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Briefly Noted

Erosion of Czech Stalinism

In a further effort to cope with internal pressures for political liberalization and economic reform, Czechoslovakia's Stalinist President Novotny on 21 September dismissed or re-assigned a number of leading officials who were identified with political oppression and economic stagnation, replacing them with representatives of a younger and more moderate generation of Communists. Premier Siroky, two hard-line deputy premiers and four ministers were dropped. Two Slovaks were appointed ministers without portfolio and four new central committee commissions were created, three dealing with economics and one with ideology. Josef Lenart, a 40-year-old Slovak who has been a member of the party presidium since December 1962 and who is untainted by Stalinism, was appointed premier. However, in order to circumscribe the influence of his more liberal appointees and safeguard his own position, Novotny has kept his own lieutenants in key positions; viz. the appointment of Jiri Hendrych, long a Novotny supporter and heir apparent, as chairman of the new agricultural commission. Despite these maneuvers, Novotny is unlikely to placate Slovak regional discontent, popular dissatisfaction with political and economic conditions or his political opposition within the Czechoslovakian CP, although his actions may serve to defer slightly the agony of his own decline. 25X1C10b



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~~SECRET~~ 7 October 1963

DATES

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- 23 Oct Hungarian revolution fails under force of Soviet brutal military repression. 23 Oct-4 Nov 1956.
- 23 Oct Leon Trotsky expelled from CPSU Politburo in 1926.
- 7 Nov October Revolution. Lenin and Trotsky seize power from the Provisional Government, 1917.
- 10 Nov World Youth Day (Communist).
- 10 Nov Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEF), Djakarta 10-17 Nov 1963.
- 11 Nov International Student Week 11-17 November, concluding with International Students Day on the 17th (International Union of Students, Communist).
- 12 Nov Leon Trotsky expelled from the CPSU, 1927.
- 14 Nov (China-Russia) Treaty of Peking cedes Chinese "Great Northeast" to Russia, 1860.
- 15 Nov Bolsheviks proclaim "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia," affirming principle of self-determination to peoples of the former Empire, 1917.
- 30 Nov USSR attacks Finland, 1939.
- December Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Co-operation, 4th AAOEC, scheduled for Karachi, 1963.
- 5 Dec USSR adopts new "Stalin" constitution providing for universal suffrage, freedom of speech, press and assembly, 1936.
- 20 Dec UN issues second call for Tibetan freedom, 1953.
- 27 Dec Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty arrested, Hungary, 1943.

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████████████████████ COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#13

14-27 September 1963

Commentary

Principal Developments:

1. The most important development in this period was the Soviet government's statement of 21 September. This statement replied to the Chinese official statement of 1 September (see Chronology #12), and argued that in their very denials, the Chinese showed both their indifference to the costs of nuclear war and their ardent desire to acquire nuclear weapons. Another part of the Soviet statement, apparently answering the 6 September People's Daily-Red Flag article's charge of subversion in Sinkiang, claimed that there had been 5000 Chinese violations of the Sino-Soviet border in 1962. The Soviets did not, however, publish either the 1 September Chinese statement or the 6 September article; audiences in the USSR know of the 1 September statement only in Soviet paraphrase, and are officially unaware that the 6 September article (or the violently anti-Khrushchev 13 September article) even exists. (Peking's earlier statements (31 July and 15 August) were published along with the Soviet replies, on 3 and 21 August.)

2. The end of the above-mentioned 21 September Soviet statement hinted at a possible resumption of the CCP-CPSU meetings held in July, but made this dependent on "ending open polemics." On 16 September, a British CP statement, largely pro-CPSU and anti-CCP, had included a proposal for a world conference; Moscow omitted this detail in early TASS reports, but Moscow Radio reported it to domestic audiences two days later, and on 24 September Pravda published, in "trial balloon" fashion, an appeal by the Portuguese CP for a world conference.

3. On 19 September, the Soviets published an editorial in Pravda on the Sino-Indian dispute, clearly indicating that the CPR was the aggressor in the conflicts of 1959 and 1962, and stressing the bad impression Chinese aggression makes on Afro-Asian countries. The editorial deplored frontier quarrels and violations generally, including by implication the Sino-Soviet border.

4. Among non-bloc CP's, a pro-Chinese faction of the Swiss Party of Labor (Swiss CP) was disclosed on 16 September to have split away, claiming contacts with similar splinter groups in Belgium and Italy. (Switzerland houses an unusually large number of Chinese diplomats, who apparently have been working to some effect.) On the other hand, a leader of the Colombian CP (Jose Cardona Hoyos) claimed (according to Pravda, 17 September) that "the Chinese Communists have no influence in our ranks," the Chairman of the Swedish CP accused the Chinese of revisionism (Pravda, 16 September), and the Finnish CP plenum (14-15 September) passed a resolution rejecting the Chinese position (TASS).

A clandestine "Voice of Iraqi People" broadcast accused the Chinese and Albanians of trying to divide the Iraqi Communist movement. On 22 September, TASS reported that the Peruvian CP's Political Committee supported the "Moscow Treaty," but while the Committee's statement condemned French atomic testing, it did not condemn Peking.

5. At the UN, on 17 September, Albania submitted a proposal for the "restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China," to admit the CPR to the UN. Such resolutions have always been submitted by the USSR in the past.

6. On 23 September, after missing a week, the series of Chinese articles resumed with "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?" In this article, the Chinese use quotations from the Yugoslav press to support their own argument that Tito has turned Yugoslavia into a fascist dictatorship subordinate to the United States. Khrushchev, who should repudiate Tito, follows instead in Tito's footsteps. The Soviet statement of 21 September suggests in places that China is no longer a "socialist" country; this Chinese article states flatly that Khrushchev has abandoned Marxism-Leninism.


Significance:

During the last period covered by this series, the Chinese took the propaganda initiative with their 1 September statement and their articles on the history of the dispute and on Stalin (6 and 13 September); the main Soviet effort was their agitation on the Naushki incident (first reported 9 September). But in the two weeks now under review, the roles were reversed: the Soviet leaders appeared to feel that they were getting the best of the dispute -- their "peaceful coexistence" line had the widest appeal, and had not been satisfactorily countered by the CCP 1 September statement. But Soviet vulnerability was also shown by their failure to publish the latest Chinese materials.

Soviet treatment of the British and Portuguese CP statements suggests that Moscow, in its present mood of confidence, may be considering a call for a new intra-party meeting. In the present state of the dispute, the Soviets probably have little interest in further private meetings with the Chinese alone, but they might be interested in a new world conference of CP's, under their own control. Presumably they would expect to isolate the Chinese if they attended, or else, if the Chinese refused to come, the Soviets could use the occasion to reaffirm the pure Moscow line and read the Chinese out of the movement.

Soviet criticism of Chinese policy in the Sino-Indian border conflict (expressed in the 21 September statement as well as in the 19 September Pravda article) may reflect a Soviet expectation of further aggression in the Himalayas. In any case, the Soviets on their own account are concerned over Chinese irredentism.

While the official party organizations are lining up with the Soviets, it is becoming clearer than ever that the Chinese intend to create their own subsidiaries wherever they can. We must remember that the Sino-Soviet rivalry may often result in a competition to see who can attack the United States most sharply -- on the pattern of a 29 September Pravda article condemning what is called "The Rampage of Racism" in the United States. 25X1C10b



CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

14-27 September 1963

#13

September 14-16 - Both Soviet and Chicom propagandists continue discussion of the Naushki incident. On 16 September, the Chinese publish their government's note on the affair, along with Soviet government's notes of 7 and 9 September. Other stories describe the reception of the Chinese train crew and passengers in Peking (NCNA) and deplore this reception (Izvestiya 16 September).

September 14-15 - National Conference of the Swiss Party of Labor (Swiss CP) meets in Geneva. Western readers learn on 16 September that a pro-Chicom faction has split off from the main body of the SPL, under the leadership of Lucien Monnet, and Monnet claims to be in touch with similar factions in Belgium and Italy, as well as with the Chinese Communists. Although Tass covered the conference, it makes no reference to the split until 18 September, when it circulates to Eastern Europe a report ridiculing the faction. Also on 14-15 September, a Finnish CP plenum rejects the Chinese position.

September 16 - The British CP publishes a statement (according to Tass) saying that "British communists categorically reject the objections of CCP and CPR government leaders to the Moscow partial nuclear test-ban treaty." Pravda summarizes an article by the Chairman of the Swedish CP, Hilding Hagberg, accusing the Chinese Leaders of revisionism, and complaining of attacks from Chinese quarters on the eve of the Swedish CP's 20th Congress.

September 17 - Assuming a task previously shouldered by the USSR, the Albanian UN delegation submits a proposal for the "restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China," that is, to give Peking the UN seat now held by the Chiang Kai-shek government. A clandestine Arabic broadcast of station Peyk-e Iran, the "Voice of the Iraqi People," accuses the Chinese and Albanians of trying to divide the Communist movement in Iraq "and to create confusion in the ranks of the Communists and democrats." Pravda publishes an article by a leader of the Colombian CP, Jose Cardona Hoyos, claiming that "The Chinese dogmatists have no influence in our ranks."

September 18 - A Pravda story indicates that the British CP statement of 16 September (see above) included a request that all CP's study the question of calling a new international conference. Tass also carries a Daily Worker account of a speech by the General Secretary of the British CP, John Gollan, denouncing the CCP leaders, and saying: "We have never heard such language before except from the Trotskyites." NCNA reports that 13 members of the agency's Prague office have returned to Peking, receiving a warm welcome by more than 500 government officials. Chiang Lien-chung, leader of the returnees, says: "The Czechoslovak Government

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tried by every means to blockade the correct views of the CCP and government and of other fraternal parties persevering in Marxism-Leninism, but it could not shut out truth." One Embassy official and one student returned with the ^{NCNA} group. In Pyongyang, the visiting Chairman of the CPR, Liu Shao-chi, delivers a militant speech, denouncing the Soviet doctrine of division of labor:

"They are merely using this so-called international division of labor as an attractive cloak to cover their own practice of profiting themselves at the expense of others, a practice characteristic of relations among the capitalist countries, so as to obstruct the efforts of the economically under-developed socialist countries to develop an independent national economy and to make these countries economically dependent on them and politically come under their control."

Liu charges that the "modern revisionists" are smearing the revolutionary struggle as a "movement for piling up corpses" and "promising the peoples freedom after death," while they themselves blindly worship nuclear weapons:

"They recklessly brandish their nuclear weapons to blackmail other countries. With the sure knowledge of meeting no opponent, they speculate in that situation and then ascribe the achievements of the revolutionary struggle of the peoples to the credit of their policy of nuclear blackmail. But once confronted by an opponent, they capitulate, at the expense of the interests of the revolutionary people, to the nuclear blackmail of the opponent, sliding from adventurism to capitulationism. When they engage in speculations, they boast about their nuclear weapons in superlative terms; when they capitulate, they allege that nuclear war is imminent and that their capitulation is 'in obedience to the imperative call of the time' and has 'saved world peace.'"

Liu claims that, while yielding to imperialist nuclear blackmail, "the modern revisionists continue to practice nuclear blackmail toward the people of the socialist countries and the revolutionary people of the whole world," trying to frighten them with nuclear horror stories. However, the Korean speaker who welcomes Liu, a local official, makes only a cursory attack on "the modern revisionists."

September 19 - A Pravda editorial, "Serious Hotbed of Tension in Asia," discusses the Sino-Indian border question, indicating that the CPR has looked for a quarrel, and has refused to accept the proposals of the Colombo conference of non-aligned countries. Chinese policies are causing great anxiety in Asia and Africa, and are helping reactionary politicians in India. The Sino-Indian conflict is used to disrupt conferences, as at Moshi and the Moscow women's congress, showing the severity of the conflict:

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"Particularly alarming in this connection is not only the absence of any real efforts to solve the conflict, but also increasing evidence that the conflict may again be aggravated." The editorial hints that there is concern for Soviet boundaries as well:

"On the question of frontier quarrels we hold Leninist views and are convinced that there are no questions which cannot be solved by peaceful means, by means of talks, without bloodshed....As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, its attitude to those countries which border on it is one of respect."

N CNA notes bitterly on 21 September that "India's official propaganda machine" has given this editorial maximum publicity. On 25 September, People's Daily reprints the editorial in full, and promises to comment on it later, saying meanwhile: "The article totally disregards facts, perverts the truth, slanders China as wanting to settle its border dispute with India through war, and maliciously attempts to poison the relations of Afro-Asian countries, the Colombo conference countries in particular, with China."

September 20 - Komsomolskaya Pravda carries stories of Chinese persecution from four recent escapees from Sinkiang. In Pyongyang, Nodong Sinmun publishes an article by three Korean scholars, criticizing the Soviet World History for its treatment of Korean history. The Soviet history, the Koreans claim, overlooks the glorious ancient culture of Korea, fails to follow the Marxist principles of partynost and historicism, and mechanically copies from the works of Japanese and other imperialist writers. But among the faults of the Soviet work (the Koreans say) are its repetition of a legend that the first tribal confederacy was founded by an exile from China in the 12th century B.C., and the allegation that the Korean natives learned handicrafts and the culture of silk and of various grains from China.

September 21 - The Soviet government publishes an official statement replying to the Chinese 1 September statement; this statement discusses the Chinese attitude on the nuclear test ban treaty, on the possession of nuclear weapons, on the Sino-Soviet border, on the Sino-Indian conflict, and on the people's communes. Moscow notes that more than 90 countries have signed the test ban treaty, and points out that recent Chinese disarmament proposals are copied from two different Soviet proposals. Friedrich Engels is quoted to show that, even in 1893, "broad sections of the population were calling for disarmament," with Engels' full support. As for the Chinese denial in their 1 September statement that they are seeking their own nuclear weapon at any cost, the Chinese statement "actually confirms the conclusion we have drawn and proves once again that the negative position of the CPR Government toward the nuclear test-ban treaty is explained precisely by their desire to make their country a nuclear power." Alleging that the Chinese say openly that they will have A-weapons if it takes 100 years, the Soviets point out that the Chinese are hardly in a position, economically speaking, to divert resources to building nuclear arms.

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"It is well known that China does not have surplus resources, and it takes enormous resources to produce nuclear weapons.... We do not consider ours a poor country, but even we have much to do to put an end to those material difficulties which still exist for the time being and about which we speak openly."

Soviet weapons protect the whole camp, as Mao recognized in September 1958, when he said that, in view of the Soviet capability, China "need not organize the production of such weapons, especially considering that they are very expensive." The attempt now to acquire an independent capability suggests that the Chinese "have developed some sort of special aims and interests which cannot be supported by the military force of the socialist camp":

"For it is impossible to accord plans of developing nuclear weapons so as to increase, for instance, one's influence in countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, or to create for oneself 'a position of strength' in outstanding international issues, or to increase international tensions, with the peace-loving foreign policy course of the countries of the socialist system."

The Soviet statement then adds, tongue in cheek: "We would not (like?) to think that the CPR government is guided by such motives."

The Soviets turn against the Chinese their "full quotations" from Mao and "Long Live Leninism!":

"... the Chinese leaders deliberate whether a half or 100 per cent of mankind would be destroyed in the flames of a new war.... This is shown by the pronouncement of Mao Tse-tung even in the altered form in which it is given in the statement of the Chinese Government of 1 September: 'X Tass ellipsis... if bad comes to worse half of humanity will perish, but half will remain. But imperialism will be razed off the face of the earth and the whole world will go socialist.' No less eloquent in this sense is a quotation from Red Flag, which they are trying to deny, to the effect that in case of war the victorious peoples 'most rapidly will create over the ruins of destroyed imperialism a civilization a thousand times higher.'"

In a powerful bid for support from the CP's of small countries, the Soviets charge that, when a Czech journalist told Tao Chu, a member of the CCP Central Committee, that all the Czechs might be killed in a thermonuclear war, Tao replied:

"'In the case of a war of annihilation the small countries belonging to the socialist camp would have to subordinate their interests to the interests of the camp as a whole.'"

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In Chinese eyes, "The war variant of the development of events is regarded...as inevitable and even more desirable than the peaceful variant." Every time a relaxation of tension has occurred in recent years, the Chinese have deliberately stirred up trouble, as in the case of the Sino-Indian conflict of 1959. They even stir up trouble on the Soviet border:

"Beginning with 1960, Chinese servicemen and civilians have been systematically violating the Soviet border. In the single year of 1962, more than 5,000 violations of the Soviet border from the Chinese side were registered. Attempts are also being made to 'develop' some parts of Soviet territory without permission.... Chinese propaganda is making definite hints at the unjust demarcation of some of the sections of the Soviet-Chinese border allegedly made in the past. However, the artificial creation today of any territorial problems, especially between socialist countries, would be tantamount to embarking on a very dangerous path."

Somewhat surprisingly, the Soviet statement ends with a call to end polemics, and hints that the July CCP-CPSU talks might be resumed, as it was then agreed to continue them later. The Soviets state their readiness to take "all the steps we can to achieve unity with China," but add that if the Chinese misinterpret this good will and continue their slanderous and factional activities, "they must clearly realize that the most resolute rebuff from the CPSU and from the Soviet people awaits them on this road."

Also on 21 September, an award ceremony and a state banquet were held in Ulan Bator on the occasion of the departure of 309 Chinese workers for China. Mongolian officials expressed gratitude for the contribution of the Chinese workers, functionaries and students, but it appears that the departure closed out Chinese aid programs in Mongolia. The returnees were given the now-customary welcoming reception when they arrived at the Chinese border on 23 September.

September 22 - Tass reports that the Political Committee of the Peruvian CP endorses the "Moscow" test ban treaty, and condemns the French Government for its intention to persist in testing.

September 23 - A Moscow Radio broadcast in French to Africa ridicules Chinese claims that they abstain from the Third World Meeting of Journalists because it is not held in Africa and because it is to deal with professional and not political matters; Algiers (where the journalists' ship is to touch) is in Africa, and the struggle for peace, against reaction, and for national independence and social justice will be broached at the meeting. In Ulan Bator, the Mongolian Montsame news agency transmits an "observer's" commentary, endorsing the 21 September Soviet statement.

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September 24 - Pravda publishes a statement by the Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party, saying that Chinese policies are dangerous, and their contentions that the CPSU imposes a "peace course" on parties in capitalist countries are deplorable; no one is imposing a "peace course" on the Portuguese CP, which must overthrow a fascist government by force. The statement urges "the earliest convocation of a meeting of all communist and workers parties which, in addition to discussing ideological problems, would work out the standards regulating relations between fraternal parties." Tass and Moscow Radio circulate this story to domestic and European audiences.

September 25 - Leninskaya Smena of Alma Ata carries a story by Asir Vakhidov, a former member of the Chinese Komsomol Central Committee and Secretary of the Sinkiang Komsomol, who has fled from China. Vakhidov, a Uighur by nationality, states that hundreds of his fellow-countrymen are languishing in "so-called labor training camps, which are in fact concentration camps." "We were branded as 'traitors,' 'cosmopolitans,' and 'Soviet spies' and dismissed from our jobs," Vakhidov says; "People who for any reason got in touch with the Soviet Consulate were submitted to questioning." According to a Tanyug item of 26 September, a similar story appears in the current Literaturnaya Gazeta, written by a Kazakh writer, Bukhara Tishkanbeyev, formerly living in Sinkiang.

September 26 - After a pause of two weeks (the first two articles appeared a week apart), People's Daily and Red Flag publish the third in their series of articles answering the CPSU Central Committee's Open Letter of 14 July 1963: "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?" Not too surprisingly, the Chinese answer to the title's question is "No!" They claim that capitalism and usury flourish in Yugoslav cities, kulaks wax fat in the Yugoslav countryside, and the dictatorship of the proletariat has been turned into a "dictatorship of the bureaucrat-comprador bourgeoisie," a category which sounds faintly reminiscent of Djilas's New Class. "U.S. aid has been the mainstay of Yugoslavia's finances and economy"--thanks to Tito's having concluded a series of traitorous treaties with the United States:

"Because of the conclusion of these treaties and agreements and because the Tito clique has made Yugoslavia dependent on U.S. imperialism, the United States enjoys the following rights in Yugoslavia: 1) to control its military affairs; 2) to control its foreign affairs; 3) to interfere in its internal affairs; 4) to manipulate and supervise its finance; 5) to control its foreign trade; 6) to plunder its strategic resources; and 7) to collect military and economic intelligence."

Under Tito, state power has degenerated from the dictatorship of the proletariat into the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie; "the

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dictatorship of the bourgeoisie not only exists, but is a brutal fascist dictatorship at that. The Tito regime has set up many fascist prisons and concentration camps where tens of thousands of revolutionaries have been tortured to death by every kind of inhuman punishment." On the other hand, counterrevolutionaries are pardoned. Khrushchev, however, fraternizes with the Tito clique "not because it has corrected any of its errors but because he is following in Tito's footsteps." Khrushchev and Tito "both want to liquidate the socialist camp," and Khrushchev

"has abandoned Marxism-Leninism, scrapped the 1960 statement, and wallowed in the mire with the renegade Tito clique, in complete violation of the interests of the Soviet Union, the Soviet people, and the people of the whole world. This will not be tolerated by the great Soviet people, the overwhelming majority of the CPSU members, and cadres at various levels, all of whom have a glorious revolutionary tradition."

The article contains numerous quotations from the Yugoslav press, which cannot however be regarded as a guarantee of its factual accuracy. Although the article contains at the end an incongruous call to the Soviet leaders to turn back before it is too late, its publication appears to constitute a resounding refusal to end the open polemics.

September 27 - Moscow Radio broadcasts domestically a Pravda summary of the John Gollan 14 September speech (see under September 18 above), now including a passage appealing for a world conference of CP's, on the basis of the 1957 declaration and the 1960 statement.

CHRONOLOGIE -- DISSENSIONS COMMUNISTES

No. 13

14-27 septembre 1963

14 - 16 septembre: Les propagandistes soviétiques et chinois continuent à discuter de l'incident de Naushki. Le 16 septembre, les Chinois publiaient une note de leur gouvernement concernant l'incident en même temps que des notes du gouvernement soviétique datées du 7 et du 9 septembre. D'autres articles parlent de la réception à Pékin du personnel et des passagers du train chinois (Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle) ou déplorent cette réception (Izvestiya, 16 septembre).

14 - 15 septembre: La Conférence nationale du parti travailliste suisse (parti communiste suisse) s'est réunie à Genève. Les lecteurs des pays occidentaux apprennent le 16 septembre qu'un groupe pro-chinois sous la direction de Lucien Monnet s'est séparé du gros de l'organisation; Monnet prétend qu'il est en contact avec des groupements analogues en Belgique et en Italie, et qu'il l'est également avec les communistes chinois. Bien que l'agence TASS ait été représentée à la conférence, elle n'a pas mentionné la séparation jusqu'au 18 septembre, date à laquelle elle a fait circuler en Europe Orientale des articles tournant au ridicule le groupement dissident. Egalement le 14 - 15 septembre, un plénum du parti communiste finlandais s'est élevé contre la position chinoise.

16 septembre: Le parti communiste britannique publie une déclaration (selon le TASS) qui dit que: "Les communistes britanniques rejettent catégoriquement les objections du parti communiste chinois et du gouvernement de la République Populaire de Chine à l'égard du traité de Moscou interdisant les essais nucléaires." La Pravda donne un résumé d'un article du président du parti communiste suédois Hilding Hagberg, qui accuse les leaders chinois de révisionnisme et se plaint d'attaques émanant de Chine à la veille du 20^e Congrès du parti communiste suédois.

17 septembre: Assumant la tâche précédemment dévolue à l'Union Soviétique, la délégation albanaise aux Nations unies soumet une proposition pour la "restauration des droits légitimes de la République Populaire chinoise" autrement dit, pour accorder à Pékin le siège aux Nations unies que détient à l'heure actuelle le gouvernement de Chiang Kai-shek. Une radio clandestine arabe, "La voix du peuple de l'Iraq", accuse les Chinois et les Albanais de chercher à provoquer des dissensions dans le mouvement communiste en Iraq, "et de créer la confusion parmi les rangs des communistes et des démocrates". La Pravda publie un article du leader du parti communiste de la Colombie, Jose Cardona Hoyos, qui prétend que "les dogmatistes chinois n'exercent aucune influence parmi nos

18 septembre: Un article de Pravda fait savoir que la déclaration du parti communiste britannique du 16 septembre (voir plus haut) contenait une requête que tous les partis communistes étudient la question de convoquer une nouvelle conférence internationale. TASS reproduit également un compte-rendu du Daily Worker du discours du secrétaire-général du parti communiste britannique, John Gollan, qui dénonce les leaders du parti communiste chinois et déclare: "Nous n'avons jamais entendu de langage pareil, sauf de la part des trotskistes". L'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle fait savoir que 13 membres de son agence à Prague sont retournés à Pékin et qu'ils ont été chaleureusement reçus par plus de 500 fonctionnaires gouvernementaux. Chiang Lien-chung, leader du groupe de repatriés, déclare: "Le gouvernement tchécoslovaque a essayé par tous les moyens d'empêcher l'expression des vues correctes du parti communiste chinois, du gouvernement chinois et des autres partis fraternels qui persévèrent dans le marxisme-léninisme, mais il n'est pas parvenu à empêcher la vérité de se répandre." Un fonctionnaire de l'ambassade et un étudiant sont rentrés avec le groupe. A Pyongyang, le président de la République Populaire chinoise, Liu Shao-chi, fait un discours agressif dans lequel il dénonce la doctrine soviétique de la division du travail:

"Ils ne font qu'utiliser la soi-disant division internationale du travail comme un voile attrayant destiné à couvrir leur propre habitude de tirer profit pour eux-mêmes aux dépens des autres, une habitude caractéristique dans les relations entre pays capitalistes, qui consiste à empêcher les efforts des pays socialistes économiquement sous-développés et tendant à développer une économie nationale indépendante, pour rendre ces pays économiquement dépendants et placés du point de vue politique sous leur contrôle".

Liu prétend que les "révisionnistes modernes" calomnient la lutte révolutionnaire en prétendant que c'est "un mouvement pour entasser des cadavres," et qu'ils "promettent aux peuples la liberté après la mort", cependant qu'eux-mêmes adorent aveuglément les armes nucléaires:

Ils brandissent leurs armes nucléaires comme moyens de chantage contre les autres pays. Certains de ne trouver aucune opposition, ils spéculent dans cette situation et ensuite prétendent que les résultats obtenus dans la lutte révolutionnaire des peuples l'ont été grâce à leur politique de chantage nucléaire. Mais une fois mis en présence d'un adversaire, ils capitulent, aux dépens des intérêts du peuple révolutionnaire, au chantage nucléaire de l'adversaire, glissant de l'aventurisme au capitulationnisme. Lorsqu'ils s'engagent dans des spéculations, ils se vantent de leurs armes nucléaires en termes superlatifs; lorsqu'ils capitulent, ils prétendent que la guerre nucléaire était imminente et que leur capitulation est en réponse à l'appel impératif de

l'époque' et qu'elle a 'sauvé la paix mondiale'".

Liu prétend que tout en cédant au chantage nucléaire des impérialistes, "les révisionnistes modernes continuent à pratiquer le chantage nucléaire à l'égard des peuples des pays socialistes et des peuples révolutionnaires du monde entier", cherchant à les terroriser par des histoires de bombes nucléaires. Cependant, l'orateur coréen qui a souhaité la bienvenue à Liu, un fonctionnaire local, n'a dirigé qu'une attaque superficielle contre "les révisionnistes modernes".

19 septembre: Un editorial de Pravda "Foyer de tension sérieuse en Asie", discute de la question de frontière sino-indienne, indiquant que la République Populaire chinoise avait cherché querelle, et qu'elle avait rejeté les propositions de la conférence des pays non-alignés de Colombo. La politique chinoise cause de grands soucis en Asie et en Afrique, et aide les politiciens réactionnaires de l'Inde. Le conflit sino-indien est utilisé à désagréger les conférences, comme à Moshi ou au Congrès mondial des femmes à Moscou, ce qui montre la sévérité du conflit; "Ce qui est particulièrement allarmant sous ce rapport ce n'est pas seulement l'absence de tout effort réel de résoudre le conflit, mais également la preuve croissante que ce conflit risque encore une fois de se trouver aggravé". L'éditorial fait allusion au fait qu'il intéresse également les frontières soviétiques:

"Au sujet de la question de querelles de frontières, nous partageons les vues léninistes et nous sommes convaincus qu'il n'y a pas de questions qui ne puissent être résolues par des moyens pacifiques, par des entretiens, sans faire couler le sang... En ce qui concerne l'Union Soviétique, son attitude à l'égard des pays avec lesquels elle a une frontière commune est une attitude de respect".

L'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle souligne aigrement le 21 septembre que "la machine officielle de propagande de l'Inde" a donné à cet éditorial une publicité maximum. Le 25 septembre, le Quotidien du Peuple reproduisait l'éditorial en entier, et promettait de donner plus tard des commentaires, soulignant entretemps: "L'article se moque totalement des faits, altère la vérité, calomnie la Chine en prétendant qu'elle veut régler sa querelle de frontière avec l'Inde au moyen d'une guerre, et cherche avec malveillance d'empoisonner les relations entre la Chine et les pays afro-asiatiques, en particulier ceux ayant participé à la Conférence de Colombo."

20 septembre: La Komsomolskaya Pravda fait paraître des histoires de persécution chinoise contées par quatre personnes échappées récemment du Sinkiang. A Pyongyang, le Nodong Sinmun publie un article par trois savants coréens critiquant l'Histoire mondiale publiée par les Soviets, pour la façon dont a été traitée l'histoire de la Corée.

L'histoire soviétique, prétendent les Coréens, oublie l'ancienne culture glorieuse de la Corée, néglige de suivre les principes marxistes de partynost et d'historicisme, et copie mécaniquement les travaux d'auteurs japonais et autres impérialistes. Mais, d'après les Coréens, parmi les erreurs de l'oeuvre soviétique se trouve une répétition de la légende que la première confédération tribale fut fondée par un exilé de Chine au cours du 12^e siècle avant notre ère, ainsi que les affirmations que les indigènes coréens avaient appris en Chine les travaux d'artisans, la culture de la soie et celle des diverses céréales.

21 septembre: Le gouvernement soviétique publie une déclaration officielle en réponse à la déclaration chinoise du premier septembre; cette déclaration discute de l'attitude chinoise à l'égard du traité nucléaire, de la possession des armes nucléaires, de la frontière sino-soviétique, du conflit sino-indien, et des communes populaires. Moscou souligne que plus de 90 pays ont signé le traité nucléaire, et que les propositions récentes des Chinois concernant le désarmement sont les copies de deux propositions soviétiques différentes. Friedrich Engels est cité pour montrer que même en 1893, "de larges sections de la population demandaient le désarmement", avec un soutien sans restrictions de la part de Engels. En ce qui concerne une dénégation chinoise contenue dans leur dénégation du premier septembre, ils cherchent à tout prix d'avoir leurs propres armes nucléaires, la déclaration chinoise "confirme actuellement la conclusion à laquelle nous sommes arrivés et prouve une fois de plus que la position négative du gouvernement de la République Populaire chinoise à l'égard du traité nucléaire s'explique précisément par leur désir de faire de leur pays une puissance nucléaire". Prétendant que les Chinois disent ouvertement qu'ils auront la bombe atomique même s'il leur fallait cent ans pour l'avoir, les Soviets soulignent que du point de vue économique les Chinois sont loin d'être en position de détourner des ressources pour la construction d'armes nucléaires:

"C'est un fait bien connu que la Chine ne possède pas de ressources excédentaires, et il faut des ressources énormes pour produire des armes nucléaires... Nous ne considérons pas notre propre pays comme étant un pays pauvre, mais nous-mêmes avons de grands efforts à faire pour faire cesser les difficultés matérielles qui existent encore pour l'instant, et dont nous parlons ouvertement".

Les armes soviétiques protègent le camp tout entier, ainsi que Mao l'a reconnu en septembre 1958, lorsqu'il dit qu'en raison du potentiel soviétique la Chine "n'avait pas besoin de créer une production de ces armes, en raison particulièrement de ce qu'elles coûtent". Le désir de le faire maintenant montre que les Chinois "se sont créés quelques objectifs et quelques intérêts spéciaux qui ne peuvent être soutenus par la force militaire du camp socialiste":

"Car il est impossible d'harmoniser les plans de développement d'armes nucléaires pour augmenter par exemple l'influence d'un pays dans les pays de l'Asie, de l'Afrique ou de l'Amérique Latine, ou de créer pour ce pays une position de force dans les problèmes internationaux, au d'augmenter les tensions internationales, avec la politique étrangère pacifique des pays du système socialiste".

Et les Soviétiques ajoutent avec malice: "Nous n'aimerions pas penser que le gouvernement de la Chine Populaire soit guidé par des motifs pareils".

Les Soviétiques tournent contre les Chinois leurs "citations intégrales" de Mao et de "Vive le leninisme!".

"...les leaders chinois délibèrent pour savoir si la moitié ou la totalité de l'humanité serait détruite dans les flammes d'une nouvelle guerre... Les déclarations de Mao Tse-tung [le montrent] même dans la version modifiée qu'en donne la déclaration du gouvernement chinois du 1er septembre: '...au pire la moitié de l'humanité périrait, mais la moitié survivrait. Mais l'impérialisme se trouverait balayé de la face de la terre et le monde entier deviendrait socialiste.' Non moins éloquent en ce sens est un extrait du Drapeau rouge, déclaration qu'ils cherchent à renier, et qui veut qu'en cas de guerre les peuples victorieux aillent 'rapidement sur les ruines de l'impérialisme détruit créer une civilisation mille fois supérieure".

Dans un effort gigantesque pour le soutien du parti communiste pour les petits pays, les Soviétiques prétendent que Tao Chu, membre du comité central du parti communiste chinois, aurait répondu ce qui suit à un journaliste tchèque qui lui disait que tous les Tchèques risquaient d'être tués dans une guerre thermo-nucléaire:

"'Dans le cas de guerre d'annihilation, les petits pays appartenant au camp socialiste auront à subordonner leurs intérêts aux intérêts du camp tout entier'."

De l'avis des Chinois: "La variante de guerre dans le cours des événements est considérée... comme étant inévitable et même plus souhaitable que la variante pacifique." Chaque fois qu'il y a eu un relâchement de tension au cours de ces dernières années, les Chinois ont fait exprès de créer des ennuis, comme dans le cas du conflit sino-indien de 1959. Ils créent même des ennuis sur la frontière soviétique:

"Commencant en 1960, les militaires et les civils chinois ont violé systématiquement la frontière soviétique. En la seule année 1962, il y a eu plus de 5.000 violations de la frontière so-

ont été faites également de 'mettre en valeur' certaines parties du territoire soviétique sans obtenir de permission... La propagande chinoise fait des allusions précises au fait que les démarcations soi-disant faites dans le passé dans certains secteurs de la frontière sino-soviétique étaient injustes. Cependant, la création artificielle aujourd'hui de tout le problème territorial, en particulier entre pays socialistes, reviendrait à s'embarquer sur une voie très dangereuse."

Fait assez surprenant, la déclaration soviétique se termine par un appel à terminer les polémiques, et fait allusion à ce que les entretiens de juillet entre le parti communiste chinois et le parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique pourraient être repris, ainsi que cela fut entendu. Les Soviets déclarent qu'ils sont prêts à prendre "toutes les mesures que nous pouvons pour parvenir à une entente avec la Chine," mais ils ajoutent que si les Chinois donnaient à cette preuve de bonne volonté une interprétation erronée et continuaient leurs calomnies et leur attitude de discorde, "ils doivent comprendre clairement qu'une rebuffade la plus résolue de la part du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique et du peuple soviétique les attend le long de la route".

Egalement le 21 septembre, une cérémonie de distribution de récompenses et un banquet d'Etat eurent lieu à Ulan Bator à l'occasion du départ à destination de la Chine de 309 ouvriers chinois. Les officiels mongols exprimèrent leur gratitude pour la contribution faite par les ouvriers, les fonctionnaires et les étudiants chinois, mais il semble que ce départ met un terme au programme d'aide chinoise à la Mongolie. Les repatriés furent accueillis par une réception de bienvenue, bienvenue coutumière, lorsqu'ils arrivèrent à la frontière chinoise le 23 septembre.

22 septembre: TASS fait savoir que le Comité politique du parti communiste péruvien approuve le traité "de Moscou", interdisant les essais nucléaires, et condamne le gouvernement français pour son intention de poursuivre les essais.

23 septembre: Une radio de Moscou, en langue française, destinée à l'Afrique, tourne en ridicule les affirmations chinoises que ceux-ci s'abstiennent de participer au 30^e Congrès mondial des journalistes parce qu'il n'a pas lieu en Afrique et parce que le congrès allait traiter de questions professionnelles et non pas de questions politiques; Alger (où le navire des journalistes va faire escale) se trouve en Afrique, et la lutte pour la paix, contre la réaction, et pour l'indépendance nationale et la justice sociale seront des questions traitées à la réunion. A Ulan Bator, l'agence de presse mongole Montsane fait passer un commentaire signé "Observateur", approuvant la déclaration soviétique du 21 septembre.

24 septembre: La Pravda publie une déclaration du Comité central du parti communiste portugais, qui déclare que la politique chinoise est dangereuse, et qu'il est et qu'il était déplorable de leur part de prétendre que le parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique imposait aux partis des pays capitalistes "une politique de paix." Personne n'impose de politique de paix au parti communiste portugais, qui doit renverser par la force un gouvernement fasciste. La déclaration fait appel "à une convocation urgente de tous les partis communistes et travaillistes qui, en plus de la discussion des problèmes économiques, établirait des règles pour les relations entre les partis fraternels." TASS et Radio-Moscou font circuler cette déclaration à l'intention des audiences soviétique et européennes.

25 septembre: Leninskaya Smena de Alma Ata publie un article de Asir Vakhidov, ancien membre du Comité central de la Jeunesse communiste chinoise et secrétaire de la Jeunesse communiste de Sinkiang, qui s'est échappé de Chine. Vakhidov, qui est de nationalité uigur, déclare que des centaines de ses compatriotes se trouvent dans "de soi-disant camps de préparation au travail, qui en fait ne sont que des camps de concentration." "On nous qualifie de traîtres, de cosmopolites et d'espions soviétiques et on nous licencie de nos emplois, déclare Vakhidov; les gens qui pour quelque raison ont été en rapport avec le consulat soviétique sont soumis à des interrogatoires." D'après un article du Tanyug du 26 septembre, une histoire analogue paraît dans Literaturnaya Gazeta, sous la signature d'un écrivain kazakh, Bukhara Tishkanboyev, ancien résident de Sinkiang.

26 septembre: Après une pause de deux semaines (les deux premiers articles ont été publiés à une semaine de distance l'un de l'autre), le Quotidien du peuple et le Drapeau rouge ont publié le troisième de leur série d'articles répondant à la lettre ouverte du 14 juillet 1963 adressée par le Comité central du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique: "La Yougoslavie est-elle un parti socialiste?" Il n'y a rien de très surprenant que la réponse des Chinois à cette question est "Non!" Ils prétendent que le capitalisme et l'usure prospèrent dans les villes yougoslaves, les koulaks s'engraissent dans la campagne yougoslave, et que la dictature du prolétariat a été transformée en une "dictature de la bourgeoisie bureaucrate-comprador", catégorie qui rappelle quelque peu la Nouvelle classe de Djilas. "L'aide économique des Etats-Unis a été le soutien des finances et de l'économie yougoslaves", grâce à Tito qui a conclu une série de traités perfides avec les Etats-Unis:

"Grâce à la conclusion de ces traités et de ces accords et parce que la clique de Tito a fait que la Yougoslavie dépende de l'impérialisme des Etats-Unis, les Etats-Unis jouissent des droits suivants en Yougoslavie: 1) le contrôle de ses affaires militaires; 2) le contrôle de ses af-

fares étrangères; 3) le droit d'ingérence dans ses affaires intérieures; 4) le droit de manipuler et de diriger ses finances; 5) le droit de contrôler son commerce extérieur; 6) la possibilité de piller ses ressources stratégiques, et 7) la faculté d'obtenir des renseignements d'ordre militaire et économique."

Sous Tito, le pouvoir d'Etat a dégénéré d'une dictature de prolétariat en une dictature de la bourgeoisie; "la dictature de la bourgeoisie non seulement existe, mais elle est par-dessus le marché une dictature fasciste brutale. Le régime Tito a créé de nombreuses prisons brutales et des camps de concentration, ou des dizaines de milliers de révolutionnaires ont été torturés à mort et soumis à toutes sortes de punitions inhumaines". D'un autre côté, les contrerévolutionnaires sont pardonnés. Khrouchtchev cependant fraternise avec la clique de Tito "non pas parce qu'il a corrigé aucune de ses erreurs mais parce qu'il suit les traces de Tito". Khrouchtchev et Tito "veulent liquider tous les deux le camp socialiste"; Khrouchtchev de son côté:

"a abandonné le marxisme-léninisme, a mis au panier les déclarations de 1960, et il se vautre dans la boue avec la clique du traître Tito, allant à l'encontre des intérêts de l'Union Soviétique, du peuple soviétique et du peuple du monde entier. Ceci ne sera pas toléré par le grand peuple soviétique, par la grande majorité des membres du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique, par les différents cadres, qui tous possèdent une tradition glorieuse de la révolution".

L'article contient des passages nombreux tirés de la presse yougoslave, sans que l'on puisse être certains cependant de leur crédibilité. Bien qu'à la fin l'article contienne un appel incongru adressé aux leaders soviétiques, qui leur dit de faire marche arrière avant qu'il ne soit trop tard, sa publication semble constituer un refus rotentissant de mettre un terme à la polémique ouverte.

27 septembre: Radio-Moscou transmet localement un résumé donné dans Pravda du discours de John Gollan du 14 septembre (voir ci-dessus le 18 septembre); ce résumé contient un passage demandant la convocation d'une conférence mondiale des partis communistes, sur la base de la déclaration de 1957 et de celle de 1960.

CROLOGIA -- DISENSIONES COMUNISTAS

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14-16 Septiembre: Los propagandistas tanto soviéticos como chinocomunistas prosiguen la discusión del incidente de Naushki. El 16 de septiembre los chinos publican la nota de su Gobierno sobre el asunto, así como las notas del Gobierno soviético de 7 y 9 de septiembre. Otros relatos describen el recibimiento en Pkin de la triplulación y los pasajeros chinos (Agencia Nueva China) y deploran dicho recibimiento ("Izvestiya" 16 septiembre).

14-15 Septiembre: La Conferencia Nacional del Partido Suizo del Trabajo (el PO suizo) se reúne en Ginebra. Los lectores de la prensa occidental se enteran el 16 de septiembre que una facción pro chinocomunista se ha escindido del cuerpo principal del PST, bajo la dirección de Lucien Monnet, y éste declara estar en contacto con facciones semejantes en Bélgica e Italia así como con los comunistas chinos. Tass se ocupa de la conferencia pero se abstiene de mencionar la escisión hasta el 18 de septiembre, fecha en que envía a Europa Oriental un informe poniendo en ridículo dicha facción. El 14 y 15 de septiembre también, un pleno del PC finlandés rechaza la posición china.

16 Septiembre: El PC británico publica, según informa Tass, una declaración en el sentido de que "los comunistas británicos categóricamente rechazan las objeciones de los dirigentes del PC chino y del Gobierno de la RP china al tratado de Moscú contra los ensayos nucleares." "Pravda" resume un artículo de Hilding Hagberg, presidente del PC sueco, acusando a los dirigentes chinos de revisionismo y quejándose de ataques de origen chino en la víspera del Vigésimo Congreso del PC sueco.

17 Septiembre: Tomándose una tarea que antes había sido de la URSS, la delagación albanesa a la ONU somete una propuesta para "la restauración de los legítimos derechos de la República Popular China", o sea dar a Pekín la banca en la ONU que ahora ocupa el Gobierno de Chiang Kai-shek. Una emisión clandestina en árabe de la estación Peyk-e Iran, la "Voz del Pueblo Irakí", acusa a los chinos y albaneses de intentar dividir el movimiento comunista en Irak y "crear la confusión en las filas de los comunistas y demócratas". "Pravda" publica un artículo de José Cardona Hoyos, dirigente del PC colombiano, declarando que "los dogmáticos chinos no tienen influencia alguna en nuestras filas".

18 Septiembre: Un artículo de "Pravda" indica que la declaración del PC británico de 16 de septiembre (vea más arriba) incluyó el pedido de que todos los PC estudiaran la cuestión de convocar una nueva conferencia internacional. Tass también publica un relato del "Daily Worker" sobre un artículo de John Gollan, secretario general del PC británico, repudiando a los dirigentes del PC chino y declarando: "Nunca habíamos escuchado semejante lenguaje excepto de parte de los trotakistas". La Agencia Nueva China informa que 13 miembros de la oficina de Praga de la agencia han regresado a Pekín, siéndoles prodigado un cálido recibimiento por más de 500 funcionarios del Gobierno. Chiang Lien-chung, líder de los regresados, declara: "El Gobierno checoslovaco trató por todos los medios de bloquear las correctas opiniones del PC y Gobierno chinos y de otros Partidos fraternos que

verdad". Un funcionario de embajada y un estudiante regresaron con el grupo de la Agencia Nueva China. En Pyongyang de visita, Liu Shao-chi, presidente de la RP china, pronuncia un discurso militante repudiando la doctrina soviética de la división del trabajo:

"Están sencillamente empleando esta sedicente división internacional del trabajo como atrayente capa para cubrir su propia práctica de beneficiarse a expensas de otros, práctica que caracteriza las relaciones entre los países capitalistas, para obstruir los esfuerzos de los países socialistas económicamente subdesarrollados por desarrollar una economía nacional independiente y hacer que dichos países queden sujetos a ellos económicamente y caigan políticamente bajo el control de ellos".

Liu denuncia que los "revisionistas contemporáneos" están desacreditando la lucha revolucionaria como "movimiento para amontonar cadáveres" y que "promete a los pueblos la libertad después de muertos", mientras que ellos mismos adoran ciegamente las armas nucleares:

"Blanden sin cautela alguna sus armas nucleares para chantajear a otros países. Con el seguro conocimiento de no encontrar oposición, especulan en dicha situación y luego atribuyen las realizaciones de la lucha revolucionaria al crédito de su política de chantaje nuclear. Pero una vez se les encara un opositor, capitulan, a expensas de los intereses del pueblo revolucionario, al chantaje nuclear del opositor, deslizándose del aventurismo al capitulacionismo. Cuando se dedican a las especulaciones, se jactan de sus armas nucleares en términos superlativos; cuando capitulan, alegan que la guerra nuclear está inminente y que su capitulación es 'en obediencia al llamado imperativo de la época' y ha 'salvado la paz mundial'".

Liu declara que, en tanto que se rinden ante el chantaje nuclear imperialista, "los revisionistas contemporáneos continúan practicando el chantaje nuclear hacia el pueblo de los países socialistas y el pueblo revolucionario del mundo entero", tratando de amedrentarlos con espeluznantes cuentos nucleares. Sin embargo, el orador coreano que da a Liu la bienvenida, un funcionario local, hace un ataque rutinario contra "los revisionistas contemporáneos".

19 Septiembre: Un editorial de "Pravda", titulado "Grave hervidero de tensión en Asia", trata de la cuestión fronteriza entre India y China, indicando que la RP china ha buscado querrela y se ha negado a aceptar las propuestas de la conferencia de Colombo de naciones no alineadas. Las líneas de conducta de China están causando grave ansiedad en Asia y Africa y están ayudando a los políticos reaccionarios de India. El conflicto chino-indio se emplea para desbaratar conferencias, como la de Moshi y el congreso femenino de Moscú, demostrando la severidad del conflicto: "Especialmente alarmante en este particular es no solamente la ausencia de todo verdadero esfuerzo por dar solución al conflicto sino la creciente evidencia de que el conflicto puede volver a agravarse". El editorial da a entender que también hay preocupación por las fronteras soviéticas:

"En materia de querrelas fronterizas mantenemos ideas leninistas y estamos convencidos de que no hay cuestiones que no puedan

sin derramamiento de sangre... Por lo que concierne a la Unión Soviética, su actitud respecto a los países fronterizos a ella es de respeto".

La Agencia Nueva China apunto con acritud el 21 de septiembre que "la maquinaria oficial de propeganda de India" ha dado máxima publicidad a dicho editorial. El 25 de septiembre el "Diario del Pueblo" reproduce íntegramente el editorial, prometiendo comentar más tarde, y dice entretanto: "El artículo hace caso omiso totalmente de los hechos, trastroca la verdad, calumnia a China en el sentido de querer decidir su disputa fronteriza con India por la guerra, y maliciosamente trata de emponzoñar las relaciones de los países afroasiáticos, en particular los países de la conferencia de Colombo, con China".

20 Septiembre: "Komsomolskaya Pravda" publica relatos de cuatro individuos evadidos recientemente de Sinkiang sobre la persecución china. En Pyongyang, "Nodong Sinman" publica un artículo por tres estudiosos chinos criticando la "Historia Mundial" soviética por la forma en que trata la historia de Corea. La historia soviética, declaran los coreanos, pasa por alto la gloriosa cultura antigua de Corea, deja de seguir los principios marxistas de partynost e historicismo y copia mecánicamente de las obras de escritores imperialistas tales como los japoneses y otros. Pero entre los defectos de la obra soviética, dicen los coreanos, están la repetición de una leyenda que dice que la primera confederación de tribus fue fundada por un exiliado de China en el siglo 12 a.J., y la pretensión de que los naturales de Corea aprendieron de China el cultivo de la seda y de varios cereales.

21 Septiembre: El Gobierno soviético publica una declaración oficial en contestación a la de los chinos de 1° de septiembre; dicha declaración comenta la actitud china sobre el tratado contra los ensayos nucleares, sobre la posesión de armas nucleares, sobre la frontera chino-soviética, sobre el conflicto chino-indio y sobre las comunas populares. Moscú apunta que más de 90 países han suscrito el tratado contra los ensayos nucleares y señala que las propuestas chinas recientes sobre el desarme están copiadas de dos propuestas soviéticas diferentes. Cita a Friedrich Engels para demostrar que ya para el 1893 "amplios sectores de la población reclamaban el desarme", con el completo apoyo de Engels. En cuanto a la negativa china en su declaración de 1° de septiembre de estar procurando su propia arma nuclear a cualquier precio, la declaración china "realmente confirma la conclusión a que hemos llegado y comprueba una vez más que la posición negativa del Gobierno de la RP china sobre el tratado contra los ensayos nucleares se explica precisamente por su deseo de hacer de su país una potencia nuclear". Alegando que los chinos dicen abiertamente que van a tener armas nucleares aunque les tome cien años, los soviéticos señalan que los chinos difícilmente están en condiciones de desviar recursos para la fabricación de armas nucleares:

"Es bien sabido que China carece de un superávit de recursos, y se requieren enormes recursos para fabricar armas nucleares... Nosotros no consideramos el nuestro un país pobre, pero nosotros mismos tenemos mucho que hacer para poner fin a las dificultades materiales que aún existen por ahora y de las cuales hablamos abiertamente".

Las armas soviéticas protegen todo el campo socialista, como Mao

capacidad soviética, China "no necesita organizar la producción de tales armas, especialmente viendo que son muy costosas". La tentativa actual de adquirir una capacidad independiente sugiere que los chinos "han desarrollado alguna clase de propósitos e intereses especiales que no pueden ser apoyados por la fuerza militar del campo socialista".

"Ya que es imposible emparejar planes de desenvolvimiento de armas nucleares para aumentar, por ejemplo, la influencia propia en países de Asia, Africa y América Latina o para crearse una 'posición de fuerza' en cuestiones internacionales sobre salientes con el derrotero pacífico de la política exterior de los países del sistema socialista".

Añade la declaración soviética, burlescamente: "No quisiéramos pensar que al Gobierno de la RP china lo animan semejantes móviles".

Los soviéticos vuelven contra los chinos sus "citas íntegras" de Mao y "Viva el Leninismo":

"... los dirigentes chinos debaten si el 50 ó el ciento por ciento de la humanidad quedaría destruido en las llamas de una nueva guerra ... [Esto lo demuestra] el pronunciamiento de Mao Tse-tung aun en la forma alterada en que lo presenta la declaración del Gobierno chino de 1° de septiembre: '[elipsis de Tass] ... en el peor de los casos media humanidad perecerá, pero quedará la mitad. Pero el imperialismo será barrido de la faz de la tierra y el mundo entero pasará a ser socialista'. No menos elocuente en este sentido es una cita de 'Bandera Roja', que tratan de desmentir, en el sentido de que en caso de guerra los pueblos victoriosos 'con la mayor rapidez crearán sobre las ruinas del imperialismo derruido una civilización mil veces superior'".

Solicitando poderosamente el apoyo de los PC de países pequeños, los soviéticos denuncian que, cuando un periodista checo le dijo a Tao Chu, miembro del CC del PC chino, que en caso de guerra nuclear todos los checos podrían morir, Tao replicó:

"'En caso de una guerra de aniquilación los países pequeños que pertenecen al campo socialista tendrían que subordinar sus intereses a los intereses del campo en general'".

En opinión de los chinos, "La variante bélica del desarrollo de los acontecimientos se considera ... inevitable y hasta más de desear que la variante pacífica". Cada vez que en años recientes se ha producido una distensión los chinos intencionalmente han provocado el malestar, como en el conflicto chino-indio de 1959. Hasta en la frontera soviética crean dificultades:

"Comenzando en 1960, militares y civiles chinos han estado sistemáticamente violando la frontera soviética. Tan solo en 1962 se registraron más de 5 mil violaciones de la frontera soviética desde el lado chino. También se hicieron tentativas de 'desarrollar' algunas partes del territorio soviético sin permiso ... La propaganda china está haciendo claras alusiones a la demarcación injusta de algunos sectores de la frontera

chino-soviética que alegan haber sido hecha en el pasado. Sin embargo, la creación artificial hoy de problemas territoriales, especialmente entre países socialistas, equivaldría a lanzarse a un camino pelagrosísimo".

Un poco sorprendentemente, la declaración soviética termina con un llamado a poner fin a las polémicas y deja entrever que las conversaciones de julio entre el PC chino y el PCUS podrían ser reanudadas, ya que se convino entonces que serían continuadas más tarde. Los soviéticos manifiestan su disposición a dar "todos los pasos que podamos por conseguir la unidad con China", pero añaden que si los chinos malinterpretan esta buena voluntad y persisten en sus actividades calumniosas y facciosas "deberán comprender claramente que en ese camino les aguarda el más resuelto rechazo del PCUS y del pueblo soviético".

También el 21 de septiembre se celebraron en Ulan Bator una ceremonia de premio y un banquete de estado en ocasión de la partida de 309 trabajadores chinos para China. Funcionarios mongoles expresaron su gratitud por la contribución de los trabajadores, funcionarios y estudiantes chinos, pero parece que la partida de éstos clausuró los programas chinos de ayuda en Mongolia. Los regresados recibieron la ya acostumbrada manifestación de recibo cuando llegaron a la frontera china el 23 de septiembre.

22 Septiembre: Informa Tass que la comisión política del PC peruano se suscribe al tratado "de Moscú" contra los ensayos nucleares y denuncia al Gobierno francés por su intención de proseguir sus ensayos.

23 Septiembre: Una emisión de la Radio de Moscú en francés para Africa ridiculiza los asertos chinos de que se abstienen de tomar parte en la Tercera Reunión Mundial de Periodistas porque no se celebra en Africa y porque tratará de asuntos de la profesión y no políticos; Argel (donde tocará el barco de los periodistas) está en Africa, y la lucha por la paz, contra la reacción y por la independencia nacional y la justicia social será tratada en la reunión. En Ulan Bator, la agencia noticiera mongola Montsame transmite un comentario de "observador" apoyando la declaración soviética de 21 de septiembre.

24 Septiembre: "Pravda" publica una declaración del Comité Central del PC portugués que declara que las líneas de conducta de los chinos son peligrosas y sus argumentos de que el PCUS impone un "rumbo de paz" a los partidos en los países capitalistas son deplorables; nadie le está imponiendo un "rumbo de paz" al PC portugués, que tiene que derrocar a un Gobierno fascista por la fuerza. La declaración sugiere "la más pronta convocatoria de una reunión de todos los partidos comunistas y obreros que, además de discutir problemas ideológicos, elaboraría las normas que gobernarán las relaciones entre los partidos fraternos". Tass y la Radio de Moscú difunden el relato a sus auditorios del interior y de Europa.

25 Septiembre: "Leninskaya Smena" de Alma Ata publica un artículo de Asir Vakhidov, ex miembro del comité central del Komsomol chino y secretario del Komsomol de Sinkiang, evadido de China. Vakhidov, de nacionalidad uigur, declara que centenares de sus compatriotas languisecen en "los llamados campos de entrenamiento obrero, que son en realidad campos de concentración". "Se nos marcó como 'traidores',

metropolitanos y espías de los soviéticos y se nos expulsó de nuestros empleos", expresa Vakhidov. "Las personas que por cualquier motivo se pusieran en contacto con el consulado soviético eran interrogadas". De acuerdo con un artículo de la Agencia Tanyug de 26 de septiembre, un artículo parecido aparece en la edición actual de la "Literaturnaya Gazeta", escrito por Bukhara Tishkanbeyev, escritor kazaj que anteriormente vivió en Sinkiang.

26 Septiembre: Después de una pausa de dos semanas (los primeros dos artículos aparecieron con una semana de separación), el "Diario del Pueblo" y "Bandera Roja" publican el tercero de su serie de artículos en contestación a la Carta Abierta del Comité Central del PCUS de 14 de julio de 1963: "¿Es Yugoslavia país socialista?" La respuesta china, que no sorprende mucho, es que no. Dicen ellos que el capitalismo y la usura florecen en la ciudades yugoslavas, los kulaks se engordan en los campos yugoslavos y la dictadura del proletariado se ha convertido en una "dictadura de la burguesía burocrático-compradora", una categoría que suena un poco como la Nueva Clase de Milovan Djilas. "La ayuda de los Estados Unidos ha sido el sostén de las finanzas y la economía de Yugoslavia" -- gracias a haber Tito concertado una serie de tratados traicioneros con los Estados Unidos:

"Debido a la concertación de dichos tratados y acuerdos y por haber la camarilla de Tito puesto a Yugoslavia en sujeción al imperialismo norteamericano, los Estados Unidos gozan de los siguientes derechos en Yugoslavia: 1) a controlar sus asuntos militares; 2) a controlar sus relaciones exteriores; 3) a inmiscuirse en sus asuntos internos; 4) a manipular y supervisar sus finanzas; 5) a controlar su comercio exterior; 6) al despojo de sus recursos estratégicos; y 7) a recoger inteligencia militar y económica".

Bajo el gobierno de Tito, el poder del estado ha degenerado de la dictadura del proletariado a la dictadura de la burguesía; "la dictadura de la burguesía no solo existe sino que hasta es una brutal dictadura fascista. El régimen de Tito ha establecido muchos campos de concentración y prisiones fascistas donde decenas de millares de revolucionarios han sido torturados a muerte con toda clase de castigos inhumanos". Al mismo tiempo se perdona a los contrarrevolucionarios. No obstante, Krushev fraterniza con la camarilla de Tito "no porque haya corregido alguno de sus errores sino porque él está siguiendo los pasos de Tito". Krushev y Tito "ambos quieren liquidar el campo socialista" y Krushev

"ha abandonado el marxismo-leninismo, descartado la declaración de 1960 y hozado en el lodo con la camarilla de Tito, en completa violación de los intereses de la Unión Soviética, el pueblo soviético y el pueblo de todo el mundo. Esto no será tolerado por el gran pueblo soviético, la aplastante mayoría de los miembros del PCUS y cuadros a varios niveles, todos los cuales tienen una gloriosa tradición revolucionaria".

El artículo contiene numerosas citas de la prensa yugoslava, lo que no obstante no puede considerarse garantía de su exactitud de hecho. Aunque el artículo contiene al final una incongrua invitación a los dirigentes soviéticos a dar marcha atrás antes que sea demasiado tarde, su publicación parece constituir una resonante negativa a poner fin a

27 Septiembre: La Radio de Moscú difunde interiormente un resumen en "Pravda" del discurso de John Gollan de 14 de septiembre (véase 18 Septiembre), con inclusión ahora de un trozo que pide una conferencia mundial de PCs a base de las declaraciones de 1957 y 1960.

7 October 1963

701. Crisis in Communist Agriculture

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BACKGROUND: The gravity of the Communist agricultural failure in 1963 became known in September when the Soviet Union purchased tremendous quantities of grain -- upward of 8 million metric tons -- from free world countries to feed itself and its satellites, including Cuba. The full extent of the failure is not yet known: the Soviets may dip into their presumably large grain reserves (known to be kept in event of war) or may attempt to fulfill all of its needs and commitments through purchases. Experts at this time estimate the crop failure to be a minimum of 10% loss with the possibility that it could be more than 30%. FYI. The crop now appears to be about the level of the 1959 and 1960 crops -- an 18% decrease from 1962 when the program called for a 21% increase.⁷

In spite of failure to increase its overall agricultural production in recent years, the Soviet Union has been a net exporter of grain: in 1962 it imported only 45 thousand tons while exporting 4.8 million metric tons (hereafter referred to simply as tons), three-fifths of it to Eastern Europe. The USSR claimed a production of 70 million tons in 1962, but it was probably closer to 55 million tons. Current purchases suggest that this year's crop is well under 50 million tons. That the Soviets reach exceeds their grasp is notable in the fact that their overall farm production has not yet reached its 1958 level while their grand 7-year plan (1959-1965) called for a 70% increase. In the meantime, the Soviet population has steadily increased, which means less food per capita year by year.

The devastating 1963 failures in the USSR and the Bloc, largely brought on by drought, demonstrate more dramatically than ever their basically unrealistic agricultural policies, farm systems and planning. See BPG #123, item #690 "Belated Help for Soviet Agriculture" and unclassified attachment "Agriculture in the Soviet Bloc."⁷ In his speeches, Khrushchev has railed at farm officials for their inefficient management, and talked about bureaucratic administrators who did not know good farm procedures. At the same time he has stressed the need for using greater quantities of fertilizer, and the need for irrigation. These latest remedies are largely unavailable to the managers and bureaucrats who have to make do with what they have. Typical of Khrushchev's off-the-cuff interference was a hint (18 September) that he would force V.D. Beliayev, Chairman of the Lower Volga Economic Council, to replace outmoded machinery in spite of Beliayev's expressed opinion that production loss during a changeover would make it unprofitable.

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Speeches made by Khrushchev earlier this year criticizing agricultural officials might have suggested that the Soviet Union was aware there would be a serious crop setback. For example, in response to a March 12, 1963 proposal he made in a speech, five of the largest Soviet Republics -- the RSFSR, the Ukraine, the Kazakh, the Kirgiz, and the Tadzhik (as well as the Moldavian and Byelo-Russian) -- passed laws reducing the number of cows which could be privately owned and placing a penalty of up to three years of corrective labor for any owner feeding bread to cows. /It is the practice in many parts of the USSR, where grain is not available to private households, for farmers to buy bread for their cows. Bread, a staple supplying about one-half of the Russian diet, is heavily subsidized by the state, its sale is controlled by the state, and prices are very low.7 But Khrushchev's speeches evidently were concerned only with continuing low production (four successive years of mediocre crops before 1963) and with serious reductions in the winter wheat output. The devastating failure of the summer-fall crops in the satellites and the USSR were evidently not foreseen, nor was there any provision for such emergencies in Communist planning: only six months ago the USSR had sold 43 million bushels of grain to Brazil; only eight months ago they negotiated a tremendous sale to Japan; and just before the massive purchase of wheat from Canada, the Soviet re-purchased nearly 4 million bushels from European countries and were negotiating to buy back what they had sold to Great Britain.

Soviet purchases of grain in September were made in several steps. In the early part of the week of September 9 the Soviets bought 11 million bushels from Canada; on September 16th they made the history-making purchase of 227.5 million bushels (193 of wheat and 29.5 of wheat flour or 6.2 million tons) from Canada; on September 18th another agreement was signed, this time with Australia, for 53.5 million bushels (or 1 million tons) all in wheat flour, with an option for another 5 or 6 million bushels. The Canadian sale, it is reported, would have been even larger if Canada's transportation facilities had been sufficient to meet the deadline delivery date set by the USSR. It was reported in September that Soviet officials were negotiating: with private U.S. producers for the purchase of some 100 to 200 million bushels of wheat; with Italy and West Germany for something around 300 thousand tons; and had cancelled a sale of grain to Finland. The purchase of large quantities of wheat flour suggests that the Soviets waited so long to recognize the critical nature of their need that their milling plants were inadequate to make grain available for use.

In spite of its own calamity, the USSR is fulfilling its commitment to Cuba, whose needs have increased from 292 thousand to 465 thousand tons as a result of drastic failures in all of its own crops. The Canadian sale was contingent upon the willingness of that country to ship the 465 thousand tons directly to Cuba.

Part of the large Soviet purchases are intended to fulfill commitments to satellites, but: Poland has already asked to buy

a million tons from the U.S.; it is reported that a Bulgarian mission is in Canada; and the Czechoslovakian government has inquired into purchases in the U.S.

China. At the time the Soviet purchases were announced, negotiations by Communist China for 137 million bushels (or 500,000 tons) of wheat from Canada for delivery before the end of 1963 were disclosed -- six months before the expiration of their earlier 3-year contract. Their full agreement calls for a maximum of 5 million tons and a minimum of 3 million tons during the 3-year period 1 August 1963 to 31 July 1966. Approximately three years ago the CCP had largely phased out its Commune program on the heels of countrywide chaos resulting from this half-conceived, misdirected and poorly administered monstrous effort. In 1959-1960, Chinese officials discovered that, over the years, agricultural production figures had consistently been inflated by regional and local officials. Unrealistic production goals, therefore, were in part caused by the inaccurate base throughout the country provided by officials intent on protecting themselves by claiming successes they had not achieved. But disclosure of these facts (i.e. failure of the Communes and the practice of inflating production figures) and the promise to institute realistic agricultural programs, have apparently not produced better results. The population continues to suffer and the CPR is forced to purchase food in some attempt to maintain its massive population at a subsistence level.


Recent economic decisions of the CCP involve further deprivation for the Chinese people. In their anger at the Soviet Union, the CPR is engaged in a strenuous effort to repay, at an unnecessarily fast rate, the earlier loans made by the USSR. Further, they have launched a campaign for self-sufficiency in an effort to enhance their political prestige. Advocating "self-reliance" in socialist economic development, they are attacking the USSR denunciation of this principle, primarily with respect to CPSU policies toward the Satellites in Comecon (CEMA). In its "go-it-alone" policy, the CCP is attempting, in competition with the CPSU, to create an image of its own strength as the (Communist) nation to be imitated and followed.

Khrushchev has admitted, in a parenthetical reference in a speech published on 30 September, that "a difficult situation has arisen in 1963 and we shall not be able to harvest the amount of bread grain we had reckoned upon"; he also disclosed the USSR's purchases from Canada and Australia (8.8 million tons, according to his statement), and the allocation of 400,000 tons from Rumania. Informal restrictions have been placed on the purchase of bread in Moscow stores, and bread and flour are sometimes simply unobtainable. The Kremlin is clearly trying to take the shock out of the hard facts of the situation, to lessen the food deficit by spending hard cash for foreign grains, and to control the reactions of the people to this latest failure in the production of consumption goods.

For six or seven years Khrushchev has been telling the Russian people that his agricultural policies would lead to immense increases in all types of food production. In addition to concentration on expanding grain and corn acreage (especially in the new lands program), meat and dairy products were promised in the near future. One of these promises was made as follows:

"The leading collective farms and state farms, ... have made a pledge ... to catch up with the United States in the next few years in the production of meat, milk, and butter per capita of the population." (Khrushchev in Moscow radio broadcast November 6, 1957 on the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.)

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Games of the New Emerging Forces
(GANEF0)

BACKGROUND: Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEF0) will be held in Djakarta, Indonesia from 10 to 22 November 1963. The decision was announced by Indonesian Sports Minister Maladi on 13 February 1963 and has been reaffirmed inter alia in resolutions adopted at subsequent Afro-Asian conferences.

In February 1963, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) suspended Indonesia for an indefinite period as a disciplinary measure following Indonesia's failure to allow athletic teams from Taiwan and Israel to participate in the Asian Games held in the late summer of 1962 in Djakarta under IOC auspices. This action was taken in accordance with IOC rules that all eligible participants must be allowed to participate.

On 9 February 1963 the Department of Sports of the Republic of Indonesia denounced the action of the IOC as having been prompted by arrogance and lust for power by elements in the IOC who were accomplices of Taiwan and Israel, the imperialists, capitalists and colonialists. Their statement said that, far from being isolated by the IOC's action, Indonesia would be freer to realize its ideals of organizing new games free from imperialist and colonialist elements.

Claims of the sponsors. Indonesian officials, including Sukarno, portray GANEF0 as being inspired by Olympic ideals merged with the Bandung spirit (which is attributed to the first governmental-level Afro-Asian conference of 1955). They say GANEF0 is the logical growth of the present world order, a world of the awakening of the continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America, preceded -- as stated in an Indonesian ANTARA broadcast -- by the birth of the socialist countries.

The sponsors of GANEF0 say that the political changes of the world are not sufficiently reflected in the present structure of international sports, because reactionary elements and those with vested interests have deliberately sought to maintain the status quo. The sponsors say that just as the freedom of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the establishment of the socialist countries were the result of hard struggles, so will the transformation of the world of international sports require relentless struggle to conform with the new world order. In the words of Sukarno "sports cannot be separated from politics . . . (indeed) sports must be based on politics." Political, religious and all types of

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fraternal societies have long organized sport groups as organizational adjuncts to encourage a mass following; and countries have encouraged participation in international sports events to improve their image and cultural contacts throughout the world. Communist countries, however, have at times sponsored international events excluding committed free countries in an attempt to capture prestige for themselves as the center of world sports. Sukarno is following this tactic in an attempt to destroy any true international sports organization which encourages world-wide participation in the spirit of free competition and is, in this sense, apolitical.

GANEF0 sponsors claim that they are not against the principles of the existing international sports movement as represented by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). This claim is contradicted, however, by the implication that IOC's principles do not really apply to the new family of nations, i.e. IOC has not taken proper cognizance of the "breakdown of the old order." Some sponsoring elements make this explicit, saying that GANEF0 is fully in accord with the struggle against imperialism and colonialism.

Position of International Olympic Committee. In an IOC circular, dated 15 August, to members of the IOC, National Olympic Committees, and International Amateur Athletic Federations (IAAFs), IOC President Avery Brundage stated inter alia that IOC has no information about GANEF0 and "no connection with them." The circular says that if the games


"are not sanctioned by the International Federations IAAFs, participants will be liable to suspension, since most international federations have rules that prohibit members from participating in unsanctioned events. If they are sanctioned by the international federations, only members of those federations will be eligible to participate, since most international federations have regulations against the participation of non-members. (Obviously there is no reason for being a member of a federation if participation in its event is open to non-members)."

Participants. According to available reports 52 nations have been invited to the Games. In August, Indonesia announced that with the New Emerging Forces alone GANEF0 would not be complete and the sponsors have agreed to include all progressive forces in other countries. Just which nations are considered eligible for GANEF0 has never been made clear. Since the nations of the emerging areas and the Communist countries add up to considerably more than 52, and there is conflicting and only partial information on the invitees, an accurate list of the participants cannot be given at this time. Presumably South Vietnam, South Korea, Taiwan, Israel, Union of South Africa and areas still under colonial rule will not be invited.

According to a report of last April the Soviet Union advised Indonesia that it will not participate in the Games, because IOC members are not allowed to take part in games organized by non-members. However, a recent report states that the Soviet Union is planning to send 300 athletes and the Chicoms a 350-man team. Reportedly, several African countries as well as Burma are reluctant to participate in the Games since they have learned that the Chicoms have agreed to defray expenses for all countries which cannot pay their own way. The Chicom subsidization presumably is to be channeled through the Indonesian government. The Burmese, it is reported, do not want to put themselves in the position of "being dominated by Peking."

NCNA reported on 13 September the Indonesian Minister of Sports' statement that 20 countries had accepted invitations to the Games and that those countries opposed to GANEFO will leave no stone unturned in their attempts to undermine the Games. In an apparent reference to the IOC circular, Maladi is reported also to have stated that some international sports associations have warned their member nations not to take part in GANEFO, and to have added: "Do not take notice of them, we need not ask their permission."

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7 October 1963

703 WH,a. Dissensions Among Latin American Communists

BACKGROUND: New evidence of Sino-Soviet competition in Latin America and the effect of the Sino-Soviet dispute upon Latin American Communist Parties (as discussed in Bi-Weekly Propaganda Guidance No. 693, WH,a, "Communism in Latin America," 26 August) appears daily.

Among the recent developments:

1. Four prominent Soviet Communist Party officials arrived in Montevideo (ideological and propaganda experts including the chief editors of the official CP journal, Kommunist, and the CP propaganda journal, Agitator, and the deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee) to attend the celebrations of the 43rd anniversary of the Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU). The celebrations were originally planned for 21 September, the day the PCU was founded, but were postponed until 5 October.
2. A secret meeting of Latin American Communist Party officials in Montevideo in early October continues to be reported from a variety of sources. The arrival of Soviet Party officials and the postponement of the PCU celebrations lend credence to these reports. The agenda reportedly will feature discussions of the Sino-Soviet conflict, plans to create political and economic chaos in Latin America, general sabotage strategy including specific programs for Brazil and Argentina, and an analysis of communism on the continent.
3. The Chinese Communists plan to create a "new Communist International" according to a report in Rome's pro-Peking Communist newspaper Ritorniamo a Lenin (Let Us Return to Lenin). Among the Communist Parties supporting the Chinese, according to the paper, are those in Venezuela and Puerto Rico. (See Washington Post and Press Comment, 4 September.)
4. Peking is stepping up attempts to win supporters among the traditionally Moscow-oriented Communist Parties of Latin America. Chinese Communist trade officials reportedly told a recent meeting of Uruguayan pro-Chinese leftists that similar splinter groups were springing up everywhere and that Peking was ready to help them in every way possible. One element of the Ecuadorean Party is reported to be receiving funds from both the Chinese and the Cubans. In Peru young pro-Chinese leaders are reported to constitute a serious challenge to the old guard of their CP and sharp dissension has forced postponement of the CP plenum. Latin America's best organized pro-Chinese group -- the Communist Party of Brazil which broke away from the pro-Soviet

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Brazilian Communist Party -- reportedly has formed an alliance with Francisco Juliao's Peasant Leagues and other extreme leftists and established combined political and military directorships to consolidate "all Brazilian revolutionary forces."

5. Cuba continues its aggressive attempts to foment rebellion. President Guillermo Leon Valencia of Colombia charged on 26 September that "today the fight is with Fidel Castro." He declared that he had documentary proof of open Castro intervention in Colombia and called Castro-supported terrorists and guerrillas "wolves in sheep's clothing" which pose "the greatest danger ever to threaten the country."

There is reason to believe that the Cubans see in the Sino-Soviet dispute new opportunities to re-assert their claim to lead the Latin American revolution and for Castro to regain lost stature. After considerable silence on the subject, they have renewed their exhortations for rebellion and violence in Latin America. "Violence," declared Cuba's Minister of Industries Ernesto "Che" Guevara in the September issue of the Cuban Communist theoretical journal, Cuba Socialista, is "the midwife of new societies." He said:

"We had predicted that the war would be continental... Will its vortex be in Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, or Ecuador? /Note the designation of countries where violence, pro-Chinese factions and/or Cuban-supported guerrillas exist/ Will these present skirmishes be only manifestations of an unrest that does not bear fruit? It does not matter What counts is the decision to struggle that ripens day by day; the awareness of the need for revolutionary change, the certainty of its possibility."

Cuba's support of dissident elements in Latin America and its encouragement of rebellion have aroused not only legally-constituted governments, but also local Communist Parties. The latter object to Cuba's financial and material aid to dissidents without the prior knowledge and approval of the local Parties. More than one old-guard leader has been upset to find his opposition within the CP financed by Cuba.


6. Yugoslavia President Tito has acted as a catalyst to precipitate or exacerbate dissension on his tour of Latin America. Catholics in Brazil, for example, launched a campaign protesting his visit, publicizing the fact he had been excommunicated by Rome and calling him the "torturer" of Archbishop Stepinac. They were joined by Brazil's far left, Classe Operaria, the weekly newspaper of the pro-Chinese CPB, denounced the visit of "the temporary president of Yugoslavia" as an imperialist plot (with the notation that his request to join President Goulart on a big game hunt revealed his "aristocratic tendencies"). "Tito and his gang," the paper concluded, "call themselves socialists but in reality they yield to North American monopolies in exchange for dollars and weapons."

Conservative political leaders in Brazil restricted his itinerary, reduced the length of his stay and limited his contacts. His reception in Chile was indifferent and threats on his life severely limited his contact with the public. The conservative press had a field day. Panama papers called him a "slippery neutralist" with "zig-zagging politics" and suggested: "Paint him as a classic acrobat who walks the edge of a razor."

But the most significant effect of Tito's visit was among the leftists. Comments ranged from effusive welcoming editorials to scathing attacks on the so-called leader of "independent" communism. The Communist Party of Bolivia reportedly resolved to adopt a neutral position using the Party paper to acknowledge his presence but omitting any praise. Bolivian CP leaders felt it was impossible to ignore his visit and designed this strategy to prevent stimulating ideological disputes within the Party.

It is reasonable to expect that the Sino-Soviet dispute will increase tensions within the Communist Parties of Latin America and coupled with the developments described above will contribute to more fractionation of the Communist movement in this area.

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704 EE,WE,a. Stalinist and Pro-Chinese Dissidence in the
25X1C10b European Communist Parties

BACKGROUND:

Italy. In January 1963 a splinter group from the PCI established the "Associazione d'Amicizia tra Italia e Cina" (Italo-Chinese Friendship Association), dedicated to the violent overthrow of the bourgeois state and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The group has its headquarters in Padua and branches in a number of Italian cities. It is composed for the most part of Trotskyites and militants expelled from the PCI, i.e. of disparate extremist groups working outside of or on the fringes of the Italian Communist and Socialist parties. It publishes a monthly magazine entitled Italia-Cina. The Association is recognized, officially endorsed and presumably funded by the Chinese, although it may receive additional funds from a variety of sources which see in it an instrument to weaken the PCI. At present, the Italia-Cina organization is going through a period of disagreement and disorientation, a phenomenon usually experienced by Communist groups which break with the party organization and then attempt to reconcile divergent interests and ideas and to agree on some form of organized protest. The Association -- which is without a leadership of national stature and whose cadre is formed basically from dissident sections of the Padua provincial Communist Federation -- has succeeded in publishing a number of booklets attacking the embourgeoisement of Togliatti, Nenni, et.al., accusing the PCI leadership of the by-now-familiar heresies of "reformism," "constitutionalism," "demobilizing the working class" etc., while advocating a return to Marxist-Leninist purity and revolutionary action. The PCI, while publicly ignoring the group or insisting that the hard-line trend is negligible, is disciplining party members in contact with the factionalists. For the present, Togliatti, fresh from successes in the Italian elections won on a program of moderate parliamentary reform (i.e. the opposite tactic to that advocated by Italia-Cina) is in a very good position to maintain party discipline and isolate the left-wing factionalists. In fact, the PCI appears -- in a sense -- to be exploiting the Italia-Cina Association by contrasting the radical program of the latter with its own "peaceful" and "democratic" efforts. Nonetheless, the appearance of a rival group of dedicated militants, supported and funded by Communist China, is a phenomenon which he cannot afford to ignore. In addition to Italia-Cina, which at the moment is the chosen instrument of Peking, there are other independent manifestations of Chicom activity in Italy which reflect radical, abstract or anarchist currents and appeal largely to an extremist fringe.

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Belgium. Factionalism in the Belgian Communist Party, on the other hand, is capable of posing a significant challenge to party leaders. When Jacques Grippa, Secretary of the Brussels Federation, politburo and central committee member, was expelled from the Party at the XIVth BCP Congress in April 1963, together with three other prominent members of the Brussels Federation, for "engaging in factional activities incompatible with the party constitution...", he took with him an estimated 25-40 percent of the Brussels Federation. Grippa's dissident "Brussels Federation" held its own Congress 23 June, "dissolved" the regular party organization and demanded an extraordinary national congress. The dissidents receive funds and polemical propaganda from the Chinese who recognize in Grippa an important tactical asset in their campaign to develop pro-Chinese support among the European CPs. Grippa, long an advocate of greater militancy, has steadfastly attacked Khrushchev's "moderate" policies and opposed the Belgian CPs endorsement of them since the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961. At the XIVth BCP Congress, he and his followers circulated to all the delegates a document reiterating their dissident views. In August Grippa, who had already spent most of July in Albania, made a visit to Communist China. In late August the dissidents attacked Moscow and the Belgian CP in a statement characterizing the Moscow group as revisionists and scissionists. On 27 September, five members of the party's youth association in Brussels were expelled for "deliberately attempting to create a split within the Brussels Federation of the young Communist organization." The Belgian CP is the first in Europe in which a significant splinter party has been formed.

France. While there are a number of left-wing Communist groups (Trotskyite, dissident Trotskyite etc.) in France which oppose the French Communist Party and favor greater militancy (some of which have helped spread Chinese propaganda), an organized, Chinese-backed opposition group is still only in the formative stage. Indications exist, however, that the Chinese have selected certain individuals to engage in extensive propaganda activities on their behalf in the hope of creating factions and gaining support in the traditionally conservative but docile and Moscow-oriented French CP.

United Kingdom. While there appears to have been little left-wing opposition at the British CP Congress in April 1963, where a dozen or so delegates criticized the party's refusal to publish the Sino-Soviet exchanges and called for public debate of the issues (they also criticized Yugoslav revisionism), in August and September 1963 the correspondence columns of the Daily Worker indicate that pro-Chinese sentiment exists even in the ranks of the British CP. The fact that these letters, many of which are strongly militant and sympathetic to the Chinese stand, were allowed to be published in the official party organ, is an indication both of party reluctance to take sides in the quarrel and of the difficulty in convincing the conservative and orthodox British Communist rank and file of the wisdom of Khrushchev's policies. For the present, the Chinese Communists

seem to be working largely through the Britain-China Friendship Association which is responsive to Chinese direction and supports China on major points of difference with the Soviet Union.

Switzerland. In mid-September 1963, dissident members of the Partei der Arbeit, the Workers (Communist) Party, formed a new "Communist Party of Switzerland" in opposition to the autocratic and unrepresentative methods of the present Partie der Arbeit leaders in suppressing the Chinese point of view and ordering party members to follow the Moscow line. The new party is in contact with the Chinese and is receiving and disseminating Chinese propaganda. It is in contact also with Italian and Belgian dissidents. The Swiss dissidents are mostly from Vevey in the Canton of Vaud. The new party is led by Gérard Buillard, "Secretary General," formerly Secretary of the Vevey Section of the Worker's Party, recently expelled for distributing Chinese propaganda pamphlets. The public emergence of a dissident faction in Switzerland is basically a reaction against the uninspiring policies of Secretary General Edgar Woog who has maintained traditional Swiss CP subservience to Moscow and to the Italian Communist Party. In regard to Chinese activities in Switzerland, the NCNA office in Geneva is expanding to accommodate the NCNA officials recently expelled from Prague.

General. There have been recurrent rumors throughout the summer of 1963 that the Chinese Communists intend to establish a new Communist international which would promote revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and be responsive to Chinese direction. Evidence indicates that the Chinese are attempting -- at the least -- to coordinate activities of the revolutionary factions of the various European Communist Parties. Jacques Grippa, and three other Belgian dissident leaders were in Tirana between 14 July and 5 August 1963, together with Franco Molfese, and other Italian leaders of the Italia-Cina Friendship Association. Gérard Buillard, leader of the Swiss dissidents, appears also to have been to Albania in August. Subsequently, the Belgian leaders visited Peking. A militant Communist publication entitled Revolution has recently appeared in Paris in Spanish, English and French. The publication may be intended as a link among the revolutionary Communist factions in Europe.

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Down on Red Farms

Soviet Agriculture Faces Fifth Straight Below-Par Harvest

Weather Woes Shrink Grain
Output; Scarcity of Feed
Spurs Slaughter of Animals

Bosses Score Inefficiency

By JOE WESTERN

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—With harvest time at hand,

the Kremlin's Red masters are facing their fifth straight year of embarrassing below-par farm production.

U.S. analysts are now convinced of that prospect. By sifting Russian agricultural statistics, weather reports and Communist concessions of error, they're piercing some of the fog veiling the current facts about life down on the Soviet farm. The findings include these:

This year's crops of badly needed livestock feed grains, vital wheat for bread making and all-important potatoes promise to sag below last year's none too great results. By the Communists' own admission, plantings of these crops actually shrank from 1962 acreages, some of them by over 10%. Since planting time, they've suffered from extreme cold and heat and from drought. In one major grain-raising region, rainfall this year has been less than half of normal.

Shortages of feed are forcing Russian farm bosses to trim their herds of cattle, hogs, sheep and goats and send to slaughter hundreds of thousands of skinny, often underage animals. While scanty Soviet meat supplies may thus be swelled temporarily, the longer-range effect will be to prolong or worsen Russia's chronic meat scarcities. For lack of cattle feed, too, Soviet milk production promises to slip below last year. Even before this year's bad news came in, the Moscow daily Pravda surveyed the feed situation and complained: "Hooves and tails increase, but production remains almost on the same level."

Less Food Per Capita?

Though output of cotton and some lesser crops may top 1962, these increases may not be enough to offset other shortcomings. At best, by Free World reckonings, the USSR's total farm output this year probably won't rise significantly above last year's showing; that was about 5% short of record 1958. Moreover, because the Soviet Union's population may rise by about 1.5% to an estimated 226

million in 1963, per-capita food and fiber production may well fall to about 87% of 1958's levels from 88% in 1962.

No one expects anything approaching famine to result, of course. But the lack of more meat and milk alone indicates Premier Khrushchev's regime is falling down on a promise to better the lot of his people and to catch up to U.S. farm abundance. The USSR's current seven-year plan tentatively envisioned a total 1959-through-1965 farm production increase of 70%, with especially steep gains in meat and milk. In every year so far, Russian farmers have failed even to match record 1958. What's more, total Soviet farm output continues to lag more than 30% behind the U.S. even though Russia's 1963 planted acreage of 539 million acres is nearly 75% larger than this country's. This uninspiring example, compared to Western agricultural abundance, threatens to hamper export of the Red faith to developing nations.

Again this year as last, the Russians are blaming bad weather for most of their agricultural woes. But officials continue also to excoriate lower-echelon bureaucrats and farmers for inefficiency, ignorance and inertia.

In fact, Western analysts find, the Communist system of tight state control, with limited incentive for producers, is heavily to blame. Even special production bonuses and 1963's increases in prices for farmers have not been enough, it's believed, to spur them to dawn-to-dusk labors. Still another brake has been Russia's post-1958 slowup in growth of investment in agriculture, affecting spending on farm machinery, fertilizer and other essentials.

Freeman Detoured

Admittedly, separating Communist farm fact from fancy continues to defy precise analysis; any conclusive on-the-spot investigation is impossible. Indeed, Russian reluctance to let prying Western eyes see serious crop damage may have been behind an unexpected and still unpublicized switch made in the travel plans of Agriculture Secretary Freeman and his party of technicians touring Iron Curtain lands this summer.

On July 15 in Moscow, Russian Agriculture Minister I. P. Volovchenko handed the Americans a schedule conspicuously lacking a long-scheduled trip: A two-day trek through the heart of the famed wheat-growing "New Lands" around Tselindgrad, some 1,400 miles east of Moscow; the region, formerly prairie, was plowed up for crops beginning only in 1954.

Instead the Soviets had substituted a shorter jaunt to Orenburg, 750 miles east of the Russian capital. After listening to Mr. Volovchenko's unconvincing explanations, Mr. Freeman agreed to the change because Orenburg is at least in the fringe of the New Lands, and because he was reluctant to make trouble just as the nuclear test ban negotiators had reached agreement a few blocks away in the Kremlin.

Adding to Free World suspicions of Red farm failures this year is that both Pravda and Izvestia, Russia's leading dailies, have fallen silent of late about agricultural prospects, a topic to which they devoted copious

space in more promising past years. "If things were turning out well in the current harvest," says a Western specialist, "they'd be bragging about it."

Analyst Cites Potential

Nonetheless, many U.S. farm specialists are beginning to warn against any Western tendencies to minimize the longer-term Soviet farm potential. "Unquestionably, their agricultural economy has stagnated since 1958," says a respected analyst, "and we think a major reason is that they cut back in capital investment growth." But if the test ban accord and any subsequent tension-easing should lead Russia's rulers to divert big money from armaments to farm machinery, fertilizer and other production aids, this analyst contends, a jump in farm output would surely result.

But at least until Russian plant breeders develop plants more resistant to frost, heat and drought, it's agreed the Soviet Union's generally inhospitable weather will continue to plague Moscow's farm planners most years. As compared with American weather, Russia's climate tends to be dry and subject to temperature extremes; it is not moderated by warm, moisture-laden winds blowing off oceans or large lakes. Because the USSR lies much farther north than the U.S., the average growing season is short, much like that of Canada's prairie provinces.

For 1963 crops, U.S. onlookers agree, extremes of cold and heat plus lack of moisture have stunted per-acre yields of key Soviet farm commodities.

Severe Winter Hurt Crops

The past winter was unusually long and cold. In the Ukraine, long-time bread basket of the USSR, fall-planted crops, mostly wheat and barley, were badly hurt. Then spring came late, and it was dry and hot. So was the summer that followed, damaging spring-planted corn.

Eastward in the "New Lands," wheat and other grains have suffered lately from scanty rainfall and extra-high temperatures. So far in 1963, precipitation in this semi-arid area, which has sometimes produced as much as 25% of Russia's wheat crop, has been less than half of normal and average thermometer read-

ings have run several degrees above even the region's searing norms.

Coming on top of reduced plantings of some basic crops, this buffeting by nature assures a punier output of certain vital farm products.

The Communists themselves admit this year's plantings of major livestock feeds, including corn, oats, hay and sugar beets grown for forage, are down to around 136 million acres this year from over 150 million in 1962. With feed scarcer, Soviet milk output is expected to shrink somewhat below last year's U.S.-estimated 116 billion pounds, a showing roughly 10 billion short of the 1962 U.S. total and even farther behind in per-capita terms. Even with a temporary bulge in livestock slaughter, Soviet farms are expected to provide no more than 70 pounds of meat per citizen this year, only slightly above last year's 67 pounds, and far less than the expected record 167 pounds per capita going to American dining tables this year.

Not only has the Soviet wheat crop suffered weather damage, but planted acreage of this basic bread grain admittedly slipped below 166 million acres this year, down 2 million from 1962. Outlook: Production somewhat lower than last year's, which was reckoned by Free World analysts at about 2 billion bushels.

Potato Plantings Decline

Plantings of potatoes, a staple in Russian diets, at only 21 million acres are off by 500,000 acres from the 1962 total. The USSR already is suffering acute spud shortages, stemming from last year's shrunken output; U.S. experts estimated it at only about 68,200 tons, far below 1961's more normal crop of about 83,600 tons.

It's true that Russia reports 1963 plantings of protein-rich field peas and beans used mostly for livestock feed jumped to 31.6 million acres from 20.5 million in 1962, that cotton moved up to 6 million acres from 5.7 million and that oilseeds, mostly from sunflowers, at 15.6 million acres were up from 14.8 million. Oil pressed from the seeds is used mostly in cooking.

But because of this year's siege of rough weather, actual harvests of these crops may not climb in step with planted acreage. And increases could be overshadowed by setbacks elsewhere on the farm front.