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Briefly Noted

Czechoslovakia as a Model for "Peaceful" Transition: The 40th Anniversary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party was hailed by the Communist World as the example par excellence of the "peaceful revolution" from capitalism to the completion of a fully "socialist" state. Its special significance as a "model" accounted for the importance accorded the Czech anniversary as compared with those of other parties which have been celebrated this year. Antonin Novotny, whose predelections for Stalinist methods are well-known, made a speech in which he claimed - with typical Communist disregard for fact - that the Czech party throughout its history had fought dogmatism-secretarianism as vigorously as it had Social-Democratic, right wing, and revisionist elements. In so doing, Novotny sought to convey the impression that the Czech party has freed itself from the the dogmatic addictions which characterized it in the past and to portray himself as a loyal and convinced supporter of Khrushchev's current policies. Notable by their absence from this felicitous gathering were representatives of the Communist parties of Albania and the Chinese People's Republic.

Trial of Hungarian Church Officials: On 7 June a show trial of eleven (11) Hungarian Church officials charged with anti-state activity began in Budapest. The trial is the climax of a campaign to neutralize the Hungarian Catholic Church which began in February and March with the arrest of large numbers (some estimates range as high as 3,000) of priests most of whom were probably released subsequently. All but one of the men on trial "admitted" charges that they had "recruited former students of Catholic schools and members of Catholic youth organizations banned by the government:" in an effort to set up a "Catholic elite youth corps" whose members would have taken over government posts in a "Christian republic." One priest, however, a Piarist monk, by the name of Odon Lenard, stoutly maintained that practices such as the writing of religious pamphlets and teaching youths the scriptures privately could not be classified as anti-state crimes. More trials of Catholic clergy may be forthcoming. For additional details see Press Comment and the Current Intelligence Digest.


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395. Aftermath of the Military Coup in Korea

Background: A force of some 3,600 Army troops and marines led by Major General Pak Cong-hui, Deputy Commander of South Korea's Second Army, seized Seoul on May 16 and deposed Prime Minister Chang Myon. The leaders of the successful coup have kept President Yun Po-sun as a legal facade while they have effectively superseded the Constitution with their own "basic law", set up a totally military "Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR), a totally military cabinet, and a panel of civilian, academic advisors. The SCNR proclaimed that it would restore the government to civilian control after they have wiped out all forms of Communist subversion, eliminated official corruption, and strengthened the national economy. It abolished all political parties and many other organizations and imprisoned several thousand people; the Council's "basic law" permits a wide variety of actions which were previously illegal and also allows for much ex post facto action against former officeholders military leaders, businessmen, union leaders and others. The principal motivating force behind these actions appears to have been a group of field grade officers led by General Pak's brother-in-law, Lt. Col. Kim Cong p'il. The general public, including the students who had unseated the Rhee regime, unconvinced that the Chang regime had made significant progress on economic and anti-corruption measures, remained passive throughout. In the name of anti-communism and anti-corruption, however, the new regime has moved heavily against "progressivist" intellectuals -- e.g. the teachers' union, and has taken various puritanical measures against the general public, with an as yet unmeasurable long-term effect.

From the US point of view important characteristics of the new rulers of Korea are their nationalistic fervor, their impatience and their obvious inexperience in governing and in handling public relations both domestic and external. The prospect is that, although various factions within the military clique now ruling will continue to wage an internecine struggle for power, the current coup group will remain in the saddle for the foreseeable future. It is very unlikely that constitutional government and civilian rule will be restored in Korea in the next twelve months. The relatively independent attitude toward the US manifested by the new leaders, moreover, has presented a picture of great interest and obvious implications to military officers in Far Eastern countries -- e.g. Vietnam and Thailand. In addition, the seemingly anti-Japanese posture of at least some of the new leaders does not favor prospects of greater Free World strength in Northeast Asia. ROK moves for unification on terms advantageous to the Communists are less likely than heretofore but remain a possibility. Factors underlying this danger include: the radicalism of some of the younger coup officers and possible reactions by the general public to present repressive measures.

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396. Vietnam as an Example of "Peaceful Coexistence"

Background: The situation prevailing today in Vietnam is an excellent example of what is meant when the Communists refer to peaceful coexistence between countries having differing political and social systems. In an editorial on the Moscow Conference, in the Hanoi newspaper Hoc Tap it is stated that: "Peaceful coexistence is precisely a form of class struggle between two world systems, a struggle in the political, economic and ideological fields." *

Both in a report which Le Duan, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party (Lao Dong Party, i. e. Communist Party), submitted to the Third National Congress of the Party in September 1960 and in a report which he presented to the Congress on the November 1960 Moscow Conference, he emphasized the need of overthrowing the Government of South Vietnam by force and pointed to the steps which have been taken to accomplish this. In outlining the two main tasks of Vietnam's revolution, Le Duan said that "the first consists in carrying out a socialist revolution in North Vietnam and the second in realizing the tasks of the national people's democratic revolution, by eradicating the colonial and semi-feudal regime in South Vietnam and realizing national reunification." He went on to explain that "for the past six years, the revolutionary movement in the South has been firmly maintained and developed. To insure the complete success of the revolutionary struggle in South Vietnam, our people there must strive to establish a united bloc of workers, peasants and soldiers and to bring into being a broad national united front with the worker-peasant alliance as the basis, directed against the US-Diem clique."

Referring to the Moscow Conference, Le Duan said: "The ultimate objective of Communist and workers parties is the construction of socialism in the world. The transition from capitalism to socialism is a result of the struggle between the socialist and capitalist systems, the result of socialist revolutions and national liberation revolutions. Thus, the transition from capitalism to socialism is a process of revolutionary and class struggle in the world as well as in each country. Under the condition that the world is divided into the socialist and capitalist systems, peaceful coexistence and competition is an objective necessity. It is an important form of the class struggle between socialism and capitalism on the international plane. Peaceful coexistence daily deepens the contradictions of imperialism and contributes to its disintegration thus creating favorable conditions for enlarging class struggles in capitalist countries and stepping up national liberation struggles in colonies and dependent countries."

LeDuan emphasizes the need to encourage revolt by explaining that "the * In Communist lexicon "Peaceful Coexistence", the principle of which was developed by Lenin, means the establishment of a "breathing spell" (PEREDYSHKI) during which time the opposition would be lulled into a false sense of security while the Communists conduct their subversive activities to undermine the opposition. According to the Moscow Declaration "the policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of mobilizing the masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace."


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transition from capitalism to socialism will be carried on through anti-imperialist, socialist and national liberation revolutions. It is clear that the present era is not an era when capitalism has temporarily stabilized, when revolutionary struggles have temporarily subsided, or when capitalism will disappear into socialism gradually or peacefully. At present we have more advantageous conditions than ever to step up anti-imperialist revolutions. The struggle for achieving peaceful coexistence among countries of both systems and the development of revolutionary movements in capitalist countries are two closely connected aspects of the present struggle of the people of the world."

Le Duan's statements clearly illustrate the basic Communist understanding of peaceful coexistence as being rarely a tactic which will serve to prevent any action on the part of the free world while the Communists continue to effect definite gains by means of subversive warfare.



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397. Toward a Communist Utopia - the Agro - City

Background: The establishment of the agricultural commune system in Communist China has perhaps overshadowed the trend toward larger state farming units (sovkhozes) in the Soviet Union and other Communist states. (Poland is a notable exception.) Moving from the collective farms (kolkhozes) to the sovkhozes is but a step toward the formation of even more "scientific" units, proposed by Khrushchev in the Stalin era (in March 1951) the agro-cities. Dormant for years, the scheme has recently been revived in the Soviet press. Khrushchev proposed concentrating villages into large urban-like settlements, which would contain large apartment buildings for housing the peasants (who would move - or, perhaps more accurately, be moved out of their individual farmsteads) and into dining halls, stores, small industries, and other features normally associated with urbanization. The former private plots of the collective farm members were to be replaced by small garden plots on the outskirts of the new towns where they could be tilled in common by the town's population. Already collectivization of the farmers is virtually complete in Bulgaria and East Germany; it is in its final stages in Czechoslovakia and Hungary; it is progressing in Rumania; however, it is getting virtually nowhere in Poland, where the Gomulka regime has chosen not to pursue it in face of the strong resistance of the Polish peasants. When collective farming has become a fait accompli, the next step is to merge the collectives into larger units - a process which effectively destroys the myth that the peasants control the collectives. In Eastern Europe the merging has so far been confined to Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, but the Hungarian authorities have indicated that they are likely to follow as soon as they have brought the remaining private land under the common plow. Speaking at Kalinovka in the eastern Ukraine (his birthplace) in late 1958, Khrushchev said:

"I'm for moving people from the separate farmsteads and small settlements into attractive villages with modern, well-built houses and good streets and sidewalks so that all the conditions are created for a cultured life. Each one will have a school, a hospital, a maternity home, nurseries, and so forth... But this is not all. It is high time that the system switched on the run from the narrowly agrarian to the agrarian-industrial track. It is time the collective farms built their own mills and bakeries, creameries, canneries and sugar refineries and enterprises for the processing of flax and cotton and other types of local raw materials."

In their efforts to "build socialism", the Communists have had to reckon - both in practice and in theory - with large peasant populations whose habits and vital interests are quite different from those of industrial workers. Collective farms, in the Communist view, have provided a solution to one aspect of the urban-rural conflict, giving the government political and economic control of the peasantry. Large-scale socialized farming also offers an avenue to the Marxist utopia of a rationalized, scientific society in which differences between the town and the country. The new giant farms are one step toward that

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398. UAR Reacts Strongly to Soviet Attacks

Background: The UAR, with surprisingly firm support from other Arab States (including Iraq), has reacted sharply to Soviet criticism of its alleged mistreatment of local Communists. Similar Soviet complaints have been voiced by the Soviets about the treatment of "patriots" (i. e. Communists) of Iraq. The current Soviet attacks are a renewal of those published in articles in the December 1960 issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism. The articles were not attributed to Khalid Bakdash, former leader of the Syrian Communist Party now in exile behind the iron curtain, but it is conjectured that he inspired and possibly wrote them. The official daily of Cairo, Al-Jumhuriyah, wrote on 6 June that Moscow's propaganda is putting the USSR in the "imperialist camp" and added that if Soviet leaders believe they can impose their views on the UAR through the USSR-UAR trade agreements, "they feed on delusions." It also said that "from their recent attempt to exert pressure on us it may be readily seen that they have been inclined to interpret our positive neutralism as some sort of alignment with the camp they represent. In the light of this misconception they have also imagined that they have the right to demand from us the price of alignment and the price of submissive dependence. They obviously believed that unless we were willing to pay the price they would have the right to take us to task..." The Nationalist daily of Baghdad, Al Fajr Al Jadid, came to the support of the UAR in this propaganda battle with the USSR. In an editorial published on 7 June it states that Russia miscalculated the capability of UAR news media to return two blows for every one... Agents of Soviets do not represent Arab opinion, it points out, and Communist agents are not loyal Arab nationals but strangers... The attack on the UAR, it emphasized, for the sake of Soviet agents makes clear that Communists are loyal to no one but Russia. Some UAR commentators have speculated that the present Soviet attack has been timed to coincide with the preliminary conference of "non-aligned" nations in Cairo, originally proposed by President Tito of Yugoslavia (during a visit to Cairo) and President Nasser of the UAR. Included in the USSR attack was the allegation that two prominent Communists were arrested and killed in UAR prisons. One was Farajallah Helu, former Secretary of the Lebanese Communist Party. The UAR has long ago denied any knowledge of this matter. The other case is that of one Riad el Turk. The UAR did more than deny his killing; on 5 June he was allowed, alive and apparently in good health, to meet the press in a Damascus prison.

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399. More Evidence of the Communization of Cuba

indicating that Cuba is becoming a communist state.

Background: Ernesto "Che" Guevara, long considered the gray eminence of the Castro regime, declared on 5 June 1961 that there would soon be formed a single party in Cuba, the result of the fusion of Castro's 26 of July Movement and the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) - the Cuban Communist Party. Guevara further declared that the revolutionary directorate, the associations of youth and women, the confederation of workers, the committees for the defense of the revolution, and the militia should be united under this single party. Such a fusion has long been the stated objective of the PSP, and several weeks before Guevara's statement, Carlos Raphael Rodriguez, PSP leader and editor of the Communist newspaper, Hoy, had claimed that the new fused party would be formed on 26 July 1961, the eighth anniversary of the Castro movement's fight to gain power in Cuba. The PSP has been the only organized political party permitted to exist in Castro's Cuba. The formalization of the Communist Party's political hegemony that the planned fusion represents, is, however, significant evidence of the rapidly progressing full communization of Cuba. It is the repetition of a step the Communists have inevitably taken in other satellites.

In this latter connection, an article in the April issue of Kommunist, the official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is worth noting. The article concerns Germany and does not even mention Cuba. However, it begins by pointing out that the merger of the Social Democratic Party with the Communist Party of East Germany in April 1946 "constituted the turning point in the history of Germany and the German working class movement." It is interesting that a few weeks after the Moscow party organ made this statement, the Cuban Communists decided that Cuba had reached the same "turning point." How the Communists worked to bring about this fusion of political parties with the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia is told in detail in the pamphlet entitled: How Parliament Can Play a Revolutionary Part in the Transition to Socialism, by Jan Kozak, Communist Member of the Czechoslovak National Assembly (Attachment to Bi-Weekly Propaganda Guidance #65, dated 8 May 1961). He describes the struggle as the fight between the "working class" seeking to change parliament "into one of the levers actuating the further development and consolidation of the revolution" and "the bourgeoisie" who "tried to use it (parliament) for the stopping of the revolution." The struggle went on from 1945 to 1948, when, Kozak says, "an actual disintegration of the national socialist, the people's and the democratic parties took place. Honest members of these parties were parting with their bourgeois leadership and coming into the ranks of the CPCS."

Other evidence of the increasing communization of Cuba involves the most recent developments in police state tactics. On 7 June, it was announced in Havana that a new Ministry of Interior had been formed, and that it would be "responsible for public order." Under the new measure, the department of information, the national revolutionary police, and the maritime police become part of the new ministry. The use of such a ministry to enforce totalitarian control might be called a classical Communist pattern, as the above-mentioned Kozak article makes clear. The new head of the ministry is Ramiro Valdez, a

crypto-Communist, who has been head of G-2 since the early days of the Castro government, and, as such, has been responsible for the introduction of police-state terrorism. Among other things, he is responsible for the wide-spread informant system. How thorough this system has become is graphically illustrated in the 2 June 1961 issue of Vision, a bi-weekly Spanish language magazine published in New York with hemisphere-wide circulation. Vision reproduced a copy of the printed form neighborhood informants are to fill out for the officials of the "Committee for the Defense of the Revolution." Informants are to list all packages going into and out of apartments in their neighborhoods, report on all young men who are not working and have no visible means of support, all gatherings of persons, all strange cars entering or leaving the neighborhood, all persons entering or leaving apartments at abnormal hours, and, of course, all conversations which reveal counter-revolutionary sentiments, and reactions of people in general to decisions and measures of the regime.

Finally, it should be noted that on the same day the new Ministry of Interior was created, a decree was issued closing all private and parochial schools in all parts of Cuba, and confiscating their property. Education, henceforth, will be completely controlled by the Communist-dominated Ministry of Education.



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19 June 1961

25x100! 10b The United Nations, the Soviet Union, and the Neutral Countries

Background: It is no accident that, for newly independent nations, a key step in attaining sovereignty is, in practice, admission to the United Nations. In joining the UN, the new, small nations become the equals, in the General Assembly, of the largest world powers. Countries which could otherwise never make their voices heard can raise them with resonance in New York. The UN serves as protector and sounding board for emergent nationalities. The smaller countries have the most intense interest in a strong UN organization, able to defend their freedom under the rule of law; this has been shown by the experience of countries as differently oriented as South Korea (not itself a UN member), Iran, the UAR, Lebanon, and the Congo. Not countries like these, but certain larger powers, are apt to assert that the UN infringes on their rights.

Khrushchev cultivates neutral leaders and proposes or supports declarations on such issues as human rights and immediate independence for colonies -- although human rights are least respected in the Soviet bloc, and although the USSR has been absorbing, not freeing territories inhabited by other nationalities. Support for human rights declarations costs the Soviets nothing, while their Declaration on Colonialism (like their disarmament proposals) is designed to discredit moderate, reasoned leadership, and to create chaotic situations which their followers can exploit. (The USSR's real feelings on the subject of the sovereignty and equality of the small nations have been shown by the behavior of Khrushchev in the UN, and of his subordinates in approaching peoples over the heads of their governments. (See Guidance Items #301, #305, #354, #355 and #378).

When it comes down to concrete measures, however, the Soviets are usually at odds with the UN. They refuse to modify their position when opposed by UN majorities, and when defeated, they are very bad losers. A few examples from the Soviet record in the UN illustrate this: (1) the USSR refused to support UN action (which it could not veto because it had not anticipated Security Council action in a meeting which it boycotted) against Communist aggression in Korea, -- contrary to fact and in direct conflict with basic principles of the UN Charter with regard to collective security; 2) the USSR forcibly suppressed the revolt in Hungary in 1956 and has rejected since that time UN requests to send an investigation team or a UN representative into Hungary; 3) the USSR refused to support UN actions condemning Communist China's genocide against Tibet; 4) the USSR refused to assume its share of the financial burden for UN actions in the Congo, and more seriously, intervened unilaterally with war materiel and other support for the pro-Communist faction while at the same time actively attempting to sabotage all UN efforts to arbitrate disputes and to allow the establishment of a stable Congo government; 5) the USSR has long refused to assume its share of the financial obligations for the UN emergency force maintaining a neutral zone in the Middle East -- the Gaza Strip between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

In organizational matters, as distinct from substantive, there is an equally clear attempt by the USSR to block the UN and check its development. The most familiar display of Soviet organizational tactics is in the use of the veto. The USSR has vetoed measures in the Security Council 94 times in

contrast to 7 for all of the other permanent members combined (none of which was cast by the US). The USSR has also: 1) launched a campaign against Secretary-General Trygve Lie, noted for his dedication to the principles of internationalism and neutrality, and forced him out of the UN in 1957; 2) unable to gather the 2/3's Assembly vote to pass some of its own ulterior proposals, developed a continuing program to marshall the 1/3 minority vote to prevent effective UN action on other proposals; 3) carried on a campaign of vilification against Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, charging him with violation of the very neutrality for which he is noted, after he steadfastly held to Security Council and Assembly instructions in the Congo; 4) proposed revision of the office of the Secretary-General to a triumvirate representing Communist, Western, and neutral blocs, with a built-in veto. This new veto would permit the Soviets to block the actual carrying-out of any course of action voted by UN members. As recently as 3 June, the Soviet delegation to the UN issued a violent statement attacking Hammarskjold, who had ventured to defend his office and his own position. The Soviet proposal for including neutral bloc representation is actually a clever attempt to enlist neutral support for weakening the UN, thus removing an obstacle to the unrestrained exercise of Soviet pressure tactics. Saying that there are no neutral men, Khrushchev is trying to remove all chances of mediating disputes, so that the rest of the world will have no other alternatives than those of surrender or war. As Chakravarthi Narasimban, Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs of the UN and an Indian national, put it, only those "among the big powers who feel that the influence of the Secretary General poses an obstacle to the unhampered pursuit of their political interests, would... continue to attack the institution itself." Thinking in terms of hostile blocs, the Soviets would replace all effective international organization with a rigid division into three sections -- actually two, since they calculate that the neutrals, once completely divorced from the west and deprived of UN protection, will be unable to maintain their independence from Moscow and Beijing.

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Briefly Noted

Soviet Criticism of Ilya Ehrenburg: In the June issue of the journal of the Russian Federation of Writers, Ilya Ehrenburg, the famous Soviet author, was criticized for assuming the "hopeless and historically doomed task of defending and restoring moribund and modernistic ideas.... My God.... to what extent has his capitulation to decadent esthetics reached?" While admitting that Ehrenburg had written a number of wonderful novels, stories and verse the article deplored the fact that "in recent years his opinions on esthetic questions have come to contradict the principles on which his best theses are based.... he has begun to justify modernistic views and tastes." The article also claimed that Ehrenburg "even tried to justify" Pasternak's withdrawal from the main stream of Soviet life.

Sentencing of Hungarian Church Officials: A 19 June communique from the Budapest Tribunal states that "on the basis of the confessions of the accused.... the Budapest Tribunal found Gesza Haves and his accomplices guilty of forming an organization to overthrow the Hungarian People's Republic.... They made preparations to change the internal order of Hungary and restore the bourgeois system.... to return the means of production to private owners and restore to the Church its former property.... They set up several illegal organizations, recruiting chiefly among the youth. They prepared and distributed a large amount of counter-revolutionary material and established several illegal duplicating and bookbinding shops. Sentences ranged from 2 1/2 to 12 years imprisonment and (according to Tass of 19 June) includes subsequent deprivation of civil rights and partial confiscation of property.

The trial constitutes the most aggressive anti-church manifestation in Hungary since the 1956 revolution and reflects the regime's increased confidence in its internal strength. It has been reported that other trials have recently taken place and that several priests have received prison sentences of 5 to 7 years.

Background: An editorial in the April issue of the party organ Partien Zhivot (Party Life) confirmed rumors that an opposition group had been discovered within the Bulgarian Communist Party. According to the article, Dobri Terpeshev and Yonko Panov, former BCP leaders who had been ousted for revisionist tendencies, were the ring leaders. Together with Nikola Kufardzhiev, the secretary of the Central Council of Trade Unions, they were accused of organizing "faithless and distrustful" party members who "gloated over difficulties" and who had "sold themselves to foreign agents." Although the editorial did not identify the "foreign agents", rumors have linked the group with Vladimir Sindjelic, Second Secretary of the Yugoslav legation at Sofia, who was declared persona non grata on 7 March. At that time, he was publicly charged with having attempted to make contacts with Bulgarian citizens and with denouncing the Bulgarian regime and its policies. It has also been reported that these groups wrote anonymous letters to members of the Central Committee, held conspiratorial meetings, contacted, briefed and attempted to recruit others, proposed the organization of strikes in Bulgarian industries, wrote pamphlets and appeals which were mailed to other party members and attempted to organize groups in Plovdiv and Sofia. Furthermore, the group was alleged to have addressed a letter to the Politburo in which it urged a basic change in policy and argued that the present party leaders have not been successful in eradicating Stalinism and that they are to blame for the serious economic failures. Currently, the Bulgarian regime is undertaking a reorganization of its party and government machinery, ostensibly to rectify administrative shortcomings, particularly in the management of the economy. Todor Prakhov, Chairman of the Central Committee of Trade Unions, has been fired and leaders in five of Bulgaria's 30 administrative districts have also been removed. In several other areas, party leaders have been severely criticized. The decision to air these shortcomings, many of which have existed for years, was probably forced on the regime by the case of the dissident group and by the latter's demanding a revision of Bulgaria's economic policies.

On 6 April the party first secretary in Pleven was fired, and it was recommended that the head of the People's Council also be dismissed; the charges were not specified. On 22 April the First Secretary in Dimitrovo was fired; on the same day Spas Rusinov, member of the Mikhaylovgrad party committee, was ousted for "incorrect methods of work" and for violations of "state and financial discipline" during the time, more than a year earlier, when he had been first secretary. A local paper revealed that some time in early May the party first secretary in Khaskovo District was ousted, and on 17 May, the Plovdiv District People's Council Chief, Nikola Stoilev, was fired "for having tolerated serious shortcomings and mistakes in work." Many of the individuals who have been purged may have been among the "doubters" who questioned the feasibility of the "leap forward" in the spring of 1959.

3 July 1961

By suggesting that the Yugoslavs are supporting the opposition groups, the Bulgarian regime may be attempting to play down dissension which is essentially internal. The regime's overly ambitious economic policies of 1959-60, have left the regime vulnerable to charges of unrealistic planning. Moreover, the administrative reorganizing and decentralization which accompanied these policies created widespread dissatisfaction among party members. The May issue of the party theoretical journal Novo Vreme (New Times) confirms speculations that the dissidents used Bulgaria's economic and administrative ills to argue for economic reforms. The Novo Vreme article and the regime's handling of Yugoslav diplomat Sindjelic, implied that the dissidents were oriented toward Yugoslav revisionist economic policies. The article also stated that the regime was obliged to defend its policies against attacks by those who supported Vulko Chervenkov, the Stalinist former party boss who was demoted in 1956 but who still holds high positions in the party.

The potentially disparate elements - "revisionists" as well as "hardliners" in the Bulgarian party may have interpreted the Moscow Declaration and the Albanian heresy as signs of a weakening of Moscow's control over the international Communist movement

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
402. UNITED NATIONS: Khrushchev Proposes Moving UN Headquarters to

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Background: While in Vienna and immediately following his talks with President Kennedy, Chairman Khrushchev sounded out Austrian governmental officials on a proposal to move the UN from New York to Vienna. Chancellor Gorbach of Austria confirmed that Khrushchev had made this proposal and said that Austria would be happy if Russia and the United States would agree to move. Subsequently, however, Austrian officials have expressed themselves as being lukewarm toward the proposal and dubious over the ability of their country to cope with the problems that would be created. The Soviet approach in Vienna was apparently only a first step in a Soviet bloc campaign to build up pressures for removal of the UN Headquarters from New York. Among the African and Asian delegations now in New York the Soviets have begun to play up the problem of discrimination as a prime reason for moving the UN away from the United States. Similarly, the Nacvalac case and other incidents involving bloc diplomats have been cited as reasons for leaving a country which is unable to provide protection for foreign representatives and which does not respect diplomatic immunity.

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3 July 1961Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040002-6
403. Exacerbation of Soviet-Albanian Relations

Background: During the last month, Albania has accelerated the process of weakening its ties with the Soviet Union and strengthening its bonds with the People's Republic of China. On 27 May an Albanian court condemned to death four defendants, including Vice Admiral Teme Sejko, who with nine others had been accused of plotting an armed uprising with the aid of the "Yugoslavs, Greeks and U.S. Sixth Fleet". In reality, the trial was directed against Khrushchev who, for the past year has been attempting to oust Hoxha and replace him and his cohorts with leaders responsive to Soviet control. Thus, despite its exotic billing, the trial actually was used as a vehicle for denouncing detente policies associated with Khrushchev. Sejko and three other defendants, were condemned to death and executed 31 May 1961. Soviet bloc reaction to the trial is interesting. With the exceptions of East Germany and Bulgaria - each of which referred to the trial briefly on one occasion - the Soviet Union and its satellites maintained a frozen silence on the proceedings at Tirana.

Now, Moscow has resorted to more direct methods in order to isolate her erring erstwhile satellite. In late May and early June, the Soviet Union began a withdrawal of its military personnel from Albania. The USSR appears also to be abandoning to Albania its Vlone military base. At the end of May the Albanian military attache in Moscow hastily departed for home possibly after having been expelled. Some of the satellites and Western CP's are apparently following Moscow's lead in their attitude toward Albania. For example, a Hungarian official was reported to have voiced concern over the developments in Albania and to have told an Albanian diplomat that Hungarian aid to Albania would be affected. The Italian Communist Party, which in April declined an invitation to an Albanian Trade Union meeting and postponed indefinitely a joint "peace partisans" meeting, also appears to be avoiding the Albanian comrades. With Poland, official contacts have been almost non-existent since the departure of the Albanian Minister to Poland in March. There are indications that Czechoslovakia has withdrawn credit for developing nickel extraction in Albania and the Chinese reportedly have promised to build a processing plant instead.

The Manchester Guardian of 9 June and the London Daily Telegraph of that date report on a violent speech delivered by Hoxha at the November conference of World Communist Parties in Moscow in which the latter accused Khrushchev of "brutal intervention" in Albania, stating that the USSR had put pressure on some of the Albanian leaders in an attempt to set them against the "rightful leadership" of the party. According to Mr. Hoxha, the Soviet Union delayed on a promised shipment of 5,000 tons of wheat so that "the Soviet rats could eat while the Albanian people were dying of hunger."

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Background: It was anticipated that the 20th anniversary of the Nazi attack on Russia would be the occasion for accusations against the Western nations and the West Germans. But the Soviets have given these accusations extra force in connection with Khrushchev's current drive against West Berlin, and this attack will probably grow still more strident and intensive over the summer. Khrushchev's militant 21 June speech centered on the idea that Britain and France had intended to "destroy the Soviet Union by the force of the Hitler military machine," and that even today "the aggressive imperialist circles of the West... would not be averse to trying this once more now if they found a force which they could push against the Soviet Union." Although Khrushchev refrained (probably in the interests of splitting NATO) from explicitly identifying the views of all Western leaders with those of the West German "revanchists," he clearly intended to draw an analogy between his conception of the situation in 1938-39 and his conception of that in 1961. Both conceptions are false, distorted interpretations super-imposed upon a minimum factual basis.

Both the Soviets and the Western powers erred in handling Hitler; the difference was that between the man who pays a gangster "protection" money (the West), and a second gangster who shares in dividing the loot (the Soviets). Soviet claims that the West plotted to turn Hitler on the USSR are ridiculous; Hitler could not attack the Soviets without crossing Poland and other East European countries, and Western opinion would never have permitted their governments to support such an attack. (Even Sir Horace Wilson and R. S. Hudson, who attempted last minute appeasement negotiations in the summer of 1939, never discussed the possibility of a Nazi attack on the USSR, and always insisted that the Germans must restore the confidence which had been shattered by the annexation of Czechoslovakia.) Khrushchev's history generally overlooks the role of Western opinion, which feared war, and dictated appeasement until Hitler's entry into Prague left no doubt of his aggressiveness. But the appearance of weakness was deceptive; Khrushchev also overlooks the force which British, American, and French (underground) opinion gave to the Western effort after the fall of France. (A fuller discussion of the 1939-1941 period is contained in an attachment to this guidance item.)

In his discussion of the war itself, Sovocentrically called the "Great Russian Patriotic War," Khrushchev makes light of the Western contribution, not mentioning that the British and American forces were engaged not only with Germany but also with Japan, whose forces numbered over 6,000,000. The Western and Chinese forces fought Japan for years in remote unglens, on beaches, and in roadless mountain areas. Soviet participation in the war against Japan lasted six days, 8 to 14 August 1945, beginning two days after the first atomic bomb was dropped at Hiroshima. Khrushchev is quite right in saying that Soviet losses were much greater than Western; they were also roughly three times greater than German losses on all fronts (See Guidance #318, 21 November 1960). Were all these deaths necessary, considering that the Red Army had 290

divisions in 1939, and 21,000 tanks in 1941? (Although the Red Army had two models larger and more powerful than those of the Germans, 19,000 of these tanks had been wiped out by the end of the summer. The Germans had attacked with 3,000 tanks.) Such practices as suicide infantry charges through minefields to clear the way for armor help to explain the Soviet losses. As political deputy with the forces, Khrushchev himself played a role by ordering hopeless attacks at Kharkov in 1942.

The least factual part of Khrushchev's speech was his attack on Adenauer and the West German military leaders. Khrushchev states: "You (Adenauer) say that if we sign a peace treaty with the GDR you will stop at nothing." Adenauer never said anything of the kind. His strongest recent statement was that made on 11 June, in connection with the Soviet proposal that the East and West Germans should negotiate a treaty between them; Adenauer said: "This demand we will never accept." His position on a possible East-German-Soviet peace treaty is the same as that of the other NATO powers: they cannot prevent such an action. The defense of British, French, and American occupation rights in West Berlin is another matter, but it concerns those powers and not West Germany. Khrushchev, however, has responded to this threat which Adenauer never made by saying that it will mean suicide for West Germany. Just as Khrushchev seems to be the real source of threats he also appears to be the real revanchist. He says that the new frontiers of Germany have "restored historical justice which was violated by the forefathers of the present German militarists." This apparently means that the Soviet Union has won just revenge for the aggressions of the Teutonic Knights in the 12th to 14th centuries. Khrushchev also stresses the war guilt of the German military caste, never mentioning the Soviet assistance to General von Seeckt in evading the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles in the 1920's. But whatever the faults of the Wehrmacht leaders, and they were many, the fact remains that this group (and allied civilian conservatives) furnished the only element in Germany, Communists not excepted, to attempt to remove Hitler. The honorable role of the July 1944 plotters contrasts vividly with Khrushchev's own spineless submission under Stalin.

The recent history of militarism in Germany is as follows: In July 1948 the "Barracked People's Police" (KVP) was organized in East Germany. A year later its strength had reached 48,000 and, in 1950, 55,000. In 1951 the KVP received tanks, howitzers, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. Unlike the ordinary civil police ("People's Police"), they proved loyal to the regime when the East German people revolted on 17 June 1953. In November 1955 all wraps were taken off and the KVP became the "National People's Army" (NVA). This dropping of the mask was possible because the first 101 members of the West German Bundeswehr, which had no disguised antecedents, received their uniforms that month; it could be claimed in East Berlin that Bonn was the first to have an army. By 1960, the Bundeswehr army had 160,000 men, the NVA 71,000. However, the former were mainly conscripts serving one year only. The NVA members were largely pre-trained in a paramilitary organization, the "Society for Sport and Skill" (GST). Actually, the East German military strength was doubled through such other organizations as the Border Police, the Alert

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Police, the Transport Police, and the Guard Units. Moreover, there are party-controlled, factory-based Battle Groups (Kampfgruppen), providing organized militia, somewhat on the Chinese model.

The Berlin crisis does indeed recall the situation on the eve of World War II. Communist charges of West German "provocation" in inciting defections, holding government and refugee meetings in West Berlin, etc. recall Ribbentrop's charges to the Polish Ambassador that Poland had adopted a "peculiar attitude" in the League of Nations Minorities Commission, that Polish students had provoked incidents in Danzig, that there had been anti-German demonstrations in Warsaw, and that there was an "open press feud" with Germany. Khrushchev says that Berlin is "a bone in the throat" that has to be removed; Hitler said, "In the case of Danzig and the Corridor I have again tried to solve the problems by proposing peaceful discussions. One thing was obvious: they had to be solved. That the date of the solution may perhaps be of little interest to the Western Powers is conceivable. But this date is not a matter of indifference to us." After these problems had been solved, Hitler said, the relationship with Poland could be changed to one of "peaceful coexistence" (his words). As the Soviets try to do now, the Nazis tried to make the Western allies feel that Poland's attitude was suicidal and fanatic, and therefore that there could be no obligation to her: Weizsacker told the French Ambassador: "...it was inconceivable that France or Great Britain would be willing to stake their existence in favor of their friend who had run amok," and he told the British Ambassador that "Germany believed that the attitude of the Poles would be or was such as to free the British Government from any obligation to follow blindly every eccentric step on the part of a lunatic." Khrushchev should note 25X1C10b that the Nazi tactics did not prevent the West from going to war.

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Geneva

Background: Although, for purposes of propoganda, the Communists profess an interest in the possibility of setting up controlling bodies as a means of preventing certain actions which might lead to open conflict in various parts of the world, they have, in every case, evolved a carefully worked out system which, in effect, would nullify whatever capability such bodies may have to take independent action in any given situation. They intend to achieve this by insisting upon tripartite membership within the control body (1 Communist bloc member, 1 free world member and 1 neutral) with each member having veto power over the other two.

In the case of the International Control Commission for Laos, the Communists have twice reversed their position to accommodate their current strategic plans. The original ICC in Laos served the Communists well until its withdrawal at the request of the Royal Government in July-August 1958. Consequently, comments and propoganda from that time until May 1961 emphasized demands for the return of the ICC to Laos. However, when it became apparent that the Western powers were willing to have the ICC return, but also planned to strengthen its authority to investigate reported cease-fire violations and to make it, in fact, an effective body, the Communist position changed to use delaying tactics to prevent the ICC's return. Thus, it was only at the insistence of the Western powers that the Communists agreed to reconvene the ICC. Following its arrival in Vientiane, the ICC declared that the opposing sides had ordered their forces to observe a cease-fire. Using this statement, and in the face of proof to the contrary, the Communists have repeatedly claimed that the Pathet Lao/Kong Le forces are observing the cease-fire and are being attacked by the Royal Government troops. At the same time, they have opposed all suggestions that the ICC investigate these alleged violations. When the Royal Laotian Government furnishes uncontested proof of continued Pathet Lao/Viet Minh aggression against RLG positions, as was the case at Ban Pa Dong, the Communists justify their actions by claiming that they were merely reoccupying positions held by them prior to the cease-fire declaration and, in consequence this does not represent any breach of the cease-fire declaration.

When suggestions are made, as they were by the French and Canadian delegates to the Geneva Conference, that the International Control Commission be provided with both the authority and the means of investigating violations of the cease-fire and of enforcing same, the Communists once again get around this subject by claiming that any useful action which the ICC could carry out in Laos might risk infringing on the independence and sovereignty of the nation.



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ADDENDUM

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Item #404 - See Attachment entitled "Nazi-Soviet Relations (1939-1941)". Suggested Material for this item follows:

Documents:

Germany. Auswartiges Amt. Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941. Washington, 1948.

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Clay, L. D. Decision in Germany. 1950. (Postwar)

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Hilger, G. and Meyer, A. G. The Incompatible Allies: Soviet Relations, 1918-1941. 1953.

Langer, W. L. and Gleason, E. The Challenge of Isolation, 1937-1940 and The Undeclared War, 1940-1941. 1953.

Namler, L. B. Diplomatic Prelude, 1938-1939; Europe in Defeat; and In the Nazi Era. 1948-1952.

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Renouvin, P. Les crises du XXe siecle: vol. II, De 1929-1945. 1958.

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Some of the English-language books cited above have been translated into other languages. Ciano's Diario has been translated into English.

CROSS-INDEX

- 401. Nationalist Opposition Group in the Bulgarian Communist Party - C, H.
- 402. UNITED NATIONS: Khrushchev Proposes Moving UN Hquaters to Austria - E, I, J, W.
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- 404. Hitler, Adenauer, and the Soviets - B, C, E, O.
- 405. LAOS: "Ban Pa Dong" or "The Control Commission Without Controls - A, D, E, S.

NAZI-SOVIET RELATIONS
1939-1941

In spite of Soviet assertions, and notwithstanding a tremendous mass of documentary and memoir information from German as well as Western sources, no serious evidence supports the charge that the Western powers planned to incite Hitler to attack the USSR. It is true that Neville Chamberlain, the most important Western leader of 1938-39, was very suspicious of Moscow, and that (unlike Churchill) he was reluctant to enter into an alliance with the Soviet Union. Chamberlain once stated: "I can't believe that she (Russia) has the same aims and objects as we have, or any sympathy with Democracy as such. She is afraid of Germany and Japan and would be delighted to see other people fight them." His dominant motivation, however, was an intense fear of any world war, and consequently he seized on every possible opportunity to avoid it. He did not think in terms of inevitable conflict, or even (unfortunately) of a balance of power; he was not, as the Communists were, power-minded in his approach to diplomacy. Instead, he hoped to reach an agreement between "reasonable men" which would preserve the status quo. This was, of course, quite the wrong way to approach Hitler, but it was a far cry from using the forces of the Reich to destroy the Bolshevist state. It may be hard for the Kremlin to realize it, but the USSR was simply not then the dominant preoccupation of Western leaders.

There were two elements in the pre-World War II situation which are often overlooked today, especially by Soviet propaganda. One was that Hitler was able (like Khrushchev today) to advance certain arguments for his foreign policy claims. Rearmament was justified as "equality", the reoccupied Rhineland was German territory, Austria had sought Anschluss between 1918 and 1933, and most of the Sudeten people spoke German. The British and other Western powers did not feel that there was a strong case against Hitler's foreign policy until the annexation of the rump Czech state on 15 March 1939. From then on, the British acted to guarantee Poland and to try to build up an alliance to support what was left of the East European status quo. In retrospect, this action was belated; democratic governments, because they depend on popular support, are often influenced by plausible arguments rather than by the rules of power politics. This misleads power-oriented dictators, who make two different serious errors: they think the democracies are playing some deep and devious game, or that they lack determination and will. Hitler made the latter mistake, and Khrushchev seems to be making both of them simultaneously. In regard to the second error, it has been shown that once the people of a democracy do become thoroughly aroused, they become very belligerent, and they will tend to press on until their enemies are completely defeated; their warlike momentum may prevent them from considering a negotiated peace, which might in some cases be a more reasonable solution.

The other forgotten factor of the thirties was that there was then a whole row of independent nations between Germany and the USSR, of which Poland was the most important. The West could not have encouraged Hitler to attack the Soviet Union without sacrificing these countries, and after Czechoslovakia fell, Western opinion would not tolerate any further sacrifice. This is why there was never any real possibility of a deal with Hitler to annihilate the USSR. On the other hand, these countries had all good ideas of Soviet intentions, and they and Western opinion would not allow the Soviet Union to move Soviet forces into their countries. If the Western governments had not respected the refusal of the Polish government to permit the entry of Soviet troops, they would have sacrificed their whole political position of protecting Eastern Europe against aggression.

When it became apparent in August 1939 that the Western powers could not reach agreement with the Soviet Union, Stalin might have declared himself neutral. This might conceivably have made Hitler hesitate to attack Poland, not knowing what would follow. But instead, Stalin proceeded to conclude a "non-aggression" pact with the Fuehrer. Negotiations towards this had actually begun, at least half-initiated by Moscow, after the Nazis entered Prague on 15 March; indeed, Stalin, in a speech as early as 10 March, had been more abusive about the "so-called democracies" than about the "Fascist aggressors." The non-aggression pact announced on 21 August was distinguished from previous Soviet

non-aggression pacts by the fact that there was no provision for denunciation in case one of the parties attacked a third nation, and by the unusual provision that the treaty would enter into force as soon as it was signed, i. e., before ratification. In other words, Stalin knew that there would be an immediate attack on Poland. Although Molotov asserted in a speech that there was no more in the pact "than is written in it," a Secret Additional Protocol assured the Soviets a share in the Baltic states, in Poland, and in Rumania, shares which they have retained and increased since the war. Captured German documents show that it was the USSR that proposed and wanted the secret deal. The Soviet share in these territories was their quid pro quo for giving Hitler what is considered the goal of German diplomacy, a situation in which he could wage a one-front war.

One cannot help but conclude that Stalin not only gained territory, but also thought Hitler a congenial ally, and the new line seems to have been a welcome change from the fruitless pretenses of the Popular Front. During the 1920's there had been close cooperation between the Soviet government and the head of the Reichswehr, General von Seeckt, and for ten years German officers were trained with planes and tanks on Soviet territory, beyond the reach of Allied inspection. Such German military figures as General von Blomberg, General Freiherr von Hammerstein, the Ritter von Niedermayer, and an aide of Ludendorff, Major Tschunke, spent prolonged periods in the Soviet Union. Some of this activity leaked out at the time, as in the Muenchner Post of 19 Jan 1927. The closeness of the relationship in 1939-41 is revealed again in recently published German documents. The Soviet Union gave the German Navy valuable support in their campaign against British shipping by providing a base on the Murmansk coast. On 6 September 1940, after the Germans had obtained other bases through the conquest of Norway, Berlin sent a message to Moscow instructing the German Embassy to convey the thanks of the Reich Government. On 9 September the Embassy reported Molotov's "satisfaction that we (the Nazis) had found useful the base placed at our disposal." Soviet material support flowed to Germany, the German Embassy reporting on 28 November 1940 that "Molotov's proposal (for material assistance) considerably exceeds our expectations," and 4 January 1941, "Mikoyan's statements today... were characterized by great cooperation and... the raw material delivery proposed by Mikoyan represents a valuable supplement to the economic agreement in a most important area." In January 1941, the partners concluded trade agreements which provided the Nazis not only with grain but also with strategic materials such as copper, tin, nickel, tungsten, and molybdenum. A veteran German economic diplomat, Karl Ritter, called those agreements "the biggest economic treaty complex that has ever been concluded between two states." When Molotov gave a reception on 2 November 1940, the German Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg, "and the representatives of England and France and other countries" were placed at side tables. The Soviet Union was prepared to sign a treaty with the three Axis powers, carving up Asia and Africa between them. Germany was to center her "territorial aspirations" in Central Africa, Italy was to get North and Northeast Africa, Japan would expand southward to Eastern Asia, while for Stalin, there was to be staking out a sphere of influence south of the Soviet Union "in the direction of the Indian Ocean." On 26 November 1940, Molotov demanded that the treaty also provide for the withdrawal of German troops from Finland, for a Soviet-Bulgarian "mutual assistance" pact, and for a renunciation of Japanese rights in Northern Sakhalin, and the effect of this demand, especially that part of it which would have given Bulgaria to the USSR, was to make Hitler order "Operation Barbarossa" on 22 December 1940. While Hitler's impatience and megalomania were no doubt the basic reason for the attack, he might have waited until England was defeated if it had not been for Soviet greed and blackmail tactics. Stalin did not realize at first that he had ruffled his fellow-dictator. When indications became too strong to be entirely ignored, Molotov was replaced as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars by Stalin himself, evidently on the theory that he had been the irritant; Tass issued denials of troop concentrations and of strained relations; and the Embassies of Belgium, Norway, and

Yugoslavia were closed. Deliveries under the trade agreements continued to be faithfully executed, at least from the Soviet side. Until the last moment, Stalin questioned the truth of all reports that Hitler would actually attack, preferring to believe in Hitler rather than in Churchill. Even when the attack began -- as Khrushchev disclosed in his secret speech in February 1956 -- Stalin judged that this was provocative action by "undisciplined sections of the German army." In other words, he could not really believe that Adolf would do this. Khrushchev now says that the Soviet government realized that, in concluding the non-aggression pact, "it was striking a deal with the devil incarnate." But this was not the way Stalin looked at the matter. For him it was, instead, a way of sharing the spoils, of joining the side of Power.