in Asia," page 1.

Since the Sino-Soviet split broke into the open and particularly since the 1960 Moscow Conference of 81 Communist and Workers Parties, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been maneuvering among the Communist Parties of the world for support of its position. Apart from Albania, only in the Asian area has this effort paid off in really overt support, and even there the Chinese position did not win immediate praise. In the first place the split was not in the interests of the Asian parties, if for no other reason than that they were reluctant to face the difficult task of choosing sides. Making a choice between Moscow and Peking might come to mean cutting themselves off from one or the other, but it meant also an agonizing internal party squabble: leaders as well as the membership of the parties were not in agreement on which side to back. Powerful individuals and factions in virtually all of them still disagree on the future orientation of their parties in which the pro-Soviet faction tends to be led by the older, Moscow-trained and internationalist-minded leaders. Asian parties on the whole, however, feel that they have little to lose and much to gain by adopting some variation of the more revolutionary Peking line. Today, the CCP is the leader of a regional bloc embracing the parties of Asia east of India (pro-Soviet CP) and Ceylon (Communist orthodox and Trotskyite parties). All of these parties except the Australian, are oriented to Peking.

While all of the Asian parties have their own specific and unique reasons for having adopted pro-Chinese positions, they hold certain reasons in common. Some of these are geographic and ethnic factors; others originate in the feeling of shared or similar problems of Communist development. Chinese experience is valued by Communists primarily concerned with questions of revolutionary power in predominantly agricultural societies. The Chinese have also successfully exploited and aggrandized their own image as a country victimized by colonialism and imperialism. On these two grounds, the Chinese have succeeded in presenting themselves to much of Asia as the most valid model for transforming society. The Chinese Communists have supplemented their posture as the true arch-revolutionaries by their stance as the defender of the exploited "colored" peoples of the world and as their main ally against the White races of Europe.

(730. Continued)

A brief review of the situation in each of China's Asian satellites shows the following: North Korea /Democratic People's Republic of North Korea/ -- The Korean Labor (Communist) Party is clearly and deeply committed to Peking. In the early days of the dispute, Premier and Chairman of the KLP, Kim Il-sung, attempted to avoid taking sides, but soon the pressures of geographic and ethnic affinities and the experiences of joint opposition to a common enemy during the Korean War prevailed. By September 1962, Pyongyang was pursuing a strong anti-Yugoslav line and blamed the Sino-Indian border troubles on the "recklessness of the Indian jingoist clique." The pro-Chinese trend continued throughout 1963 and in September when Liu Shao-chi visited North Korea, a joint communique announced "complete identity of views on all subjects discussed... including important questions arising in the international Communist movement." The Soviet Union has attempted to pressure the North Korean party by reducing both military and technical aid, but to no avail. Some Soviet aid is continued, apparently in the hope of strengthening the hand of the pro-Soviet faction in the North Korean party.

North Vietnam /Democratic Republic of N.V./ -- The Lao Dong (Communist) Party proceeded with extreme caution during the early stages of the Sino-Soviet conflict, and Ho Chi Minh even tried on several occasions to mediate the dispute. Ho's experience and skill make it possible for the Lao Dong Party to walk the tightrope of neutrality longer than most; however, since late Spring 1963 the Vietnamese position has had a distinctly Chinese cast. Despite his talents and his prestige, Ho's inability to maintain a neutral position is probably due to North Vietnam's geographic position in the shadow of China and as a jumping off point for armed action against the small states in southeast Asia. A central point in Peking's argument is that local national liberation wars can be fought and won without escalating into large-scale nuclear conflicts. The Chinese have accordingly deplored Soviet restraint in the "revolutionary situation" in southeast Asia and this has won them favor with the extreme and radical factions in the North Vietnamese party. The Lao Dong are aware that the key to their success or failure is their drive to get their hands on the food-rich delta in the South without which they cannot feed the population of the North. If the Chinese Communists are to prove their point regarding national liberation wars anywhere, it must be through North Vietnam: this has made the stakes too high for even Ho Chi Minh to maintain his neutrality.

Indonesia -- The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) is the largest in the non-Communist world and has a fair chance to succeed Sukarno's vacillating rule: as such, it represents an important prize for either side. Last May, the CPR's Red Flag praised the PKI for its "correct line" and for its "unremitting struggle against modern revisionism." PKI General Secretary D.N. Aidit is generally conceded to be among the old-line Moscow-oriented leaders in Asia; prior to the 22nd CPSU Congress he resisted the pressure of the majority of the rank and file members and of a number of PKI




politburo members to side with Peking. Recently, however, the pro-Peking faction has prevailed and the PKI has come out on the side of China on the Sino-Indian border dispute, the handling of the Cuban crisis and the Yugoslav revisionists. It has actively seconded Peking's bid to control the Afro-Asian fronts. The primary internal question at issue between the PKI's pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions is the PKI's relationship and attitude toward Sukarno. The pro-Peking group advocates increasing pressure on Sukarno to bring the Communists into the Cabinet and give it real political power; this is consistent with Peking's contention that the Communist Party must have decisive power in the national democratic stage of a revolution if it is to be carried to a successful conclusion.

Japan -- The Japan Communist Party (JCP) has also tried to remain neutral as long as possible, but is swinging more and more into the Chinese camp. It has republished Chinese attacks on Nehru, refused to denounce Albania, endorsed Chinese Communist border claims, attacked Yugoslav revisionism, and opted for local editing and publishing of the Japanese-language edition of World Marxist Review. Even though the leadership of the JCP has moved slowly and tried to present itself as a possible mediator in the dispute, the schism within the party is very deep as is attested by the many defections that have taken place.

Burma -- The Burma Communist Party with an insurgent force led by Thakin Than Tun, and the Communist Party (Burma) with less than 300 members led by Thakin Soe, are both illegal. While Ne Win is moving toward a one-party system, several parties continue to function and among them is the National United Front (NUF), a coalition of pro-Communist parties with a membership of about 5,000. The Front is pursuing a strategy of national democracy as a way station to communism (the Soviet Line); the illegal parties have carried on a civil war (Chicom style) for ten years and attach a much higher price to cooperation with the government than the NUF.


Federation of Malaysia -- Illegal since 1948, the Malayan Communist Party has been operating by penetrating legal parties and through front groups. In Singapore, where the population is 75% Chinese, the Communist Party is illegal. With a hard core of 100-200 members and some 1,800 followers, it operates through the pro-Communist Barisan Socialist Party led by Lim Chin Siong and through youth and labor organizations. In Sarawak the Communist Party is illegal but the Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO) has penetrated the split Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP). Its militant arm -- it has an armed strength estimated at 3,500 -- has received training from the Indonesian Army and the CCO has established a link with the PKI.

/New Zealand -- Though not strictly speaking an Asian party, the New Zealand CP has consistently supported the Chinese position and represents the first and only case in which a non-Asiatic party (aside from Albania) has sided with Peking.7




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Indian Politics and the Succession Problem

Changes in the governments of England, the United States and the German Federal Republic, all in late 1963, stimulate concern over future changes in other non-Communist countries dedicated to free and orderly governmental succession. For India, ruled throughout her 16 years of independence by the same magnetic and powerful leader, the problem is not so easily solved. She lacks the British Conservative party's unity to agree on the new Prime Minister and the strong political heir-apparent who succeeded to the Chancellorship of Germany. Although aging and believed anxious to doff the burdens of office, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru declines to nominate a successor. Barring drastic upheavals, any new Prime Minister chosen within the next few years will come from the ruling Congress Party.

The Congress Party, which won 361 of the 494 seats in the lower house of Parliament (Lok Sabha) and received 45% of the popular vote in the 1962 election, stands for moderate-left socialism and occupies a position between the extremist opposition parties. Despite its nation-wide following (it was the only party to enter a candidate in every constituency in the 1962 elections) it is beset by liberal-conservative dissension, regional differences, popular distress over the Chinese attacks of 1962, economic difficulties and obvious neglect of party organization. Declining party power is reflected in the loss of three significant by-elections in 1963. Corrective measures are being taken. Under the so-called Kamaraj Plan Nehru asked twelve party leaders to resign their posts in regional and central governments in order to devote themselves to revitalizing the party. The loss of the first free election in Goa (held in early December 1963), while not indicative of the potential achievements of party reform, is a severe blow to the Congress Party which won only one seat in the thirty-member legislature.

Opposition Parties. The Communist Party of India, driven by the Sino-Soviet split, has lost popular strength and prestige since the Chinese Communist attacks of October 1962. However, party leaders appear to be struggling to prevent an open organizational rift between the Peking and Moscow factions. Following the Soviet Union's commitment of support to Indian defense against China, the CPI launched a drive to increase its estimated 100,000 membership. They won 29 Lok Sabha seats in 1962 and received approximately 10% of the popular vote.

The Praja Socialists, once the most prominent of the non-Communist opposition parties, was reduced in 1962 to 12 seats and 7% of the popular vote. In 1957 they had won 19 seats and 10% of the popular vote. The several rightist parties are, as yet, of limited national significance with the exception of the Swatantra Party which polled 8% of the vote and won 22 seats.

Some of the communal and religion-based groups are gaining new adherents although their combined vote was only 14%; they hold a total of 37 seats (no unity is implied -- there is intense rivalry among them). Independents and small parties ranging from extreme left to right, won 33 seats and 15% of the vote.

Possible successors. National elections will be held in 1967 but India may face the succession question at any time in the interim. The two men most prominently mentioned as candidates in 1963 were former Finance Minister Morarji Desai and former Home Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri -- both now concentrating on party work under the Kamaraj plan. K. Kamaraj himself is a former Chief Minister of Madras and the nominee for party president, a position of both prestige and power. Indian President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan is a Western-oriented former Oxford University professor who is believed to hold a broad view of the potential power of the presidency but to lack any political base of his own. It has often been said that Nehru himself would prefer to see his only child, 46-year old Mrs. Indira Gandhi, as his successor. Although an able political figure and active Congress Party president in 1959, she has held no state office.

Political Prospects. Indian political stability, like that of other developing countries, is extremely sensitive to economic factors. Failure to expand the economy at a rate sufficiently greater than the population growth rate may bring extremist, perhaps disruptive, pressures on the government. Further Communist Chinese military aggression may again lend a sense of patriotic unity to Indian defense but would simultaneously drain meager resources which are desperately needed for domestic reforms and investment. If the socialist, mixed-economy five-year plan shows some continuing, albeit slight, progress; if the Congress Party unifies and strengthens its nationwide organization; and if the opposition remains divided, continuity will undoubtedly be provided by a Congress Party figure committed to Nehru's policies. Nehru once said: "If there is a solid secular and socialist base -- that is, a deep, sound and self-confident foundation for our ideals and approaches, I am not at all worried as to what happens at the top or who takes over."