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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

## ANALYSIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS

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ANALYSIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS

1. Enclosed is an analysis of Soviet foreign propaganda broadcasts prepared by the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service. The salient points of the Enclosure are summarized below.

2. A large proportion of all Soviet propaganda broadcasting is devoted to extolling the success of the Soviet system in the U.S.S.R. The chief additional note in broadcasts directed toward countries outside the Soviet sphere is condemnation of specific "reactionary" activities or utterances. Otherwise little comment is made on matters of local interest, except in the case of the following countries evidently under special propaganda pressure:\*

a. Spain: forceful propaganda almost exclusively concerned with the "anti-Franco struggle" both within and outside of Spain.

b. Austria: frequent criticism of the Austrian government and the U.S. and British zone military governments, with particular reference to the lenient treatment of Nazis, war criminals, and Fascist refugees.

c. Greece: intense and sustained propaganda against the present regime and in support of the E.A.M.

d. Turkey: the "absence of freedom" in that country is stressed, with particular reference to the forthcoming elections (imputing to the Turkish Government in advance an unrepresentative character).

e. Iran and the Arab states: the powerful Tabriz radio has conducted an intensive propaganda against the Iranian Government. The Soviet broadcasts stress denunciations of British and Turkish policy, past and present.

f. China: broadcasts about China support the Communists and denounce the National Government as the pawn of "foreign reactionary groups" bent on preventing the attainment of real unity. U.S. policy in China is vigorously condemned.

g. Korea: U.S. attempts to dominate the country through its unification under a "reactionary" provisional government are contrasted with the benevolence of the Red Army, to which alone Korea owes its liberation. While the Soviet zone enjoys unity and efficiency, the U.S. zone has to endure party politics.

\* Comment on the situation in Germany is a function of the Berlin rather than the Moscow radio, and is not covered in the Enclosure.

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h- Japan: The U.S.S.R. champions the cause of the Japanese Communist Party, and complains that the U.S. is fostering the American, but not the Soviet, type of democracy. Its propaganda implies obliquely that, in seeking to accomplish the purposes of the occupation with a minimum of disruption and ill-will, the U.S. is retaining in power "reactionaries" whom it regards as potential allies.

i. Great Britain and the United States share scathing attacks on "zealous warmongers" who seek to prevent "further development of the cooperation among democracies that arose (during) the war against Fascist aggression." Britain is criticized more severely than the U.S. with regard to occupation policies, treaty drafting, and reparations questions. In addition British policies with respect to Spain, Greece, the Middle East, and colonial issues are heavily attacked.

Reactionary developments in the U.S., such as the Ku Klux Klan, are stressed, as are strikes, unemployment, and the disadvantages of living in a capitalist economy.

3. Soviet foreign policy is presented as consistently directed toward the establishment of peace, democracy, international cooperation, and universal security. All resistance to Soviet policy is that of "reactionaries" seeking to defeat these purposes.

In contrast, the policy of the United States is to dominate the world by means of the atomic bomb. In the United Nations the attitude of the United States is a domineering denial of the equality of states, and particularly of the Soviet Union's well earned right to equal leadership in world affairs. In occupied areas the United States supports "reactionary" elements; its interest in overseas bases is "imperialistic."

Soviet propaganda does not admit the possibility of a conflict of interest between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. The trouble is that, under "reactionary" influences, the U.S. Government has departed from the policies of President Roosevelt. The American people, however, are alarmed by and opposed to this development.

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ENCLOSURE~~SECRET~~**ANALYSIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS**

Prepared by the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service  
22 July 1946

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The Soviet Government uses foreign-language broadcasting as an instrument for implementing and promoting Soviet foreign policy. Its comprehensive foreign language service, embracing most areas of the world, is clearly guided by a central propaganda directive which changes in accordance with the changing requirements of Soviet policy abroad.

The current schedule of Soviet foreign language broadcasting, introduced in April 1946, contains 88 transmissions in 31 languages, for which 37 different wavelengths are used, the total daily broadcasting time being 42 hours, 15 minutes. This represents a considerable drop from the wartime peak, in March 1944, when Soviet programs abroad consumed 65 hours daily.

A breakdown of the current schedules reveals the following allocation of broadcasting time:

345	minutes :	English (of which 100 minutes are exclusively for North America and 55 minutes are taken up by a joint program for North America and Britain)
300	"	German (75 minutes of which are directed to Austrian listeners)
270	"	Spanish (150 minutes for South America)
120	"	Chinese, French, Polish
95	"	Bulgarian
90	"	Italian, Turkish
75	"	Finnish, Rumanian
60	"	Arabic, Japanese, Persian, Swedish
50	"	Greek
45	"	Czech, Danish, Dutch, Hungarian, Norwegian, Serbo-Croat, Slovak, Slovene
30	"	Albanian, Bengali, Hindustani, Indonesian Malay, Korean, Portuguese (for Brazil only)
15	"	Yiddish

In addition, it should be pointed out that a separate and extensive telegraphic service conducted by the Tass agency transmits material in English and French (both hellschreiber and morse) for universal consumption and through 24 hours with slight intervals. The agency also transmits another English service of approximately 18 hours exclusively for North America, a German hellschreiber service from 1000 to 0200; a Spanish morse service for Latin America, and two French morse transmissions for the Near East and North Africa.

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SOVIET RADIO ATTITUDES TOWARD SIGNIFICANT GEOGRAPHIC AREAS

Turning to the structure and content of Moscow's foreign broadcasts, a rough division can also be made between those directed to countries which may be termed political pressure points and those which have no immediate significance in the Soviet scheme. In broadcasts to both groups a large amount of time is devoted to the success of the Soviet system in the USSR. In addition, the chief note in broadcasts directed to countries outside the Soviet sphere of influence is what the Moscow radio itself calls "vigilance." This in effect means that no activity or utterance, even of minor interest, which could be interpreted as "reactionary" or anti-Soviet is allowed to pass without notice, and more frequently, without an elaborate reply. At the same time, it is constantly emphasized that Soviet policy is fundamentally based upon peace and security and rigidly upholds the principles of UN.

To those countries which lie within the Soviet sphere of influence, and whose radio stations, even if not under direct control, may be relied upon to reflect the Soviet viewpoint, Moscow radio does not devote much specific propaganda. This applies in varying degrees to Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania and Hungary and, also, it may be noted to Czechoslovakia and Finland, although broadcasting from the latter countries, particularly Czechoslovakia, strikes a definitely independent note compared with the others.

Broadcasts for these countries follow variations of a general pattern, comprising news of Soviet home affairs, international news and articles from the Soviet Press or commentaries also broadcast in other languages, and, of course, music. Little news or comment is given of specific interest to the country concerned, whose home affairs are only occasionally discussed in articles quoted from "New Times" and other Soviet papers, written for a wider audience. The apparently individual talk by Ovcharov, "our Balkan commentator" - addressed to countries in the Balkan group - is usually a rewritten version of some commentary previously broadcast in other languages, perhaps slightly altered to emphasize the Slavic angle. It may also be noted, as an example of the Soviet method, that commentaries discussing and often strongly criticizing Hungarian internal affairs have not been heard in broadcasts for Hungary since the reorganization of the Government and the subsequent visit of the Premier and his delegation to Moscow.

Broadcasts for Greece and the Middle East

Transmissions to Greece present a sharply contrasting picture essentially conditioned by that country's political situation. As in the case of Turkey and Spain, the present political regime is openly attacked and the propaganda offensive is intense and sustained. Extensive use is made of news of Greek home interest such as statements by the E.A.M. delegation during its visit to Moscow and copious extracts from the Greek Left-wing Press. In addition to generally distributed articles and commentaries, which when concerning the Greek situation have on occasion been broadcast earlier and at greater length than in other languages, talks exclusively directed to a Greek audience are frequently given.

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A similar tendency is to be found in comment for Turkey and Iran which more often than not is mainly directed against "reactionary" and anti-Soviet influences in those countries. At the same time, the Azerbaijan National Radio, with its powerful transmitter at Tabriz - a parting "gift," it was stated, of the Red Army - has been broadcasting intensive propaganda in Turkish Azerbaijani against the Iranian Government, and this station also broadcasts in Persian, Kurdish, Russian, Arabic and French, "to enlighten world opinion on our national aspirations and achievements."

As in the case of Greece, transmissions in Turkish tend to pay great attention to internal politics and to stress the "absence of freedom" in Turkey, a familiar theme which Moscow's Turkish commentator Erdem has repeatedly embroidered in connection with the elections. For Arab and Iranian listeners, on the other hand, Turkish policy past and present is strongly attacked, and in Middle Eastern transmissions for all destinations, anti-British propaganda is marked and listeners are intermittently warned against the activities of Nuri-El-Said, of the alleged implications of the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty and the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, and of British policy generally.

#### Broadcasts for Germany and Austria:

Although similar in treatment to broadcasts for the Soviet sphere of influence, the Moscow radio in German provides certain individual aspects which merit a more detailed examination. With the emergence of the Berlin radio and its satellites inside the Soviet zone as the mouthpiece of Soviet policy in Germany, German broadcasts from Moscow have lost most of the personal character they displayed during the war, when broadcasts under the aegis of the "Free Germany Committee" proved a most effective propaganda medium. Moreover, the amount of time allotted to broadcasts for Germany has been gradually reduced since the end of the war. A large proportion of these transmissions, as in the case of other languages, is now devoted to publicizing all aspects of Soviet life and progress, and to the Soviet line on international affairs through the usual medium of long extracts from the Soviet press, commentaries and carefully selected and arranged news items. Relatively little time is given to German domestic affairs.

Strictly German features are limited largely to local reportage on economic, political and cultural progress in the Soviet zone, attributed to "our correspondent" and duplicating to a considerable extent the much wider service of the Berlin radio. Such commentaries as are addressed directly to the German people are delivered anonymously and follow the propaganda line of the Berlin radio, although with a more stereotyped and monotonous presentation.

Broadcasts for Austria contain very few reports originating from the Soviet or other zones, apart from extracts from the press, mainly the Communist papers. These broadcasts differ in tone from the Vienna radio, which is no doubt under Soviet censorship but not apparently under direct Soviet or Communist control. The subjects treated in the anonymous commentaries addressed to Austrian listeners and the propaganda trends are in the main those ventilated by the Austrian Communist Party, but with some

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change of emphasis. They are frequently critical of Austrian policy, a most frequent topic being the lenient treatment accorded to Nazis, war criminals and Fascist refugees by the Austrian authorities and the American and British military governments.

#### Broadcasts for Scandinavia and Western Europe

The content of these broadcasts for all areas excluding Spain conforms with the general policy of presenting the general Soviet picture except when, in accordance with the guiding principle of Soviet "vigilance" referred to above, internal events call for fuller comment. Thus, individual attention is paid to "reactionary" activities in Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark in commentaries for these countries, but only on occasion.

An attempt at less stereotyped presentation is evinced by Moscow's broadcasts to France. Among the broadcasts which seek for a local flavor are the "Listeners' Mailbag" sponsored by the France-USSR Association and an objective review of the Soviet press presented in the French manner. Such news items as the arrival of a Soviet wheat ship in Marseilles are given prominence and individual treatment.

Of other broadcasts for Western Europe, those in Italian reveal little of individual interest. Dutch broadcasts, too, conform to the general pattern, and there appear to be no broadcasts in Flemish or specifically directed to Belgium.

Spanish broadcasts from Moscow, on the other hand, are notable for their commentaries of purely Spanish appeal. Aracil, who delivers them, is reputed to be a well-known Spanish literary figure, and his forceful propaganda is almost exclusively concerned with the "anti-Franco struggle" in and outside Spain. His commentaries are sometimes included in the Spanish service for Latin America, which, however, more often broadcast talks of wider interest and in line with the general Soviet output.

#### Broadcasts for the United States and Great Britain

The large allocation of time to Moscow's programs in English to the United States and Great Britain is also reflected in the individual attention to their composition and presentation. Certain minor divergencies between the treatment of the services for the United States and Britain are to be found both in the use of announcers with an American accent for the former and in the variation of propaganda twists according to the destination of the commentary.

In general, the Soviet radio is more critical than approving in its references to the United States. References to the United Kingdom, while fewer in number, are even more critical. Scathing attacks are directed against "those British and American reactionaries who are seeking to prevent the further development of the cooperation among democracies that arose in the days of the war against Fascist aggression." Opposed to the "zealous warmongers" are the bulk of "the people of the freedom-loving nations" who are as one with the people of the Soviet Union in their desire to preserve peace. Moscow tells the United States that if American foreign policy is moving in the direction of an Anglo-American military bloc, this policy

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does not have the support of American and other citizens.

The largest number of news reports dealing with domestic events in the United States are devoted to economic affairs. There are frequent references to items in the American press giving statistics on strikes and unemployment, and to the disadvantages of living in a capitalist economy. Direct and detailed comment is made on reactionary developments in the United States and the persons and organizations opposing manifestations such as the Ku Klux Klan are applauded.

While Soviet criticisms of American and British foreign policy and attitudes toward the United Nations are directed concomitantly against the United States and Britain, Britain is singled out for heavier attacks on such matters as occupation policies in Germany and attitudes toward treaty and reparation questions. Heavy criticism is also directed at the British attitude toward Spain during and after the Civil War, colonial policy, activities in the Middle East and interest in the Greek elections.

#### Broadcasts for Japan

For months after VJ-Day, Moscow's broadcasts to the Japanese people eschewed comment on events in Japan or even the Far East. Such commentaries as were given were devoted to a glorification of life in the Soviet Union, while news reports were limited to straight accounts of international events drawn mostly from Europe.

In April, coincidental with the Japanese elections and the outspoken criticisms of MacArthur's occupation policies voiced by the Soviet delegation to the Allied Council for Japan, Moscow's transmissions assumed a new tone and point. From that time to the present, the two daily broadcasts in Japanese and one in English directed to Japan have delved thoroughly into Japanese domestic affairs and their relationship to occupation policy, with the conclusion that Japan is being allowed to pursue a course inimical to the best interests of the Japanese people and the world.

In substance, Moscow would give the Japanese people the impression that United States policy in Japan is based on the following objectives: (1) to keep the Japanese tractable without provoking too much ill-feeling; (2) to punish the most notorious war criminals without impairing the Japanese political and economic structure to the point where occupation problems would become overwhelmingly burdensome; (3) to implement the terms of the Potsdam Declaration in word but not necessarily in spirit; (4) to develop in Japan the United States version of democracy and at the same time to keep the Soviet system from gaining ascendancy; (5) to convince the Japanese public that in the future, Japan and the United States should have close ties; (6) to reduce considerably the power of the Zaibatsu without basically altering Japan's capitalist system. Implied but only very obliquely is the view that the United States seeks in many respects to keep Japan's militaristic clique intact as the nucleus of a Japan which one day might be militarily allied with the United States. General MacArthur as an individual is not the object of attack.



The burden of Moscow's message is that the Japanese reactionaries are at the helm, steering the country according to the pre-war compass, with utter disregard for the urgent needs of the people. Although it does not bulk large in point of volume, the link is made between Japanese reaction and the occupation policy on all key issues, such as the preservation of the Emperor system, the failure to dissolve the great industrial and trade combines, the withholding of full freedom of speech and agitation on the part of the progressive parties and groups, and the unrepresentative results of the Diet elections attendant upon the premature ballot. In more direct fashion than in most of its other overseas beams, Moscow exhibits partisanship for the Japan Communist Party which is depicted as growing, despite formidable obstacles.

#### Broadcasts about China

No broadcasts from the USSR to China are at present intercepted by the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service. The only material available, therefore, is comment about China in broadcasts to other areas.

The Moscow radio line on China represents a clear-cut attempt to discredit the National Government, on the one hand, and to solidify the position of the Chinese Communists, on the other. Chiang Kai-shek's government is depicted as the pawn of "foreign reactionary groups," which seek to block the attainment of real unity.

Under vigorous attack is the American policy in China. United States economic and military aid to the National Government is labelled as unwarranted interference in China's domestic affairs. It is noted that although Red Army troops have evacuated Chinese soil in deference to the people's will, the United States has failed to withdraw its occupation forces. Liberal use is made of the American press for quotations in support of the thesis that right-minded people not only in the United States but in China are opposed to the American policy, which is aimed at the ultimate dominance of Chiang Kai-shek's regime over all of China, including the Northeastern Provinces.

#### Broadcasts to Korea

Moscow's broadcasts to and about Korea establish the antithetical purposes of American and Soviet policy in that country. The United States policy, as Moscow sees it, is based on these objectives:

- 1) Establish "dominant rights" in Korea.
- 2) Set up a provisional government including the "reactionaries" but excluding those Koreans with a Communist tinge.
- 3) Break down the occupation barriers, do away with the division zones and unify the country economically as a primary step toward political unification.

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- 4) Criticize Soviet policy in northern Korea and combat Soviet criticism of the United States policy in southern Korea.

By contrast, Moscow disseminates the following view of its own policy in Korea:

- 1) The Koreans have nothing to fear from the Red Army, which is "peculiarly different" from other armies. The Red Army, no matter in what country its troops are stationed, feels that the people whose country it occupies are "quite capable" of setting up their "political life, not for the secondary benefit of reactionaries, but for the primary benefit of democratic elements." The Red Army is a "liberator" and a preserver of the interests of mankind.
- 2) The Koreans owe Russia an everlasting debt of gratitude for liberating them from Japanese oppression. That is, the atom bomb did not crush Japanese militarists, who would have continued to fight in Korea and elsewhere on the Asiatic Continent: it was the Red Army that proved the deciding factor.
- 3) Northern Korea is solidly united and efficiently administered, while southern Korea has "no united front", as a "fight is going on between political parties." (Whenever possible, such statements are credited to Koreans.)

#### Broadcasts about Other Areas of the Far East

The Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service does not intercept Moscow broadcasts to the areas discussed in this section, but as indicated in other broadcasts the Soviet position seems to be:

South Sakhalin and the Kuriles: 1) To emphasize that southern Karafuto (Sakhalin) and the Chischime (Kuriles) group belonged to Russia in the "old days"; that the Red Army "liberated" these islands from Japanese oppression, and the Soviet Union is the "legal owner." 2) To convince the native population that it is receiving equal rights and privileges with the "Soviet citizens," and that the work of rehabilitation and reconstruction is being pushed forward speedily. 3) To assure "Japanese laborer residents" that they will not be punished for "crimes committed by Japanese imperialists."

Indonesia: Moscow points out that the Netherlands Government proposal for recognition of the Indonesian Republican Government would involve only "insubstantial concessions," and would mean the isolating of various parts of Indonesia, thus dooming the republic to "political and economic weakness."

#### SUMMARY OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AS REFLECTED IN USSR BROADCASTS

Radio Moscow depicts Soviet foreign policy as a consistent, integrated force, not beset by the pulling of reactionary elements. The general line is that Soviet policy aims at peace, international cooperation and free democracy, while all policies which can be interpreted as opposed to Soviet aims, even in the slightest detail, will lead to world disorder, political and economic slavery, or even to war.

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Broadcasts maintain that the Soviet policy is aimed at eradicating fascism and strengthening democracy, and at working for a firm and lasting peace through international cooperation. Soviet behavior both within the United Nations and in her bilateral relations, is described by the Soviet radio as bearing out this description of general foreign policy. No opportunity is lost to convince the world that a "heroic" Red Army saved mankind from "the claws and teeth of fascism" both in Europe and the Far East, and that the atomic bomb did not materially alter the course of the war. The Soviet radio combats all attempts to keep the Soviets from participating in "the leadership of this new world" and to prevent "international reactionaries" from using the victory over fascism as a means to benefit themselves.

With respect to the control of atomic energy, the broadcasts reflect "the Soviet policy of peace and defense of universal security." The Soviet proposals for atomic control "aim at prohibiting the manufacture and use of atomic weapons, just as the civilized world has already vetoed poison gas and bacteria in warfare."

The broadcasts on domestic affairs give testimony that the Five-Year-Plan is one of "peaceful development" in accordance with the over-all peaceful policy of the USSR. These domestic broadcasts present conditions in the Soviet Union at their best, with everybody contented and happy, all loyal to the government, and proud of Stalin.

#### SUMMARY OF U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AS REFLECTED IN USSR BROADCASTS

Soviet broadcasts describe American foreign policy in terms of a conflict between the forces of fascism or reaction and the forces of democracy. While the efforts of the late President Roosevelt to lay the foundations of international peace are unstintingly praised, and the efforts of men all over the world to help expand and consolidate "democracy" are applauded, the Russians claim that the past year has witnessed growing activity on the part of "reactionary forces (who) aim to disrupt the cooperation of freedom-loving people and undermine the collaboration of the Big Three." According to the Soviet Radio, "such activity is making itself felt in the United States, too. It is not by accident that American domestic elements are sounding the alarm and exposing the plans of American reactionaries, aiming at world supremacy, for an Anglo-American military alliance against the USSR."

A fuller exposition of the Soviet attitude toward United States foreign policy is found in broadcasts on the United States attitude toward the United Nations organization. The Russians see the approach to the solution of international problems as increasingly being set by two different tendencies. The first is "imperialist", one group of powers seeking to dominate the entire international organization, with the other nations submitting to their domination. Against this tendency, Radio Moscow sets a "democratic" tendency based on peaceful collaboration, a policy which has the adherence of the Soviet people. Soviet broadcasts state that UN should guide itself "by the principle of equality of States and not by the principle

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of the domination of some States over others." Circles who uphold the latter principle are regarded by Radio Moscow as enemies of international collaboration who realize that the preservation of unanimity among the major powers is a necessary condition for the existence of the UN, and are therefore trying to defame the USSR. The "reactionary" press of the United States is accused by the Russians of creating an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust of the USSR and of "sowing the seeds of conflict and anxiety." But, as in their treatment of the U. S. foreign policy, the Russians, in their reports on UN, attribute to the mass of citizens a deep concern and a desire to dispel that atmosphere of suspicion.

On the subject of atomic energy the Soviet radio represents the United States policy as an attempt to consolidate its monopoly of atomic weapons for an indefinite period in order to dominate the world.

The Russian radio reaction on United States occupation policy in Germany is that the political situation in the United States zone is not calculated to promote democracy, but is serving to strengthen reactionary tendencies among the Germans. American occupation authorities are said to support these reactionary elements. This judgment is based on news of "werewolf" activities and the existence of reactionary political parties, and in reports that industry is still in the hands of "magnates of monopoly capital" and land in the hands of big landowners. The Soviet radio comment on the United States Far Eastern occupation policy has been adequately covered in the geographic sections above.

Reports and editorial comment on the position of the United States in regard to military bases are frequently quoted from the Scandinavian and American press. The Russian radio quotes articles from these sources to support its claim that the United States should withdraw from many of the foreign bases occupied during the war.

The United States policy toward Russia, as Radio Moscow reports it, is to become increasingly "firm" with the Soviet Union, and to turn away from Roosevelt's policy of friendship; also, to convince the world that Russia's part in winning the war was by no means as great as Russia itself proclaims: to "twist popular world opinion" concerning the Soviet Union's equal right to participate in world leadership and to curb Russia's aspirations by employing "atomic diplomacy."

#### SOVIET VERSUS AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ACCORDING TO RADIO MOSCOW

Out of the vast amount of Soviet foreign-language broadcasting considered for this report emerges the conclusion that the Soviet radio reflects a serious cleavage between American and Soviet foreign policy. The two nations are presented, more often by implication than by direct statement, as working at cross-purposes in many areas throughout the world. While the

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USSR pursues a course unswervingly aimed at peace, unity among the nations and democracy for all, the United States, prodded by a relatively small group of reactionaries in high places, pursues a policy detrimental to the people and, at worst, engendering conflict. Nowhere does Moscow voice the opinion that the basic interests of the two nations bring them into opposition. Trouble arises only insofar as the United States departs from the policy enunciated by President Roosevelt and, in opposition to the will of the American people, moves in the direction of imperialism.

The most succinct and perhaps the sharpest expression of divergencies between the two countries appears in a "Pravda" comment on the American plan for international control of atomic energy. Summarizing the "Pravda" statement in a broadcast to Japan, Moscow states:

"The Soviet proposals and the American plan, the "Pravda" observer concludes, reveal two different trends in current international politics. The first reflects the unswerving Soviet policy of peace and the defense of universal security. The American plan is the product of atomic diplomacy and reflects an obvious desire for world domination, but nowadays desires of that sort have no chance for success."

As Moscow sees it, the United States must, and if the great mass of the American people have their way, inevitably will abandon its "desire for world domination" in favor of a foreign policy in which the two nations may live in harmony.

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