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
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15 January 1962

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480. CONGO: Possible Decline of Secessionism in Katanga Province




Background: It seems almost incredible - so much has happened - but only a little more than a year and a half has passed since the Belgians gave Congo its independence on June 30, 1960. The present situation, perhaps, can be seen as arising from the events of last August, when all elements of the Congo body politic, except Tshombe, President of Katanga Province (although provision had been made for Katanga representation also), had agreed through the national Leopoldville parliament upon the formation of a new government under the moderate, anti-Communist Prime Ministership of Cyrille Adoula. The inauguration of the Adoula government brought to an end (at least for the time being) the illegal, breakaway regime of Antoine Gizenga, who had sought to replace the late pro-Communist Lumumba as national Prime Minister and whom in turn the Communists have long sought to make their puppet. Adoula has been described by Secretary Rusk as "a man of intelligence, moderation and nation-wide stature. He has made clear his determination to keep his country from control of any foreign quarter." With his moderation, Adoula has emerged from the background of tribalism in the Congo as a man not only of unusual sanity and steadiness - like Nyerere of Tanganyika - but of outstanding firmness of purpose with a real gift of leadership.

After UN forces had overcome resistance at the Katanga capital of Elizabethville, and accompanied by the usual Congolese disorder as to where a meeting between Adoula and Tshombe was to take place, the Katanga leader agreed to meet the national Prime Minister at Kitona on the Congo's west coast. There, on December 31, 1961, agreement was reached between the two leaders on the reintegration of Katanga Province into the national government. It is to be hoped that Tshombe, who as the leader of Katanga is in a relatively strong financial position, will not welsh on this agreement. Katanga is not only in the best financial position of any province in the Congo, its propaganda agents (whether in support of secession or whatever it might be) are well-heeled abroad.

UN forces in the Congo must be freed to attend to other urgent work in the Congo. Gizenga, although he is first Vice-Prime Minister of the Congo under Adoula, has abandoned that regime and fled to his stronghold at Stanleyville. Unless the Katanga situation is relatively stabilized, serious menaces such as the dissidence of Gizenga, and others following his lead, cannot be dealt with and the cold war will come to the Congo with a vengeance with still more bloodshed to follow.

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481. The Russian Orthodox Church - Religious Institution or Tool of Communism?

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Background: During the course of the past year the Russian Orthodox Church has actively engaged itself in building up its relationships with Western religious organizations, but especially with the Greek Orthodox Church and the World Council of Churches. During the winter of 1960-61, a delegation toured the Near East, visiting Istanbul, Jerusalem, Beirut, Athens and elsewhere and concerning itself with discussions of preparations for the Eastern (Greek) Orthodox Church Conference to be held at Rhodes. A delegation attended the Rhodes Conference, September 24 to 30, 1961, and was prominently active there. In mid-November, it attended the conference of the World Council of Churches at New Delhi and was formally admitted to membership. On all these several occasions, the most prominent Russian individual was Archbishop Nikodim (Boris Rotov), Patriarch of Moscow and All the Russias, who is generally conceded to be the rising star of the Russian Orthodox Church.

At the time of the Near East tour, it was generally considered probable that the Russians were maneuvering for leadership of the Eastern Orthodox Church and dominance of the proposed Ecumenical Council, preparations for which were undertaken at the Rhodes Conference. While this did not eventuate (probably because of the firm control exercised by the Greek Orthodox delegations) the Russians were able, both at Rhodes and New Delhi, not only to exercise considerable influence but more importantly to plug the all-to-familiar Communist propaganda themes of "Disarmament", "World Peace", "Anti-Colonialism." At Rhodes, one reporter who saw a copy of Nikodim's speech said that it was straight out of the Communist Party handbook. Also at Rhodes, the Russians successfully opposed a proposal to condemn atheism.

As of 1961, the Russian Orthodox Church claims 50,000,000 "believers", 30,000 priests, 20,000 churches and "over" 50 monasteries (the figures are from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia). While these figures are considered overly generous, the important fact is that even if the figures are accepted at face value, they represent a decline from pre-revolutionary Russia figures of 24,000 churches, 88,000 priests and 975 monasteries. The 1914 totals were 77,767 churches, 117,916 priests and 1,025 monasteries.

Early communism bluntly identified itself with Atheism and crudely persecuted all organized religion. Recognition of the strength of certain institutions led to a new tactic of attempting to capture religious leadership (either by converting the true leaders or by replacing them with trusted Communists from within their own religious or minority groups) and redirecting the work of the Church into Communist ideological indoctrination. At the present time, crude persecution and attacks on organized religion are foresworn; without changing basic doctrine, Communists now manipulate religious institutions (i. e. organized bodies, churches) through controlling

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officials, and buttress this with more sophisticated, creative propaganda against religious dogma, ritual, etc., and for "scientific atheism."

Organized religions in the Soviet Union are subjected to varying degrees of interference and pressure, dependent largely upon two factors; their willingness to cooperate with or acquiesce in the dictates of the CPSU, and the degree of their relationship to a non-Soviet religious organization. At the head of the list is the Russian Orthodox Church, which enjoys its position not only because it is willing to cooperate but also because it is the established religion of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (the old Imperial Russia) and hence not subject to suspicion of fostering resistance to or revolt from Soviet rule. The Lutherans and the Baptists are more closely restricted in their activities but are tolerated, while the Roman Catholic Church is not only persecuted institutionally but has to face the competition of a National Church directly under the thumb of the CPSU. Jehovah's Witnesses, Jews (recognized as a national minority in the USSR) and Moslems are rigorously suppressed as organized religions and regularly discriminated against as individuals. While Russian Orthodox clerics travel far and wide, peddling the government line - as they peddled it under the Tsars - the Moslem Central Asian ecclesiastics are kept under iron surveillance and rarely permitted to go even to Mecca because of the Russian fear that Islam might once again, as it has several times before, serve as the catalyst for a Central Asian national liberation movement.

The Government of the USSR, no less than the ruling elite of Czarist Russia, has always been ambivalent concerning the Russian Orthodox Church. From time to time, the church hierarchy and individual high churchmen or influential priests have been used for political purposes. Of course, under the Czars, the Russian Orthodox Church was the established religion, and tie-ins between church and state could be managed without the necessity either of openly and deliberately assaulting the physical indicia of religious worship - the maintenance of churches, monasteries, chapels, church schools and the like - or of attacking the basis of religious belief as such. The CPSU has not hesitated to do the former, and their own figures demonstrate their success. Their efforts against the latter, ^{and to} promulgate the doctrine of "Scientific Atheism" as a substitute for the ancient, deeply implanted faith and superstition of the vast majority of Russians, has been, in so far as can be judged on the basis of the available evidence, singularly unsuccessful. The current effort to use the formal edifice of the Russian Orthodox Church as a vehicle for promoting Soviet Communist propaganda throughout the free world represents a new and different approach and does not and must not be interpreted as a real change of basic Communist doctrine on religion.



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Background:

a. General On 25 December 1961, the Standing Committee of the Second National People's Congress (NPC) announced that the third session of the NPC would be convened in Peiping on 5 March 1962. The NPC is the rubber stamp legislative body of the CPR and the Chinese equivalent of the USSR's Supreme Soviet. Despite the constitutional requirement that the NPC meet annually, no session has been held since March-April 1960, presumably because of the regime's reluctance to publicize its economic failures. It will be recalled that Premier Chou En-lai departed Moscow shortly after the opening of the 22nd CPSU Congress and sought to excuse his abrupt departure by asserting that his presence was being required in Peiping in order to prepare for the NPC. Peiping has also announced that a session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) will open in Peiping on 5 March.

b. National People's Congress (NPC) The NPC, as defined by the 1954 Constitution, is "the highest organ of state authority" in Communist China and the "exclusive legislative authority in the country." In practice the NPC has no real power and acts primarily as a sounding board for Communist Party policy statements and as a channel for transmitting party policy to the nation. Past sessions have been short, voting is by "unanimous decision" and speeches have parroted the party line after it has been explained to the session. It should be borne in mind that national policy and direction are not formulated in the government of state structure, but by the party; hence a National People's Congress, such as will be convened on 5 March 1962 is of little importance compared to a National Party Congress. Nevertheless the NPC will serve the important function of publicizing and disseminating party decisions, primarily as they pertain to economic plans and programs for 1962.

c. Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) The CPPCC was organized in 1949 as an ad hoc constituent assembly. Once it had adopted the Organic Law of the Central People's Government which provided for the "election" of the NPC it ceased to exist as a political organ of the regime. It has, however, developed into the chief united-front organization of the regime and its members are drawn

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 from Party controlled mass line organizations, insignificant "democratic parties," and various nationality groups. The CPPCC is empowered to "advise" the regime, but its chief value is to lend some flavor of "democracy" to the Communist regime's internal structure and to serve as a vehicle to spread party decisions.

d. NPC Meeting Against a Backdrop of Repeated Economic Failures Year-end statements by CPR media implicitly admit a decline in heavy and light industry output, cite drops in cotton and industrial crops, and note that while the 1961 grain crop was better than 1960's, it was poor. The regime acknowledges a lag in mining and chemical industries and sees further cuts in capital construction for 1962. The People's Daily alludes also to a possible further retreat in policy on agricultural communes. In general, we may expect NPC proceedings to reflect a further "leap back" from the radical policies associated with the 1958-60 "leap forward" program. The People's Daily sees 1962 as a period for "adjustments in all fields" with the main effort to be in the agricultural field. Crop failures, requiring increased imports of grain; malnutrition and disease, underlined by last year's outbreak of cholera; an increase in Sino-Soviet tensions emerging from the 22nd CPSU Congress; and the regime's failure to gain admission to the United Nations, all underline the CPR's continued failure to solve outstanding problems.

Important or new manifestations of existing Sino-Soviet tensions may not emerge from the NPC. However, Premier Chou En-lai has made a practice of addressing the opening and closing sessions of the Congress, at which time he reviews the foreign policies of the CPR. In this context it would not be surprising for him to allude to his current quarrel with the Soviet Union at least indirectly by noting, for example, continued CPR support to Albania, the need for unity among Communist nations, the priority assigned to "supporting national wars of liberation" as opposed to "peaceful co-existence," or the futility of negotiating with capitalist countries. Because of the internal, governmental nature of the NPC, coupled with the fact that foreign delegations are not to be expected, it would be most unusual if the NPC were utilized as a forum for presenting the CPR side of its dispute with Moscow. However, we do not completely discount the possibility that the Congress will be used for just such a purpose and we should be alert to this contingency.

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
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483. Suspension of Diplomatic Relations Between the USSR and Albania

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Background: On 3 December 1961, the Soviet Union informed Albania that it was withdrawing its entire embassy staff and commercial representation from Tirana and simultaneously demanded the withdrawal of the Albanian Embassy staff and the commercial counselor from Moscow. The Eastern European satellites in turn have severely curtailed their relations with Tirana. The USSR's suspension of diplomatic and economic relations is the latest in a series of Soviet actions designed to warn the Communist Parties that the CPSU intends to reassert its authority and that the penalty for flouting this authority has been increased. Since the break with Albania has been extended from the sphere of party relations to government relations, continued Chinese support of Albania now means the endorsement of a regime which officially - though not unanimously - has been declared heretical and excommunicated from the Communist commonwealth. Khrushchev's action also forces an unwelcome choice on the Communist leaders of Japan, Indonesia, North Korea and North Vietnam who have been engaged in an awkward balancing act since Khrushchev's public condemnation of Albanian actions at the 22nd CPSU Congress and in the face of Peking's continued endorsement of the Tirana regime.

Three accusations were leveled by Moscow in its notes to Albania regarding the suspension of governmental relations. Two of these concerned an Albanian demand that Moscow reduce by two thirds the size of its embassy in Tirana and an accusation that Albania was interfering with the work of the Soviet Embassy staff in Tirana. The third complaint cited "hostile" activity carried on by Albanians in the USSR, referring particularly to the Albanian Embassy's distribution of documents -- which included several of Hoxha's attacks against Khrushchev -- to selected Western Embassies on 25 November. Meanwhile, the Chinese have in effect declared that they will not retreat in the face of this latest Soviet response to their continued support of Albania.

Since the death of Stalin and the consolidation of the Communist revolution in China, the right of the CPSU to make decisions for the entire bloc has increasingly been challenged. In this connection, the case of Albania is an instructive example of the attempt of one party to dissent from the dicta of the CPSU on questions involving its own vital interests (ultimately, the continuance in power and very lives of the present leaders). Hoxha and company have long been apprehensive that, if relations between Moscow and Belgrade improved to the point of Belgrade's return to the bloc the Albanian party would again fall under Yugoslav domination (as was the case before the break with Tito occurred in 1948). Therefore the Albanians demurred in decisions which promoted a rapprochement with the Yugoslavs and insisted on a hard line toward all "revisionists." (See attachment for an outline of this trend in Soviet-Albanian relations.) On two separate occasions the Soviet Union organized coups in an attempt to replace the current Albanian leaders with Moscow men who would do its bidding. Both attempts were thwarted. Meanwhile, as Soviet economic aid was withdrawn, Tirana

obtained assistance from Communist China which was also in the process of challenging Soviet authority since it too had discovered that decisions reached in Moscow on the basis of what was useful to the development of the Soviet Union 45 years after the Bolshevik revolution had little validity or applicability to Chinese problems. At the 81 Party Conference in Moscow in November - December, 1960, the Soviet Union attempted - unsuccessfully - to get formal recognition of its right to make decisions binding on the entire Communist world. China and Albania refused to acknowledge this right and the fundamental disagreement was papered over in a Declaration of this conference, which while it stated that the "generally acknowledged vanguard of the world Communist movement has been and will continue to be the CPSU....." and that the "experience of the CPSU..... is of fundamental significance for the entire international Communist movement..." refused to accept and formalize the principle of the CPSU's right to make decisions binding upon the entire movement. Instead, the problem was left in the following vague terminology:

"All Marxist-Leninist parties independently and equally work out a policy proceeding from the specific conditions of their countries, guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and extend mutual support to each other.... Every party is responsible to the working class and working movement. When necessary, communist and workers parties hold conferences to discuss topical issues, to exchange experience, to gain views by means of consultations and agreement on joint action in the struggle for common aims. When this or that party raises questions about the activity of another fraternal party, its leadership turns to the leadership of the party in question and, when necessary, meetings and consultations are held. The experience and outcome of the meetings of representatives of communist parties held during the past few years, particularly the outcome of the two largest conferences of November 1957 and the present conference, show that, in present conditions, such conferences are an effective form of mutual exchange of views and experience and enrichment, through collective effort, of Marxist-Leninist theory and the working out of united positions in the struggle for common aims."

In the light of the above statement, signed by the 81 Communist Parties, Khrushchev's unilateral 22nd CPSU Congress condemnation of Albania for "fractionalism" (i. e. for independently working out a policy proceeding from the specific conditions obtaining in Albania) and renewed attack on Stalin, were direct violations of the 81 Party agreement and an attempt by the CPSU to reassert its hegemony over the world Communist movement. It was for this reason that Chou En-lai walked out of the gathering and returned to Peking. Albania did not even attend the meeting. Members of a number of the other fraternal parties, such as the Italian Communist Party and the Polish Worker's Party, while not agreeing with the methods or ideological viewpoints of Tirana and Peking, have also taken exception to the arbitrary methods used by Khrushchev to reassert his authority.

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484. Nuclear Testing and Disarmament



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Background: Last spring there was genuine, if cautious, hope that the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom would be able to start moving toward general disarmament by concluding a nuclear test ban treaty [redacted]. By August, it was becoming apparent that Khrushchev had lost interest in such a treaty ([redacted]) and on the 31st of that month, the Soviets announced that they were resuming nuclear testing in the atmosphere [redacted] thus torpedoing hopes that no more fallout would be added to the atmosphere. This guidance is intended to bring recipients up to date on nuclear testing and disarmament developments since the Soviet test resumption on September 1, 1961.

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Immediately after the Soviet tests began, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan proposed a voluntary ban on nuclear tests in the atmosphere -- which would, however, be checked by national monitoring facilities. When (5 September) it became clear, after three tests, that the USSR was continuing an intensive test program, Kennedy ordered a resumption of U.S. tests underground. The Belgrade neutrals conference did not condemn the Soviet testing, but took a "plague on both your houses" line, calling (6 September) for an immediate resumption of negotiations "on the prohibition of all nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons." When the UN General Assembly met, India led the neutralists, submitting a resolution calling for a resumption of an uncontrolled test ban, notwithstanding the proven futility of any ban without safeguards. On 2 November, this Indian resolution was approved 72 to 21 in the Political Committee, the USSR, the UK, and the U.S. all voting against it. On 14 November, the Political Committee passed other resolutions to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons in war (60-16, the U.S. and UK maintaining in opposition that Soviet threats made it suicidal to renounce the use of nuclear weapons in defense) and to bar the testing or stockpiling of nuclear weapons in Africa (57-0, with 42 countries, including the Western powers, abstaining). The voting in the UN this fall shows (other cases could also be cited) that any resolution which purports to support disarmament will be adopted by a heavy majority.

Despite the Berlin crisis and even the resumption of testing, negotiations between McCloy and Zorin on general disarmament had continued, and on 20 September a joint statement appeared, endorsing a broad set of general disarmament principles. The U.S. secured recognition of many of the principles in its general plan (submitted by President Kennedy to the UN on 25 September: see Press Comment, 26 September), but the Soviets refused to agree that, after each stage of disarmament, the stock of weapons remaining should be verified. They called this verification espionage, while the U.S. insisted that it was essential to prevent the secret retention of arms. (If there were to be "general and complete disarmament," a Nation which had secreted a thousand tanks could march over whole continents.) Another point of difference also remained: the make-up of the disarmament negotiating committee, which would work out a treaty. The USSR wanted to replace the ten-nation committee (five Communist, five Western powers) with a 15-nation group, bringing in 5 neutrals in line with the troika principle. The U.S. firmly opposed the

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troika, making a counter-proposal of a 20-nation committee (10 neutrals). On 13 December, agreement was finally announced on the make-up of an 18-member committee (West: U.S., UK, Canada, France, Italy; Soviet bloc: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, USSR; others: Brazil, Mexico, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Burma, India, UAR, Sweden). The new eight nations were selected on the basis of geographical distribution. General disarmament talks are now tentatively scheduled to begin in Geneva on 14 March.

The test-ban talks had been recessed on 9 September, actually no doubt as a result of stalemate and test resumption, but officially in order to await the debate of the UN General Assembly. On 9 November, the Assembly voted 71 to 11 for a U.S. -UK sponsored resolution to resume test-ban negotiations, and negotiations did commence again at Geneva on 28 November. They immediately ran into a road-block, when the Soviets, ignoring all past discussions, presented a proposal for a renunciation of tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and in water -- these to be detected by national detection systems -- and an on-faith renunciation of underground tests, pending progress toward general disarmament. (U.S. experts do not believe outer space and under-water tests can be reliably detected without a world-wide international surveillance system.) The Soviet proposal thus provided no safeguard against the secret preparation of new tests. The main purpose, presumably, was to embarrass the U.S. in its underground testing and possible future atmospheric testing -- "don't do as I do, do as I say." Other tactics were also employed for this purpose: on 17 December, Mikhail Menshikov, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S., stated on television that if the U.S. did not stop underground testing "at once, then of course we will start our tests again, and not only ordinary bombs, but perhaps superbombs also." When asked if his government was planning a 100 megaton explosion, Menshikov said: "Quite possible, quite possible." The test-ban talks recessed again before Christmas, but are due to resume 16 January.

During the Soviet test series, world interest focused on fallout and on the use of the tests for purposes of terror and intimidation. These were indeed real aspects of the Soviet tests, but their importance should now be qualified somewhat: fallout did not turn out to be as heavy as expected, and the tests did serve to improve Soviet nuclear techniques. In retrospect, the main result may have been the demonstration that world opinion has little influence on Soviet policy. Hostile public reaction may have been one reason why a 100 megaton weapon was not tested, but other large explosions did occur, and an extremely intensive test series took place, in spite of all protests. This fact puts the whole disarmament problem in a somewhat different perspective.

Most past disarmament proposals have relied, in greater or lesser degree, on the assumption that moral pressure, expressed through world opinion, would keep nations from arming. The Indian viewpoint perfectly exemplifies this approach, even though moral considerations proved of little weight when it came to annexing Goa. The United States realized that the Soviet Union was prepared to violate any agreement when it served their interest, but (for some time at least) it still believed that the Soviets would be anxious to conceal their violations. In the test-ban negotiations, we therefore worked to develop an inspection mechanism as a deterrent to secret testing. But the Soviet test series now indicates that, instead of worrying so much about secret underground tests, we must be more concerned over the likelihood that any agreement, disarmament or otherwise, may be publicly scrapped when it suits Soviet convenience. In other words, the world needs controls which

the USSR will respect. Now the U.S. did, in the test-ban talks, press also for the establishment of the principle of international organs of control; we hoped that once international controls had been successfully used in connection with nuclear testing, they could be extended to all forms of disarmament. The new U.S. general disarmament program provides for the gradual development of international verification and peacekeeping machinery. International control seems the logical ultimate answer -- but we are a long way from it today. Under present conditions, reliance must be placed on other measures, namely the national strength of those states which respect the principle of freedom of choice, and which are determined to preserve it. In flouting world opinion, the USSR not only negates the hopes placed on the influence of that opinion, it also shows dangerous over-confidence in the strength of her own military and power-political position. Unfortunately, by its categoric rejection of any controlled test-ban, and by its unilateral resumption of nuclear testing, the Soviet Union has destroyed confidence and put the world back into an arms race. Consequently, until a controlled arms agreement is reached, the U.S. must provide the necessary deterrent itself, in combination with other free governments. We believe that a controlled disarmament agreement would be in our interest, and also in the genuine interest of the Soviet Union. It appears, however, that the Soviet Union will not recognize this interest until it is convinced that bullying and deception do not work.

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