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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP

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DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

The Week in the UN Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763Date: 17 FEB 1978 By: 024

The UN marked time this week awaiting the results of the US elections. Strong SC action on Palestine truce violations was deferred and the problem referred to a subcommittee. GA debate continued on the Balkan case amid slashing Soviet bloc attacks on US "imperialism" in Greece. In Indonesia, hope for resumption of negotiations by the Good Offices Committee dimmed. Yugoslavia again raised its complaint of US-UK maladministration of their Zone of Trieste.

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Probable Soviet maneuver on new UN members. There are mounting indications that the USSR intends to sponsor or support "blanket" admission of all twelve applicants for UN membership. At the beginning of this session, the Soviet delegation failed in its attempts to strike from the agenda the Argentine proposal for the admission of all applicants receiving the required majority of seven SC votes in spite of a veto. GA approval of this resolution would mean acceptance of Austria, Ceylon, Eire, Finland, Italy, Portugal and Transjordan. With favorable SC recommendations on these states blocked by the Soviet veto, the GA is powerless to extend membership barring some extra-legal move such as proposed by the Argentines. Faced with growing opposition to indiscriminate Soviet vetoes of membership applications and the consequent possibility of GA acceptance of such a plan, the USSR will probably attempt a "deal" to eliminate this antagonism and at the same time to gain admission for its five satellites (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Outer Mongolia and Rumania) now ineligible because they failed to gain the required SC majority. Through a speciously reasonable proposal for "blanket" admission of all twelve applicants, the USSR may seek to win over members, such as Sweden (author of a similar proposal last year), which would be appeased by the "universality" principle of UN membership.

Under a "blanket" admission plan, the West and East would gain an equal number of additional votes, Finland probably feeling forced to divide favors between the two blocs. The "joker" lies in the proportional advantage resulting to the USSR by almost doubling its voting strength, thus increasing its ability to block anti-Soviet GA decisions. Furthermore, USSR delegate Vishinsky's preoccupation with the problem of admitting Outer Mongolia has raised fears that the Kremlin aims at creating a precedent for the admission

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of numerous new-born Asian satellites, which might be extended to include even some puppet Chinese state.

Although not opposing universality per se, the US and UK maintain that Charter requirements must be met in each individual case. On the other hand, they cannot accept the Argentine hypothesis that the veto right on membership applications does not exist. Therefore, the UK and US may well seek a solution such as that approved at the 1947 session, calling for a review by the SC of all membership applications.

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Possible UN consequences of a Chinese collapse. The imminent loss of all Manchuria threatens the entire Nationalist position in China. Should a Communist regime completely succeed the present Chinese Government, the latter would undoubtedly claim China's seat as a permanent member of the Security Council. The same result would flow from a Nationalist-Communist coalition which would radically alter the political complexion of the Government. In either case the problem confronting the UN would be unprecedented. For the first time, the Government of a permanent SC member would have shifted over to the Communist contingent. A Communist China sitting in the SC would immediately increase the vote of the Soviet bloc to three and would alter the present veto picture where the USSR generally casts the sole negative vote among the permanent members. Should the Nationalist Government succeed in retaining jurisdiction over even a small portion of China, it would probably continue to send representatives to the UN. Were both "Governments" then to send delegations to the SC, the controversy might be submitted to the International Court of Justice. In any event, the resulting situation would be fraught with three important consequences for the US in relation to the UN. It would (a) deprive the Western bloc of its present propaganda opportunities in forcing unilateral Soviet vetoes; (b) cut down the Western majority in the SC; and (c) exercise a magnetic influence on such UN members adjacent to China as Siam and Burma, drawing them closer to the Communist bloc.

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Likely UN action on Greek case. No slackening of Soviet and satellite interest in the Balkan dispute was evident during the first week of discussion by the GA Political Committee. Vituperative attacks against the Western Powers for their support of the fascist Greek Government and charges of US imperialist maneuvers in the Mediterranean highlighted the Eastern approach. Despite these accusations, two proposals to hear a guerrilla representative were unanimously defeated. Strong Yugoslav support for the USSR position dampens previous hopes that the Tito-Cominform split might reduce Yugoslav activity against Greece.

- 2 -

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Continuation of the UN Special Committee on the Balkans, as called for in the US-UK-Chinese-French resolution, appears almost certain. On the other hand, any Australian plan to curtail the Special Committee and increase its conciliatory powers -- a proposal probably rooted in Australian Prime Minister Evatt's attempts to bridge the East-West gap -- is unlikely to secure UN approval. UNSCOB's conciliation functions may, however, be strengthened in an attempt to satisfy its adherents and make the final decision as unanimous as possible. Subsequent Soviet and satellite continued abstinence in regard to UNSCOB may be anticipated.

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The Berlin question. It would be wishful to pretend to see anything conciliatory in Premier Stalin's blistering press statement accusing the US and UK of an aggressive attitude on Berlin, impugning the six "neutrals" who had striven for a settlement and charging the western powers with having entered into agreements which they subsequently repudiated. In this instance the customary roles of Stalin and Vishinsky seem to have been reversed and Stalin to have become the more corrosive of the two. His attack on the West may have been calculated to offset the propaganda victory achieved by the Western powers in obtaining a 9-2 vote in the Security Council. However, the realities of the situation, the success of the airlift, the calculation of advantage and disadvantage, will determine the Soviet course and thus even Stalin's words do not necessarily exclude a settlement of the Berlin dispute. Following the veto, the Western powers have taken no further action for the time being. They will await whatever new efforts the six "neutrals" may make in an effort to effect a settlement.

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US elections retard UN action on Palestine. Uncertainty as to US policy pending elections, added to a double French holiday, brought already halting UN action on Palestine to a virtual standstill last week. In the SC, the UK and China had proposed a resolution which, after endorsing the action taken by Acting Mediator Bunche in calling on Egypt and Israel to withdraw to their 14 October military lines, would appoint a committee of the five permanent SC members, Belgium and Colombia to examine appropriate sanctions under Article 41 in the event of non-compliance. Marking time until the US attitude could be clarified, the SC referred the Anglo-Chinese resolution to a subcommittee.

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Prompt UN measures to relieve Arab refugees likely. The resolution for the relief of the Palestine refugees submitted last week by the US, UK, Belgium and the Netherlands will probably be quickly adopted by the GA.

- 3 -

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Little opposition, even from the Israeli representatives, is expected. Substantial alleviation of the needs of 500,000 Arabs facing winter without food and shelter should result from implementation of the resolution which: (1) sets total Arab relief requirements for the next nine months at \$29,500,000; (2) calls upon all UN members to contribute towards the required sum; (3) directs Secretary General Lie to establish a UN agency to administer the aid; and (4) authorizes an immediate advance up to \$5,000,000 from the UN Working Fund, this sum to be repaid from the governmental contributions received. The UN Secretariat, expressing doubts about its ability to administer these measures, has suggested that a GA subcommittee be set up as an advisory body to the UN relief director.

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A New stage in development of Western Union. Under the pressure of the deepening East-West crisis and US insistence upon creation of a functioning defense organization to which it could lend material support, the five Brussels Pact powers have established a combined command and apparently prepared an estimate of required US military aid. Moreover, although previously somewhat cool to the idea of a North Atlantic defense pact including Canada, the US and certain peripheral countries, the WU Consultative Council recently announced complete agreement on the principle of such a pact (apparently proposed by the US at the summer meetings with the WU Ambassadors as a means of associating the US with the Western European security bloc). These steps mark the end of the first or organizational stage in the development of an integrated Western European defense system, and will apparently lead to the second stage of negotiations with the US and Canada on a larger regional grouping and on US military aid. However, the steps taken to date by no means indicate that WU has become an effective force. Although a skeleton combined command has been set up, it is doubtful whether substantial combined planning and training or the standardization of tactics and equipment has yet taken place. Even with US aid it will take a long time before WU powers will be able to guarantee their own security.

Another major problem affecting WU, which has already been raised by the UK, is the correlation of WU rearmament with the ERP. The British are concerned lest US military aid be provided only at the expense of US recovery program allocations; they also fear the effect of their increased rearmament expenditures on UK recovery progress. Some British cabinet members reportedly believe the USSR actually desires to induce Western Europe to embark on large-scale rearmament, counting on the resultant diversion of manpower and materials to hamper economic recovery. The determining factor as to whether WU rearmament and the ERP, actually two sides of the same coin, will work against each other, will be the willingness of the US Congress to appropriate sufficient funds for both purposes.

As negotiations proceed toward expansion of WU into a North Atlantic pact, the question of including other continental nations will arise. The interest

- 4 -

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of these nations in joining any Western security bloc will be heightened by the prospective inclusion of the US and the consequent possibility of receiving US military aid. Italy has recently shown increased interest in aligning itself with a Western bloc. Both Denmark and Norway have extended feelers for US military aid. The French army Chief of Staff reportedly believes it desirable to bring Spain and Italy into WU. Should the US associate itself with the WU countries in a defensive alliance, it will undoubtedly exert a powerful attraction on many other European states. On the other hand, some WU members have expressed a certain reluctance to include other countries which would be military liabilities and which might compete for US aid.

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Revival of Trieste governorship issue. The USSR may attempt to revive in the SC the question of appointing a Governor for the Free Territory of Trieste in an effort to remove US-UK occupation troops from this strategic area. Such a Soviet move would not, despite the current strained relations between Belgrade and Moscow, be inconsistent with its past action in regard to the Territory. When Yugoslavia raised the question of US-UK treaty violations in their Trieste Zone, the USSR came, albeit a trifle reluctantly, to its support. The USSR has consistently sought a UN Governor but failed to accept the majority candidates, preferring an indecisive figure who would be unable to oppose effectively a Communist coup. The UK, in an effort to forestall a Soviet move on the governorship question is lobbying for the West's proposal to return the territory to Italy. Recent renewal of the Yugoslav charges against the Anglo-American Zonal administration may provide the USSR with an opening for reviving the old issue.

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UN trusteeship activities progress despite Soviet attacks. The midway course which the US, China and the other moderates have charted between the colonial (UK) and anti-colonial (USSR) powers has made possible the constructive work so far achieved by UN trusteeship organs. The GA Trusteeship Committee, rocked by British accusations of "incompetence" for exceeding its functions and Soviet criticism of too limited activity, has survived both charges and is demonstrating a capacity for constructive achievement. Rejecting Soviet attempts to make obligatory the submission of political information on non-self-governing territories, the Committee adopted a report defining arrangements for the submission of such information and continuing for another year the Ad Hoc Committee set up by the GA to examine and make recommendations on the information received. Also it recently adopted, over UK objections, an Indian resolution requesting members to inform the UN of any constitutional changes in the territories under which an administering power might cease supplying reports. The USSR, which has found the Trusteeship Council an effective forum for attacks on the administering powers, now seeks to extend the trusteeship system beyond the former mandated territories and to broaden UN activity in existing trust areas. It has furthermore suggested that Czechoslovakia be added to the Ad Hoc Committee. The UK,

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irritated by recurrent criticisms of the administering powers, has expressed fear that the TC will "degenerate into a platform for political propaganda". British irritation on this score, however, will probably diminish as the Council demonstrates continued capacity for constructive performance.

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Progress in the OEEC. Recent activities of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the sixteen nation directing body for the ERP, have caused US observers to note with satisfaction that it is finally rolling along. The OEEC has completed work on its first annual program, approved an intra-European trade plan and is now working on its overall four-year recovery program. In grappling with these practical problems, it has shaken itself down and become a functioning organization. Evidently the UK, previously accused of dragging its feet, has strengthened its delegation and now appears to be exercising some constructive leadership.

Substantial further strengthening of the OEEC will probably be required, however, before it can adequately perform its function of promoting European economic cooperation and can convince the US Congress that this ERP objective is being properly carried out. The OEEC has appointed a committee to examine its present structure and recommend any improvements. It is hoped that this may lead to more dynamic high-level direction and to the creation of a more effective Secretariat. One likely move which is being urged by ECA will be the appointment of a prominent political figure as permanent vice-chairman or Director General of OEEC, in order to provide the requisite full-time leadership.

- 6 -

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