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RADIO PROPAGANDA REPORT

CPR CLAIMS TO BE NEARING COMMUNISM THROUGH COMMUNES:
SEEDS OF IDEOLOGICAL DISCORD WITH MOSCOW

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Foreword

Part A of this report examines (1) claims advanced by Communist China to be rapidly approaching communism through the new system of "people's communes"; (2) the extravagance of those claims, when read alongside the orthodox Soviet portrayal of "gradual" progress in the USSR toward communism in a distant future; and (3) possible groundwork in Peking propaganda for claims to have devised, in the communes, a model for an Asian "special road" to communism.

Part B presents evidence in the CPSU's October Revolution anniversary slogans that the USSR may have serious misgivings about the CPR's new ideological pretensions. Part C brings out further indications of such misgivings in the manner in which Soviet propaganda has underplayed the communes, particularly the CPR's claims about their ideological import.

The conclusion suggested by this report is that the CPR's claims to be rapidly nearing communism have introduced an element of strain into Sino-Soviet relations. There are no signs that such an element of strain is likely to overshadow the basic Sino-Soviet community of interests. But the depth of the Sino-Soviet ideological divergence is such that open polemics could conceivably come about unless some compromise line concerning the implications of the commune movement is devised.

A forthcoming Radio Propaganda Report will examine some recent divergences in satellite propaganda treatment of the communes--evidence that no standard line has yet been set throughout the bloc.

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CPR CLAIMS TO BE NEARING COMMUNISM THROUGH COMMUNES:SEEDS OF IDEOLOGICAL DISCORD WITH MOSCOWSummary

1. Claims that communism is "already not far away" in China have been prominent in Peking propaganda since the release of the 29 August Chinese Communist Party directive on establishing "communes." Communalization is presented by the CPR as a major step toward full communism. According to NCNA, it has already been extended to more than 90 percent of China's peasant families. A free-supply system, putting into effect the communist criterion for distribution "to each according to his need," is said already to be in force in a number of communes. A Chinese Politburo member has claimed that eight of the Communist Manifesto's ten preconditions for achieving communism have already been met in China and that progress has made toward meeting the remaining two--combination of manufacturing with agriculture (in the communes), and elimination of the distinction between manual and intellectual labor (in the CPR's current education reform).
2. Peking's new ideological pretensions raise an implicit challenge to Soviet ideological hegemony in the bloc:
 - a. Peking's claims could serve as groundwork for the proclamation of full communism in China before the USSR proclaims it in the USSR. The CPR, after only nine years in existence as a state, pictures itself as taking practical steps toward communism as a foreseeable goal. It does not include development of heavy industry in its two recent listings of preconditions for communism, possibly conceiving of communism as something China can attain through self-sufficient communes before becoming a major industrial power. The USSR, after 41 years, still portrays itself as moving toward communism as a distant goal, and adheres to the orthodox Leninist-Stalinist line that makes that goal attainable only on an integrated, highly developed industrial base.
 - b. The CPR all but invites invidious comparison of its own progress toward communism with that of the USSR, calling communalization unparalleled in "world" history.
 - c. Peking propagandists have not always been careful to limit the applicability of the commune system to China, leaving open the possibility that it could be applicable in other countries.
 - d. One CPR Party spokesman went so far as to imply that China's road to communism might serve as a model for all of Asia: In the earliest authoritative Peking discussion of communes, an alternate Chinese Politburo member exhumed a 1919 quotation from Lenin--never cited by Moscow--to suggest that not only China but all Asian countries should proceed toward communism in a special way distinct from that of Russia and the European countries.

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3. Moscow's propaganda treatment of the communes suggests Soviet misgivings about the CPR's new ideological claims:
 - a. No Soviet leader has so much as mentioned communes, although there were ample occasions on CPR National Day when mention of them would have been appropriate.
 - b. The Soviet press has devoted only one full-length article to communes--in LITERARY GAZETTE rather than a top Party theoretical journal, although KOMMUNIST and PARTY LIFE have both touched on the subject.
 - c. Radio Moscow discussed communes only three times, and then very briefly, in 215 commentaries reviewing China's progress on CPR National Day.
 - d. No Soviet-originated comment has endorsed the CPR's linkage of communes to communism. Moscow has diluted and even misrepresented the Chinese claims, and has been careful to limit the significance of communes to the Chinese scene. It has also continued to attack the "revisionist" heresy that there can be special roads to socialism which depart from the Soviet prototype; one such attack appeared in a discussion of China on CPR National Day.

4. The most direct evidence that the CPR's claims have introduced an element of strain into Sino-Soviet relations appears in the CPSU's slogans this October. The slogan for China uses a subtle semantic device to move the CPR down a notch in the scale of countries "building socialism"--precisely at a time when the CPR is claiming radical advances not only in building socialism but toward communism itself. In all prior sets of May Day and October Revolution anniversary slogans since May 1956, by which time the CPR had announced the basic completion of its collectivization, China had been pictured as ahead of all the satellites in the building of socialism. In three successive sets of slogans, in May and October 1957 and May 1958, the CPR had been called "builder of socialism" (which could be taken to mean that it had already built socialism), while the satellites were still "building socialism" (which could only refer to a process in being). The distinction in China's favor seemed an acknowledgement of claims at the September 1956 Chinese Party Congress that the CPR had "fundamentally realized" socialism. Now China is moved back to the stage of "building socialism"--back to where it was before May 1957 and back to the level of all the satellites.

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CPR CLAIMS TO BE NEARING COMMUNISM THROUGH COMMUNES:

SEEDS OF IDEOLOGICAL DISCORD WITH MOSCOW

A. CPR CHARTS OWN ROAD TO COMMUNISM

1. Peking on the Imminence of Communism in China

Since the inauguration of the CPR's concerted publicity for the commune movement this August, Peking propaganda has begun to make ideological claims which--when compared with Soviet statements--suggest that the CPR may envisage proclamation of a full communist society, the ultimate goal of all bloc countries, in advance of the Soviet Union.

Communism in China "Not Far Away"

The 29 August Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee directive on communes, published belatedly on 10 September, established something in the nature of a time schedule for the attainment of communism in China. Although in one paragraph it pictured the communes as a way to "complete the building of socialism ahead of time and to carry out the gradual transition to communism" (the familiar Soviet cliché) it concluded with the unambiguous statement that

the primary purpose of establishing people's communes is to accelerate the speed of socialist construction, and the primary purpose of building socialism is to prepare actively for the transition to communism. It seems that the realization of communism in our country is already not something far away.* We must actively use the form of the people's commune and through it find the concrete road of transition to communism.

Here the directive describes the people's commune as an organizational unit through which the road to communism will be found. Elsewhere it pictures the commune as an organizational form which will remain the basic social unit in a fully communist society. The reorganization of rural areas into such units has been completed with extraordinary speed. Only 8,694 communes, embracing somewhat over 30 percent of all peasant households, were reported as established by the end of August. But on 30 September, on the eve of China's National Day celebrations, NCNA announced that 750,000 agricultural cooperatives had already "transformed themselves" into 23,384 communes embracing 90.4 percent of the country's peasant households. Although the 29 August directive envisions that the consolidation of the communal units will require a period of from three to six years, NCNA's announcement now indicates that all but 10 percent of China's peasantry has already been absorbed into an organizational framework in which the further evolution toward a fully communist society will take place.

As reprinted in the 11 September PRAVDA, the directive's phrase "realization of communism" appears as osushchestvleniye kommunizma and "already not something far away" as uzhe ne yavlyayetsya chem-to dalekym. The Peking NCNA's English translation of the directive renders this passage as, "It seems that the attainment of communism in China is no longer a remote future event." Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP78-02771R000300120007-6

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Few Preconditions for Communism Still To Be Met

Communalization, however far advanced, is not yet communism. The directive on communes makes it clear that the communes will remain "socialist" rather than "communist" in character for "a number of years." It is only after this unspecified number of years, after several other preconditions have been met, that communes will become "communist" in character as Chinese society enters communism:

After a number of years, as the social product greatly increases, the communist consciousness and morality of the entire people is enormously raised, universal education is instituted and developed, the distinctions between mental and manual labor... gradually vanish, and the function of the state is limited to protecting the country from external aggression but plays no role internally--at that time, Chinese society will enter the era of communism.

Peking propaganda has already laid what could serve as groundwork for claims to be meeting some of these preconditions. With respect to universal education, the CCP's 19 September directive on education fixed a three- to five-year goal for "the task of basically eliminating illiteracy, promoting primary education, establishing middle schools in every agricultural cooperative, and establishing creches and kindergartens for children before they reach school age."*

Where the directive set forth five preconditions still to be met for the achievement of communism, an article in the CCP theoretical journal RED FLAG by Politburo member Lu Ting-i compressed them into only two. Lu's article, published 1 September, was said to have been "written in accordance with the conclusions of an educational work conference called by the CCP Central Committee." Lu drew on the 110-year-old Communist Manifesto as his authority, claiming that of Marx's 10 preconditions for communism the CPR had already carried out eight "through the adoption of means suitable to the actual conditions in our country." All that remained, Lu said, were (1) the combination of agriculture with manufacturing, and (2) the combination of education with industrial production.**

* Fifteen years is set as the target period for "vigorously developing middle school and higher-level education; and another 15 years for popularizing higher-level education.

** Marx's other eight conditions were (1) Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes; (2) a heavy progressive or graduated income tax; (3) abolition of all rights of inheritance; (4) confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels; (5) centralization of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly; (6) centralization of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the state; (7) extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the state, the bringing into cultivation of waste lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan; and (8) equal liability of all to labor; establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.

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By using Marx's 10 preconditions, Lu excluded what seemed the most formidable of the five advanced in the commune directive--limitation of the function of the state to protecting the country against external aggression.

Lu claimed that both of the two remaining preconditions he cited were already "beginning to be carried out." He said one of the main purposes of the communes was to combine agriculture with manufacturing--the first of the two preconditions. And he maintained that one of the principal purposes of the CPR's educational reform was to meet the precondition that education and industrial production be combined, or, put another way, that the distinction between mental and manual labor be eliminated. Peking media have already begun to propagandize the educational reform as a move toward eliminating this distinction, and hence as a move in the direction of a communist society,* just as they have propagandized communes as a major step toward communism. And Peking propagandists have supported Lu's claim that both the educational reform and communalization are well advanced.

Free-Supply System: "To Each According to Need"

One of the basic universal criteria for achieving communism has always been the attainment of a system that would distribute the fruits of production not according to work performed but according to need. The CPR claims already to have partially met this basic criterion in a number of the pioneer communes through the institution of a free-supply system.

The CCP Central Committee directive on communes, released on 10 September, made no mention of this system. But at the end of September--when Mao and several other top leaders were returning to Peking after extensive tours of the provinces--it was announced that "a number of communes," including 70 percent of those in the pilot province of Honan, were supplying their members with free staples and that some communes were providing clothing, housing, and a number of other services without charge.

Politburo Member Li Hsien-nien, reporting in the 16 October RED FLAG on his observations during a tour the previous month, confirmed that some version of this supply system was in use in most of the communes in Hopei as well as in Honan. Li said that in some communes he had visited, food, clothing, housing, education, medical care, maternity care, and marriage and funeral services were all provided by the commune as part of its remuneration system. He strongly endorsed this system, and suggested that it be applied to other necessities as soon as possible. He added:

The portion for distribution according to needs...will be gradually increased, and the payment portion according to work done will be gradually reduced. And so the transition to communism will be realized step by step.

Li's statement implied that communism would be achieved when all remuneration in the communes was based on the principle of "needs." The question of who will decide how much each individual "needs" is answered in the regulations for China's model commune--the "Sputnik" commune in Honan--

* A Bratislava PRAVDA article on 25 October, reviewing CPR domestic progress, accepts this CPR claim declaring that the distinction between intellectual and manual labor will "wither away" in China in "the near future."

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which were given nationwide publicity by Peking media in September. These regulations say that when grain production reaches a high level and all commune members accept the system, "they will be supplied with food free of charge in accordance with standards laid down by the state." With the state defining these standards, the problem of satisfying "needs" would seem by no means insurmountable.*

2. Moscow on the Struggle for Communism in the USSR

Whether one takes as authoritative Lu Ting-i's optimistic view of the imminence of communism in China or the commune directive's more conservative view, the spirit of both is considerably less cautious than the official line taken by the Soviet Union.

"Gradual" Transition Toward Final Goal

While the CPR claims in its nine years of existence to have reached a point where communism is a practical possibility, the USSR after 41 years still treads cautiously in speaking of the attainment of that ultimate goal. The official Soviet line is that the USSR is now in a period of "gradual transition" from socialism to communism.

In one of the most recent discussions of the problem of building communism in the USSR, the Central Committee journal KOMMUNIST (No. 12, signed for the press 9 September 1958) states flatly that communism is still far off:

there must be a final disappearance of class distinctions, of substantial distinctions between mental and physical labor, between the town and the village, while the consciousness of all the toilers must rise to the level of their communist vanguard. But this is a matter for the very distant future.

At the XX CPSU Congress in February 1956, Khrushchev conveyed no suggestion that communism was imminent in the Soviet Union. At one point in his speech he referred to the economic progress made in the four years between the XIX and XX Congresses as "a new big step forward along the road of gradual transition from socialism to communism." Elsewhere in the speech he used a metaphor which suggested a long road ahead toward communism:

The Soviet Union is now on a steep rise. To speak figuratively, we have climbed such a hill, we have reached such a height that we can see the wide horizon on the path toward the final aim: a communist society.

* Peking has not indicated precisely when the CPR expects to have the free-supply system in effect in all communes. The Bratislava PRAVDA of 25 October went so far as to suggest that the system would be instituted in most of the communes within five to six years: "...the basic principle of a communist society 'from everybody according to his strength and capability, and to everybody according to his needs,' is being substantially implemented here. However, thus far it refers only to a few communes and only the first tests are being made...Naturally a larger commune cannot venture on such experiments at the present time. However, it is believed that the communes may start to implement this higher form of a communist society within five to six years."

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Only recently, a Soviet social scientists' discussion of the theoretical problems involved in building communism portrayed these problems as serious and considerable. The discussion took place at a conference of top-ranking social scientists of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The main report, delivered by Deputy Chairman of the Academy and prominent Soviet economist Ostrovityanov, was published in PRAVDA on 28 June 1958. Although Ostrovityanov claimed in an opening paragraph that the building of communism in the USSR was an "immediate, practical aim," he set no time schedule for attaining it, saying only that Soviet technical progress had insured the creation of a "basis for communism in a short historical period."

Industrialization As Base for Achieving Communism

In the Soviet view, communism will be achieved finally when heavy industry and the productive forces of the economy are far advanced. The Soviet Political Dictionary, signed for the press on 4 April 1958, says:

Under communism the national economy will be based on much higher techniques than under socialism, both in industry and in agriculture. On the basis of advanced technique there will be achieved the complex mechanization of work, the full automation of production, the chemisation of all branches of the economy, the maximum growth of electrification, the utilization of new forms of energy....The most important conditions for the transition to communism are the all-round growth of heavy industry, the electrification of all branches of the national economy, the complete mechanization and automation of production.

Reflecting what may be the crux of the difference between the CPR and Soviet views of communism, Peking does not--despite its current campaign to double steel production--make heavy industry, electrification and automation necessary prerequisites for the achievement of communism in China. In Peking's portrayal, communism based on communalization will be characterized not by a highly developed modern industrial state such as the USSR, but by a state comprising a group of decentralized, nearly self-sufficient communes which attempt to make the best of available resources, utilizing whatever industry falls within the communal area--handicraft, light industry or heavy industry. Peking thus redefines the orthodox Leninist view of communism, a view based on the premise that communism could only be built on the economic foundations of a highly industrialized country.

By going back to the 110-year old Communist Manifesto for its criteria for communism, Peking has managed to sidestep the implications of the modern industrial era in which the Leninist and Stalinist views on communism were developed. The Soviet Union adheres to the orthodox portrayal of communism as still a distant goal in a country that has considerable distance yet to travel in industrialization.

Reforms Unaccompanied by Ideological Claims

Unlike Peking, Moscow does not present its current educational and agricultural reforms as moves to speed up progress toward communism. Khrushchev's educational reform program for the USSR aims, as Peking's does for China, at obliterating distinctions between mental and manual labor. But in the memorandum explaining the reform Khrushchev presents

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it as a practical matter of improving the educational system; he speaks once vaguely of the role of the educational reform in building the "edifice of communism," but nowhere presents it in ideological terms as a step that is a major advance toward communism.

The Soviet and CPR portrayals of their respective agricultural reforms diverge in the same manner. The CCP's commune directive said agricultural cooperatives were being converted into communes because cooperatives were outmoded. Agricultural cooperatives, made up of several hundred peasant families, could no longer satisfy China's economic needs. Cooperatives would therefore be amalgamated into larger units combining agriculture with industry, trade, education, culture and military protection. These units, the people's communes, would be the fundamental social units for the future; they would remain the "basic social units in a communist society." In the Soviet Union, Khrushchev not only did not present his machine-tractor station reform early this year as a step toward communism, but was hard pressed to prove that it was not a step away from communism.

Having ignored the ideological aspects of his MTS proposal in his 22 January speech at Minsk, Khrushchev devoted a considerable effort to defending the ideological consistency of the proposal in his Theses published on 28 February. In what seemed an effort to minimize the extent to which his proposals departed from the mainstream of Soviet doctrinal statements on MTS-collective farm relations, he made no direct reference to Stalin's views on the subject (Stalin had argued in 1952 that any transfer of basic agricultural machinery from MTS to collective-farm ownership--as has now been done in accordance with Khrushchev's proposal --would go in exactly the opposite direction from communism).*

3. Peking As Ideological Proselytizer

It may well be that the furious pace of communalization in China stems from practical economic goals which the regime felt it could not achieve without resort to such a drastic measure.** But whatever the motivating factors may have been, Peking need not have put forward communalization in such an elaborate ideological context, with such extravagant claims about its role in speeding up progress toward communism. It could have pictured the communes simply as a way of speeding up the building of socialism.

* The MTS reorganization is discussed in Radio Propaganda Report CD.104 of 18 April 1958, "Indications of Further Changes in Soviet Collective-Farm System."

** For a discussion of such economic motivating factors, see Richard Lowenthal's "China, A Fourth World Power?", Radio Free Europe Background Information, 3 October 1958. See also "Economics and Ideology in Sino-Soviet Relations," a panel discussion by Soviet-affairs specialists, Radio Free Europe Background Information, 29 September 1958. Several of the participating economists view the communes as a response to requirements for greater production in a country extremely short of capital and with a rapidly increasing population. (A source within the bloc itself, the Polish Party organ TRYBUNA LUDU on 21 October, makes a similar point.) RFE's specialists speculate that (continued on page 9)

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Peking pronouncements have in fact reflected awareness of the implications of the CPR's ideological claims about the communes--awareness that the CPR is in effect suggesting, in its pretensions to be rapidly approaching communism, that it might overtake and even outdistance the USSR despite the latter's 32-year head start.

Vice Chairman Chu Te said on 9 September that "the organization of people's communes...is a major event not only in Chinese history, but in world history." An article in the CCP's theoretical journal RED FLAG, broadcast on 16 October, called the innovation of the free-supply system in the communes an event "without parallel in history." These references to world history seem calculated precisely to invite comparisons with the USSR, the only country in the world whose history would make it susceptible to such comparison.

Inherent in Peking's ideological portrayal of communalization is the possibility that the CPR may be putting itself in the position of setting ideological standards for the entire bloc and thus creating a serious challenge to Soviet leadership.

While Peking propaganda has not suggested that the commune system might be applicable in the bloc as a whole, it has not always been careful to restrict the applicability of the commune system to China. The 29 August directive itself says, without any qualifying phrase about limitation to China, that

the people's communes are the best form of organization for the attainment of socialism and passing gradually to communism. They will become the basic social units in communist society.

A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial of 1 October makes a similar claim that the communes "will be the best organizational form for...the gradual transition to communism"--not specifying that this is true only for China, in China's particular situation.

Other Peking statements have, like Lu Ting-i on 2 September, spelled out the qualifier that the communes are the best organizational form for China. That the qualifier is used sometimes, but not rigidly or

(continued from page 8) with the cessation of direct Soviet loans to the CPR--which they trace to 1956--the Chinese Communists must now rely on their own resources and that the communes are considered the best means of mobilizing these resources.

The terms of the most recent Sino-Soviet technical aid agreement, signed in Moscow on 8 August and released simultaneously in Moscow and Peking on 12 August, does in fact suggest that the CPR is relying to a much greater extent than before on its own resources. The agreement says Soviet aid will consist of "surveying, research work, designing of certain industries, supply of parts of the equipment, instruments and cables, as well as the dispatching of experts and the training of Chinese personnel." It goes on to say, however, that "in view of China's achievements in industrial development and in training its own engineering and technical personnel, the Chinese side will carry out the designing, surveying and research work on most plants covered by the agreement, while the engineering industry of the People's Republic of China will supply the equipment needed for these plants."

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consistently, suggests that CPR theoreticians are aware they may be treading on potentially dangerous ideological ground but are not seriously concerned to mute or suppress this crucial ideological implication of the communes.

CPR's Pattern Could Be Relevant Elsewhere in Asia

There are already indications that the CPR may hold up the communal system as a prototype at least for the Asian communist countries. In the earliest authoritative Peking pronouncement to mention the communes, Peking laid the basis for such a claim along with the basis for a claim that China and Asia should be excepted from European methods of building communism.

A long RED FLAG article on 16 July, dwelling on Mao's contributions to communist theory, laid great stress on the vagueness of Marx's and Engels' very general schemes for implementing communism and exhumed a long-buried quotation from Lenin, using it out of context to demonstrate that special conditions for building communism--unknown to European countries--existed in Asia. The crux of these special conditions was the existence of a huge, backward peasantry.

The article was written by Chen Po-ta, alternate Politburo member, deputy director of the CCP Propaganda Department, and editor of RED FLAG. Chen's article, replete with laudatory references to Mao's theories, made only a bow in the direction of Marx and Lenin and not even that in the direction of the current Soviet leadership. Chen first stressed the lack of precision in Marx's and Engels' prescriptions for communism:

Needless to say, Marx and Engels could only show us the general direction of struggle and give us the general principles for directing the struggle; they could not write out a prescription for each nation and each country that will...insure victory of revolution and the realization of communism. It was impossible for them to...provide each nation and each country with a detailed and ready-made scheme....Revolution must depend on the people of each country.

In going on to discuss the difficulties of building communism in backward countries with large populations, he drew on a quotation from Lenin's 1919 report to the second congress of the Communist Party organizations of Eastern Russia, a quotation unused in Soviet pronouncements:

You are confronted with a task never before encountered by the Communists of the world: that is, you must, in the light of special conditions unknown to the European countries, apply the general communist theory and communist measures and realize that peasants are the principal masses and that it is not capital but the survivals of the Middle Ages that is to be opposed...You must find special forms to unite the proletarians of the world with the working masses of the East.

Chen Po-ta pointed out that the passage was taken from Lenin's report to the Communist Party organizations of Eastern Russia. He did not acknowledge that in context it was not intended to sanction "special forms" for building communism throughout Asia but simply to authorize the Communists in the Eastern sections of Russia to adapt their tactics

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to the conditions peculiar to the backward areas of the Tsarist empire. He contended, on the contrary, that Lenin was in effect sanctioning "special forms" of building communism throughout the entire Far East:

The contents of these words actually went beyond the frontier of the Soviet Union. The Eastern countries beyond the frontier of the Soviet Union were more or less in the same position, that is, the peasants were the principal masses. Thus, the task presented by Lenin--an "extremely momentous task" in his words--was in fact likewise placed before the Communists of Eastern countries.

In effect, Chen was taking a statement no longer incorporated in Soviet dogma* to justify a special Chinese and Asian communist road to communism based not on the working class but on the peasantry. This road, he later implied, would be based on the commune which would combine agriculture and industry, the peasant and the worker. He seemed to provide an answer to the problem long plaguing communist theoreticians of how to proletarianize the peasantry. And his article could clearly serve as groundwork for future claims that China's road to communism through the communes is a model for all Asian bloc countries.

USSR Denies Validity of "Special Roads"

Moscow has ignored the claims to Chinese exceptionalism raised provocatively by Chen Po-ta. Soviet propaganda has continued to stress the universal applicability of the Soviet road. On at least one recent occasion, Moscow has pointedly referred to China's "socialist transformation" not to represent China as in any way exceptional but precisely as proof that special roads do not exist. RED STAR on 30 September, commemorating Chinese National Day, took pains to make the point that the CPR's experience could in no way justify the "revisionist" idea that there can be special roads of socialist building:

The entire process of socialist transformation of China is clear demonstration of the all-victorious force of Marxism-Leninism. The example of China makes particularly clear the absurdity of the fabrications of contemporary revisionists that fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism on the construction of socialism are allegedly outdated, that the experiences of the Soviet people, who were the first to implement these principles, have no international significance, and that therefore the Communist and workers parties of other countries must necessarily work out their own "special" road, different in principle from the road which was and is covered by the Soviet Union.

RED STAR's unusually defensive language suggested Soviet concern that the Chinese innovation might strengthen revisionist arguments. It could be read as a reply to the arguments put forward by Chen Po-ta in July--a warning to the Chinese Communists that claims to exception from the "universal" laws are "revisionist heresies" no matter where they come from.

* The statement does not appear in the most recent postwar edition of Lenin's collected works issued by the Soviet State Publishing House for Political Literature.

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B. MISGIVINGS ABOUT CPR CLAIMS REFLECTED IN SOVIET SLOGANS

1. No Acknowledgement of New Commune System

The current greeting to Communist China in the CPSU's 1958 October Revolution anniversary slogans makes no reference to the establishment of communes. Issued semiannually, each May Day and October Revolution anniversary, the CPSU's slogans have traditionally been used as vehicles to convey to the Communist world the precise line fixed in Moscow with respect to foreign and domestic affairs. The slogans not only reflect the state of the USSR's general relations with other countries and the premises of Moscow's over-all policies, but the line with respect to actual current developments: This October's greeting to China, for example, takes due note of the Taiwan Strait crisis.*

In October 1955, the CPSU's slogan for China took note of the CPR's accelerated drive to cooperativize its countryside, referring to "cooperation in agriculture." A special effort was apparently made to insert that phrase following Peking's release of a major speech by Mao Tse-tung raising the CPR's goal for the development of rural cooperatives. The phrase "cooperation in agriculture" was not contained in the initial releases of the slogans, but appeared in subsequent ones, having evidently been added at the last minute in acknowledgement of Mao's speech.

Had the CPSU chosen to acknowledge the communes in its current greeting to China, it would have had a clear precedent in the sloganization of the CPR's 1955 cooperative movement.

2. CPR Reduced to Satellite Level of "Socialist" Progress

The current slogan for China not only ignores the communes, but withdraws a subtle semantic distinction between the CPR and the satellites that had seemed to place the former a notch higher in the scale of countries "building socialism."

In the prior three sets of May Day and October Revolution slogans, the CPR had been called "builder of socialism" (stroitel sotsializma) while the satellites were said to be "building socialism" (stroyashchiy sotsializm). The difference, hair-splitting though it may seem at first glance, was a real one: "Builder of socialism," in Russian as in English, can be taken to mean that the country either is in the process of building socialism or has already built it; there is no ambiguity about "building socialism," which can only refer to a process in being.

The difference could not have been attributed to the mechanics of sentence structure--the slogans for China and the satellites were structurally parallel in this regard. The difference seems hardly attributable

* The October 1958 set of slogans is analyzed in detail in Radio Propaganda Report CD.117 of 20 October 1958, the latest of the reports issued regularly by FBIS on the CPSU's May Day and October Revolution anniversary slogans.

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to chance, having been present consistently since May 1956. Close examination of the slogans over the years has indicated that they are formulated with extreme care to convey precise, subtle shades of meaning in the esoteric language peculiar to Communist communications.

Having three times, in these carefully formulated documents, distinguished China from the satellites in a manner that could only be interpreted as favorable to the CPR, Moscow now withdraws the distinction--and so withdraws any basis for crediting the CPR with faster progress toward socialism than the satellites.

China Always Distinguished from Satellites Until Now

From October 1954, when references to the building of socialism first appeared in slogans for bloc countries, until October 1958 the CPR had always been distinguished from the other bloc countries with respect to how far it had gone toward socialism. Before May 1956, the CPR was placed at a lower level than the satellites (it was struggling for construction only of the "foundations" of socialism in October 1955, for example, when the satellites were already struggling to build socialism itself).

By May 1956, after the CPR had announced completion of its collectivization, the slogans credited China with having overtaken and outdistanced the satellites: China was "successfully realizing a socialist transformation" while the satellites were still "struggling for...the construction of socialism."

By October 1956, a month after the VIII Chinese Communist Party Congress had announced completion of the "fundamental" tasks of socialism in China, the CPSU elevated China another notch to "successfully building socialism" while the satellites were still "struggling for" its construction.

By May 1957, the satellites were finally graduated to "building socialism" (stroyashchiy sotsializm),* catching up to the level the CPR had reached the preceding October. And the CPR--still keeping its distance from the satellites--was in turn moved up another ideological notch to "builder of socialism" (stroitel sotsializma). This ambiguous formulation, implying that the Chinese Communists might already have built socialism, seemed a bow in the direction of acknowledging the claim advanced at the September 1956 CCP Party Congress that China had "fundamentally realized the tasks of the socialist revolution."**

The shade of difference between China and the satellites, in the former's favor, was preserved in October 1957 and May 1958.

The chart on the opposite page shows the consistent progression upward in socialist building which had until this October been credited to the Chinese Communists, and the careful distinction which until this October had been drawn between China and the satellites.

* The formula was applied that May Day to all the satellites except the DRV (which was not yet credited with having reached any stage in socialist building) and Hungary (which in this first set of slogans after the Hungarian rebellion drew a special--and equivocal--"warm wish for successes in the building of socialism").

**In Party Secretary General Teng Hsiao-ping's report to the Congress.

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	<u>Slogans for China</u>	<u>Slogans for the Satellites</u>
May 1954	(no reference to building of socialism)	(no reference to building of socialism)
Oct. 1954	successfully struggling for... construction of the foundations of socialism	successfully struggling for... construction of a socialist society
May 1955	successfully struggling for... construction of the foundations of socialism	successfully struggling for... construction of socialism
Oct. 1955	successfully struggling for... construction of the foundations of socialism	struggling for the construction of socialism
May 1956	<u>successfully realizing</u> a socialist transformation	<u>struggling for...</u> the construction of socialism
Oct. 1956	<u>successfully building</u> socialism	<u>struggling for...</u> the construction of socialism*
May 1957	<u>builder of</u> socialism	<u>building</u> socialism
Oct. 1957	<u>builder of</u> socialism	<u>building</u> socialism
May 1958	<u>builder of</u> socialism	<u>building</u> socialism
Oct. 1958	<u>building</u> socialism	<u>building</u> socialism

* In October 1956 the CPSU introduced the practice of greeting each bloc country in a separate slogan. Prior to that time, a single slogan had been used to greet the people's democracies collectively.

All the satellites have consistently been described in identical language in their respective slogans, except for (1) the DRV (not promoted from "building a new life" to "building socialism" until October 1958) and (2) Hungary in the May 1957 slogan that came after the Hungarian rebellion.

Since October 1957, all the satellites have been greeted in Russian-alphabetical order. Only China has been differentiated as to status: China comes first, followed by the other Communist countries in alphabetical order.

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The October 1958 slogan for China is thus the first one since October 1954 --when descriptions of socialist building were introduced into Soviet slogans--that has not either retained China at the level credited to her in the last previous set of slogans or promoted her to a higher level. The new formula for the first time breaks the pattern which since May 1956, in five successive sets of slogans, had portrayed the Chinese Communists as higher than the satellites in the scale of countries building socialism.

Levels of Socialist Building Always a Sensitive Subject

The extreme sensitivity of Communist leaders to formulations concerning levels of socialist building was demonstrated in October 1955, when Molotov wrote an open letter to the editors of KOMMUNIST admitting that he had expressed "a theoretically mistaken and politically harmful" formulation in his February 1955 Supreme Soviet speech. In that speech, in discussing the different levels of development of the countries in the bloc, Molotov had distinguished the level attained by the USSR from that attained by the satellites:

Side by side with the Soviet Union, where the foundations of a socialist society have already been built, there are also people's democratic countries which have made only the first-- but extremely important--steps in the direction of socialism.

In his letter of self-criticism, Molotov admitted that his "erroneous formulation leads to an incorrect deduction that allegedly a socialist society has still not been built in the USSR--that only the foundations of a socialist society have been built...." In the final paragraph of his letter, Molotov said that the incorrect formulation "brings confusion" into ideological questions. At the XX Party Congress the following February, Khrushchev attacked Molotov--though without mentioning him by name--for the same "incorrect" formulation.

The extreme sensitivity of the subject was evident not simply from the fact that Molotov was compelled to recant his formulation, but from the reasons for which he was compelled to disavow it. The formula was impermissible not only because it was wrong in and of itself, but because it could lead someone to draw "an incorrect deduction"--because it carried with it a possible implication that would be incorrect.

Hence the extreme care--the hair-splitting differentiations--in the language of the CPSU's slogans, language contrived not only to convey ostensible meanings but to provide those educated in communist parlance with the basis for deductions as to real meaning.

PRAVDA Editorials on Slogans Use Equivocal Formulae

In broaching the sensitive subject of progress toward communism in the bloc, PRAVDA's 20 October editorial on the current slogans used a formula that seemed designed to beg the question of China's progress relative to the USSR's. The editorial referred ambiguously to the successes already achieved in the "construction of socialism and communism in the USSR, the CPR and all the countries of the camp." By lumping all the bloc countries together, PRAVDA sidestepped the crucial question of comparative stages reached in the individual bloc countries' progress toward communism.

Six days later, another PRAVDA editorial similarly sidestepped the problem. Devoted to "The Great Cooperation of Socialist Countries," that editorial stated that the world socialist system was entering a "new phase

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of development": Where previously the building of socialism had been completed only in the Soviet Union, "now we are entering the epoch of the completion of the building of socialism in many countries." It did not, however, differentiate among those other countries. With respect to the CPR, it said "the great Chinese people are carrying out the task of the building of socialism with great enthusiasm." At best, this seemed no greater an achievement than "the great victory in the struggle for socialism scored by the people of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Albania, Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, Rumania, the DPRK, the Mongolian People's Republic and the DRV."

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C. CALCULATED SOVIET PROPAGANDA DEEMPHASIS OF COMMUNES

In the indirect manner characteristic of communist communications, Moscow has indicated that it does not endorse the radical new Chinese Communist ideological claims.

No high-ranking Soviet leader has yet mentioned the communes--and there was ample occasion when mention of them would have seemed called for in speeches and congratulatory messages on CPR National Day (1 October). The Soviet press carried articles by CPR spokesmen on National Day which lauded the communes--but the Soviet press always publishes articles by Chinese authors on the CPR's National Day, and the Chinese spokesmen always review what Peking regards as its major accomplishments. In the entire period since the inauguration of communes in August, including the period surrounding National Day, the Soviet central press has published only three discussions of communes by Soviet authors. Only one of the three was a full-length article devoted to communes--and that appeared not in the top theoretical organs of the Party, but in LITERARY GAZETTE. Radio Moscow managed to broadcast 215 CPR National Day commentaries without mentioning the communes in more than three.*

In one glaring distortion, the official Soviet Government organ IZVESTIA misquoted a passage from the CCP directive in what seemed a deliberate effort to suppress the Chinese Communists' claim to be nearing communism. In an instance of more subtle misrepresentation, the CPSU Central Committee journal PARTY LIFE prefaced a passage from the directive with a qualifier limiting its significance strictly to the Chinese scene--something the directive itself did not do.

1. Paucity of Authoritative Soviet Comment

Since the release of the 29 August CCP directive on the establishment of communes, Soviet authoritative press organs have given the communes minimal token publicity and have originated only three discussions of any aspect of communalization.

No Soviet leader has mentioned communes. Khrushchev's National Day telegram to Mao Tse-tung referred three times to the CPR's efforts in "socialist" construction. His only reference to communism was an ambiguous

* Although Moscow has not commented extensively in the past on Chinese internal economic demarches, Soviet treatment of Peking's accelerated collectivization drive in the winter of 1955 was markedly less restrained than current treatment of the communes. Mao Tse-tung's 31 July 1955 report, stepping up the campaign, was released by Peking on 16 October. Twelve days later a Soviet home service commentary dwelt in detail on the "grand progress of socialist transformation of Chinese agriculture." On 3 December PRAVDA published a lengthy account of the agricultural transformation based on selected quotations from PEOPLE'S DAILY. PRAVDA also published several TASS dispatches from Peking in December dealing with the new collectivization drive, and on 20 December it published a long description of Chinese agricultural developments by its staff correspondent in Peking. The following month, the Soviet Party paper published a collection of articles on the socialist transformation in the Chinese countryside with a foreword by Mao.

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one, putting its attainment for the CPR--as for the USSR--in an unspecified future: "The friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples is sealed for all time in the unity of aims for communism."

A. Andreyev, CPSU Central Committee member and chairman of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Society, similarly ignored the communes altogether in his Moscow Stadium speech on the eve of CPR National Day. The subject was ignored even by Soviet official spokesmen in Peking, who were responding directly to remarks in which their Chinese counterparts lauded the communes.

Despite the fact that all major Peking commentaries on National Day hailed the development of communes as a move of major importance, PRAVDA's 1 October National Day editorial said nothing that could even be construed as an indirect reference to communes. PRAVDA said only that the "socialist cooperative system is firmly established in the Chinese countryside." The Peking PEOPLE'S DAILY that same day repeated the standard CPR rationale for the commune movement--that "the cooperatives are inadequate to meet the demands of the developing situation" in China.

Single Full-Length Article on Communes in LITERARY GAZETTE

The sole full-length discussion of communes by a Soviet author appeared in the 30 September LITERARY GAZETTE over the signature of the paper's Peking correspondent Alexander Smerdov. The article offered no interpretation of the ideological significance of the communes, nowhere even using the word "communism." Smerdov's largely descriptive article conveyed the impression that nothing more was involved in communalization than a changeover to a more advanced stage of "socialist agriculture." Communes were

the fast but planned transition from the now existing cooperative form of Chinese socialist agriculture to a higher socialist organization.

Smerdov followed the pattern of an earlier single-paragraph discussion of communes in the CPSU Central Committee's PARTY LIFE (No. 18, signed for the press 26 September). Author A. Martynov's short paragraph on communes--buried in a seven-page article on "Victorious Construction of Socialism in China"--said nothing about communes as related to a transition to communism:

The mass movement which has recently developed in the country for the reorganization of the agricultural production cooperatives into large people's communes of a socialist type is called on to play a large role in the mobilization of the creative activity of the 500,000,000-strong peasantry. Leadership of local industry, agriculture, trade, industry, education, health and the people's militia is being transferred to the jurisdiction of the people's communes. As is pointed out in the decision of an expanded session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP, the people's communes, under Chinese conditions, "is the best organizational form for the hastening of socialist construction."

In introducing the quotation from the CCP directive with the phrase "under Chinese conditions," Martynov added a major qualifier that is not expressed in the directive.

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KOMMUNIST Presents Innocuous Picture of Communes

A historical review in KOMMUNIST of CPR achievements since 1949, geared to CPR National Day, contains five innocuous paragraphs on communes in the course of 11 pages, discussing factually the number of communes organized in certain provinces and the manner in which they are organized. This article in the CPSU Central Committee's theoretical journal (No. 13, signed for the press 2 October) follows the pattern of the LITERARY GAZETTE and PARTY LIFE articles in conveying no suggestion whatever of the radical nature of the communes as pictured in Peking propaganda. Author Sidikhmenov's only evaluative comment is that the communes are playing "a large role in the further growth of the productive forces of society and in the organization of a sharp upsurge of agriculture."

To these five paragraphs, Sidikhmenov adds a sixth consisting of a verbatim quotation of the passage in the CCP directive which does relate the communes to the attainment of communism. But the quotation on the ideological significance of the communes is tacked illogically at the end of Sidikhmenov's own remarks, which are in a totally different vein.

Sidikhmenov in effect goes no further than the Soviet Party press had done before (in PRAVDA's reprint of the CCP directive) in offering pro forma acknowledgement of the CPR's claim about progress toward communism. He not only declines to evaluate the Peking claim, but in an indirect way offsets it by presenting a vastly diluted picture of communalization.

2. Minimal Comment on Communes from Radio Moscow

Soviet radio propaganda, for mass consumption, has virtually ignored the communes. Since 1 September, Moscow's 60-odd commentaries devoted wholly to CPR economic developments have contained only four short paragraph-length discussions of communes, three of them on National Day. Soviet home service newscasts have mentioned communes only once, in a brief 5 September item citing a Peking report that all peasants in Honan Province had joined communes.

On the occasion of CPR National Day, a traditional time for review of Chinese Communist progress in all spheres, Radio Moscow managed to broadcast 215 commentaries about China without discussing the communes in more than three.

A 29 September home service talk by Academician Kapitsa, on CPR developments in general, noted that

fresh, enormous changes are taking place in agriculture. The Chinese countryside is now embracing new forms of economy-- people's communes. ...As pointed out by the decision of the CCP Central Committee on 29 August 1958, the creation of people's communes is a necessary basic course aimed at speeding up socialist building, pre-schedule building of socialism, and a gradual transition to communism."

Kapitsa took the quotation on "gradual transition to communism" directly from the CCP directive. He simply reported the CPR's claim, offering no comment of his own.

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The following day, another commentary on CPR domestic progress by a Soviet academician, broadcast twice in the home service, included the following short sentence on communes:

People's communes are now being set up in Chinese villages to accelerate socialist construction and progress toward communism.

Yuryev did not elaborate.

Nothing was said about communism in the only subsequent Radio Moscow commentary reference to communes--by historian Feliks Alekseyev, beamed only to North America on 21 October. In the course of a general discussion of the reorganization of China's rural life, Alekseyev devoted only 150 words to the communes, concluding that the purpose behind communalization was to raise Chinese living standards and to "forge ahead along the road of progress at still greater speed."

3. Three Soviet Press Articles by Chinese Spokesmen

Three Chinese-authored articles have appeared in the Soviet central press, all in connection with CPR National Day: articles by Politburo alternate member Po I-po in IZVESTIA, by Politburo member Li Fu-Chun in PRAVDA, and by a member of a local commune Party committee in SOVIET FLEET. Li Fu-chun's contained only a paragraph on the communes, Po I-po's contained about eight paragraphs, and the article in SOVIET FLEET was completely devoted to a description of communalization.

All three articles put forward, in one way or another, the contention that communalization would speed up the transition to communism. All three thus raised the ideological implications of the communes that Soviet comment itself has all but totally ignored. Po I-po quoted the key paragraph from the CPR commune directive, Li Fu-chun paraphrased it, and the local CPR commune official called his particular commune "the first flowering of communism in our area."

Having invited Chinese spokesmen to contribute articles to the Soviet press for National Day, a traditional practice, it seems unlikely that Moscow would assume for itself the power to veto what the Chinese leaders chose to write. Publication of the CPR spokesmen's views in articles on such an occasion cannot be taken automatically to imply unqualified Soviet approval of their total content.

IZVESTIA Tampers with Key Passage in CPR Directive

That Moscow does not, in fact, endorse the ideological claims for communalization made by the CPR leaders in the Soviet press was indicated by what seems a direct, deliberate distortion of a passage from the CCP directive on communes in Po I-po's article in IZVESTIA. Po quoted from the CCP directive on communes the passage which in the original reads "the establishment of communism in China is no longer a remote future event." As it appears in IZVESTIA, the passage reads "the establishment of communes is no longer a remote future event."

It is unlikely that Po I-po himself would have deliberately misquoted the CCP directive. Barring the equally unlikely possibility of a printer's or translator's error, it would appear that IZVESTIA's editorial board

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altered the text to remove any suggestion that the CPR was moving toward the attainment of communism in the not too distant future.

Although similar passages were not altered elsewhere--either in the Soviet reprint of the commune directive or in the Li Fu-chun article--this distortion alone would seem a reflection of Moscow's serious concern about the radical CPR ideological claims for the communes.

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