

P. W. W. W.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MIDDLE EAST/AFRICA BRANCH

Vol. III No. 18

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

For Week Ending
5 May 1948

*TS 0036439
cy° CASC-1*

Document No. 001
NO CHANGE in Class.
* DECLASSIFIED
Class. CHANGED TO: TS
Auth: DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Date: DDA REG. 77/1763
2 MAR 1978 By: 011

TURKEY

Re: Road to recovery: It is entirely possible that the most enduring benefit to be gained by the Turks out of the \$175 millions allocated them from the US Greece-Turkey aid bills will ensue from the very small amount (less than 3 per cent of the total) which is being applied to highway construction.

It is true that the work is primarily directed toward meeting possibly urgent military need. The Turkish road network is appallingly bad, and it has always been neglected in favor of the construction of railroads, which themselves have been built primarily to meet military strategic requirements. Now, however, it is realized that, while the slow construction of railroads continues, the rapid building of durable all-weather roads has become of the first military importance. Under the technical guidance of US Public Roads Administration experts, the program is already well under way.

But whether or not military needs ever become urgent, the new roads will be there, available for commercial use. They undoubtedly will be of enormous economic value. Mineral resources, in some instances known to exist for thousands of years, need no longer remain undeveloped for lack of economical transportation. Perishable foods may be swiftly carried to market, instead of being left to rot for lack of means of transport or safe storage space. Turkey's forest wealth may be exploited as never before, while new industries can be brought into existence in what has hitherto always been deserted, rocky wilderness. All this cannot happen in a year, of course, and its occurrence will only be possible without war and, to a considerable extent, without even the threat of war.

Gladstone's sick run of Europe doesn't look quite so sickly these days. He may, indeed, prove to be an exceedingly fortunate fellow.

ARAB STATES

The situation in Palestine: The prospects for a Palestine truce appear as remote as ever in spite of the various efforts now being made in Palestine, New York, and the Arab capitals. The dispatch of British reinforcements has had the effect of deterring Jewish

F1

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2.

attacks on Jaffa and in the Jerusalem area and possibly of delaying the invasion of the country by the armies of the Arab states. Both Jews and Arabs appear unwilling to provoke the British, who are increasingly determined to maintain order during the last ten days of the Mandate. After the end of the mandate 15 May, contingents of the Arab states' armies will be free to move in, and full-scale operations can be resumed without interference from the British.

Neither side can muster decisive striking forces, although both Arabs and Jews have large numbers armed and trained for part-time defense of their own communities. Hagana, the Jewish army, has approximately 35,000 full-time members, with perhaps 20,000 more troops available for field duty out of some 50,000 civilians now on part-time home guard status. Hagana is well trained and has armored cars and light support weapons. However, the Hagana field forces are scattered, and the Jews have not committed more than 3,000 men in any attack to date.

The principal segment of the Arab forces is expected to come from the regular armies of the Arab states, operating under Arab League control. Although the armed forces of the Arab states total well over 100,000 most of them will be needed at home for internal security duty. Initially, the Arab states are expected to contribute no more than 18,000 (out of some 35,000 available for Palestine duty), including the 8,000-man Transjordan Arab Legion and contingents from Iraq, Syria, and perhaps Egypt. These forces possess armored cars and light artillery, and the Arab Legion's efficiency is relatively good. Also available are the 15,000 troops of the only partially trained Arab Liberation Army, which is still smarting from recent defeats. Approximately 30,000 Palestinian Arabs are members of paramilitary organizations and another 70,000 are available for home guard duty.

The Arabs can count on some assistance from Beduin tribesmen in the nearby countries, while the Jews have some reinforcements available among immigrants waiting at Mediterranean and Black Sea ports for the British naval blockade to be lifted.

The beginning of the unrestricted campaign will find the Jews in substantial possession of the areas allotted to them under the partition scheme, except in southern Palestine, where no more than 3,000 Jews are scattered in isolated settlements. They strongly hold the coastal area from newly captured Haifa to south of Tel Aviv, including a small area in the Arab port of Jaffa. They have consolidated their positions in the Lake Tiberias area of the northeast and appear to be in a position to seize all of Jerusalem. They do not, however, hold a firm route of supply from the coast to either Tiberias or Jerusalem.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.

The primary aim of the Jews, therefore, will be to hold their present areas, making partition a fact. They will probably attempt to complete the seizure of Jaffa and to extend their coastal holdings north of Haifa to the Lebanon border. They will probably undertake limited attacks to strengthen their communications with the Lake Tiberias region (particularly around Arab-held Nazareth, which controls the main Haifa-Tiberias road). They may seek to seize Jerusalem (either for themselves or for the UN), and may make some attacks on Arab troops concentrations. In case of military reverses, the Jews are probably prepared to abandon their Lake Hula salient in the extreme north and then the Tiberias area, holding the coastal areas (which contain well over half the Jewish Palestinian population) at all costs. In the event of striking initial success, they might launch a major attack on the Arab Liberation Army in the Nablus area and might eventually attempt to extend their rule over all of Palestine.

Although the ultimate Arab aim is to destroy all vestiges of a Jewish state, their immediate aims appear less ambitious than those of the Jews. Initially, the Arab regulars can be expected to occupy the Arab sectors of Palestine and possibly also the Jewish areas of southern Palestine. There after, they will probably make limited scale attacks on key points along Jewish communications, on utilities (such as the Jerusalem water supply at Ras-el-Ain and Solomon's Pools) and on isolated Jewish settlements. They would resist Jewish seizure of Jerusalem. Despite public pressure for a dramatic victory and possible limitations on the ability of the Arab states to maintain their armies in the field for an extended period, strong direct attacks by the Arabs are unlikely.

Thus the immediate prospect is for a series of limited-scale battles, in which neither side will obtain a decisive victory. The Jews will probably hold substantially what they do at present but the communications will remain subject to harassment. The campaign will settle down to a long-run affair in which the Arabs will damage the Jewish economy by guerrilla attacks on communications and exposed farms and by economic sanctions (including continued shutdown of the oil pipeline to Haifa and the Maharayin hydro-electric station which supplies Haifa and Tel Aviv).

The changing role of the political party in Iraq: Hitherto, political parties have played a minor role in determining the course of Iraqi politics. Ministers in successive cabinets have been members of a tightly-knit ruling clique and without exception have been connected with the two conservative parties, the National Democratic and the Liberal.

There have been recent indications, however, that this fundamental pattern is now undergoing basic changes. In April 1946,

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

4.

the Independence Party was formed under the leadership of Mohammed Kubba. This party contains a hard core of the pro-Rashid Ali elements remaining in Iraq; its philosophy is intensely nationalistic, anti-Hashemite, Anglophobic, and of the extreme right. Its influence, though steadily on the increase, did not become a force to be reckoned with until the signing of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in January 1948. As the leading spirit in organizing the demonstrations which led to the consequent fall of the cabinet of Saleh Jabr, the party gained additional adherents among the people; the new government was obliged to acknowledge the party's increased stature by giving Kubba a cabinet post.

At the other end of the scale, another group is also preparing to challenge the existing regime. The Peoples' Party headed by Aziz Sharif, and the National Unity Party led by Abd-el-Fattah Ibrahim, both leftist in inclination, were banned by the government in 1947 as "subversive." Despite this, they have continued their operations underground, becoming more and more Communistic in character. In January an attempt was made to turn the demonstrations against the treaty into a Communist rally, but the groups had evidently overestimated their strength; they received a severe setback at the hands of the government and of the Independence Party adherents and several of their henchmen were jailed. There have been recent reports that the leftist leaders have reconciled their differences and have agreed to cooperate in mapping strategy for the coming elections.

Of the two opposing forces, the Independence Party looks as the stronger. Should it become sufficiently influential to obtain control of the government, the position of the Regent and the Hashemite dynasty would be extremely precarious. The Independence group would certainly demand the return of Rashid Ali; in view of his bitter feud with the Hashemites it is difficult to see how the country would be big enough for both.

It is also possible that the deteriorating economic situation may increase the strength of the leftist groups to a point where they will feel themselves in a position to make another bid for power. Their next appeal to the people may attract enough dissident elements to bring success.

At all events, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the day of the small group which has hitherto controlled the destinies of the country is passing. The wane of British influence, on which they have relied, and the ineffective furlings of the present weak government are hastening their eclipse. A population which has at last realized the power it wields demands a change, and whether that change be to the left or to the right, that it will come is inevitable.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

5.

IRAN

The return of Qavam: The enthusiastic reception given Qavam upon his return to Iran on 3 May may presage a renewal of the struggle for power between him and the Shah. Qavam not only retains a group of loyal supporters in the Majlis but also appears to be gaining the support of such varied elements as the anti-Soviet Seyyid Zia (former prime minister) and members of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party. The Shah, who is increasingly insistent on obtaining greater prerogatives, has declared that "dictatorial measures" might shortly become necessary, especially if Qavam engages in political intrigue. If Qavam becomes politically active, the ensuing conflict between him and the Shah will seriously reduce Iran's ability to stand up against Soviet demands.

INDIA--PAKISTAN

Pakistan and the USSR: Pakistan's decision to exchange ambassadors with the USSR can be attributed to dissatisfaction with the US and UK rather than to a reversal of its firm anti-Soviet stand. Heretofore, Pakistan has clearly indicated its intention of remaining aloof from the USSR. Now, however, it is convinced that the UK has unduly favored India (as a more valuable ally), and it also holds the US and UK largely responsible for the concessions made to India by the Security Council in the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan further resents the decision of the US not to allow it to purchase in the US greatly needed military supplies so long as the Kashmir dispute remains unsettled. Pakistan's establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR (while it does not represent the adoption of a pro-Soviet attitude) is apparently intended as a clear indication that the Western powers cannot ignore the wishes and needs of Pakistan if the close collaboration of the latter is to be assured.

The Kashmir situation: Efforts by the Security Council to effect a settlement of the Kashmir dispute have resulted in the passage of a resolution acceptable neither to India and the pro-India legal Government of Kashmir headed by Sheik Abdulla nor to Pakistan and the revolutionary pro-Pakistan Azad (Free) Kashmir Government.

Under the terms of the resolution, Sheik Abdulla's Government would, pending the outcome of a plebiscite, be broadened to include equal representation of pro-Pakistan elements; Indian troops would be progressively withdrawn to the extent permitted by the requirements of internal security; and Pakistani forces would be allowed by mutual agreement between the dominions to occupy certain areas of the State to assist in the maintenance of law and order. The Government of India and Sheik Abdulla's Government of Kashmir claim that these provisions, if implemented, would nullify the legal rights of India and Abdulla, and would also constitute a breach of faith with the people of Kashmir.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Pakistan and the Azad Kashmir Government, on the other hand, maintain that a fair plebiscite cannot be held so long as Sheik Abdulla heads the Kashmir Government and so long as Indian troops remain in occupation of the State. The Government of Pakistan maintains further that it would be unable to persuade the tribesmen of the North West Frontier Province to return home, and that the use of force against them would permanently alienate this important segment of Pakistan's population. Pakistan, supported by the Azad Government, demands therefore the complete withdrawal of all troops and the replacement of Abdulla by an interim neutral administration to be appointed by the Security Council.

Despite the bitterness of the dispute and Pakistan's conviction that a fair plebiscite would result in a pro-Pakistan vote, it is unlikely that the Government of Pakistan will sponsor an attempt to end India's occupation of the State by force. The Government realizes that the Army's serious shortage of arms and ammunition makes victory improbable. Indian Army leaders, on the other hand, notwithstanding India's superior military strength, recognize the possibility of over-extending their forces in Kashmir and have indicated a desire to effect a settlement by agreement with Pakistan.

Current statements by Indian political leaders are contradictory. They suggest that in view of the failure of the Security Council to provide a satisfactory solution, the termination of the dispute will be sought both by "other peaceful means" (implying direct arbitration with the Government of Pakistan) and by intensified action of the Indian Army. If arbitration is adopted, a satisfactory and lasting solution could probably be obtained by conceding to Pakistan those areas of west and north Kashmir (including Poonch and Gilgit) which have clearly indicated an overwhelming sentiment in favor of Pakistan. Jammu and the important vale of Kashmir would be retained by India. If, on the other hand, India attempts by force to establish Sheik Abdulla's rule over all of Kashmir, initial successes will probably be obtained, but retaliation by the tribesmen, with the connivance and possible involvement of the Pakistan Government, and further rebellion in the State can be expected in the near future.

~~TOP SECRET~~