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THE POSSIBILITY OF BRITAIN'S ABANDONMENT OF OVERSEAS MILITARY COMMITMENTS



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THE POSSIBILITY OF BRITAIN'S ABANDONMENT OF OVERSEAS MILITARY COMMITMENTS

SUMMARY

1. The Commitments.

Britain's overseas military commitments include: (1) the defense of its dependent territories from external aggression and internal disorder; (2) obligations set forth in treaties and agreements; (3) obligations implicit in Britain's Commonwealth and general defense policies; and (4) occupational responsibilities.

2. The Possibility of their Abandonment.

The British Government has at present no intention of giving up any of its overseas military commitments, and there is no reason to believe that economic stringency will force it to do so; certainly not in the near future. Various readjustments of overseas forces will doubtless be made from time to time for strategic reasons; these will, if important, be carried out in consultation with the US.

Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report. It is a revision of ORE 93-49, and contains information available to CIA as of 20 September 1950.

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THE POSSIBILITY OF BRITAIN'S ABANDONMENT OF OVERSEAS MILITARY COMMITMENTS

1. Britain's Current Overseas Military Commitments.

The overseas military commitments of the UK, some burdensome and some only potentially costly, are of several types:

(a) Those natural to a modern colonial power: the defense of its dependent territories from external aggression and internal disorder;

(b) Those set forth explicitly in treaties or agreements, involving defense guarantees, the supply of arms and/or training missions;

(c) Those implicit in Britain's Commonwealth and general defense policies; and

(d) Occupational responsibilities.

Within these general types there is overlapping. For example, by treaty the UK is bound to defend Egypt and enjoys the right to maintain troops and bases there; but a commitment to defend the Middle East from external aggression, to maintain a condition of stability there, and to control the Mediterranean-Suez Canal-Red Sea "life-line" is implicit in Britain's Commonwealth and general defense policies. Similar considerations apply to Iraq. As another example, Gibraltar would be defended as a dependent territory, but it would also be defended for reasons implicit in the Commonwealth and defense policies. It is apparent, therefore, that although for convenience and organization British commitments can be broken down into categories, many of them fit more than one.

A commitment, it should be made clear, is a fixed military policy or principle embedded in the national strategy, involving an intention to carry out a given mission; it need not include a precisely specified number of troops, ships, or aircraft. A commitment remains operative regardless of fluctuations in the strength of the forces on the spot, so long as policy is unchanged. Until policy is altered, therefore, any such fluctuations affect only the adequacy of the forces to fulfill the mission

and, in the case of a defense obligation, measure only the size of the risk accepted.

To service the present commitments of the UK, British forces (including colonial troops) are disposed across the world* according to British "Estimates of the Situation" and the availability of bases.

a. The Dependent Territories.

Britain's defense commitments include all the parts of the widespread dependent Empire. The majority of these parts, however, require no positive defense efforts or only token forces (for example, the colonies in the Western Hemisphere, the Pacific Islands, Aden).

Some British dependencies, though internally stable and not in immediate jeopardy from aggression, are strategically situated; they must be kept prepared for defense and maintained as air, naval, and/or army bases. In some cases their local economies must be supported by annual grants-in-aid (subsidies). Their installations must be serviced, developed, and manned. Included in this group are Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, and Singapore; and Kenya as the site of a large supply depot. The British military investment in each of these installations is heavy.

Two dependencies at present require relatively large commitments. Some 40,000 army troops (including colonial troops) are disposed in Malaya on active operations, together with supporting air and naval forces, to put down insurrection. Some 20,000 troops, including supporting air and naval elements, are disposed at Hong Kong to cope with the Chinese Communist threat to that colony.

b. Treaties and Agreements.

Britain's treaty obligations (and advantages) are numerous. Some are costly; some only potentially so. Some are overlapping.

*See Appendix for the present disposition of UK forces.

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~~SECRET~~(1) *The North Atlantic Treaty (1949).*

By the terms of this pact the UK is committed militarily according to the following terms:

Article V. The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

The explication of Britain's obligations under the NAT is still in progress. It may be notable, however, that of the five regional planning groups set up, the UK is a full and permanent member of four—more than any other state. (The US is a permanent member of only two of them at present, though it is associated with each of the other three in a non-member role.)

In this connection, though antedating the NAT organization, the UK has maintained two large military staffs in the US apart from the service attachés. One, still in existence, is known as the British Joint Services Mission; the other, abolished in 1949, supported the British element of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(2) *Five-Power Treaty of Western Union (Brussels Treaty) (1948).*

Britain is committed militarily according to the following terms:

Article IV. If any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other high contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

Under the terms of the Treaty the UK has committed itself to a centralized supreme com-

mand, to an integrated staff organization, to the defense of a line east of France and the Benelux countries, to increased production of military equipment, and to other cooperative measures involving equipment, training, and the assumption of the major share of administrative costs of the organization in London and Fontainebleau.

(3) *The United Nations Charter (1945).*

According to the charter the UK is committed militarily under the following articles of Chapter VII:

Article 43. 1. All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements, shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and member states or between the Security Council and groups of member states and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their constitutional processes.

Article 45. In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, members shall hold immediately available national air force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

No explication of these articles has yet been agreed on among the concerned powers, though the UK continues to maintain its element of the Military Staff Committee and may be presumed to be prepared to accept a suitable obligation according to the stated terms, if general agreement can be achieved.

Under Article 43 the UK has committed naval and ground forces to the defense of South Korea.

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(4) *The Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk (1947).*

This pact commits the UK and France to take such action as necessary to put an end to any threat to the security of either of them "arising from the adoption by Germany of a policy of aggression or from action by Germany to facilitate such a policy."

(5) *Anglo-Portuguese Treaties.*

There are eight treaties and a Secret Declaration covering a period from 1373 to 1899, the most important being:

(a) The Treaty of 1661, which binds His Majesty to "take the interest of Portugal and all its dominions to heart, defending the same with his utmost power by sea and land, even as England itself," and further to send troops for the purpose and ships also.

Though an annexed Secret Article binds His Majesty to "defend and protect all conquests or colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal against all his enemies, as well future as present," it is expected that the UK will refuse to defend Portuguese Macao in the event of attack on the latter by the Chinese Communists. A threat to the African or Atlantic Ocean colonies of Portugal would be another matter, however.

(b) The Secret Declaration of 1899 in which both parties confirm the Secret Article of 1661.

(6) *The Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance (1942).*

Britain's military obligations under this treaty are as follows:

Article IV. Should either of the high contracting parties during the post-war period become involved in hostilities with Germany (or any of the states associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe), in consequence of the attack of that state against that party, the other high contracting party will at once give to the contracting party so involved in hostilities all military and other support and assistance in his power.

This treaty binds both parties not to conclude any alliance or take part in any coalition directed against the other (Article VII), and not to seek territorial aggrandizement or interfere in the internal affairs of other states (Article V). Thus, either the UK or the USSR could at any time make a case for breach of

treaty against the other; and the UK Government as recently as July 1948 declared its view that the treaty is "still technically operative." As a practical matter, however, neither this treaty nor the one with Poland (see below) figures in Britain's strategic planning.

(7) *The Anglo-Polish Treaty (1939).*

The UK is committed militarily in the following terms:

Article I. Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequences of aggression by the latter against that Contracting Party, the other Contracting Party will at once give the Contracting Party engaged in hostilities all the support and assistance in its power.

Article II. (1) The provisions of Article 1 will also apply in the event of any action by a European Power which clearly threatened, directly or indirectly, the independence of one of the Contracting Parties, and was of such a nature that the Party in question considered it vital to resist it with its armed forces.

(2) Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of action by that Power which threatened the independence or neutrality of another European state in such a way as to constitute a clear menace to the security of that Contracting Party, the provisions of Article I will apply, without prejudice, however, to the rights of the other European State concerned.

(8) *The Anglo-Jordan Treaty (1948).*

In substance this treaty commits the two parties to the following:

(a) Should either party become engaged in war, the other party will immediately come to its aid. In the event of imminent menace of hostilities, the parties will immediately concert together the necessary measures of defense.

(b) In event of either party being engaged in war or menaced by hostilities, each will invite the other to bring to his territory, or territory controlled by him, the necessary forces of all arms.

(c) The King of Jordan will safeguard, maintain, and develop as necessary the airfields, ports, roads, and lines of communication in and across Jordan as may be required for the purposes of this treaty and will call upon the British for any necessary assistance to this end.

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(d) The King of Jordan invites the British to maintain units of the Royal Air Force at Amman and Mafrak airfields, and he will provide all necessary facilities. The UK, however, will reimburse the King of Jordan for all expenditures incurred in (c) and (d).

(e) The King of Jordan will afford, on request, all necessary facilities for the movement of UK armed force units across Jordan on the same financial terms applied to his own forces; the King of Jordan will also permit British navy ships to visit Jordan ports at any time upon notification.

(f) An Anglo-Jordanian Joint Defense Board is set up to formulate agreed strategic plans, to coordinate measures for the implementation of (c) above, to consult on training and equipment, and to consider, if necessary, the location of UK forces at places other than (d) above.

(g) In view of the desirability of identity in training and methods of the Jordan and British forces, the UK:

i. offers appropriate facilities in Britain or its territories for training the armed forces of Jordan;

ii. makes available operational units of its armed forces for joint training;

iii. provides on request any British service personnel required to ensure the efficiency of Jordanian forces;

iv. affords military instruction in British schools for Jordanian officers; provides arms, ammunition, equipment, aircraft, and other war material.

(h) As long as the treaty is in force Britain will, in accordance with arrangements to be agreed upon annually, afford financial assistance to Jordan to enable it to carry out obligations undertaken.

For the British fiscal year ending on 31 March 1950, this financial assistance amounted to £3.5 million. The ruler of Jordan is a virtual puppet of the British and, in a practical sense, the UK has almost unlimited military rights there.

Since the conclusion of the treaty it has been extended to cover that part of Palestine under the control of Jordan.

In conjunction with the Egyptian and Iraqi Treaties (see below) and an anticipated agreement with Cyrenaica, this treaty enables Brit-

ain to plan a defense-in-depth of the Suez Canal Zone and to count on uninterrupted land communications from North Africa to at least the border of Iran in case of war (provided an arrangement can be made with Israel for transit rights in the southern Negeb).

(9) *The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (1936).*

In substance this treaty commits the two parties to the following:

(a) Should either party become engaged in war, the other will immediately come to his aid in the capacity of an ally.

(b) The aid of the King of Egypt, in event of imminent menace of war or apprehended international emergency, will consist in furnishing the UK on Egyptian territory all facilities and assistance in his power, including use of ports, aerodromes, and means of communication.

(c) Until such time as the parties agree that the Egyptian Army is in position to protect the Suez Canal, the King of Egypt authorizes the UK to station forces in specified zones around the Canal.

(d) Without prejudice to (a) above, UK troops in the Canal Zone may not exceed 10,000* land forces and 400 pilots together with necessary ancillary personnel for administrative and technical duties. These numbers do not include civilian personnel.

(e) The Egyptians will provide, when necessary, reasonable means of communication and access to and from localities where British forces are situated and will also accord facilities at Port Said and Suez for landing and storage of materials and supplies for British forces, including maintenance of a small detachment of British forces in those ports to handle and guard this material and these supplies in transit.

Though Egypt has denounced this treaty, the UK considers it still in effect and remains hopeful that a new treaty containing terms reasonably satisfactory to British requirements will eventually be concluded when Egypt's postwar xenophobia has died down. An RAF training mission continues to be active with the Royal Egyptian Air Force.

*British troops in Egypt in fact far exceed this stipulated maximum; see tabulation of army disposition on page 13.

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(10) *The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1930, effective 1932).*

In substance the provisions of this treaty are as follows:

(a) Should either party become engaged in war, the other party will immediately come to its aid in the capacity of an ally, and in the event of an imminent menace of war the parties will immediately concert together the necessary measures of defense. The aid of the King of Iraq will consist in furnishing to the UK on Iraq territory all facilities and assistance in his power including the use of railways, rivers, ports, aerodromes, and means of communication.

(b) The King of Iraq will grant the UK sites for air bases at or in the vicinity of Basra (Shaiba) and for an air base to the west of the Euphrates (Habbaniya), and further authorizes the UK to maintain forces on Iraq territory at the above localities. The strength of these forces shall be determined by the UK from time to time after consultation with the King of Iraq.

(c) The UK undertakes to grant, whenever may be required by the King of Iraq, all possible facilities in the following matters, cost of which will be met by the King of Iraq:

i. naval, military, and aeronautical instruction to Iraqi officers in the UK;

ii. provision of arms, ammunitions, equipment, ships and aeroplanes of latest available pattern for forces of Iraq;

iii. provision of British naval, military, and air force officers to serve in advisory capacity to the forces of Iraq.

(d) In view of the desirability of identity in training and methods between the Iraq and British armies, the King of Iraq undertakes that:

i. if necessary to have recourse to foreign military instructors, these shall be chosen from amongst British subjects;

ii. any personnel of his forces sent abroad for military training will be sent to the territories of the UK, and only to another country when British facilities are not available;

iii. the armament and essential equipment of his forces shall not differ in type from those of the UK forces.

(11) *The Treaty of Mutual Assistance between Britain, France and Turkey (1939).*

In substance the provisions of this treaty are as follows:

(a) In the event of Turkey being involved in hostilities with a European power because of aggression of that power against Turkey, Britain and France will cooperate effectively with Turkey and will lend it all aid and assistance in their power.

(b) In the event of an act of aggression by a European power leading to war in the Mediterranean area in which France and the UK are involved, Turkey will cooperate effectively with France and the UK and will lend them all aid and assistance in her power. In the event of an act of aggression in the Mediterranean in which Turkey is involved, France and the UK will collaborate effectively with Turkey.

(c) In the event of France and the UK being involved in hostilities with a European power in consequence of aggression committed by that power against those powers in an area other than the Mediterranean, the parties will immediately consult together. Nevertheless, it is agreed that in such eventuality Turkey will observe at least a benevolent neutrality toward France and the UK.

(d) In the event of: (1) aggression by a European power against another European state whose government one of the parties had, with the approval of that state, undertaken to assist in maintaining independence or neutrality against such aggression; or (2) aggression by a European power which, while directed against another European state, constituted in the opinion of one of the governments of the parties a menace to its own security, the parties will immediately consult together with a view to such common action as might be considered effective.

(12) *The Anglo-Greek Agreement (1944)*

The presence of British troops in Greece was first formalized by the above agreement. An invitation to the British forces to continue in Greece has been reaffirmed by succeeding Greek governments. However, the last British combat unit — an infantry brigade numbering some 3,000 men — was withdrawn in late 1949 and early 1950. The British main-

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tain three service missions in Greece—military, air, and naval—engaged in training and re-equipping the armed forces. (The British also maintain a Police and Prisons Mission for training purposes.) Since the American Military Aid to Greece mission began to operate in 1947, the US and UK missions have worked jointly and closely.

(13) *The Treaty of the Trucial Chiefs of Oman (1853)*.

This treaty mediated by the British, established that the UK would watch over and insure the peace agreed to among themselves by the Chiefs of the Arabian Coast, and that, in case of aggression by one of the parties on another, the UK would obtain reparations for the injured party.

(14) *The Anglo-Bahrein Convention (1861)*.

By the terms of this agreement between the Sheikh of Bahrein and the British Government the UK agreed to maintain the security of the former's possessions against war, piracy, and slavery on the part of "the Chiefs and tribes of this (the Persian) Gulf," and to obtain reparations for the Sheikh for any such acts. Usage and precedent, however, have established that Britain has expanded its obligations to include the protection of Bahrein from aggressive acts regardless of their source.

(15) *The Anglo-Kuwait Understanding (1914)*.

In this understanding, documented by official letter, the British Government recognized the Sheikdom of Kuwait as "an independent Government under British protection."

(16) *The Anglo-Qatar Treaty (1916)*.

This treaty provides in substance for the British defense of Qatar against all aggressive actions and the exaction of reparations, unless Qatar itself provoked the aggressive actions.

(17) *The Anglo-Burmese Defense Agreement (1947)*.

This agreement provides for:

(a) the evacuation of all British troops from Burma immediately after Burma becomes independent (January 1948);

(b) the transfer to Burma of airfields, naval vessels, fixed Army and RAF establishments and initial equipment for the Burmese Army;

(c) the establishment of a Naval, Military, and Air Force Mission for instructional and advisory purposes with the condition that the government of Burma will not accept such a mission from any government outside of the British Commonwealth;

(d) a British contribution of financial and technical assistance in maintaining specified airfields;

(e) the extending of all reasonable British facilities for purchase by the government of Burma of war material;

(f) ships of either navy to have the right of entry into ports of the other party upon direct notification between their respective naval authorities on the spot;

(g) military aircraft of either party to have the right, upon customary peacetime direct notification between the respective air authorities, to fly over the territories of the other, and to enjoy staging facilities at airfields agreed upon;

(h) the government of Burma to afford all reasonable assistance including facilities of access and entry into Burma by air, land, and sea, to British forces bringing help and support to Burma by agreement with the government of Burma or to any part of the Commonwealth by agreement with the government of Burma and with the government of that part of the Commonwealth;

(i) the opening of fresh negotiations by either party with the other on any matter within the defense sphere, such negotiations, except by agreement, not to affect obligations under this agreement.

As from 4 January 1951, this agreement can be terminated subject to twelve months' notice on either side.

(18) *The Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement (1944)*.

This was to be a temporary agreement for the regulation of mutual relations during the remainder of the war, but its replacement by a permanent treaty has been delayed pending the disposition of the Italian colonies. Article VI provides that the UK will make available to Ethiopia a British Military Mission whose head shall be responsible to the Ethiopian Minister of War for the organization, training, and administration of the Ethiopian Army. The

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mission may be withdrawn upon three months' notice by either party.

(19) *Anglo-Thai Military Relations.*

There is no formal military agreement between Thailand and the UK. Britain enjoys, however, especially close relations with Thailand and provides special facilities to the Thais such as the training of Thai officers in the UK and Malaya, and the provision of arms and supplies. The British Military Attache in Bangkok serves as military adviser to the Thai Army. Local agreements have been concluded between Thai and Malayan authorities permitting the passage of border patrols over the national boundary and providing for exchange of information in efforts to deal with disorders in the Malaya-Thailand border area.

(20) *Anglo-Saudi Arabian Military Relations.*

The UK maintains a Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia. In addition it provides a Civil Air Training Mission, and the RAF has shown interest in surveying the area for airfield sites.

c. Commonwealth and General Defense Policies.

(1) *Commonwealth Policies.*

Britain's Commonwealth and general defense policies contain implied military commitments not expressed in contractual or treaty relations (except in the case of Ceylon¹).

So far as the Commonwealth is concerned, it may be assumed that the UK would participate in the defense of any of the Dominions

¹ The Anglo-Ceylonese Defense Agreement (1947) provides that (1) the two governments will give each other such military assistance for the security of their territories, for defense against external aggression, and for the protection of essential communications as it may be in their mutual interest to provide; (2) the UK may base such naval and air forces, and maintain such land forces in Ceylon as may be required for these purposes and as may be mutually agreed; (3) the Government of Ceylon will grant the UK all the necessary facilities. . . . These . . . will include the use of naval and air bases and ports and military establishments and the use of telecommunications facilities; (4) the UK will aid in training and development of Ceylonese armed forces; (5) joint administrative machinery will be established to implement this cooperation and to coordinate the defense requirements.

made the object of aggression by a non-Commonwealth power. Though varying in degree, Dominion by Dominion, the UK's military and strategic relations with the other Commonwealth nations are close. There is interchange of certain intelligence, and in some cases a division of intelligence work. The UK is the source of much of the others' equipment and doctrine, and provides technical and general training facilities and advisory services. Two of Britain's major naval bases, Trincomalee (Ceylon) and Simonstown (South Africa) are leased from the Dominions and maintained by the Royal Navy. British officers serve in and advise the Indian and the Pakistan forces on contract; New Zealand looks to the UK for technical military guidance. Canada and Australia are on the most intimate military terms with the British forces, and the UK is carrying out joint research and development projects with each.¹

Since the war, the UK has encouraged the Dominions to enlarge their armed services and assume greater defense responsibilities, to reduce the size of the burden on itself of the imperial defenses. Britain has to that end freely provided all the indoctrination, advice, and training desired. It has provided all manner of military equipment, often at nominal prices and sometimes without charge.

(2) *General Defense Policies.*

Britain's over-all defense policies also contain implied military commitments, based on the mission of the armed forces, i.e., to insure the security of the UK, the dependent empire, and British interests overseas; and to take the leading part in insuring the security of imperial communications. The Middle East, in British thinking, falls within these terms. As the locus of gigantic British investments the Middle East is the source of essential oil supplies, a center of imperial communications, and the sole Eurasian-African land bridge; the British are determined to defend it against aggression by an external power. (The British have encouraged US participation in Middle East defense planning.) Britain's strategic planners subordinate the area only to the

¹ Progress is being made in improving military relations with South Africa, which recently have not been as cordial as in the past.

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home defense zone; they view a Soviet menace to the Middle East as a threat to Britain's national security virtually as dangerous as any similar threat to Western Europe; they consider that the loss of the Middle East would endanger the independence of Pakistan, India, Ceylon, and Southeast Asia and would probably permanently affect the world balance of power between the USSR and the West. The British would, therefore, react vigorously to any threat to this area, regardless of whether a treaty relationship existed requiring action.

Also a part of Britain's defense policies is the giving of military aid and advice to nations expected to be allies in event of war. It follows from this that the UK has special relations, not always reflected in explicit treaties or general agreements, with the numerous countries which use British Tables of Organization, equipment, and doctrine. Special technical missions to these countries have been fairly frequent, and their specialists attend military schools in the UK. Apart from the Commonwealth, several countries of Western Europe and Scandinavia were the beneficiaries after the war of surplus British equipment, including ships, aircraft, and army supplies. All the countries of the Middle East periodically seek military favors from the UK and minor potentates have for long received politico-military subventions. Thailand and Burma are likewise applicants for military favors. Argentina's purchase of British aircraft led to the establishment in Argentina of a technical advisory mission, reportedly on a two-year contract.

d. Occupational Responsibilities.

British forces have occupational missions in Germany, Austria, Trieste, and the Italian colonies. About 20 percent of the British Army forces are so committed.

(1) Germany.

The UK occupies and administers an area of 33,700 square miles in northwest Germany in accordance with the agreement reached by the European Advisory Commission (a body set up at the Moscow Conference of 1943 and originally including representatives of the US, the USSR, and the UK) and approved by the governments in 1945. No limit was set on the numbers of troops, and though the later

Potsdam agreement set out the main purposes of the occupation of Germany, it made no provision for its termination.

(2) Austria.

The UK occupies and administers the Southern Zone of Austria in accordance with the agreement reached by the European Advisory Commission, which in 1945 included France, and approved by the four governments in 1945. No limit was set on the numbers of troops. The termination of the occupation depends on the terms of the Austrian State Treaty. Though the treaty is still under negotiation, one agreed article specifies the withdrawal of troops within 90 days after ratification by the occupation governments.

(3) Trieste.

The Italian Peace Treaty called for a short-term military occupation of the Free Territory of Trieste until the appointment of a governor under the UN Security Council. The treaty provides that troops in the FTT shall not exceed 5,000 each for the UK, US, and Yugoslavia. When a governor is appointed, these troops shall be at his disposal for a period of 90 days after his assumption of office, after which they will cease to be at his disposal and will be withdrawn within a further period of 45 days, unless the governor advises the Security Council that some or all of the troops should not be withdrawn, in which case the troops required may remain until not later than 45 days after the governor has advised the Security Council that the troops are no longer needed for internal security.

(4) The ex-Italian Colonies.

The UK occupies and administers the ex-Italian colonies of Libya (excepting the province of Fezzan) and Eritrea by the terms of the Italian Peace Treaty, pending their final disposal according to UN General Assembly decisions. The British will retain their responsibilities in Libya until it becomes an independent power on 1 January 1952, and in Eritrea until some disposition is made by the 1950 session of the General Assembly.

The civil administration of these areas has been a financial burden to the British. They have wished for some time to relinquish their responsibilities in Eritrea and the Libyan province of Tripolitania. The province of Cyre-

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naica plays a part in the pattern of Britain's strategic planning for Middle East defense, although it is secondary in importance to the role of Egypt. The British expect to have concluded a satisfactory defense treaty with its ruler when Libya becomes independent, enabling the permanent retention of bases in Cyrenaica. Meanwhile, they have an understanding with the Emir, and already have begun substantial constructional work.

2. The Likelihood of Abandonment of Commitments.

The British Government has at present no intention of giving up any of its overseas military commitments. There is no reason to believe that economic stringency will force it to do so unless some striking change takes place in the trend of world events. The British economic situation is for the time being improved, and is apt to remain so at least as long as the US and NATO rearmament program ensures a high level of economic activity throughout most of the Western world. There will be no purely economic compulsion in the foreseeable future for the British to reduce military appropriations below those of FY 1950.

Indeed, in the new state of affairs following the invasion of South Korea the British have already planned an increase, over the next three years, of about 45 percent in their military budget and have extended the term of conscription from 18 to 24 months. It is, however, doubtful whether in the present condi-

tions of greatly increased world tension, the entire structure of British overseas commitments can continue to be adequately maintained—whether the margin of risk can be held constant—even by such an accelerated military effort as the British intend to put forth. Because dangers have increased in most parts of the world, the forces required to meet these dangers need also to be increased. It is especially plain that a much larger number of NATO forces is required upon the European continent, and pressure has already been put upon the British Government to increase its contingents there. In theory, it is possible that the British might abandon some of their more distant overseas commitments in order to strengthen their forces in Western Europe; actually, it is unlikely that they would do so.

Under present world conditions, therefore, no abandonment of British overseas commitments is to be expected. Readjustments of one sort or another (such as the temporary weakening of Hong Kong in order to reinforce UN troops in Korea), dictated by strategic considerations, will certainly be made from time to time. It is probable that here and there in the world the discrepancy between the military force required to fulfill a commitment and the force actually present—the degree of calculated risk—will increase. These possible weaknesses, and the readjustments needed to deal with them, are strategic problems which will generally be solved in full consultation with the US.

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APPENDIX

BRITISH ARMY AND BRITISH COLONIALS:
ESTIMATED DISPOSITION AS OF
1 SEPTEMBER 1950

<i>Area</i>	<i>UK Troops</i>	<i>Colonials</i>
United Kingdom	228,000	
Germany	47,000	
Austria	4,900	
Trieste	4,300	
Malta	1,500	1,500
Gibraltar	2,700	150
Greece	200	
Cyprus	1,900	
Libya	9,000	1,700
Egypt	24,000	8,700
Sudan and Eritrea	2,300	
East Africa	3,500	15,800
West Africa	1,500	14,800
Aden	120	700
Jordan	1,000	
Malaya	17,000	23,000
Ceylon	150	350
Hong Kong	12,500	750
Caribbean	1,100	700
India	230	350
Pakistan	350	
Korea	1,500	
Miscellaneous	2,250	
	367,000*	68,500

* About one-half are conscripts.

THE ROYAL NAVY: DISPOSITION AS OF
1 JULY 1950

The British fleet is currently composed of 5 battleships, 6 aircraft carriers, 6 light aircraft carriers, no heavy cruisers, 24 light cruisers, 110 destroyers, 57 submarines, 168 escorts, 68 fleet minesweepers and auxiliary vessels.

Although some of these are undergoing refit, or are in reserve, the following are operational:

Home Waters

1 battleship
3 aircraft carriers
3 light aircraft carriers *
3 light cruisers
31 destroyers
21 submarines
14 escorts
7 fleet minesweepers

Mediterranean

1 light aircraft carrier
4 light cruisers
9 destroyers
5 submarines
7 escorts
4 fleet minesweepers

South Atlantic

1 light cruiser
2 escorts

America and West Indies

1 light cruiser
1 destroyer
1 submarine
2 escorts

East Indies

2 light cruisers **
5 escorts
1 fleet minesweeper

Pacific

1 light fleet carrier
3 light cruisers
7 destroyers
11 escorts
2 submarines

*One light carrier due in Pacific in September.

**Since 1 July one cruiser has left to relieve a cruiser in the Pacific.

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THE ROYAL AIR FORCE: DISPOSITION AS REPORTED ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1950

<i>United Kingdom</i>	Type	Number of Squadrons (assigned and available)	Remarks
	Medium Bomber	19	2 detached to Malaya
	Light Bomber	2	
	Night Fighter	6	
	Day Fighter	38*	(34 half strength)
	Reconnaissance	11	1 operating in East Africa
	Transport	10	
<i>Germany</i>	Light Bomber	4	
	Day Fighter	5½	{ 1 detached to Hong Kong 1 detached to Malaya
	Reconnaissance	½	
<i>Middle East</i>	Light Bomber	2	{ 1 Aden 1 Iraq (detached to Malaya)
	Night Fighter	1	Egypt
	Day Fighter	6	{ 4 Egypt 1 Cyprus 1 Malta
	Reconnaissance	3	{ 1 Egypt 2 Malta
	Transport	5	Egypt

* Includes 20 Royal Auxiliary Air Force Squadrons with 160 aircraft presently assigned to Fighter Command Groups.

Far East

Light Bomber	1	Malaya
Day Fighter	2	{ 1 Hong Kong 1 Malaya
Reconnaissance	4 + 1 Flt.	{ 3 Malaya 1 Hong Kong 1 Flt Ceylon
Transport	3	Malaya

Sub-Total of Tactical Units in the UK

	MB	LB	FTR	RCN	TRANS	TOTAL
Tactical units	17	2	24	10	10	63
Aircraft in Tactical Units	136	16	229	86	80	547

Sub-Total of Tactical Units Outside UK

	MB	LB	FTR	RCN	TRANS	TOTAL
Tactical Units	2	7	14½	7½ + 1 Flt.	8	39 + 1 Flt.
Aircraft in Tactical Units	16	57	226	68	64	431

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	<i>MB</i>	<i>LB</i>	<i>FTR</i>	<i>RCN</i>	<i>TRANS</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
Tactical Units	19	9	38½	17½ + 1 Flt.	18	102 + 8 Flts.
Aircraft in Tactical Units	152	73	455	154	144	978

ROYAL NAVAL AVIATION: DISPOSITION AS REPORTED 15 SEPTEMBER 1950

Home Based	Fighter Squadrons	4
	Attack Squadrons	4
Mediterranean	Fighter Squadrons	1
	Attack Squadrons	1
Pacific	Fighter Squadrons	1
	Attack Squadrons	1

ROYAL NAVAL AIRCRAFT STRENGTH AND TYPES

	<i>Attack</i>	<i>Fighter</i>	<i>Recon- naissance</i>	<i>Liaison</i>	<i>Training</i>	<i>Misc</i>	<i>Total</i>
Number in tactical units	76	73	149
Total number of aircraft	890	842	76	18	435	68	2,329

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