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ANTI-COMMUNIST ELEMENTS IN IRAQ

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## ANTI-COMMUNIST ELEMENTS IN IRAQ

There are in Iraq a number of groups--ethnic, religious, social, economic, political--which have a certain degree of cohesiveness and identity of interests, and may, on occasion, react as a group. In general, they can be described as anti-Communist. But to attempt to categorize them as regards political orientation is impossible for anyone sitting in Washington.

One fact stands out. In Iraq today there are no groups which can definitely be termed pro-West, with the exception, perhaps, of small colonies of foreign nationals (see Tab VI). There is no available evidence which would permit us to conclude that anti-Communist nationalists in Iraq can be equated with a pro-Western attitude.

Most Iraqi groupings are, first and foremost, nationalistic, although they may interpret and manifest this nationalism in different degrees and ways. Most groups are also Muslim and Arab. A few have economic and/or social ties with the West (see Tab V) or, in the case of certain Christian minorities (see Tab III), religious ties, but these are incidental and relatively unimportant. Positive pro-Westernism existing in Iraq is strictly a matter of individuals rather than of groups. Each group mentioned in this paper or in the annexes probably includes some individuals who, for one reason or another, favor the West. The identity of these individuals, however, cannot be determined here.

The problem is further complicated by the fact that membership in the various groups overlaps. An urban shopkeeper, for example, will probably identify himself also as a member of an ethnic and religious group and, possibly, of a political party. It is impossible to determine with which grouping he identifies himself most or from which he derives his political opinions.

### A. Pro-Western Elements

The only groups which can be identified as pro-Western with any degree of certainty are the small colonies of British, Americans, Pakistanis and Turks (see Tab VI). The few Jews (see Tab II) who remain in Iraq presumably have at least a sentimental attachment towards Israel, but the delicacy of their position requires them not only to avoid any manifestation of such feelings but even vigorously to abjure any liking for

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Zionism. The Turcoman minority is believed to be pro-Turkish (see Tab II).

Other groups have certain ties with the West, although in no case are these ties probably strong enough to warrant their being termed pro-West. The Assyrian minority, for example, has long had ties with the British, both of an economic and religious nature; moreover their spiritual leader now resides in the U.S. Similarly, several Eastern Rite Catholic groups have religious ties with Rome. It may also be pointed out that these groups, as well as all others which are anti-Communist as a whole, include individuals who are pro-Communist if not actual Party members (see Tab III).

In the economic field the vested interests, especially the large businessmen and importers-exporters, have long-established ties with Western business and commercial interests, which they are believed to value and to wish to maintain. Artisans and the small shopkeepers, both urban and rural, also are acquainted with and prefer Western goods. But among these groups also the attraction of the West is diluted by other factors such as nationalism, Arabism, and Islam (see Tab V).

#### B. Pro-UAR Elements

The pro-UAR elements in Iraq are somewhat easier to identify, although it is impossible to calculate their numbers or influence. Included are members of the Ba'th and Istiqlal Parties, junior army officers identified with the Ba'th Party or with former Deputy Premier 'Abd-al-Salam 'Arif, a faction of the National Democratic Party, and some intellectuals and students (although probably a larger element of these two groups is controlled by the Communists). (See Tab IV). Some Bedouin tribes also appear to fall into this category (see Tab I). Finally, there are relatively large numbers of Egyptian nationals in Iraq--teachers, economists, technicians, etc.--who can be considered as agents or supporters of 'Abd-al-Nasir (see Tab VI).

#### C. Nationalist Elements

Other groups, while they may be anti-Communist, are neither pro-West nor pro-UAR but Iraqi nationalists or concerned solely with their own self interests, desiring primarily to be allowed to live with a minimum of outside interference.

The Kurds, for example, have no love for the West, are actively hostile to the idea of Iraq's union with the UAR, and,

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despite many reports to the contrary, are not conspicuously pro-Communist (although there are Kurdish Communists). Essentially they are pro-Kurdish. Some are positive Kurdish nationalists who aspire to an independent Kurdistan; others identify their interests with Iraq and would be content with local autonomy coupled with greater consideration from, and more participation in, the Baghdad government (see Tab II).

The same considerations are largely valid also as regards the Shias (see Tab I). Some Bedouin tribes are reported to be actively hostile towards the Qasim regime, but this makes them neither pro-West nor pro-UAR (although some tribes, notably the Shammar, were allegedly involved in the pro-UAR coup attempted in late 1958 by Rashid Ali Gaylani). The tribal shaykhs, who determine the opinions and political affiliations of their respective tribes, are primarily concerned with protecting their own positions and vested interests and with avoiding any control of, or interference in, tribal affairs by the central government (see Tab I).

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ANNEXES

ANTI-COMMUNIST ELEMENTS IN IRAQ

I. Muslim Arab Groups

A. Shias

About 60 percent of Iraq's population is composed of Arabs who adhere to the Shia sect of Islam. Poor, uneducated and largely agricultural, they are concentrated along the Tigris south of Baghdad and on the Euphrates south of Falluja. They are largely indistinguishable from the Arabs of Iran's Khuzistan Province.

As a group the Shias possess a certain cohesiveness because of their geographic concentration and obedience to religious leaders. Politically, also, they share the same aspirations. Although in the majority, the Shias traditionally have had little share in the government; and a greater share of political power is a major Shia objective. Domination by the Sunni Muslim element within the country also leads Shias to be hostile to the idea of union with the UAR, since they feel that they would be even more submerged by Sunnis than is now the case.

The Shia religious leaders--ulama, or mujtahidun-- form a distinct class within the Shia community. It is an important and powerful group since all Shias, except for intellectuals, are responsive to the will and direction of these leaders in political as in religious matters. Having strong ties with tribal shaykhs (who subsidize them), landowners and other conservatives, and sharing the traditional conservatism of any priestly group, the ulama form a very conservative if not reactionary bloc. They are generally opposed to secularization, to socialism and communism and the anti-religious policy of the USSR. Although far from being pro-Western, they prefer the US to the USSR. Like the Shias in general, they are against union with the UAR.

The ulama are especially strong in the Shia shrine cities of Kadhmain, Najaf and Karbala. One recent report, however, stated that the Communists controlled Najaf but

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that the ulama still had the upper hand in Karbala.

Ulama leaders include Shaykh 'Abd-al-Ridha Shabilli and Shaykh Muhsin al-Hakim. The Najaf League of Ulama is led by Shaykh Muhammad Ridha Muzaffar and Shaykh 'Ali Ghashif al-Ghita.

#### B. Sunnis

Sunni Arabs form the second largest element in Iraq and, politically, have long been dominant. They are scattered throughout Iraq and are even to be found among the Shias in the south. Zubair district, for example, is almost exclusively Sunni, and there are large colonies in Nasiriyya, Suq al-Shaykh and Khamisiyya. The Sunni Arab population includes the nomadic tribes (discussed separately below).

The Sunnis are to be found in all economic and social groupings. Politically, they contribute both to the pro-Communists and to the pro-UAR element. They are not cohesive like the Shias, nor do their religious leaders enjoy the same prestige or influence.

#### C. Tribes

Iraq has at least 153 Arab tribal groups, varying greatly in size and importance, which together comprise more than 250,000 people. About half are concentrated in Karbala Liwa; approximately 70,000 are in Mosul Liwa, 30,000 in Muntafiq Liwa, and 25,000 in Dulaym Liwa.

The tribes as a whole are not cohesive, but individual tribes are since, to a large extent, they are responsive to the will of their shaykhs. The latter have ties with vested interests, that is, businessmen and landlords, of which many are shaykhs. Conservative by nature, they are primarily concerned with maintaining their authority and with avoiding governmental interference in tribal matters.

The tribes and their shaykhs can be considered both anti-Communist and anti-UAR, although the Rashid Ali Gaylani pro-UAR coup attempt in late 1958 is said to have had the support of tribal shaykhs from the Diwaniyyah area in southern Iraq as well as of the paramount shaykh of the Shammar.

The following are among the more important of Iraq's

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many tribes:

1. Shammur al-Jarba: Part of the great Shammur confederation of Syria, this tribe numbers about 90,000 and owes allegiance to its own paramount shaykh, Ahmad al-Ajil Yawar. It ranges from the Jabal Sinjar area of Mosul Liwa to the regions immediately west and south of Baghdad. It is hostile to the Qasim regime; and although reportedly involved in the Rashid Ali coup attempt, it is also said to be pro-Hashimite.

2. Al-Dulaym: Also loyal to the former royal family, this tribe numbers about 125,000. The most important of the shepherd tribes, it inhabits northern Dulayim Liwa, centered around Ramadi, and both sides of the Euphrates upstream from Falluja. Its paramount shaykh is 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Ali Sulayman.

3. Amarat Ubayzah (or Aneiza): Ranging from Rutba to Karbala, this tribe, 50,000 strong, is also believed to be loyal to the former royal family and hostile to the Qasim regime. Mahruz al-Hadal, a member of the former Parliament, is a leader of the tribe.

4. Kut: Its tribal lands extend from Kut almost to the Iranian border. Related by marriage to the murdered Crown Prince, the tribe is hostile to the Qasim regime.

5. Al-Muntafik: Inhabiting an area along the Shatt al-Gharraf from Kut al-Hai south to the Shatt al-Arab and from the Euphrates almost to the Tigris, this is a federation of three tribal confederations (Ajwad, Bani Malik, and Bani Sa'id), each of which includes various individual tribes. Ultimate control of the federation is in the hands of the Shabib-Sa'dun family.

6. On the lower Tigris are the Albu Muhammad and Ma'dan (Marsh Arabs), which include many individual tribal groups.

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## II. Non-Christian Ethnic Minorities

### A. Kurds

Numbering about 800,000, Iraq's Kurds are concentrated in the north and northeast parts of the country. Sulaimaniyya Liwa is almost exclusively Kurdish, and they form a majority in the Liwas of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk and Diyala. There are also large numbers of Kurds in the districts of Mandali and Khaniyin.

Comprising at least 72 tribes which range in numbers from 1,000 to 50,000, the Kurds can be divided into three major groupings on the basis of tribal organization, language and geographic location. From north to south these are: (1) Badinan, an extension of Turkish Kurds who go up to Lake Van and down to the Greater Zab, and speak Kermanji, or "literary" Kurdish; (2) Suran, who live between the two Zabs; and (3) Baban, who inhabit the area from the Lesser Zab to the Diyala River. The Suran and Baban both speak a Persian dialect of Kurdish.

Sunni Muslim by religion, the Kurds include all social, occupational, economic and political subgroups. Regardless of tribal differences, all Kurds share the racial characteristic of clannishness and obedience to tribal leaders. They also share certain political and economic aspirations. The Kurds desire greater autonomy, greater economic development, and greater participation in the government. Some want an independent Kurdistan, others would be satisfied with autonomous status within Iraq.

Although many Kurds are attracted by Soviet propaganda and promises and some are Communist Party members, most are primarily pro-Kurdish. Even the Barzani tribe and its leader, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, are not known definitely to be Communist despite their long residence in exile in the USSR. Baba Ali, Iraq's present Kurdish Minister of Communications, has claimed he knows definitely that Barzani is not a Communist.

All Kurds can be considered strongly opposed to Iraqi union or close association with the UAR, since they already resent their minority status which such union would only intensify.

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**B. Turcomans**

There are between 70,000 and 75,000 Turcomans (or Turkmen), who dwell along a line Qara Tappah-Kifri-Tuz Qaramatu-Kirkuk-Altun Kupri-Arbil, and east of Mosul in Tall Afar and vicinity. Sunni Muslim by religion, they speak a Turkish dialect and are considered to be pro-Turkish.

The Turcomans are weak, internally split, and lack tribal cohesion. While many rural Turcomans--notably the Jarjariyyas around Tall Afar--do retain their tribal organization, those living in urban areas are both educated and Arabicized.

**C. Lurs**

Originally from the southern Zagros Mountains, particularly the Pusht-i-Kuh range, Iraq's 60,000 Lurs occupy the border regions next to Iran. They constitute a large proportion of the population in the towns of Badra and Mandali and neighboring villages, and are also an important element in 'Ali al-Gharbi, Qa'lat, Sikar and Karradi.

The Lurs are Shia Muslims. Most are poor, and they traditionally provide the porters (hamals) of Baghdad and Basra. They have given no evidence of political consciousness.

**D. Shabaks**

Numbering between 10,000 and 12,000, the Shabaks are chiefly agriculturalists who live along the Tigris south of Mosul and in the Sinjar district. They speak a Kurdish dialect. The Shabaks maintain close, harmonious relations with the Yazidis.

**E. Jews**

Of the once prosperous Jewish colony of over 150,000, less than 10,000 remain in Iraq. The Jews still in Iraq are completely without economic or political significance. Either sincerely or to avoid further persecution, they abjure Zionism and claim they desire only to live as Iraqi citizens.

**F. Yazidis**

The so-called "Devil-Worshippers" of Iraq, the 32,437

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(as of 1947) Yazidis live almost exclusively in Mosul Liwa. They constitute a majority in Sinjar district, west of Mosul, where they are rural, and about one-third in Shaykhan district, north of Mosul, the location of their principal shrine, Shaykh 'Adi, and the residence of their Amir, Ba Adri. Their principal village near Mosul is Baashiqa.

The Amir, as head of a strictly graded religious and political hierarchy, has full control over all members of the sect, who are mostly very poor. The present leader is Amir Tahsin.

G. Mandeans

As of 1947 the Mandeans (or Sabians) numbered 6,597, all of whom were urban, scattered along the rivers south of Baghdad. In Suq al-Shayukh, their main center, they form less than 10 percent of the population; other sizeable groupings are located in Basra, Amara and Nasiriyyah. The major occupations of the Mandeans are boat-building and silversmithing.

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### III. Christian Minorities

#### A. General Distribution

The 1947 census showed roughly 150,000 Christians in Iraq, of whom 77,000 lived in Mosul Liwa (45,000 in Mosul district). The principal Christian district is Tall Kayf, in which they comprise 50 percent of the population; the town of Tall Kayf itself is almost exclusively Christian. The districts of Zakho and Amadiyya, north of Mosul, are about 25 percent Christian, largely rural, and the same percentage also holds for Shaykhan district. In Dohuk district Christians comprise about 10 percent of the population.

There are roughly 7,700 Christians in Kirkuk and 4,000 in al-Qosh. They form seven percent of the population of Arbil district (half of them in the town itself) and about three percent of Basra district. Baghdad has about 28,000 (five percent) and Ramadi district of Dulaym Liwa about 9,000 (12 percent).

#### B. Assyrians

Numbering between 20,000 and 25,000, the Assyrians (or Nestorians) have long been in conflict with the Iraqi Government which rejects their claim to being a separate nation and sharply resents their habit of appealing for support to foreign nations or international organizations. They have looked to the British especially for protection.

During the era in which the British maintained bases in Iraq, they employed up to 6,000 Assyrians as members of the "Iraqi Levies," which were used as a protective force for these bases. Many of these now live in a new settlement at Daurah, where some are employed at the refinery. About 1,000 work in the Kirkuk oil fields; 1,100 live near Mosul and another 3,700 in neighboring villages, especially in the vicinity of 'Ayn Zala, north of Mosul.

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The Assyrians also have religious ties with the British. Since the last century the Archbishop of Canterbury has maintained a mission among the Assyrians to educate their priesthood, and as a result the Assyrians are closely identified with the Anglican community. Another religious tie with the West is the residence in the US of their hereditary religious leader--the Mar Shamun, or Patriarch of the East--who was exiled from Iraq in 1932.

Local leaders appear to be Archbishop Thimoleteus Shalita and Yusuf Khushaba. In January 1959 the two men reportedly pledged the community's support to Qasim, who, in return, was said to have told them that he was considering the arming of as many as 5,000 Assyrians in case of need.

C. Chaldeans

Numbering about 98,000, the Chaldeans speak Arabic and are of Arab racial stock. Their spiritual leader is the Patriarch of Babylon, whose seat is in Mosul. Western Catholic missionaries have been active among them for 100 years.

D. Syrian Catholics

Subject to the Patriarch of Antioch in Beirut, this sect numbers an estimated 25,000 of whom 20,000 are in the north and 2,500 in Baghdad.

E. Syrian Orthodox

About 12,000 Syrian Orthodox Christians, also known as Jacobites, live in Iraq. Most live in Mosul, the Jabal Maqlub district to the north, and Sinjar district. There are also small numbers of them in Baghdad, Basra and Kirkuk. They owe religious obedience to the Patriarch of Antioch, whose seat is in Homs, Syria.

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F. Armenians

The small colony of about 4,000 Armenians consists almost entirely of persons who arrived after World War I. Exclusively urban residents, they are professionals, artisans and skilled mechanics. They are inactive politically, although a few are reportedly Communists.

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#### IV. Political Groups

##### A. Istiqlal Party

Mainly Sunni but including a few Shias, the Istiqlal was founded in 1946 by politicians who had supported the Rashid Ali coup of 1941. Rightist and strongly nationalistic, but supporting a program of social reform, the Istiqlal draws its adherents mainly from the cities (Baghdad, Mosul and Basra especially). It enjoys very limited support in rural and tribal areas. The Istiqlal champions the ideal of Arab unity and strongly advocates union with the UAR.

Head of the party is Muhammad Mahdi Kubba, now a member of Iraq's Presidential Council. The principal other leaders are Fa'iq al-Samarra'i, now Ambassador to Cairo, and Siddiq Shanshal, Minister of Guidance.

##### B. Ba'th Party

The Ba'th Party of Iraq (BPI) is a branch of the overall Ba'th Party, whose major element is the Arab Social Resurrection Party in Syria. Strongly attracted by the idea of Arab unity, the BPI is the most vigorous advocate in Iraq of union with the UAR. It appeals to the younger educated nationalists and has a considerable following among junior army officers.

The principal BPI leaders are Fuad Rikabi, now Minister of State; Dr. Sa'dun Hamadi, editor of al-Jumhuriyyah; and Faysal Habib Khayzaran. The party is closely identified with the cause of former Deputy Premier 'Abd-al-Salam 'Arif.

##### C. National Democratic Party

Formed in 1946, the National Democratic Party (NDP) is a leftist party which advocates social reform, state ownership of public utilities and nationalization of oil.

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Its adherents come from the large cities and towns, with only a few in tribal and rural areas. Although it currently supports some sort of tie with the UAR (though not union), it is believed to have been widely penetrated by Communists.

The party leader is Kamil al-Chadirchi, and is represented in the cabinet by Finance Minister Muhammad Hadid, Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Jabbar Jumard, and Agriculture Minister Hadid Hadji Mahmud.

#### D. Muslim Brotherhood

This Iraqi branch of the reactionary Muslim organization that began in Egypt has never been popular or widely supported in Iraq. Such members as it has are almost exclusively Sunni, since Shias regard it with suspicion. In addition it suffers from internal splits. It is hostile both to the USSR and to the West; and because of Nasir's persecution of the Brotherhood in Egypt, it is also opposed to the idea of union with the UAR.

The Brotherhood's leaders in Iraq are Muhammad Mahmud Sawwaf and Muhsin Nimir Khatib. Gen. Najib Rubi'a, head of Iraq's Presidential Council, has been reported to be a leading member, although there is no confirmation of this.

#### E. Miscellaneous Groupings

Following the 14 July revolution, the Istiqlal and NDP reportedly combined into a National Congress to provide civilian support for the Qasim regime. No details are available as to the actual existence of such a coalition or, if it does exist, as to its method of operation.

In late October 1958, Adnan al-Rawi, a returned exile, was reported to be organizing independent nationalists into a Mithaq al-Rabitah al-Qawmiyin (Charter of the National Union), with the active assistance of Fadhil Mashhadani, a former Istiqlal Party lawyer and now Chief of Administration of the Iraqi State Railways. The Rawi group was said to be cooperating with the Istiqlal.

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In November the BPI, Istiqlal and Arab Nationalists (Qawmiyin al-Arab) were reported to have formed a loose working union under the name Tajama al-Qawmi (Nationalist Group). In December anti-Communist elements including the BPI and former Nuri al-Said supporters were reported to have formed a Rabtat al-Qawmiyyah (National Group).

If any of these groups actually exist--and there is no confirmatory data on any of them--they presumably would be pro-UAR since all involve either the Istiqlal and/or the Ba'th Party, both of which are advocating union with the UAR.

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V. Economic and Social Groups

A. Military Officers

Iraqi officers constitute a cohesive and powerful group fully aware of its power. Drawn from the upper and ruling classes, it has ties of kinship and economic interests with those classes and, as a group, can be considered both anti-Communist and anti-West. (There are, however, probably both pro-Communist and pro-West officers.) Junior officers are believed to be strongly pro-Nasir, while the senior officers are primarily Iraqi nationalists.

Among the leading officers who are believed to be anti-Communist are Chief of Staff General Ahmad Salih al-Abdi; Deputy Chief of Staff Brig. Gen. Muhammad Shukri; Brig. Gen. Aziz al-Uqaili, 1st Division Commander; Brig. Gen. Nazim Tabaqchali, 2nd Division Commander; and Brig. Gen. Ahmad Muhammad Yahya, Minister of Interior.

While non-commissioned officers and enlisted men constitute separate groupings, they can largely be discounted since both are under the firm control of their officers.

B. Vested Interests

Composed of landowners, big businessmen, industrialists and tribal shaykhs, this group constitutes the elite of Iraq and has traditionally furnished most government leaders. They are cohesive both socially and through kinship ties. Politically conservative, they are, as a group, anti-socialist and more disposed to Iraqi than to Arab nationalism.

The business elements especially have strong associations with Western business and commercial interests and therefore tend to be more friendly towards the West than most other Iraqi groupings.

Among the business associations of this group are the Iraqi Federation of Industries and the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce (Muhammad Jaffar al-Shibibi, president). The Iraqi Date Association can probably also be considered linked to this group.

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C. Shopkeepers

Small shopkeepers, both urban and rural, are cohesive to a degree but lack leadership. They are used to, and prefer, Western goods and would probably not favor any breaking of commercial relations with the West. However, they have little power and tend to comply with constituted authority. They are, moreover, easily influenced, and their opinions tend to reflect whatever propaganda reaches them most. Most of the comments about this class also apply to the artisans.

D. Middle Class and Skilled Workers

These two groups do not appear to be closely knit. As of August 1958 they were, according to one report, split between those favoring the UAR, a smaller group primarily concerned with economic interests and opposing union with the UAR and tending to favor the West, and a third group which supported the Communists.

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## VI. Foreign Colonies

### A. General Remarks

According to the 1947 census (the latest figures available), there were 73,828 foreign nationals in Iraq. Of these 63,886 were residents of three cities: Baghdad, 29,204; Karbala, 21,670; and Basra, 13,012.

### B. Iranians

More than 75 percent (52,430) of all foreign nationals were Iranians. About 25,000 resided in Baghdad (or near the Shia shrine of Kadhimain on Baghdad's outskirts), 20,000 in the Shia holy cities of Karbala and Najaf, and 4,000 in Basra. The Iranian element is important because many of Iraq's Shia ulama are Iranian.

In 1947 about 1,000 Afghans, who were closely identified with the Iranian community, also resided in Kadhimain and Najaf.

### C. Pakistanis

Of the 4,790 Indo-Pakistanis in Iraq in 1947, about half resided near the three Shia shrines and the rest in Basra. The figure may be larger today since a considerable number of Pakistanis were brought into Iraq in 1950-1951 to replace emigrating Jews in the telegraph and railway administrations.

### D. Saudis

In 1947 there were approximately 3,400 Saudis, of whom 234 lived in Kadhimain and nearly 3,000 in Zubair town in Basra district, which is a trading center for the desert to the south. These Saudis are generally identified with Bedouin interests.

### E. Syro-Lebanese

Most of the roughly 2,800 Syrians live in districts close to the Syrian border, especially in Haditha sub-district on the Euphrates and Dohuk district of Mosul Liwa. Some live in the city of Mosul. In 1947, there were also about 200 Lebanese in the oil port of Fao.

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**F. Palestinians**

Since the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, about 5,000 Palestinian refugees have arrived in Iraq. Like Arab refugees elsewhere, they are destitute and anti-West. They are probably susceptible to both Communist and Nasirist propaganda.

**G. Egyptians**

The number of Egyptians now in Iraq is not known but is probably fairly high. According to one report, at least 1,200 Egyptians were given jobs, with 5-year contracts, during the period when 'Arif was Deputy Premier. These included 400 school teachers, 300 within the Development Board, and 500 elsewhere in the government. Each can be considered, if not an active UAR agent, then at least a supporter of closer Iraqi-UAR ties.

**H. Turks**

Despite the long Turkish control of Iraq, only 926 persons, half of them in the Mosul area, claimed Turkish citizenship in the 1947 census.

**I. Other**

In 1947 there were about 3,000 British subjects, most of them of Oriental racial origins, in Iraq. Several hundred of them lived in the Holy Cities and half the remainder in Baghdad and Basra. About 300 were in Kirkuk.

Today there are probably several hundred Britishers and as many Americans in Iraq, a large percentage of them connected with the oil industry. As of 31 March 1958, the three oil companies in Iraq employed 648 non-Iraqis, most of them from the US or UK. As of October 1958 the Daurah refinery was employing 69 Americans and 43 Britishers.

No figures are available as to numbers of other Western nationals (e.g., German) in Iraq.

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