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PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

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Central Propaganda Directive
Briefly Noted

Record Copy

621 WH, b.

Cuba's Sugar Crop Exposes
Basic Communist Failings

622 EE, WE

European Integration--
Temporary Check

623 EE, b

Significant Shortages in
Soviet Agriculture

624 AF, FE

Captured Viet Cong Document
Admits Communist Weaknesses

NE, WH

625 WE, EE

Why the United States Will
Defend Europe

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Briefly Noted

The Cuban Crisis Through RED Glasses

In reviewing the Cuban crisis, the New York Times of 28 January (Western edition) noted:

"Last Oct. 29--just one week after President Kennedy had confronted Khrushchev on the Cuban issue--Pravda headlined its page one: 'Guarantee Peace and Security of the Peoples.'

"That headline stated the theme of the Russian interpretation of the Cuban affair: That by protecting Cuba from American invasion, Khrushchev had averted world-wide atomic war. The theme has been hammered home since in speeches, editorials and diplomatic exchanges...."

Seen through RED glasses, Khrushchev is the "Prince of Peace," not the perpetrator of the crime that caused the crisis. The heaviest guns of the Communist propaganda machine have been employed to re-write history. There is an obvious need to establish the facts, to counteract Communist propaganda and to insure an accurate historical record of the Cuban crisis.

To serve this objective, three unclassified attachments are provided: First, "Who is the Prince of Peace?" which is a brief statement of how Communist propaganda alters the facts (marked "Not for Verbatim Publication," simple variations--adaptation to each local audience plus paraphrasing--are all that will be needed to use it); second, an article from The New Republic which gives "chapter and verse" of the Communist propaganda line; and third, "The 'Prince of Peace' Story for the Soviet People," a collection of statements from a Look magazine story of 18 December 1962 which the Kremlin removed when it reprinted an abridged version of "154 Hours on the Brink of War" in its 5 January 1963 issue of Za Rubezhom, in an effort to make it appear that US writers were affirming that the US was the aggressor rather than the Soviet Union (it is possible that USIA may send this collection of quotations to its posts).

Communists Exploit Peasant Unrest in Mexico

Communist-inspired violence and political agitation among poverty-stricken, land-hungary peasants is growing in one section of Mexico and poses a threat to the nation's economic and political security.

(Briefly Noted Cont.)

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
11 February 1963

Mexico's 48-year-old land reform program has won the praise of many. President Lopez Mateos has distributed 24 million acres to peasants in four years compared with 96 million acres by former administrations over the previous 44 years. But graft, corruption, and bureaucracy take their toll and Mexico's new land owner usually lacks the know-how and finances to fully utilize his land. Rising birth rates and dwindling income contribute to the peasant's problems.

Communist agitators have seized upon these conditions to foment unrest and incite violence. Squatters brigades have invaded big ranches and farms; pitched battles with federal troops, rioting and violence have occurred in a few cases. Communists formed an Independent Campesina Central (CCI) claiming membership of one million. CCI's leaders claim their objective is to exert pressure for faster and bigger land distribution. At the organization meeting, former President Lazaro Cardenas praised Cuba's agrarian program as a model. In an attempt to curb growing unrest, President Lopez Mateos has promised to increase the pace of his program and break up every large private ranch and farm within two years. (See Press Comment, especially 5 February issue, for detail.)

Developments in Mexico underscore the importance of the fundamental objective of the Alliance for Progress--"to bring our people accelerated economic progress and broader social justice within the framework of personal dignity and political liberty"--and its specific land-reform goals. Communist exploitation of weak spots in Mexico--with its widely-praised, long-term land reform efforts--sounds a special warning for Mexico's neighbors.

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Translations of ONE DAY OF IVAN DENISOVICH Published

Translations are now appearing of the first Soviet-published novel on Stalin's prison camps, ONE DAY OF IVAN DENISOVICH (See Guidance #614d). This book is now available in two American editions, one published by Frederick Praeger and one by E. P. Dutton. Victor Gollancz is publishing a British edition, it is expected that there will shortly be a Japanese edition, and other editions will probably follow. The London Observer printed brief excerpts, shortly after the novel first came out in Novy Mir (see

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(Briefly Noted Continued)

Press Comment, 10 December 1962), and the Saturday Evening Post has published longer excerpts in its 9 February issue.

The fact that there are two American editions of the same book (the first such duplication since MEIN KAMPF was published in translation in the 1930's) might furnish additional reason for editorial and literary commentary. The Praeger translation is by Max Hayward and Ronald Hingley, and appears to be far superior in style. The Dutton translation is by Ralph Parker, a Moscow correspondent of the London Daily Worker who in 1949 wrote a book of Stalinist propaganda, CONSPIRACY AGAINST PEACE. Parker does not seem to have omitted any details from his translation (after all, the story was first published with Khrushchev's blessing), and Harrison Salisbury even maintains that Parker's translation is more accurate. But perhaps because of his long residence in the USSR, Parker uses outdated slang, and his sentences lack strength, clarity, and fluency. The Dutton/Parker translation (which is also used by Gollancz) is authorized by the Soviet government, and the Soviets are themselves publishing it in the periodical Soviet Literature No. 3, 1963; this version is also in the process of appearing serially in the Moscow News.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn's ONE DAY OF IVAN DENISOVICH not only reveals conditions in the camps, but also provides a surprisingly frank picture of the corruption and wirepulling which still take place throughout Soviet society. We recommend stressing this latter aspect in our output. The discussion of this book also provides an occasion for calling attention to other books on Soviet prisons and camps, some of which (e.g. Krasnov and Weissberg) are superior in their account of camp and prison conditions. A list of some of these books is contained in an attachment.


Border Conflict Costs the CPI Its Local Fronts

On 22 December 1962 Thought magazine, published in New Delhi, reported in an article entitled "Comradely Woes" [see Press Comment of 24 January 1963] that the Sino-Indian border conflict has created serious difficulties for the Communist Party of India (CPI). The fairly lengthy article, among other things, elaborates on the following developments in the local fronts: The India-China Friendship Association has become extinct; the Indian branch of the World Peace Council has been indiscreetly silent for some time with some of its supporters turning their backs on the WPC and others repudiating it; the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee has collapsed ("its foundations gave way burying the organization as well as its leaders under its moral debris"); the All-India Trade Union Congress, the oldest and most organized front, shows signs of waning influence over the Indian proletariat; the All India Progressive Writers Association seems to have lost its direction--some of its members have even appealed to the WPC to condemn China for its perfidy.

The article points out that while some of the international fronts, such as the women's (WIDF), the teachers, (FISE), the lawyers (IADL), and the journalists (IOJ), never enjoyed a mass base in India, they did provide a useful bait to draw in unsuspecting and apolitical persons and non-Communist socialists.

With the weakening, if not disappearance, of the "transmission belts," the article points out the CPI is finding it difficult not only to recruit new cadres but also to act as the eyes and ears of Moscow. However, the article also cautions that the CPI may be able to stage a comeback, particularly on the trade union front and that Communist "nationalists" ("Dange-ites") are facing tough opposition, particularly in Bengal, from pro-Peking leaders, whether arrested or gone underground.

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Special Notice

CHICOM POLEMICAL BOOKLET
The Common Enemy
Available on Direct Order from Peking


Workers of All Countries Unite, Oppose the Common Enemy

Foreign Language Press, The State Bookstore
Guozi Shudian, P. O. Box 399, Peking
People's Republic of China

The People's Republic of China (CPR) is publishing a booklet containing its three recent and most outspoken papers on its ideological dispute with the Soviet Bloc, namely: "The Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us," the editorial of December 31, 1962 which marked a new phase in the dispute; the People's Daily editorial of December 15, 1962 whose title is used for the brochure; and "Leninism and Modern Revisionism," published in the first 1963 issue (January 14) of Red Flag.

The booklet, according to CPR announcements via radio to Moscow and in its home service /it is presumed that broadcasts have also been made to SEA in English and that periodicals will carry notices, in addition to the fact that the CPR will itself mail copies abroad, may be ordered by mail from the above address (apparently without charge).

The announcement said it will be published in the following foreign languages: Russian and English, to be followed by French, Spanish, Japanese and Esperanto. The three articles are also being published separately in the above languages as well as in German, Vietnamese and Arabic.



- 5 March Tenth anniversary of the death of S T A L I N
(21 December 1879 to 5 March 1953)
- 14 March Eightieth anniversary of the death of K A R L M A R X
(1818-1883)
- 28-30 March WPC-supported Cuban Solidarity Conference,
Rio de Janeiro, currently scheduled for 28-30 March 1963
- 1 April Fifteenth anniversary of beginning of B E R L I N B L O C K A D E
(1948)
- 11 April International Day of Liberation from Fascism
(or Day of Remembrance) sponsored annually by
the Communist Front: International Federation
of Resistance Fighters (FIR).
- 17 April Birthday of N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the USSR
Council of Ministers, First Secretary of the CPSU
Central Committee (1894)
- 24 April World Youth Day Against Colonialism and for
Peaceful Coexistence (Communist)
- April Twentieth Anniversary of Germans' discovery of
the Communist KATYN massacre
- April Afro-Asian Journalists' Conference, currently scheduled
for Indonesia in April 1963 (see DIR 12399 dated
22 January 1963 to Stations of participating nations at
preparatory conference held in Djakarta in February).
- 14 May Warsaw Pact, 20-year mutual defense treaty signed at
Warsaw by USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, Rumania and East Germany, in 1955.

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February 1963

621 WH, b. Cuba's Sugar Crop Exposes Basic Communist Failings

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BACKGROUND:

"A people commits suicide the day on which
it bases its existence on a single crop."
--Jose Marti, 1883.

Capitalizing on its good soil, warm climate and considerable moisture, Cuba has, in the past, produced sugar more cheaply than any other country and has been the largest producer and exporter of sugar in the world. But Cuba's production today is falling far short of pre-revolution days. Since the Cuban regime's agrarian policy, the only element which has changed, now conforms to the classic pattern of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, the plight of Cuba's important sugar industry is testimony to the shortcomings of that system. The details may be found in Cuba's own admissions (see the unclassified attachment, "Fact Sheet on Cuba's Sugar Industry"). The highlights are summarized below.

The Policy. When a developing Communist movement needs the support of the peasants, "land for the landless" is its battle cry (see the Briefly Noted item, "Communists Exploit Peasant Unrest in Mexico"). Once the movement gains power, a token distribution of land is made by the new regime. Later, after a period of consolidation, the regime reneges on its promises and takes the land for itself. This Communist pattern is exactly what happened in Cuba (see Guidance Item 592, "Cuba: Revolution Betrayed").

Under Cuba's so-called Agrarian Reform Law of 1959, some large estates were divided and small parcels distributed to peasants. Small land owners held 57 per cent of the land before the revolution; after Castro's promised "land reform," they showed a gain of two per cent. The remaining 41 per cent of Cuba's land was organized into co-operatives and a few state farms. Then came the third decree of Communist agrarian "reform"--conversion to state or so-called "people's" farms. "The people's farm is like a factory." Instead of becoming land owners as Castro had promised, the peasants are simply wage earners.

Emulating other Communist comrades, Cuba's radicals preached "overnight" industrialization and "great leap forwards" in mechanization. These advances coupled with diversification of agriculture would free the nation from sugar--a seasonal one-crop economy dependent upon foreign markets. Thousands of peasants were organized into military and militia units; parades and meetings consumed much of the working day and lengthy speeches and "educational" courses the nights; peasants flocked to the cities to get the rewards of their revolution, many seeking employment as replacements for the professionals and skilled workers who fled Cuba in large numbers. The net result was neglect and even abandonment of the cane fields--largest income-producing crop.

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A note of alarm was sounded as sugar production dropped more than 30 per cent below previous norms. Cuba was unable to meet commitments to Communist-Bloc nations, much less gain needed foreign exchange through sales to other nations. The director of the sugar industry declared in August 1962:

"Everyone is well aware of the disorganization, . . . and the loss of conscience regarding the need to produce cane, owing to the policy carried out by the Agrarian Reform Institute. . . . there is total disorganization and apathy with respect to cane production, and this is sharply reflected in the present harvest, . . . the policy of abandoning cane is also beginning to spread.

"In view of this situation, we consider that the revolutionary government should take steps without delay to increase 1963 production."

Suddenly, sugar became the nation's number one crop again and all-out efforts were ordered to increase production. New planting goals were set, but the regime had an inkling of the troubles to come when only 80 per cent of the planting goals were achieved. "Sugar cane," declared Ernesto "Che" Guevara, "must be the center of our work in the years to come." The major task was one of undoing the damage the regime had already done.

The Organization. In typical Communist style, committee was piled on committee in a bureaucratic form that finally prompted the leaders to deplore the piles of paper that delayed action and the workers to protest that meetings, rallies, parades and other devices designed to stimulate enthusiasm were sapping their strength and actually interfering with production.

A super-committee was named to mobilize the 1963 sugar harvest. The biggest problem: lack of manpower. First it was announced that 95,000 workers would be needed. This was later scaled down to 50,000 supplementary workers. Volunteers were called for--preferably those with experience. "Permanent" volunteers were solicited. Finally in desperation, the nation's unions were given quotas of "permanent volunteer" workers they were responsible for delivering to the cane fields.

Emulating the "down-to-the-countryside" drives of Communist China and other Red models, leaders of the regime set an example for professionals and others lacking cane-cutting experience by volunteering for weekend duty. But this drew a cry and at least one provincial official pleaded "Volunteer workers should know something about the work."

Substitute and make-shift incentives were decreed to overcome the workers' apathy. First, wages were raised, but the \$2.50 per day average for a cane cutter still fell short of the \$5 or \$6 figure of pre-Castro days. Work "norms" or quotas were set for individuals and

groups; "glorious worker" awards were announced; competition was encouraged; extra food rations were authorized; strict discipline was enforced, restrictions placed on movement from one job to another, and controls put on sick leave and absenteeism. Rallies and exhortations became the order of the day.

The Workers. How to meet the labor shortage? The Red handbook says "meetings, having discussions, organizing our work, setting goals," etc. The Cuban regime tried them all and still fell short. More than one labor official complained of the endless chain of speeches, meetings, rallies, parades, etc. So how did the regime launch their "volunteer" brigade into the cane fields in January 1963? With a rally and a parade.

But shortages of food, shoes, transportation and other essentials plus the effect of the regime's shifting policy from "we're no longer slaves of cane" to "everyone must work in the cane fields" and the absence of real incentives began to show in poor work in the cane fields. Officials were especially critical of the young workers whom they had counted upon to be the vanguard of the 1963 sugar harvest. Retired cane workers were drafted and there were reports of attempts to import experienced workers.

The Machines. Critical shortages of skilled mechanics as well as vital lubricants, spare parts and experienced managers affected the machinery of agriculture and industry. When the regime confiscated the sugar mills, skilled management, trained workers and expert mechanics were replaced with "trusted revolutionaries." But the sugar mills began to break down and some even were dismantled and "cannibalized" in order to keep others running.

The regime announced it would overcome the labor shortage by developing machines to do the cane harvesting. Cuba's official news agency told audiences outside of Cuba that 1,000 cane-cutting machines and 500 cane-lifting machines were at work. These were the totals promised for delivery by 30 December 1962. But the people inside Cuba had been told by "Che" Guevara that the promise had not been kept and could not be kept. Reports of students assembling machines belied their presence in the fields; reports of problems and difficulties in operating the machines belied their effectiveness.

Use of the make-shift machines actually caused greater work. Laborers had to clear areas for the machine to work. Mechanization requires, for example: better roads, gas and oil; cane washers and other extra efforts at the mills to remove dirt and rocks which the inhuman machines picked up with the cane; trained operators and more mechanics--all in addition to the time and considerable expense of creating the machines in the first place. And above all, machines could not cure the fundamental problem of several years of neglect of the cane fields and the lag in utilizing better varieties of cane, improved fertilizers and insecticides, etc.

Cuba's efforts to mechanize stimulated comparisons with the ill-fated back-yard furnaces of Communist China--the frantic program to establish that "no home is complete without one" and the complete abandonment of the effort when it proved costly and utterly useless.

The Protection. While the lagging spirit of the workers gives a clue to their enthusiasm for the regime and its efforts, the picture becomes clearer when one considers the several appeals to protect the sugar harvest. "Strict discipline" was ordered and special efforts made to prevent fires "be they instigated by counterrevolutionaries or the bad revolutionaries." The military and militia were ordered on duty and in some areas special "watch" committees were organized to provide 24-hour guards for the cane fields.

Again, we see the Communist pattern of propaganda that the regime enjoys total and complete support of all the people coupled with extensive measures to guard against sabotage, to organize and control the people, to maintain larger-than-necessary military establishments, to recruit militia throughout the countryside, etc.

The Results. And what are the results of Cuba's "enlightened socialist" program--its emulation of the Soviet Communist model? Cuba's officials admit the 1963 sugar harvest faces difficulties. While no official target figure has been announced, one sugar boss said in August 1962 that the maximum harvest would be 5,350,000 metric tons. This is less than the 1962 goal, which makes it more realistic, but it is still an optimistic estimate since the actual 1962 harvest was only 4,800,000 metric tons. The latter figure was achieved, as was the 1961 harvest, by employing more land than had ever been devoted to sugar cane before. By comparison, pre-Castro production ran as high as nearly 6,000,000 metric tons.

Reports of some areas lagging behind even the reduced accomplishments of 1962, of some mills not working to capacity, of admitted shortages of labor, skilled mechanics, transportation, etc., give credence to some estimates that the 1963 harvest will be lucky to top 4,000,000 tons.

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11 February 1963

623 EE, b. Significant Shortages in Soviet Agriculture

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
BACKGROUND: Preliminary examination of Soviet agricultural output for the year 1962, making due allowances for the usual Soviet overestimation--for example--of grain production, shows that production has fallen to about the level of 1958. This fall becomes a significant factor in an economy whose agricultural production is already too low, in view of the seven per cent increase in population in the preceding four years, and the failure to fulfill the projected increase in production estimated in economic plans. The most striking shortage was in the production of potatoes--which is staple in the diet and an important livestock feed in northern European USSR (Byelorussia, the Baltic Republics, and the Central, Volga-Vyatsk and Northwest regions of the RSFSR).

Production of potatoes for 1962, according to preliminary estimates, was 68.8 million tons--the lowest since 1950, the earliest year for which postwar statistics are available. (See Annex attached: "Production of Potatoes in the USSR, 1950-1962.") Some 18 million tons of the 1962 potato crop will have to be set aside for seed, leaving 50.8 million tons for food, feed, waste and industrial use, which constitutes slightly more than two-thirds of the quantity available for these uses during the past six years. If, moreover, normal deductions are made for waste and industrial use, only about 41.8 million tons will be available for use as food and feed in the 1962/1963 consumption year. In contrast with this, 55 million tons were consumed for food and feed alone during the 1961/1962 consumption year. The prospects for the 1963 crop outlook are worsened by the fact that: (a) growing and harvesting conditions in 1962 apparently reduced the quality of the crop--potatoes recently seen in the Moscow market reportedly are the poorest in years; (b) Europe has not yet emerged from what has been the coldest winter in many years.

Plenum speeches by Communist Party leaders, both in the Byelorussian and the Baltic Republics, further indicate the seriousness with which the general agricultural outlook is regarded at least in the northern European USSR. Crops were ruined because of flooding on 30 per cent of the seeded area of Byelorussia and there have been similar losses in the Baltic Republics. Communist Party leaders go so far (following the Communist Chinese pattern) as to describe the harshness of the weather in the Baltic area as similar to the terrible year 1928--variously described by them as a year of famine, starvation and unbelievable difficulties for the bourgeois peasantry. They hastened to add that in 1962, under socialism, these difficulties have been overcome, omitting the mention of what specific remedies have been undertaken to alleviate the situation--and also not mentioning the fact that the Baltic States did recover from the calamitous crop-year of 1928 as independent countries, being spared the incredible horrors of Stalin's post-1928, anti-kulak, vicious war upon the Soviet peasantry.

During the last two years (1961-1962) there have been a number of reports of civilian unrest in the USSR--riots in the Novochoerkassk (near Rostov) and Grozny areas; refusal of Soviet dockworkers to load butter on ships bound for Cuba; labor troubles in Kemerovo--to name the most prominent. Some of these disturbances appear to have been associated with consumer dissatisfaction--for example, with the retail price increase in livestock products in June 1962, which almost certainly was an important factor in triggering the Novochoerkassk riots. It should be noted, however, that consumer dissatisfaction is the result of a number of factors, and it is extremely difficult (and perhaps unwise) to try to measure precisely any one of them. But it does seem to be true that elements of discontent in the USSR--other than unhappiness with the Communist regime per se--may be foreseen for the period between now and next summer, particularly in a densely populated area such as northern European USSR which contains about 27 per cent of the population of the entire country. All this will be a source of continuing discontent during the next few months at least unless the regime is prepared to: transfer food and feed from surplus areas (if any) to those where the shortages occur; draw upon such reserves as it can find; reduce its food exports; and/or (again after the pattern established by the Chinese Communists) appeal to the free world to come to its rescue.

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624 AF, FE, NE, WH. Captured Viet Cong Document Admits Communist Weaknesses

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BACKGROUND: A Viet Cong /Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam/ document dated September 1962, recently captured, reappraises political and military strategy, reports on progress made over the past year and outlines the tasks ahead. Designed to exhort the guerrilla fighter to greater efforts in a somewhat deteriorating situation, the document explains past mistakes and future difficulties but gives assurances of ultimate victory. "The certainty of Communist victory in this or any "popular revolutionary movement" or "just" war is based on the doctrine of historic inevitability, despite the Viet Cong's own warning of previously unexpected military difficulties and their tacit admission of vulnerability, i. e., "It is only by isolating us that the enemy may have hopes of destroying us. "

The Viet Cong leadership admits to significant miscalculation in their 1961 appraisal, saying "...we underestimated the U.S. capacity for intervention and underestimated the enemy... the idea of a prolonged struggle full of hardships was not thoroughly understood..." /Emphasis added./ The document expresses equal surprise at the previous miscalculation as to the popular nature of the strong Vietnamese resistance to the Viet Cong, as follows:

...the people's struggles for their essential rights were not intensified as they should have been to oppose more forcefully the reactionary policies of the enemy /i. e., the Government of Vietnam/ The movement was still weak and slow; particularly in contended areas, in those under enemy control, and in cities.

Turning to the political tactics of the struggle, the document predicts that

...the enemy may get bogged down and be compelled to negotiate and compromise...the result may be a situation like that of Laos...the present situation in Laos is a very important transitional step for the Lao revolution... Now we are fighting /in South Vietnam/ and at the same time demanding the formation of a coalition government; and demanding peace and neutrality... and to persuade peace-seekers in the very ranks of the enemy.

The success of the strategic hamlet plan, put into effect within the year by the South Vietnamese government, is evidenced by the plans for sabotaging and weakening the hamlets and by the statement that

...our counteraction of the enemy's plan of strategic hamlets ...will be a most important struggle to be carried out... by political and military forces, and by different branches of the party.... /Emphasis in original/

Examples of Communist Aggression, Subversion and Miscalculations. Communist aggression and subversion have been exposed and documented in many countries besides Vietnam. The most recent and potentially most dangerous aggression, and one involving serious miscalculation, was Khrushchev's failure to anticipate America's will and ability to rid the Western Hemisphere of the Soviet aggressive military threat in Cuba. Going backward through time, the following attempts, among others, at subversion and aggression can be listed:

In 1961 the Soviet Union, eager to believe that Guinea was nearly in the Communist bag, encouraged teachers' demonstrations in which Soviet citizens were implicated, and President Touré expelled the Soviet Ambassador for attempts to overthrow his regime.

In 1960, Soviet officials were expelled from the Congo after showing, by many crude activities, that they were too eager to operate in Leopoldville where Soviet bloc arms were subsequently uncovered by Congolese officers.

As early as 1948 (the subversion and aggression in the takeover of all East Europe were completed by this date) Stalin failed to take control of West Berlin in the infamous blockade to which French, British and American allies responded so vigorously.

In the Philippines the guerrillas harassed the government and the people from their mountain strongholds for several years following the close of the war, but their military effectiveness and popular appeal were destroyed.

Communist insurgents fought in Malayan jungles for 12 bloody years but failed to take over the government ---defeated by Malayan-British military cooperation and by lack of a popular uprising to support them.

Similar attempts at subversion and aggression by indigenous Communists, supported by established Communist governments, are being carried on in every continent on the globe. The captured Viet Cong document, but one evidence of the military and political tactics currently being pursued, serves as an example of general Communist strategy to subvert the world.

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February 1963

625 WE, EE. Why the United States Will Defend Europe.

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BACKGROUND: Certain Europeans have said that the United States would hesitate and even fail to defend its NATO allies from Soviet attack; if the Soviets attacked, so the argument runs, the US would bow out in order to avert a Soviet nuclear attack on its own territory. Some of those who express this idea seem positively anxious to remove US influence from European affairs. For reasons of his own, General de Gaulle acts in a way calculated to produce just such a withdrawal. Yet the withdrawal will occur only if all European governments (presumably in some sudden wave of anti-American feeling) ask for it. As long as most of these governments desire US support, it can be assumed that the US will remain at the side of its allies, for the following reasons:

Historic. The white population of the United States (90% of the total) is descended from European ancestors, or from natives of such countries as Turkey and Armenia. By language, the United States inherits a share in one of the major European cultures, that of the British Isles, but although that culture has contributed more than any other, America is not "Anglo-Saxon," i. e. anglicized. Large numbers of German, Scandinavian, Dutch, Polish, Hungarian, Italian, Russian, Greek, and other immigrants have added their own national contributions. France sent fewer immigrants, but France made possible American independence, and Paris has been described as the place where good Americans go when they die. Everywhere in Europe, one finds families with American relatives or individuals with American friends. Americans eat European-style food, wear European-style clothes, read many European books, and often listen to European music. European culture has now probably penetrated more thoroughly than ever, thanks to the exposure of many American soldiers and travellers, and to the relaxation in US tariffs. It is partly because they themselves have fused the various European cultures that Americans regard a united Europe as logical and inevitable.

Because America was remote from Europe in the days of horse and sail, Washington urged his countrymen to abstain from European alliances and European problems. But while they tried for over a century to follow his advice, the Americans were guarded by the British Navy, and British policy served American interests as well as British by supporting a balance of power in Europe. After 1914, isolation lost its reality, though politicians and newspapers still found it a profitable rallying cry, especially since it was naively expected to keep the US out of war. Witting and unwitting German propagandists tried to use isolation to keep America from opposing Germany. But America acted to tip the balance against Germany in both world wars, ultimately because authoritarian leaders controlling European industry and an aggressive military machine could have dictated to the rest of the world. Despite isolationism, Americans have never been able to remain wholly aloof from European affairs, and they have been involved in hostilities

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(625. Continued)

in every major world conflict since the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713). Since the conversion of Senator Vandenberg to bipartisan foreign policy in 1947, isolationism in its older sense has ceased to be even a serious dream in the American mind.

Economic. Economic and financial relations are not decisive in deciding such questions as whether to react to a military threat. But they help to establish the atmosphere in which such decisions will be made. Countries which trade heavily together tend to remain friendly despite political frictions, and vice versa.

Europeans who think of the US as far off probably pay little attention to trade. Actually, US exports to western Europe increased from \$4.5 billion in 1958 to \$6.3 billion in 1961; imports from Europe went from \$3.3 billion to \$4.0 billion. (The contrast of exports and imports might suggest an "unfavorable balance of trade" for Europe; actually payments were balanced by "invisible imports," especially US payments supporting NATO forces in Europe). We hear much talk about overseas agriculture, but the bulk of world trade takes place between developed capitalist countries; regrettably, the share of less developed nations in world exports fell from 31.5% in 1953 to 24.7% in 1960.

Non-military US government aid (grants and credits) for European recovery totalled \$25 billion from July 1945 to March 1961. Of this, \$6.7 billion went to the United Kingdom, \$5.3 billion to France, \$3.7 billion to West Germany, \$3 billion to Italy, \$966 million to the Netherlands, and \$703 million to Belgium. Europeans should regard these sums, not as something for which they must forever carry a burden of gratitude, but as a practical yardstick with which to gauge the American interest in a free and prosperous Europe.

Military-Technical. Historically-minded anti-"Anglo-Saxon" Europeans are influenced by the memory of the opening stages of the two world wars. In 1914, the British at first only mobilized four divisions to share in the defense against five major German Armies, and American troops only began serious fighting in the spring of 1918, one year after America's entry in the war. Similarly, it is recalled that in 1940 the small BEF was cut off and pushed into the sea, and that the British and Americans returned to Italy only in 1943 and to France in 1944. These recollections tend to pass over the contribution of the British and Americans to final victory, especially that of the British in the first war, but that of both in the second. In any case, whatever justice there may be in the historic reproach of tardy assistance, it could not be levelled at the US today. There are now 400,000 US servicemen in western Europe, mainly in West Germany. These include six infantry divisions, and equipment for two other divisions whose men could be flown in; none of these forces was diverted from Europe during the Cuban crisis. The West German services themselves now muster 450,000 men, 12 divisions. France has only two divisions of her army remaining committed to NATO. American medium range missiles in some countries are being replaced by Polaris submarines, but this

replacement serves to increase over-all NATO defense power, to make it less vulnerable, and to offer less encouragement to hostile attack on populous areas.

If a Soviet attack is to take place, two possibilities present themselves:

a. Counting on a numerical superiority, the Soviets might launch a heavy conventional attack, most likely in Germany. In this case, the presence of US and British troops in Germany, organizationally integrated under NATO with German Federal Republic forces, ensures that the US and Britain will be involved. American lives would be among the first lost. If the Soviet forces could not be halted by conventional means--and surely it is in Europe's interest to avoid nuclear warfare if possible--tactical nuclear weapons already on hand in Europe could be used to fire small-scale nuclear warheads. If these also failed to halt the Soviet advance, ICBM's and strategic aircraft could be called in. American doctrine is based on ability to meet a Soviet attack at any level with superior force, and at the highest level, the US has the whole range of its strategic deterrent, including SAC, its ICBM's and invulnerable Polaris missiles. The latter could not be knocked out even with an overwhelming attack on the US itself.

b. Another possibility is that the Soviets might launch a surprise nuclear attack. But even the heaviest Soviet attack would leave the US able to counterattack with Polaris missiles, SAC planes on airborne alert and hardened-site Minuteman missiles in the US. If the Soviet attack only struck European targets, the Soviets would leave all US forces outside Europe untouched, an even more dangerous situation for them. Emotionally, the deaths of millions of Europeans and tens or hundreds of thousands of US nationals in Europe would offer extreme provocation; rationally, US leaders would feel impelled to strike back before US capabilities to knock out Soviet weapons were seriously reduced. A surprise nuclear attack limited to Europe is thus highly improbable. Aside from these considerations, the US has offered to establish a multilateral nuclear force under NATO, which would ultimately give Europeans participation in NATO's nuclear force and a share in responsibility for its use.


Political. If there is any lesson that Americans believe can be drawn from the two world wars, it is that the best way to secure peace is by timely opposition to aggressors, and not by appeasement or isolation. This idea has been prominent in President Kennedy's speeches, and it was this idea which caused the US to lead in the formation of NATO. The US signature on the North Atlantic Treaty formally

commits the US to join in resisting aggression in NATO Europe. The US has honored and will continue to honor its collective defense arrangements such as NATO and OAS treaties; these are indeed the cornerstones of free world security. For a great power, faithfulness to defensive obligations is not only a matter of integrity; such faithfulness is necessary for the responsible exercise of its power. If the US did not honor its European obligations, its government would stand exposed as feeble and cowardly. Not only would the US lose its world position, not only would US promises and guarantees lose their value, but the willingness of the US to defend its own territory would be called into question. If the Soviets were to annex--more or less undamaged--the population, industry, and resources of western Europe, and to direct this new power against the US, the US would be compelled to become a garrison state as well, and freedom might be extinguished everywhere. This is not a state of affairs the Americans intend to accept.

The US has the power and the will (demonstrated last fall in connection with Cuba) to defend itself and its allies. Is there any other government which third countries can trust as well to deter Soviet attack, to defend their interests?

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WHO IS THE PRINCE OF PEACE ?

The scene: Reglia, a small village in Cuba.

The man on stage: A correspondent for the US Communist Party newspaper, The Worker.

The action: Portraying (as described in The Worker, 16 December 1962) a Red "peeping Tom."

Red "peeping Tom" speaks:

"Walking through the streets, late at night, you could see through the open windows, the parlors of the citizens. A picture of Jesus Christ would be hanging large on one wall, or a statue of a saint, dressed in white. On another wall was the figure of Fidel Castro. And, in many a house, on a third wall, you'll see the picture of Vladimir Lenin."

As if anticipating that this trioka arrangement would tax the audience's credulity, and unable to resist the opportunity to insert, in a subtle way, some Communist Party doctrine, Red "peeping Tom" continues:

"You remember reading Lenin's observation that religion need not be a bar to radical and revolutionary thought,

(Whereupon we must admit that we do not remember such an observation and furthermore, that we detect a wily attempt to steer us away from the Lenin observation we do remember, i. e., "Religion is the opium of the people. Religion is a kind of spiritual gin in which the slaves of capital drown their human shape and their claims to any decent human life.")

and here (Red "peeping Tom" continues), in these working-class homes of Reglia, you saw him (Lenin) sharing the parlor with Fidel Castro and the Prince of Peace."

The curtain closes, but the memory lingers on.

This drama includes many of the essential ingredients of Communist propaganda--identification with the working class, claims of the "common man's" respect bordering on idolatry, association on a par with local leaders, affinity with local customs, religious symbols and personages as desired, etc. And we know that Red "peeping Tom" can play the roles of Judas or Jesus, as the occasion demands, with equal finesse.

And what of facts? Is Lenin's picture really to be seen in many of these workers' homes in this small Cuban village? Well, we also know that Communist propaganda is not wedded to the truth. As the former director general of the Soviet press agency Tass put it: "Nothing can be left to chance. Readers cannot simply be given the bare facts from which they might form their own opinions." And as an editor of the official Czech news agency explained his implementation of this policy: "Almost all news must be slanted, adapted to the party line or, in the cynical jargon of a Communist journalist, 'cooked!'"

By "cooking" the news, Communist propaganda converts Khrushchev standing in Cuba with his hands full of offensive missiles into Khrushchev hovering protectively over Cuba, his hands full of peace doves. In re-writing history, the Red propagandist turns the perpetrator of the Cuban crisis into the "savior of the peace." By blatant "cooking" of the facts, Khrushchev is robed in white, fitted with a halo, given the title of "Prince of Peace" and recommended for the Nobel Peace Prize.

The extent of the twists, squirms and shifts in Communist propaganda on the Cuban crisis is documented in "Cooking' the Cuban News: That Historic Week as Seen in Czechoslovakia" in The New Republic, 29 December 1962. The article reveals the techniques of control over public opinion as exercised in a Communist nation. The Communist propaganda machine was caught off-guard as the Cuban crisis broke;

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completely mobilized "in around-the-clock service of Soviet propaganda," all media concentrated on vociferously denying the US expose of Soviet missiles in Cuba ("slander and fabrication"); and, when Khrushchev acknowledged he'd been caught "Red-missile" handed, made an unabashed shift to the line, "The Soviet Union has achieved a great new victory in its struggle for peace."

To avoid any doubt as to who is the "Prince of Peace," and to insure that the "bare facts" are not allowed to be the base upon which the world may form its own opinions, Communist propaganda declares:

"All sensible people of the world now see the Soviet Union for what it truly is--it and its unchanging socialist peace policy, its stand for brotherhood and its struggle for the future of mankind... Looked at strictly from the view-point of international law and logic... the Soviet Union and the Cuban Republic demonstrated during the course of the whole affair not only a determination to defend law and order, but, as well, a maximal effort to prevent war..."

Stripped of Soviet propaganda, in their raw "uncooked" state, the facts give us a very different picture.

THE NEW REPUBLIC
DECEMBER 29, 1962

"Cooking" the Cuban News

That Historic Week as Seen in Czechoslovakia

by Stanislav Koutnik

The former general director of the Soviet Press Agency *Tass*, Palgunov, once wrote in a brochure which later became the fundamental textbook for all Communist news agencies, that every news item or report printed must be a piece of "agitation." News must be "fighting and persuasive, and for this reason it must be explained to the reader by a properly timely commentary." Furthermore, wrote Palgunov, "Nothing can be left to chance. Readers cannot simply be given the bare facts from which they might form their own opinions."

Just how these guide-lines apply in practice was explained by Antonin Buzek who, until recently, headed the London bureau of *Cateka*, the official Czechoslovak news agency, and, prior to that, served as the agency's managing foreign editor. He chose to ask for political asylum in Great Britain just after he had offered the post of chief of the foreign news department in Prague. He wrote: "Almost all news must be slanted, adapted to the party line or, in the cynical jargon of a Communist journalist, 'cooked.' The basic policy of *Cateka*, as far as foreign news is concerned, is to wait for a hint from Moscow - 'waiting for *Tass*', so to speak." (*Forum Service*, London, March, 1962.)

This technique of control over public opinion is important to keep in mind; it is the guide by which the Czech press attempted to report the events which took place between the 22nd and 28th of October - "an historical week of worldwide crisis," as the Czech press now refers to it.

President Kennedy's announcement of American measures against the Soviet installations in Cuba apparently took the Czechoslovak regime and its propaganda apparatus by complete surprise. *Rude Pravo* (the organ of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party), on October 20, was still writing about "several tourist excursions which would be flying to Cuba during November and December" - without specifying what sort of "tourists" these would be. On Monday, October 22, after the President's declaration had already been made public, Radio Prague's commentator first of all reported the news of the sudden return of leading government figures to Washington, but then added: "I suppose that this campaign . . . again is being exaggerated . . . its purpose smells of propaganda and an effort to exert pressure." He amplified his forecast: "I feel, first of all, that if the United States were to mount an invasion at this time, it would have to mass a substantially increased number of air and naval forces in the Caribbean area . . . It seems most probable that Washington needs this new anti-Cuban campaign for domestic and international reasons. . . . The US Government is, thereby, attempting to justify new arms expenditures. . . . It is, from the

standpoint of international politics, an attempt at creating an atmosphere which will discourage English, Norwegian and Italian shipping concerns . . . from keeping their ships on routes to Cuba . . . *Economic, political and psychological pressure is naturally a double-edged weapon. . . .*" he said.

It is apparent from the allusions to various types of non-military pressure that the regime and its propaganda set-up were convinced up to the very last moment of the determination of the US President to take action in some manner other than military.

The relatively restrained Czechoslovak government declaration, run by every newspaper in the country on the 23rd of October, merely stated: "No sovereign state can allow ships sailing under its flag to be detained by another state and prevented from reaching their destination . . . nor will they permit control to be exerted over the purposes of voyages. [Note: Two Czech ships which had been on their way to Cuba returned to port.] The assumption of such a right by the United States may result in an enormous expansion of the scope of international conflicts." This declaration does not speak of any single conflict which could be construed to mean war, but, rather, of conflicts in general. The conflict might be nothing more than an exchange of notes of protest. Another sentence further along does not appear to regard the American blockade as aggression; it rather warns against further steps by the American Government: "Every aggressor - and the American militarists had better keep this in mind - must reckon with the fact that if he were to run the risk of committing aggression, he is certain to be repaid with a crushing retaliatory blow." In conclusion Prague declared that, "The Czechoslovak people fully and honorably intend to meet all their obligations to the Cuban Republic." Similarly cautious as well was the concurrent "spontaneous declarations of all the workers": ". . . We will, as suppliers of equipment for Cuban industry, fulfill all our commitments on time." In neither of these two declarations is mention made of either military aid or further arms shipments.

In the days that followed, every newspaper, radio station and other organ was mobilized in around-the-clock service of Soviet propaganda. Yet while the Prague regime was following the Soviet line in a reasonably meticulous manner, it did, nevertheless, deviate greatly enough from this line to merit attention. Especially noteworthy is the way in which the Czechoslovak Stalinist leadership spoke out not so much aggressively as with downright vulgarity. Thus *Rude Pravo*, on October 24, characterized President Kennedy's speech as: ". . . the sort of arrogance rarely witnessed in history. . . . Nations cannot swindle with impugny in today's world. . . ." Radio Prague's commentator of the day spoke of "Kennedy's stupid announcement"; and several hours later, on the program "Radio Prague's

STANISLAV KOUTNIK, research associate at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, has written extensively on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Chat with Listeners," the American President was identified with Hitler: "Hitler first wanted privileges for Henlein and then eventually occupied all the border territories until, finally, he occupied us as well. The same thing could happen today, were we to give ground. After Cuba could come Berlin, then all of Germany. And then it would be our turn - but under

even worse conditions than before. . . ." This particular broadcast of the "Chat" then proceeded to examine the motives behind the American move. The commentator asserted: "A puppet government composed of Cuban counter-revolutionists would be brought into play. . . . In substance, Washington is planning the creation of some sort of new government resembling Chiang Kai-shek's." The commentator supplied an interesting answer to a listener's question about "whether the American action has some connection with our preparations for signing a peace treaty with Germany." The commentator appeared to expect Khrushchev to provoke a crisis in Berlin very soon: "A really very probable connection does seem to exist. . . . Two factors are particularly evident in the case of Berlin: First of all, Berlin would be militarily indefensible for the West, and, secondly, the signing of a peace treaty is certain to mean the utter defeat of American military policy in Europe. And this defeat is already underway. . . ."

Radio Prague's comparison of the American Government to Hitler was snatched up the following day by every paper in the country. *Rude Pravo's* lead article ran this way: "Corporal Hitler, obsessed as he was by the self-same scheme for world domination, introduced a certain brand of crudity in his dealings. But even he, the worst mass murderer in history, took pains to provide each of his aggressions with a semblance of justification. . . . The college man sitting in the chair of the President of the United States of America has, as the representative of aggressive forces, gone even further than Hitler. . . . The inspection of imports on their way to Cuba is not only a move against freedom, but a move taken directly against humanity. . . ."

Undone in Prague

Very nearly the same words were broadcast by Radio Prague on the evening of the 25th of October in a dispatch from its New York correspondent, Karel Kyncl. Kyncl thus describes the response to the whole crisis as felt in the USA: "The only thing printed supporting the policy of the Kennedy Administration was distributed by 12 youngsters posted outside the entrance to an office here in New York. . . . There were leaflets issued by the American Nazi Party. Nothing could be more characteristic of the aims of Kennedy's policy."

During the succeeding days, after overseas radio stations had informed the Czechoslovak people that America was accusing the Soviet Union of shipping rockets with nuclear war-heads to Cuba, and of building launching pads for them, the regime maintained that these indictments were "slander and fabrication": "an egregious assertion," wrote *Rude Pravo* on October 25: "Everyone knows" it added next day, "that neither do any Soviet military installations exist in Cuba, nor are any being built" on the Caribbean island.

On Saturday, October 27, Khrushchev admitted the "universally known facts." Just how this admission tripped up Czechoslovak Communist propaganda is revealed by Radio Prague's commentator who, many hours after the admission had been made public, quoted

from the Soviet newspapers *Sovietskaja Rossija* and *Pravda*, and the London *Daily Worker*, printed on the immediately preceding days, which had characterized Kennedy's disclosure of the installations as a "lie."

That evening Radio Prague's commentator offered the opinion that there would have to be an "exchange" worked out: the base in Cuba for the bases in Turkey. This was the first official Czech allusion to bases in Cuba - and, at that, it was made *en passant*. The commentator declared that, "The American demand which attempted to restrict the liquidation of rocket installations to the Western Hemisphere alone has now boomeranged back against the United States!" And, before the end of its evening transmission, the Radio broadcast a letter to Cuba "written by a Czechoslovak school-girl in the fifth grade, and published just prior to this program by *Vecerni Praha*: 'Dear Cuba, We know that you'll stand fast!'"

The press and radio had to retreat. Apparently it was a retreat which the Novotny regime wanted far less than Khrushchev. On Sunday, October 28, the entire propaganda machinery turned to autumnal sentimentality, resignation and petulant abuse. Thus *Rude Pravo's* leading article for that day, entitled "This Sunday . . ." began with this sentence: "This Sunday seems like any other. . . . Time passes as it usually does . . . yet once again we're one experience richer. . . . Our advance forward and our striving for peace obviously have not halted for a moment. On the contrary! They've not halted for the very reason that we know just what is happening. . . ." An outburst of rage follows: "Once again . . . and all the more vividly . . . we have seen with what unconcealed ruthlessness, with what purely Hitler-like arrogance those gentlemen in their dinner-jackets and generals' and admirals' uniforms are capable of whipping up trouble against the peace of the world. . . ."

And what of Nikita Khrushchev who had admitted that the Soviet Union did indeed have installations in Cuba, which he offered to ship back home? *Rude Pravo* and with it all the organs of Czechoslovak Communist propaganda had this to say: "In the course of a very serious crisis for which the American imperialists are to blame . . . a further significant step was taken on Saturday by the Soviet Government . . . the proposals of the Soviet Union are equitable, reasonable and realistic . . . they give the world cause for hope - and more time to the imperialists to do some reconsidering . . . in order that they might finally realize that an abyss lies agape before all of us; that the path they have chosen will not lead to a liquidation of the crisis which has developed nor contribute to the establishment of normal, peaceful relations between states. These goals are implicit in the path chosen by the Soviet Union. It has chosen to follow this path, as it always has done in the past, because it has with it the sympathy of the entire world. . . . The Soviet Union has achieved a great new victory in its struggle for peace. . . ."

Rude Pravo thereupon proceeded to instruct the population on how to help the forces of peace to victory over the danger which had been fabricated: "Each of us can contribute with his informed, citizenly demeanor, with steadfastness and discretion. . . . As always at such times as these, we are all the more strongly reinforced in the awareness of the fact that we are on the side of right, honor and law - now as in years past. All sensible people of the world now see the Soviet Union for what it truly is - it and its unchanging socialist peace policy, its stand for brotherhood and its

struggle for the future of mankind. . . ." Elsewhere in the paper, bold headlines draw the reader to the contents of an important announcement: "TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF SUNDAY FOR A RAPID POTATO HARVEST."

Less conspicuous are the reports of artists and writers who had been hurriedly sent into the field by the regime to ascertain just how the people felt about the whole Cuban affair. The writer Krista Bendova sent from Bratislava a typical report: "The fact that Cuba was, in many instances, no longer being discussed seems to be a further example of the people's awareness of the issues: they are calmly and unrelentingly going about their seemingly ant-like occupations at the very moment when the threat of annihilation hangs over the world - at a time when the bourgeoisie and nihilists are losing their nerve and sense of purpose in life. . . . And it suddenly dawns upon you that this ant-like, steady-disciplined labor is a part of a more important historical framework. This labor does, in the final analysis, seem to say more than all the words which proclaim 'Cuba; you're not alone! 'We're with you Cuba! 'We shall be victorious!'"

And what should be told the school-children? An entire issue of *Rude Pravo's* "Sunday Supplement for Children" was devoted to Cuba. A school-boy named Josef Masin submitted a letter "To Pedro in Havana," in the name of all Czechoslovak children, in which he wrote: "The American President is afraid of the example which Cuban patriots are setting for the other nations of Latin America. . . . May our friendship grow even stronger!" An account is given to the children in the article entitled "Hands off Cuba, Kennedy!"

"Do you know, dear children, what an American blockade of Cuba can do? It can cause the slow-down of production and the over-all shortage of raw materials and machinery; a lack of proper clothing, food, medicine - and even of school supplies. And that's not all. If Cuba were not to have sufficient defenses any aggressive state could attack and destroy it. . . . The Soviet Government forcefully responded to the challenge that the USSR would not abandon Cuba in its hour of need. You children have already read in your history books about how the valiant, courageous Soviet Union and its people defeated Hitler and liberated many lands - including Czechoslovakia - from him. . . . So don't worry, children. The Americans will have to retreat from the Caribbean!"

Milena Honzikova - apparently one of those "tourists" whose excursions were mentioned by *Rude Pravo* on October 20 - contributed an article that day, to which the children of Prague were referred:

"There are children from three years onward in the school in Candelaria . . . fair-haired little girls whom the sun never tans; little Negro girls whose ebony skin can never pale. One of the very first notions they have about the world is

"Fidel - Khrushchev - Paz." For it's only in Cuba that you can hear both *The Internationale* and the revolutionary march *Adalante Cubanos* sung naturally as the children's first songs. The revolution is, after all, responsible for providing everything which fills their lives. . . ."

She observed something quite different and interesting in Cardenas, where "on the previous day 200 cowardly people were in the streets, while nearly everyone else was indoors because of the rain. They were shouting that they'd had enough of the privations caused by the American embargo and that *there ought to be a surrender*. . . ." The situation the following day was, she writes, quite different:

"Thousands came out today to give their answer. A lengthy militia review was staged. . . . Foot-soldiers passed by with automatic rifles slung over their shoulders. . . . There was something incredibly moving about the joy with which they bore their weapons along, in an over-flowing tide whose power grows in the knowledge that the fate of the revolution is in their hands. . . ."

By Monday, October 29, the entire gigantic propaganda apparatus had begun to admit to realities. On radio Prague's "Chat," during which the question "But won't Cuba be left defenseless?" had often been asked by listeners, one of the program's participants replied: "The question of the future of Cuba will henceforth basically depend upon the agreement to which President Kennedy has already assented in principle." After a week of comparing Kennedy to Hitler, Mussolini and Nero, Czechoslovak propaganda admitted in a conciliatory manner over Radio Prague that "Cuba's future does not depend so much upon the Soviet Union as it does upon the peaceful intentions of the United States . . . the possibilities for an agreement exist, and negotiations are what are most needed at the present time."

And Those Technicians?

"This historic week" - like every other fairy-tale - had to end with a bit of moral advice. Hesitation and silence had lasted for several days. But on November 4, *Rude Pravo* finally wrote: "Looked at strictly from the view-point of international law and logic . . . the Soviet Union and the Cuban Republic demonstrated during the course of the whole affair not only a determination to defend law and order, but, as well, a maximal effort to prevent war. Hundreds of millions of people throughout the world were aware of this stand and appreciated it enormously. . . ." And Radio Bratislava indulged in some deep brooding on the same day over ". . . the pre-eminence of socialist morality

over American morality." Not a single word had been uttered all the while on the fate of several Czech "technicians" in Cuba during those "critical days."

What did the people think during that week? They behaved much as they had during the 1956 Hungarian uprising. "The Cuban question" has never been popular with the people. According to the Italian daily *Il Tempo* (May 5, 1962) the chief slogan shouted during the May Day student demonstrations in Prague was "Cubà si - meat No!!" France-Press Agency reported several other slogans shouted on May Day: "We stint in great and small and to Cuba give it all!" and "Prague's lines lengthen that Havana's may shorten."

Prague's evening paper *Voderni Praha* wrote specifically about "the two Pragues" which were observable just at that time. One of them was the Prague of organized demonstrations and "unanimous protest resolutions." "And the 'other' Prague?" the writer asked: "It's really nothing more than a shadow . . . although, even so, one can't help but saying something about it. What about those scare-mongers and hoarders . . . who dodged the demonstrations in order to rush off to get to the stores before anyone else? What about them? Just what sort of front-line fighters are these? Do they expect to fight against international piracy by buying tins of cooking oil or cartons of salt? What do these people really believe in? . . . in the weight of hoarded provisions or in the power of our camp? Shame on them! Ought we not to assure our Cuban friends that we're standing solidly behind them . . . instead of massing in front of Prague's stores?"

Here, from among innumerable quotations regarding the interests of the population during the crisis, are a few sentences from a commentary broadcast by Radio Prague on October 28: "Do you know, madam, why you can't get beefsteak? We're exporting tons of meat to East Germany! And to all those African countries! And just look at all those brand-new statesmen taking trips here! All that's got to cost something, let me tell you! It's all got to come from somewhere!" The Radio's political commentator drew the following conclusion: "The most absurd nonsense is being spread about the influence of our foreign policy on our domestic situation . . . and there are many people who appear to believe that there's something to all this talk. . . ."

A final note: by November 11, Radio Bratislava was not only talking of peaceful coexistence, but also of "some kind of collaboration . . . mutual concession . . ." between capitalistic and socialistic systems. That same day, Radio Prague capped its gyrations by taking a brand new position, peaceful co-existence for the sake of "permitting the capitalistic world to slow down its acute and chronic economic problems." President Kennedy, apparently, moved in two weeks from being Hitler to being a friend who needs support.



"The Missiles That Weren't Here Are All Gone."

The "Prince of Peace" Story for the
Soviet People

The Kremlin has informed the Soviet people about the Cuban crisis--but not exactly as it is known to the rest of the world. To make its version appear credible, the Kremlin reprinted a Look magazine story of December 18, 1962, in the January 5, 1963 issue of Za Rubezhom. BUT, a good one-quarter of the article was not presented in this abridged version--it could not be since the Communist aim since October 1962 has been to reconstruct the Cuban crisis so that the United States would appear as the aggressor and the Soviet Union as the savior of peace. Portions of the Look story (referenced to the pages on which it appeared) which were not reprinted are as follows:

page 43, sixth paragraph (underlined portion omitted):

"The Russians were cramming the 750-mile-long Caribbean island with light jet bombers and missiles that pointed at America's heartland."

page 44, fifth full paragraph (omitted entirely except for first eight words):

"Cuba was on every official mind in Washington because of Khrushchev's daring midsummer move. A stream of freighters, some Russian, some under Russian charter, had crossed the Atlantic to Cuba, their holds filled with weapons, their decks covered with suspicious crates. By September, Cuban refugees were telling Central Intelligence Agency operatives--and Republican senators--stories of missile bases being constructed by Soviet technicians in Cuba."

page 49, first full paragraph (omitted entirely):

"Two related events occurred during this September-October period. First, operatives inside Cuba reported the arrival of a Red Army general, known to be a top missile-and-rocket expert. Second, a Russian Embassy officer in Washington returned from a Moscow vacation and sought out the President's brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. Khrushchev, said this official, had told him personally he wanted President Kennedy to know that no weapon capable of hitting American soil would be placed in Cuba. This curious message conflicted, as did so many things involving the Kremlin, with the intelligence about the presence of the missile-and-rocket general."

page 49, second full paragraph (underlined portions omitted):

"The photo logjam broke on October 14, when U-2 planes and low-flying fighters returned with pictures that were to shake the world. Working all through Sunday night, hundreds of photo interpreters compared thousands of the new photographs with earlier ones. The evidence was unmistakable. The Soviets had installed mobile missiles that could hit targets as distant as Washington, D. C. and were preparing sites for fixed 2,500 mile missiles that could destroy cities in all but the northwestern corner of the United States. IL-28 bombers were assembled, ready to strike. Khrushchev suddenly had a gun at America's belly."

page 50, first full paragraph, third sentence (omitted entirely):

"The threat to American citizens was too grave."

page 50, second column, last full paragraph, last two sentences (on "Operation X"; underlined portions omitted):

"Such an assault would kill Russians without warning and might spark the impulsive Khrushchev into atomic retaliation--the dreaded global fire storm. Bob Kennedy said flatly at one session: 'My brother will never be a party to a Pearl Harbor.' "

page 50, fourth paragraph, fourth sentence (discussing "Operation X"; underlined portion omitted):

"They were given 15 minutes to knock out the missiles, so that Castro could not touch off a world holocaust by firing nuclear warheads at American cities. "

Page 50, third column, third full paragraph, third sentence (underlined portion omitted):

"Kennedy campaigned in Connecticut, was booed at Yale by unsuspecting students who wanted a stronger Cuban policy. "

page 50, last paragraph, continuing on page 51, and page 51, first full paragraph (omitted entirely):

"The big White House meeting earlier that day was the one in which President Kennedy, in his rocker, faced the dour Gromyko. Rusk and Thompson flanked them. Gromyko talked tough on Berlin, threatened a Soviet move after our November 6 elections. Kennedy made no mention of the Cuban missile sites. He had no intention of tipping his hand to the Russians until American policy jelled.

"But Kennedy did leave the room and return to read sternly from a September 13 statement of his. This vowed to do 'whatever must be done' if the Soviet buildup turned Cuba into 'an offensive military base' threatening our security. Gromyko blandly replied that the arms in Cuba were purely defensive in nature. Kennedy did not argue, but Gromyko's lie--the second official Russian falsehood within a month--stuck in his throat. "

page 52, last paragraph, continuing onto page 54 (underlined portion omitted):

"The White House confidentially asked top network officials for radio and TV time Monday night. Don Wilson, deputy director of the U.S. Information Agency, and Salinger prevailed on telephone-company officials to make secret connections with 11 radio stations in nine cities, so the stations could beam Spanish translations of the President's speech to Cuba and South America. "

page 54, second column, fourth full paragraph (omitted entirely):

"The biggest worry now was that the Russians might get wind of the operation and make the first move in the UN. Gromyko was due to fly back to Russia from Idlewild Airport at 2 p.m., and an operative was dispatched to watch his movements. He reported by phone that Gromyko took off on schedule, after making an innocuous plane-side statement, apparently unaware of the impending American action. "

page 54, third column, first two full paragraphs (omitted entirely):

"The legislative meeting lasted longer. After the briefings by Rusk and McCone, two men spoke out against the President's course--Sen. Richard B. Russell (Dem., Ga.), chairman of the Senate Armed

Services Committee, and Sen. J. William Fulbright (Dem., Ark.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Both argued for an invasion. Russell said a blockade was the least effective measure, irritating the most nations and taking the most time. The President calmly defended his decision. Blunt Charlie Halleck broke up the conference. 'I'm standing with the President', said the Republican leader.

"As the minutes ticked toward 7 p.m., Salinger and Newton Minow, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, called managers of the 11 powerful radio stations selected to broadcast the speech in Spanish. When they protested that they had no cut-in facilities, Salinger revealed that the lines already had been laid. Later, startled Americans tuned to the stations were to hear a voice speaking in Spanish."

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FACT SHEET ON CUBA'S SUGAR INDUSTRY

Cuba's sugar industry needs more "sweetening" if previously proclaimed goals are to be achieved for the nation's basic, major dollar-producing industry. Here's the general situation in capsule form, from two Communist sources:

"Cuba grows mainly sugar cane, 56 per cent of its land is used for the cultivation of sugar, and her sugar production and volume of sugar exports are the greatest in the world. Cuba derives 30-40 per cent of her income from sugar. Eighty-six per cent of the total value of exports of Cuba is from sugar and sugar by-products. Some 500-600 million US-dollars in foreign exchange comes from the sale of sugar. For this reason, henceforth, for a considerable period, Cuba must continue to put her main efforts in growing good sugar cane and increasing her sugar production. The government has decided to add 10,000 caballerias* to sugar cane output and it expects to produce 7 million tons of sugar in each of the next few years. As mentioned previously, the conversion of sugar cane cooperatives to sugar cane state farms is an important step in making the government policy effective...

"In the years after the revolution, the major agricultural products had various degrees of increases in production: for example, in the sugar harvest of 1961, Cuba produced 6,563,866 tons of cane sugar... During the Second People's Sugar Harvest in 1962, the Cuban people... produced 4,880,000 tons of cane sugar..." Peiping, Shih-chieh Chih-shih, 10 Nov. 1962.

*A caballeria equals 33 acres.

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"In 1962, genuine state planning began... Sugar, Cuba's number one agricultural product, is expected to total about 5 million tons this year." Halle (East Germany), Freiheit, 3 Jan. 1963.

The complete story of Cuba's disorganization in the widely-proclaimed "Year of Organization" is revealed in the regime's own admissions and reports on the sugar harvest program. It is "progress" by "achieving" a shortage of labor; promises but limited delivery of machines to overcome the labor shortage; widespread fear of sabotage and repeated exhortations to recruit volunteers (which suggest not everyone is an ardent supporter of the regime); and, prospects of failure of the entire admittedly essential effort.

Selected items from Havana's press and radio revealing the plight of Cuba's Communist-run basic industry are presented below. Underscoring has been added to facilitate the reader's quick review of the essential facts of Cuba's experience with a Red sugar harvest.

The Policy

"Our aspiration is not to produce sugar for Cuba... What we must do is to produce for the world market... the yield in each instance must double... We must mechanize the canecutting... We must grow cane plants that yield a lot... Sugar cane must be the center of our work in the years to come.

"We have insisted, during the past four years of revolutionary government, on the necessity of starting to change the specific gravity which sugar has in the economic life of the nation--80 per cent of exports and more than 25 per cent of the gross national product. However... always having the sugar industry as a base. In other words, our plans for development must never be based on the neglect or under-evaluation of our prime industry. . .

"There was an excessive enthusiasm, an excessive optimism for the development of new agricultural forms to the detriment of sugar cane... It would be completely wrong to think that sugar cane should be completely replaced by other products..." Minister of Industry Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Havana CMQ TV Network 20 Dec. 1962.

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"Some... errors have undeniably been costly, among them, particularly, a certain disregard of the importance to our economy of the sugar industry during this initial period and for some years of our future development. This has been an error... which has affected our export capacity, so decisive in the development of an open economy like Cuba's." President Osvaldo Dorticos, Cuba Socialista, January 1963.

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"The National Sugar Committee, then received the final report on the planting of new cane for 1962, which reached a total of 12,986 caballerias, equivalent to 83.4 per cent of the goal of 15,580 caballerias." Havana Radio Rebelde, 19 Jan. 1963.

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"Our general average last year was approximately 4,000 arrobas* per caballeria. This is extremely low. The sugar cane was very badly cared for. Besides, it was frequently attacked by fire..."

"Today, Cuba still depends on an efficient sugar production for its accelerated development... we must never think that our development is not linked to this industry. This is why we give it so much importance." Minister of Industry Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Havana CMQ TV Network, 20 Dec. 1962.

*An arroba equals 25.35 pounds.

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The Organization

"What was the first reaction of the revolution, or of the revolutionary comrades? It was an attempt to flee from the spirit that meant to a great extent being the slaves of the cane... The fundamental problem of the next harvest consists also in the lack of manpower... For this reason, we must take political and administrative steps to guarantee the affluence of canecutters... We mean by using men in labor where their inexperience will allow them to produce the most. For example, behind the canecutting machines where the harvest requires no skill. Cancutting requires long preparation and great physical stamina. These inexperienced men so employed will also cause the least damage. The volunteer cancutters naturally do not have the skill to cut cane as it should be cut and, consequently, the fields suffer from this.

"We must also improve labor discipline during the harvest time. We must take very serious steps in order to avoid fires, be they instigated by the counterrevolutionaries or the bad revolutionaries. We must ask for a strict discipline... we must improve the cultivation methods; we must improve the stock... We must work on an accelerated development of the canecutting machines..." Minister of Industry Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Havana CMQ TV Network, 20 Dec. 1962.

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"At the meeting we studied last year's experience and ... some corrections will be necessary. In the first place, we are going to make an effort in all sectors to procure as permanent macheteros comrades who have at some time cut cane; who have worked as macheteros ... As you know, we are pulling macheteros from the factories, from work centers..."

"...we require that you make an effort to inform the permanent macheteros of the average amount of cutting and loading they perform per battalion. ... many labor unions returned from sugar cane cutting during the last harvest, believing that they had cut a higher average than they had actually cut. Generally, they confused their fatigue with the yield from their work..."

"...we established an average quota for all the permanent macheteros... We believe that it would be proper to assign a quota..." CTC-R (Central de Trabajadores Cuba Revolucionaria-Workers' Committee for Defense of the Revolution) Secretary General Lazaro Pena, Havana Radio Rebelde, 19 Dec. 1962.

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"The CTC-R also announced that all available cane will be milled and that there will be a shortage of cane-cutters... However, the CTC-R assures that the help of volunteer workers will contribute to the most brilliant success of the new sugar harvest. The Cuban labor union center also announced the creation of incentives..."

"...contrary to the situation under capitalism, today there are not too many canecutters in Cuba--rather there are too few... only the canecutting machine can resolve the situation for the sugar harvest of the future... machines do not bring them either unemployment or hunger, but rather... they are the beginning of definitive liberation from the hard work of canecutting and stacking... The machines we possess are few and will therefore not be enough to make up for the shortage of canecutters..."

"The CTC-R appeals to the agricultural workers union ... to overcome the certain difficulty of bad cane in various areas. The CTC-R also exhorts the workers to prevent the improper and unauthorized burning of certain cane because of the impatience of comrades, administrators, or workers."

"The CTC-R calls upon all the union leaders to organize emulation, mobilization and all action... It calls upon them to see to the supply of cadres of workers in the sugar harvest." Havana Reloj Nacional Network, 5 Jan. 1963.

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"A national subcommittee has been set up in the Ministry of Industries to control the sugar harvest daily throughout the country. It will be responsible for the daily solution of all the problems that arise... The subcommittee will turn in a weekly report on the progress of the harvest and will meet daily." Havana CMQ Radio, 11 Jan. 1963.

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"In provincial reports presented at the meeting, it was revealed that in addition to the lack of labor, the greatest difficulties to be overcome are the lag in the repair of roads and the shortage of shoes, tires, rope, tools, as well as certain food items... lack of numbers of permanent canecutters... deficiencies demonstrated in the supply of volunteers..."

"With respect to the mechanization of the work... confirmed the decision of the government to accelerate the construction of 500 cane loaders of which the first will be delivered soon. At the same time, work is being rushed to complete the construction of the 1,000 cane-cutting machines..." Havana Radio Rebelde, 19 Jan. 1963.

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The Workers

"We are short 95,000 sugar cane cutters in Cuba. Ninety-five thousand are still needed to cut sugar cane. We cannot import them from another country nor from any planet. We are going to cut some of the sugar cane with the machines but the machines are only in the experimental stage. The machines will not resolve this problem for us as yet. The only thing which will resolve the problem... will be by holding meetings, having discussions, organizing our work, setting goals, control, and by fulfilling agreements and goals..." Report at National Sugar Plenum, Havana Radio Rebelde, 19 Dec. 1962.

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"Formerly, one could pretend to be rich, influential, or a playboy. Some pretended to have a great deal of cash and others pretended to be big shots.

"But nobody in Cuba thought of pretending to be a cane cutter (machetero) until after the revolution.

"Last night, Che [Guevara] straightened us out.

"It seems that we don't make the grade as 'macheteros.'

"We ruin the cane, in the future... we'll load it.

"The machines and 'those who know how' will cut the cane. Those of us who don't will load it.

"Naturally, some resist the idea that they don't know how to cut cane;

"I'm not the one he's talking about,' they say, 'because I cut cane like a house afire.'

"Since none of these 'underdeveloped macheteros' can be found, it is going to be necessary to figure out a method to determine cane cutting abilities.

"Without bothering to look at the figures, Cubans have believed seriously that, in raising and processing cane, we were the world champions.

"On the contrary, the figures show that our yield per caballeria is low.

"Our average yield per caballeria is 4,000 arrovas. In Hawaii, the average is double this amount.

"But we eat 20 pounds more sugar per year than any other country in the world.

"Siquitrilla has known more than one fellow who has eaten more ~~cane~~ than he cut. Walking sugar mills.

"What is good about all this is that by following the true road, we will continue making real triumphs..." --by Siquitrilla, La Tarde, 23 Dec. 1962.

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"The third sugar harvest will begin on 10 January all over the country. . . . An estimate of manpower needs has been made, needs which will be less this year because we are using canecutting machines. . . . The Cubans revolutionary workers organization has urgently called on 25 national organizations to furnish 50,000 permanent volunteer workers who will go to the canefields, organized in battalions, full of enthusiasm. . . .

"Sugar is our most important source of foreign currency. . . . Knowing the difficulties that could arise, the main one being lack of manpower--even with the machines--the victory now depends on organization." Hoy, 7 Jan. 1963.

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"The victory of the sugar harvest depends upon organization. . . . The CTC-R has made an appeal to the 25 national unions to contribute 50,000 permanent volunteers organized into battalions. . . . many workers last year could not participate. . . because they lacked transportation. We have seen what insufficient transportation, too many ceremonies and festivities on working days, or time devoted by the sugar workers to other crops can do." Radio Havana, 7 Jan. 1963.

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CTC-R Executive Committee and provincial delegations met 8 Jan. "to discuss the formation of permanent canecutting volunteer Brigades which will work through the sugar harvest, and part-time or weekend volunteers." Revolucion, 8 Jan. 1963.

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"... CTC-R leaders and the members of the executive committee of the 25 national trade unions and of the several trade union groups will join the canecutters on Saturdays and Sundays..." Havana Radio Rebelde, 8 Jan. 1963.

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"Benito Sanchez, secretary general of the CTC-R in Camaguey said thousands of workers will be needed. . . but emphasized that volunteer workers should know something about the work." Hoy, 9 Jan. 1963.

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"... thousands of volunteer cancutters, carrying their knapsacks and machetes, will gather in front of the national capitol in Havana to take part in a parade before they leave for Camaguey Province. . . Camaguey needs no fewer than 45,000 canecutters. . . the national trade unions are carrying out a brotherly competition to attain the target of 50,000 permanent voluntary canecutters from the working class." Radio Havana, 9 Jan. 1963.

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"The National Sugar Industry Workers Union has called on retired sugar workers who are physically fit to cut sugar to sign up as volunteer canecutters. . . ." Havana Radio Progreso, 9 Jan. 1963.

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"... steps have been taken to give the canecutters an extra ration of food, in addition to the food they need daily, so that they may conserve their strength for the task facing them." Santa Clara Centro Radial Revolucionario, 10 Jan. 1963.

"What is the basic duty of the working class? It is the duty of the revolutionary, and work must be taken by all as their basic duty.

"...the young people...have in many cases not yet been able to rise to the same heights in daily work... When the word 'sacrifice' refers to the obscure, perhaps boring, but daily and enormously effective task of work done...we see today a little. The young people are not in the lead...And this is not normal...

"We, after four years of revolution have arrived at a more or less critical point..." Minister of Industry Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Radio Havana, 28 Jan. 1963.

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"Today it is necessary to increase production and productivity in industry and agriculture for the good of our revolution... In Cuba, this is a time for work..." Revolution, 28 Jan. 1963.

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"If we do not produce at the increasing pace demanded by the moment...the revolution will wilt like a plant without water." El Mundo, 28 Jan. 1963.

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The Machines

"Repairs will be finished in 95 per cent of the sugar mills by the third week in December." El Mundo, 2 Nov. 1962.

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"...the establishment of people's schools in the areas of the eight sugar mills which are currently being dismantled for repairs /to other mills?/ was discussed." Hoy, 23 Nov. 1962.

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"A thorough study has been made of the manpower shortage... and every means has been tried to correct the shortage by the use of canecutting machines... 1,000 were to be manufactured... The promise was the delivery of all the machines was to be made on 31 December. This is a promise that has not been kept... and it will not be kept...

"However, we must not have too many illusions about the canecutting machines... naturally, no machine can run for 24 hours... the stability of the machines will be determined at the end of the harvest. We are also faced with the task of teaching 1,000 tractor drivers to specialize in the canecutting process. It is relatively hard to drive the machine... The work is difficult for a single person... may be the forerunners of more perfect machines. We must rely on the canecutting machines. We must mechanize the cane cultivation and aspire to a 100 per cent mechanization..."

"This year we needed people to operate 1,000 tractor-canecutters, 1,000 canecutting machines and at the same time 500 cane loaders in the form of cranes... with the difficulties these machines offer, we must have at least two tractor operators for each work unit. In other words, just to operate the machines which are going to resolve an insignificant part of Cuba's program this year, we would need 3,000 tractor operators... to this figure we add the number of mechanics required to service the canecutting machines, and the number of mechanics required for the development of the assembly line production... So far we have been

"The coordination that must exist in a sugar field when machines are working in it is much greater than when 'macheteros' are working in it. This is the reason why we have worked up to now to select the most rudimentary machine....In order to complete the cane-cutting machines, we have had to pull mechanics from the petroleum and electrical industry....We have a shortage of qualified manpower across the entire scope of our economy. We also have a shortage of technicians who can serve as managers for our manpower." Minister of Industry Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Havana CMQ TV Network, 20 Dec. 1962.

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"Before the canecutting machines could cut the cane, several macheteros and 'pathmakers' opened a path through the center of each stand of cane to permit the canecutting machines to operate." Cruces Emisora, CMHK, 19 Dec. 1962.

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"The tests confirmed that cane-cutting machines should be used on level, cleared land. As a result of the tests, adjustments will be made on the machines so that it will separate cane from foreign elements. The possibility of mechanizing loading operations is being studied with hopes that the first loading machines can be put into operation in 1964." La Tarde, 17 Dec. 1962.

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"The 'Patria o Muerte' Sugar Mill reported that the operation of cane cutting machines in its fields is improving as the operators acquire experience." Hoy, 29 Dec. 1962.

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"I want to harp on this again even though last year I harped quite a lot on this matter of the sugar harvest, that a great effort was made with the canecutting machine trials...."

"The machines have proved to be an effective means of assisting in the sugar harvest and are a first step.... However, something has happened. Yesterday, Wednesday, the machines were idle, waiting for workers, the weeders, the rakers and the loaders, who did not show up on the job...."

"The human element continues to be the most important factor.... Not even with 10,000 machines can we solve the problem of the sugar cane cutting and we only have 1,000 machines." Kuchilian, Havana CMQ TV Network, 28 Dec. 1962.

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"Students of the Machinery Operators' School of Holguin, Pinar del Rio Province, are assembling 50 cane-cutting machines." Hoy, 2 Jan. 1963.

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"Fifty new canecutting machines are being made ready... Young students are doing the assembly work rapidly despite their inexperience." Havana Radio Rebelde, 2 Jan. 1963.

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"Five hundred sugar cane-lifting machines will be assembled.... These machines were designed by Cuban experts." Havana Radio, 18 Jan. 1963.

machines... the first great step has been taken in Cuba to solve the serious manpower shortage.... The Paco Cabrera shop, in Camaguey Province, in the center of our country, was given the task of building 100 cane-lifting machines... and 20 of these are already operating in the cane fields." Prensa Latina, 30 Jan. 1963.

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The Protection

"Fires No, Care Yes" posters giving reasons for increased fire prevention in sugar cane fields are being distributed. Revolucion, 3 Dec. 1962.

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"The necessity for permanent enlistment of volunteer workers... was recognized... Specific measures will be taken to avoid all kinds of fire, including fire put intentionally to bad cane fields..." Hoy, 13 Dec. 1962.

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"...we will avert sabotage by the enemies of the revolution who will surely try to interrupt the third people's sugar harvest... with the motto: 'Not one cane stalk shall be left standing!'. . . the people, massively... will... turn every sugar cane field and every sugar mill into an insurmountable trench of the revolution." Santiago Circuito Oriental de Radio, 12 Jan. 1963.

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The Results

"This provincial distribution of the mills in operation, as well as the production figures, indicate the growing danger of a lag in the process of the sugar harvest... the amounts of cane processed so far has been very much less than that of the same period last year." Santa Clara Centro Radial Revolucionario, 29 Jan. 1963.

Production of Potatoes in the USSR
1950 - 62

Million Metric Tons

<u>Year</u>	<u>Production</u>
1950	89
1951	70
1952	72
1953	73
1954	75
1955	72
1956	96
1957	88
1958	87
1959	87
1960	84
1961	84
1962	63.3

Extracts from a Document dated September 25, 1962 prepared by the South Vietnamese Communist guerrillas, the Viet Cong, and captured in South Vietnam.

I. Status of the Revolutionary Movement in the South

During eight years of stubborn struggle since the re-establishment of peace, the revolutionary movement in the South has been developing, although it sometimes was faced with many difficulties. Since 1960, the movement has gained special strength. The movement has been a struggle beset with hardships and difficulties in opposing the aggressive U.S. imperialists, who cynically increased their intervention, and against Ngo Dinh Diem and his clique of lackeys. More significant successes are being achieved day after day. From 1954 to 1959, U.S. imperialists used their system of advisers and the "American Aid" label to rule the South. The U.S. - Diem clique thought it could easily destroy the revolution in the South, but the developments that followed were quite contrary to their expectations. Since 1960, the revolutionary movement has grown more vigorous and has shaken the U.S. - Diem regime; the U.S. increased intervention, increased military personnel, and introduced weapons illegally into the South; but they were unable to curb the power of the revolutionary movement. At the end of 1961, in view of the danger of collapse of the regime in the South, the U.S. made a further step by starting an armed invasion of the South; but the movement held on and continued to develop.

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We should be fully conscious of the present gravity of U.S. aggression, and this situation is now and will become more difficult for the revolution in the South, making this war more unrelenting and stubborn. However, with the present extent of U.S. intervention, there is in fact no change as yet in the relative strength of the enemy forces and ours. Before intensifying the antiguerrilla and counterinsurgency war, the U.S. will continue to supply troops and weapons on a gradual basis and will further its intervention only if unable to improve the critical situation; thus the main forces that are fighting us are still Diem's army.

II. Some Questions Relating to the Approach, Direction and Mottos of the Struggle, and Characteristics of the Present Phase of the Revolution.

As the situation keeps developing to our advantage, many favorable opportunities may arise, as has been stated by "Anh Tu" and "Anh Tam" in a resolution:

"Owing to our forceful struggle, there may be big battles, and when the enemy forces have been thinned out, we may combine with the people for a general upheaval and a coup d'etat; or, before complete victory is achieved by a general upheaval, the threat of collapse may compel the enemy to stop the war and recognize the sovereignty and independence of our people. This may happen in the event the enemy suffers a heavy defeat, having a decisive character; and when the revolutionary movement is nearing complete victory.

"Owing to our persevering struggle, the enemy may get bogged down; he is unable to win and, the longer the war, the more handicapped he will be; therefore, he may be compelled to negotiate and compromise. The scope of the negotiations may vary depending on the relative strength between the enemy and us; the result may be a situation like that of Laos, at present; or, the enemy may be obliged to recognize our sovereignty and independence, as happened in Algeria."

In any case, if negotiations and a temporary compromise take place, we will have made an important step towards victory.

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In any event, we will win; but we should know how to win gradually; we should make transitional steps on our way towards complete victory. The world situation and the status of our struggle in the North and in the South, at present, are providing many potentialities for the revolution

-continued-

to make such steps and to progress; and these potentialities will increase when our forces grow stronger and our struggle is intensified, and when the enemy suffers many defeats. With regard to leadership, we should orient the revolution in that direction. The transitional steps may take many different forms, sometimes complicated ones; the present situation in Laos is a very important transitional step for the Lao revolution. A transitional step, whether it be a major or a minor one, will represent a stride in the revolution; will have a very profound revolutionary meaning; and will be an important advantage gained by the revolutionary forces in SVN. A very minor transitional step may sometimes have a major meaning and effect. Now we are fighting, and demanding peace and neutrality, in order to institute transitional steps for the movement to progress more easily, to further the isolation of bellicose elements, and to persuade peace-seekers in the very ranks of the enemy.

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In the "resolution" of October 1961, "Anh 9 Nam" made a clearer analysis of the enemy's military activities, and gave more attention to the military aspect of the revolutionary struggle because he did not have a quite accurate idea of the war situation in the South and of U. S. military designs; so that in giving directions, he did not attach enough importance to the measures necessary to cope with this war, like using a revolutionary war to oppose the aggressive war against the revolution, along with political struggle; the setting up of bases, and the intensification of guerrilla warfare, etc., have not been used.

As the first step of their armed aggression in SVN, U. S. imperialists are carrying out a real war against the people in the South. This war may extend on a larger scale, but it cannot yet change the course of our struggle. It is not because the enemy is carrying out a real war against our people that we should change the course of our struggle, i. e., shift to an all-out war to achieve our revolutionary task. Such a change would not be advantageous to us because we would not be able to make full use of our people's strength and capacity for struggle. Our course of action at this time will still consist in intensifying the armed struggle, as well as the political struggle; in combining these two forms of struggle to repulse the enemy, step by step, and develop such conditions as will enable us to defeat the enemy completely.

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During the last few years, along with armed struggle, we have been carrying out a political struggle, in varied forms; and have achieved many significant results. We fought the enemy by carrying out political offensives, by building up and developing our political strength through activities such as direct and indirect struggles by the people; action upon the enemy's Army and civil servants by the people; political campaigns to isolate the enemy in our country and in the world; and, even struggles through public opinion and discussions. Political struggle is one aspect of our offensive methods; one of our forces against the enemy. Our political struggle is the manifestation of our absolute political superiority and of a basic weakness of the enemy; it shows our strength and our capacity for initiative; it aggravates the enemy's basic weakness, curtails the enemy's military superiority, and helps strengthen our military capacity, which is still inadequate. Thus, underestimating the importance of political struggle would be very dangerous; it would mean giving up a very efficient weapon and an extremely important force. Political struggle will have long-lasting effects; when important developments in the situation take place as the result of the strength of the revolution, the role of the political struggle may be transcendent (for instance in case of negotiations, a cease-fire, etc.). Even in the event that the U. S. sent troops in large number to the South, it would not mean that we would no longer be able to carry out political struggle (see above); but political struggle alone would not be enough to decide our victory and the enemy's defeat.

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At the meeting on October 5, 1961, "Anh 9" defined correctly the role and the significance of political struggle; and he also realized, more clearly, the importance of armed struggle and the need for combining political and military struggle. His appreciation of the

situation was much more realistic and clear than before, particularly with regard to political struggle; however, during the recent period, the problem of building up armed forces and making preparations to cope with enemy military designs has, in fact, not been fully appreciated. Concerning the political struggle, we still do not fully realize the possibility of fighting the enemy step by step, and do not know how to make the best use of our capacities for political struggle under different circumstances.

With regard to the present character of the revolution, "Anh 9 Nam," in the "resolution" of October 1961, remarked that the revolution in the South had reached a period of "high tide." This remark implies that the movement is developing powerfully and widely, and that the direction of the offensive against the enemy consists of making efforts to arrive rapidly at a general upheaval; but it does not show the "tugging back and forth" aspect of this resolution and the prolonged struggle. The movement is seething and continues to develop, but owing to the cynical intervention of the U.S., we need time to overcome our weaknesses and shortcomings; we still have to struggle stubbornly for a long time, and progress step by step; thus, the tenor of the present phase of the revolution shows the immediate course to be followed by the revolution, at this time. This phase may be called "a phase of intensification of political and military struggle to defeat the enemy gradually, to gain advantages step by step, to progress towards final victory." With the tenor of the present phase of the revolution as stated above, we must realize that at this time we should intensify political and military struggle even further and for a long time; that we should perseveringly and resolutely oppose all activities of the enemy; continue to attack the enemy; preserve the results already achieved; and, make further efforts in building up and developing our forces. We will continue to obtain new results; we cannot start a general upheaval immediately, but will have to repulse the enemy step by step, boost the movement gradually, and develop favorable conditions to defeat the enemy completely.

A very important point relating to leadership, which should be thoroughly understood, is that this is a long struggle, full of hardships, but sure of success. This prolonged struggle, full of hardships, but of sure success, is the essential process of the revolution in the South and originates from the objective comparison of strength between us and the enemy in the world, in our country, and in the South; from the character of our revolution, which is a revolutionary struggle for liberation of the people, with the distinct features of a class war, as well as a decisive struggle between the two most advanced and antagonistic forces in the world: the force of peace, democracy, and socialism on one side, and the aggressive force of imperialism and colonialism on the other side. It is a prolonged struggle because we are not yet in a position to defeat the enemy immediately, but we will have to defeat them step by step, to gain advantages gradually and continue to boost the revolutionary movement. In this prolonged struggle, we should fight stubbornly and unceasingly and continue to achieve further results. Moreover, the revolutionary movement in the South is favored by the present situation in the world. (The force of peace, democracy, and socialism is quite superior to the aggressive force of imperialism; the relative strength between the enemy and us in Southeast Asia is changing to our advantage). In the North, the socialist doctrine continues to develop; the revolutionary movement in the South is in a seething phase and continues to expand, so that "a prolonged struggle, full of hardships" does not mean that we should take our time, drag out the struggle, and wait for the opportunity.

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In the resolution of October 1961, "Anh 9 Nam" did mention that this is a prolonged struggle, full of hardships, and that the advancement of the revolution will not always be an easy process; but because we underestimated the U.S. capacity for intervention and underestimated the enemy, because the idea of a prolonged struggle full of hardships was not thoroughly understood, leadership has been greatly affected in the past; for instance, in carrying the offensive against the enemy, insufficient efforts were made to

built up and consolidate our forces; to make provisions to cope with the enemy's new schemes; to strengthen capacity of the masses for struggle in the military, political, economic, and cultural fields; to see to the basic problems connected with a prolonged struggle, such as setting up bases, preserving and developing the forces.

III. Comments on the Revolutionary Movement in the South and the Enemy's Plan of Activity.

Although the enemy fought the movement more harshly than before and although our endeavor to build up and consolidate our forces was insufficient to keep up with the rapid development of the movement, we continued to make progress and to preserve and increase our forces.

In spite of increased terrorism on the part of the enemy, our political movement held on and was strengthened, and extended further in certain areas, particularly in the Delta, in Zones I, V, and VI. The people's movement was intensified through extensive propaganda campaigns; through struggles to demand essential rights, to oppose terrorism, killing, plunder, poison-spraying; and even included people in strategic hamlets. These struggle activities took place continuously, everywhere, and developed a movement of political opinion which extended to the very ranks of the enemy's Army and civil servants to oppose U.S. imperialist aggressors, and to demand peace and neutrality and a democratic coalition government. The people's movement against the strategic hamlets and the regroupment of population began to extend and assumed the most stubborn aspects; in certain areas, many strategic hamlets were destroyed. In the process of the struggle, the people's organizations were extended and strengthened. However, in many areas, the people's struggles for their essential rights were not intensified as they should have been to oppose more forcefully the reactionary policies of the enemy, such as strategic hamlets, regroupment of people, draft, militarization of the youth of both sexes, extortion, etc. The movement was still weak and slow; particularly in contended areas, in those under enemy control, and in cities. Leadership was still defective in that it followed a rigid pattern, lacked flexibility, and lacked awareness of a prolonged struggle so that the people's forces were not adequately strengthened.

In providing leadership to oppose the strategic hamlets, enemy schemes and designs were underestimated so that our forces were not adequately consolidated for this purpose.

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In the recent past, our leadership has achieved many results, and had many points of excellence, but also some shortcomings, the most important of which were as follows:

We underestimated the schemes, designs, and capacities of the U.S. At the meeting in October 1961, an evaluation of the enemy was made, but it was not quite accurate. For that reason, leadership was not appropriate; we saw most of the advantages, but overlooked the difficulties; we considered the advance of the revolution as an easy and rapid process, and were not fully aware of the fact that this is a prolonged and hard struggle; we failed to combat subjective attitudes. Thus, when carrying out the offensive against the enemy, we did not make enough effort to build up and develop our forces and to strengthen the people; we did not make adequate provisions to cope with the enemy's efforts in fighting and destroying us. In leading activities in the three types of areas, we did not give enough attention to the setting up of bases and to extending the movement in weak areas and in cities. At the meeting in October 1961, the problem of defeating the Staley Plan was brought up, but because we did not make an accurate evaluation of the enemy's schemes and did not succeed in overcoming our weaknesses, the measures prescribed to cope with the enemy were still too general, particularly in connection with the strategic hamlets and the regroupment of people.

In certain places and at certain moments, in implementing the policies of the Party, we still leaned towards the right. The degree of this shortcoming varied with different areas and different echelons.

The plans and policies only prescribed general principles, but did not include concrete procedures suitable to the status of the movement.

The leadership approach and the organization of working methods to ensure proper implementation of the Party's plans and policies were not realistic enough, not quite consistent with the abilities of the "structures" and the people; and we were slow in detecting mistakes and new problems.

In summary, although the movement has extended considerably, has achieved many results, and set up stable structures, it still has important weaknesses and shortcomings in its process of development which we should be fully aware of and should resolutely overcome in order to lead the revolution to further successes.

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The U.S. is adopting a new strategy, conformable with the Staley-Taylor Plan, in order to resume the initiative, with the wicked purpose of isolating the revolution and our armed forces from the people in SVN. It is only by isolating us that the enemy may have hopes of destroying us.

In order to isolate the South from the North, the enemy has accused the North of invading the South, slandered the revolutionary movement in the South, and set up a white belt along the 17th parallel and the border area adjacent to Laos and Cambodia, in order to cut all relationship of the revolution in the South with the outside world.

In order to isolate the revolutionary forces from the people they hurriedly set up a system of centers to regroup rural and urban people, under the slogan of "strategic hamlets," with the purpose of controlling the people, contending with us for manpower and economic resources, reoccupying rural areas to isolate us from the people, and concentrating forces to destroy us. They are intensifying the people's activities against the revolution.

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Because their forces and their capacities are limited, while they are urging various areas to carry out military activities, to set up strategic hamlets, and to regroup the people; they also concentrate forces to intensify military activities in the Delta of SVN, and to attack populated spots in three areas of SVN, the most important of which is the Western area. While they eagerly set up strategic hamlets in weak contended areas, they intensify military activities to regroup the people in areas near our bases and continue to use planes, helicopters, and commando units to attack us, and to subject our protected base areas to economic blockade, with a view to carrying out large-scale offensive action to destroy our bases.

They have continued their scheme of dividing the people, antagonizing Catholics and non-Catholics, and slandering the policies of our Front; for instance, they used agents to egg on the Cambodians against us; they propounded autonomy to lure the mountaineers; they bribed the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, and urged them to fight the revolution. Pro-French and pro-U.S. elements also increased activities within the people's organizations, religious groups, and the ethnic minorities to secure a backing, to plan activities to fight us, and to fight Diem; they are also intensifying activity with the purpose of winning over the intermediate strata of the population.

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IV. Plans and Specific Activities for the Immediate Future.

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We should promote a comprehensive movement of political and military struggle; carry out a continuous offensive to reduce enemy forces; build up our own forces; intensify action upon the Army; disorganize enemy forces; counteract the enemy's scheme, which aims at separating the masses from the revolution; sabotage strategic hamlets; lessen enemy pressure in areas where the movement is still weak; oppose military operations; fight enemy commandos and spies; strengthen and extend our local bases; strengthen the people

in the political, military, economic, and cultural fields; and, build up a powerful military force which will cooperate with the people to defeat the enemy.

In order to counteract enemy schemes, we should sabotage strategic hamlets; prevent the enemy from besieging and attacking our bases; and, urge forward the development and consolidation of our forces. The meeting felt that the following essential activities should be carried out, along with the various activities of the Party.

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1. Opposing and Destroying Strategic Hamlets and Regroupment Centers

The enemy is mobilizing military and civilian personnel to conduct terrorist and mopping-up operations and to set up strategic hamlets and regroupment centers so as to isolate our armed forces, and our cadres and Party members, for the purpose of destroying the revolutionary movement in the South, and resuming control over the people through a combination of military, political, economic, and cultural schemes. He has combined such policies as: the army draft, mobilizing compulsory labor, extortion, etc. He not only delimits the boundaries in bases, but also in areas and in villages for the purpose of repelling and destroying us.

With his present military superiority, the enemy can set up a number of strategic hamlets, set up a white belt in certain areas, and harass our bases. He will increase activities to destroy production, to plunder property, and to make further difficulties for the people. He will intensify terrorism to upset the people.

This scheme is so important to the enemy that he calls it "unique national policy" because in the Staley plan it is considered as the one most essential factor that will determine victory. Thus, as far as we are concerned, our counter-action of the enemy's plan of strategic hamlets and regroupment centers will make it possible for us to preserve and develop our movement. This will be a most important struggle to be carried out by various echelons in various areas, by political and military forces, and by different branches of the Party; this will be a prolonged and stubborn struggle; and it is only when there is a big change in the relativity of strength between the enemy and us that we can completely defeat this scheme.

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2. Some Important Problems

Although the people and the cells have fairly good morale and have acquired enough experience, they should not be subjective because this stubborn and prolonged struggle to oppose strategic hamlets and regroupment centers required better moral preparation, a more comprehensive and stronger movement, and better and more flexible leadership. It will be very important to set up and preserve covert structures so as to maintain the movement and the strength of the people in order to oppose and defeat the enemy's schemes. We should realize that our structures in weak and contended areas are still inadequate and overt, and we should try to remedy this shortcoming. In base areas and in areas adjacent to our bases, we should prevent the enemy from regrouping the population and delimiting boundaries, by carrying out various forms of struggle. We should have two types of members: legal and illegal ones (their numbers will vary depending on the area); when the enemy rounds up the people, we will introduce covertly those people who are capable of production and of protecting the bases; when the situation is tense, we will exhort the regrouped people to struggle and return, and we will withdraw the covert people; we will thus "tug back and forth" with the enemy.

With regard to military activities, we should urgently intensify the people's movement, set up combat villages, and extend guerilla warfare. In areas where strategic hamlets have been or are being set up, we should have the guerrillas harass the enemy, and organize secret self-defense corps members to create disturbances, to chastise resolutely the evil-doers, and paralyze them completely. We will concentrate our armed forces to carry out military operations in a very large area, fight continuously, and penetrate deeply into the enemy's rear areas to destroy the lines of communication.

In providing leadership, the cells and the district committees should concentrate on the struggle against strategic hamlets and regroupment centers. At the zone and provincial levels, we should assign committee members and cadres who already have assumed direct leadership in areas where there are many strategic hamlets.

3. Setting up Bases

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Because a base is not a temporary station for the troops and various organizations, nor a retreat, but a place to build up and develop revolutionary forces, in every respect, to attack enemy areas, and because it is like "a flag representing the revolution and the new system," the various echelons should understand that it is their responsibility to consolidate the forces and the facilities to set up bases.

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4. Administration of Rural Areas

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In providing leadership for rural administration, the various echelons should carry out the policies properly, and see that the administrative organizations and methods are consistent. Situations such as cadres holding all the jobs, or the creation of unrealistic organizations, should be avoided.

5. Intensifying the Political Struggle

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...there are circumstances when the struggle should be extremely resolute, and go as far as bloodshed in order to be successful, as when the people oppose compulsory evacuation from their land and homes; when they oppose regroupment, strategic hamlets, drafting for the Army or for compulsory labor, etc.

We should make the people see clearly the practical results obtained directly or indirectly through struggle; meanwhile, we should continue to organize, develop and strengthen the people's forces, and to further the people's political awareness in order to maintain and extend the struggle movement.

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We should continue to lead the people in their struggle; utilize the overt and legal economic, cultural and social organizations as a means to gather forces to struggle against the enemy.

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6. Intensifying the Military Struggle

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We should organize attacks against the enemy in his rear areas to upset him. In the past, such activities were neglected; there was no adequate preparation or organization, and weapons and facilities were lacking. Now, we should set up specialized units and clandestine forces to attack ways of communication, warehouses, airports, and U.S. offices particularly. Public utilities such as electric plants, machines, etc., are not to be

sabotaged yet. In carrying out sabotage activities in urban areas, we should endeavor to preserve our structures. Clandestine organizations for sabotage in urban areas should be set up separately and have no connection with political organizations; and when using such organizations in Saigon in particular, we should ponder on the immediate and future advantages and drawbacks.

7. Activities in Connection with the Front

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Working upon the upper strata; and taking advantage of the internal differences in the government.

Vis-a-vis the upper strata and Government employees in the South, our policies are not practical enough; our propaganda and education activities are still inadequate, whereas the enemy is making efforts to corrupt their minds and to urge them to fight us. Sometimes our attitudes and actions toward them are not even consistent with our policies. The capitalists in the South are politically weak, but they are more or less inclined towards neutrality. We should gain influence over proprietors of small shops, intellectuals, Government employees and military officers, so that we can be made aware of the importance of gaining their support, and of the role they may play in the Front. We should give them propaganda on the Front's policies; we should also devise suitable forms of organization and activity for them and educate them in order to stimulate their anti-U.S. feelings.

Among Government employees, we should develop cadres and sympathizers, and increase propaganda activities; but secret organizations should not be set up as yet.

With regard to dignitaries of religious groups, we should work upon those who are anti-U.S.-Diem. Good dignitaries will be educated and guided to carry out activities to gain influence over the people. Reactionary ones will be unmasked and isolated.

With regard to pro-French elements, even if they are against the revolution, we should still work upon them and win their cooperation in opposing Diem. However, we should understand that we do so just to turn to account the enemy's internal differences and that it is not the same as working upon the upper strata. We should extend the revolutionary movement and not yield our controlled areas to them; and we should try every means of neutralizing their influence in areas such as those occupied by the religious sects. We should try by every means to establish relations with them and to secure their cooperation in certain places and at certain moments. Some may even be invited to join the Front, but approval by higher echelons should be obtained.

With regard to organizations such as the Movement of National Revolution, the Republican Youth, the Women's Solidarity Movement, in areas where we cannot yet carry out subversive activities, such as the cities, we will use the boycott method and will use infiltration to limit their reactionary activities and to disorganize them.

8. Action Against the Army

In view of the general trend in the world and in our country, and of the potentialities of the movement under the leadership of the Party, we can see that it is necessary and possible to stimulate nationalism, anti-U.S. feelings, the longing for peace and the aversion to war in the minds of the troops in SVN, with the exception of the feudalists and evil-doers. The slogan, "coalition between workers, farmers and the troops," is not only used for propaganda to demoralize enemy troops, but under the conditions of the strong political and military struggle

movement, it is also capable of inducing enemy units to oppose the war and to rebel. In order for the slogan to be more specific and more effective, it can be worded as follows: "the people, the troops and officers in the SVN Army should get together to oppose U.S. aggression." In addition, there will be other slogans aimed at the troops and officers, to stimulate their nationalism, to urge them to oppose the U.S. and the war, to demand peace, and to oppose U.S. commanders.

At present, the people's movement for action against the Army is fairly extensive on the surface, but activities such as organizing and developing revolutionary structures should be carried out deeper within the enemy's Army. Generally speaking, we should continue to rely upon the people, the troops' families, the captured and surrendered troops, to intensify action against the Army, but we should also provide closer leadership and make use of more realistic methods.

Because most officers come from the upper strata of the population, our methods should be nearly the same as those used to work upon the upper strata. We should extend the range of their expectations to induce them to side with the revolution.

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9. Economic and Financial Activities

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The purpose of financial activities is to increase incomes, to economize and to improve financial management. Recently, the various echelons did not fully realize the importance of financial activities to provide for the needs of the revolution. Action against the people to obtain contributions from them was still inadequate; there were still injustices and inconsistencies; other national resources that could have been exploited were overlooked; financial management was still defective. In the coming period, we should make a survey to determine the potential incomes and the sources of income for each area; and cut down those expenditures that are not absolutely necessary.

The main source of income will still be the contributions of the people and the results will depend upon the methods used in urging the people to give voluntarily. We should work upon the people to make them realize that it is the responsibility of everyone to contribute to the needs of the revolution.

10. Counterespionage Activities

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Counterespionage policies should be sound and specific and should aim at educating and reforming a majority of backward and erring elements, and at chastising the few refractory chiefs. We should be very cautious in making arrests. Specific rules should be prescribed in connection with arrests, investigations and judgments, to ensure that policies are properly implemented. In places where mistakes have been made, corrective measures should be taken, but we should be very careful and not let the enemy take advantage of the situation.

The system of security and protection should be strengthened; short courses should be organized to train cadres, especially in the villages, to give the cadres and the personnel in the security and protection systems a better understanding of their responsibilities and of the policies.

11. Communications and Transportation

This is a very important activity. Recently, some results have been achieved, but they were insufficient and far below the goals contemplated in our plans

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12. Activities of the Party

Significant results have been achieved during the past few years with regard to building up the Party. In many places, the number of members has increased two or three times. However, the Party developed very slowly in weak areas and included very few women or members from religious groups. Cadres were not trained enough to meet the increasing needs.

We have succeeded to a certain extent in overcoming rightists and uncertainty, and in promoting the idea of attacking the enemy and developing the movement; meanwhile, because policies were not well understood, a thoughtless and short-sighted attitude has developed which is characterized by contentment with present achievements. Recently, in view of the increase in U.S. military intervention, a fear of the U.S. and of a long hard struggle has developed even though confidence in the certain victory of the revolution still persists. Generally speaking, educational activities within the Party were still inadequate; the capacities and efficiency of the cadres and Party members were not in keeping with the requirements for guiding the movement. Organizations for specialized activities were lacking and working methods at various echelons were still defective. At the village level in particular, the capacities of the cells as well as their organization and working methods were not consistent with the development of the situation in rural areas. Meanwhile, certain areas have not been able to settle the internal problems between old and new members properly; and problems relating to Party members and cadres who had been imprisoned and released have not been solved in conformance with policies.

In connection with the coming activities of the Party, the following question should be given special attention. With regard to moral leadership, we should educate Party members to make them realize that this is a long hard struggle, but that we are capable of gradually defeating the enemy and gaining advantages step by step before achieving victory. We should be fully aware of the difficulties, but by promoting resolution and perseverance, by stimulating the fighting spirit, optimism and confidence, we will surely lead the revolution to victory. Meanwhile, we should overcome pessimistic attitudes in view of the intensification of enemy destructive activities.

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We should develop the Party in areas, villages, and hamlets where we have few members; more women and members from religious sects should be recruited for the Party. Cadres in Saigon should be increased, and cadres should be assigned to weak areas to build up Party structures.

In consolidating the Party, the main activity will be education. Depending on the character and position of each area, constant goals will be prescribed for the consolidation task. The goals for consolidation in rural areas will be: to improve the capacity for rural administration; and to build up and lead political and military forces to oppose terrorism. Party structures should be kept secret and protected, and provided with guidance for a prolonged struggle. The enemy is still capable of carrying out relentless attacks in certain rural areas, particularly in those where strategic hamlets are to be established, and we should develop Party members, labor-youth members and cadres for clandestine activities. In case of emergency, when the enemy threat increases, cells will be set up and the clandestine system will stay and stick to the people to lead the movement.

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(See project concerning organization)

25 September 1962

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