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15 July 1963

Briefly Noted

Communist Hypocrisy on Genocide.

The Peoples Republic of Mongolia has accused the government of Iraq of genocide and announced that she would seek a United Nations General Assembly (GA) resolution calling for cessation of military action against the Iraqi Kurds. Iraq is attempting to put down Kurdish rebellion against the government but the charge of genocide is groundless. The Mongolian action during the September GA Session is intended to afford the Soviet Union the occasion to attack the revolutionary Iraqi government which overthrew Soviet-supported General Kassim on 8 February 1963, arrested and executed Iraqi Communists for crimes against the people and handed Soviet Middle East expansionism a severe setback.

The Soviets are seeking means of weakening the Iraqi government, hoping that a successor government would be more amenable to Communist influence. Two recent Soviet moves in this direction include an announcement that the Soviet Union would uphold the cause of the Kurdish minority against the Iraqi government (despite Soviet protestations against interfering in the internal affairs of another country) and would suspend aid to Iraq if the latter continued its military action against the Kurds (despite Soviet claims that its aid is granted without political strings). An additional, clumsy, anti-Iraq move is reflected in the July 3rd Baghdad Radio announcement that a group of "Communist and Moscow agents" had been foiled in an attempt to take control of a nearby military camp where former Kassim government officials and Communist enemies of the revolution are imprisoned. The "vile Communist plot" was quickly put down, said the radio, declaring that "death, only death is what the plotters and the Moscow agents deserve." Documents found on the plotters list the names of persons to be given top posts following a successful coup. Included were a former high ranking Iraqi officer now in the Soviet bloc and several Communists now fighting with the Kurdish rebels.

The Soviet Union, whose shrieks of outrage would be heard around the world if any country presumed to take a case of Soviet armed action against its minorities into the UN, has undoubtedly hit on the better plan of arranging for Mongolia's sponsorship of a genocide charge in the GA. It is ludicrous that Mongolia, who was unmoved by the real Chinese genocide campaign in 1959 against fellow Asians in Tibet, should now be deeply concerned for any reason about the Kurdish tribes in the mountains of far-off Iraq. The USSR supported Mongolia's entry into the UN in 1961 and included Mongolia as the only non-European satellite in CEMA.

(Briefly Noted Cont.) ~~SECRET~~ 15 July 1963
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Wherever publicity is given to the Mongolian charge, we cite facts exposing (1) the Soviet hand, ire and intent, (2) Mongolia's role vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and its inaction in the Tibetan case which occurred before USSR-CPR differences broke into open conflict, and (3) the nature of genocide as defined, documented and condemned by the UN in the Chinese-Tibetan case, which exposes the fraudulent nature of the charge against Iraq.

15 July 1963

DATES OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST

- 6 Aug 2nd Latin American Youth Conference, still scheduled for Santiago, Chile, 6-11 August but likely to be postponed or cancelled.
- 13 Aug Communist East Germany sealed East-West Berlin border by building a wall (more than 30,000 refugees had registered in West Berlin in the preceding month), 1961.
- 17 Aug Soviet-Polish Treaty went into effect. Poland received German territory as compensation for territory annexed by the Soviet Union, 1945. (see 17 & 19 Sept)
- 20 Aug Leon Trotsky assassinated in Mexico City, 1940.
- 24 Aug Stalin-Hitler non-aggression pact signed, 1939.
- 24 Aug North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) entered into force, 1949.
- 31 Aug Federation of Malaysia (Malaya, Singapore, British Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak) expected to come formally into being.
- Sept Algeria: Ben Bella's government is responsible for promulgating a Constitution and holding parliamentary elections by the end of September.
- 14 Sept Red China's troops entered Lhasa, Tibet, 1951.
- 15 Sept Soviet Union signed Friendship and Mutual Assistance and Collaboration treaties with Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, pledging not to change their social or economic systems, 1947.
- 17 Sept Soviet Union invades Eastern Poland and divides country with Nazi Germany, 1939.
- 17 Sept International Committee for Cooperation of Journalists (ICCJ) Conference on board Soviet ship in the Mediterranean, Sept. 17 - 1 Oct.
- 19 Sept Starts Week of International Struggle Against Fascism and War (Communist).
- 29 Sept International Union of Architects (UIA), seventh Congress, Havana, Cuba, 29 Sept. - 3 Oct. to be followed by UIA General Assembly and International Symposium on Architecture, Mexico City, 6-15 Oct.

~~SECRET~~

PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#7

24 June - 8 July 1963

Commentary

Principal Developments:

1. The CPSU-CCP party talks got under way on schedule in Moscow and are continuing in complete secrecy, but they have been preceded and accompanied by increasingly virulent pronouncements and hostile gestures on both sides. After two oral warnings to the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow about the activities of Chinese personnel in distributing texts of the CCP 14 June letter in the USSR, the Soviet Foreign Ministry on 27 June expelled five Chinese as personae non gratae. The Chinese first revealed the Soviet action by publishing a Peking Foreign Ministry statement of June 29 denouncing it: simultaneously Peking also announced the smashing of a display window at the Chinese Embassy in Moscow by Soviet citizens, calling it "obviously a planned act of sabotage." The CCP then issued a statement dated 1 July denouncing the Soviet attacks on the CCP and the recall order -- "thus extending ideological differences . . . to the sphere of state relations," -- but stating that the CCP would send its delegation to Moscow as scheduled, despite these Soviet steps. The five expellees were ostentatiously feted in Peking during the next few days, including Premier Chou En-lai's personal commendation.

2. The Soviets were finally moved to publish a double-barreled reply to the Chinese goading on 4 July. Pravda carried a CPSU statement denouncing Chinese conduct and announcing that: "Inasmuch as the CC/CCP is demonstrating no interest in cutting short the polemics . . .; the CC/CPSU . . . has decided to reply to the letter of the CCP in the press." Izvestiya carried a Soviet Foreign Ministry statement which said that Chinese publication of "its tendentious version" of the recall demand compels the USSR to set the record straight: it then lists an amazing range of Chinese distribution activities throughout the USSR.

3. The Chinese responded the next day by publishing on the front pages of their papers the texts of the above CPSU statement and the Soviet note demanding the recall of the Chinese, together with a CCP comment on the former and a Chinese Foreign Ministry official note of protest to the latter. The FM note, branding as a lie the Soviet contention that Soviet personnel had not engaged in dissemination of Soviet materials in China, cites instances in which they had. The period closed with a mass rally in Peking to applaud again the ousted Chinese.

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(Commentary Cont.)

(Commentary Cont.)

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24 June - 8 July 1963


4. Evidence accumulated of a world-wide effort of unprecedented volume by the Chinese to disseminate the texts of their latest exchange with the CPSU.

5. Developments elsewhere in the Communist world during this period should not be overlooked. The Albanians went even further than before in openly inciting rebellion against Khrushchev's leadership, and the North Koreans had the effrontery to emphasize their struggle against "modern revisionism" before the Soviet Chargé in Pyongyang on the occasion of the anniversary of the Soviet-N. Korean friendship and aid pact. The Yugoslavs protested to the Chinese over the attacks on Yugoslavia in the joint communique with N. Korea, and the Yugoslav Chargé departed Peking for unstated purposes, with "not a single representative of the Chinese Foreign Ministry present." The Rumanians continued to demonstrate an "independent" stance, avoiding the E. Berlin "summit" gathering with Khrushchev and Ulbricht, sending a highly-placed representative to a Comecon meeting in Moscow, signing annual programs for cultural and scientific exchanges with China, and sending a team to participate in international volleyball championships in Albania after all other Soviet-bloc countries pulled out.

6. Apparently the Chinese achieved a significant breach in the solid wall of pro-Soviet Communist parties in Western Europe with the formal appearance of a break-away group of "Chinese dissidents" who are challenging the incumbent CP leadership in Belgium. And the Communists in Ceylon are reportedly divided on the issue, although the leadership remains loyal to Moscow thus far.

Significance:

As of our cut-off date, it is still impossible to forecast the course which the CPSU-CCP talks will follow, and there might well be drastic developments before this guidance is received. With the mounting bitterness and hostility described in the foregoing, it is clearly possible that the talks might be broken off before going much further. But whether or not the talks continue, there seems to be little doubt that the feud will continue and grow in intensity. In its July 4 statement, the CPSU declared its decision to reply to the basic CCP challenge of 14 June, and this reply (which could conceivably be the Soviet vehicle for excommunication of the Chinese) will undoubtedly bring a still longer and stronger Chinese polemic in retaliation.



References (classified)

International Communism: Alignment of the Communist Parties in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, State INR, May 15, 1963 (Conf.)
A 14-page analysis of the Communist parties or groupings in all countries, Communist-ruled and non-Communist, showing status, membership and percentage of national vote as well as alignment.

#7

24 juin - 8 juillet

24-29 juin: Le congrès de la Fédération démocratique internationale des femmes réunies à Moscou est devenu un nouveau champs de bataille de la querelle sino-soviétique: voir également 6 juillet.

26 juin: Tous les journaux de la Chine communiste publient un article basé sur une dépêche du Tass, sur la résolution du plénum du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique concernant les entretiens entre le parti communiste chinois et le parti communiste de l'Union soviétique y compris les déclarations que la décision "rejette catégoriquement, en tant que calomnieuses et sans fondement les attaques" du parti communiste chinois, et décide "de poursuivre résolument" la ligne adoptée par les communistes de l'Union soviétique.

26 juin: La visite d'une délégation parlementaire de la Corée du Nord au Vietnam du Nord (voir Chronologie du 19 juin et la suite) s'est terminée par un banquet d'adieu au cours duquel Pak Kum-chol et Truong Chinh ont pris de nouveau la parole. Cependant, tous deux s'abstinrent d'attaquer le révisionnisme. Les Vietnamiens du nord auraient-ils réussi à faire équilibre aux pressions que la Chine communiste exerce sur les Coreéens du Nord?

27 juin: L'agence yougoslave TANYUG annonce que le secrétariat des Affaires étrangères a adressé ce jour "une vive protestation" au gouvernement de la République populaire chinoise "contre l'attaque brutale et calomnieuse visant la Yougoslavie et sa politique et contenue dans le communiqué collectif" publié à la fin de la visite du président de la Corée du Nord Choe en Chine (voir Chronologie, 23 juin).

27 juin: Des articles parus dans deux journaux de Bruxelles, le Drapeau Rouge, organe officiel du parti communiste, et Le Peuple, journal socialiste, font savoir qu'un groupe de "dissidents chinois" a tenu son propre congrès à Bruxelles au cours du weekend précédent. Le goupe dissident est dirigé par 4 membres expulsés du parti au cours du congrès de Pâques (voir Chronologie, mi-avril), mais qui prétendent que leur expulsion est illégale et que la moitié des communistes bruxellois les soutiennent. Ils votèrent en faveur de la destitution des leaders actuels du parti communiste coupables de "politique révisionniste et scissionniste". Le Drapeau Rouge met la presse et le public en garde contre toute publication émanant des dissidents qui serait illégale et tendrait à créer une confusion, et le député communiste Gaston Moulin a déclaré au Peuple que les rebelles ne constituaient un problème qu'à Bruxelles, alors que les autres membres dans le pays restaient solidement derrière l'organisation légitime du parti.

15^e anniversaire de la résolution de la Yougoslavie, par un editorial de 10.000 mots où il res-
sasse les opinions albanaises sur les révisionnistes moder-
nes et, non content d'insulter Khrouchtchev personnellement,
il incite ouvertement et directement à la révolte: "Rester
muet pendant que Khrouchtchev parle et agit... équivaut à
une complicité dans l'activité hostile de N. Khrouchtchev...
Il est grand temps de rejeter avec mépris pardessus bord
l'attitude de soumission tacite et d'approbation en présan-
ce de tel ou tel dictat."

29 juin: L'agence de presse de la Chine Nouvelle fait con-
naître que le 27 deux événements à Moscou ont contribué à
la détérioration des relations sino-soviétiques à la veille
de la conférence bilatérale importante, et qu'ils n'ont
pas été mentionnés par la presse soviétique. Le premier
consistait en "la requête déraisonnable du gouvernement so-
viétique tendant à faire rappeler par le gouvernement chi-
nois trois membres de l'ambassade chinoise en Union sovié-
tique, et deux autres Chinois (un étudiant et un fonction-
naire d'un institut) qui se trouvaient en Union soviétique."
La déclaration du ministère des affaires étrangères de la
République Populaire chinoise annonçant le rappel prétend
que la revendication soviétique a été faite "sous prétexte
qu'ils avaient distribué en Union soviétique la lettre
publiée du comité central du parti communiste chinois en
date du 14 juin" alors que c'est "une action normale et un
droit irrévocable pour l'ambassade chinoise et le personnel
chinois se trouvant en Union soviétique de distribuer des
documents officiels du comité central du parti communiste
chinois. Les établissements soviétiques et leur personnel
en Chine ont toujours agi de la même façon sans qu'aucune
objection ne soit soulevée par le gouvernement chinois".
Le ministère alla jusqu'à déclarer qu'il était "parfaite-
ment justifié" de s'enquérir si, en émettant "des reven-
dications aussi déraisonnables" faites "sous un prétexte
aussi insoutenable" le gouvernement soviétique ne cherchait
pas consciemment "à saper l'unité, à gêner les relations et
à créer des obstacles. Le deuxième événement annoncé par
l'agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle était celui au
cours duquel "des vitrines pour photographies de presse
furent brisées en face de l'ambassade chinoise" à Moscou
par "quatre citoyens soviétiques". Le ministre des affai-
res étrangères de la République populaire chinoise a op-
posé une fin de non recevoir aux explications du ministère
des affaires étrangères de l'Union soviétique selon les-
quelles l'homme qui s'était rendu coupable de cet acte "se
trouvait en état d'ivresse", et a déclaré être certain
qu'il s'agissait "d'un acte délibéré de sabotage".

29 juin: La Pravda publie le texte du discours de Khrouch-
tchev prononcé le 21 juin au plénum du parti communiste de
l'Union soviétique, qui contenait pour la première fois
une attaque directe et en public des leaders chinois qui,
"ont grossi à l'extrême leurs divergences avec le parti
communiste de l'Union soviétique et le mouvement communiste
tout entier". Il confirma que la coexistence pacifique

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trangère soviétique et indirectement accusa les Chinois
"d'attitude raciale nationale".

30 juin: En Roumanie, Gheorghiu-Dej se trouvait absent sans explication d'une réunion de chefs des régimes du bloc soviétique européen, qui eut lieu à Berlin-Est pour célébrer soi-disant le 70^e anniversaire de Walter Ulbricht. Les observateurs estiment que Khrouchtchev profitait de l'occasion pour s'assurer d'un soutien ferme de la ligne soviétique dans les discussions avec les Chinois qui auront lieu prochainement, et il présume que l'absence de Gheorghiu-Dej était due aux tentatives faites récemment par la Roumanie d'adopter une position "indépendante" entre les deux adversaires. Par la suite, deux correspondants occidentaux à Bucarest (Binder du New York Times le 3 juillet et un correspondant anonyme de Reuters le 7 juillet) annonçaient "une accumulation de preuves" que Khrouchtchev se serait rendu secrètement en Roumanie pour discuter avec Gheorghiu-Dej les 24 et 25 juin, dates pour lesquelles Moscou n'a pas fourni d'indications quant au lieu où il se trouvait.

30 juin: Des télégrammes de Moscou font savoir que l'Union Soviétique a intensifié son brouillage des programmes en langue russe radiodiffusés quotidiennement par Pékin pendant quatre heures et demie, et cela peu de temps après avoir cessé de brouiller les émissions de la Voix de l'Amérique et de la BBC.

30 juin: L'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle a publié une déclaration du comité central du parti communiste chinois datée du 1^{er} juillet et publiée dans la presse chinoise le même jour, où il était fait mention "des attaques directes et déraisonnables contre le parti communiste chinois "dirigées récemment par les Soviets, ainsi que la demande soviétique de rappel de cinq Chinois, "faisant ainsi déborder les différences idéologiques entre les deux partis dans le domaine des relations d'Etat", et a prévenu que "cette série de mesures... est de nature à gêner davantage encore les relations sino-soviétiques et à produire une scission dans le mouvement international."

1-3 juillet: L'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle annonce que "les chefs des services gouvernementaux" ont fait une réception aux cinq Chinois "dont le rappel... fut demandé sans raison valable par le gouvernement soviétique"; au cours de cette réception, ils "conversèrent cordialement avec les cinq personnes et leur exprimèrent leur sympathie". En date du 3, le premier Chou En-lai reçut les cinq, "eut une conversation cordiale avec eux, leur disant qu'ils avaient bien fait leur travail", et "les félicitant de leur attitude responsable et active et de leur esprit indomptable". Les journaux chinois publièrent ces articles en première page, avec photographies.

3 juillet: Khrouchtchev, s'adressant à environ 70.000 Allemands de l'Est à Frankfurt-sur-Oder, et "perceptible-
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lin-Est, a declare qu'il n'y avait que "les fous" qui
pensaient pouvoir renverser le capitalisme au moyen d'une
guerre. "Quiconque à l'heure actuelle ferait éclater une
guerre se trouverait immédiatement annihilé dans cette guer-
re."

3 juillet: Neuf membres de la délégation chinoise à leur
arrivée à l'aérodrome de Moscou furent détenus pendant 90
minutes pour opérations de douanes, alors que les autres
passagers de l'avion furent libérés en 20 minutes. Le même
jour, l'ambassade chinoise distribuait aux missions occi-
dentales à Moscou le texte de la déclaration du 29 juin par
laquelle le parti communiste chinois condamnait l'ordre
soviétique d'expulsion.

3-6 juillet: Le comité exécutif de l'organisation du plan
économique des 7 nations du bloc soviétique, le Comecon,
qui comprenait le vice-premier ministre roumain Biradeanu,
se mettait d'accord à Moscou pour continuer à mettre en
commun la production industrielle sur une base coopérative,
annonce l'agence TASS. Le communiqué était suffisamment
vague sur la façon dont fut résolu le problème de la Rou-
manie, insistant à développer sa propre industrie lourde.

4 juillet: La Pravda faisait passer en première page "une
déclaration du comité central du parti communiste de l'U-
nion soviétique se rapportant aux entretiens prochains en-
tre les représentants du parti communiste de l'Union so-
viétique et du parti communiste chinois." Elle donna les
noms de sept membres de la délégation soviétique en décla-
rant qu'ils "s'en tiendront strictement à la ligne adop-
tée par les 20e, 21e et 22e congrès et qu'ils défendront
le cours général du mouvement communiste mondial exprimé
dans les déclarations des conférences de Moscou des partis
marxistes-léninistes." Le journal souligne que le parti
communiste chinois continue à "aggraver la polémique" par
des attaques "calomnieuses et sans fondement" dans sa
lettre du 14 juin, et s'en réfère ensuite à la déclaration
publiée le 1er juillet par le parti communiste chinois,
qui "présente sous un faux jour les mobiles qui ont pous-
sé le parti communiste de l'Union soviétique à ne pas pu-
blier la lettre du 14 juin. D'autre part, en distribuant
leur lettre, les Chinois ont "porté une infraction sérieuse
aux procédures établies en Union Soviétique," "ont inter-
venu dans les affaires privées de notre parti et ont fait
passer le désaccord du domaine des relations entre partis
à celui des relations entre Etats". "Au lieu de chercher
une voie vers le rapprochement,... les leaders chinois
poussent le différend vers une aggravation dans les rela-
tions." La déclaration annonce ensuite:

"Dans la mesure où le comité central du parti
communiste chinois fait preuve d'un manque d'in-
térêt à abréger la polémique et qu'elle conti-
nue à distribuer largement sa lettre et à faire
des déclarations dirigées contre notre parti, le

comité central du parti communiste de l'Union soviétique, dans le but de présenter les points du différend sous une lumière correcte et cherchant à défendre le marxisme-leninisme, a décidé pour sa part de répondre à la lettre du comité central du parti communiste chinois par voie de presse."

Le même jour, Izvestiya, organe du gouvernement soviétique, publiait une déclaration du ministère des affaires étrangères qui disait que "étant donné que le ministère des affaires étrangères de la République populaire chinoise s'est hâté de publier dans la presse sa version tendancieuse concernant la demande soviétique de rappel et qu'il a "présenté une interprétation déformée des faits", le ministère des affaires étrangères soviétique se trouve obligé de présenter "les explications nécessaires". Apportant "des faits nouveaux" la déclaration soviétique que les Chinois incriminés "à l'insu des organes soviétiques se sont mis à disséminer illégalement par tous les moyens et avec une persistance croissante et importune, la lettre mentionnée ci-dessus qui fut imprimée spécialement à grand tirage en langue russe, dans les bureaux soviétiques, dans les aérodromes, dans les stations de chemin de fer, et dans d'autres places". Cette lettre fut "distribuée" simultanément dans les diverses institutions de Moscou par le personnel de l'ambassade utilisant plusieurs automobiles, adressée par la poste aux citoyens soviétiques ou remise à leur domicile, et transportée par des courriers spécialement affectés de Moscou dans les autres villes." La déclaration dit que le ministère des affaires étrangères de l'Union soviétique avait fait une représentation verbale à l'ambassadeur chinois le 17 juin et de nouveau le 24 juin. "Mais, même après cette seconde représentation... la distribution s'est poursuivie sur une échelle même encore plus large. Elle fut poussée au point que les équipes chinoises du train Moscou-Pékin en dispersèrent les exemplaires par les fenêtres des wagons dans les gares de chemin de fer", et "en donnèrent lecture pendant les arrêts des trains, utilisant pour cela les systèmes de haut-parleur publics." Lorsque des ressortissants soviétiques objectèrent, les Chinois "se comportèrent avec défiance dans bien des cas". La déclaration soviétique qualifie de "fabrication" qui n'a "rien à voir avec la réalité" et de "tentative de blanchir les agissements illégaux des Chinois" l'affirmation faite par les Chinois "que les organismes et le personnel soviétiques en Chine se seraient livrés à des activités analogues".

5 juillet: La délégation chinoise fut accompagnée jusqu'à l'aérodrome de Pékin par tous les hauts fonctionnaires du parti communiste chinois à l'exception de Mao (dont l'absence semble avoir été voulue afin de maintenir l'opération à un niveau au-dessous de l'échelon supérieur), et fut saluée à Moscou par sept délégués soviétiques, à la tête desquels se trouvait Souslov. Les journaux de Pékin

publièrent ce jour en première page une déclaration du comité central du parti communiste chinois concernant la déclaration du comité central du parti communiste de l'Union soviétique datée du 4 juillet, avec en plus le texte de cette dernière déclaration, ainsi que la note de protestation officielle du ministère des affaires étrangères chinois à la note du ministère des affaires étrangères soviétique datée du 27 juin, par laquelle celui-ci réclamait le rappel de cinq chinois avec en plus le texte de cette dernière note. La brève déclaration du parti communiste chinois disait que celui-ci ne pouvait pas accepter les déformations, les accusations et les attaques" contenues dans la déclaration du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique et qu'il avait donné des instructions à sa délégation "de faire au cours des pourparlers les commentaires qui s'imposaient". Malgré ces provocations, le comité central du parti communiste chinois "a donné des instructions à sa délégation de faire preuve de la plus grande patience", et il "espérait que le résultat des entretiens ... contribuerait à la préparation d'une région des représentants de tous les partis communistes et de tous les ouvriers." La note du ministère des affaires étrangères chinois, qui fut délivrée à l'ambassade soviétique le 4 juillet, énumère les publications disséminées par les organismes soviétiques et leur personnel en Chine, y compris les discours de Khrouchtchev au Suprême soviétique du 12 décembre 1962 et au congrès du parti de l'Unité socialiste du 16 janvier, ainsi que les éditoriaux de Pravda du 7 et du 10 février. "Ce qu'il faut souligner surtout c'est le fait que les organismes et le personnel soviétiques en Chine ont distribué la lettre du 30 mars 1963 adressée par le comité central du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique au comité central du parti communiste chinois avant qu'elle n'ait été publiée dans la presse chinoise". Mais lorsque les Chinois en firent autant "le gouvernement soviétique déclara immédiatement que cela constituait une action illégale et un manque de respect envers le souveraineté d'Etat ... et émit la prétention injustifiée de faire rappeler le personnel chinois. Cela est inadmissible dans les relations internationales en général, et mois encore dans les relations entre deux pays socialistes." Malgré ces obstacles, le gouvernement n'aura pas recours à des représailles contre le personnel soviétique en Chine et "il espère que le gouvernement soviétique s'abstiendra à l'avenir de se livrer à des actions nuisibles]" A l'arrivée de la délégation chinoise à Moscou la première page de Pravda étalait un éditorial décrivant des réunions d'aktivs de partis dans toute l'Union soviétique, prouvant à l'unanimité la résolution du plénum de juin, y compris les instructions du parti à la délégation chargée de discuter avec les Chinois, ainsi que le rejet "des attaques calomnieuses et sans fondement" proférées par le parti communiste chinois. A Moscou les Chinois annoncèrent soudainement leur intention de ne pas participer au festival du film qui s'ouvre à Moscou le 7 juillet.

5 juillet: Le Times de Tokyo se basant dans ses commentaires sur les traditions historiques et culturelles communes qui existent entre le Japon et la Chine ainsi que sur ses liens d'amitiés resserrés avec le peuple chinois, demande aux leaders de Pékin d'abandonner leur attitude dogmatique à l'égard du marxisme-léninisme et d'adopter un point de vue plus large pour le règlement des problèmes mondiaux. Le même jour, le Sankei de Tokyo publiait un article téléphoné par son correspondant de Moscou Kenzo Hori, qui contenait les passages suivants: "Les étudiants soviétiques s'indignent de l'attitude

chinoise. Ils disent que c'est scandaleux de la part de la Chine d'être hostile envers l'Union soviétique alors qu'une aide soviétique en quantité considérable a été envoyée à la Chine. Des rumeurs circulent à Moscou que tous les étudiants chinois pourraient retourner chez-eux. Il y avait environ 2.000 étudiants chinois à Moscou il y a six mois, mais ce nombre ... est en décroissance constante. Dans les gares vers la Sibérie, nous voyons beaucoup de citoyens chinois retournant chez-eux. Il faut noter que les journalistes chinois se sont mis à appliquer "la diplomatie souriante" envers leurs collègues japonais. A la fin de février, un journaliste chinois a invité des reporters japonais dans la salle à manger de l'ambassade chinoise. Ceci constitue un fait sans précédent. Il démontre que les Chinois cherchent désespérément à attirer les japonais de leur côté afin de remporter une victoire dans la dispute sino-soviétique. Il est possible que les Chinois veuillent l'amitié des Japonais car ils appartiennent à la même race et qu'ils utilisent la même écriture. Plus la Chine s'éloigne de l'Union Soviétique et plus, il me semble, elle se penchera vers le Japon."

5-6 juillet: Célébrant par une réunion à Pyongyang le second anniversaire du traité d'amitié, de coopération et d'assistance mutuelle entre l'Union Soviétique et la Corée du Nord, le président de la Société de l'amitié Soviético-coréenne Yi Ki-yong a mentionné la lutte des Coréens "contre le révisionnisme moderne" dans son discours principal; de son côté le chargé d'affaires soviétique Pimenov s'abstenait d'en faire mention. Un court éditorial du Nodong Sinmun à ce sujet contenait également un passage concernant la défense sans relâche "de la pureté du marxisme-léninisme contre le révisionnisme moderne."

6 juillet: Les réunions entre Chinois et soviétiques dans la villa des Collines de Lénine sont entourées de secret. Les journaux et la radio de Moscou n'ont même pas annoncé que ces réunions avaient eu lieu. Khrouchtchev se trouve à Kiev. Entre temps, Radio-Moscou a cessé de diffuser "Pékin vous parle", une émission d'une demi-heure en langue russe transmise par Radio-Pékin à l'intention des auditeurs soviétiques. A Pékin, tous les journaux ont publié un long article de l'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle, émanant de Moscou, qui attaquait violemment le traitement réservé aux Chinois à la conférence de la Fédération démocratique internationale des femmes, qui eut lieu la semaine dernière, accusant les Russes "de fomenter la discorde et les agitations anti-chinoises." L'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle a fait également distribuer un article paru dans les éditions du 30 juillet du Malayan Monitor publié à Londres, qui indirectement accusait Khrouchtchev de couvrir Pékin de la boue "du dépotoir existant déjà de ce qu'on appelle la déstalinisation." Ching Po, quotidien communiste chinois de Hong Kong, attaquait Khrouchtchev personnellement et se moquait de sa politique.

6 juillet: Un télégramme du New York Times de cette date émanant de Colombo annonce que le parti communiste de Ceylan se trouve divisé, les chefs parlementaires éduqués à Moscou restant fidèles mais les membres les plus jeunes, sous la conduite du secrétaire général de la Fédération syndicale de Ceylan, Shanmugathasan, se rapprochant de plus en plus de Pékin. Ce dernier a annoncé qu'il ferait une conférence publique sur "le marxisme-léninisme contre le révisionnisme"

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au cours de cette semaine, mais la conférence fut annulée au jour
avant la date fixée sur ordre des chefs du parti, qui le menacèrent
d'expulsion.

7 juillet: Les entretiens de Moscou ont été suspendus pour la jour-
née, mais Pékin organisa un ralliement-masse de 7.000 fonctionnaires
et employés gouvernementaux pour faire applaudir les cinq Chinois
expulsés, le ministre des affaires étrangères Chen I y figurant comme
principal orateur. Un des Chinois expulsés déclara à cette réunion
que "tous les Soviétiques impartiaux désapprouvent cette conduite,"
et que "les autorités soviétiques empêchaient depuis longtemps le
peuple soviétique de prendre connaissance des opinions du parti com-
muniste chinois. Ils allèrent même jusqu'à attaquer et à calomnier
le parti communiste chinois en public, et nommément." En Italie,
l'Unita, organe du parti communiste italien, dénonçait les attaques
chinoises dirigées contre la politique de coexistence pacifique de
Khrouchtchev et accusait les Chinois de "déformation et d'erreur" dans
leur lettre du 14 juin.

7 juillet: La presse communiste et la presse de gauche de Hong Kong
dénoncent les agissements "hostiles des Soviétiques dirigés contre la
Chine Populaire au cours de ces derniers jours, à l'aide de gros en-
tête en première page et d'expressions plus violentes encore que celles
adressées aux Etats-Unis à l'époque de la guerre de Corée", annoncent
les correspondants occidentaux. Les accusations portant également
sur la dénonciation par les Soviétiques de centaines d'accords économiques
avec la Chine.

7 juillet: Hanof fait radiodiffuser le texte d'un article de 7.000
mots intitulé "Le renégat Tito crache de nouveau son venin du révi-
sionisme," paru dans l'édition de juillet du Hoc Tap, organe de la
théorie du parti, article qui se rapproche par sa violence de la
ligne communiste chinoise, "le révisionisme est une véritable création
de l'impérialisme", leur "cheval de Troie". "La tâche de nous tous,
communistes, est de dénoncer la position de la clique de Tito ... de
tirer une ligne entre le marxisme-léninisme et le révisionisme, entre
nous-mêmes et l'ennemi dans le domaine idéologique, ... d'écraser le
révisionisme." "La coexistence pacifique ... n'est qu'une partie
de la politique étrangère des pays socialistes, et non pas toute cette
politique ni la seule politique."

8 juillet: Le parti communiste indonésien (P.K.I.) annonce qu'il en-
verra une délégation sous la conduite du président Aidit à Moscou
et à Pékin, répondant aux invitations des deux comités centraux, et
que cette délégation quittera Jakarta le 19 juillet. Le même jour
l'Agence de Presse de la Chine nouvelle donnait un discours récent de
Njoto, deuxième vice-président, fait dans le sud de Sumatra par lequel
celui-ci confirmait que l'un des principaux objectifs de la délégation
est de chercher à combler le fossé qui divise le mouvement communiste
international.

8 juillet: L'Albanie se plaint que des équipes militaires de trois
pays communistes seulement parmi ceux invités ont participé au tournoi
international de volleyball, et que d'autres pays communistes qui
avaient accepté de participer se récuserent "d'une manière hostile."
Les pays présents furent la Chine, la Corée du Nord et la Roumanie.

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REVUES
Revue de Pékin, No. 25, 21 juin 1963, l'édition anglaise contient le texte en entier de la lettre du parti communiste chinois du 14 juin; les éditions françaises et espagnoles n'ont pas encore été reçues ici, mais il est probable que le texte de cette lettre s'y trouve également. Le texte in extenso fut publié également avec des informations utiles s'y rapportant, dans le New York Times du 5 juillet, aussi bien dans son édition internationale que dans son édition locale.

"La Chine, la Russie engagées dans la lutte pour le pouvoir", par Edward Crankshaw, London Observer News Service, 6 juillet: reproduit dans Washington Post le 7 juillet 1963.

"Le grand schisme", par Hugh Seton-Watson, Encounter, mai 1963.

CRONOLOGIA -- DISENSIONES COMUNISTAS

No 7

24 Junio - 8 Julio

24-29 Junio: El Congreso de la Federación Democrática Internacional de Mujeres en Moscú (FDIM) se convirtió en otro campo de batalla en la contienda chino-soviética. Ver también 6 de julio.

26 Junio: Toda la prensa chinocomunista publica un informe, basado en un despacho de Tass, sobre la resolución del pleno del PCUS con respecto a las conversaciones entre el PC chino y el PCUS, incluso las declaraciones de que la resolución "categóricamente rechaza como infundados y calumniosos los ataques" del PC chino y que resuelve "proseguir con tesón" la línea actual del PCUS.

26 Junio: La visita de una delegación parlamentaria norcoreana a Vietnam del Norte (ver Cronología, 19 de junio et seq) concluyó con un banquete de despedida en el cual Pak Kum-chol y Truong Chinh de nuevo pronunciaron discursos. Ambos, sin embargo, se abstuvieron de atacar el revisionismo. ¿Será que los norvietnameses han conseguido neutralizar la presión chinocomunista sobre los norcoreanos?

27 Junio: La agencia noticiera Tanyug anunció que la secretaria de relaciones exteriores había mandado ese mismo día una "fuerte protesta" al Gobierno de China "contra el brutal y calumnioso ataque a Yugoslavia y su política cometido en el comunicado conjunto" publicado al concluir la visita a China del presidente norcoreano Choe. (Ver Cronología, 23 de junio.)

27 Junio: Informaron artículos en dos diarios de Bruselas -- el órgano oficial comunista "Drapeau Rouge" y el socialista "Le Peuple" -- que un grupo escindido de "disidentes chinos" había celebrado su propio congreso en Bruselas el fin de semana anterior. El grupo disidente lo encabezan los cuatro miembros expulsados del Partido en el Congreso a mediados de abril (ver Cronología de entonces) pero que se niegan a reconocer como legal su expulsión y declaran que la mitad de los comunistas de Bruselas los apoyan. Pasaron una resolución destituyendo a los actuales dirigentes del PC por su "política revisionista y escisionista." "Drapeau Rouge" advirtió a la prensa y al público que cualquier material que los disidentes pudieran hacer público sería ilegal y con intención de confundir, y el diputado comunista Gaston Moulin declaró a "Le Peuple" que los rebeldes eran problema en Bruselas solamente y que en el resto del país los miembros estaban sólidamente en apoyo de la legítima organización del partido.

29 Junio: El diario albanés "Zeri I Popullit" celebró el decimoquinto aniversario de la resolución del Cominform que expulsó a Yugoslavia con un editorial repitiendo en 10.000 palabras las opiniones de Albania sobre los revisionistas modernos y no solo insultando a Krushev por nombre sino también abierta y directamente instando a la rebelión: "Quedarse callado mientras Krushev habla y actúa ... equivale a hacerse conspirador en la actividad hostil de N. Krushev

de tácito sometimiento y aprobación de un diktat tras otro."

29 Junio: La agencia noticiera china (Sinjua) anunció dos acontecimientos en Moscú que dañaron aun más las relaciones chino-soviéticas en la víspera de las importantes conversaciones bilaterales y que no habían sido mencionados en los órganos de noticias soviéticos. El primero fue "la irrazonable exigencia del Gobierno soviético de que el Gobierno chino retirara a tres empleados de la Embajada China en la Unión Soviética y a otros dos chinos (u estu-
tante y un funcionario de instituto) de la Unión Soviética." La declaración del ministerio de Relaciones china dando a conocer la demanda de retiro expresó que había sido hecha "so pretexto de que habían distribuido en la Unión Soviética la carta dada a la publicidad del CC del PC chino de 14 de junio," aunque "es normal e irreprochable que la Embajada china y el personal chino en la Unión Soviética distribuyan documentos oficiales del CC del PC chino. El personal y los establecimientos soviéticos en China han estado haciendo siempre lo mismo y el Gobierno chino jamás ha formulado objeciones." Continuó diciendo que "se justifica plenamente" preguntar si, haciendo tan "irrazonable exigencia" con "tan insostenible excusa" el Gobierno soviético no está "intencionalmente tratando" de socavar la unidad, viciar las relaciones y crear obstáculos. El segundo anuncio de Sinjua fue el del destrozo de "los escaparates de noticias gráficas frente a la Embajada china" en Moscú por "cuatro ciudadanos soviéticos." El ministerio de Relaciones chino rechazó la explicación del ministerio de Relaciones soviético de que el culpable se hallaba "en estado de ebriedad" y declaró que "esto fue obviamente un acto premeditado de sabotaje."

29 Junio: "Pravda" dio a la publicidad el texto del discurso de Krushev del 21 de junio al pleno del PCUS conteniendo su primer ataque directo y público contra los líderes chinos, que habían "exacerbado en extremo sus divergencias con el PCUS y el movimiento comunista entero." Reafirmó que era la coexistencia pacífica la línea general de la política extranjera soviética e indirectamente acusó a los chinocomunistas de un "punto de vista racial nacional."

30 Junio: El rumano Gheorghiu-Dej estuvo ausente sin explicación de una reunión de los jefes de los regímenes del bloque soviético europeo, que se dijo ser en celebración del septuagésimo cumpleaños de Walter Ulbricht. Los observadores especularon que Krushev aprovechaba la ocasión para aunar apoyo firme para la línea soviética en las próximas conversaciones con los chinos, y se presumió que la ausencia de G-D estaba relacionada con las tentativas recientes de Rumania de adoptar una posición "independiente" entre los contrincantes. Más tarde dos corresponsales occidentales (Binder del "New York Times" el 3 de julio y uno sin firmar de Reuter el 7 de julio) informaron desde Bucharest una "creciente acumulación de evidencia" de que Krushev había volado en secreto a Rumania para conversar con G-D el 24 y 25 de junio, fechas en las cuales en Moscú no se dio cuenta de su paradero.

30 Junio: Sinjua dio a la publicidad una declaración del CC del PC chino fechada (y publicada en la prensa china) el primero de julio contra el PC chino" por parte del Soviet y a la demanda soviética de
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que fueran retirados cinco chinos -- "extendiendo de ese modo las divergencias ideológicas entre ambos partidos a la esfera de las relaciones entre estados" -- y hacía la advertencia de que dicha "serie de medidas ... constituyen un grave paso en el empeoramiento aun mayor de las relaciones chino-soviéticas y en la fabricación de una excisión en el movimiento internacional."

1-3 Julio: Sinjua informó que "miembros dirigentes de los departamentos del Gobierno" celebraron recepciones en honor a los cinco chinos "cuyo retiro ... fue irrazonablemente exigido por el Gobierno soviético," en las cuales "mantuvieron cordiales conversaciones con las cinco personas y les expresaron su solidaridad." El día 3 Chou En-lai recibió a los cinco, "mantuvo una cordial conversación con ellos, diciendo que habían hecho bien su trabajo," y "los alabó por su activa actitud de responsabilidad y su espíritu indómito." La prensa china puso en primera plana estos informes, con gráficas.

3 Julio: Kruschew, dirigiéndose a unos 70.000 alemanes orientales en Francfort del Oder, y "notablemente más caluroso" que en su discurso de Berlín, declaró que "solo los lunáticos" pensarían en tratar de derrocar el capitalismo por medio de la guerra. "Cualquiera que desatara la guerra hoy sería aniquilado inmediatamente en ella."

3 Julio: Nueve miembros menores de la delegación china llegaron al aeropuerto de Moscú -- donde estuvieron enredados 90 minutos en los menesteres de aduana mientras que a los otros pasajeros los despacharon en 20 minutos. El mismo día la Embajada china distribuyó a las misiones diplomáticas occidentales en Moscú el texto de la declaración del PC chino del 29 de junio condenando la orden soviética de expulsión.

3-6 Julio: El comité ejecutivo del Comecon, la organización de planeamiento económico de siete naciones del bloque soviético, con la participación del vicepremier rumano Biradeanu, acordó en Moscú continuar mancomunando la producción industrial en forma cooperativa, según informó Tass. El comunicado fue lo bastante impreciso en cuanto a si se había resuelto, y de qué modo, el problema de la insistencia rumana en el desarrollo de su propia industria pesada.

4 Julio: "Pravda" puso en primera plana una "declaración del CC del PCUS con relación a las próximas conversaciones entre representantes del PCUS y el PC chino." Mencionó a los siete miembros de la delegación soviética y declaró que ésta "retendrá sin desvío la línea adoptada por los congresos 20, 21, y 22 y defenderá el rumbo general del movimiento comunista mundial expresado en las dos declaraciones de las conferencias en Moscú de partidos marxistas-leninistas." Se refirió a que el PC chino continuaba "agravando las polémicas" con los "ataques calumniosos e infundados" en su carta del 14 de junio, pasando luego a la declaración del PC chino publicada el primero de julio que "presentó en una luz falsa los móviles del PCUS" al no publicar la carta del 14 de junio. Además, al diseminar su carta, los chinos han "violado burdamente los procedimientos establecidos en la URSS," "intervenido en los asuntos internos de nuestro partido y transferido divergencias del campo de las relaciones entre partidos

nacia una agravación de las relaciones. La declaración anuncia en-
tences:

"Como el CC del PC chino no está demostrando interés alguno en poner fin a las polémicas y continúa distribuyendo ampliamente su carta y expidiendo declaraciones contra nuestro partido, el CC del PCUS, en interés de una iluminación de los puntos de divergencia y con el fin de defender el marxismo-leninismo, ha decidido por su parte replicar a la carta del CC del PC chino en la prensa."

El mismo día "Izvestiya," el órgano de prensa del gobierno soviético, publicó una declaración del ministerio de Relaciones haciendo constar que "por cuanto el ministerio de Relaciones de la RP china se apresuró a publicar en la prensa su tendenciosa versión" de la demanda soviética de retiro y "presentó una interpretación deformada de los hechos," el ministerio de Relaciones soviética se ve "obligada a dar las explicaciones necesarias." Presentando "unos cuantos hechos," la declaración soviética expone que los chinos acusados, "sin el conocimiento de los órganos soviéticos, empezaron a difundir ilegalmente, por diversos métodos y maneras y con creciente persistencia e importunidad, la citada carta, impresa especialmente en una masiva edición en lengua rusa, en oficinas soviéticas, en aeropuertos, en estaciones de ferrocarril y en otros lugares." Fue "simultáneamente llevada por miembros del personal de la embajada a diversas instituciones de Moscú en varios automóviles, dirigida por correo a ciudadanos soviéticos y entregada en sus domicilios, llevada a otras ciudades por trabajadores despachados especialmente de Moscú." La declaración expuso que el ministerio de Relaciones de la URSS había hecho una intervención verbal ante el embajador chino el 17 de junio y de nuevo el 24 de junio. "Pero aun después de esta segunda intervención ... la distribución de dicho material continuó y adquirió aun mayor amplitud. Llegó a tal extremo que las tripulaciones chinas del tren de Moscú a Pekín [la] echaron al vuelo por las ventanillas de los coches en las estaciones" y la "transmitieron por los sistemas altoparlantes de los trenes durante sus paradas." Cuando el pueblo soviético mostraba su desaprobación, los chinos "actuaron con desafío en muchos casos." La declaración soviética denuncia como "fabricación" que "nada tiene que ver con la realidad" y "una tentativa por dar apariencia buena a las acciones ilegales del lado chino" el aserto chino "que los fganos y personal soviéticos en China dizque llevaban a cabo actividad parecida."

5 Julio: La delegación china fue despedida en el aeropuerto de Pekín por la plana mayor de PC chino con excepción de Mao (cuya ausencia se tuvo por intencional, para hacer que la medida no involucrara el máximo nivel) y recibida en Moscú por los siete delegados soviéticos, encabezados por Suslov. Los diarios de Pekín aquel día desplegaron en primera plana una declaración del CC del PC chino sobre la declaración del CC del PCUS de 4 de julio más el texto de esta, y la nota del ministerio de Relaciones chino protestando oficialmente la nota del ministerio de Relaciones soviético de 27 de junio que demandaba el retiro de cinco chinos, y el texto de esta última nota. La breve declaración del PC chino expresa que "no puede estar de la cuerdo en las deformaciones, la acusación y los ataques" contenidos en la declaración del PCUS y ha dado instrucciones a su delegación de "hacer

dichas provocaciones, el CC del PC chino "ha dado instrucciones a la delegación de ejercer la mayor paciencia" y "espera que el resultado de las conversaciones ... será ventajoso para los preparativos por convocar una reunión de representantes de todos los partidos comunistas y obreros." La nota del ministerio de Relaciones chino, que fue entregada a la Embajada soviética el 4 de julio, hace una relación de los materiales difundidos por el personal y los órganos soviéticos en China, incluso los discursos de Krushev ante el Supremo Soviet en 12 de diciembre de 1962 y en el congreso del SED el 16 de enero y los editoriales de "Pravda" de 7 de enero y 10 de febrero. "Lo que debe ser especialmente apuntado con énfasis es el hecho de que personal y órganos soviéticos en China habían distribuido la carta del 30 de marzo de 1963 del CC del PCUS al CC del PC chino antes de que fuera publicada en la prensa china." Pero cuando los chinos hicieron lo mismo, "el Gobierno soviético inmediatamente lo denunció como ilegal y acto de desacato a la soberanía del estado ... y elevó la injustificada demanda por el retiro del personal chino. Esto no es permisible en las relaciones internacionales en general y mucho menos en las relaciones entre dos países socialistas." A pesar de dichos obstáculos el Gobierno chino no tomará represalias contra el personal soviético en China y "confía que el Gobierno soviético no volviera a tomar acciones dafinas." -- La primera plana de "Pravda" a la llegada en Moscú de la delegación china llevaba un editorial describiendo reuniones de aktivs del partido por toda la URSS apoyando unánimemente las resoluciones del pleno de junio, incluso sus instrucciones a la delegación del partido en sus conversaciones con los chinos y su rechazo de los "ataques calumniosos e infundados" del PC chino. -- Los chinos en Moscú anunciaron de repente su decisión de retirarse del festival de cine que comenzaría el 7 de julio, en Moscú.

5 Julio: El "Times" de Tokio, fundamentando sus opiniones en las comunes tradiciones históricas y culturales de Japón y China y en la amistad estrecha con el pueblo chino, elevó un ruego a los líderes de Pekín de que abandonaran su concepto dogmático del marxismo-leninismo y tomaran una visión más amplia en la resolución de los problemas mundiales. El mismo día el "Sankei" de Tokio publicó un informe telefónico de su corresponsal en Moscú Kenzo Hori que incluía los siguientes extractos: "Los estudiantes soviéticos están indignados ante la actitud china. Declaran que es un ultraje que China se ponga en hostilidad contra la Union Soviética cuando una enorme cantidad de ayuda soviética ha sido enviada a China. Aquí en Moscú se rumora la posibilidad de que todos los estudiantes chinos vuelvan a su patria. Hace seis meses había aquí en Moscú unos dos mil estudiantes, pero el total ... va en descenso constante. En las estaciones del ferrocarril siberiano vemos a muchos chinos que regresan a su patria. Es de notar que los periodistas chinos están empezando a emplear la 'diplomacia sonriente' para con sus colegas japoneses. A fines de febrero los periodistas chinos invitaron a reporteros japoneses al comedor de la Embajada china. Esto no tenía precedente. Demuestra que los chinos están tratando con desesperación de atraer a los japoneses a su lado para ganar la victoria en la disputa chino-soviética. Puede que los chinos deseen amistarase con los japoneses porque ambos tienen el mismo ancestro y emplean la misma escritura. Mientras más se separe China de la Unión Soviética, con

Celebrando el segundo aniversario del tratado soviético-norcoreano de amistad, cooperación y asistencia mutua con una asamblea en Pyongyang, el presidente Yi Ki-yong de la Asociación de Amistad Coreano-Soviética incluyó la lucha coreana "contra el revisionismo moderno" en su discurso principal, mientras que el agragado soviético Pimenov omitió mencionarla. El breve editorial de "Jodong Sinmun" sobre el asunto también incluyó el pasaje sobre defender siempre "la pureza del marxismo-leninismo contra el revisionismo moderno."

6 Julio: Las sesiones entre chinos y soviéticos en las Lomas de Lenin están envueltas en el secreto. Los diarios de Moscú ni siquiera anunciaron que la reunión había empezado. Krushev está en Kiev. Entretanto, Radio Moscú dejó de radiar "Habla Pekín," programa de media hora en lengua rusa producido por Radio Pekín para los oyentes rusos. La prensa entera de Pekín publicó un extenso despacho de Sinjua desde Moscú atacando duramente el trato de los chinos en la conferencia de la FDIM la semana pasada y acusando a los rusos de "provocar disputa y agitación antichina." Sinjua también distribuyó un artículo de la edición de 30 de junio del "Malayan Monitor," publicado en Londres, acusando a Krushev indirectamente de embarrar a Pekín desde un "sumidero ya hecho de la llamada destalinización." El diario comunista chino de Hong-Kong "Ching Po" atacó a Krushev por su nombre y ridiculizó sus líneas de conducta.

6 Julio: Un despacho de esta fecha en el "New York Times" procedente de Colombo informó que el PC de Ceilán está dividido, permaneciendo fiel a Moscú la dirigencia parlamentaria de formación moscovita e inclinándose más y más hacia Pekín los más jóvenes, encabezados por Shanmugathasan, secretario general de la Federación Sindical ceilanesa. Este había anunciado que pronunciaría esta semana una conferencia pública sobre "Marxismo-Leninismo versus Revisionismo", pero la misma fue cancelada el día antes de llevarse a cabo por orden del alto mando del partido, que había amenazado expulsarlo.

7 Julio: Fueron recesadas por esta día las conversaciones en Moscú, pero Pekín presentó una manifestación de masa de siete mil funcionarios y burócratas para aplaudir a los cinco chinos expulsados, pronunciando el ministro Chen I de Relaciones Exteriores el discurso principal. Uno de los expulsados dijo a la multitud que "todo el pueblo soviético de ánimo justiciero está en desacuerdo con esta conducta, "y que "por largo tiempo las autoridades soviéticas habían impedido al pueblo soviético informarse de las opiniones del PC chino. Llegaron hasta el extremo de atacar y calumniar al PC chino públicamente y por nombre." En Italia el órgano del PCI "l'Unita" denunció los ataques chinos contra la política de Krushev de coexistencia pacífica y acusó a los chinos de "deformaciones y errores" en su carta de 14 de junio.

7 Julio: La prensa comunista e izquierdista de Hong-Kong ha estado condenando los actos soviéticos de "hostilidad" contra China Popular en los dos últimos días, empleando "titulares a todo ancho y conceptos más duros que los que dedicaban a los EE.UU. cuando la guerra de Corea," de acuerdo con los corresponsales occidentales. Las acusaciones se refieren también al descarte por parte de los soviéticos de centenares de acuerdos económicos con China.

7 Julio: La radio de Hanoi difundió el texto de un artículo de siete mil palabras titulado "El Renegado Tito de Nuevo Vomita el Veneno del Revisionismo" publicado en la edición de julio de "Hoc Tap," órgano teórico del partido, que se aproximó a la dureza de la línea chinocomunista, de que "el revisionismo es la creación misma del imperialismo," su "caballo de Troya." "La tarea de cada uno de nosotros los comunistas es denunciar la posición de la camarilla de Tito ... trazar la divisoria entre el marxismo-leninismo y el revisionismo, entre nosotros y el enemigo en la esfera ideológica, ... destrozando el revisionismo." "La coexistencia pacífica ... es únicamente parte y no toda ni la única línea de política exterior de los países socialistas."

8 Julio: El PC indonesio (PKI) anunció que mandará a Moscú y a Pekín una delegación encabezada por su presidente Aidit a invitación de los respectivos comités centrales, partiendo de Jakarta el 19 de julio. El mismo día Sinjua informó un discurso reciente de Njoto, segundo vicepresidente, en Sumatra del Sur que confirmó que uno de los principales fines de la delegación será tratar de ayudar a sanar la ruptura en el movimiento comunista internacional.

8 Julio: Albania se quejó de que únicamente los equipos de vólibol militares de tres países comunistas se presentaron para una competencia internacional de campeonato, y que otros países comunistas que habían convenido en participar se habían retractado "hostilmente." Los que tomaron parte fueron los de China, Corea del Norte y Rumania.

Referencias

"Peking Review" No. 25, 21 de junio de 1963; contiene el texto íntegro en inglés de la carta del PC chino de 14 de junio. No se han recibido las ediciones en francés y español, pero es probable que también lo contengan. El texto completo también fue publicado, así como material de fondo de gran utilidad, por el "New York Times" de 5 de julio en sus ediciones tanto nacionales como internacional.

"China, Rusia Agarradas en Lucha por el Poder," artículo de Edward Crankshaw del London Observer News Service, 6 de julio; publicado en el "Washington Post" de 7 de julio de 1963.

"El Gran Cisma," artículo de Hugh Seton-Watson en "Encounter," mayo de 1963.

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677. Popular Front Strategy Revived

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BACKGROUND:

Post-War Isolation. The impact of war-time alliance had brought Communists into prolonged coalitions with non-Communists, both in governments and in private organizations. Communists sat, for instance, in the governments of "national unity" of France, Italy and Austria; Communists and non-Communists jointly reorganized labor unions, including the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), formed organizations of victims of Fascism and engaged in quite a few other "united" enterprises. This "honeymoon" came to an end 1947 -- 1949: the Communists recognized that their "restraint" (e.g. soft-pedaling labor demands in France in the interest of post-war reconstruction) failed to bring them effective control of the governments in which they participated, while the non-Communists learned from bitter experience that the Communists had not been "reformed" as a result of the war-time alliance against Hitler (as some optimists had hoped) and broke away from the joint organizations, forming their own labor unions (Force Ouvrière in France, CISL in Italy) and their own international federation of labor unions, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).

Since that time -- which coincided with the economic revival of Western Europe under the Marshal Plan -- Communist Parties in most countries of the free world remained essentially isolated, though in many instances ominously strong, opposition groups, reinforced by a wide galaxy of auxiliary and front organizations. In quite a few recently independent countries outside Europe, the Communists misused the newly gained independence for armed uprisings and guerrilla warfare (as in India, Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines), thus insuring their even more rigid isolation. In the majority of African and Latin American countries, Communist Parties were -- until a few years ago -- either non-existent, or insignificantly weak or illegal.

Return to the Popular Front? Most recently, however, the outlook for new Communist attempts to enlist the help of non-Communist parties and even governments has significantly improved in a number of countries -- even though for a variety of different reasons. Typical examples of this turn in favor of the Communists are:

- a. France -- where Socialist and other middle-of-the-road parties accepted Communist support in the last general elections (as a desperate -- and not conspicuously successful -- defense against de Gaulle's

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and where a popular front, primarily designed (at least by non-Communist participants) as a means to prevent the re-election of de Gaulle in the presidential election of 1965, is being discussed by Communists, Socialists and leftist splinter groups.

b. Italy -- where the Communist gain of 1 million votes in the last general elections induced the PSI (Nenni Socialists) to break off support of the government and where they are now pressing for a government which could operate only under CP tolerance, if not with direct CP participation.

c. Argentina -- where a "national front" of Communists and Peronistas has impeded the stabilization of a democratic regime for the last several years.

d. Brazil -- where the CP itself is not dangerously strong, but where penetration of the administration of President Goulart, of labor unions, peasant leagues, political parties and other mass organizations by Communists and other leftists appears to make steady and virtually irresistible progress.

e. Chile -- where the CP has worked with considerable success since 1935 in the political Popular Action Front (FRAP), as well as in labor unions and among agricultural laborers who are a prime objective, and is now preparing for next year's elections in the popular front, whose party membership fluctuates.

f. India -- where the CP, though weakened in its popular appeal by Chicom aggression, has managed to come once more closer to the ruling Congress Party on a "patriotic, national defense" line.

g. Indonesia -- where the CP, despite her 1948 uprising against the new republic, is now the only legitimate mass party, controlling labor unions and other popular organizations and exerting powerful influence on the administration of President Sukarno.

h. Ghana -- where President Nkrumah and his monopolistic government party are treated by Moscow virtually like a CP, admitted to the CPSU Congresses, etc.

i. Spain and Portugal -- where the Communists, though underground and in exile, have redoubled their efforts to form united fronts in view of the succession crises, expected soon in both countries. For example, successful approaches of pro-Communist groups to the Portuguese opposition party leader General Delgado; and Communist lobbying among Spanish exile groups in Munich.

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 The Rationale of Communist United or Popular Front Strategy.

No Communist Party has ever seized sovereign power on the basis of a popular majority vote. Communist Parties do not recognize any other political parties, whether Socialist, Liberal, Conservative or anything else, as their equals, but consider them (at best) as tools, to be used for a while, until they can be disposed of and liquidated. The relationship between a CP and a non-Communist group is therefore never the type of "coalition" or "alliance" arrangement often existing between two or more bona fide (i.e. neither Communist nor Fascist) parties, whether in order to form a government or for purposes of joint opposition: in these arrangements, each partner implicitly acknowledges the equal right of the other to exist as a political entity -- even though he will naturally make every effort to weaken his competitors and strengthen his own position within such alliance. Communists, however, consider any other party (or non-Communist government) as an enemy to be ultimately destroyed -- even if they need their assistance temporarily. Consequently, a CP -- regardless of the contents of "unity" agreements -- will continue to penetrate its "partners," to proselytize among their followers and to do everything possible to prepare their ultimate downfall and destruction. Only the CP's own needs will occasionally impose some limitations on these nefarious tactics -- as Russia's plight in the earlier stages of World War Two forced Stalin to make some initial concessions to the West.

(The united front strategy is common to all elements in the World Communist Movement, regardless of which side of the crumbling monolith they happen to stand. It is a basic characteristic of all Communist activities and not at all related to "peaceful coexistence" or other issues of the current controversy between Moscow, Peking and other Communist Parties.)

Communist Alliance Techniques. A "united front," in Communist parlance, denotes some form of cooperation between the CP and a Socialist Party, labor unions or other non-Communist elements of the labor movement. Communists speak of a "united front from below" when they proselytize among the rank-and-file of their "partners," to impose their tactical demands on the leaders of those groups. "United front from above" implies that the CP feels compelled to negotiate with the leaders of the group(s) in question -- which they don't like to do since it usually hampers their freedom of maneuvering (one of the most significant exceptions: the "unity of action" agreement between the Italian CP and the Nenni Socialists, terminated by the latter a few years ago). "Popular Front" describes Communist cooperation not only with Socialist and Labor groups, but with potentially any political party or mass organization, including even right-wing groups, for defense against Fascism (see: Popular Fronts in France and Spain before World War II, and the Resolution of the 7th Comintern Congress, Moscow 1935). "National Front" denotes a combination of Communist and non-Communist forces, usually at the government level, to prepare a Communist take-over under the pretext of national unity (see the first post-war governments in Czechoslovakia and other satellites).

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Communist Successes. Communist use of the strategy and tactics, summarized above, though not uniformly successful, has yielded numerous far-reaching advantages to their cause. Psychologically, the slogan of "unity" -- whether as "labor unity," "anti-fascist unity" or "national unity" -- has proven to be a very strong emotional and intellectual attraction in most countries. Ever since Marx concluded his "Communist Manifesto" (1847) with the ringing appeal "Proletarians of the world, unite!", the concept of unity -- at virtually any price -- has dominated all segments of the international labor movement, Socialist Parties, labor unions and other organizations. Politically, the leaders of the political parties and other mass organizations thus manipulated by the Communists, were usually no match for the duplicity of the latter: most of them believed mistakenly that this was merely another instance of "coalition" and failed to see, let alone to stop, simultaneous CP penetration into the ranks of their own organizations, CP propaganda misuse of the "united action," CP occupation of the key positions in unified mass organization, and so forth. Even the imminent danger of Communist seizure of power failed some times to u n i t e the non-Communist majority for effective defense -- as in Czechoslovakia, 1948. Thus the Popular Front in France enabled the Communists to seize control over the entire labor union movement (where they had held only a minority position before) and to deprive the Socialist Party of a large portion of its proletarian following.

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ACTION:



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25X1C106 678. Soviet Espionage Exposures

BACKGROUND: In June 1962, Khrushchev wrote in a letter to the Chairman of the Japanese CP, Sanzo Nozaka (published by Tass, 28 June 1962):

"Espionage is needed by those who prepare for attack, for aggression. The Soviet Union is deeply dedicated to the cause of peace, does not intend to attack anybody, and therefore has no intention of engaging in espionage."


If Khrushchev's first sentence had been correct, then a Soviet attack would now be overdue, for the last part of his second sentence has certainly been proven false. The last few months have seen a rash of exposures of Soviet spy cases. (See attachment.) Some of these cases, such as the (1 July) expulsion of Gennadi G. Sevastyanov from the US for his attempted recruitment of a CIA employee, or (7 February) of Ivan Skripov from Australia for contact with a female double agent, resulted in no damage to free world security. Other cases, such as those of Col. Stig Wennerstrom or of H.A.R. Philby, may have been much more damaging. The case of Profumo, Ward, Christine Keeler and Yevgeniy Ivanov suggests one way in which Soviet espionage gets a foothold, but the Oleg Penkovskiy case has shown that Soviet society also produces motivations and opportunities for espionage, and that the Soviets are also vulnerable; this case has led to the recall of many RIS officers, to the expulsion of General Varentsov from the CPSU Central Committee, and to the mysterious disappearance of General Ivan Serov.

In the flood of revelations on all sides, some of them highly sensational, some people are shocked, but many ordinary citizens get the impression that East and West are pretty much alike, both in conducting espionage and in suffering from it. The day is passing, if it has not already passed, when espionage as such surprises anyone. The public is still impressed by cases with widespread ramifications (as with Profumo and Penkovskiy), and some are still startled to find that the Soviets should involve the nationals of countries like Sweden, Iceland, and New Zealand in their intelligence collection effort. But these reactions are probably growing weaker, and the idea that the Soviets are villains because they spy could gradually disappear.

But Soviet spy cases need not lose their propaganda value. For one thing, much will depend on how the play on such cases is handled; they can be treated as specimens of a larger pattern of Soviet activity, rather than merely as spot news. Secondly -- and this is related to the first point -- Soviet spy cases can be used to give the public a realistic appreciation of Soviet

espionage techniques. The more the world becomes aware of these techniques, the more difficult it will be for the Soviets to operate, and the easier it will be for western services to turn or defect Soviet agents and intelligence officers.

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679 EE,WE,a. The June Plenum of the CPSU

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BACKGROUND:

The Setting of the Meeting. First scheduled for 28 May 1963, the CPSU Central Committee plenary meeting on ideological problems finally met from 18 to 21 June inclusive. Two headline-grabbing events preceded the meeting: the space flights of Valeriy Bykovskiy and Valentina Tereshkova (which the Soviets had carefully planned) and the Chinese Communist letter of 14 June (which the Soviets definitely had not planned). Thus while Bykovskiy and Tereshkova may have failed to achieve a union in space, the Soviets had no difficulty in demonstrating a high degree of space prowess. But in the light of Soviet problems with China and even Rumania, Soviet ideological dynamism and leadership was far from conspicuous when the plenum began and even less evident when it ended.

As the Central Committee gathered, Tass released (on 18 June) a temporizing statement which expressed "deep regret" at the "arbitrary interpretation," distortion, and "unwarranted attacks" in the Chinese letter. The statement explained that the Soviet press would not publish the letter, since that would necessitate a public reply, leading "to a further aggravation of the polemics." (See Propagandist's Guide to Communist Dissensions #6, BPG No. 119, 1 July 1963.) The Chinese themselves immediately undertook to circulate their letter in Moscow.

It had been originally expected that the plenum would produce a new series of violent attacks on erring writers and artists. But the Kremlin seems to have found this problem, like that of the Chinese, so serious that it had to be pushed out of the spotlight. According to a Moscow-dated AP story of 17 June, Khrushchev at a 16 May meeting had sharply criticized his assistant in charge of the ideological struggle, Leonid Fedorovich Ilichev, because Ilichev had failed to report to him the hostile reaction of Soviet and other intellectuals to his, Khrushchev's, attacks on artistic and literary experimentation and independence. Certainly there had been a serious domestic reaction; the editors of Komsomolskaya Pravda reported on 23 May that an earlier article attacking Yevtushenko had evoked more than 1,200 letters totalling 5000 pages "in which readers talk at the top of their voices about life and literature, about the times, and about themselves." A Young Writers' Conference, finally held on 7-10 May, had been boycotted by young writers and was finally eked out with speeches by Komsomol officials, cosmonauts, and elderly authors. Because of the seriousness of this resistance, and also because of the adverse reaction abroad, the Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A00020020005-4 the attacks on the writers and artists had to be minimized.

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Ilichev's Speech. In his opening keynote speech at the plenum, Ilichev downgraded the problem of the non-conforming intellectuals by making them only one of a series of ideologically delinquent groups, such as bureaucratic party hacks, pilferers of state property, wayward youth, drunkards, churchgoers, and people who regard their home as their castle. He repeated old clichés about the New Man, about the need for more work and discipline, and about the party's leading role in Soviet society. Ilichev gave the impression of a sleek, robe-wearing minister in what had once been a fiery evangelical sect; he still used some of the old vocabulary, but he did not offend the taste of his congregation with too much fire and brimstone. Thus at one point, Ilichev applied to the critics of socialism the label of "kulak lieutenants," but for fear of arousing memories of Stalinism, he hastily turned to eulogize the memory of Soviet soldiers. In speaking of art, Ilichev denied any intention to revert to the "methods of guidance of art practiced during the period of the personality cult."

One section of Ilichev's lengthy speech discussed the problem of "imperialist ideological subversion," a danger on which the Kremlin recently held an intra-bloc conference. Ilichev listed four alleged clichés of the ideologists of imperialism: that the Marxist-Leninist analysis is out of date; that capitalism has changed and that social conflict is disappearing under it; that socialism neglects the material and spiritual requirements of man; and that socialism and capitalism are moving in the same direction. These concepts are by no means impervious to serious criticism. But Ilichev's "refutations" are not serious criticisms at all, and will convince no one who was not convinced already; for example, the question of whether Marxism-Leninism is outdated is dismissed with a pat reference to "the whole course of development of mankind in the 20th century," and the charge that communism neglects spiritual and material requirements is "answered" with rhetoric about socialism stunning the world and exploring the cosmos. Ilichev's arguments are those of a man who is no longer capable of logical thoughts -- perhaps the result of his totalitarian upbringing. Marx, Engels or Lenin would never have produced such fatuous platitudes.

Plenum Fails to Face Up to Problems. Ilichev's speech was followed by others from party officials and spokesmen for the Soviet "establishment," expanding on the various areas of ideological interest: motion pictures, education, literature, the press, youth activities, labor unions, and so on. The higher-level speakers generally agreed that there were serious deficiencies, while the lower-level ones tried to show that, at least in their own areas of responsibility, everything was working out for the best. None of the speakers seemed to offer effective solutions for the most serious problems, such as the questioning of the past role of present leaders, the conflict of generations, and the decline in respect for party guidance. Except for Khrushchev, the speakers followed Ilichev in avoiding (Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020005-4 "decision") on ideology failed to lay down specific measures

either for strengthening the belief in communism or for suppressing heresies.

Apparently the CPSU has decided to use less publicized measures to control literary and artistic expression, thus avoiding hostile public reactions, especially abroad. The plenum did not act on a proposal for a unification of "creative workers" unions, even though supported by Ilichev, but now the unions will apparently adopt this proposal themselves -- "voluntarily." The unification will provide a pretext for eliminating liberal influence and tightening control. Following a vaguely worded recommendation of the plenum, the number of newspapers in Moscow will be cut in half, with the functions of the specialized papers taken over by the mass papers, such as Pravda, Izvestia, and Komsomolskaya Pravda; these last will be expanded in size. This action will strengthen party control, and reduce chances for placing unorthodox materials in less-known periodicals. There are also signs that provincial book publishing will be curtailed: Khrushchev complained at the plenum that writers whose works were rejected in Moscow or Leningrad sometimes succeeded in getting published elsewhere.

Secret Discussions on the Chinese Problem. The plenum could not completely overlook the Chinese problem; the Chinese were dealt with in secret speeches by Mikhail Suslov, Boris Ponomarev, and Yuriy Andropov, who represent the USSR in the July discussions. The Chinese letter was circulated to the delegates (a privileged group) and the plenum passed a resolution on the coming meeting with the Chinese, which was somewhat stronger than the pre-plenum Tass statement, e.g.: "The CPSU Central Committee categorically rejects as groundless and slanderous the attacks of the CCP Central Committee on the CPSU and other Communist parties, on the decisions of the 20th, 21st, and 22nd CPSU Congresses, and on its Program." Parts of the resolution sounded almost as though the Presidium had suspected the Chinese of trying to instigate a Stalinist revolt at the plenum.

Khrushchev's Speech. The concluding speech at the plenum was Nikita Khrushchev's. This speech was not published until eight days after its delivery on 21 June, and this time may have been spent in expurgating the text; there may, for example, have been a lengthy discussion of the Chinese problem in the original. In the form we have it, the Khrushchev speech shows the leader's concern over lack of party discipline and the influence of western ideas. He repeatedly stressed the unity of the party, its ties with the people, and its leading role in Soviet life. He demanded complete obedience to Kremlin decisions, and threatened disobedient members with expulsion; one such person, explicitly named, was Viktor Nekrasov, who had praised some features of western society, and who had refused to recant.

On the whole, the published speech is less violent than Khrushchev's 8 March speech (see BPG #644d.). He praised the

writings of Aleksandr Tvardovskiy (who as editor of Novy Mir has published much "liberal" material written by others) and said he would like to believe that Ernst Neizvestniy, the controversial sculptor, "is an honest and gifted man." He also claimed to have frankly told Stalin that, despite Malenkov's claim at the 19th Congress (1952) that the grain problem had been solved, the Ukrainians had no bread. In this, and in recalling that he had to overcome Stalinist opposition before making his famous 1956 secret speech, Khrushchev seemed to be defending himself against the charge of complicity in Stalin's crimes.

Khrushchev's speeches are always free-wheeling and somewhat eccentric. This speech, however, exceeded the norm in repetition, disorganization, and non sequiturs. The last section, on economic problems, was completely irrelevant to what had been discussed at this plenum, and seemed to be a rambling rehash of Khrushchev's speeches on this subject over the last several years. Among other things, he hinted at new changes in the organization of planning, when the last changes (see BPG #637) have hardly yet taken effect. His statements on economics may be partly a matter of reasserting his own views, apparently contested last spring by Kozlov.

Nevertheless, Khrushchev is now once again the uncontested leader. Kozlov is apparently out of the picture, whatever the nature and origin of his illness. Two new Central Committee Secretaries were named on 21 June, Leonid Brezhnev and Nikolai Podgorniy (see attachment for unclassified fact sheet on Brezhnev.) Brezhnev appears now to be Khrushchev's heir apparent. He has been a "Khrushchev man" since before World War II -- in the Ukraine, on the Ukrainian front, in the Virgin Lands, and in the higher leadership. Like Khrushchev, he has agricultural and industrial experience, and he can be crude and undiplomatic. But he seems to lack Khrushchev's former energy and quickness of mind, and he also lacks Kozlov's massive self-esteem. If the aging Khrushchev should go, Brezhnev might well prove only a stopgap leader; other heirs-apparent, such as Trotsky and Malenkov, have failed to establish themselves. Certainly it will take greater talents than Brezhnev to steer the USSR through the problems now arising. Only a complete innovator, comparable to a new Lenin, could restore the moral leadership of the party. For the Soviet Union has outgrown the old dogmas, and no longer believes in or respects them.

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680 EE,WE,a. East Europe 10 Years After Stalin's Death

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BACKGROUND: Events in East Europe increasingly reflect national diversity and resistance to Soviet dictat. This development can be seen now not only in Albania's defiance of Moscow and in Khrushchev's accommodation to "Titoism," but also in the unexpected Rumanian refusal to accept her allotted role in CEMA and in the nationalist pronouncements of Slovakian Communist writers and journalists.

In 1953 the relationship between East European countries and the Soviet Union could be characterized as one of direct colonial-type exploitation on the one side and almost total subservience on the other. Local Stalins in the satellites, working closely with the Soviet Embassies and MVD representatives, ruled their satrapies through undisguised police terror.

Khrushchev's "new course," inaugurated in 1954, introduced a more flexible program aimed at overcoming the bureaucratic inertia of the Stalinist era. The Soviet First Secretary's pilgrimage to Belgrade in May 1955 presaged accommodation with Tito's brand of socialism in 1962-63. The 20th CPSU Congress with its spectacular denunciation of Stalin, helped to bring about a bloody revolt in Hungary and drastic changes in Poland. Although the reaction in the rest of East Europe was less explosive, the 20th CPSU provided the impetus for subsequent modifications. Khrushchev's new course and particularly his peace-making mission to Belgrade marked the beginning of Albania's resistance to the USSR and its subsequent break with Moscow. In Bulgaria, Chervenkov's power was challenged and other Bulgarian leaders began searching for alternatives to Stalinism. In Czechoslovakia, the modicum of artistic and intellectual ferment which was in evidence immediately after the 20th CPSU Congress was quickly suppressed by the Stalinist Party leaders who ignored the basic forces, including the nationalism, at work in the country. In Rumania, the regime of Gheorgiu-Dej maintained both its cohesiveness and its Stalinist-type controls over a docile populace.

The 22nd CPSU Congress in December 1961 provided a second strong impetus for de-Stalinization. As such, it even affected the course of countries like Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, which while paying lip service to Khrushchev's program, had retained most of their Stalinist characteristics. Also, new factors had come into play: above all, the development of a second major center of Communist authority in Peking, but also of importance, Albania's defection and the rapprochement between the USSR and Yugoslavia.

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The Sino-Soviet dispute also destroyed the myth (already undermined by the break with Yugoslavia) of a disciplined, monolithic bloc, and of the infallibility of the CPSU. It revealed, instead, a more familiar, if equally dangerous phenomenon, that of aggressive Russian and Chinese nationalism masquerading in a socialist cloak. In East Europe, the dispute has afforded an opportunity to bargain allegiance in the Sino-Soviet struggle for greater independence from Moscow.

Compared to what it was at Stalin's death in 1953, East Europe since the 22nd CPSU Congress not only has a different composition but a changed internal dynamic and a new relationship with the Soviet Union.

First of all, Albania as of 1960 or slightly earlier began adopting positions which openly supported the Chinese side of the Sino-Soviet dispute. All Moscow's attempts to overthrow the Hoxha regime (by internal plot and external economic pressures) came to nought and diplomatic relations were suspended in December 1961. Thus, Albania became the second East European country to throw off Soviet authority.

In Bulgaria, which had no "moderate" precedents and where the more liberal leaders had long since been purged, few meaningful de-Stalinization measures were taken until after Khrushchev's visit in the summer of 1962. At the Party's VIIIth Congress in November 1962, most of the leaders who had been connected with the Ministry of Interior in the Stalinist era were ousted. However, in many cases this amounted to little more than personal vendetta since those doing the ousting were as much addicted to Stalinist methods as their predecessors. Still, it is apparent that, obedient to the wishes of Moscow, the current leaders are searching desperately for new formulae with which to make Bulgarian Communism a more acceptable and viable phenomenon.

De-Stalinization arrived slowly and belatedly in Czechoslovakia. The XIIth Czech Congress in December 1962 reaffirmed the hard line policies and recommissioned the old-guard Stalinist leaders. An attempt by Rudolf Barak, representing the more moderate group in the Czech hierarchy, to take over from Novotny in late 1961 had failed and Barak had been sentenced to 15 years in prison. However, by the spring of 1963, pressure from within the Party (and possibly also from Moscow) reached the point where Novotny could no longer ignore it. Czech, and particularly Slovak intellectuals began to criticize the regime openly; alluding to the role of present leaders in the "violations of socialist legality" which characterized the purge trials of the Stalin era, they demanded immediate and far-reaching de-Stalinization measures. The June meeting of the Slovak Writers Union and Journalists Union took a strong stand, criticizing Premier Siroky by name and Novotny by implication. Although the extent of internal Party opposition to Novotny is not clear, the latter may not be able to contain the current dissent. In such an event

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there is a good chance that he and his lieutenants -- among the most durable Stalinist holdovers in East Europe -- will be replaced with more moderate leaders capable of holding the Party together during a de-Stalinization phase.

In Hungary, despite the initial abhorrence with which he was regarded by the people for his role in "selling out the revolution" and liquidating Imre Nagy, Janos Kadar turned out to be the type of middle-of-the-road leader which, from the Moscow point of view, the situation demanded. Through the introduction of economic incentives and, in general, by more flexible internal policies, Kadar succeeded in eliciting enough popular cooperation to move forward with his liberalization program. In August 1962, a short time before the Party Congress, Kadar was finally in a position to expel from the Party the former Stalinist leaders Rakosi and Geroe and to remove Karoly Kiss from the Politburo. Together with the above-named, 17 other political leaders, prosecutors, judges and State Security officials were expelled for complicity in the trial and execution of Laszlo Rajk (accused of Titoism and purged in 1949). These measures were taken in the context of "liquidating the personality cult, remedying all wrongs that could be mended, clearing the Party of the members of the Rakosi clique who abused their power at the expense of the people and the Communist movement, and putting an end to the baleful methods introduced by the Rakosi clique." It was also done in the context of improving relations with Tito. Thus, Kadar removed the most notorious Stalinist remnants in the Party and attempted to write a formal finis to the abuses which led to the 1956 revolt. Since that time he had continued to work to improve the image of Hungarian Communism at home and abroad.

The Gomulka regime in Poland, while it has fallen short of meeting the initial expectations of the West and also of many Poles, made a definite break with the past and set Poland on a more nationalist and more independent course. Police coercion has been greatly curtailed and although some of the political "liberalism" of the post-1956 era has gradually been reduced, in the intellectual and cultural fields Poland compares favorably with many countries in the world. Moreover, the "Polish road" has been an example to other countries of the Soviet bloc including the USSR itself. More recently, the freer experimentation Poland has exhibited in internal policies has begun to be extended (to a very moderate degree) to external policies as well. Poland's relations with China, Yugoslavia and with the West differ, at least in degree, from those of the rest of East Europe and from those of the USSR itself. Gomulka (once accused by Khrushchev of "selling out" Polish Communism) also appears to be playing the role of advisor and confidant to the Soviet leader in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

From Rumania has come perhaps the greatest surprise of all. On the basis of its relative economic prosperity, the country,

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long considered one of Moscow's most obedient satellites, has openly defied Soviet policy regarding economic integration in CEMA, and flouted Moscow's authority by returning its ambassador to Tirana, by refusing (to date) to reestablish Party relations with Tito and by flagrantly publishing a lengthy summary of the 14 June letter from Peking to Moscow after the latter "in the interests of unity" had refused to do so.

Yugoslavia has developed, since the advent of Khrushchev in the USSR, a very interesting and -- perhaps -- portentous relationship with Moscow. The political course set by Khrushchev at the 20th CPSU Congress has been well received by Tito and, together with K.'s 1955 initiative, marked a beginning for improved relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Since Khrushchev's new course conceded a greater variety and looser definition of "socialism," the attitude of the various CP's toward "Titoism" was to become one of the main tests of genuine acceptance of Khrushchev's brand of socialism. The rapprochement between the two countries in 1962 and Khrushchev's stubborn defense of Yugoslav "socialism" in the face of Chinese attacks indicate that this new form of association with the Soviet Bloc, which permits Yugoslavia to retain its independence, may be indicative of eventual future relations between Moscow and East Europe.

Summary: In order to rejuvenate the stagnant bureaucracy inherited from the period of Stalin's suppression, Khrushchev was forced to permit greater variety and flexibility. In the long run viability meant enlisting popular cooperation. Khrushchev's decision constituted the first step in a process which was to lead to a gradual loosening of ties between the USSR and its Eastern European appendages.

The "Soviet bloc" is better described today as an alliance of Communist states sharing common goals in which the Soviet Union predominates but no longer commands unquestioning obedience. Since it has become increasingly difficult to deal with dissent in the traditional manner, Moscow must rely more and more on agreement by consensus. In a sense, the former "satellites" have come of age; they are getting too big and too sophisticated to control by direct dictat .

Internally, while the Communist leaders of East Europe are still addicted to authoritarian methods, they are increasingly obliged to consider and accommodate pressures from the people and from within the party. In the economic sphere, CEMA is proving the difficulties of combining economic unity with pressure for political plurality. Foreign policy in at least some of the East-European satellites (e.g. Poland and Rumania) might be described as "complementary" to that of the USSR rather than "identical." In brief, we are witnessing the incipient stage of national forms of Communism. This does not


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imply the likelihood of a break with Moscow; it does mean that -- despite the various unifying factors of geography, ideology, and economics -- with the advent of new and younger leaders, the mutual interests of each side will coincide to a lesser extent.

Finally there is the seemingly inexorciseable spectre of re-nascent East European nationalism. The most striking example is that of Slovak resentment of Czech domination which is currently plaguing Novotny's rule in Czechoslovakia. However, this is only one of several potentially explosive border and nationalities problems, including Macedonia, Transylvania, the Polish Eastern Territories, Bessarabia, etc. which are apt to haunt intra-Bloc relations for a long time to come.

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Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)
Fifth World Congress

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BACKGROUND: [Also see BPG #115 item 654 of 6 May 1963] The Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) held a congress in Moscow from 24 to 29 June. Reportedly, 1,541 delegates represented 113 countries: 27 European, 23 Asian, 34 African, 25 Latin American, 2 North American; and Australia and New Zealand. The largest delegations came from Brazil, Japan, Great Britain, Italy, France, West Germany, Norway, the USSR, the CPR, Canada and the US. Fifty countries which had previously not been represented at WIDF congresses sent delegations. Representatives of all the major international Communist fronts such as the WPC, WFTU, WFDY, FIR, etc. also attended. Eugenie Cotton was re-elected WIDF president. The elected honorary vice presidents are Leonora Andrea Andreen (Sweden) and Dolores Ibarruri (Spain).

Khrushchev sent a message to the Congress in which he stated that any future world conflict would be a nuclear rocket war of extermination; therefore the Soviet Union would strive for disarmament and pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence with both Communist and non-Communist countries. An opportunity for Khrushchev's "peace" speech had been afforded by the just-completed space flight of Valentina Tereshkova who attended the Congress.

The Congress had ^{three} significant characteristics: (1) almost disregarding many militant speeches of delegates, the final appeal of the Congress to the women of all countries was a moderate general statement with surprisingly few traditional cold war overtones; (2) contrary to expectations at a women's congress pursuing broad, pacific charter aims, the Sino-Soviet conflict interfered far more violently with the completion of its agenda than at other recent international Communist front affairs, and with the significant difference that the policies of the moderate, pro-Soviet forces prevailed; and (3) although the policies of the moderate, pro-Soviet forces prevailed, they were forced to resort to heavy-handed, non-parliamentary control procedures.

The Congress did not contribute anything tangible to WIDF's program of action except the reiteration of traditional Soviet propaganda themes (on disarmament, peace, anti-colonialism, sovereignty, national independence, the rights of women, health and education of children, etc.) calculated to attract sympathy and support from women of the underdeveloped areas. However, the tensions which developed and the organizational changes approved may well be the beginning of a fundamental change in the makeup and character of the WIDF. For example, according to a

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Peking NCNA broadcast, the Chicoms charged that "... the chairman... forcibly adopted a 27-member executive bureau."

On the opening day, the 50-women Italian delegation equally divided between Communists and non-Communists and led by a Communist member of the Italian parliament, angrily walked out of the hall when the Japanese delegate delivered a report that attacked the US for its maintenance of military bases overseas, including Japan, while praising Communist governments for "sparing no effort" to reduce international tension and to achieve general disarmament. The Italians issued a statement that the Congress must not and cannot identify itself with the position of one of the two power blocs; it cannot and must not take political sides. This delegation also pointed out that the Japanese report had not only included vehement attacks on the US but had addressed itself to Japanese problems rather than to the issue of peace. (The Japanese Communists, who obviously dominated their delegation, have been leaning increasingly toward Peking's position in the ideological conflict between Moscow and Peking). The Italian delegation made it clear that it did not support the US, but wanted to see the Congress confined to dealing with social conditions of women and in the home. Reportedly, at an organizational committee meeting, the British and French delegations joined the Italians in protesting cold war speeches, but they did not join in the boycott of the Japanese speech. The American delegation of 65 sat through the Japanese and Cuban -- see below-- speeches.

The second Italian delegation walkout came when the Cuban delegate, Carmen del Busto, secretary of the Cuban Women's Socialist Federation gave another report that charged American troops with deliberately poisoning South Vietnam's water supply and contrasted these and other anti-US charges with high praise for governmental policies benefitting women and children in North Vietnam and in the USSR.

A Chicom delegate (Mrs. Kuo Tien) forced the Congress into temporary suspension when she sought to refute the Indian delegate's (Pro-Soviet Communist Mrs. Aruna Asas Ali) accusation that the Chinese are blocking Indian and neutral nations' attempts to settle the border dispute. Mrs. Kuo Tien dashed to the speaker's platform demanding to be heard immediately to explain the Chicom position. When she continued to occupy the platform after being declared out of order, an uproar broke out and the Chairman (Dr. Joan Garritt of the UK) adjourned the session. Members of the Congress presidium filed off stage, and delegates, newsmen and photographers converged on the podium. Mrs. Jeanette Vermeersch, wife of French Communist leader Thorez, violently attacked the Chinese delegate ("Here is the imperialist press, and you tell us you are against imperialism!"). Finally, an African delegate succeeded in persuading Mrs. Kuo that with the help of African and Asian delegations she would be given a chance to state her views at a later session. During the same session Mrs. Kennedy's name was thrown into the debate after a

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Spanish (exile) Communist delegate, Dolores Ibarruri of Spanish Civil War fame, had praised the policy of coexistence. An advocate of the Chinese militant view sneered: "Do you want to come to terms with Mrs. Kennedy?" and to the applause of the vast majority of the Congress received Ibarruri's affirmative reply, "if Mrs. Kennedy is ready to help defend her children from nuclear war."

The fundamental issues of the Sino-Soviet conflict became evident as the Congress progressed to establish programs and policy. The leader of the Chinese delegation (Yang Yun-yu) attacked the "imperialist" US President, claiming that his peace strategy was designed to pit the CPR and the Soviet Union against each other. In hardly veiled form she attacked Soviet coexistence policy and Soviet attempts to reach agreements with the West; claimed that Khrushchev's peace policies are incompatible with Communist revolutionary principles; and maintained that peaceful coexistence is acceptable and workable only if based on Chicom principles. Although the speech was milder than the Chicom letter of June 14 to Khrushchev -- reportedly it had been modified on the insistence of the Congress secretariat -- it nevertheless was a clear attempt to discredit the Russians and in the long term to win supporters for the Chicom point of view. The Chinese distributed translations of the speech to the delegates, approximately 50% of whom, according to one estimate, were CP members of the countries they represented. The speech received little applause and none whatever from the Soviet delegation and the many hundreds of Soviet guests present in the meeting hall. As was to be expected, the Chicoms received the enthusiastic support of the Albanians in all their actions.

The final statement of the Congress, which appealed to the women of the world to fight for peace and against an atomic arms race, resulted in little pro-Peking support in split voting. All accounts of this voting vary with the origin, for example: Moscow TASS and western sources said that the Chicoms and Albanians "voted against the appeal" and North Vietnamese and North Koreans "abstained"; Peking NCNA, however, said "The Chinese, Korean and Albanian delegates voted against it by a show of hands. The delegate from the DRV abstained and the South Vietnam delegate did not take part in the voting." The appeal closely paralleled Soviet foreign policy statements. It did not name the US, its allies or NATO as responsible for the dangers to world peace.

The salient passages of the Congress appeal state:

". . . We do not want war to be a means of deciding conflicts between states; we are convinced that conflicts should be settled by negotiations.

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"We wish to work for the establishment of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems all over the world on the basis of mutual respect, territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, non-interference, equality and mutual benefit, for the achievement of total and general disarmament and the rigorous control of thermonuclear disarmament in particular.

"We appeal to you:

"To act without rest and without respite to bring about the cessation of nuclear tests;

"To support the creation of nuclear-free zones;

"To struggle for the removal of all military bases and the withdrawal of military troops on foreign soil;

"To support the action of personalities, organizations, and governments, and of all those who act in this spirit;

"To multiply the number of women's campaigns for peace, peaceful coexistence, and disarmament.

"Disarmament will be one of the greatest victories of peace-aspiring humanity. It will contribute to peace in the world, create conditions for true equality among the peoples, liberate immense material and human resources for peaceful work, and put science in the service of humanity.

"Disarmament will not solve all the unsolved social and other problems, but will create conditions in accord with the interests of the peoples.

"The cause of disarmament and peace is inseparable from the cause of the peoples' struggles for their national independence. . . .

"We support the women and peoples who struggle against all kinds of imperialist oppression and all forms of colonialism and remnants of feudalism for their liberty and national independence. . . ."

The Chicom delegation had favored a militant declaration, condemning US imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism as the basic problems causing world tensions. Their failure to vote for the final statement brought boos from nearly all delegates and guests who wildly cheered its adoption.

The Chinese delegate subsequently accused the sponsors of the Congress of having carried out anti-Chinese maneuvers,

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manipulated the debate, violated democratic principles, and maliciously spread slanderous stories about the Chinese delegation -- i.e., similar but more pointed charges to those levelled by the Soviets against the Chinese at the recent Afro-Asian Journalists' Conference in Djakarta (see BPG #117, item 667, dated 3 June 1963). The Albanian delegation was denied the opportunity to explain its position. A North Korean radio broadcast charged that the Congress was held "in an undemocratic manner in an uproarious atmosphere of slander and calumny, disorder and duress." It registered surprise at the fact that the Congress was being used as a platform for the anti-China campaign. The Indonesian press on July 9, according to a Peking NCNA broadcast, carried a critical statement by Maasie SIWI, general secretary of GERWANI, Indonesia WIDF affiliate, which condemned the undemocratic handling of the congress and said "there was no revolutionary spirit in the program of the WIDF and the GERWANI categorically rejected it."

The New York Times (30 June) mentioned indications that the organizers of the Congress had made an attempt to avoid an open split with the Chicoms by incorporating in separate resolutions (not available at this writing) some of the more violent anti-Western charges that the Chicoms wanted to have incorporated in the formal declarations. These resolutions were allegedly prepared in closed sessions of various commissions and were not voted on by the Congress but were read to the plenary assembly.

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DOCUMENTS ON COMMUNIST UNITED AND POPULAR FRONT STRATEGY AND TACTICS

(Underlinings and subtitles added)

I. Basic COMINTERN Instruction to Penetrate Mass Organizations:

From "Conditions of Admission to the Communist International" (the 21 conditions), adopted by the 2nd COMINTERN Congress, Moscow, August 1920.

"9. Every party which wishes to join the Communist International must carry on systematic and persistent communistic activity inside the trade unions, the workers councils and factory committees, the co-operatives and other mass workers' organizations. Within these organizations communist cells must be organized which shall by persistent and unflagging work win the trade unions etc. for the communist cause. In their daily work the cells must everywhere expose the treachery of the social-patriots and the instability of the 'centre.' The communist cells must be completely s u b o r d i n a t e to the party as a whole."

II. LENIN: How to Exploit Bourgeois Disunity:

From Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder," 1920.

"It is possible to conquer the more powerful enemy only by exerting the utmost effort, and by necessarily, thoroughly, carefully, attentively and skilfully taking advantage of every, even the smallest 'fissure' among the enemies, of every antagonism of interest among the bourgeoisie of the various countries, among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie in the various countries; by taking advantage of every, even the smallest opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional. Those who do not understand this fail to understand even a grain of Marxism and of scientific, modern socialism in general."

III. STALIN: United Front must not impede CP "independence":

From Stalin's speech at CC/CPSU Plenum, 1 August 1927.

"A united front can have revolutionary significance only if and when it does not hinder the Communist Party from conducting its independent political and organizational work, only if it does not prevent it from organizing the proletariat into an independent political force, rousing the peasantry against the landlords, openly organizing a revolution of workers and peasants and thus preparing the conditions necessary for the hegemony of the proletariat."

IV. Popular Front Against Fascism.

From the resolution of the 7th COMINTERN Congress, Moscow, August 1935.

"In face of the towering menace of fascism to the working class and all the gains it has made, to all toilers and their elementary rights, to the peace and liberty of the peoples, the Seventh Congress of the Communist International declares that at the present historical stage it is the main and immediate task of the international labor movement to establish the united fighting front of the working class. For a successful struggle against the offensive of capital, against the reactionary measures of the bourgeoisie, against fascism, the bitterest enemy of all the toilers . . . it is imperative that unity of action be established between all sections of the working class, irrespective of what organization they belong to, even before the majority of the working class unites on a common fighting platform for the overthrow of capitalism and the victory of the proletarian revolution. But it is precisely for this very reason that this task makes it the duty of the Communist Parties to take into consideration the changed circumstances and to apply the united front tactics in a new manner, by seeking to reach agreements with the organizations of the toilers of various political trends for joint action on a factory, local, district, national and international scale.

"With this as its point of departure, the Congress enjoins the Communist Parties to be guided by the following instructions when carrying out the united front tactics:

"1. The defense of the immediate economic and political interests of the working class, the defense of the latter against fascism, must be the starting point . . . Communists must not limit themselves to merely issuing appeals to struggle for proletarian dictatorship, but must show the masses what they are to do today They must strive, through the joint action of the labor organizations, to mobilize the masses around a program of demands that are calculated to really shift the burden of the consequences of the crisis on to the shoulders of the ruling classes

"2. Without for a moment giving up their independent work in the sphere of Communist education, organization and mobilization of masses, the Communists, in order to render the road to unity of action easier for the workers, must strive to secure joint action with the Social Democratic Parties, reformist trade unions and other organizations of the toilers against the class enemies of the proletariat, on the basis of short or long-term agreements

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"5. Joint action with the Social-Democratic Parties and organizations not only does not preclude, but on the contrary, renders still more necessary the serious and well-founded criticism of reformism, of Social Democracy as the ideology and practice of class collaboration with the bourgeoisie, and the patient exposition of the principles and program of Communism to the Social Democratic workers.

"6. Election campaigns must be utilized for the further development and strengthening of the united fighting front of the proletariat. While coming forward independently in the elections and unfolding the program of the Communist Party before the masses, the Communists must seek to establish a united front with the Social Democratic Parties and the trade unions and exert every effort to prevent the election of reactionary and fascist candidates. In face of fascist danger, the Communists may, while reserving for themselves freedom of political agitation and criticism, participate in election campaigns on a common platform and with a common ticket of the anti-fascist front "

V. MAO TSE TUNG on the Anti-Japanese United Front:

From Mao, "Urgent Tasks of the Chinese Revolution since the Formation of the Kuomintang-Chinese Communist Party United Front," September 1937.

". . . . To resist Japan we need a strengthened united front which means the mobilization of the people of the whole country to participate in the united front. To resist Japan we need a solid united front, which means the necessity of common policies. Common policies . . . will also serve as a binding force of the united front, binding tightly, as with a cord, all the organizations and individuals from all the parties, groups, classes and armies that participate in it

"What should our common policies be? They are the Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat Sen and the Ten Great policies for Anti-Japanese resistance and National Salvation announced by the Chinese Communist Party

"Communism is to be implemented in a future stage of the revolutionary development. Communists do not wishfully envisage the

realization of Communism at present, but are striving for the realization of the historically determined principles of national revolution and democratic revolution. This is the basic reason why the Chinese Communist Party has raised the slogans of an anti-Japanese national united front and a united democratic republic.

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"Our race and nation now stand at a critical hour of survival. May the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party work in close harmony! May all our fellow countrymen who do not want to be slaves rally together on the foundation of Kuomintang-Chinese Communist Party solidarity! The realization of all necessary reforms in order to overcome numerous difficulties -- such is the urgent task now facing us in the Chinese revolution. The accomplishment of this task will certainly bring about the defeat of Japanese imperialism. . . ."

VI. United Front of National Liberation in Japan against U.S. Occupation:

From: B. Ponomarev, leading CPSU ideologist, in PRAVDA, February 28, 1953.

"The Japanese people who have fallen into the misfortune of the American occupation, are in a more difficult situation than at any time in their history. The Japanese Communist Party is fighting for the formation of a united, national liberation, democratic front of all progressive Japanese forces in the struggle for national liberation from the American occupiers and against the transformation of Japan into a springboard for war in the Far East. The Communist Party program states that the workers and peasants will be the main force in this liberation struggle. The artisans and small traders, small and middle employers, and also a large section of the Japanese industrialists and merchants, suffering from the occupation regime and laws of the reactionary government, will join their alliance"

VII. Current Tactics: United Front against U.S. Imperialism and for Peace:

From: Statement issued by the leaders of 81 Communist Parties, Moscow, November 1960.

". . . . In some non-European developed capitalist countries which are under the political, economic and military domination of U.S. imperialism, the working class and the people direct the main blow against U.S. imperialist domination, and also against monopoly capital and other domestic reactionary forces that betray the interests of the nation. In the course of this struggle all the democratic, patriotic forces of the nation come together in a united front, fighting for the victory of a

revolution aimed at achieving genuine national independence and democracy, which create conditions for passing on to the tasks of socialist revolution.

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"The working class, peasantry, intellectuals and the petty and middle urban bourgeoisie are vitally interested in the abolition of monopoly domination. Hence there are favorable conditions for rallying these forces.

"Communists hold that this unity is quite feasible on the basis of the struggle for peace, national independence, the protection and extension of democracy, nationalization of the key branches of economy and democratization of their management, the use of the entire economy for peaceful purposes in order to satisfy the needs of the population, implementation of radical agrarian reforms, improvement of the living conditions of the working people, protection of the interests of the peasantry and the petty and middle urban bourgeoisie against the tyranny of the monopolies.

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"The restoration of unity in trade union democracy in countries where it is split, as well as on the international scale, is essential for heightening the role of the working class in political life and for the successful defense of its interests. The working people may belong to different trade unions, but they have common interests.

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"It is also essential to peace and social progress that the national and international unity of all the other mass democratic organizations be restored. Unity among the mass organizations may be achieved through joint action in the struggle for peace, national independence, the preservation and extension of democratic rights, the improvement of living conditions and the extension of the working people's social rights.

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"Communists will continue to criticize the ideological positions and right-wing opportunist practices of the social-democrats, they will continue activities aimed at inducing the social-democratic masses to adopt positions of consistent class struggle against capitalism, for the triumph of socialism. The Communists are firmly convinced that the ideological differences obtaining between themselves and the social-democrats must not hinder exchanges of opinion on the pressing problems of the working-class movement and the joint struggle, especially against the war danger.

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"The vital interests of the working-class movement demand that the Communist and social-democratic parties take joint action on a national and international scale to bring about the immediate prohibition of the manufacture, testing and use of nuclear weapons, the establishment of atom-free zones, general and complete disarmament under international control, the abolition of military bases on foreign soil and the withdrawal of foreign troops, to assist the national-liberation movement of the peoples of colonial and dependent countries, to safeguard national sovereignty, promote democracy and resist the fascist menace, improve the living standards of the working people, secure a shorter working week without wage cuts, etc.

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"Today in a number of capitalist countries the working class, headed by its vanguard, has the opportunity, given a united working class and and popular front or other workable forms of agreement and political co-operation between the different parties and public organizations, to unite a m a j o r i t y of the people, win state power w i t h o u t civil war and insure the transfer of the basic means of production to the hands of the people.

"Relying on the majority of the people and resolutely rebuffing the opportunist elements incapable of relinquishing the policy of compromise with the capitalists and landlords, the working class can defeat the reactionary, anti-popular forces, secure a firm majority in parliament, transform parliament from an instrument serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument serving the working people, launch an extraparliamentary mass struggle, smash the resistance of the reactionary forces and create the necessary conditions for p e a c e f u l realization of the socialist revolution.

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"The meeting sees the further consolidation of the Communist parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, of proletarian internationalism, as a primary condition for the unification of all working-class, democratic and progressive forces, as a guarantee of new victories in the great struggle waged by the world Communist and working-class movement for a happy future for the whole of mankind, for the triumph of the cause of peace and socialism."

Colonel Rudolf Abel

Colonel Abel was the only son of a minor Czarist official. He had an unusual flair for languages, and taught English, German, and Polish in Moscow while in his twenties. He appears also to have had training in drafting and engineering, assets in technical intelligence work, and he has some talent as an artist. According to a press report in the London Sunday Telegraph of 18 February 1962, Abel's first assignment for Soviet military intelligence (GRU) was a "legal" one, as a Soviet commercial attache in pre-Hitler Germany. Later, after further training, he worked as an "illegal resident," independent of any Soviet embassy, and purportedly as a Pole or a Lithuanian. He eventually set up a studio in Brooklyn as a retired photo-finisher, a good cover since he used micro-photographic techniques in his intelligence work. He also used radio communications and "dead drops." His activities were disclosed to the American authorities in May 1957 by the defection of an associate, Reino Hayhanen, who had also worked in the US as an "illegal" using the passport of one Eugene Maki, an American who had gone to the USSR as a child. Among disclosures resulting from the Abel affair was that of the recruitment by the Soviets of Sergeant Roy Rhodes, who had been assigned to the US Embassy in Moscow. Rhodes had been pressured into working for Soviet intelligence by the claim that, after a carefully-staged drinking party, he had made a Russian girl pregnant, and by the threat that consequently he would be refused permission to leave the Soviet Union. Abel's network had been ordered to locate Rhodes after the latter's return to the US.

Gordon Lonsdale

Lonsdale was a Soviet national and a professional intelligence officer of Soviet State Security (KGB), who as an "illegal" controlled other agents. Using the name and documents of a Canadian who was taken as a child to Finland, Lonsdale appeared in Canada in 1954 and went from there to England in March 1955. He carried on various business affairs which served to cover his espionage activities. Two members of Lonsdale's network were Peter and Helen Kroger, an American couple whose true names were Morris and Lena Cohen. The Krogers left the US after the arrest of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and David Greenglass in 1950, presumably for fear of incrimination. Pictures of the couple were later found among the effects of Col. Rudolf Abel, after Abel's arrest. The Krogers applied for New Zealand passports in Vienna in 1954, using forged supporting documents. They established themselves in England in 1955, where Peter Kroger for a time pretended to be a dealer in antiquarian books, specializing in Americana. When arrested, Helen Kroger was carrying a letter containing microdots (tiny photographic pictures the

size of a pinhead) and microdot and high-speed radio equipment was found concealed in the Kroger home. Two other individuals in Lonsdale's organization were Henry Frederick Houghton and his fiancée, Ethel Elizabeth Gee, both employed at the Underwater Weapons Establishment of the British Admiralty. After World War II, Houghton, with 23 years of naval service, took a desk job in the Admiralty. While a clerk with the British Naval Attache in Warsaw in 1951, he was watched by Polish intelligence and compromised himself by black market activity and a liaison with a Polish woman. He was passed to the KGB on his return to England in 1952, where he was able to supply secret naval information. In June 1960, Houghton introduced his 46-year-old fiancée to Lonsdale, and she was induced to provide secret information which had been unavailable to Houghton. Houghton's expenditures, out of keeping with his Admiralty salary, led to investigation and to the arrest of the members of the net.

Ragnar Gunnarsson

Ragnar Gunnarsson was a member of the Icelandic Communist Party who took part in a 1953 tour of the USSR under the sponsorship of the Icelandic-Soviet Society and the Soviet Youth Anti-Fascist Committee; during the tour, he became friendly with the chief guide-interpreter, "Yuriy Stefanovich." Six years later, while Gunnarsson was running a trucking business using Czech-made trucks, he was visited by Alipov, a secretary from the Soviet Embassy in Reykjavik, who said he was bringing greetings from Yuriy Stefanovich. Alipov was, however, unable to see the busy Gunnarsson regularly until all of Gunnarsson's trucks were incapacitated by a lack of spare parts. Then Alipov took Gunnarsson for a drive and asked him if he could find out when the US was going to set up a submarine supply base in Iceland. Gunnarsson said he was unable to do this, but Alipov was insistent. Moreover, Gunnarsson was unable to get parts for his trucks, and the Czech commercial representative, V. Stokl, finally told him that he should forget about his trucks and work for the Soviets. By the end of 1960, the trucking business collapsed, due to Gunnarsson's troubles in operating the vehicles, and although Gunnarsson moved, Alipov traced him down and induced him to photograph an electronic installation. Gunnarsson had seen pictures of the installation in the press, and thought this action harmless, but the Soviets sought to use it to compromise him. To clinch their control, six months after Alipov's return to the USSR two other Soviet diplomatic officials, Kiselev and Dmitriyev (an interpreter), called on him and paid him for the photographs over protest, leaving the money and walking out. A loyal Icelander, Gunnarsson now informed the police, who guided him while the Soviets first tried to compromise him further with trivial tasks and then asked him to find a bus driver with access to the US air base at Keflavik. At

this stage, the police wound up the case by breaking in on a rendezvous of Gunnarsson with Kiselev and Dmitriyev on 25 February 1963. The two Soviets were expelled as personae non gratae.

Ivan Fedorovich Skripov

In 1959, First Secretary was the first Soviet to arrive in Canberra to reopen the Soviet Embassy, closed after the highly publicized defection of KGB officer Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov in 1954. By giving parties and mixing at every possible social gathering, Skripov rapidly built up a broad circle of contacts in government and other circles, contacts likely to benefit Skripov's intelligence organization, the KGB. In March 1961, Skripov met a woman employee of the Australian government at the Sydney Zoo, and recruited her for intelligence work. Unknown to him, however, she was cooperating with the Australian security service, and reported everything to them. Skripov trained her in the tricks of spycraft, including secret writing, and paid her periodically, the total finally coming to 425 Australian pounds. After a year, Skripov gave her the job of recovering first one and then another metal cylinder from a dead drop, and in October 1962 he had her dig up a package buried in a cemetery. Before giving Skripov the package, she took it to security officials, who found that it contained an unused Canadian passport in the name of Andrew Huha, and a passport photograph of another person. When Skripov gave her another package for delivery to an unidentified person in Adelaide, security officials found that it contained a high speed radio transmitter, identical with the set found in the Kroger home in the Lonsdale case. The party to which the set was to be delivered failed to appear, and rather than return the set to Skripov, as he was demanding of the agent, the Australian government disclosed what was going on and demanded Skripov's recall (7 February 1963). Such radio sets are not needed by "legal" intelligence operators like Skripov, but they are essential equipment (as are also false passports) for "illegal" operators. The Australian government did not want this set to be given Skripov, as Skripov might then, through a dead drop or another go-between, have passed it on to some "illegal" unknown to Australian security officials.

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Other relatively recent cases, on some of which investigation is still (July 1963) proceeding, include:

Lt. Col. Anatoliy Fedorovich Loginov, Assistant Military Attache, Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, expelled in December 1961 for attempting to obtain secret information from an employee of the Canadian government.

Vladislav Sergeyevich Andreyev, Commercial Counselor, and Nikolai Ivanovich Shtykov, Second Secretary, both at the Soviet Embassy in Wellington, expelled from New Zealand for attempted espionage in July 1962.

Valerian Pripoltsev, employee at the Soviet trade mission, Cologne, Germany, arrested in August 1961 on charges of espionage and convicted in February 1962. He was released from prison in July 1962 and expelled as persona non grata.

Yuriy Mishukov, translator, and Yuriy V. Zaitsev, Political Affairs Officer at UN Headquarters, New York, asked to leave in the summer of 1962 by the US Government. They had attempted to recruit an American, Richard Flink, who informed the FBI, and played along with them with the FBI's support. At first only mildly interested in Flink, they became much more enthusiastic when he became a Republican candidate for the New York State Assembly, giving him \$1,000 for campaign expenses, and promising \$2,000 more. Previously they had paid Flink small sums for unclassified information on US regulatory agencies, hoping to establish a tie which could be exploited if Flink became a civil service employee.

William Vassall, a homosexual British Admiralty clerk, was recruited by the Soviets in 1956 while employed in the office of the British Naval Attache in Moscow. He had been plied with brandy at a private dinner party near the Bolshoi Theater, and then photographed in compromising circumstances. Both in Moscow and later after his return to London, he had transmitted secret materials to Soviet agents, and he was paid sums up to 700 pounds a year. Vassall was arrested in September 1962, and sentenced to 18 years imprisonment on 22 October 1962.

Colonel Stig Wennerstrom, a Swedish air force officer with access to secret information, served as Assistant Air Attache in Moscow in 1940-41 and as Air Attache there from 1949 to 1952. According to press reports, he was recruited in 1948 while an instructor at an air force school for senior officers in Stockholm. He subsequently served as Air Attache in Washington from 1952 to 1957. He was in the Defense Command Staff in Stockholm from 1957 to 1961 and acted as an advisor to the Swedish Foreign Office from 1961 until his arrest on 25 June 1963. Upon his arrest, the Swedish government declared Major General Vitali A. Nikolsky, Soviet Military Attache, and Georgi P. Baranovski, First Secretary in the Stockholm Embassy, personae non gratae. On 3 July, a Vienna weekly (Welt am Montag Sport) reported that Semen I. Yushchenko, now Soviet Military Attache in Vienna, was said by western intelligence services to have preceded Nikolsky as Wennerstrom's contact man. While Yushchenko was in Stockholm in 1959, he had reported to Swedish police the offer of two Swedish citizens to sell low-level information to the Soviet embassy. The Swedes in question were indicted in 1961. It now appears that Yushchenko reported the offer rather than taking it up because he feared he might be detected in his much more important operation involving Wennerstrom.

Leonid Ilich BREZHNEV

Born 16 December 1906 in Kamenskoye, now Dneprodzerzhinsk, in the Ukraine, Brezhnev is now Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and (since 21 June 1963) also member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Brezhnev has twice before been a member of the Secretariat -- 1952-53 and 1956-60 -- but has not previously combined this position with high governmental office.

Brezhnev joined the CPSU in 1931. He graduated from the Kursk Land Management and Reclamation School in 1927, worked as a land manager in Kursk Guberniya and Sverdlovskaya Oblast (Urals) from 1927 to 1930, and then attended the Metallurgical Institute in his home city of Dneprodzerzhinsk, graduating in 1935. There he worked as an engineer at the F.E. Dzerzhinskiy Metallurgical Plant, and entered politics in May 1937, being elected Deputy Chairman of the Dneprodzerzhinsk City Executive Committee. By 1938 he was chief of a section of the Dneprodzerzhinsk Oblast Party Committee, becoming a Secretary of this Committee in 1939. According to Current Biography, Brezhnev's association with Khrushchev began in the 1930's in the Ukraine, where Khrushchev was sent as First Secretary (i.e., chief) in 1938 to conduct a ruthless purge. This purge probably helps to explain Brezhnev's rapid rise in the Dneprodzerzhinsk party organization; there were vacancies to be filled.

Like Khrushchev, Brezhnev served as a political officer in the Ukraine during World War II; he became a Major General in 1943, and rose to the position of chief of the Political Administration for the 4th Ukrainian Front. After the war, Brezhnev held various party posts in the Ukraine, where Khrushchev was First Secretary for most of the late '40's. Brezhnev was chosen Zaporozhe Oblast First Secretary in 1946 and Dneprodzerzhinsk Oblast First Secretary in November 1947; in January 1949 he also became a member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian CP. In July 1950 Brezhnev was transferred to the Moldavian Republic as First Secretary of the Republic's CP.

Brezhnev's activities in Moldavia were considered so successful that in October 1952, at the 19th CPSU Congress, he became not only a member of the CPSU Central Committee, but also a CPSU Secretary and a candidate member of the Presidium, surrendering his Moldavian responsibilities. After Stalin's death, the number of Secretaries was reduced, and Brezhnev lost both his Secretary and candidate Presidium member positions. For a year he served as Deputy Chief in the Main Political Directorate (i.e., Party Control Department) of the Ministry of Defense; he was responsible for political control in the Soviet Navy, and held the rank of Lieutenant General. As Khrushchev's power increased, however, new horizons opened for Brezhnev. He was sent to Kazakhstan as Second Secretary of the Kazakh CP in February 1954, becoming First Secretary in

August of that year. In that position, he carried out Khrushchev's "Virgin Lands" agricultural program, designed to bring virgin land under cultivation. Unlike later Kazakhstan First Secretaries, Brezhnev did not fall in disgrace; he recovered his Secretary and candidate member positions at the 20th Congress in February 1956, and returned to the central apparatus in Moscow. At the June plenum in 1957, when Khrushchev routed his "anti-Party" opponents, Brezhnev became a full member of the Presidium.

On the recommendation of Khrushchev, Brezhnev succeeded K. Ye. Voroshilov as titular head of the Soviet state in May 1960, becoming Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. He again lost his major party offices, and this shift to a figurehead position might be interpreted as a loss of standing; the shift has never been fully explained. Brezhnev rejoined the party Presidium in October 1961. As chief of state, Brezhnev has visited Finland (September 1961), Sudan (November 1961), India (December 1961) and Yugoslavia (September-October 1962). On a trip to Morocco, Ghana, and Guinea in early 1961, Brezhnev's plane was fired at by French fighter planes. It is reported that he may visit Iran in late 1963, and possibly also Cambodia.