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TO : [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency

DATE: October 3, 1955

FROM : [redacted] 25X1A9a

SUBJECT: Paper on Communist Tactics at International Conferences

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At the request of [redacted] this paper has been reviewed within DRS and the reaction has not been too favorable. In general it is felt that the paper is quite superficial and that it is geared both in style and content to a rather low level audience. While it might be of help to some group entirely unoriented to Communist practices, the statements concerning Communist tactics and policy and the examples given are so commonplace that anyone who reads a newspaper regularly should be quite familiar with them--consequently the paper would be of little use as a guide to persons engaged in conferences.

In attempting to give illustrations, the study is often misleading in attributing certain types of behavior to the Russians alone. Many of the Soviet maneuvers at conferences are really not innovations but have long been practiced by Western European nations--Harold Nicolson's "Diplomacy" contains some excellent examples. Yet this paper tends to make them exclusive Soviet inventions and supposedly therefore something to be frowned upon by other negotiating nations.

There is a need for a study on the subject of conference tactics, especially for the many lesser conferences in which inexperienced and lower-ranking US diplomatic and military personnel are engaged with Soviet negotiators of far higher training and experience. Such a study should encompass the difference in tactics used by the Soviet Union in various conference situations. They use quite different tactics depending upon the issue involved, their position of strength or weakness within the particular conference situations. They use quite different tactics depending upon the issue involved, their position of strength or weakness within the particular conference, and the particular goal, whether momentary or long-run they are attempting to achieve.

Such a study should also encompass a study of Soviet agreements, their proneness to repudiate tentative agreements made in previous conferences when such a step turns out to be to their disadvantage. The matter of joint press releases should be analyzed, together with the Soviet use of such instruments to imply agreement on a point in order to use the press release as a propaganda instrument for public proof of a later assertion that the western side had agreed to something when in fact it had not. There is also the Soviet tactic of planting provocative newspaper articles prior to a session in order to force the western side to affirm or deny it, thereby revealing their intended position. Another trap needed highlighting is the use of dangerously

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ambiguous Russian words which appear to be good translations of certain English words but which actually leave to the Soviet side great freedom of action in interpretation and implementation.

Of even greater use to US negotiators than a mere description of Soviet tactics would be a list of suggested tactics to counter Soviet tactics.

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