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GENERAL	
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NEAR EAST-AFRICA	
2. FRENCH MOROCCO: Sultan-Juin agreement reached US Consul McBride in Rabat reports that an agreement between the Sultan of Morocco and Florida.	
between the Sultan of Morocco and French General Ju	nt Land

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State Dept. review completed



was reached at a 17 February meeting, during which Juin declared that the affair was closed and the French Government is agreeable to having the Sultan remain on the throne. McBride comments that the agreement reached is generally satisfactory for the Sultan and has face-saving aspects for the French. He adds that the Sultan credits the French willingness to mediate to the position taken on the affair by the US.

FAR EAST

3. INDOCHINA: Effects of Cabinet crisis -- Following conversations with Bao Dai and the imperial Cabinet Director, Nguyen De, US Charge Gullion in Saigon transmits his views on the current Cabinet crisis. Gullion believes that whatever Cabinet is formed now, it is certain that the gulf between Bao Dai and Prime Minister Huu, and between the imperial Cabinet and the High Commissariat, is greater than any that existed between previous Viet and French officials. Gullion says that while Bao Dai was careful not to accuse the French directly of delaying or influencing deliberations, Nguyen De said flatly that the blame for the delay in forming the government was attributable to High Commissioner de Lattre, and secondly to Huu. Gullion is unable to tell whether or not the French "interfered" as De asserted, but he says it is clear that the crisis has been triangular among Bao Dai, Huu, and the French.

Gullion believes a new Cabinet would rest on a narrow base, only grudgingly accepted by Bao Dai and at the mercy of the strong Dai Viet minority. Bao Dai evidently believes he can dissociate himself from an unpopular government by continuing his aloof tactics; Bao Dai also could precipitate the fall of such a government by pulling out the Dai Viet representatives.

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