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Pietro Nenni's views regarding reform of the state and the building of socialism in Italy probably always have differed in certain essentials from those of the Italian Communists. (These differences became more evident and explicit following the Soviet repression of the Hungarian Revolution.) Nevertheless, the leader of the Italian Socialist Party (as the reaction of the local Communist Federation cited below indicates) continues to exert an influence not only on the Italian left in general, but also on the Italian Communist Party itself.

During the month of August 1960 Avanti, the official newspaper of the PSI (Partito Socialista Italiano; Italian Socialist Party), ran a series of articles from its Moscow correspondent on the subject of Sino-Soviet differences in which the latter states that the Sino-Soviet dispute can be healed only by China's complete acceptance of the policy of peaceful coexistence and the peaceful transition to socialism. Nenni himself contributed a signed article to the 21 August issue of Avanti.

The following are pertinent excerpts from these various articles:

According to Nenni the argument between the USSR and China concerning the interpretation of coexistence and detente is without doubt among the most significant debates of our times. Its import is not limited to the two largest Communist countries and parties but includes the workers movement throughout the world and particularly the other Communist countries.....Nenni goes on to say that the Chinese theses taken as a whole negate the validity of the policy of coexistence, detente and of the peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism. At the May 1960 meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking, the delegates were amazed at the summation of the Chinese position: "whoever fears war fears revolution; whoever fears revolution betrays the aspirations of the workers and of the oppressed peoples."..... According to Nenni, one can find a justification for anything in Lenin; thus, Lenin is cited in support of the Chinese position. However, Lenin is referring to eras and circumstances not only far removed in time, but also having almost no connection with the reality of today which has been radically transformed by the new element represented by the USSR, China, the collapse of imperialism in Asia and Africa and by the basic crises and changes which imperialism has undergone..... Since the summit, Khrushchev gives the impression that he is attempting to synthesize the Soviet and Chinese viewpoints and reconcile the policy of coexistence with that of the inevitability of war.....

According to Avanti's Moscow correspondent, an extremely significant fact can now be observed in the USSR; whereas up to a few months ago it was unusual to find a Soviet who would admit that the impersonal attacks of Pravda, of Soviet Russia and Kommunist against the dogmatists and extremists were directed at the Chinese, today this fact has become public knowledge. The fact that the disagreement with China has been made the property of the basic organs of the party and of the country as a whole is an indication that these are not tactical

314. (Cont.)

maneuvers but that the USSR intends to adhere to the principles of peaceful coexistence and a peaceful transition to socialism.....Mao does not seem to understand that the Chinese problems can be solved only by a policy of detente, and not by war, which the Chinese leaders seem to fear far less than the Soviets. Today in China it is not difficult in secondary party levels to hear people asserting with great assurance: "We do not want war but neither do we fear it; if imperialism unleashes a war it will be destroyed. It is possible that in such a conflict 200 or 300 million Chinese will be killed; however, with modern technical means we could quickly reconstruct China and at least we would be rid of imperialism for once and for all." Obviously this type of reasoning is not very profound; but didn't Mao call imperialism a "paper tiger"? whereas Khrushchev, with far greater realism, has emphasized that with the terrible means of destruction that man possesses today, in the event of a war between the two blocs, there would be neither vanquished nor victor. It appears certain that at Bucharest the Communist representatives were confronted with what might be called a confrontation of Asian communism with European communism, separated by a completely different view of relations between East and West, between the capitalist world and the Communist world. The differences between the USSR and China continue to be very serious. China tends to overrate the possibility of crises in the capitalist world, crises which the Soviets consider possible but neither decisive nor imminent. There is no doubt that Chinese knowledge of capitalist society is far less profound than that of the USSR. For this reason the Soviets fear that the Chinese underestimation of American strength could lead to some rash act which would have the deepest repercussions not only in Asia but throughout the entire world..... To what degree is Khrushchev obliged to take into account the theories of his Chinese ally? To a great extent without doubt. To understand this point, it is sufficient to take into consideration the weight that certain allies of the United States (far less important and less autonomous than China) have in the Western ranks.

It has been reported that a certain Italian Communist Federation called a meeting of Federation secretaries to inform them of the line of Sino-Soviet differences. The meeting was prompted by requests for guidance from leaders of Communist cells and sections, perplexed by questions from the rank and file members who had read the Avanti articles. Instructions from PCI headquarters were to: a) minimize rather than deny the existence of ideological differences; b) soft-pedal the Yugoslav stand; c) affirm that the differences are of form rather than substance; d) beware of the anti-Communist press which is seeking to split the unity of the international workers' movement; e) emphasize that the differences of opinion only confirm communism's basic democracy without which the movement would revert to Nazi-Fascist totalitarianism; and f) do not allow Party members a free rein to engage in ideological discussions.

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315. India Moves Against Communist Party

As a result of its long-standing border dispute with the People's Republic of China, the Government of India has taken a significant step. It proposes to amend the Criminal Law Act in order to make punishable the following: attempts to endanger the country's security by questioning through word, sign, visible representation, or any other means, the nation's territorial integrity or its frontiers, and the making, publishing, or circulating of any report or rumor calculated to disrupt the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any area adjoining the frontiers of India. The proposed amendment, which will undoubtedly be ratified by the next session of parliament, follows the collection of much evidence by the Home Ministry, of activity on the part of Indians in Indian Territory that is regarded as prejudicial to the country's security. Prime Minister Nehru, in parliament not long ago, accused the Communist Party of India of "unpatriotic" activity. He was apparently quoting reports that disclosed attempts by Indian Communists to establish liaison with Chicom troops in Tibet. These reports evidently also stated that Communists had distributed pamphlets and leaflets designed to arouse disaffection among border peoples. Apart from this amendment, which is primarily aimed against the Communists and which in itself is considered most unusual, the Indian Government has commenced to tighten screening of Chinese residents in the country, especially in the city of Calcutta. Strong efforts by the Chicoms are reportedly under way to recruit Chinese residents in the country. In West Bengal alone, for example, this effort seems to be aimed at about 40 percent of the state's Chinese population of around 10,000. The rest are regarded as having "strong Kuomintang leanings". The Indian government has reacted vigorously against this development. Of the 40 percent of Chinese leaning toward Red China about 5 percent have been "persuaded" by the Indian Government to leave. A senior executive of the Bank of China in Calcutta is among 20 Chinese residents of West Bengal to be ordered out of the country. An additional 10 Chinese have been given notice that they must leave India within 90 days. Despite the Chinese Embassy's protest against the order, the government terminated the operating permit of the New China News Agency (Sinhua) in New Delhi after NCNA reports of a recent strike were found to be "tendencious and not in accordance with the facts."

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316. CUBA: Communist; Most Prominent Protege

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During the public ceremonies opening the celebration of the forty-third anniversary of the Russian October Revolution, 7 November 1960, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, reported actual strong man of the Castro regime (See Bi-Weekly Propaganda Guidance #46, Item 274), was given a prominent place on the platform with Khrushchev, Liu Shao Chi, and other top leaders of the Communist world. This is only one of a number of recent actions indicating the special significance the Soviet Union attaches to Cuba. The annual series of slogans published to commemorate the October Revolution contained, this year for the first time, a slogan on Cuba. Item number 35 in the list conveys "warm greetings to the heroic Cuban people, who are building a new life and selflessly defending their national freedom and independence." No individual Latin American country has ever before been mentioned in the slogans. Soviet Bloc propaganda broadcasts during the period 19 October to 1 November 1960 show a record level of attention to Cuban affairs, rising from three percent of the total comment on all subjects 17 to 23 October to thirteen percent of this total from 24 to 30 October. The previous high was during July 1960 and included publicity for the Moscow visit of Fidel Castro's brother Raul. During his visit to New York to attend the UNGA session, Khrushchev gave Fidel Castro special attention epitomized in the widely publicized photograph of Castro being given a bear hug by the Russian leader. More substantive signs of support are the increasing number of Bloc technicians being sent to Cuba. Recent estimates put the total of Soviet, Chinese and Czech military and other experts, including jet aircraft pilots, now in Cuba at four thousand. Intelligence reports indicate that among this number are leading Bloc economic experts attempting to administer remedies to Cuba's ailing economy. It is interesting to note that Cuba is reciprocating this attention; referring repeatedly to Khrushchev's rocket-rattling support, staging mammoth rallies to commemorate the anniversary of the October Revolution, etc.

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317. Federation Internationale des Syndicates de l'Enseignement (FISE), and
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World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Africa

Both illustrative of and highlighting the current approach of the Communist Bloc to the new states of Africa was the Third World Conference of Teachers, held in Conakry, Guinea, in late July under the sponsorship of the Federation Internationale des Syndicates de l'Enseignement (FISE), the Communist-front international teachers union affiliated with the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Some 273 persons representing 44 countries attended. Of the 12 African states represented, Mali sent 35 people, Guinea over 50, while the remaining 10 states sent 17. Only a small percentage of the delegates to this so-called teachers conference were teachers. The African delegates were by and large undistinguished minor officials of the Ministries of Education and labor unions. The entire Communist Bloc was well-represented; all other country delegations were Communist-dominated. Serious action or discussion concerning the immense problems of education and the teaching profession now facing the African states was not undertaken. For the most part, the Conference devoted itself to propaganda speeches and resolutions which condemned the US for aggression and imperialism; condemned colonialism and Western European powers; praised Communist educational systems; buttered up Guinea and Guinean officials. This follows the new line toward Africa adopted by the WFTU in the mid-1950's. Rather than urging affiliation of African teachers organizations - professional and those that are part of national labor movements - with FISE and WFTU, the more flexible tactic of lending support to nationalist and anti-colonialist associations is being adopted, whether or not they follow the Communist line. The new policy involves visits to Communist Bloc countries, organization of seminars and so-called training courses, and the holding of international conferences in the new African states. 25X1C10b

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The 1960 US Census showed a total population (including overseas forces but excluding Alaska and Hawaii) of 179.6 million, within 500,000 of the previous estimate of the US Bureau of the Census. By contrast, the 1959 Soviet census showed a population of 208.8 million, although a USSR Central Statistical Administration official had anticipated a figure of about 215 million. Since 1910, US population has increased 93%, while the population of the area encompassed by the present boundaries of the USSR has increased only 24% since 1913. In 1939, Soviet population was 46% larger than that of the US, whereas in 1959 Soviet population was only 18% larger. A primary cause of lag in the Soviet population is the loss of around 25 million lives (21 million of them men) in World War II, a loss whose extent was unknown until 1959. Strictly military deaths were probably around 10 million, half the men enlisted, while the German battle dead including all fronts from 1939 to 1945 numbered 3.3 million (omitting the 1.3 million Germans still missing). The margin of Russian battle losses over German must be attributed to the operation of the Soviet political and military system under Stalin (see Khrushchev's Secret Speech of 25 February 1956), including the effects of the purges on efficiency, the failure to heed warnings, party interference, the terrorization of subordinate commanders, and the blind mass frontal attacks ordered by "Marshal" Stalin. In contrast, the poorly equipped Czarist army lost 1.7 million dead in World War I, fewer than the Kaiser's forces. The mass execution of minority nationals and the deaths in the labor camps probably accounted for most of the remaining 15 million deaths (3/4 of them male). Aside from World War II casualties, other causes of population losses include emigration (2 million), deaths and birth deficit (i. e., lag in births below normal) from the Civil War period (22 million) and from the collectivization in the early 1930's (up to 20 million), plus a large birth deficit from World War II (20 million). Births would also have been higher had it not been for the sacrifice of housing for industrialization.

In the days of the first five year plans, the losses, especially birth deficits, were an aid to industrialization, since there were relatively few consumers to be cared for in relation to the number of productive workers. But since 1956, the combination of the lack of war babies with the war losses caused an acute labor shortage, aggravated by the fact that above the age of 32, there are only 3 men to every 5 women. The prospective increase in working-age population amounts to only about half the 12 million increase in employment called for in the 7-year plan, which was adopted before the extent of the losses was known. The labor shortage has been an unacknowledged factor in the reduction of the armed forces and of the police, the reorganization of education, the emphasis on automation and mechanization, the attack on bureaucracy, and the campaign against idle youth. The losses may also have contributed to the decision for a co-existence policy.

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319. The Cult of Khrushchev

Events after the U-2 incident, such as the presence of Marshal Malinowski in Paris, and the appearance of articles on "collective leadership" in Soviet party journals, led to Western speculation on the possibility that Khrushchev might be losing his predominant position. Now that the dust has somewhat settled, however, it seems apparent that the cult of Khrushchev is as strong as, if not stronger than, ever. Every activity of the Soviet dictator has been given prominence in Pravda and Izvestiya and on Radio Moscow. Khrushchev's 23 September speech at the UN was summarized on the radio 245 times, and there were 480 supporting commentaries, adding up to greater publicity than Moscow has ever given to a Khrushchev speech. If we take the summaries alone, his 14 January 1960 troop-cut speech and his 21 July address to the Rumanian Party Congress are the only speeches to be summarized as many times. The September issue of Ogonyok, the Russian illustrated magazine, featured a reproduction of a painting of Khrushchev by V.A. Serov, the artistic glorifier of Lenin and Stalin, showing Khrushchev talking to "the ordinary people" in the same kind of pose used in Serov's depictions of Lenin. The same issue also contained a cartoon and accompanying poem, showing a slimmed-down Khrushchev in oilskins as the captain at the helm. In October, Khrushchev was shown in a color photograph on Ogonyok's cover, and his picture appeared countless times on the inside pages. Other Soviet leaders, especially Suslov, have praised Khrushchev in their speeches and it may be noted that, as a result of the reshuffle of the Presidium in May, Khrushchev is now the only Presidium member holding posts in more than one of three key groups: the Central Committee Secretariat, the Central Committee Bureau of the RSFSR, and the USSR Council of Ministers; he is a member of all these bodies. Khrushchev himself has commented on the rumors of leadership differences: on 8 July, in Vienna, he told a reporter, "I, as Premier of the USSR Council of Ministers and First Secretary of the CPSU, do not know of any difference of opinion either within the party or within the country." It is possible that Khrushchev's health may have somewhat circumscribed his activities. Party Life admitted that he was indisposed in June, and a need for rest may have been a reason for using the Baltika rather than a TU-104. But he showed amazing energy at the UN meetings, and there have been no recent reports of collapse. It may be suggested that the party journal articles on collective leadership and demonstrations of comradeship among the leadership could be largely motivated by a desire to deflate the cult of Mao and to show solidarity vis-a-vis the Chinese Communists.

There are differences between Khrushchev and Stalin. Stalin, with his Marshal's uniform, his Byzantine aura, the towns named after him, and his claims as party theoretician, projected a different image. He based his power on a double foundation of party and state, using overt coercion. Khrushchev has characteristically attacked Stalinism and the "cult of personality", thus putting himself on the side of the angels, and cutting the ground from under internal and external criticism. But, using almost exclusively the party apparatus, he has built up his own position, steadily eliminated all rivals, and assumed supreme power. The concept of "Big Brother" takes on, with Khrushchev, new and more subtle significance. He does not, ordinarily, resort to terror; instead he sets about creating a "New Soviet Man". He has developed "Newspeak" to a


refinement hitherto undreamt of; one of his latest distortions of words is his claim that there is "freedom" in the Soviet Empire. The fact that he has never been elected in any free vote, that he has bloodily suppressed opposition both inside and outside the USSR, that he is again returning to the concept of Socialist realism in Soviet art and literature, are all ignored in Khrushchev's propaganda.

Khrushchev frequently attempts to associate himself with the image of Lenin. It should be noted, however, that there was nothing benovolent about Lenin. Lenin was the man who brought the concept of undemocratic, elite control to Marxism, who did not hesitate to use German aid, who carried out the October revolution to anticipate the Constituent Assembly, who throttled that assembly (the only democratically elected body in Russian history) when it proved to have a hostile majority, who executed his political opponents or sent them to exile or Siberia.

Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev are all alike in that they have led a doctrinaire, minority party dedicated to controlling society, supposedly for society's good, regardless of society's wishes. This cannot be reconciled with freedom. If Khrushchev should die tomorrow, another "Leninist" would rise in his place.

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