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NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH  
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## NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Vol. IV No. 16

For Week Ending  
27 April 1949

## GREECE

Intensified military activity: The recent increase in the frequency of clashes between guerrillas and national forces throughout central and northern Greece, resulting partly from aggressive probing on both sides, forebodes a considerable period of intensified military activity. Although the guerrillas are not leading from any new strength of their own (actually their recruiting and supply potential within Greece has suffered a decline), they have not lost the active friendship of any of their northern neighbors. Even Tito is maintaining (at least publicly) his correct Communist attitude toward the guerrilla movement, and a spokesman of his has again lauded the guerrillas while blaming Americans for most of Greece's ills. Albania, however, has been providing the guerrillas with their most valuable support. From Albania the guerrillas have been bringing still more of their reserves into the Vitsi-Grammos sector to counteract the fairly heavy casualties suffered in the Grammos battle. There also appears to have been a slight build-up of guerrilla strength near the Bulgarian frontier of eastern Macedonia, along with indications that the Cominform is seeking to create the impression that the guerrillas are receiving increasing aid from Bulgaria while Yugoslav support is decreasing. In view of the intensification of military activity in Greece, the guerrillas may in fact stand to gain an increase in logistical support from Albania and Bulgaria as an earnest of Cominform intentions. In such an event, Greek anger recently directed against Albania will be extended to include Bulgaria, and the Greek press and public may be expected to become more clamorous than heretofore for a larger army. The Greeks have already expressed hearty approval for a recent British suggestion that Greek armed strength be increased. They may become convinced that only with such an increase can the struggle be ended with a minimum of bloodshed.

## TURKEY

Bipartisan foreign policy threatened: For the first time in many years differences of opinion over the conduct of Turkey's foreign policy are beginning to appear. The first indication was when it became evident

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that Turkey would be excluded from the North Atlantic Treaty group, and that no correlated security agreement with Turkey as a member was likely in the near future. A writer in the government party journal ULUS was allowed to suggest rather bitterly that Turkey (unless itself attacked) might best adopt a policy of neutrality toward both East and West. Although this suggestion, based on the notion that Turkey had been abandoned, was vehemently repudiated by both government and opposition spokesmen, similar views have been expressed by at least one responsible official--the Director-General of National Security. This gentleman (Perkel) recently expressed to a US representative in Ankara his opinion that Turkey should not enter into a formal pact, because in the event of an East-West war the Turks would be obliged to fight; it would be better, in Perkel's view, for Turkey not to fight (unless attacked), but rather to remain neutral and keep large Soviet forces immobilized. It is noteworthy that Perkel, whose expressed view is altogether opposed to the official line, is in almost daily personal communication with the President, the Prime Minister, and the principal officers of the Turkish General Staff. It may be suggested that the Perkel attitude was a deliberate ploy, as part of an effort to impress the US with the idea that the Turks might really revert to neutrality. It seems inconceivable, however, that Perkel should make such a clumsy attempt, and at the same time advocate Turkey's exclusion from formal pacts, just as the Foreign Minister was going to Washington to learn how formal a commitment to safeguard Turkey's security was obtainable from the US. Foreign Minister Sadak has now visited Washington, where he received many signs of US recognition of Turkey's plight, and reassurances that the security of Turkey has not been abandoned in favor of that of Western Europe. He has no formal commitment, however, and no promise of any in the present circumstances. He may therefore find it difficult to persuade the great majority of the Assembly and the public that the many concrete signs of US interest in Turkish security must be regarded as sufficient assurance of continuing US support and even of aid should Turkey be attacked. There are many people in Turkey who will not consider this sufficient. The first manifestation of this cleavage--which would principally be over the government's inability to obtain what almost everybody wants--will be in the National Assembly and in the press, after Sadak has reported upon his visit to the US.

#### PALESTINE

Peace conference: The Palestine peace conference now being held at Lausanne between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Syria is not expected to produce an early solution of outstanding problems.

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The main issues are: (1) Israel's frontiers; (2) the Arab refugees; and (3) the future status of Jerusalem. On the first issue, Israel will try to persuade the Arabs to accept approximately the present armistice lines as legal frontiers. The Arabs, on the other hand, will attempt to cut Israel back to the original partition boundaries or at least to frontiers enclosing an equivalent amount of territory. Transjordan will demand a port on the Mediterranean and a corridor leading to it. Syria will demand Western Galilee, and quite possibly Eastern Galilee as well. Thus unless very great pressure is exerted on one side or the other, agreement on this issue will be difficult to obtain. With respect to the Arab refugees, it is unlikely that even the Arab governments themselves expect the refugees to be repatriated in any significant numbers. Israel will probably agree to permit the return of a token number and then devise some sort of formula for awarding compensation to the remainder. The formula will be so designed as to provide a face-saving device for the Arab governments (which have been demanding repatriation or compensation for the refugees) without placing any undue financial burden on Israel. On the matter of Jerusalem, the major remaining difficulty will be for the contracting parties to persuade the UN to accept the division of the city into Israeli and Transjordan sectors in disregard of the UN's recommendation for internationalization. Even if agreement is reached on these main issues, Israel and its Arab neighbors probably will not exchange diplomatic representatives or establish commercial relations for a long time to come.

### IRAN

Constituent Assembly: The Shah's program for constitutional reform moved one step closer to accomplishment with the convening of the newly elected Constituent Assembly--the second in Iran's history--on 21 April. It is not clear yet, however, how readily the Assembly will carry out the tasks assigned to it: (1) revision of the rather vague Constitutional provisions regarding dissolution of the Majlis; (2) establishment of a regular procedure for amendment of the Constitution; and (3) determination of how the Senate called for in the Constitution should be brought into being. Elections held early in April for the 270 Assembly seats brought in most of the Majlis members plus local notables known to support the program of the government. However, the strong Majlis support for constitutional reform which was evinced soon after the attempted assassination of the Shah has now lessened, and the Majlis is becoming more aware that the

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Constitutional reform program strikes directly at its prerogatives. The Assembly may therefore be expected to proceed cautiously, although eventually its respected elder statesman president, Muhammed Sadeq Tabatabai, will probably be able to get the program enacted substantially as it was presented by the Shah.

#### INDIA - PAKISTAN

The tribal issue: Tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan seems to have lessened within the last fortnight. The subjects of the controversy between the two states, the Pathan tribesmen of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas, do not seem to have been particularly aroused by the agitation which has taken place over their status, and the somewhat calmer tone which Afghanistan's anti-Pakistan press and radio propaganda has now taken suggests that the Afghans, realizing that their campaign is less successful than was expected, may be preparing for a peaceful retreat. They can hardly make such a retreat gracefully, however, unless Pakistan issues some sort of statement indicating that it does not intend to force the integration of the tribal areas into Pakistan. Thus far such a face-saving assurance has not been forthcoming, although Pakistan has made the conciliatory overture of formally stating, on 19 April, that it would be quite willing to negotiate the question of the tribal areas if Afghanistan would halt its anti-Pakistan campaign. Meanwhile, two other powers, the UK and Iran, have also taken an active interest in ending the controversy. The British Foreign Office is considering the possibility of calming the Afghans by helping them sell their goods in sterling areas and by holding out the hope of a loan and of arms shipments. Iran, which has already urged patience and conciliation on Pakistan, has intimated that it may offer its good offices in settling the dispute. Neither of these proposed steps, however, offers an easy solution. The British can hardly make arms shipments to Afghanistan except with Pakistan's assent, which is not likely to be forthcoming under present circumstances. Iran's projected offer is unlikely to be accepted by Afghanistan because of the latter's suspicions of Iran and their present difficulties over the Helmand River.

India and the Commonwealth: The British Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, which convened in London 21 April, has still to make an official statement regarding the future status of India. It is probable, however, that some legal formula will be obtained whereby India can remain a member of the Commonwealth after proceeding with its announced plans

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for becoming a republic. Most of the other members of the Commonwealth, despite the strong attachment of many of them to the Crown as the symbol of unity, desire India to remain one of them. The Indians, for their part, appear to realize the benefits of continued membership in the Commonwealth and the difficulties they would face if they severed their ties with it.

**UNCIP woes:** The UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) has once again failed to get India and Pakistan to agree on truce terms for Kashmir. UNCIP's truce proposals of 15 April elicited a moderately favorable response from Pakistan, which "accepted" them with reservations. India's reply to UNCIP, however, completely ignored the question of acceptance or rejection, instead reiterating displeasure at the absence of reference to the disarming and disbanding of the Azad forces and to India's responsibility for the security of Kashmir. The Indian press continues to play up alleged cease-fire violations, and it appears that the period of peace and quiet which set in after the cease-fire is definitely over. Faced with increasing criticism from both sides for its alleged weakness and vacillation, the Commission plans to present revised truce proposals by the end of April, this time urgently requesting that both sides accept the terms immediately and unconditionally, without further discussions.

#### NOTED IN BRIEF

The propaganda intent of the latest Greek guerrilla "peace offer," couched in vague but familiar terms, is shown by the fact that it was timed to coincide with the opening of a Communist and fellow-traveling "peace" congress in Paris 20 April. Only a week previously the guerrillas had heard new praise and strong exhortations from Greek Communist chief Zachariades to "make 1949 a decisive year for victory."

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Defeatism among non-Communists in Cyprus at the approach of the May municipal elections is scored by The Cypriot, an English-language daily published with Cypriot Greek nationalist backing. The paper calls upon anti-Communists to realize without further delay that they must somehow adopt a real policy with "human breath and appeal" if they

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expect to prevent a Communist sweep. The US Consul in Cyprus has already reported the probability that the Communists would carry the elections in at least three, and possibly four, of the six main towns unless the Nationalists unite. Although the Nationalists hold a potential majority, it is unlikely that they will be able to overcome their traditional divisiveness before the elections.

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Membership in the Council of Europe appears to be likely for both Turkey and Greece, unless last-minute objections are raised by smaller Western European states.

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Recent negotiations between Socony-Vacuum Oil representatives in Ankara and the Turkish Cabinet were presumably about the development of Turkey's new and, at present, only oilfield at Ramandag.

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Despite faithful Soviet support of the Jewish cause in the UN and connivance in the Czechoslovak arms running to the Israeli Army, the USSR has never relaxed its hostility to "bourgeois nationalist Zionism" nor has it permitted Jewish emigration from the USSR to Israel. Lately the satellite countries, where large numbers of emigrants await transportation to Israel, have tightened their restrictions. Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett has remarked on Israel's great distress at this hostility toward Zionism and Zionist activities in Eastern Europe and the USSR, but denied that this meant a diplomatic estrangement between Israel and the USSR. Meanwhile, the Soviet press campaign against Zionism continues with a new anti-Semitic slant in a series of vehement attacks on the evils of cosmopolitanism as personified in the "rootless intellectual" and "passportless wanderer" of Jewish name.

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Israeli authorities reportedly "take a grave view" of the recent ambushing of Israeli convoys by Arabs dressed as beduin and feel that these incidents may presage continuous hit-and-run border raids into Israel

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for some time to come. As a result of this week's ambushes (in which 15 Israeli soldiers were killed) west of Hebron and south of the Dead Sea, the Israeli Army is concentrating on tightening its control of the dangerous border areas. Israel may possibly find that defending its territory from this kind of raid is a sufficient and credible excuse for further encroachments into Arab territory.

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The Israeli-Transjordan "Special Committee," which was established without UN supervision during the recent armistice, made no substantial progress in the two meetings held last week. In the Jerusalem area, the Transjordanians gained control of nineteen square miles in return for yielding a village to the Israelis. On other conflicting points in the Jerusalem region and particularly in the Arab-held Latrun sector, the Israelis appeared more conciliatory than heretofore. The Transjordanians, however, are apparently hesitant to make any major concessions for fear of damaging their bargaining position at Lausanne.

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Israeli strategy for opposing the internationalization of the entire Jerusalem area was indicated this week by President Weizmann's speech in New York. Referring to Pope Pius XII's recent message on this point, Weizmann stated that the Israelis would readily agree to international control of the sacred places (which are mainly located in the Arab-held Old City) but that Israeli administration of the Jewish-controlled New City could not be yielded. Just last week Prime Minister Ben-Gurion conceded to Ethridge that, while Jerusalem could not be the capital "for several years," it could quickly become the chief Israeli city were Israel's border to be advanced to the Jordan River.

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Syria has finally evacuated Hill 223 (in the Mishmar hay Yarden Arab-held salient just south of Lake Hula) as a result of UN pressure and the threat of retaliatory military action by the Israelis. Since Israel previously pulled back its forces from a recent Jewish thrust into Syrian territory, the outlook now seems greatly improved for concluding a final armistice agreement between Israel and Syria.

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Several Iranian political and military figures, including General Arfa, the former Chief of Staff, and reportedly Prince Ali Reza, the Shah's half brother, are endeavoring to oust General Razmara, ambitious Chief of Staff of the Iranian Army. The attack against Razmara has principally taken the form of an interpellation of the Saed Government in the Majlis, charging Razmara with embezzlement, malfeasance, and laxity toward the Tudeh Party. Although the attack on Razmara has taken up much of the time of the Majlis recently, it is not likely to be successful. There is no indication that the Shah, who has been Razmara's strongest supporter, has lost confidence in him. Razmara believes that the Minister of War, who is suspected of having supplied data to support the charges, will eventually feel constrained to defend him in the debate. Prime Minister Saed has dismissed the matter as unimportant and apparently plans to do nothing positive which might upset the loosely knit alliance of Majlis factors which has provided him with such strong support to date.

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Some Iranian leaders are exhibiting unrest over the fact that the US is not extending to Iran the amount of backing against Soviet aggression which it has given to Turkey. Recent statements of the Shah, in particular, have implied that the disparity in US aid will build up Turkey as a threat to Iran, as well as providing the Soviets with an invitation to invade Iran. Although additional appeals and arguments, sound and unsound, may be expected to emanate from Tehran, Iran will continue to resist Soviet pressure so long as the present type of US support is maintained.

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