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
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WEEKLY SUMMARY



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H I G H L I G H T S

As the fourth week of the present Berlin impasse came to an end without relieving the tension between the USSR and the western powers, the joint air lift continued to meet the minimum food requirements of Berlin's western sectors. French attention was deflected from the Berlin crisis by concern over the unexpected and apparently unnecessary fall of the Schuman government. In Palestine, the Security Council successfully re-established an Arab-Jewish truce which offered no permanent settlement of the Palestine problem but did offer the possibility that a prolonged stalemate might ensue.

Despite the immediate success of the air lift in enabling the western powers to hold fast in Berlin, the general economic situation in the city's western sectors was deteriorating (see page 3). The Berlin situation continued to receive minimum attention from propagandists within the USSR, possibly indicating Soviet indecision concerning the next move (see page 7).

In France, Radical Socialist Leader Andre Marie was attempting to form a "transition cabinet" which would hold power until the October elections for the upper house and departmental assemblies (see page 3). De Gaulle has indicated that he would be ready to take power after elections had been held. Elsewhere in western Europe, it appears that the Italian Government will soon be forced by Soviet pressure to come to some decision concerning Soviet shipbuilding contracts for Italian shipyards (see page 4).

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In eastern Europe, a slackening of Bulgarian support for the Greek guerrillas may be indicated by the de-emphasis given the fighting in Greece by the Bulgarian press (see page 9). In the Grammos Mountains, the Greek Army has resumed the offensive. However, Operation Crown is already behind schedule, and continued prolongation of the campaign will bring serious logistical and morale problems (see page 10).

In Palestine, UN Mediator Bernadotte was confronted with the task of enforcing the truce with the firmness necessary to maintain the status quo and to save face for Arab leaders with their people who wish to continue the fight (see page 11). Meanwhile, Communist-controlled Czechoslovak air operations are being extended throughout the Middle East in close cooperation with Jewish interests in Palestine (see page 12).

The long-continuing economic crisis in China has reached such a stage that the people are repudiating the national currency and have turned to barter as a means of exchange. Meanwhile, the Soviet ambassador in China has again urged National Government officials that the civil war be ended (see page 14).

In Latin America, the recent reorganization of the Chilean Cabinet has revealed the political disunity of the government and has emphasized the inherent instability of the Gonzalez administration (see page 15). The political impasse in Panama has not yet been resolved, but some means may be found by the groups opposing president-elect Arnulfo Arias to void his election before he takes office on 30 September (see page 15).

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WESTERN EUROPE

GERMANY

Although the air lift to Berlin is meeting minimum food requirements for the western sectors, the general economic situation in these sectors continues to deteriorate for lack of power and inability both to obtain raw materials and to deliver finished goods. In the western zones of Germany, increased production and general economic improvement have been slow to follow the introduction of new currency. In June, nearly all business came to a standstill in anticipation of the currency reform, and at present the Germans are preoccupied with the impasse in Berlin. In addition to this preoccupation with Berlin and currency reform, bad weather has depressed the economic outlook by threatening crop prospects throughout the western zones.

FRANCE

The fall of the Schuman Government on 20 July, although unexpected and undesired by a majority of the French people and their parliamentary representatives, occurred when the Socialist deputies, preoccupied with partisan politics in anticipation of the fall elections, set in motion the disruptive forces which were inherent in the coalition. The issue on which the coalition split, a difference of some \$ 10 million in a military budget of \$ 1 billion, was neither so great as the issues successfully met by Schuman in the past nor so important as others likely to arise in the future. Schuman, who was aware of the desire of the majority to avoid a crisis, threatened to resign if the Government's budget were not passed. When a Socialist amendment to reduce the Government's figure was passed by a

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combined vote including Communists and Socialists, Schuman fulfilled his promise.

General De Gaulle almost immediately indicated that he was ready to assume power but only after elections which would, in effect, give him a mandate from the people. Because Schuman was not voted out of office, however, there is no constitutional justification for national elections now. Actually, De Gaulle probably does not wish to take power at this time. Rather than associate his party with a coalition which must now decide upon politically unpopular issues, he would prefer to wait until a Gaullist Government can be formed.

After two days of continuous conference with party leaders, President Auriol selected Andre Marie, Radical Socialist Minister of Justice, to form a government pending the October elections for the upper house and departmental assemblies. If this "transition cabinet" is formed, it will probably not be much more than a caretaker government. However, because the Gaullist deputies may hold the balance of power, the new Government could pave the way for a return of De Gaulle. If the fall elections result in a victory for De Gaulle's Rally of the French People, which is more likely now than heretofore, dissolution of the present Assembly and new national elections would probably follow early in 1949.

ITALY

The question of Soviet shipbuilding contracts will have to be decided soon by Premier De Gasperi as a consequence of continued Soviet pressure against the Italian Government. Despite reports that the Italian Foreign Ministry planned to request cabinet approval for about 15% of the contracts offered

SECRET**ITALY**

by the USSR, nothing appears to have been done to date. The Soviet Ambassador in Rome has again threatened to "expose" the Italian Government's resistance to Soviet shipbuilding orders which would substantially increase employment. If no government action is taken, the Italian Communists can be expected to make effective use of this inaction for propaganda attacks against the De Gasperi Government.

The Italian government's stability and its continued, effective cooperation with western powers may hinge upon the assurance given Italians concerning participation in the administration of the prewar Italian colonies. Some measure of popular feeling on the colonial issue is indicated by the willingness of the De Gasperi Government to agree to a joint Arab-Italian administration of Libya instead of a straight Italian trusteeship for the colony as previously suggested to the US and the UK. This willingness to temporize may have resulted in part from the realization that Libyans would resist outright control by Italy. Moreover, for this reason Italians might even agree to a condominium including one or two of the western powers. The Italians are apparently prepared to accept any military provisions necessary to protect US-British strategic interests in the colonies, but Italian officials have expressed the hope that these military requirements can be clarified before the administration of the colonies is established. A trusteeship limited to the US and UK, however, would lend substance to anti-US-UK views held by both the extreme Right and the extreme Left in Italy. Simultaneous attacks upon the De Gasperi Government might undermine its position at a time when Italy's collaboration with western powers on economic and military matters is imperative.

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UNITED KINGDOM

The British position concerning Antarctica has undergone considerable modification. The Foreign Office is presently recommending that all British-claimed land in Antarctica below 60° -- except most of the South Shetland island group -- be placed under the joint control of the eight powers who are claimants in the area. Argentina's claims to the Falkland Islands would be unaffected, and Argentina would probably remain unsatisfied by this move. British political relations with Chile, however, might be much improved, and a potential source of friction with the US would be eliminated. Such a settlement would not impair British commercial interests. Moreover, if the South Shetland Islands were retained, the warm water port and potential air base of strategic Deception Island could be utilized to protect the sea route around Cape Horn.

SCANDINAVIA

Through the alignment of Denmark and Norway with western European union, the UK hopes to prevent the formation of a Scandinavian defense agreement dominated by Swedish policies of neutrality. The British Foreign Office considers the development of a strongly US-supported western union a prerequisite to Scandinavian adherence. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Lange of Norway has proposed to Denmark and Sweden that a series of meetings be held which will omit discussion of neutrality but will explore prospects for Scandinavian defense collaboration. If the meetings fail, Lange intends to recommend to the Norwegian Government that a declaration be made of Norway's affiliation with the western powers.

SECRET**E A S T E R N E U R O P E****SOVIET UNION**

The continuing lack of domestic Soviet propaganda on Berlin may be explained by the Kremlin's desire to keep its Berlin tactics unencumbered by domestic propaganda commitments, to avoid causing a war scare in the Soviet Union which would lower morale and increase hoarding, and to eliminate the possibility of showing up a Soviet weakness in case the USSR does not succeed in evicting the western powers. During the past week, Soviet propagandists have devoted much time and space to Togliatti's attempted assassination. Stalin's telegram accusing Italian Communists of negligence was given widespread publicity and probably resulted in the announcement by Italian Communists that a purge of party ranks was imminent. Also, during the past week IZVESTIA made its first mention of internal developments in Yugoslavia since the Cominform-Tito clash in an account praising the achievements of Yugoslav railway builders. This demonstration of impartiality indicates a desire by the Kremlin to keep the Tito rebellion on a Communist Party level and to leave the way open for an eventual accommodation between the two governments.

The USSR and Satellites are satisfactorily fulfilling, in general, their commitments in trade agreements with the western powers. Although there have been some complaints about the quality of eastern European products, the willingness of western countries to negotiate new trade agreements and to extend old ones indicates general satisfaction with Soviet and Satellite deliveries. In many instances, deliveries have actually preceded receipt of shipments from the west. Such promptness springs in part from Soviet-Satellite eagerness to obtain vitally-needed equipment from the west.

SECRET**SOVIET UNION**

The USSR will be able to export grain to western Europe this year despite a decrease in amount of grain available for export and stockpiling, largely because of the increased harvests expected in Satellite countries. By diverting to export channels and stockpiles grain shipments which would have gone to Satellite areas, the USSR should be able to continue its favorable grain export position into 1949.

Politburo doubt concerning the likelihood of an imminent US depression may be indicated by continued failure to take drastic action against E. S. Varga, leading Soviet economist. In the latter part of 1947, Varga publicly contradicted the basic Marxist doctrine that a collapse of capitalistic economies is inevitable. Varga contended that, through a continuance of moderate state planning set up during wartime, Capitalism might be able to delay its collapse, if not avert it entirely. Varga has stubbornly refused to recant despite severe attacks from Soviet economic journals.

TRIESTE

An eventual solution to Trieste may be facilitated as a result of the Tito-Kremlin rift and the ensuing split within the Communist Party of Trieste. Because the pro-Tito faction of the Party is in the minority, even in the Yugoslav Zone, the Kremlin is no longer embarrassed by the necessity of catering to Yugoslav nationalist aspirations and can rely upon the pro-Cominform group to accept whatever decision the USSR makes concerning Trieste. Moreover, the continued failure of the Kremlin to reach agreement with Tito: (1) will weaken Soviet determination to support Yugoslav demands on the area; and (2) may increase Soviet desire for an agreement which would effect the withdrawal of US-UK troops from Trieste,

SECRET**TRIESTE**


thus reducing the risk of an incident if more direct Soviet interference in Yugoslavia should become necessary. Meanwhile, the split in the Communist Party of Trieste has eliminated Tito's major instrument for economic and political penetration of the Free Territory. In addition, Tito will be reluctant to risk further opposition from the USSR by pressing the Trieste issue at this time.

BULGARIA

Slackening Bulgarian support for the Greek guerrillas is indicated by Bulgarian press treatment of the fighting in Greece. Instead of front page reports of Markos successes, the press has been carrying small back page paragraphs asserting that Markos is repulsing all attacks. This press treatment lends credence to unconfirmed reports that Bulgaria ceased shipping arms to Markos shortly after the Cominform attack on Tito. If this development can be interpreted as an indication that the USSR has temporarily "written off" the Greek venture, such a Soviet decision would have been prompted by: (1) a desire to conserve Bulgarian and Albanian military strength in case of trouble with Yugoslavia; (2) inability at this time to reconcile conflicting nationalist interests between Greek, Bulgarian, Yugoslav, and Albanian Communists concerning the disposition of Greek Macedonia and Thrace; and (3) the difficulty of achieving guerrilla success without direct intervention which would increase the risk of open conflict with the US. If, however, the guerrillas are able to prevent a decisive Greek Army victory in the Grammos area, the Kremlin may order its Satellites to increase their support of the Markos regime.

GREEK ARMY GRAMMOS OFFENSIVE - 16 JULY 1948

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
SECRET**GREECE**

The Greek Army, after a brief lull, has resumed the Grammos Mountains offensive against the guerrillas with sharp attacks by artillery and air forces. At the conclusion of the fourth week of action, the guerrillas had suffered heavy casualties, but they had stubbornly refused to give ground and had been reinforced with about 1,000 troops from without the battle area. Another 2,000 troops immediately threaten the rear of the army cordon. Army casualties have not been quite so heavy as those of the guerrillas. Operation Crown is behind schedule; continued prolongation of the campaign will result in serious logistical, reserve, and morale difficulties and also will raise grave political problems in Athens. Although the army may still be able to clear the Grammos area by the end of August, the guerrillas have won an important tactical advantage. The unprecedented success of the guerrilla static defense has forced the army to make drastic revisions in its original plan of action and also has fortified guerrilla determination.

The Grammos drive has been highly publicized as the operation designed to break the back of guerrilla resistance. At the conclusion of the campaign, if it is not apparent to the refugee peasants and the weary Greek soldier that guerrilla activity has been effectively decreased, Greek morale will plunge to a new low.

(At beginning of second U. N. Truce)

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SECRET**NEAR EAST - AFRICA****PALESTINE**

The Palestine truce, which was re-established by the Security Council following a week of violent Arab-Jewish hostilities, is not likely to result in a permanent settlement between Jews and Arabs. The opposing armies will hold to their present positions, extremist groups on both sides will become involved in at least minor violations, and neither Israel nor the Arab states are likely to modify their claims sufficiently to bring about a general agreement. If UN Mediator Bernadotte can effectively enforce the truce, if Israel can effectively restrain the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang, and if the Arab governments can control the extreme nationalism of their peoples, the stalemate will continue and the whole issue will probably come up again in the General Assembly in September.

The Jews agreed to renew the truce because its terms favor Israel militarily and politically. The Arabs, on the other hand, accepted the extension only because of military weakness and fear of UN sanctions. Arab support of the truce will depend largely on the reaction of the Arab people, who were confident of victory and were assured by their leaders that the truce would not be extended. Their bitterness may well erupt into violence against their governments or the western powers, or both. If their wrath is turned against their leaders, some of the Arab governments in an attempt to survive will probably resume the Palestine war. Arab leaders, however, will first make every effort to turn the anger of their people against the UN, the US, and the UK.

The Israeli forces made substantial gains during the nine days of fighting between the expiration of the UN truce on 9 July and its renewal on 18 July. The Arab threat to Tel Aviv

SECRET**PALESTINE**

was eliminated by the capture of Ramle, Lydda, and Ras al Ein. A Jewish thrust southeast of Isdud effectively prevented the Egyptian forces from joining the Arab Legion at Latrun. The Jews are supplying Jerusalem through the widened strip of territory between that city and Tel Aviv by skirting Latrun and Bab el Wad, the only remaining Arab blocks along the main road, and a Jewish offensive within Jerusalem succeeded in breaching the walls of the Arab-held Old City. In the north, Jewish forces took the strategic Arab-Christian town of Nazareth. The only Arab advance of any consequence was made by the Iraqi Army north of Jenin. The Transjordan Arab Legion engaged in no offensive action during the period of fighting.

Commercial air operations outside Soviet-controlled territory have been established and are being expanded by Communist interests, despite US efforts to block such operations. Czechoslovak Airlines (CSA) has developed a profitable business transporting passengers and cargo from Rome through Athens to Haifa and has consolidated its position as a friendly carrier for Jewish interests in Palestine. Active negotiations, moreover, are now under way between CSA and the Zionist-controlled Pan African Air Charters (PAAC) for joint operation of a route from Europe through Haifa to South Africa. If a joint CSA-PAAC airline should be designated as the official flag carrier of the State of Israel, CSA efforts to obtain modern long-range aircraft (hitherto frustrated by the US and western European powers) and to extend its air routes would be furthered. Furthermore, through affiliation with powerful Jewish interests, CSA might participate in the greatly-expanded worldwide operations envisaged for the State of Israel by Jewish commercial enterprise.

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INDIA

The danger continues that the sporadic fighting in Kashmir may develop into full-scale war unless the UN Commission acts quickly to effect a cease-fire. Indian officials, in commenting to the Commission on the undeclared war existing between India and Pakistan, claim that a plebiscite cannot be held in the state until Pakistani forces are withdrawn and threaten that India will "end with force that which began with force." The Government of Pakistan, which asserts that its troops (some 10,000 men) are in Kashmir for defense purposes only, has shown no disposition to retreat from its position. Although neither dominion wants war, both are committed to strong stands on the Kashmir issue. The Commission is accordingly faced with the ultimate problem of finding a compromise that both dominions can accept without loss of prestige.

A forced solution of the Hyderabad problem is threatened by Indian officials. The Government of India has again asserted that aircraft from Pakistan are illegally transporting arms and ammunition to Hyderabad, although neutral observers are of the opinion that the materiel does not come from Pakistan, where an arms shortage exists. Continuation of the Indian economic blockade of Hyderabad and predatory raids into Indian territory by Hyderabad extremists presage increased violence.

SECRET**F A R E A S T****CHINA**

China's present inflationary crisis may represent a final stage in the disintegration of the National Government. In a succession of financial crises, the Government has been incapable of coping with the recurrent emergencies until, at last, the printing press method of financing the civil war is producing its logical and inevitable result: the repudiation of the national currency. In many sections of China, barter, the open use of silver dollars, and a general reluctance to accept the Chinese National Dollar are becoming increasingly apparent. It is extremely unlikely that US aid can effectively check this trend. Repudiation of the currency is expected to produce chaos and civil disturbances in the urban areas. In addition, it is problematical whether any kind of military force can be maintained if the government's money is not acceptable. (For a detailed discussion of the Chinese crisis, see ORE 45-48, "The Current Situation in China," which is being disseminated on 23 July.)

Soviet peace overtures to Chinese Nationalists may be designed to promote the disunity of the government at Nanking. If circumstances become favorable, the USSR may offer its good offices to end the war, in which case a coalition government might emerge which would facilitate rather than deter Communist penetration and considerable propaganda value would accrue to the USSR as mediators of the peace. The USSR may believe, moreover, that a continuation of hostilities would insure increased US aid to Nationalist China with a concomitant increase in US influence.



WESTERN HEMISPHERE

CHILE

Reorganization of the Chilean Cabinet has emphasized President Gonzalez' inability to form a workable political coalition. The inherent instability of the Gonzalez regime stems from the fact that the cabinet is administrative and not based on political agreement among its members. The cabinet, for example, is right-of-center politically in an administration which claims to be leftist and pro-labor. The division of the labor front at present also appears to preclude strong support of the government. Opposition to the administration is growing among parties formerly content with a technical cabinet and government policy. Thus, the reorganization of the ministries, together with the extension of the president's special powers for an additional 120 days, has only deferred the problem of finding a solid basis of support for an administration which must consolidate a substantial labor bloc in order to meet the growing threat of the non-Communist opposition.

PANAMA

The Panamanian political impasse continues. The Supreme Court of Panama recently declared unconstitutional a resolution of the National Assembly which called for the resignation of President Jimenez. Jimenez may therefore complete his term in office which ends on 30 September. If the groups who oppose President-elect Arnulfo Arias remain united, they can without violence deny him the presidency in one of two ways: (1) void the election results before the expiration of Jimenez' term of office (which would allow the cabinet to choose a provisional president from among its membership); or (2) declare a plurality for Domingo Diaz, who received 37% of the votes as opposed to Arias' 38%.



SECRET**PANAMA**

The support of pro-US Police Chief Remon, which the anti-Arias factions now have, will probably produce a settlement of the presidential issue favorable to US security interests.

PARAGUAY

Military dictatorship in Paraguay would follow the inauguration of President-elect Gonzalez on 15 August. A paradoxical alternative is open to the Paraguayan people in the illegal retention in office of Provisional President Frutos, whose democratic government was engineered by an extra-constitutional coup. Frutos could be expected to sponsor a more democratic and independent government than Gonzalez, but it is unlikely that any new administration would deviate radically from Paraguay's pro-US policy, which both factions consider a bulwark against Argentine penetration.

ARGENTINA

Negotiation of a general ECA purchase agreement, as recommended by US Ambassador Bruce, would to a considerable extent relieve the present tension of the Peron regime by providing Argentina with the prospect of substantial dollar receipts. Although Argentina is confronted with the necessity of making fundamental changes in domestic and foreign economic policy to adjust to present and prospective economic conditions, the immediate crisis is essentially a financial one and substantial dollar receipts would provide a welcome breathing spell. Because Peron has made real concessions on the terms on which ECA purchases would be made, his administration may be expected to react more favorably to a general purchasing agreement than to a procedure whereby the US would exercise a power of veto in sales negotiations between Argentina and the sixteen members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

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SECRET**A P P E N D I X****SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR BLOCKADING VIENNA**

A Soviet blockade of Vienna would pose far more serious and immediate problems than does the present blockade of Berlin. The transport of supplies through the Soviet zone for the use of the 1½ million Viennese living in the sectors occupied by the western powers is governed by no written agreement between the western powers and the USSR. If the USSR should cut off the land routes for supplies, both western power troops and the Viennese in the western sectors would be faced with an immediate and critical food shortage. At present, food requirements of the Viennese in the western sectors, the western troops, and their dependents are met almost entirely from imports.

Supply of Vienna by air could be effected only on an extremely limited scale by air drop. Both the US airfield and the joint British-French airfield lie within the Soviet zone, some distance from the western sectors of occupation in Vienna. Furthermore, the western sectors are almost wholly dependent upon the Soviet sector for essential public utilities. All of the hydroelectric power lines, most of the gas, and all of the water supply for the western sectors could be cut off at a moment's notice. Sewage disposal plants are also located in the Soviet sector.

The US has, in concert with other western powers, committed itself to the establishment of a free and independent Austrian Republic within the 1937 boundaries. The US, as well as the western powers and the USSR, has extended recognition to the present Austrian government. Moreover, Austrian national and foreign policies are based upon the assumption that the US, together with France and the UK, will back the Austrian Government. US prestige, therefore, would be seriously impaired by the failure of the western powers to maintain their position in Vienna.

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