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MAO'S CHINA

A Model For Africa ?



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MAO'S China, although it has departed from tradition in many ways, has maintained and even increased a long-standing Chinese interest in Africa.

Centuries before Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung established his regime in 1949, Chinese officials, merchants and explorers were intrigued by the mysteries and potentialities of the vast continent.

Some Sino-African contacts go back almost 2,000 years. Second century writings of the famed geographers of Alexandria attest that Africans already knew both land and sea routes to China. There was a brisk trade exchange in ivory and porcelain during the Chinese Sung dynasty, from 960 to 1279. Ibn Batuta, the legendary Arab traveler, reached China in 14th century journeys from Morocco and Cheng-ho, a representative of the Chinese royal court, led naval expeditions to East Africa in the 15th century.

Under Mr. Mao, the People's Republic of China (also known as Mainland China or Communist China) has sought to develop its ties with Africa in new and accelerated ways.

It has sent trade, cultural and political emissaries to virtually every African country and has encouraged return visits by African governmental, business and youth leaders. African students have been urged to attend Chinese universities. Above all, there has been a concerted effort to advance the idea that China can serve as a model for the development of Africa's many newly independent nations.

Peking's representatives say their experiences in attempting to feed, clothe and industrialize their over-populated country could be of great value if applied to the needs and desires of Africa. Communist China, they say in effect, can be a political and economic pattern for any other nation with similar problems.

The validity of this "model" concept has become one of the decade's most frequently-discussed topics.

Pertinent African and Chinese views, together with some of the more important background issues, are summarized in the following pages.

Peking and Non-Alignment

African statesmen and the officials of Communist China have expressed strikingly different viewpoints concerning the proper role of their respective nations in world political affairs.

Many African leaders eloquently affirm that non-alignment is the keystone of their national policies.

Peking insists that neutrality of any kind is an unreasonable concept.

Premier Ben Bella of Algeria, in October, 1962, said:

"We intend to remain independent despite what any other state may think. We are, I repeat, completely faithful to our policy of non-alignment and neutrality."

"Non-alignment," President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana declared on June 21, 1963, "is now a world factor and moral force in international relations. The contribution of Africa as a continent united in its observance of a truly non-aligned policy will give tremendous weight to that force."

Or, as President Modibo Keita of the Republic of Mali put it at the Addis Ababa African summit conference on May 24, 1963:

"The African states, uniting their efforts, must develop an independent African policy, in all domains, which will be clear to any non-African country, any great power or group of powers. Together we must simultaneously undertake the solemn engagement of building African unity, of never making our organizations into an instrument of one state or group of states."

Peking's official spokesmen, especially when traveling in Africa, tend to avoid direct confrontations on the sensitive non-alignment issue and to suggest instead that Communist China and the new African nations are bound together by more important ties of mutual self-interest.

But the Chinese are at a great disadvantage in face-to-face discussions of existing international relationships. Their historic and continuing stand against neutrality and world cooperation in the United Nations is too well known to be explained away with diplomatic amenities.

Astute African officials, for example, are well aware that Liu Shao-chi's classic work on "Internationalism and Nationalism" contains the blunt assertion that neutrality is impossible.

Mr. Liu, who is vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist party as well as Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic, also declared in

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his 1948 opus that "all the nations, countries, classes, strata, parties and groups in the whole world" must choose one side or the other in the so-called East-West conflict.

Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung, who in 1940 had predicted that "all the countries of the world will be swept into one or the other of . . . two camps," expressed Peking's position on non-alignment even more succinctly in 1949 when he said: "Neutrality is mere camouflage and a third road does not exist."

It is pure illusion, the Chinese leader has declared, that any country can follow a policy of inclining "to neither side" on any international political question.

Jen-min Jih-pao, the official Chinese Communist party newspaper, carried the "choose-sides-or-else" ultimatum to its ultimate extreme in a November 30, 1961, editorial urging that non-Communist governments be "wiped off the face of the earth" in the interests of international solidarity.

African awareness of this Chinese attitude was indicated by President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, on January 18, 1963, when he said:

"The Communist states, in their efforts to weaken the foundation of non-Communist states, try to create an atmosphere of discontent. In addition, Tunisia can neither accept their insistence on the necessity of class warfare nor their belief that Tunisia should follow in the wake of the USSR or Red China."

In a December, 1963, editorial, the **Tanganyika Standard** made this observation regarding the tour of Africa then being made by Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai:

"Africa today is alert to the danger of those who seek to replace one form of domination with another. Indeed it is for this reason that African states have chosen to follow the path of positive neutrality and warned that they intend to pick their own friends."

Columnist Ayo Adefolaju, writing in the Lagos, Nigeria **Sunday Times** of December 29, 1963, said:

"No amount of propaganda pumped into the head of the modern African can easily convince him that Communist China is likely to be a better friend of Africa than any other nation of the world.

"China's record is hardly anything to envy what with its current aggression against the Republic of India, what with its humiliation of the Dalai Lama and his poor country. Which African can ever agree

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with Chou's dogma that war is inevitable? Who does not know that the majority of China's teeming population are living in abject poverty worse than the case in most parts of Africa?

"Communists like capitalists have a right to wish that their system should be adopted throughout the world. But it is wishful thinking to expect that the new Africa which is emerging will continue to adopt foreign systems when it can evolve its own system.

". . . There are very few Africans who can easily be attracted to Communism. The average African is essentially a democrat who wishes to be ruled with his own consent."

Several weeks earlier, on October 21, the Kenya **Daily Nation** had warned that "the Chinese aim is to get a toehold in Africa and make individuals as well as governments friendly to them. They are out to convert those responsive to their thinking and to subvert those who are not. . . It is clear that the Chinese have no interest at all in fostering African unity."

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Peking and Peace

Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia stated at the Addis Ababa Summit Conference on May 22, 1963: ". . . We demand an end to nuclear testing, to the arms race, because these activities, which pose such dreadful threats to man's existence, waste and squander humanity's material heritage. . ."

In official resolutions, the Conference later affirmed its unanimous opposition to "all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests" and appealed "to the great powers to . . . sign a general and complete disarmament agreement under strict and effective international control."

On August 5, 1963, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union ended long negotiations by signing a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests except those underground. More than 100 other states — including 30 nations of Africa — promptly signed or acceded to the treaty. Communist China, however, rejected the agreement as a "dirty fraud."

The African nations approving the pact were: Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy Republic, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somali Republic, South Africa, Sudan, Tanganyika, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic and Upper Volta.

African diplomats hailed the treaty as a step toward general disarmament, the relaxation of international tensions and lasting peace.

Nigerian Foreign Minister Jaja Wachuku called the treaty "a right step in the right direction at the right time." Ambassador Richard E. Kelfa-Caulker of Sierra Leone said it was "a shaft of light in the great darkness." Ambassador Omar Mohallim of the Somali Republic said it "brings great hope to humanity." Ambassador Aristide Issembe of Gabon called it "an open door on the road that leads to reconciliation of peoples and human brotherhood."

Expressing hope that the treaty would lead to further reduction of tensions, Senegalese Ambassador Ousmane Soce Diop said the African nations do not want to see the world divided into two antagonistic blocs. Ambassador Konan Bedie of the Ivory Coast saw in the treaty the promise of an international climate favorable to African economic, cultural and social development. The same factor was stressed by Ambassador S. Edward Peal of Liberia, the first African nation to sign the treaty in Washington. Ambassador Abdou Sidikou of Niger,

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the 100th signatory, viewed the pact as a "decisive step toward the common objective toward which humanity is reaching — that is peace."

While other African statesmen expressed similar opinions, Communist China assailed the treaty. "It is unthinkable for the Chinese Government to be a party to this dirty fraud," an official Peking statement said July 31, six days after the three original signatories had initialed the agreement in Moscow.

In this and later statements, the Chinese contended that the treaty "has every harm and no benefit" and "is rotten to the core." They maintained that it "jeopardizes the interests of the people of the world and the cause of world peace" and that it is "not a first step toward peace but a step to increase the danger of war."


How did Peking arrive at these singular conclusions? The answer appears to lie in the dogma to which the Chinese have held rigidly during their ideological dispute with the Soviet Union since 1956.

Chinese party theorists view the world in terms of a series of "irreconcilable contradictions." The chief of these is depicted as the "inevitable" hostility which exists between Communist and non-Communist countries. This is usually stated as the contradiction between "socialism" and "capitalism," or between "socialism" and "imperialism and its lackeys." Antagonistic blocs, thus, are said to be an inescapable reality in the world as it is now constituted.

Such blocs will exist until Communism conquers all opposition and establishes its own rule everywhere, Chinese spokesmen maintain. They emphasize that non-Communist nations "will never withdraw from the arena of history of their own accord." Eventually, all must be overthrown. Only when they "are wiped off the face of the earth can the great ideal of everlasting peace of mankind be really translated into reality," the Peking **Jen-min Jih-pao**, top official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, said December 1, 1961.

Possessing this militant outlook and recognizing that other nations will defend themselves against Communist conquest, Peking argues that warfare is also inevitable. Communist parties, therefore, are urged to develop the power needed "to make a revolution that will smash the bourgeois state machine." On April 16, 1960, the Chinese party magazine **Red Flag** called to mind this passage from the works of Lenin: "Not a single great revolution in history has ever been carried out without a civil war and no serious Marxists will believe it possible to make the transition from capitalism to socialism without a civil war."

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Thirty African nations were among the more than 100 states which in 1963 signed or acceded to a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests except those underground. The hands here are those of Ambassador Miguel Augustus Ribeiro, signing for the Government of Ghana. Communist China refused to join the treaty and called it a "dirty fraud."

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The peaceful co-existence tactics which soviet Premier Khrushchev advocates for Communist gains will not achieve the final victory, Peking insists.

In 1963 the Peking regime on numerous occasions reaffirmed its commitment to these rules which Mao Tse-tung laid down many years earlier: 1) "Whoever has an army has power, for war settles everything; 2) "Every Communist must grasp the truth that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun; 3) "The whole world can be remolded only with the gun. . . War can only be abolished through war — in order to get rid of the gun, we must first grasp it in our hands."

The Chinese argue that the emergence of nuclear weapons has not changed the validity of these Maoist rules or "the fundamental Marxist-Leninist theory" on the inevitability of war. They accuse the Soviet Union of "fatalism" and "pessimism" for dwelling on the terrible destruction that nuclear war could bring to all parts of the world. They say it is "spineless" and "cowardly" to shrink from revolutionary risks because of fear that local wars might lead to general thermonuclear war.


If Communist states maintain sufficient military might, Peking believes, they could win a nuclear war. Then, as **Red Flag** prophesied in 1960, "on the debris of a dead imperialism, the victorious people would create swiftly a civilization a thousand times higher than the capitalist system and a truly beautiful future for themselves." A cruel and callous view, indeed, the Soviet Union replied, "a cynical gamble with human lives."

Upholding these positions as the nuclear test ban treaty was initiated and signed, Peking charged that the Soviet Union had "sold out" Communism's world revolutionary interests by entering into an agreement which could limit the military potential of the Communist states.

Another factor was also involved here: the strong revolutionary and chauvinistic desire of the Chinese to develop nuclear weapons of their own. They recognized that the test ban could deter their plans or further isolate China in world opinion if they conducted atmospheric tests in the future. On August 20, 1963, a Soviet government statement said the Chinese leaders had "shut themselves off from the entire world by some sort of blinkers" and were "blinded by their craving to have nuclear weapons in their own home."

While opposing the partial test ban treaty, Premier Chou En-lai on

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In contrast to Chinese leaders, African statesmen greeted the nuclear test ban treaty as an important step toward disarmament and lasting peace. The treaty was first signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, by U. S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and British Foreign Secretary Lord Home. More than 100 other nations later joined in the treaty.

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August 2 addressed a letter to "the government heads of all countries of the world" proposing that a global summit conference be called to discuss "the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons." This was widely regarded as an attempt to deflect support from the test ban treaty.

Peking continued to promote the idea of a general disarmament parley, although a Chinese government statement of September 1, 1963 declared: "Universal and complete disarmament can be realized only after imperialism, capitalism and all systems of exploitation have been eliminated. To make propaganda about the possibility of realizing 'a world without weapons, without armed forces and without wars' through universal and complete disarmament while imperialism still exists, is to deceive the people of the world and is detrimental to the struggle for world peace."

An explanation of this apparent inconsistency — calling for disarmament but deeming it impossible of attainment — may be found in earlier Chinese sources. These reiterate that a "world without weapons" can be achieved only when Communism creates a "world without states." However, they continue, this should not stop Communist parties from making disarmament proposals as a tactic to arouse feelings against "imperialism" and keep alive the concept of "irreconcilable contradictions." Chinese Central Committee member Liu Changsheng explained the tactic to a World Federation of Trade Unions meeting in Peiping June 8, 1960: "We support the disarmament proposals put forward by the Soviet Union. (But) it is of course inconceivable that imperialism will accept proposals for general and complete disarmament. The purpose of putting forward such proposals is. . . to unmask the aggressive and bellicose nature of imperialism before the peoples of the world."

Africa's acceptance of the nuclear test ban treaty took outright exception to Peking's views. The Kenya **Daily Nation** saw a job lying ahead. It commented on July 27, 1963: "Red China does not yet possess the atomic bomb. But the indications are that (China) is working hard to catch up with Russia and the West and it has been predicted from Moscow that China can be expected to explode an atomic bomb in the next two or three years. Here is a worthwhile task for African leaders. . . It will be their job to persuade China not to restart the nuclear arms race, not to plunge millions of people into war-mindedness and not to cast new shadows over the survival or extinction of mankind."

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Peking and War

Representatives of 28 other countries were encouraged by the words of Chou En-lai, Premier of the Chinese People's Republic, at the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. Addressing the Political Committee of the conference on April 23, Mr. Chou said in part:

"We should . . . settle all questions that may arise amongst us on the basis of common peace and cooperation. . .

"We, on our part, do not want to do anything for the expansion of Communist activities outside our own country. . .

"As to respect for territorial integrity, it is stated that China will not and should not have any demand for territory. . .

"As to the determination of common borders which we are going to undertake with our neighboring countries, we shall use only peaceful means, and we shall not permit any other kinds of methods."

The now historic Asian-African Conference had met to consider common problems and discuss ways of achieving greater economic, cultural and political cooperation. It was convened on the invitation of the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. African states which participated were Egypt (now the United Arab Republic), Ethiopia, the Gold Coast (now Ghana), Liberia, Libya and the Sudan (now Republic of the Sudan).

Some delegates came to the conference with serious misgivings concerning the international intentions of Communist China. They expressed their desire for a clarification of these questions:

Would the Peking regime seek to expand beyond its frontiers to threaten neighboring states? Would it seek to export Communist revolution to other states? Should not Communist colonialism be condemned along with any other kind?

Previous actions by the Peking regime had provided solid reasons for raising these questions. The Chinese People's Republic was established on October 1, 1949. A year later, Peking's forces began invading Tibet. During October, 1950, Peking also began pouring troops into Korea. In defiance of United Nations police action there, the Chinese intervened to support North Korea's invasion of the Republic of Korea. For this action, they were branded as aggressors by a vote of the United Nations early in 1951.

Before the Bandung Conference, Burmese Communists had been

receiving sanctuary and military training on the Chinese side of the ill-defined border between Burma and China. Indonesian leaders were uneasy over financial subsidies which Peking was providing the Indonesian Communist Party. Chinese military aid continued to reach North Viet-Nam, although such help from outside had been prohibited by the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Indo-China. Support was also being offered Communist guerrillas in Laos. In a speech to the Bandung Conference, Prince Wan Waithayakon, Thai Foreign Minister, cited evidence of Chinese activities "for purposes of infiltration and subversion in Thailand."

Territorial claims of the Peking regime had caused trouble in relations with Burma, Pakistan and India. On April 2, 1953, Foreign Minister Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan had protested a Chinese violation of Pakistan's border in Hunza state. An attempted Chinese crossing into the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh was protested by New Delhi on August 27, 1954. Determined to seize Taiwan, Peking's forces on September 3, 1954, began shelling Quemoy Island, garrisoned by the Republic of China. Intensive military activity in the Taiwan Strait continued into the early months of 1955.

Despite Peking's known penchant for forceful solutions, before the Bandung Conference there were signs which appeared to be possible harbingers of change. Three times in 1954, Communist China made non-aggression pledges to India. The first pledge was contained in a trade agreement on Tibet, signed in Peking April 29, 1954.

In the preamble to the agreement, India and China promised to abide by the **Panch Shila** — the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence which Prime Minister Nehru had propounded out of his desire for world peace. The five principles were "mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence."

Peking reiterated its promise to uphold these principles when the agreement was ratified by the Chinese government June 3, 1954. The pledge was given a third time on June 28, 1954, after Premier Chou held talks with Mr. Nehru in New Delhi. Listing the **Panch Shila**, a communique on their meeting said that "the Prime Ministers reaffirmed these principles and felt that they should be applied in their relations with other countries in Asia, as well as in other parts of the world."

Premier Chou, a skillful and persuasive diplomat, arrived at the

Bandung Conference in a seemingly conciliatory mood. "The Chinese delegation has come here to seek unity and not to quarrel," he said on April 19 in his initial speech. In other carefully chosen words, he struck a posture of reasonableness — denying in the process that "we are carrying out subversive activities against the governments of other countries."

His speech of April 23 was even more moderate and more definite in commitment to the **Panch Shila**. He proposed a seven-point peace declaration which was embodied, substantially, in the final communique of the Asian-African Conference.

Once again, through Premier Chou, the Peking regime vowed to respect the territory and the rights of others. However, events which followed the Bandung meeting revealed striking discrepancies between Peking's words and actions. Clashes occurred when Chinese troops intruded into Burma in 1956. Another crisis was touched off in the Taiwan Strait in 1958. Chinese aid to Communist guerrillas in Viet-Nam and Laos went on as before. Then came new Chinese actions against Tibet and India.

When the Chinese completed their occupation of independent Tibet in 1951, they took charge of Tibetan military and foreign affairs. But they promised, in a 17-point agreement, not to alter "the existing political system in Tibet" nor the "established status, functions and powers" of the Dalai Lama, spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet's 1,200,000 Buddhist inhabitants. They also stated that they would protect "religious beliefs, habits and customs" and refrain from compulsion "in matters related to various reforms."

Instead of carrying out the agreement, Peking's officials began systematic exploitation of Tibet's economy and repression of the traditional Buddhist religion. They established a new neo-colonial framework for converting Tibet into an "autonomous region" of China. The Dalai Lama became a figure-head ruler. Tibetans were drafted into forced labor gangs and put to work building roads and airfields for Peking's use. Families were broken up and thousands were sent away to China for Communist indoctrination. Lamasaries were raided, and monks were humiliated, tortured and killed.

Tibetans stood the treatment until 1959. Then they rose in large-scale revolt. Peking ruthlessly put down the rebellion and dissolved the Tibetan government. The Dalai Lama and thousands of refugees



Chinese Communist military actions have disturbed the peace of Asia many times. In 1959 Tibetans revolted against Peking's armed occupation and colonial rule of their country. Chinese troops suppressed the revolt, as the Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetan refugees fled to India. Here a Tibetan refugee group gathers its possessions for transport to havens provided by the Indian government.

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fled to India, where they gave detailed testimony on the character of the Chinese occupation.

Assessing all the facts, the International Commission of Jurists in 1960 found Communist China guilty of repeated "acts of genocide" in Tibet. Peking was formally charged with attempts "to destroy the Tibetans as a religious group." Twice — in 1959 and 1961 — the United Nations passed resolutions deploring the many violations of the Tibetan people's fundamental rights and freedoms.

After putting down the Tibetan revolt, China increased its pressures against India. These had not ceased as a result of Premier Chou's New Delhi and Bandung pledges. Only two months after the Asian-African Conference, India was forced to protest an unauthorized encampment which Chinese troops had set up on Indian territory. As nibbling encroachment continued, Peking laid claim to 50,000 square miles of India's frontier lands. A series of Chinese attacks resulted in casualties on both sides in 1959. But it was not until October 20, 1962, that Chinese forces launched a massive invasion of India. Prime Minister Nehru led his countrymen in mobilizing to meet this "greatest menace" to India's freedom. And expressions of sympathy and support came from around the world.

When it became apparent that India would defend itself resolutely, Peking announced a unilateral cease-fire in the Himalayan war and called off its invasion. Representatives of six African and Asian countries then met in Colombo, Ceylon, to make recommendations on methods by which China and India might undertake peaceful negotiations to settle the long-standing border dispute.

Participants in the Colombo Conference were Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia and the United Arab Republic. India readily accepted the Colombo proposals. But Peking insisted on two "points of interpretation" which, in effect, constituted a rejection of the proposals. The first anniversary of the Colombo Conference passed on December 12, 1963, with Peking still refusing to negotiate on the basis of the Afro-Asian recommendations.

Public opinion in Africa was concerned over the Chinese aggression against India. The Ivory Coast newspaper **Abidjan Matin** summed up a prevailing African attitude in this December 10, 1962 editorial comment: "What one must conclude is that certain powers scorn all dialogue except that of war. And China is the epitome of such powers.

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In 1962 Communist China shocked the world by invading India — in an action running counter to previous non-aggression pledges Peking had given Afro-Asian nations. Demonstrating students in New Delhi typified the Indian protest, voiced as that nation mobilized for defense under Prime Minister Nehru. In 1963 Peking refused to negotiate its border dispute with India.

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Against the background of Peking's aggression, broken promises and support of subversion, African concern also has been voiced over mounting Chinese attention to Africa itself. One aspect of Peking's interest in the continent was noted at the United Nations on October 3, 1962, by Jean-Faustin Betayene, then Minister of Foreign Affairs for Cameroon. He told the U.N. General Assembly:

"It is common knowledge that the regime administering mainland China has consistently pursued a policy of subversion not only in Asia but in Africa as well. . . . Toward my country the People's Republic of China has for years been carrying out a policy of aggression. We know and we have proof that the Government of the People's Republic of China, on its territory, has openly trained and armed Cameroonian terrorists who are trying to overthrow the democratically established Cameroonian Government."

Another aspect was noted in a July, 1963, article published by the North African weekly journal **Jeune Afrique**. "To be an ally of the Chinese," the article stated, "it is essential to be a Marxist, Leninist, Maoist revolutionary to the tips of one's fingers and willing to submit to the discipline of the international Communist movement."

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Peking and Economic Development

Economic activity is the decisive factor shaping man's political and social life, according to the theory of Communism, and the highest economic development can be attained through state ownership and collectivization. Communist China commends its own economic system to nations in Africa and elsewhere.

But the fact is that within the past two years the Peking regime has been forced to turn to Africa to buy foods its own economy has been unable to produce in quantities sufficient for the Chinese people. Southern Rhodesia provided the Chinese with 59,000 tons of corn in 1962. South Africa supplied 167,000 tons from 1962 to mid-1963.

These purchases were only a small fraction of the total amount of grains Peking acquired from non-Communist countries in an effort to stave off Chinese famine. Almost exhausting its meager foreign exchange reserves, China has bought between 5 million and 5.5 million tons of grain annually since 1961. Contracts have been concluded for additional deliveries as late as 1966. Argentina, Australia, Burma, Canada, France and West Germany have been suppliers, in addition to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

Behind the grain purchases lies a story of severe economic failure in China. Farm production there has registered no substantial gains since 1958, although the population has increased by at least 50 million since then. When agriculture suffers in China, all else suffers. Chinese light industry draws 80 percent of its raw materials from the farms. Heavy industry requires machinery imports — which must be paid for by agricultural exports. Factories are now operating far below capacity.

China's economic crisis caused widespread hunger and hardship from 1959 to 1961. Improved conditions were reported in 1962 and 1963, but recovery is still incomplete. The outlook for any rapid economic growth in the future is poor and probably will remain so as long as the population increases each year by 10 to 17 million persons — all requiring food, clothing, other consumer goods and employment.

Overpopulation is a distinct problem in mainland China. Inability to control floods and droughts is another. The Peking regime is believed to have exaggerated the effects of bad weather conditions as a cause of its economic failures. The biggest problems, many economists say, derive from the Chinese economic system itself.

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The Chinese government has encountered trouble in inspiring high production without the incentives of some private ownership. Workers and farmers have resented the regimentation and low rewards of state-run farms and industry. Total state control, furthermore, has led to the creation of cumbersome bureaucracies. These often have enmeshed the Communist economies in strangling red tape.

While mainland China's basic problems are duplicated elsewhere, the Peking regime added to its troubles in 1958 by launching two ill-conceived developmental programs. One was called the Great Leap Forward — an ambitious agricultural and industrial drive which sought to utilize labor with unprecedented intensiveness. The other program called for the establishment of rural communes — one of history's most upsetting experiments in social engineering.

During the Great Leap Forward, Peking boasted that it would surpass Great Britain in industrial production within 15 years. In agriculture, it planned to concentrate "20 years of progress in one day." Novel methods were tried, as party propagandists attempted to whip up a frenzy of enthusiasm for production.

Party committees were given free reign in factories. They displaced qualified engineers, overworked factory hands in one "emulation campaign" after another and haphazardly altered production techniques. Peking later admitted some of the results: accounting became chaotic, costs soared, upkeep was neglected and the quality of production plunged downward.

Throughout the country, millions of persons were put to work smelting homemade iron in "backyard furnaces." Peking later confessed that the product was useless. Millions more were drafted to carry stone and dig canals to irrigate the dry North China plain. But officials reported later that many of the canals leaked 60 percent of the water they were supposed to convey.

On the farms, the Communist Party claimed it would "negate the law of diminishing returns" by proving that land could be made to produce ever-increasing crop yields.

Party "experts" instructed farm workers to set plants "so close together that even rats could not move among the seedlings." Rice fields formerly planted with 100,000 to 200,000 seedlings per mou (one-fifteenth hectare) were jammed with 300,000 to 800,000 seedlings.

The farmers were told to plow deep with new implements or even with explosives. They dug to depths ranging from one Chinese foot

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As these straining carters attest, manpower in mainland China remains cheaper and more abundant than engine power in a country still far behind its industrial goals.

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(33 centimeters) to ten feet (3.3 meters), compared with the traditional practice of plowing five inches (15 centimeters) deep.

Too late, the results became obvious. Deep plowing brought sterile subsoil to the surface and required abnormally large amounts of scarce fertilizer. Close planting cut off sunlight and ventilation. Under-nourishment produced spindly stalks, yellow leaves and small ears of grain. In many areas, farmers began to complain that crops were "falling down and dying."

Still greater disruption was caused by the rural communes. When the Chinese Communists first came to power in 1948 they redistributed land and equalized holdings of the farmers. Then they began taking the land away and organizing 120 million farm families into 750,000 "agricultural co-operatives." In 1958 they began amalgamating the co-operatives into 24,000 large communes.

Under this program, they deprived the farmer of his private property, including tools and animals. Everything became the property of the commune. The farmers were required to eat in public mess halls, place their children in nurseries, send their elderly relatives away to homes for the "useless" aged. In some cases, husbands and wives were separated and required to live in different central dormitories.

The communes constituted a massive attack on the Chinese family. Traditionally, in China as in Africa, high value had been placed on family life and family loyalties. After acceding to power, the Peking regime set out deliberately to weaken the family system. Children were taught to place love of the Communist Party above love for their fathers and mothers. They were encouraged to spy on their parents and report any criticism of the party or any other "reactionary" activities. Families were broken up as the state claimed the right to assign workers to employment away from home. The commune system went beyond all previous measures to weaken family ties.

One fundamental purpose of the communes was to "free" women for long hours of work alongside men. During the Great Leap Forward, farm workers of both sexes were reported to be displaying such enthusiasm for labor that they even ate and slept in the fields. In fact, however, they were soon overcome by fatigue, apathy and resentment. Passive resistance developed and grew in proportion to the hunger and nutritional diseases which followed crop failures.

Peking tried to maintain the pace for three years. At first, the regime

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Under the commune program which Communist China began in 1958, all land and means of production were to belong to the state. Later, small plots of land for private cultivation were returned to the farmers in an effort to spur production. Here a farmer in Hopeh province fertilizes his own farm, a two-foot (60-centimeter) strip of land alongside a furrowed field belonging to the local commune.

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said grain and cotton output of 1958 was double that of 1957. It reported that steel production had increased 107 percent and that other tremendous industrial gains had been made. However, in 1959 the party admitted that local officials, under pressure to amass impressive Great Leap Forward records, had inflated and falsified their statistical reports. As hunger deepened and industrial operations dropped below 50 percent of capacity, the truth could not be concealed.

At the beginning of 1961, Peking was forced to abandon the Great Leap Forward and retreat drastically from the commune system. An emergency program was decreed. It called for reduction of industrial investment to enable the whole country to concentrate on tasks of agricultural recovery. Small private plots of land were returned to the peasants. They were permitted to till these plots when not working for the communes. Free markets were restored for the exchange of private production.

Detailed information on the current state of the Chinese economy is concealed by Peking. Official statements on the subject are vague. Over-all statistics have not been issued since 1960. Politically-motivated grants and credits extended to other countries have been employed to give an impression that China is better off than the known facts would indicate.

But Chinese leaders, chastened by their recent experiences, do sometimes admit that Utopia lies farther ahead than they originally thought. Foreign Minister Chen Yi told an Australian television producer in 1963: "China requires 100 years to become a modern state. We have made and we will make many mistakes, because we lack experience. As I say, it will take 100 years; in the past we thought we could do it in 10. But that was wrong."

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Peking and Education

Great changes have taken place in the outside world's image of China during the 20th century, first as China was increasingly exposed to western influence and later as Mao Tse-tung's Communist party grew in power and finally gained control of the mainland in 1949.

Interest in China, however, has continued to grow.

Students from Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America have gone to Peking and other mainland cities in increasing numbers, most of them accepting scholarships and other inducements offered by China's officials and institutions.

They have been intrigued by the opportunity to expand their horizons — and to see what the Chinese revolutionaries have accomplished in little more than a decade. Many, impressed by the claims of agricultural and industrial advances made by Peking, have been eager to observe economic and social conditions at first hand.

What have African and other students learned from their experiences on the Chinese mainland?

The consensus, judging from the uniformity of the observations made by returning students, is that visitors to China must make major readjustments in their habits of living and thinking.

This is true in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well, but the adjustments necessary in Communist China are even broader in scope and sharper in detail.

One of the first problems all encounter is the Chinese language, which often requires years of intensive study. African students also report that a great deal of their precious learning time had to be given to long and tedious, but required, lessons in ideology and politics — courses they describe as "pure propaganda."

Living conditions are austere and complaints are frequent about food, travel restrictions, the ban on free social relationships and the difficulty of obtaining exit permits. Racial discrimination is often cited, too, although Chinese Communist propaganda makes a point of emphasizing that the Chinese and Africans, both races being non-white, have a great mutual bond.

A young Somali student, Abdloadir Scek Mohammed of Mogadiscio, was so resentful of his Chinese experiences that he wrote a pamphlet about them after his return to Africa. He objected to the constant surveillance by party representatives that is characteristic of

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Communist societies and concluded that "in effect, it was not possible to associate with the Chinese students or people." In order to obtain exit permits in one instance, he said, it was necessary for African students to threaten a hunger strike.

Another Somali student, referring to the bitter dispute over policies and methods between Moscow and Peking, said it was obvious to him that both the Russians and the Chinese coveted the African continent. The only difference, in his estimation, was that Soviet leaders favored gradual infiltration while Chinese party officials sought a "big revolution."

Other African students, in comments about the "hypocrisy" they observed in China, have noted that Peking, although claiming to share in the widespread African opposition to South Africa's system of racial segregation, continues to make heavy purchases of that country's agricultural and other products. Peking's imports from South Africa, in the first quarter of 1963 alone, amounted to some \$6,000,000.

Thirty youths from Cameroon, in West Africa, returned from China in 1962 with stories remarkably similar to the observations separately noted by students from the Somali Republic in East Africa. Informal personal contacts between African and Chinese students were forbidden, they said, and Africans were not even allowed to patronize the same shops frequented by non-Africans.

One of these students, Pierre Mouchilu, said "all contact is forbidden, not only between African men and Chinese women, but between Africans and Chinese" generally.

Reactions of this type are by no means confined to students from Africa. Brazilian journalist Heinrich Harrer Jr., after a 1962 visit to Peking University, wrote:

"Resented by fellow students, tired of daily lectures on Marxism-Leninism, unhappy over unkept promises and eager to get out at the first opportunity, this was the general feeling which I found among South American students."

Rene Goldman, an European youth who studied Chinese language and history at Peking University from 1953 to 1958, recalls that each new day began with loud praises of Mao Tse-tung and the Communist party — boomed from "loudspeakers all over the campus." At recreation and meal times, he said, the loudspeakers kept up a constant din of mass songs, martial music, speeches and editorials from Communist newspapers.

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"Despite their relatively good living conditions (compared to the privations endured by Chinese young people), Mr. Goldman wrote in an article published in the July-September, 1961, issue of **The China Quarterly**, "the prevailing mood of the foreign students was not one of satisfaction. Some reacted by devoting themselves exclusively to their studies and paying no attention to events in Pei-Ta (as the university was called) and in China generally, while many others, including the Soviet students, privately expressed bitterness and disappointment. . . One of the many issues at stake was the complaint by foreign students of being spied upon."

Several observers, in view of the fact that foreign students returning from China have expressed almost uniform dissatisfaction with the treatment they received, have raised the question of why African youths continue to accept Peking's hospitality.

One reason, according to Mahdi Ismail of the Somali Republic, is that the Communists have an extensive and efficient recruiting organization. "Throughout the world," he said, "are Communist agents whose task it is to offer scholarships to suitable youths from developing countries: Communist embassy attaches, representatives of Communist-front organizations like the International Union of Students, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the World Federation of Trade Unions, and other organizations affiliated with them or sympathetic to their aims."

The Chinese goal in all this, a number of African students have reasoned, is directly related to Peking's continuing overtures to foreign officials, journalists, teachers, business men and other opinion leaders. Closer ties with Africa are desired and Peking strategists are confident that the by-products are certain to include political as well as economic advantages.

So far, however, the campaign has been somewhat compromised by the sharp eyes of the students and other visitors who have accepted Peking's invitations. Even the most carefully managed tours of Communist China's showplaces, plus lavish banquets and parades of smiling citizens, have been unable to conceal evidences of Chinese life as it really is.

Emmanuel John Hevi, a Ghanaian who now teaches at a college in Nigeria, was particularly observant during his period as a medical student in China during the early 1960's.

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Among his comments:

"The medical course in the China I know leaves much to be desired. . . The incompetence of Chinese doctors was always a regular topic of discussion among foreign students. . . Added to my growing concern over the quality of the instruction at the Peking Medical School was a certain uneasiness over the fact that Chinese universities do not grant degrees, only diplomas. . .

"The Chinese have so long posed as defenders of the African and the persecuted races that it must really come as a shock to many people to hear that racial discrimination is practiced in China. Chinese racial discrimination is not of the kind that springs spontaneously from the people. It is a deliberate attempt by the Communist Party to assert and make the African accept once and for all the idea of the superiority of Yellow over Black. . .

"A Chinese girl student once said, quite bluntly, that Africa is universally known as the most backward continent on earth. I come from this 'primitive backwater' and so far as accommodation for higher as well as lower institutions of learning is concerned, and in what relates to personal and general hygiene and the treatment of students as human beings, it is we Africans who must civilize the Chinese, not vice versa. . .

"Out of a total of 118 African students who studied in China during my time, ninety-six had actually left and a further ten had signified their intention to leave by the time I packed my bags. This means that approximately 90 percent of the original number have found something wrong with China — something which made it impossible for them to stay longer. . .

"In my view, there were two causes of the student exodus: first, China failed us miserably by not offering a standard and quality of education acceptable to us. Second, we were disenchanted with socialism when we discovered that the Chinese brand of socialism was not the material of our dreams — nor the nostrum by which we dreamed to cure all the ills of Africa. . .

"No matter what the future holds I, for my part, will never regret my decision that Red China and I must go separate ways."

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